Introduction

1. A “ballistic missile” has been defined as “a rocket-powered delivery vehicle that has some form of guidance system, that is primarily intended for use against ground targets, and that travels a large portion of its flight in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.” Although not weapons of mass destruction (WMD) per se, ballistic missiles have aroused considerable concern and been targeted for control as part of the broader problem of WMD proliferation. When used in an actual attack, weapons of mass destruction must be delivered to their target in some way. States able to couple WMD to delivery systems with longer range or greater ability to penetrate defences can threaten more nations with higher levels of destruction, and with greater likelihood of success. Of the three types of delivery system usually considered for WMD—ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and combat aircraft—ballistic missiles have attracted the most attention, both because they are difficult to defend against and because they appear to be particularly suited for WMD (the less sophisticated ones being generally not cost-effective when armed with conventional weapons).⁽¹⁾

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Discussion

2. Ballistic missiles are especially useful for the delivery of nuclear weapons, where accuracy in hitting the target—such as a large urban area—may be less important than their ability to penetrate defences. However, they are less suited than aircraft or cruise missiles to deliver chemical or biological agents over an extended area (although they may still be ideal against point targets, or for terror attacks designed to intimidate a population). In general, compared to aircraft, ballistic missiles are harder to defend against, swifter in their delivery, and—since not restricted to operating from airfields—easier to hide from opposing forces (and therefore less vulnerable to attack on the ground). They may also be cheaper to acquire and maintain than modern types of combat aircraft. Nevertheless, precisely because they appear to represent the highest state of technological advancement and are less common than aircraft, their acquisition by a state may be considered particularly prestigious. Thus, it is no coincidence that virtually all states known to possess or suspected of developing WMD also maintain ballistic missile programs.

3. Ballistic missiles are typically categorized in terms of their range, as follows: short-range (SRBMs), up to 1,100 km (600 nautical miles); medium-range (MRBMs)=1,100 - 2,750 km (600 - 1,500 nmi); intermediate-range (IRBMs)=2,750 - 5,550 km (1,500 - 3,000 nmi); and intercontinental-range (ICBMs), over 5,550 km. Missiles with ranges up to 300 km—and to a lesser extent, up to 600-1,000 km—are already deployed throughout the developing world, largely due to the export in the 1970s and 1980s of Scud-B missiles from the former Soviet Union. In the meantime, and despite restrictions applied through the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)⁽²⁾, some of the recipients have learned to copy, modify, extend the range of, and produce their own versions of previously imported missiles.

4. Two kinds of chemical propulsion technologies—solid and liquid fuel—are widely used in ballistic missiles. Although solid-fuelled boosters are generally more difficult to develop and build than liquid-fuelled boosters, they are better-suited for mobility and urgency. Liquid-fuelled boosters were the first to be used in military applications and are still the most common. Ballistic missiles have been used in combat on a number of occasions since World War II, particularly in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s and by Iraq against Israel and Saudi Arabia, during the 1991 Gulf War. They are considered destabilizing in a regional conflict situation because they cannot be recalled after launch and—given their speed and the relatively short distances between mutual targets in areas such as the Middle East, Northeast Asia, and South Asia—they greatly reduce warning of an attack, thus encouraging a pre-emptive strike.

5. Over a dozen states in addition to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the “P5”) possess or are developing ballistic missiles with ranges of over 300 km. However, countries of proliferation concern vary widely in their ability to produce missiles, extend their capabilities, or design new types. While several developing nations have essentially no indigenous capability, others match that of the US in the mid-to-late 1960s. Practically all, however, depend on assistance or at least purchases of supplies from abroad; outside the most industrially advanced states, only Israel, India, and China can be considered truly independent in missile design and production. The countries of greatest concern from a proliferation standpoint today are discussed separately below.

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India

6. India has an extensive, largely indigenous ballistic missile program, including development and production infrastructures for both solid- and liquid-fuelled missiles. The Prithvi SRBM is a road-mobile, single-stage, liquid-fuelled missile using propulsion technology from the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air (SAM) missile. India’s first operational ballistic missile designed without foreign assistance, it is appearing in three variants: (1) an Army version, the Prithvi-1 or SS-150, with a range of 150 km (sufficient to strike any Pakistani target) and a “payload” (the mass of the warhead or other useful material that it can carry) of 1,000 kg. The Indian Army has reportedly ordered 100 of these missiles, which entered into serial production in 1997 and can be equipped with five types of warheads; (2) an Air Force version, the Prithvi-2 or SS-250, with a range of 250 km and a payload estimated at between 500 and 750 kg. It is currently undergoing flight-testing; and (3) a naval version, dubbed the Dhanush or SS-350, with a range of 250-350 km and a payload of between 750 and 1,000 kg, first flight-tested (unsuccessfully) on 11 April 2000. According to one 1998 source, “all versions of the Prithvi are nuclear-capable and can be fitted with free-fall nuclear weapons with minimal fuss or reconfiguration.”⁽³⁾ However, another analyst, noting its short range, mobility, and liquid fuel supply, has expressed doubt that the Prithvi-1, at least, would be equipped with nuclear warheads.⁽⁴⁾ The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) as of October 2000 credits India with one regiment of 3-5 Prithvi launchers.

