Speeches and Presentations

Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence by Ward Elcock, Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Ottawa, June 24, 1998

CSIS - Counter-Terrorism

I. Introduction

Mr. Chairman, at the outset, if I may, I would like to congratulate you on your initiative to seek the establishment of this Special Committee.

Your earlier work on some of the issues we are here to discuss today resulted in what I believe were two extremely valuable reports—helpful to CSIS, helpful, I believe, to government and to Parliament as a whole, and helpful from the point of view of enlightening the public on an issue of great complexity—and even greater significance—for the public safety of Canadians and the national security of this country.

In hindsight, the trends you and your colleagues identified a decade ago—and the associated issues and problems you believed required close attention—were indeed both prescient and proper. Those efforts were clearly in the public interest and I am confident that the contribution of this Committee will be very much in that same tradition.

Mr. Chairman, your hearings are timely.

The world has changed dramatically in the 10 years since you last considered these issues—and the terrorist threat has evolved accordingly.

The terrorist threat to Canada—and to Canadians—has not diminished. And the challenge of responding to that threat is certainly no easier.

Indeed, in many ways, it has become more difficult.

Persistence, vigilance and co-operation—domestically and internationally—have never been more important. The need to develop new means and mechanisms of response is ongoing—as is the requirement to refine and reinforce old ones.

Given this context, I couldn't put it better than you yourself did, Mr. Chairman, in your statement to the Senate on October 22^nd of last year, and I quote: "it is time we had another look—…another look to ensure we identify properly the security threats that face us and that we are able to respond effectively to protect Canadian citizens and Canadian interests." Unquote.

Canadians deserve to know what we believe the terrorist threat to be today—both globally and to Canada.

They deserve to know what we are doing to help meet that threat—how we are meeting our legislative requirement to help safeguard public safety.

They deserve to have confidence that within the resources, the mandate and the mission we have, we are doing the very best we can to protect Canadians against politically motivated violence.

It is in that spirit that I approach my remarks today.

Mr. Chairman, before getting into the detailed substance of my presentation, let me go on the record concerning some basics which I believe are important in establishing the context of the rest of what I have to say.

First, as you are aware—and as the Solicitor-General made clear earlier in his presentation—Canada's counter- terrorism effort is multi-faceted, involving many departments, agencies and levels of government, each with their own role. In the days ahead, representatives from those organizations will speak to their specific responsibilities. Today, I will confine my remarks to mine.

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Second, within that context, you will know that the primary responsibility of CSIS is to forewarn and to advise—to gather information, to analyze it, to pass it on to decision-makers in other organizations and law enforcement agencies in as timely, accurate and relevant fashion as we can. We are an information resource for government. We are not a police force. We do not enforce the law. We do not arrest. We do not prosecute. We support those who do.

I make this point for two reasons. One, to emphasize that we are but one part of a much larger whole. But two, to highlight that because this is the case, any evaluation or assessment of what we do must be based very much on the quality of the relations we have with others. As I will argue later, those relations—that mutual dependence and interdependence—are more crucial today than ever.

Third, my purpose today is to provide a broad overview of the terrorist threat environment and the role and activities of CSIS in helping to meet that threat. There will be questions of detail that I will not be addressing—relating to precise procedures, organizational arrangements and co-operative relationships.

I simply want to state that should you have questions that our deliberations today do not fully answer, I will be at your disposal to provide any further assistance you deem necessary.

My final point.

As I hope will be clear to you at the end of my presentation, my purpose is to be as forthcoming as possible. Secrecy for secrecy's sake is silly. I am prepared to go as far as I believe I safely can in providing specifics.

But just as there is unnecessary secrecy, so too there is necessary secrecy.

The point is, there are clear limits to what I can say. Unrestricted openness in describing what we do, how we do it, who we are investigating, what the outcome is of our work is not possible.

Therefore, I will be as open as I can be. But I will also be as careful as I must be. I know I can count on this Committee to understand those constraints.

