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Speeches and Presentations
Speaking Points for Jim Judd Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service Inaugural Meeting of the
Cross-cultural Roundtable on Security
Check against Delivery
March 08, 2005 - Overview of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Introduction
- Good morning. I'm pleased to be here to provide you with an overview of the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service.
- As new CSIS Director, I'm aware that this roundtable is an opportunity to achieve two important goals:
- First …. to bring information that's instructive and useful to you as roundtable members;
- Second …. for me to come away better informed about any issues of concern you may have.
- I believe strongly that the Service needs to engage in this dialogue, in order to build greater
communication and understanding between ourselves and Canadians. I see today's meeting as an important step in
this collaborative process.
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Outline of Presentation
My presentation on CSIS falls into three key areas:
1) Who we are, what we do and what we don't do;
2) an explanation of how our work is performed and how it is reviewed by others; and finally
3) a brief summary of our recruiting, training and liaison programs.
Where we've come from
The beginning
- CSIS traces its origin to the 1981 McDonald Commission, which recommended the creation of a civilian
security intelligence service for Canada.
- The idea of a civilian agency was to ensure Canadians' rights are protected by separating security
intelligence from law enforcement and making it directly accountable to the Government of
Canada.
- In doing that, the CSIS Act laid out a comprehensive regime for the security intelligence function in
Canada. It created a civilian agency, gave it a defined mandate and powers, set down a rigorous system of
political and judicial controls, and created independent arms'-length review.
- 1984 — Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and creation of the Service.
- The goal of CSIS legislation was to maintain the "delicate balance" between national security
requirements and respect for individual rights and freedoms. To paraphrase Justice McDonald, the goal of one
is to protect the other.
The CSIS ACT
- Canada was one of the first countries in the world to establish a legal framework for its security
service (i.e. setting its mandate and limits to its powers)
- What CSIS does: collect information on threats to Canadian security, analyze and report to government.
- What CSIS does not do: collect intelligence on non-threats such as lawful advocacy, protest and dissent. For
example, peaceful participation in a demonstration simply would not meet the threshold for the Service to
investigate. We would not, and indeed, could not investigate something of this nature. Only those persons who
advocate, support and commit violence to achieve their objectives would fall within our purview.
- Most important: CSIS does not have police powers — it cannot arrest or detain any person. We meet
with and talk to people across Canada, ordinary citizens who are not of concern, but whom we believe have the
ability and the knowledge to help us understand the threat to our national security. We rely on the voluntary
cooperation of Canadians in our efforts to ensure our collective security.
Implications of the CSIS Act for our work
- When I first arrived at CSIS a short two months ago, one of my first impressions was that, to a person, CSIS
employees are very knowledgeable about the legislation that frames what they do. The powers and limitations of
the Act, part of that balance I spoke of earlier, are ingrained in the employees from the moment they
start working for the Service.
- I am impressed by this, and comforted at the same time. It means that CSIS employees understand and live by
the important values and concepts articulated in the Act.
- The CSIS Act recognizes that in order to investigate suspected threats to the security of Canada, we
sometimes need to collect and analyze information in a way that may infringe on the civil liberties of
some people.
- Indeed, the Act gives us extensive investigative powers — from data collection to electronic
surveillance and surreptitious entry, supported by a Federal Court warrant.
- However, the Act says we may investigate only to the extent that it is strictly necessary to
obtain information on activities that may constitute a threat to the security of Canada. That means that our
investigations must be proportional to the threat, and the information we keep must be pertinent
to the threat.
- Perhaps a testament to the Act's unique and sound framework is the fact that it has served as a model
for several intelligence services around the world. Still today, countries are sending representatives to CSIS
to study our targeting, control and review mechanisms, which are all embedded in the Act.
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What we investigate - the threats
- Counter-terrorism is, obviously, the Service's priority. A great deal of our efforts go toward ensuring that
Canada does not suffer a terrorist attack, nor is used to support or stage one elsewhere.
- Our mandate also includes the investigation of cases where foreign governments or organizations try to
interfere with, manipulate or gain control of communities of different ethnic or cultural backgrounds. These
activities are not only a concern for these communities, but are also a violation of Canada's sovereignty.
- Other priorities include investigating threats to Canada's economic security and critical infrastructure,
and safeguarding the confidential information of the Government of Canada from espionage by foreign
governments.
- The Service also provides advice to government departments in screening issues, for refugees, immigrants and
citizens, government workers and others. It also participates in the process to list terrorist entities, and
investigates terrorist financing and threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms.
