Backgrounder No. 7

Proliferation Issues

Revised April 2003

“Despite the best efforts of our diplomats and counter proliferation experts, the spread of weapons of mass destruction will be a defining security challenge of this new century. It will lead to more fingers on more triggers. Not all of these fingers will belong to rational leaders. In such a situation, deterrents may not always deter.”

NATO: A Vision for 2012
Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson
At the NATO/GMFUS Conference, Brussels, Belgium October 3, 2002

Introduction

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 wakened people to a realization of the damage that an organized, motivated enemy could inflict on a civilian population. Less than a month after these attacks, news broke that several people had been infected by anthrax. Many immediately linked the two events and fears emerged that biological weapons were being employed by terrorists against American civilian populations. It was soon discovered that the mail was being used to send anthrax and the US Mail activities were interrupted as people feared opening their letters. The term “weapons of mass destruction” became part of the public’s vocabulary.

In reality, the spread and potential use of weapons of mass destruction have been an issue for many years. In 1995, the Aum Shinri Kyo, a Japanese religious cult, released the nerve agent sarin in the Tokyo subway, killing 12 and injuring thousands. In 1998, India and Pakistan shocked the world with a series of nuclear tests that demonstrated the potential consequences of future conflict in the region. By May 2002, relations between the two countries over the disputed Kashmir region deteriorated to the point that a war, possibly involving nuclear weapons, appeared likely.

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These episodes demonstrate how the proliferation of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, commonly grouped as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their delivery systems, have the potential to undermine international peace and security.

In January 2001, the United States Department of Defense, in its document Proliferation: Threat and Response, estimated that at least 25 countries possess—or are in the process of acquiring and developing—capabilities to inflict mass casualties and destruction through nuclear, biological or chemical weapons or the means to deliver them. The Federation of American Scientists in 2000 placed the number of countries possessing, pursuing or capable of acquiring such weapons and/or delivery systems at 33. While many terrorist groups lack the resources, expertise or motivation to employ WMD, there has been a growing interest among certain terrorist groups in acquiring such weapons as well. Regardless of the exact number of parties seeking WMD or their delivery systems, such estimates demonstrate what a widespread and serious issue proliferation has become and the urgent and continuing need to counter this threat.

The Government of Canada is committed to countering the spread of such weapons. Canada is a party to various international agreements which seek to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and components which can be used to produce such weapons or systems. As Canada is an internationally recognized leader in many high-technology sectors (such as the nuclear, chemical, pharmaceutical, biotechnological, electronics and aerospace sectors), it remains a frequent target for clandestine and illicit procurement activities by countries of proliferation concern.

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The WMD Threat

Nuclear and Radiological Weapons

Nuclear weapons are considered weapons of mass destruction in the truest sense. In addition to killing tens or hundreds of thousands of people or more, a nuclear weapon can destroy the entire physical structure of a large city and contaminate a much larger area with radioactive fallout. In addition to the five traditional nuclear weapons states (the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom), India and Pakistan have admitted their nuclear capabilities and Israel has long been credited with a clandestine arsenal. A number of other countries, including Iran, Libya, North Korea, and until recently, Iraq were widely suspected of harbouring nuclear weapons ambitions and/or to be actively pursuing such programs. Most analysts believe that the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities in general, and in particular to less stable or conflict-ridden regions of the world, would be harmful to international security by increasing the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used during wartime or serving as coercive tools in international diplomacy.

The basic concepts related to the development of nuclear weapons have been widely known for some time and the required technology dates back to the 1940s. However, the infrastructure required to produce nuclear weapons indigenously is considerably more difficult and expensive to develop than that for either biological or chemical weapons. This is one reason why concern about WMD terrorism focuses more on CBW than nuclear weapons.

The greatest obstacle to a potential proliferant is obtaining sufficient amounts of fissionable material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium). Countries with advanced nuclear weapons programs attempt to acquire technologies and components that can allow them to indigenously produce such fissionable material, often under the auspices of a civilian nuclear power program. Otherwise, they can attempt to purchase or steal weapons-grade fissionable material kept in scientific institutions having research reactors. It is estimated that approximately 20 tonnes of highly enriched uranium is stored in such locations throughout the world. The vulnerability of this fissile material to theft or misuse is a significant proliferation concern at the present time.