With those preliminary matters on the record, let me now proceed to the core of my presentation. It has four parts:

First, the terrorist threat globally—its sources and characteristics and how, in particular, it has evolved since your last Report;

Second, the contemporary terrorist threat to Canada;

Third, how we at CSIS have responded—and continue to respond—to that constantly changing threat; and

Finally, looking ahead, some issues and trends for the future.

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II. The Global Threat Environment

I will begin with the global threat environment concerning terrorism.

Let me say at the outset that there is always the temptation in matters such as this to declare dramatic changes—a new order or a new disorder. The sky, it seems, is always falling.

Of course, much of what we often tend to refer to as ‘new’ is not new at all; it is simply the resurgence or resurfacing of old trends. And what is often labelled as ‘old’—no longer a factor—is still there, perhaps less pervasive, but very much present all the same. So it is with terrorism.

That being said, the past decade has witnessed significant developments which, taken together, have altered the character of modern terrorism. This may not represent a sea-change. It is however, significant change.

First, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar East-West system have had a very clear impact on the sources and the strengths of terrorism.

No one is nostalgic for the Cold War. But it did bring a certain discipline. Many regional conflicts were, in a sense, regulated. Client states and client groups were subject to constraints. The rules of the game were known. Even if it was a dangerous game, there was a clear choreography about it all.

Those constraints, that disciple have disappeared. Regional conflicts, some submerged for decades, if not centuries, have come to the surface. The players have proliferated. The ability to control and to predict has eroded. In a real sense, the lid is off—and old ethnic, cultural, religious and nationalist pressures have been released. And it is these that are the fertile fields of terrorism.

Second, in addition to the collapse of the Cold War order, a variety of other factors are feeding the forces of terrorism. These include overpopulation, huge inequalities in power and income, the scarcity of resources and the mass dislocation of peoples.

Third, religious fundamentalism and extremism have joined nationalism and ethnic unrest as the primary motivators of terrorist activities. This has an impact on the sources of terrorism. As importantly, as I will argue in a minute, it has had an impact on the nature of terrorism.

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Fourth, although not altogether absent, left-wing ideology is decreasingly a factor and right-wing extremism increasingly significant—feeding on a combination of fears including economic dislocation, patterns of migration and sometimes deep conspiracy-based suspicions of government itself.

Fifth, while state sponsorship of terrorism has declined, it has also become more hidden. The fear of retribution—greater in the absence of the Cold War—has made state-sponsored terror more difficult to track, and hence prevent.

Sixth, while many traditional nationalist and ethnic terrorist groups remain—associated with old conflicts, for example, in the Middle East, Turkey and the Punjab—there is a new strain of religious and messianic extremism.

What is disturbing here is that many of these extremist groups do not have a traditional political agenda. They do not worry about offending. They do not care about retaliation. They are uninterested in negotiation. They have no interest in making themselves known before they act. There are no trade-offs, few perceived costs to acting.

This may mean terrorist threats and acts which are far more destructive—and less likely to be foreshadowed through warning—or accompanied by negotiation—than we have seen hitherto.

One of my analysts, Dr. Ron Purver, has put it this way: "the goal of these entities could simply be to cause the maximum possible amount of death and destruction to a people or a system they consider particularly abhorrent."

A respected American expert elaborates: "Today, organizations exist that advocate the use of violence not in order to gain some political concessions or piece of territory but solely for the purpose of extortion, revenge, racial hatred or God's mandate. Some see mass murder as a calling from God".

Now, it is easy to overstate this threat—and easy as well to forget the continued presence and persistence of more traditionally motivated groups. But the Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo Subway, the bombing in Oklahoma City, and the explosion at the World Trade Centre in New York—all within the last five years—are far from reassuring.

Finally, there are a number of factors, under the broad umbrella of ‘modernity’, that are having a profound impact on terrorism.

Central among these is the revolution in communications technology. In many ways, technology makes our job easier. But it makes the job of the terrorist easier as well.