7. India has also been developing an MRBM known as the Agni which, with a range estimated at between 2,000 and 2,500 km, would be capable of reaching important targets in China. This two-stage missile was first tested in 1994, achieving a range of 1,000 km. Under US pressure in 1996, India halted further work on the Agni, calling it a “technology demonstrator.” However, in July 1997, after Pakistan’s test of a 600-range-missile, India announced that it would give “high priority to the next phase of the Agni program.” In April 1999, India flight-tested a rail-mobile “Agni-II”, which carried a 1,000-kg payload a distance of 2,000 km (500 km short of its declared maximum range). An Indian defence official maintained that it had a circular error probability (CEP)⁽⁵⁾ of just 44 metres, compared to 300 metres for the Agni-I. Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes described the missile as operational, while officials of the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) disclosed plans to produce 20 Agni missiles by 2001. Shortly afterwards the head of the DRDO, Abdul Kalam, stated that a 3,500-km-range Agni-III (which would enable India to target Beijing) was under development.

8. On 6 November 1999, India’s Minister of State for Defence Bachi Singh Rawat said that India was developing an ICBM known as the Surya that would “have a range of up to 5,000 km” and “might be tested soon.” One independent analyst has noted the lack of evidence that actual flight hardware for an ICBM is ready for testing, and judged that “progress on such a weapon is likely to be slow.”⁽⁶⁾ However, the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission report noted that “While it develops its long range ballistic missiles, India’s space launch vehicles (SLVs)⁽⁷⁾ provide an option for an interim ICBM capability.” The Pentagon stated in April 1996 that “India could convert these SLVs into IRBMs or ICBMs quite easily but has shown no indications of doing so,” adding: “It has already built guidance sets and warheads, key components needed to convert an SLV into a ballistic missile.”

9. Finally, India, with Russian assistance, is developing a submarine-launched missile known as the Sagarika, although confusion persists as to whether this will be a ballistic or a cruise missile. According to one analyst it is the latter (not to be confused with the Dhanush or Prithvi-3), and India hopes to have it in production by about 2005.⁽⁸⁾

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Iran

10. Iran’s current ballistic missile force consists of approximately 300 Scud-B and -Cs, mounted on about 10 launchers, and 150 CSS-8s, with about 25 launchers. The Scud-Bs, with a range of approximately 300 km, were first acquired from Libya and North Korea; the Scud-Cs, with a range of 500 km, from North Korea; and the CSS-8s (range=150 km) from China. For a number of years, Iran assembled Scud missiles using foreign-made components; according to the Pentagon’s November 1997 report, thanks to “considerable equipment and technical help from North Korea,” “the Iranians are now able to produce the missile themselves.” Its current inventory, according to the same report, allows Iran “to strike a wide variety of key economic and military targets in several neighboring countries, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf states. Possible targets include oil installations, airfields, and ports, as well as U.S. military deployment areas in the region.”

11. In addition to acquiring missiles and related equipment from abroad, Iran has long sought to develop its own production facilities for both liquid- and solid-fuelled missiles. It has already produced a number of shorter-range, solid-propellant artillery rocket systems including the 150-km-range Nazeat 10 and 200-km-range Zelzal (both unguided). Its most dramatic development to date, however, was the flight-testing on 22 July 1998 of the 1,300-km-range Shahab-3, a liquid-fuelled missile with a 700-kg payload, based on the North Korean No Dong (but improved with Russian technology). Such a missile would put all of Israel, much of Turkey, parts of Saudi Arabia, and southern parts of Russia within striking range. However, its accuracy was estimated by one source at only about 4,000 metres CEP.⁽⁹⁾ The CIA reported in February 1999 that Iran had begun producing the Shahab-3, and in February 2000 that it had probably achieved “emergency operational capability,” defined as the ability to “deploy a limited number of...prototype missiles in an operational mode during a perceived crisis situation.”

12. While the Iranians claimed the initial Shahab-3 test as a success, US officials reported that the missile had malfunctioned about 100 seconds after launch. A second test-flight of the missile on 15 July 2000 was reported to be an unqualified success, while in a third-on 21 September 2000-the missile was said to have exploded shortly after liftoff. This latter event was described by one unnamed US intelligence official as “not a very good sign” for the program, while Pentagon sources were quoted as saying that it “calls into question the [Iranian] claims that the Shahab-3 is a fully operational system.”