- To do all this, the Service must share information, with domestic partners like the RCMP and the Canada
Border Services Agency, and with foreign allies. Terrorism today is a global phenomenon and the response to
this threat must be also be international in kind as Canada cannot counter terrorism in isolation. There are
strict rules around this sharing of information, though, and I can assure you that in every instance, we must
and do consider very carefully what information we share, and with whom we share it.
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Internal and External Accountability regimes
- Security intelligence work requires a rigid and thorough system of accountability, because of the
intrusive powers that CSIS can use.
- The framers of the CSIS Act were aware of this and took steps to ensure CSIS would be held to the
highest possible standards of control and review.
- If you look at the CSIS Act, you will note that fully two-thirds of the legislation is devoted to outlining
how our work is to be controlled, reviewed and monitored — both internally and externally.
- In fact, there is probably no intelligence organization in the world that functions within a law that is so strict
and comprehensive and clear, especially with regard to its internal and external accountability
regimes.
Internal control and accountability
- Internal accountability for us begins with direct control by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness, who is accountable to Parliament for the activities of CSIS.
- In terms of targeting, that is, determining whether or not an individual's activities warrant investigation,
there is a rigorous process within the Service. Indeed, there are six chapters of policy within the Service
dedicated to targeting issues.
- For example, an intelligence officer cannot unilaterally start an investigation. The officer must first make
a case in writing to seek approval for the investigation.
- There are three levels of targeting — the more intrusive the level of investigation proposed, the higher
the level of approval required. Additionally, a request for any level of targeting must explain why the level
is required, and show that other less intrusive measures to obtain the information we need have been
exhausted.
- For the highest level of targeting, the case is made before a committee which I chair, and which includes
senior operational managers in the Service, and a representative of the Deputy Minister of PSEP, and the
Department of Justice.
- Once such a case is made, the most intrusive measures require the personal approval of the PSEP Minister.
Finally, we must convince a Federal Court judge that the measures are needed.
- We work under what are known as Ministerial Directions. These directions stipulate the six principles
that underlie all CSIS operations. They are:
- the rule of law must be observed;
- the investigative means must be proportional to the gravity and imminence of the threat;
- the need to use intrusive investigative techniques must be weighed against possible damage to
civil liberties or to fundamental societal institutions;
- the more intrusive the investigative technique, the higher the authority required to approve its
use;
- the least intrusive investigative methods must be used first, except in emergency situations; and
- lawful advocacy, protest or dissent cannot be investigated unless such activities are carried out
in conjunction with specific threats to national security, as defined in the CSIS Act.
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Racial Profiling
- I also want to address the misperception that the Service uses racial profiling in its investigations. I can
categorically say that this is not the case. The Service investigates the activities of persons or
groups to the extent that they are suspected of posing a threat to our national security.
- For example, we have no interest in a Muslim person just because he or she is a Muslim. If a person,
however, has a pattern of travel to places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, associates with individuals known to
the Service for their threat-related activities, then yes that person's activities may warrant investigation,
if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that those activities may present a threat.
- The same could be said for Irish Canadians with links to the IRA, Indo-Canadians to the Babbar Khalsa, Arab
Canadians to Hamas and Anglo-Saxons with links to the white supremacist movement.
- The Service investigates on the basis of activities, and not ethnic or religious background.
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External Review and Accountability
- All of what I have just told you with respect to how we conduct our investigations, and whether or not we
engage in such activities as racial profiling, which are contrary to our legislation and policies, is reviewed
on an ongoing, regular basis by two agencies external to CSIS:
- the Inspector General, who reports directly to the Minister on an annual basis, as to
whether our activities are in compliance with the law, policy and Ministerial Directions.
- the Security Intelligence Review Committee or SIRC, which is independent of both CSIS and the
Government, and reports to Parliament annually, again, as to our compliance with law, policy and Direction.
- Their role, as they describe it, is to ensure that "CSIS does things right …. and does the right
things."
- In short, their job is to hold us to account. Over the past 20 years, both review bodies have done just
that, shining light on just about every corner of our activities, offering comments, criticism and
recommendations on how we can do things better.
- The relationship with our review bodies has not always been an easy one. At times we disagree strongly on
certain issues.
- But, I can assure you that CSIS is a better organization because of this rigorous accountability regime. It
has made us more disciplined, more competent and more professional. It has helped us
ensure that our investigations are carried out in a way that protects both the security and the rights of
Canadians.