It provides a mechanism for enhancing awareness and political education. It provides the secure capacity to organize terrorist operations on a world-wide basis, rendering distance nearly meaningless. It provides an avenue to create a public sense of havoc and fear—locally and globally. And the information conveyed, for example through the Internet, can enlighten millions as to the technology and delivery of weapons ranging from primitive—but highly destructive—gasoline and fertilizer bombs through to chemical and biological warfare agents.

Coupled with communications technology and its reach are other factors: the ease of travel; the erosion of borders; and the proliferation of weapons—both simple and sophisticated—together with easier access to them.

Now, taken together, what do these trends mean?

They mean a larger number of sources for terrorism—as the number of regional and ethnic conflicts grows.

They mean, as a consequence, greater difficulty in identifying the groups and individuals who may pose a threat.

They mean constantly moving targets—an ever evolving morphology as alliances come and go and new groups emerge.

They mean a truly transnational threat—where terrorism is no longer confined to the region whose conflict is its source.

They mean new weapons in the arsenal of the terrorist—as close and as common as a computer keyboard.

The bottom line that flows from all this? The global terrorist threat today, compared to 10 years ago is: more complex, more extreme, more sophisticated, more diverse, more diffuse and more transnational.

If the world is now a global village, the terrorist threat exists in every neighbourhood.

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III. The Terrorism Threat to Canada

Mr. Chairman, let me now turn to the terrorist threat to Canada.

Canadians, understandably, tend not to see their country as vulnerable to, or part of, the terrorist phenomenon. We are, after all, distant from, and not a party to, regional and ethnic conflicts. And we are a peaceful society, one that places great value on the principle and reality of moderation and order.

Certainly, there are reasons why Canada, historically, has not been as vulnerable as others.

We are not a superpower, which, by its very nature, acquires enemies.

We do not have a history of colonial exploitation or empire.

We are seen as a moderate country.

Our political system does better than many to absorb and accommodate difference.

And while distance is less and less an inhibiting factor, it is still relevant.

But on the other side of the ledger, there are a variety of factors which explain why Canada is, indeed, vulnerable.

Our borders and our coastlines are long.

Our society, like all developed countries, is comparatively wealthy—a source of technology, of equipment and funds.

As with other democracies, our openness and respect for rights and freedoms limit the ability of the state to suppress terrorism in a ruthless, repressive fashion.

We, uniquely among developed countries, exist alongside the United States, one of the world's pre-eminent terrorist targets.

While distance from conflict and moderation in our policies may make us less likely than others to be a target, we also, for the very same reasons, can be seen as a haven that might be safer than others.

And, finally, the nature of our society and the related policies concerning refugees and immigrants make us particularly vulnerable to terrorist influence and activities.

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There is probably no country in the world that reflects the population of the planet more fully than does Canada. Links of family, emotion, culture, religion and ideology exist between millions of Canadians and societies abroad.

When conflict grips those countries, its echoes can be—and are—felt here.

One million legal immigrants will enter Canada over the next five years.

We remain, proudly, a primary recipient of refugees.

While the vast majority of those immigrants and refugees have no greater priority than to be productive participants in a peaceful and prosperous society, there are those very few who slip through, bent on using Canada as a safe haven from which to support terrorist activities.

And there are others already here—some naive—who become the focus of exploitation in support of those activities.

Mr. Chairman, you will understand my need to be circumspect here, but let me go on the record with the following:

With perhaps the singular exception of the United States, there are more international terrorist groups active here than any other country in the world.

The Counter-Terrorism Branch of CSIS is currently investigating over 50 organizational targets and about 350 individual terrorist targets.

Terrorist groups are present here whose origins lie in virtually every significant regional, ethnic and nationalist conflict there is: the Punjab; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Egyptian, Algerian and Sudanese unrest; Lebanon, Turkey; Northern Ireland; Sri Lanka; the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan.