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13. Even longer-range missile programs are reportedly underway. At the time of the first Shahab-3 test, US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Martin Indyk stated that Iran was expected to launch a 2,000-km-range Shahab-4 by 2001. In February 1999, Iranian Defence Minister Ali Shamkhani publicly acknowledged the development of this missile, which he said was close to testing. He described it as having a longer range and heavier payload than the Shahab-3, before backtracking and insisting that it was only an SLV with no military applications. Western analysts believe that the Shahab-4 will use the same RD-214 engine that powered the Soviet SS-4 MRBM, able to carry a payload of over a tonne. In July 2000, Israeli officials were cited as estimating its deployment date as 2002, but it has not yet been flight-tested. One US analyst has recently remarked that the Shahab-4 “appears to be virtually autonomous; although originally based on the Soviet SS-4 IRBM and Russian technical assistance, it may have evolved beyond the point where foreign export controls can bring it to a halt.”⁽¹⁰⁾

14. Iran’s Defence Minister has also publicly mentioned plans for a Shahab-5, albeit characterizing it as an SLV as well. The US Air Force’s National Air Intelligence Center reportedly described this in September 1999 as an IRBM that could carry nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads; other reports suggest that the Shahab-5 will have an intercontinental range. Israeli officials estimate its deployment date at 2005. In July 1999, Kenneth Timmerman of the Middle East Data Project told a US Congressional committee that individual Russian scientists and engineers were helping Iran to develop an ICBM known as Kosar, with sufficient range to reach the US. The July 1998 Rumsfeld Commission, describing Iran’s ballistic missile infrastructure as more sophisticated than that of North Korea, judged that “Iran now has the technical capability and resources to demonstrate an ICBM-range ballistic missile, similar to the [North Korean] [Taepo Dong] TD-2 (based on scaled-up Scud technology) within 5 years of a decision to proceed-whether that decision has already been made or is yet to be made.” However, the US National Intelligence Council (NIC)’s September 1999 NIE was considerably less alarmist, noting that “Analysts differ on the likely timing of Iran’s first test of an ICBM that could threaten the US-assessments range from likely before 2010 and very likely before 2015...to less than an even chance of an ICBM test by 2015.” The NIC did, however, judge that “Iran is likely to test an SLV by 2010 that-once developed-could be converted into an ICBM capable of delivering a several-hundred kilogram payload to the United States.”

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Iraq

15. UN Security Council Resolution 687 prohibits Iraqi possession of missiles with a range of over 150 km. Before the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had a large-scale ballistic missile program derived mainly from Soviet Scuds. Its principal weapon was the Al Hussein, a modified Scud-B with a range of about 650 km (capable of reaching Tehran and Jerusalem), 96 of which were launched against Israel and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War. It was also developing (and had test-fired) the 900-km-range Al Abbas, capable of reaching northeastern Egypt (including Cairo), northern Saudi Arabia (including Riyadh), western Iran, and eastern Turkey (including Ankara); the 750-1,000-km-range Badr 2000, based on the Argentine Condor missile; and the 2,000-km-range Tammouz I or Al Aabed, capable of reaching Pakistan, Afghanistan, southwestern and European Russia (including Moscow), Greece, and southern Italy. Iraq has admitted to producing a total of 80 “special warheads” for its Al Hussein missiles-50 for chemical weapons (CW), 25 for biological weapons, and 5 for trials of CW-and to having filled such warheads with chemical and biological agents prior to the Gulf War. As of October 1998, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) had confirmed the destruction of 30 chemical warheads under its supervision and another 43-45 of 45 operational special warheads that Iraq claimed to have unilaterally destroyed in 1991.

16. Iraq’s ballistic missile program suffered severe damage from Coalition bombing during the Gulf War and from the dismantling activities of UNSCOM inspectors after the War. However, according to the Pentagon in November 1997, “Iraq has rebuilt substantial portions of its missile production infrastructure.” In addition, according to the Pentagon’s April 1996 report (expressing a view shared by then-UNSCOM head Rolf Ekeus), “the United States believes Iraq has hidden a small number of mobile launchers and several dozen Scud-type missiles produced before Operation Desert Storm.” The January 2001 Pentagon report was less specific as to numbers, noting only that “Iraq likely retains a limited number of launchers and Scud-variant SRBMs capable of striking its neighbors, as well as the components and manufacturing means to assemble and produce others.” However, it added that “Baghdad likely also has [ballistic missile] warheads capable of delivering chemical or biological agents.”

