Backgrounder No. 16

Operations Abroad

May 2004

Introduction

This Backgrounder, one of a series, will attempt to put into context the issue of Canada’s security intelligence operations outside of Canada - in part because there continue to be questions, and perhaps some confusion, about the issue (often resulting from definitional problems) and in part because the nature and scope of CSIS operations abroad have changed over the years.¹

Section 12 of the CSIS Act sets out the primary mandate of the Service: Collecting information and intelligence related to “threats to the security of Canada”, a term defined in section 2 of the CSIS Act.²

Historical Background

Canada’s first security intelligence organization was established by Sir John A. Macdonald before Confederation. It operated in a small area along the borders of Upper Canada, crossing over that border to secretly collect information on the Fenians and the implications of the American Civil War for Canada’s security.

At the turn of the century, rumours of American plots to annex the Yukon were investigated through the surveillance of suspected plotters in the United States and Canada, and by infiltrating some American miners’ organizations.

The First World War saw further activities in the United States directed against agents suspected of espionage and subversion. Before the United States’ entry into World War l, the Commissioner of the Royal North West Mounted Police directed, from the force’s headquarters in Regina, investigations on persons of German and Austrian extraction suspected of launching espionage or sabotage activities against Canada from the western United States.

When the RCMP became responsible for collecting security intelligence in 1920, it adopted the policy of restricting its covert operations to within Canada. This practice changed with the creation of first Special Branch and later the RCMP Security Service. In its 1981 report, the McDonald Commission described the (then) current practice as follows:

Covert Security Service operations outside Canada today are conducted on an ad hoc basis. These cases involving foreign travel always arise from an internal security investigation begun in Canada. Generally, the rationale for such operations is that the information sought relates directly to the internal security of Canada and is not the kind of information that can be or should be obtained through liaison with friendly security and intelligence agencies.

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The McDonald Commission

In considering what might constitute an appropriate framework for meeting Canada’s security needs, the McDonald Commission considered the proper scope of security intelligence activities outside Canada. In doing so, the Commission discussed the distinction between “offensive” and “defensive” intelligence agencies, finding those terms somewhat confusing and unhelpful since the distinctions could refer to any one of the three following and different ways of categorizing intelligence organizations:

(a) on the basis of the kind of intelligence collected

Intelligence is often divided into categories such as “security intelligence” (threat-related) or “foreign intelligence” (non threat-related information about foreign individuals or states), the former sometimes within the purview of defensive services and the latter part of the mandate of offensive services.

(b) on the basis of the activities of a service

Services which engage in “covert” or “executive” actions such as assassinations or attempting to promote regime change in foreign countries are sometimes described as offensive services.

(c) on the basis of the geographic location of an agency’s activities

Services which operate within their own country’s borders are sometimes described as defensive services and those which operate outside sometimes as offensive services.

The Commission noted that the mandate it recommended for the new service could be considered to be “defensive” both in the sense that the intelligence to be collected must pertain to threats to the security of Canada, and in the sense that the service’s mandate be confined to collecting and analysing information and producing intelligence. However, in discussing the geographic location of a security intelligence agency’s activities, McDonald said:

If security intelligence investigations which begin in Canada must cease at the Canadian border, information and sources of information important to Canadian security will be lost. .... If to operate abroad is “offensive”, then Canada’s security intelligence agency should be offensive in this sense ....

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The CSIS Act

When adopted in 1984, the CSIS Act reflected the McDonald Commission’s recommendations with regard to the collection of security intelligence abroad.

As noted earlier, section 12 of the CSIS Act defines the Service’s primary operational mandate and was consciously drafted to contain no restriction at all about where the Service may collect such information. Further, nothing prohibits the Service from retaining intelligence related to foreign states or persons if the information is acquired in relation to the investigation of the threats under section 12.

As the (then) Solicitor-General Bob Kaplan said during debate on the Bill:

there is no statutory requirement that the entire activities of the Security Intelligence Service be performed in Canada. I think that would be unduly inhibiting.