By way of example, the following terrorist groups or front groups acting on their behalf have been and are active in Canada: Hizballah and other Shiite Islamic terrorist organizations; several Sunni Islamic extremist groups, including Hamas, with ties to Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Lebanon and Iran; the Provisional IRA; the Tamil Tigers; the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK); and all of the world's major Sikh terrorist groups.

The vast majority of terrorist activities in Canada relate to the support of actions elsewhere that are linked to homeland conflicts.

Let me enumerate those activities.

Logistical support for terrorist acts has been provided.

Fund-raising in aid of terrorism occurs.

The exploitation of ethnic communities persists through propaganda, advocacy and disinformation.

Immigrants are intimidated, coerced and manipulated.

Terrorists have been provided safe haven here.

Immigrants have been smuggled, and other crimes committed.

And transit to and from the United States and other countries has been provided.

As only a partial list, individuals and groups here have had direct or indirect association with: the World Trade Centre bombing, suicide bombings in Israel, assassinations in India, the murder of tourists in Egypt, the Al Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia and the bombing campaign of the Provisional IRA.

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Now, some, although I would hope not many, might say that since these and other actions and activities occur outside our borders, counter-terrorism need not be a priority of this country.

I put the following on the table in response.

First, Canadians, together with foreigners here on postings or visits, have been killed or injured by terrorists in the past. We cannot forget that the largest loss of life as a result of a single terrorist act was the Air India tragedy.

Second, given that history, while no deaths have occurred on Canadian territory as a result of terrorist actions in the past 10 years, that simply cannot be taken as a predictor for the future.

For example, as only one cautionary note, we know that the infrastructure has been established here to support a terrorist act in Canada.

While I believe the groups active in Canada are aware that we and our partners are competent, I am not so naive, and neither should Canadians be so naive, as to believe that these groups will not act here if they conclude it is in their interests and if they see an opportunity to do so.

Third, Canadians abroad are always at risk to being in the wrong place at the wrong time—as was the case in 1996 when one Canadian was killed and another injured during the bombing of the Paris subway.

Fourth, as a pre-eminent trading nation, one that depends as much as any on a stable international order, our national interest lies in curbing terrorism wherever it occurs.

Finally, if we weren't in the counter-terrorism business in Canada, I can assure you others would be here doing the job for us. Indeed, we already spend time dealing with agencies and groups from other parts of the world who want to do the task for us—possibly in ways we as Canadians, would find unacceptable.

As a straightforward matter of sovereignty, it is our obligation to act.

But this leads to what I believe is a much more fundamental issue.

The fight against terrorism is a moral obligation, a responsibility of global citizenship.

The wanton use of violence to achieve political ends is contrary to our core political and moral values.

I do not believe that Canadians want their country to be known as a place from which terrorist acts elsewhere are funded or fomented.

We cannot ever become known as some R and R facility for terrorists.

In other words, and I will be as blunt as I can be, we cannot become, through inaction or otherwise, what might be called an unofficial state sponsor of terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude this section of my presentation by briefly addressing the issue of the domestic terrorist threat in Canada.

Clearly, that threat has not been as severe as can be found in other developed countries. Yet we have not been immune from politically motivated violence of domestic origins.

In recent years, right wing extremism—in particular white supremacist movements—have been a concern, and while CSIS, in co-operation with other agencies, has been active—and quite successful—in addressing that concern, continued vigilance is a matter of necessity.

While the threat of violence by native activists is less serious than it has been, the potential for future violence remains a concern.

Some single-issue extremist groups and individuals exist—focussed, for example, on the environment and animal rights.

And CSIS, as required by law, has an ongoing role and responsibility to assess the threat of politically-motivated violence that might emerge from either extreme of the national unity issue related to Quebec.

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IV. The Role of CSIS

Mr. Chairman, this Committee will be aware, that a core element of the legislated mandate of CSIS is public safety. Public safety, simply stated, involves protecting Canadians against violence. Violence that can originate abroad. Violence that can be fostered here, through extremism or support for terrorism elsewhere. Warning of that violence, and its prevention, is called counter-terrorism.