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17. Today, Iraq’s production efforts are focused on two SRBMs with ranges ostensibly not exceeding the UN-imposed limits: (1) the liquid-propellant Al-Samoud, a scaled-down Scud first flight-tested in 1997, and believed by the CIA to have a potential operational range of about 180 km; and (2) the 150-km-range, solid-propellant Ababil-100. According to the CIA, personnel previously involved with the Condor II/Badr-2000 missile are working on the Ababil-100 program, while the Al-Samoud, further ahead in development, “allows Baghdad to develop technological improvements that could be applied to a longer-range missile program.” That Iraq continues to plan for much longer-range missiles was suggested by the interception by Jordan in late 1995 of a shipment of sophisticated Russian-produced guidance instruments, suitable for 1,200-km-range missiles, bound for Iraq. A November 1997 Pentagon report concluded: “It is clear from its actions that Iraq fully intends to reestablish and broaden its ballistic missile program should UN sanctions and monitoring end or be substantially reduced.” It estimated that “Iraq could start initial production efforts within one year,” but that “it would take considerably longer for [it] to return to its pre-Gulf War capabilities.”

18. Iraq is one of just four potentially hostile Third World countries-along with North Korea, Iran, and Libya-identified by US intelligence as harbouring ambitions for an ICBM. The September 1999 NIE noted that “Analysts differ on the likely timing of Iraq’s first test of an ICBM that could threaten the US-assessments range from likely before 2015, possibly before 2010 (foreign assistance would affect capability and timing) to unlikely before 2015.” In short, it said: “Iraq could test an ICBM capable of reaching the US during the next 15 years.”

Israel

19. Israel currently deploys two solid-fuelled, nuclear-capable IRBMs developed with French and US technology: the Jericho-1, with a range of 500-660 km and a payload of 1,000 kg, of which “up to” 50 were reported in 1995 to be deployed in shelters on mobile launchers; and the Jericho-2, with a range of 1,500 km (enabling it to reach most Arab capitals and the southern part of the former Soviet Union (FSU)) and a payload of 500 kg, reportedly housed in underground bunkers in limestone hills. In 1995, work began to increase the range of the Jericho-2 to 2,000 km (although some reports were already crediting it with a range of up to 2,800 km). According to a February 1997 report, Israel was “seeking technology to improve the accuracy of its Jerichos, particularly with gyroscopes for the inertial guidance system and associated systems software.” In addition, Israel’s Shavit SLV (the civilian version of the Jericho-2) is reportedly capable of being modified to carry 500 kg over 7,800 km, “in effect making it an ICBM.” According to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) in 1993, the Shavit “could serve to deliver a small nuclear warhead a distance of over 4,500 km,” while “the parameters determined in the original design permit...increasing its range to 7,000 km.”

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Libya

20. Libya’s only possibly operational ballistic missile system is the 300-km-range Scud-B, acquired from the FSU. Its inventory is quite large, being estimated at 80 launchers and between 240 and 800 missiles. However, according to the Pentagon in January 2001, these “aging” missiles “likely suffer from poor maintenance and their operational status is questionable.” According to a 1996 report, they were sufficient to “provide a tactical strike capability that can threaten substantial areas of Libya’s regional neighbors, Egypt, Chad, Niger and Algeria, as well as the offshore islands in the Mediterranean,” but “currently cannot threaten the mainland of southern Europe.” In 1986, Libya actually fired two Scuds at a US Coast Guard facility on the Italian island of Lampedusa. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, Libya made several apparently unsuccessful attempts to purchase from abroad more sophisticated missiles such as the SS-12, SS-23 and SS-21 from the Soviet Union, the DF-3A, M-9, and M-11 from China, and extended-range Scuds or No Dong missiles from North Korea.

21. Libya has also, for over 15 years, been attempting to develop an indigenous missile, the Al Fatah, with an intended range of 950 - 1,000 km. This would allow it to target Sardinia, Sicily, southern Italy, including Rome, and US forces in the Mediterranean; or, if based near Tobruk, to hit Israel, Greece, western Turkey, and almost all of Egypt. So far, however, it has only succeeded in producing liquid-fuelled rockets with a range of about 200 km; the Al Fatah, with a “fairly small payload,” remains in the testing stage. Libyan attempts to modify their older Scuds to extend their range have proved similarly unsuccessful. According to the Pentagon in January 2001, despite UN sanctions in effect from 1992 to 1999, Libya was able to obtain some ballistic missile goods and technology from abroad, “most notably from Serbia and from Indian companies.” The UN sanctions ended in April 1999, and fears have been expressed that Libya will expand its procurement efforts (including the acquisition of complete missiles) as a result. The CIA reported in August 2000 that “Libya has continued its efforts to obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise from foreign sources.” A recent example was the 1999 attempt to ship liquid-fuel rocket engine components as “auto parts” from a firm in Taiwan to Libya, intercepted in the UK. It was also reported in May 1998 that Chinese missile research and development technicians had visited Libya. The CIA in 1993 noted that, although Libyan leaders had expressed a desire for ballistic missiles capable of reaching North America, an “actual commitment to such an expensive and technically and politically risky development program is questionable” and “Because of its limited technical capabilities,...Libya probably could not develop [such] a system within 15 years.”