Technical complexities and expense reduce the likelihood that most terrorist groups could construct a nuclear explosive device. Theft of an intact nuclear weapon is also not considered very likely given the stringent security measures in place in most of the nuclear weapons states. A more likely threat from a terrorist organization would be a radiological one involving the dispersal of radioactive substances to contaminate the air or water, or to render a particular area or facility unusable. Radioactive materials that could be used for such contamination are available from a wide range of relatively non-secure facilities, including hospitals, medical and research laboratories, universities and waste dumps. Although some types of contamination may be more difficult to achieve than commonly believed, given the widespread public anxiety about nuclear material in any form, the mere threat of such use of radioactive materials could be a potent terrorist tool.

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Chemical and Biological Weapons

Chemical and biological weapons are particularly brutal tools of death and can kill slowly and painfully. Unfortunately, such weapons, particularly biological agents, are also easier and cheaper to produce than nuclear materials and the technology and know- how is widely available. As a result, there are far more states actively engaged in chemical and biological weapons programs than there are in nuclear programs. The Federation of American Scientists estimated that 29 nations possess, were pursuing or are capable of acquiring chemical or biological weapons as of 2000. These countries included Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria and until recently, Iraq.

Chemical agents include blood agents, choking agents, blistering agents and nerve agents. Some chemical agents utilize toxic industrial chemicals and do not require much expertise to be adapted into potential weapons. Biological agents include bacterial, viral and rickettsial agents. An individual with some technical training could apply the necessary expertise given supplies and a basic laboratory to make a crude biological weapon. Certainly, any state with a modestly sophisticated pharmaceutical industry is capable of producing biological agents. Biological agents, in particular, could cause mass casualties if detection and treatment were impeded.

Fortunately, the frightening potential of biological and chemical weapons are mitigated by several factors, the most important being that it is very difficult to find effective, reliable delivery means for large-scale lethal doses of such agents. Many chemical agents require large quantities of precursor chemicals and can require high-temperature processes and create dangerous by products, making production outside of an advanced laboratory unlikely. If used, biological agents can be affected by environmental factors including wind, temperature and rain. Chemical agents are rapidly diluted when exposed to air. Also, immunization will not guarantee the safety of those who deliver the weapon. The amounts of agents needed also make large-scale food and drink contamination unlikely and make it very difficult to contaminate a large water supply, although smaller-scale contamination is possible. The release of such chemical or biological agents through vaporizing or aerosol devices has to be in a confined area for lethal exposures to occur. This indicates that enclosed spaces such as urban transportation systems, sports stadiums and office complexes are more vulnerable to such attacks than other more open areas.

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Delivery Systems

There are three types of delivery systems usually considered for WMD—ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and combat aircraft. Among these, the ballistic missile is the greatest proliferation concern both because it is difficult to defend against and because it appears to be particularly suited for WMD.

A ballistic missile has been defined as “a rocket-powered delivery vehicle that has some form of guidance system, that is primarily intended for use against ground targets, and that travels a large portion of its flight in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.” While aircraft or cruise missiles might be better suited to deliver chemical or biological weapons, ballistic missiles may be ideal for delivery of WMD (biological, chemical or nuclear) against specific point targets or for terror attacks designed to intimidate a population. In general, compared to aircraft, ballistic missiles are harder to defend against, swifter in their delivery, and easier to hide from opposing forces. They may also be cheaper to acquire and maintain than modern types of combat aircraft. Precisely because they appear to represent the highest state of technological advancement and are less common than aircraft, their acquisition by a state may be considered particularly prestigious. Thus, it is no coincidence that virtually all states known to possess or suspected of developing WMD also maintain ballistic missile programmes.

Over a dozen states in addition to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council possess or are developing ballistic missiles with ranges of over 300 kilometres. Most of these counties also have active WMD programmes. These countries include India, Iran, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria and until recently, Iraq. Countries of proliferation concern vary widely in their ability to produce missiles, extend their capabilities or design new types. Practically all such states depend on assistance or at least purchases of supplies from abroad; outside the most industrially advanced states, only Israel, India and China can be considered truly independent in missile design and production.