To this end, Counter-Terrorism Program of CSIS is directed to meeting several related challenges:

To ensure that Canada is not a place where terrorist acts occur.

To prevent Canada from being a place where terrorist acts are planned.

To prevent the raising of funds or the acquisition of material support for terrorism acts anywhere.

To ensure Canada does not become a safe haven for terrorists; and

To protect Canadian institutions and Canadians travelling or working abroad.

Now, as you know, the meeting of these challenges is a responsibility shared in different ways by many government departments and agencies.

The unique role of CSIS lies in our early warning function. Our purpose is to determine, assess, report to and advise government and its agencies on terrorist threats to the security of Canada. Ours is a support function. And very much in contrast to a police role, our responsibilities are pre-emptive, not reactive.

It cannot be over-emphasized both how difficult and how critical this is to an effective counter-terrorism effort.

By definition, counter-terrorism fails once the terrorist act has occurred. The damage is done.

The paramount requirement, therefore, is to ‘be there’ before the deed is done—to identify and target the individual or group contemplating the crime.

Yet in the case of terrorism—as opposed to traditional Cold War counter-intelligence—this task is very much more difficult. The sources of terrorism are much more numerous. Groups come and go. Transnational links are many. Their targets are unknown. Increasingly, the technological infrastructure at their disposal—from computers to the Internet to digital phones—is much more accessible to them—and progressively more difficult to monitor. And the consequences of failure on our part are severe.

Every shot in this game is a game winner—or a game loser.

Mr. Chairman, let me describe how we are meeting those challenges today, noting in particular changes over the past 10 years.

First, at the level of resources, the transformation is very clear.

A decade ago, counter-intelligence was our number one priority, a fact reflected in the division of operational resources—80% to Counter-Intelligence; 20% to Counter-Terrorism.

Today, it is essentially the reverse—60% of resources devoted to Counter-Terrorism, 40% to Counter-Intelligence, supplemented by support through physical surveillance, communications intercepts, data processing and administration. Counter-Terrorism is very much our top priority.

Second, our focus on analysis, particularly of global developments and trends, is light years ahead of what occurred even 10 years ago. Since so much of the terrorist threat originates in conflicts abroad, it is essential that we be able to know, and understand, and extrapolate from, events occurring around the world. Your earlier reports emphasized the need for this anticipatory, analytical work. This we do to an unprecedented degree today.

Third, as I have stated, our primary role is warning. Therefore, we have developed a comprehensive program of threat assessments, refined since a decade ago, which prepares and disseminates time-sensitive evaluations of the scope and immediacy of threats.

These relate to any real and immediate threat to national security, or any situation where an assessment of the plausibility of such a threat is deemed prudent. These can be associated with visiting dignitaries and delegations, Canadian assets or individuals overseas or specific situations here at home where a possible threat to national security, including public safety, is identified.

These assessments are transmitted immediately to whatever department, agency or level of government is appropriate. Several hundred of these are done every year.

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Fourth, we have developed an extraordinary successful program of community interviews. This, as well, we were not doing 10 years ago. This voluntary and open program allows us to speak directly with members of a variety of ethnic communities to get their assessment of developments and activities they may be concerned about so that we can begin to anticipate the possibility of emerging threats to Canada, and to Canadians.

Fifth, we are becoming more and more active each year in providing briefings to law enforcement and other agencies across Canada, pro-actively seeking a broader audience.

For example, in 1995, 60 such briefings were supplied. By last year, 1997, the number had risen to 210.

Sixth, Mr. Chairman, in your earlier work, you correctly emphasized the need for effective and efficient inter-departmental and inter-agency co-operation, given the shared mandate and division of labour that characterizes Canada's counter-terrorism effort.

Today, while improvements are, of course, always possible, I believe it is accurate to state that from the perspective of CSIS, that co-operative framework and process is working very well.

At the federal level, these arrangements exist with the Department of National Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Transport, Revenue Canada and the Privy Council Office, among others. We also have a full set of formal co-operative arrangements with law enforcement agencies across the country.