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North Korea

22. North Korea began reverse-engineering the Soviet-designed Scud-B in the early 1980s, later mass-producing, deploying, and exporting this 300-km-range ballistic missile (payload=985 kg), as well as a 500-km-range variant known as the Scud-C (with a 700-kg payload). According to the Pentagon in November 1997, North Korea could produce four to eight Scud-Bs and -Cs per month, and had “hundreds” in its inventory (the IISS in October 2000 credits it with 30 Scud-C launchers). In January 2001, the Pentagon estimated that North Korea had over 500 Scud missiles, many deployed just north of the Demilitarized Zone and so able to reach targets throughout the South. North Korean Scuds have been transferred in large quantities (usually estimated at several hundred) to Iran and Syria, and possibly to Egypt, Libya, and Vietnam.

23. Pyongyang has also succeeded in developing the No Dong-1 missile, with a range of about 1,000 km (sufficient to reach most of Japan, including key US military bases at Yokota, Yokosuka, and Okinawa) and a payload of 1,000 kg (theoretically capable of delivering a nuclear weapon). Flight-tested only once, in May 1993, it was reported by the Pentagon as operational in June 1998. The July 1998 Rumsfeld Commission, crediting the No Dong with a range of 1,300 km, maintained that it “was operationally deployed long before the US Government recognized that fact” and that it was “highly likely that considerable numbers of No Dongs have been produced.” The non-governmental Federation of American Scientists estimated the No Dong inventory as of June 2000 at between 12 and 36 missiles.

24. North Korea is also developing two longer-range ballistic missiles, the Taepo Dong (TD)-1 (whose range was estimated by the Pentagon in November 1997 as “more than 1,500 km”) and Taepo Dong-2 (with a range estimated at between 4,000 and 6,000 km). Pyongyang shocked the world (and particularly its Northeast Asian neighbours) in August 1998 when it used a three-stage TD-1 rocket in an unsuccessful attempt to launch a satellite, thereby demonstrating that it was nearing an ICBM-range capability. The rocket’s first stage landed in the Sea of Japan, its second stage about 330 km east of Japan, and the third stage (which used solid fuel, marking a significant advance) at a much greater distance into the Pacific, possibly as far as 6,000 km from the launch site (near the coast of Alaska). A Pentagon spokesman emphasized that North Korea still faced technical hurdles in its development of an ICBM, such as acquiring the capability to shield a warhead from extreme heat during re-entry into the atmosphere. In addition, the third stage was described as crude and capable of carrying only a very small payload. Still, the flight sent shock waves around the world, greatly stimulating demands for ballistic missile defences in the US and East Asia.

25. During the summer of 1999, US reconnaissance satellites reportedly detected signs of the imminent flight-testing of a Taepo Dong missile, possibly the TD-2. US and Japanese press reports speculated that the TD-2 would have a range of 8,000 km, adequate to reach any part of North America. In September 1999, during bilateral missile talks that had been going on intermittently for over three years, North Korea agreed to suspend its flight-testing of long-range missiles while “normalization” talks with the US continued, and in return for an easing of US economic sanctions. However, it reportedly continued to develop the TD-2 missile, as well as to export missiles and missile technology to other countries. An official of the US National Air Intelligence Center was quoted in October 1999 as saying that “their level of confidence in the TD-2 may be high enough to have it available [for use] without any flight test.”

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26. The September 1999 NIE stated that “North Korea could convert its Taepo Dong-1 SLV into an ICBM that could deliver a light payload (sufficient for a biological or chemical weapon) to the United States, albeit with inaccuracies that would make hitting large urban targets improbable. North Korea is more likely to weaponize the larger Taepo Dong-2 as an ICBM that could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload (sufficient for early generation nuclear weapons) to the United States. Most analysts believe it could be tested at any time, probably initially as an SLV, unless it is delayed for political reasons.” It concluded that “After Russia and China, North Korea is the most likely to develop ICBMs capable of threatening the United States during the next 15 years.” The NIC’s “Global Trends 2015” paper of December 2000 more alarmingly warned that North Korea “could have a few to several Taepo Dong-2 type missiles deployed by 2005.”

27. In early December 2000, it was reported that US and North Korean officials at their bilateral missile talks were close to a deal under which Pyongyang would abandon all exports of ballistic missiles, technology, and expertise, as well as the development, production, and testing of longer-range missiles for its own arsenal. In return, it would receive financial compensation for its lost exports and a US commitment to have as many as three of its civilian satellites launched each year without charge, possibly by the US, Russia, or China. Although it did not prove possible to finalize the deal in the dying days of the Clinton Presidency, the outgoing US President did express confidence in early January 2001 that a settlement would be reached during the first few months of the incoming administration.

