Speeches and Presentations
Opening Statement by
Mr. Jim Judd, Director, CSIS
to the
Public Safety and National Security Committee
October 31, 2006
Check against Delivery
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:
Thank you for inviting me today to provide you with the perspective of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) on the report of Justice O'Connor into the case of Mr. Arar.
As you know, Justice O'Connor did not find any evidence that my organization, or indeed Canadian officials, participated or acquiesced in the decision to detain Mr. Arar or remove him to Syria.
More specifically, Justice O'Connor found no evidence that my organization shared any information about Mr. Arar with the United States prior to his detention in New York and subsequent deportation to Syria.
These findings are consistent with those of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) in its review of the Service's involvement in Mr. Arar's case.
I would note as well that while some of the recommendations in Justice O'Connor's report refer to the Service and our institutional practices or policies, they do so in the context of the broader context of departments and agencies involved in national security.
In fact, there are a number of very positive remarks in his report regarding policies and practices of CSIS.
Despite these central findings of Justice O'Connor with respect to our role in this matter, there were several criticisms of the Service and some other issues that I want to address. While there is little, if anything, to add to the findings of this report, I believe it is important for the committee to understand how we are responding to these.
Before I do, I should say that I very much regret the ordeal that Mr. Arar and his family were subjected to as a result of his deportation to Syria.
Justice O'Connor found that CSIS did not do an adequate reliability assessment as to whether information received from Syria was likely the product of torture.
Justice O'Connor made it clear in his report that intelligence sharing with foreign partners is essential for CSIS to collect information related to threats to Canada. We are very much aware that this can present a challenge for us in dealing with countries with poor human rights records.
It is an unfortunate reality that many terrorist threats to the security of Canada originate in, or have connections with, countries that have poor human rights records.
That is one of the reasons why the CSIS Act requires that two Ministers approve any foreign liaison arrangement that we might propose. In considering any such arrangement, ministerial directives to the Service and our own policy require us to specifically: "address a country's human rights record, including any possible abuses by the security or intelligence organizations".
Moreover, any such arrangement will only be considered where contact is required to protect the security of Canada. We have an obligation to ensure that everything possible is done to identify threats before they materialize on our shores and we must therefore make use of all available sources of intelligence – but always subject to reasonable safeguards.
This is obviously a difficult issue. We do have arrangements with organizations in countries where there is suspicion of torture and there are times when certain restrictions are placed on any interactions with these services.
As Justice O'Connor observed in his report: "Decisions about how to interact with a country with a poor human rights record … can be very difficult and do not lend themselves to simple or prescriptive rules".
It is never a simple matter to determine whether information received from a foreign government with a poor human rights record was obtained as a result of torture. It does not necessarily follow that because a country has a poor human rights record that any information received from it was the product of torture. Moreover, our normal practice with respect to the receipt of information of any kind is to seek corroboration of it from other sources prior to coming to any determination on it.
Our information exchanges with foreign organizations are reviewed annually by the Security Intelligence Review Committee to ensure that we comply with ministerial directives and our own policies. In some instances, the Committee has made recommendations, a number of which have been implemented. For example, in its report on Mr. Arar, SIRC made a number of recommendations – restated by Justice O'Connor – regarding the need to amend CSIS' operational policy governing information-sharing and cooperation to ensure that we take into account the human rights records of foreign countries. These recommendations have already been implemented by the Service.
As Minister Day noted during his appearance before this committee, we have also developed a new caveat to accompany information we share with foreign agencies. It seeks assurance that any Canadian citizen detained by a foreign government "will be fairly treated within the accepted norms of international conventions, that he is accorded due process under law and afforded access to Canadian diplomatic personnel if requested".
Justice O'Connor also recommended that the Department of Foreign Affairs share its assessments on the human rights records of other countries to ensure a uniform appreciation of the situation in these countries. We agree with this recommendation and will work with Foreign Affairs to ensure its implementation.
Justice O'Connor noted that CSIS and the RCMP were not supportive of an initiative by the Department of Foreign Affairs to send a letter to Syrian authorities to convey the message that Canada spoke with one voice in seeking Mr. Arar's release.
As you may know, officials from my organization were questioned on this issue extensively, both in public and in camera. There was reluctance in CSIS to proceed with the proposed letter (to be "endorsed" by the then Solicitor General). There was, among others, one major reservation in this regard: that it is the Service's long-standing policy to neither confirm nor deny that any individual is or is not a subject of investigation by CSIS.
As you know, the Solicitor General of the day expressed his own reservations about signing such a letter at that time.
Justice O'Connor has recommended that a single, coherent government approach and coordination be developed to deal with Canadian detainees in foreign countries. We accept that recommendation and will work with Foreign Affairs and other government agencies to implement that.
Justice O'Connor was critical of both the process and impact of the claims made by the Government of Canada to protect national security confidences.
While critical, Justice O'Connor conceded that the overall process worked well and did not prevent him from arriving at his findings in this matter.
By way of clarification for members of this Committee, our organization has traditionally sought to maintain national security confidentiality in a number of areas. These include:
- Whether or not any individual is under investigation or not by the Service;
- Identification of individual foreign agencies with which we have any relationships;
- Identification of human sources used in CSIS investigations;
- Identification of CSIS personnel in covert operations; and
- Specific investigatory techniques used by the Service in its investigations.
There are a number of reasons for this approach including provisions in our own legislation, the Privacy Act, operational security and effectiveness, the personal safety of employees and others.
As you know, the issue of National Security Confidence claims related to this report is now before the courts.
Justice O'Connor was very critical of the anonymous and damaging leaks that were made during his Inquiry.
When classified government information appeared in the public domain, CSIS conducted its own internal investigations and also participated in investigations convened by the Privy Council Office on several occasions. Justice O'Connor was unable to identify the culprits and I understand that the RCMP's criminal investigation remains ongoing. However, none of the investigations conducted to date has suggested that CSIS personnel caused any unauthorized disclosure.
Conclusion:
Let me just conclude by saying that I and the Service take the findings and recommendations of Justice O'Connor very seriously. We are and will be adjusting our policies in some areas in response to the report and will be working with other federal organizations to ensure the effective development of responses to other recommendations in that report.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I'd be happy to take any questions Committee members may have.
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