There are two particular arrangements I would like to highlight.

It goes without saying that one of the most effective counter-terrorism measures at the disposal of a government is to keep terrorists out of the country—and to remove those who have managed to enter.

Therefore, one of the most important relationships we have is with the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. It has several key elements.

We assist that department in the screening of Canadian visitors visa applicants and prospective immigrants. As part of that effort, we maintain liaison officers in a number of countries abroad, a program that has become much more strategic and focussed on counter-terrorism.

Next, we provide information through an automated system administered by Citizenship and Immigration that alerts Immigration and Customs officers abroad—and at ports of entry—to the identity of suspected and known terrorists seeking admission to Canada.

In addition, for those who, despite these efforts, succeed in entering the country—a small number—we initiate judicial proceedings, in co-operation with Immigration authorities, to seek the deportation of terrorists from Canada.

Since 1992, this process has resulted in the deportation of 11 individuals.

Mr. Chairman, it is indicative both of the potential threat that we now face—and, I would argue, the success of our efforts—that prior to 1992, no such deportations took place.

Relations with the RCMP are my second point of emphasis.

Here, Mr. Chairman, you also provided valuable analysis and advice in your earlier work.

Let me simply say the following. Our relations have evolved substantially in the last 10 years. A comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding, governing a wide range of co-operative activities, was put in place in 1990. Both the RCMP and CSIS have liaison officers posted in the other organization. And, to pick up on a specific point made in your earlier reports, we now have full access to CPIC. In addition to working level meetings and discussions, my executive and I meet with our counterparts on a regular basis. When issues develop, which they inevitably do because of our differing yet interlinked mandates and responsibilities, we now have the mechanisms to deal with and resolve them. And we do. While things can always be better, that relationship is on a surer footing today than ever.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we have, over the past decade dramatically increased the quantity and the quality of our international relationships.

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Terrorism is international in its origins, its organization and its actions. The response to it must be international as well. As far as counter-terrorism is concerned, isolationism is a strategy for assured failure.

Currently, CSIS has over 200 co-operative arrangements with more than 125 countries.

We have liaison officers posted abroad to facilitate the exchange of information, and while the number of posts has not increased in recent years, that system is far more strategic, functional and effective in its counter-terrorism focus.

We, of course, maintain very close relationships with our traditional allies—the United States, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Germany and France, among others.

But so too we have established co-operative dialogues with countries in, for example, the Middle East, North Africa, South Africa and South America where the mutual exchange of knowledge and information is extremely useful.

In addition, we have developed new relationships on terrorist issues with former adversaries—including Russia, Romania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Ukraine.

It is symptomatic of the times—and of the terrorist threat—that in some cases we co-operate with states on counter-terrorism in full knowledge that they continue to mount traditional intelligence operations against Canada.

In addition to these bilateral linkages, Canada is also extremely active in the many multilateral fora that have increasingly put terrorism at the top of the agenda—from the UN to the G-7/P8 to the OAS and beyond.

The joint commitment and joint actions which these deliberations are yielding are critical to ensuring an effective global counter-terrorism effort. They are not niceties. They are necessities. For national efforts to succeed, multinational initiatives are essential.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, and comparing our efforts and our strategy to that in place 10 years ago, CSIS today:

• devotes far more resources to Counter-Terrorism, in investigating this very serious threat to Canada's national security;

• focuses to an unprecedented degree on analysis, assessment, early warning and the sharing of that information with others;

• pro-actively co-operates with a wide range of other government departments and agencies whenever required and appropriate; and

• is actively engaged, on our own and together with other departments, in an intense effort to enhance the international exchange of intelligence on terrorism, to co-operate over extradition, and to co-ordinate national policies to prevent and pre-empt terrorist acts and to punish perpetrators.

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V. Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, looking to the future, there are three specific issues I would like to highlight which I believe will require vigilance and action going forward.

The first is the threat of the use of chemical and biological weapons for terrorist purposes.