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Pakistan

28. Pakistan has made strenuous efforts to acquire a variety of ballistic missiles and the means to produce them indigenously. However, its indigenous capabilities are not nearly as extensive as its rival India’s (it lacks a space program and has a relatively limited scientific and industrial base). In particular, Pakistan reportedly lacks the more sophisticated manufacturing equipment, skills, and techniques necessary to independently produce high-quality components and composite materials for guidance, navigation and high temperature applications such as thrust control and heat shielding. Consequently, it has had to rely to a far greater degree on the import of missile systems, components, expertise, and technology from abroad, principally China and North Korea. This may be beginning to change, however. Regarding the new Shaheen-1 missile, one Western analyst notes that “Although media reports have associated this system with many possible technology suppliers, including China and (less credibly) North Korea or Russia, it appears to be an entirely new system, indicative of substantial indigenous expertise.”⁽¹¹⁾

29. Pakistan’s current arsenal includes the 80-km-range, solid-fuelled Hatf-1, indigenously-produced, with a payload of 500 kg (but considered very inaccurate), 80 of which (according to the IISS in October 2000) have been deployed; 30 solid-fuelled Hatf-3 or M-11s (nuclear-capable, with a range of 280-300 km and a payload of 800 kg) acquired from China in 1992⁽¹²⁾; a number of solid-fuelled Shaheen-1 or Hatf-4 missiles, first test-flown in April 1999, with a maximum range of 750 km and a claimed payload of 1,000 kg; and 12 Hatf-5 or Ghauri-1 liquid-fuelled MRBMs based on the North Korean No Dong, with a range variously estimated at between 1,300 and 1,500 km and a payload of 700 kg. The latter missile, flight-tested (to the great surprise of outside observers) in April 1998, for the first time enables Pakistan to target most of India. The US intelligence community believes that both the M-11 and Ghauri-1 “may have nuclear roles.”

30. Pakistan is also developing longer-range missiles, both liquid-fuelled (under the direction of A.Q. Khan and the Khan Research Laboratories) and solid-fuelled (under Dr. Samar Mubarak Mund and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission). The 2,400-km-range road-mobile, two-stage, solid-fuelled Shaheen-2 MRBM was unveiled at the annual Pakistan Day parade in March 2000. According to the Pentagon in January 2001, it was still in the design stage and, along with another missile claimed to be under development, the Ghaznavi, had an intended range of 2,000 km (sufficient to reach any target in India).The IISS reported in October 2000 that the Shaheen-2 was ready for flight-testing, and that the 2,500-km-range Ghauri-2 (also known as the Hatf-6) had undergone static-engine testing. In May 1999 Anwarul Haq, the scientist in charge of the Ghauri Technology Cell at Pakistan’s Kahuta Laboratories, reportedly said that work was in progress on the development of a 3,000-km-range Ghauri-3 missile.

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Syria

31. Syria, while slow to develop its own indigenous production capability, has one of the largest ballistic missile arsenals in the Third World. The IISS in October 2000 credited it with 18 launchers for the SS-21 missile (relatively highly accurate, but limited to a 70-km range) and 26 launchers for Scud-Bs and -Cs (300 and 500-km-range, respectively). US and Israeli intelligence sources were cited in September 1997 as believing that Syria possessed 60 Scud-Cs and 200 Scud-Bs; the Commander-in-Chief of the Israeli Defence Force was quoted in February 2000 as saying that Syria had “more than 800 ballistic missiles of all kinds.” The SS-21 is assumed to be intended for use against military bases and forces in northern Israel, but the Scud-B is within range of almost all of Israel, northern and western Iraq, southern and eastern Turkey, and Cyprus; while the Scud-C adds Baghdad, most of the Sinai, and all of southeastern Turkey, just short of Ankara. According to the Pentagon in January 2001, “Syria is believed to have chemical warheads available for a portion of its Scud missile force.”

32. Syria’s Scud-Bs were obtained from the FSU in the mid-1970s, and the SS-21s in the 1980s. It is said to have acquired its Scud-Cs from North Korea, and other Scud-related equipment and materials from both North Korea and Iran. The CIA in February 2000 reported that Damascus was “continu[ing] work on establishing a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability with help from outside countries such as Iran. Foreign equipment and assistance to its liquid-propellant missile program, primarily from Russian entities, but also from firms in China and North Korea, also have been and will continue to be essential for Syria’s effort.” Six months later, the CIA’s August 2000 report stated that assistance to the liquid-propellant program was “primarily from North Korean entities, but also from firms in Russia,” and added that ”Damascus also continued its efforts to assemble-probably with considerable North Korean assistance-liquid-fueled Scud C missiles.”⁽¹³⁾

33. In May 2000 the Israeli press reported that North Korea had supplied Syria with a new Scud-D. In September 2000, then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak expressed concern over reports that Syria had successfully tested such a missile, with a range of about 700 km, that would permit deployment deep inside Syrian territory, making it less vulnerable to Israeli attack.