Despite limited success in some instances, the Missile Technology Control Regime has proven unable to completely stem the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the number of states acquiring such missiles and their production capability will continue to grow. Of greatest concern is the situation in South Asia, where India and Pakistan appear to be involved in a nuclear ballistic missile “race” with potentially severe consequences for regional and global security. The ballistic missile programs of some other states (such as Iran, Israel, North Korea, Syria) are also worrisome because they have acquired, or soon will have, the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction against neighbouring states and foreign military forces within their respective regions and even, in some cases, beyond.

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Canada’s Role in Stemming the Tide of Proliferation

The Government of Canada firmly believes that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems poses a significant threat to international peace and stability. While the immediate threat of Canada being directly targeted for an attack with a weapon of mass destruction is low, Canadian troops serving in peacekeeping or peace-enforcement missions, as well as other Canadian citizens abroad, may be at higher risk of attack. As delivery ranges increase, some of Canada’s allies are being rendered vulnerable to such attacks against their home territories. In the longer term, as proliferation increases, a few states potentially hostile to Canadian interests could acquire the capability to strike Canada directly.

Canada is party to a number of international treaties forbidding the transfer of weapons of mass destruction such as the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In addition, Canada was one of the original signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, these treaties have not deterred non-signatories and certain states that ignore their treaty commitments from attempting to acquire WMD materials and technology. Canada is also actively promoting the development of an effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and advocates an immediate and universal moratorium on the production of fissile materials for weapons and explosive purposes.

Canada is also a part of several international supplier regimes and cooperation agreements designed to control the transfer of WMD technology and materials to countries of proliferation concern through the strengthening of national export control measures. These include the Australia Group (chemical and biological warfare); the Nuclear Suppliers Group, also known as the London Club (nuclear weapons and related dual-use technology); the Missile Technology Control Regime (missiles and unmanned aircraft capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction); and the Wassenaar Arrangement (transfer of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies).

Canada’s technological leadership makes it a potential source of expertise, materials and technology for states pursuing WMD or ballistic missile programs. As a result, Canada remains a target for clandestine and illicit procurement activities by countries of proliferation concern. In addition, Canada is a major world supplier of uranium and nuclear power technology. Plutonium from a Canadian-supplied reactor was used in India’s first nuclear explosion. It would be highly embarrassing to Canada if Canadian-produced expertise, materials or technology were again used by a state to produce weapons of mass destruction or their delivery vehicles.

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The Mandate and Role of CSIS

In response to these threats and the government’s security intelligence priorities, the Service has refocused its operations to create a more intensive, strategic investigative effort against proliferation and ensure timely advice is provided to the government on this threat to national security. In July 2002, CSIS created the Counter Proliferation Branch, which combines the expertise of both the counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism fields to address the merging threat of weapons of mass destruction.

The branch fulfills its role, within the CSIS mandate, by collecting information related to biological, chemical and nuclear weapons development programs undertaken by foreign governments or terrorist organizations. Through exchange relationships with foreign governments and by working closely with federal government departments and agencies, including the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Department of National Defence, the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, the National Research Council and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, the branch is able to expand upon and share its knowledge about threats and emerging trends in the area.

The changing face of terrorism has made the potential use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons in a terrorist attack a reality. A recent case involving ricin in the United Kingdom demonstrates how easy it is to produce biological agents. Instructions are readily available on the Internet. Anyone with an undergraduate knowledge of chemistry has the skill to produce them. Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Service investigations into the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction have been expanded. The Service monitors all information regarding terrorist interest in acquiring such weapons.

The primary objective of CSIS investigations is to forewarn government of threats to national security. With the information it gathers, the Service develops assessments of potential WMD threats within Canada or against Canadian interests, which are distributed to the broader security and intelligence community and to other federal government departments and agencies. In addition, the Service works closely with other government departments and law enforcement agencies to counter these threats.

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Conclusion

The proliferation of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons and their delivery systems is one of the most important security intelligence challenges facing CSIS today. The challenge is evolving as more is learned about the progress being made by foreign countries in their weapons development programs and as certain terrorist groups begin to covet the power and destructive force these weapons represent. Through its dedication to its mandate, CSIS has a vital role to play in ensuring that, to borrow from the comments of the Secretary General of NATO, we limit the number or triggers and the fingers on those triggers.

Date modified: 2005-11-14

Important Notices