Policy Research Initiative
Projet de recherche sur les politiques

Canada-US Regulatory Co-operation

Symposium Report

October 2004

PRI Project
North American Linkages

report by
Bryne Purchase

Canada

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I. Introduction

I was asked to participate in, and write a synopsis of a day-long symposium, hosted by the Policy Research Initiative (PRI) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), on Canada-US regulatory co-operation. My observations follow, based on what turned out to be a very lively discussion. I have credited by name only those who gave formal remarks. However, I have tried to reflect the views of all who spoke.

The day produced several key themes that form the outline of this report. There was often substantial agreement within a theme, although many different perspectives were brought to the table. The essence of the four formal presentations is briefly reviewed in text boxes. These presentations are available if the reader wishes to pursue them in greater detail.[1]

The central purpose of the Symposium was to debate how to move forward on this policy agenda with a clear, practical, and above all, politically achievable strategy. Jean-Pierre Voyer chaired the final session dedicated exclusively to this issue. On balance, a viable strategy for making quick progress, in a few priority areas, was clearly articulated. The final section of this review provides the details.

II. Potential Benefits of Regulatory Co-operation

For an economist, a rule or regulation, once fabricated, is a perfect example of a public good. The rule can be adopted in countless other jurisdictions at no additional cost. This is true no matter how costly the initial rule-making process was. (Of course this does not apply to subsequent monitoring and enforcement costs associated with the regulation in each jurisdiction). In addition, it is virtually impossible to stop another jurisdiction from unilaterally appropriating the regulation. And, typically, this is not even a matter of concern.

[1] For copies of the presentations, please contact Doug Blair at (613) 947-3912 or at d.blair@prs-srp.gc.ca.

The same "public good" conditions apply to the information contained in regulatory product approval processes. This is true no matter how costly it was to obtain the information that permitted the product approval.

What is the point of this? These public good attributes make the world of regulation one in which it is *very possible* to get something of value for virtually no resource expenditure in return. If existing regulatory resources are already employed in these activities, they could then be redeployed, for example to greater post-market monitoring and compliance activities or to areas of other greater priority or risk. This point was made by the PRI's André Downs and Doug Blair, and also by Jay Myers of the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters Association.

Munir Sheikh noted that, given Canada's small open economy, Canadian regulators face the daunting task of essentially replicating the same work as US regulators, but with only 10 percent of the resources. Therefore, Canadian regulators must work "smarter," and regulatory co-operation is a way to achieve that goal. Similarly, Scott Jacobs argued that while the federal government will need some level of investment in skills to implement the recommendations of the External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, it is completely unrealistic to benchmark Canada's regulatory resources against those in the United States. Canada needs to deploy resources more strategically from a risk perspective. In the same vein, Bruce Doern noted that it is critical for the federal government to maintain its regulatory science capacity.

While potential administrative resource gains associated with regulatory co-operation were not estimated, they could be very large relative to the total resource costs of the federal (or, indeed, a provincial) public administration budget. Within the domestic context, the Ontario government has a keen interest in pursuing potential resource savings through greater federal provincial regulatory co-operation. It would be useful to have estimates of the potential savings.

But the possible benefits of a wider adoption of common rules do not stop with administrative resource gains. Once rules are adopted in other jurisdictions, they have additional positive economic impacts. As Scott Jacobs pointed out, regulations define markets, and regulatory harmonization widens those markets. A wider market allows for greater specialization, economies of scale and, most importantly, greater competition and innovation. This is where the gains become even more impressive.

A number of participants argued the need for domestic federal-provincial regulatory co-operation and its potential benefits. Julia Hill noted the desire of provinces to participate with the federal regulators on specialized teams to improve regulatory co-operation within Canada on major projects. Several business representatives lauded this approach. Certainly in the area of large-scale energy projects there are potentially very large gains for the overall Canadian economy.

Exhibit I: "Canada-US Regulatory Co-operation – Charting a Path Forward" PRI Preliminary Interim Report by André Downs and Doug Blair

Why Focus on Canada-US Regulatory Co-operation?

- Benefits of NAFTA have not been fully realized; significant productivity and income gaps exist between Canada and the United States.
- Similarity of regulatory objectives; close geographic proximity; high level of economic integration; high level of trust and close working relationships between regulators.

Estimates of Potential Gains from Regulatory Co-operation

- Could increase per capita income by up to two percent.
- Cash flow analysis of new drugs, pesticides, and chemical substances suggests the value of sales could increase by about 10 percent, net income by over eight percent and rates of return by almost five percent.

Policy Proposal

- Move forward on Canada-US regulatory co-operation while recognizing concerns over Canadian sovereignty, values, and identity.
- Develop an overall strategy and take immediate action in low-risk areas.

The PRI research results provide quantitative estimates of the potential benefits from Canada-US regulatory co-operation. They do so at both an economy-wide level and, using a new cash flow model, at the sector-specific level. These empirical results were largely unchallenged at the Symposium; in particular several participants welcomed the cash flow model as an important and interesting new tool that accurately reflected the actual business decision-making process.

There were, however, a few recommendations for further refinements, such as expanding the analysis to assess benefits to the United States as well as Canada, attempting to introduce a more probabilistic approach, and breaking out the potential gains into lower administrative costs, larger corporate returns, and better outcomes.