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Other States

34. Argentina in 1990 ended its involvement with Iraq, Egypt, and a number of European subcontractors in the Condor II MRBM program, aimed at developing a solid-fuelled missile with a range of 1,000 km. Brazil at one time had a program to develop three separate solid-fuelled ballistic missiles with ranges of 300, 600, and 1,000 km, but was forced to give them up in order to join the MTCR. Egypt is currently credited with a small force of 9 launchers for aging Scud-B missiles (range=300 km), but it is also collaborating with North Korea on the production of a longer-range variant (perhaps the Scud-C) and to be attempting development of a 1,000-km-range missile, possibly using technology from the aborted Condor II program. The CIA reported in February 1999 that “Egypt continues its effort to develop and produce the Scud B and Scud C and to develop the two-stage Vector SRBMs. Cairo also is interested in developing an MRBM.” Saudi Arabia operates a number of DF-3 (CSS-2) MR/IRBMs (estimated at between 20 and 56, with a range of between 2,650 and 3,100 km) obtained from China in the late 1980s and reportedly armed with 1,600-kg conventional warheads. During 1999, US intelligence analysts reportedly suspected that a visit by the Saudi defence minister to Pakistani ballistic missile production facilities at Kahuta might have been linked to a Saudi interest in purchasing Ghauri missiles to replace the old CSS-2s. South Africa announced in July 1993 that it was abandoning a ballistic missile program then in the test phase. South Korea in the 1970s developed two surface-to-surface versions of a US surface-to-air missile (SAM), with ranges of 150 and 180 km (the NHK-1 Baekgom and NHK-2 Hyunmu, respectively). US officials reportedly suspect that the latter’s range is closer to 300 km. In 1979, Seoul undertook in a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the US not to develop missiles with ranges exceeding 180 km. However, more recently it has sought to withdraw from the MOU and to build and deploy missiles with a range of 300 km (the MTCR limit), while building prototypes with a range of 500 km (enabling it to target all of North Korea) for “research purposes.” In September 2000, the US was reported to have agreed in principle to the building of 300-km-range missiles, but a number of technical issues remained for further negotiation. South Korea is also planning to develop a liquid-fuelled SLV; in December 1999, President Kim Dea-Jung announced that the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) would complete a “working satellite-launching facility” by 2005. A US government official was quoted as saying that “this type of satellite rocket technology is transferable to military applications, and other countries in the region are certainly going to view South Korea’s program through this prism.” In the late 1970s, Taiwan developed a 100-km-range, liquid-fuelled missile similar to the US Lance. The Taiwanese version is believed to have become operational in the early 1980s but may have been terminated under US pressure. The same fate may also have befallen a 600-1,000-km-range missile begun in the late 1970s. More recently, Taiwan was reported to be developing a new 300-km-range missile in response to China’s testing of missiles off its coast in July 1995.

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Conclusions

• Of the types of delivery system usually considered for weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles have a number of advantages that have made them particularly attractive to countries of proliferation concern.

• A significant number of states in the developing world possess ballistic missiles, but many of these are based on 1950s technology and highly inaccurate. A smaller number of states have acquired, or are in the process of acquiring, more modern missiles with greater range, payload, and accuracy. Of particular interest, a few states have acquired, or are in the process of acquiring, the ability to indigenously produce their own ballistic missiles. In some cases such states are becoming ”secondary proliferators” by themselves supplying ballistic missiles or missile technology to other states.

• Despite limited success in some instances, the Missile Technology Control Regime has proven unable to completely stem the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and the number of states acquiring such missiles and their production capability will continue to grow.

• Of greatest concern is the situation in South Asia, where India and Pakistan appear to be involved in a nuclear ballistic missile “race” with potentially severe consequences for regional and global security. Given their history of conflict and close geographic proximity, the introduction of longer-range and possibly nuclear-tipped missiles into their arsenals greatly reduces warning of an attack and thereby encourages a preventative or pre-emptive strike.

• The ballistic missile programs of some other states ( such as Iran, Israel, North Korea, Syria, and potentially Iraq) are also worrisome because they have acquired, or soon will have, the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction against neighbouring states and foreign military forces within their respective regions and even, in some cases, beyond.

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Canadian Interests

35. Canada is an active member of the MTCR and, as such, would be in violation of its commitments to other states and to the world at large if it did not seek to stem the proliferation of ballistic missile systems and technologies. While not itself a producer or exporter of ballistic missiles per se, Canada, as a highly industrialized state, possesses much of the knowledge and technology, e.g. in guidance systems, as well as producing certain components, that could be applied to such programs. It would be highly embarrassing for the Canadian government or private companies if Canadian-produced expertise, materials, or technology were used by a proliferant state to acquire such delivery vehicles for its weapons of mass destruction.