Though the specific challenges that Canadian national security might face in the future were unpredictable, those responsible for drafting the legislation foresaw the need for a legal framework that would enable the new service to adapt to changes in the global security environment.

While the CSIS Act places no geographic limits on the collection of intelligence about threats to the security of Canada nor on the techniques, covert or otherwise, used in such collection, CSIS is restricted in its ability to collect non threat-related foreign intelligence ³ in relation to the defence of Canada or the conduct of the international affairs of Canada. While security intelligence collection remains the priority for the Service, the collection in Canada of such non threat-related foreign intelligence has been a growing part of the Service’s operations.

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The Changing Threat

In the early days of CSIS, the majority of the operational resources of the Service were dedicated to threats from espionage, clandestine foreign interference and subversion (the latter ending with the closure of the Service’s Counter Subversion branch in 1988). While operations were conducted abroad in response to unique and specific circumstances (for instance, in relation to an East Bloc defector or an existing human source who had access to unique information abroad), this type of activity was the exception rather than the norm.

Over time, however, CSIS has shifted its operational priorities to meet requirements related to public safety, most notably exemplified in the growing threats of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. By 1989/1990, the Service’s operational priorities, on which Cabinet is consulted, specified public safety as the number one requirement, a ranking which remains current.⁴

Given that virtually all current threats to the security of Canada either have their origins abroad or are manifested across international borders, CSIS has had to increasingly look outside Canada’s borders, both to understand the threat and to build strong cooperative relationships with intelligence services around the world. As a result, the number of liaison arrangements with foreign security and intelligence organizations has grown - from around 50 in the late 1980s to nearly 250 today.

In addition to overt liaison activity, foreign covert operational activities have also been expanded and changed. In the mid-90s this often meant cooperating with a sister service from another country, establishing joint operations to obtain information of mutual security concern. Such operations remain an important part of the Service’s repertoire. Since the late 90s, however, always subject to resource considerations and a careful risk assessment, the Service has increasingly engaged in covert foreign operations. This change was due, in part, to the changing nature of the threat; it was also a logical development of the Service’s growing experience in these operations and, lastly, because of our country’s often unique access to individuals and sources able to provide information about threats to the security of Canada. Our centralized information holdings, which include all intelligence (whether collected domestically, outside of Canada or received from liaison partners) enable the Service to fully analyse this information, all subject to full access and review by our review agencies.

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Current Practice

The accelerating international dimensions of the terrorist threat have seen foreign collection techniques employed more frequently. As expertise has grown, CSIS’s foreign operations have expanded to include, amongst others, such techniques as: tasking human sources to travel abroad, recruiting foreign sources, meeting those sources in third countries.

As the (former) Solicitor General noted in Parliament in 2001:

Mr. Speaker, what I am telling my honourable colleague, and I have said this many times in the House, is that CSIS has the authority to investigate, inside of this country and outside of this country, any activity that threatens Canada. That is the mandate of CSIS.

As noted earlier, subject always to resource considerations and a careful assessment of the risk, CSIS will continue to consider the use of covert intelligence operations outside of Canada if it will assist in investigating and better informing the government about the threats that we face to our national security.

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¹ For more information on the history and mandate of CSIS, refer to other Backgrounders available on the CSIS Web site. Titles include: The CSIS Act; The CSIS Mandate; Accountability and Review; and CSIS and the Intelligence Cycle.

² For the exact wording of both section 12 and the definition of “threats to the security of Canada” in section 2, refer to the CSIS Act available on the CSIS Web site.

³ “Foreign intelligence” in the context of section 16 of the CSIS Act means “information or intelligence relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of (a) any foreign state or group of foreign states; or (b) any person other than [a Canadian]. Under section 16, CSIS may assist in the collection of such information but only within Canada and only on the personal request of the Minister of National Defence or the Minister of Foreign Affairs and with the consent of the Solicitor General.

⁴ For further information on how the nature of terrorism has changed and what the response of Canada and CSIS has been, please refer to various CSIS publications such as: International Terrorism: the Threat to Canada or Operational Programs: Counter-Terrorism available on the CSIS Web site.

Date modified: 2005-11-14

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