- The extent of our progress is revealed in a recent SIRC report, which states:
"CSIS is now a virtually new organization, hardly recognizable as the direct descendant of the
former Security Service .... The number and type of CSIS targets ... the rigorous justification required
before anyone or any group is designated as a target ... the rigour, logic and balance of warrant affidavits
submitted to the federal court ... and the tone and content of reports by intelligence officers on targets'
files have all changed significantly for the better."
- Words of praise from our toughest critic don't come easy. They reflect a positive evolution in our approach
to security intelligence work.
- I would encourage you to invite SIRC and the IG to speak to you in a future meeting about how they undertake
their work. I am confident that the information they can provide will be helpful to you in your discussions.
- In addition, CSIS is also subject to review, as any other government department, by:
The Auditor General
The Information Commissioner
The Privacy Commissioner
The Official Languages Commissioner.
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Recruting, Training and Liaison
- When it comes to recruitment, the Service is fortunate enough to attract many of the brightest and best
young Canadians ….people who have the knowledge, aptitude and skills, and the passion for modern
intelligence work, and who also want to do the right thing when it comes to Canada's national security. This
includes intelligence officers, of course, but also analysts, computer scientists, technicians, linguists, and
others.
- Over the past two decades we've assembled a workforce that is much more representative of the Canadian
population. Today, 36 per cent of our intelligence officers are women, compared with just seven per cent in
1984.
- We've also made gains in minority representation. For example, in 1997, visible minorities accounted for 3.5
percent of our workforce. Today, they make up 9.2 percent, which compares favourably to a public service
average of 8.0 percent. That said, our goal is 10.2 percent, so we have a ways to go. The Service continues to
recruit its personnel from as diverse a population as possible.
- Once in the Service, all employees undergo cultural sensitivity training. In addition, our intelligence
officers are given extensive training in the requirements of the CSIS Act and our mandate to protect
collective security in a way that respects individual rights and freedoms.
- For example, intelligence officers also receive training courses specifically aimed at allowing them to
better understand and relate to the various communities with which they will deal. This training covers a
variety of issues relating to particular communities, and can include history, geo-politics, culture,
religion, traditions etc.
In providing this training, the Service takes full advantage of its own in-house diverse population by
regularly inviting members who represent minority groups to educate their colleagues.
- It's safe to say, though, that cultural sensitivity training within CSIS is an ongoing requirement of the
job. In order to be effective in meeting their responsibilities, CSIS officers must continually adapt and
educate themselves in relation to whatever new threat area they may be assigned. This requires them to be
conversant about such matters as culture, history, geopolitics and, naturally, the motivation(s) behind any of
the individuals/groups who represent the concern. Much of this education comes from regular ongoing contact
with members of various communities.
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Outreach
- CSIS does not have a formal outreach program. We have found that in some communities, our efforts to conduct
outreach are misunderstood, and have in fact had the opposite effect of fostering communication. I sincerely
hope that this forum can provide valuable insight for us to remedy this situation.
- That said, over the years efforts have been made — the Service recently invited, for example, leading
members of the Canadian Islamic Congress, among other groups, to talk to its employees and members of our
Executive take part in the CIC's annual Dinner on Parliament Hill.
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Conclusion
- Yesterday, I appeared before the Special Senate Committee examining the Anti-Terrorism Act.
- I told them that CSIS is implicated in most debates about security and civil liberties and that we are
usually portrayed as the ones that come to take away civil liberties.
- I'm not here to be apologetic about what we do, nor how we do it. Our job is to protect the security of all
Canadians by exercising any and all rights that Parliament grants us. Nothing more, but certainly nothing
less.
- But I do want to drive a stake through the heart of that old cliché of CSIS as the bogeyman. So what I hope
to leave you with today, and in any future interaction, is an alternate vision of CSIS, one in which we are
seen as protecting the civil liberties of Canadians, not trampling on them.
- In protecting Canadians, however, I believe we must do our best to reflect values of accountability,
integrity, respect, equality of treatment, and yes …. where possible …. a degree of transparency.
- There is certainly room to improve on the way CSIS communicates with its fellow Canadians.
- Just last month, here in Ottawa at a CBC forum on national security, well-known U of T professor Wesley Wark
noted public misperceptions about what CSIS does — and in particular the idea that we are involved in racial
profiling.
- The point professor Wark made was that this type of misperception represents a "failure of societal
dialogue". He went on to say that public dialogue on security intelligence issues is the best way to …
. in his words …. "dismantle" such erroneous notions and create bridges to greater mutual respect
and understanding.
- This roundtable, and my presence here today, are a step in the right direction and I look forward to a
continuing dialogue with you.
Thank you.
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