36. Outside of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, with their long-standing programs, no state of ballistic missile proliferation concern is currently capable of targeting Canadian territory directly from its homeland. However, Canadian troops serving in peacekeeping or peace-enforcement missions, as well as other Canadian citizens abroad, may be at risk of ballistic missile attack in various regions of the world. As delivery ranges increase, some of Canada’s allies are being rendered vulnerable to such attacks against their home territories. In the longer term, a few states potentially hostile to Canadian interests could acquire the capability, already possessed by Russia and China, to strike Canada directly with ballistic missiles.

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Selected Sources

The Arms Control Reporter (monthly; Institute for Disarmament and Defense Studies, Cambridge, MA).

Wyn Q. Bowen, The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.

Joseph Cirincione, “Assessing the Assessment: The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate of the Ballistic Missile Threat.” The Nonproliferation Review (Spring 2000), pp. 125-137.

Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program: Threats: Missiles (on-line at: http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile).

Richard L. Garwin, “The Rumsfeld Report: What We Did.” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November-December 1998), pp. 40-45.

Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright, “What They Didn’t Do.” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November-December 1998), pp. 46-51.

International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2000-2001. London: Oxford University Press, October 2000.

Rodney W. Jones et al., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998.

Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics. Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1996.

 “The Spread of Ballistic Missiles and the Transformation of Global Security.” The Nonproliferation Review (Fall-Winter 2000), pp. 106-122.

William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks (eds.), The International Missile Bazaar. Boulder: Westview, 1994.

Ye. Primakov, A New Challenge after the ‘Cold War’: The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Moscow: Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR), 1993.

US Central Intelligence Agency, Prospects for the Worldwide Development of Ballistic Missile Threats to the Continental United States [Unclassified version of NIE 93-17], available at: http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/ciaprospects.htm.

US Central Intelligence Agency, Nonproliferation Center, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (biannually, since 1997).

US Congress, Commission to Address the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States [Rumsfeld Commission], Executive Summary of the Report. Washington, 15 July 1998.

US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993.

US Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1996.

Proliferation: Threat and Response. Washington, November 1997.

Proliferation: Threat and Response. Washington, January 2001 (available at http://www.defenselink.mil).

US National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015 [Unclassified version of the National Intelligence Estimate]. Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, September 1999.

Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts. Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, December 2000.

US White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate [on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction] [annually, since 1994].

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Endnotes

1. This is not meant to suggest that there are not other, possibly preferred means to deliver WMD, particularly for less technologically-developed states seeking to attack distant targets. The unclassified version of the US intelligence community’s September 1999 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on ballistic missile threats to the US through 2015, for example, discusses a variety of alternatives to long-range ballistic missiles, including shorter-range ballistic missiles launched from forward-deployed ships, land-attack cruise missiles launched from (even commercial) aircraft or ships, and non-missile means (ie., covert delivery by ship, plane, or land). It notes that most non-missile delivery options are less expensive than developing and producing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); can be covertly developed and employed (thus masking the source, in an attempt to evade retaliation); probably would be more reliable than ICBMs that have not completed rigorous testing and validation programs; probably would be more accurate than emerging ICBMs over the next 15 years; probably would be more effective for disseminating biological warfare agent than a ballistic missile; and would avoid missile defences. The last point is particularly relevant to the current debate over the wisdom of building national missile defences. The December 2000 report of the US National Intelligence Council on ”Global Trends 2015” agreed that “The likelihood of an attack [on the US] by these [other] means is greater than that of a WMD attack with an ICBM.”

2. The MTCR, formed in April 1987, is an informal non-treaty association of governments, now numbering 32, that seeks to restrict the proliferation of missiles with ranges greater than 300 km through the sharing of information and the establishment of export control guidelines for missile-related equipment and technologies.

3. Ben Sheppard, “Too Close for Comfort: Ballistic Ambitions in South Asia.” Jane’s Intelligence Review (January 1998), p.32.

4. Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center (Washington, DC), cited in: Defense News, 10-16 March 1997. The September 1999 US NIE states simply that the Prithvi I, as well as the Agni II, “may have nuclear roles.”

5. A measure of accuracy, the CEP is the radius of a circle centered at a target within which 50 percent of all missiles aimed at that target would be expected to fall.

6. Aaron Karp, “The Spread of Ballistic Missiles and the Transformation of Global Security." Nonproliferation Review (Fall-Winter 2000), p. 112.

7. I.e., a rocket intended to carry satellites into orbit.

8. Andrew Koch, “South Asian Rivals Keep Test Score Even.” Jane's Intelligence Review (August 1999), pp. 35-36.

9. Duncan Lennox, “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Projects: Uncovering the Evidence.” Jane’s Intelligence Review (June 1998), p. 27.

10. Karp, supra, p.114.

11. Karp, supra, p.113.

12. According to the Pentagon’s January 2001 report, this missile, “based on” the Chinese M-11, is still under development.

13. The Pentagon in January 2001 stated outright that Syria was producing Scud-Cs with North Korean assistance.