This has become very much the "issue du jour" in commentary and analysis concerning terrorism—stimulated very much by the Tokyo subway attack three years ago.

It is, in my view, essential that this issue not be blown out of proportion.

The terrorist weapons of choice remain the bomb and the bullet.

The difficulties of effectively disseminating chemical and biological agents are not inconsiderable.

The fear of retribution must be considered real.

And the fact is, despite some very disturbing incidents and threats, there have been very few actual attempts by terrorists to cause mass civilian casualties using CB agents.

All that being said, the CB threat cannot be dismissed. Indeed, there are worrying trends.

The number of extremist groups whose calculus of cost and benefits may be quite different from that of more traditional terrorist groups is rising—as are the number of high casualty, less discriminate attacks.

There is increased ease of access to information concerning the manufacture of chemical and biological agents, including through the Internet.

And the availability of raw materials or finished products—whether through industrial use or access to former state programs—is a cause for concern.

The point is, simple prudence dictates that we be very mindful of this threat. Given the potentially catastrophic results of the use of these weapons, there is no issue which demonstrates more effectively the importance of early warning and assessment to a successful counter-terrorism effort.

The second issue concerns the critical importance of the security of Canada's borders. This priority will increase, not decrease, in the future, given the ease of travel and the continued spread of religious, ethnic and nationalist conflict.

Speaking as Director of CSIS, with very clear operational knowledge of this issue, I believe that looking ahead it is critical that the Department of Citizenship and Immigration continue to be provided the legislative tools it needs to maintain effective control of our borders and the technological resources that are available to exercise that control in an effective manner.

Canada's counter-terrorism effort will never succeed if we allow our borders to become but mere sieves.

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A third issue.

As I have indicated in my presentation, information and communication technology is making our job easier as an organization. It is also making the terrorist's job easier as well. This is a race. It is one we cannot lose.

From simple day-to-day communication to planning to execution, the Internet has become one of modern terrorism's best friends.

As we speak, we are encountering serious difficulties in intercepting certain kinds of communications and these difficulties will only increase as off-the-shelf technology improves.

This capacity for undetected, secure terrorist communications on a global basis is unprecedented—and very dangerous. It is one that requires investment on our part if we are to respond.

Put simply, it is my view that there can be no more cost effective contribution to meeting our counter-terrorism responsibilities than to be able to develop the technologies and capabilities required to circumvent these new weapons in the terrorist arsenal. This is not a frill. This is literally about life and death.

Mr. Chairman, in concluding, the question arises as to whether the initiatives and efforts I have outlined today have been, and remain, successful—whether or not we are doing our part to manage the terrorist threat efficiently and effectively.

That, of course, will be a judgement that this Committee will itself make.

However, as Director of CSIS, and referring to your own October 22 statement in the Senate Mr. Chairman:

I believe the, quote: "security intelligence apparatus has adjusted to the post-Cold War order". unquote

I believe that, quote: "organizations with our security intelligence apparatus are co-ordinating their activities" and that the "turf battles … identified in 1987 have been resolved". unquote.

And I believe we are, quote: "managing to stay ahead of the security intelligence threats that face us". end of quote

Mr. Chairman, my remarks today have focussed on our perspectives on the terrorist threat, on our priorities and on our programs.

But, permit me, if you will, to end with a few words about our people. Most of what I have outlined in my presentation would not matter one whit if we did not have the quality of personnel in place to make it all work. Better systems are no substitute for excellence in human resources.

I have been in this position for some time now. I also have a range of prior experience working with women and men who have chosen public service as their vocation.

I simply want to go on the record here, Mr. Chairman, and state clearly and without reservation that the dedication and professionalism of those who contribute to the counter-terrorism effort of CSIS is without peer.

Their work in safeguarding the public safety of Canadians and of Canada is singular, second to none. I am proud of their track record, proud to be able to call them my colleagues, and confident that they will continue to contribute as skilfully in the future as they have in the past.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I would be happy now to answer any questions you and your Committee might have.

Date modified: 2005-11-14

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