Caveats

While there was general agreement on the usefulness of the cash flow analysis as a tool, there was no agreement that it represented all the information that was necessary to guide policy. Tony Porter, for example, noted the inherent institutional complexity across many different sectors. No one single approach is likely to fit all sectors. Others similarly emphasized the lack of homogeneity across sectors. It is an issue to which we return below. Porter also argued that there are transaction costs associated with harmonization, including negotiation and other protocol development costs that need to be considered. Diane Gorman's presentation also alluded to some of those costs in Canada's dealings with US regulatory authorities.

There are also risks. The presentation by Michael Keenan reflected the effects, on both the agriculture sector and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, of the ongoing problems with US market access following the discovery of BSE in Canada's cattle industry. Since NAFTA, Canada's agriculture industry has become deeply leveraged on access to the US market. The

gains have been immense. But a large US market share means the political risks are great; witness softwood lumber. The industrial organization of agriculture pits small commodity producers against small commodity producers in a highly politicized environment. However, this is unlike many other sectors where common ownership by global corporations, operating in both countries, helps to mitigate the political risks.

Keenan argued that the benefits are worth the risks of being heavily dependent on the United States. But he also argued that it requires a multiple policy approach to the way risk is managed in the agri-food sector.

Exhibit II "Regulatory Co-operation, North American Integration, and the Agri-Food Sector" by Michael Keenan

Experience to Date

- Government has successfully reduced border costs in North America through a wide range of policy changes in the agri-food sector (e.g., NAFTA).
- Economic integration has deepened, and sales to the US have soared.
- Heavy US market dependence exacerbates the impact of losing market access due to disease concerns (e.g., BSE case).

Policy Implications

- Regulatory co-operation is necessary, but the associated risk cannot be managed with regulatory co-operation alone.
- There is a need for a broader response including greater domestic risk management, trade diversification, and other industrial strategies to reduce catastrophic economic impacts.

III. Regulatory Decision Processes

Regulation is not only a pervasive policy tool of government, it is unique in the way governments organize themselves to decide on its use. The collective effects of regulation on society and the economy are enormous, but little is know about them. In this regard, Bruce Doern argued that governments do not collect enough information about regulations and that Statistics Canada should be more aggressive in this regard. The lack of data stifles analysis and impoverishes public debate.

As well, unlike tax or expenditure policy, regulatory policy, in terms of its collective impacts, has no single ministerial accountability or focus. This is notwithstanding various administrative tools and requirements for regulatory alternative, cost-benefit, or business impact analyses. Several participants seized on this issue as an important aspect in dealing with the matter of regulatory co-operation.

Munir Shiekh, with the practised eye of a long-time senior public servant, took up the question of why we do not always get the least costly regulatory policy. He noted that regulations are frequently extremely complex and obtuse. And while regulatory protections come at a cost, ministers and senior officials are not paying close attention.

The question of accountability for all regulatory impacts, including costs associated with delay, was reflected in the presentation by Diane Gorman. Ms. Gorman noted that her department, while "playing a role" in the development of industry, is ultimately accountable "first and foremost" for one priority – the health and safety of Canadians. Another participant made essentially the same point, from a different perspective, by commenting that many ministers and their departments do not ultimately care about economic issues, because they are not their primary concern. Moreover, there is no central organization or forum in the government where these concerns can be addressed. We return to this issue in the final section.

IV. The Potential Cost of Regulatory Co-operation: Canada-US Cultural Differences

Is there an important opportunity cost in regulatory co-operation? Do Canadians give up something of value by cooperating? Whether a rule or product approval in one jurisdiction is of value in another depends, of course, on the tastes and predispositions of the respective consuming publics. This is an important issue that received extensive discussion at the Symposium.

Scott Jacobs voiced the opinion that in the convergence of Canada-US regulations there should be no concern about diminished consumer protection or the adoption of the minimum standard. He argued that regulatory objectives and outcomes in the two countries were virtually identical. He also argued that, first and foremost, the United States was concerned about regulatory quality. John Kirton, although not convinced of the efficacy of an across-the-board approach to regulatory harmonization, offered evidence, in the context of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, that when Canada moved to US standards on DDT, it led to Mexico increasing its standards.

Diane Gorman, in her presentation, alluded to public opinion surveys done for Health Canada in which Canadians, quite logically, supported international regulatory harmonization provided it resulted in "net benefits." More importantly, she said, those benefits must include, "first and foremost, higher international standards for safety, quality, and efficacy." It is not a question of preventing a drift through harmonization to a lower common denominator, but rather to press for *more* stringent health and safety standards elsewhere.

In short, this evidence seems to imply a kind of Canadian "cultural imperialism" when it comes to regulation. Louise Rozon cited similar survey results. John Kirton also cautioned that Canada-US values are not similar, and indeed may not be converging over a wide set of issues.

Grace Skogstad argued strongly that not only were Canadian values not similar to those in the United States, but regulatory quality may be at risk in the United States, because that country was moving away from the "precautionary principle." That principle, although variously defined, implies that one should regulate even though there is not scientific

certainty that serious harm will occur. In the most aggressive form, it can imply that one should prevent an activity unless there is scientific certainty that harm *will not* occur.

Louise Rozon similarly argued that Canadians did not share US values and wanted greater regulatory precaution. Diane Gorman had earlier argued that by harmonizing with US regulations on therapeutic products, Canadians would be sacrificing an element of precaution in their current regulatory structure. Health Canada would not be able to observe first the post-market effects of a product in the United States. In short, she saw some net advantage in delayed Canadian access. This is notwithstanding that "access" was reported to be the first priority of Canadians.

Exhibit III: "Health Canada and International Regulatory Co-operation"
by Diane C. Gorman

Mandate

- The Health Products and Food Branch of Health Canada remains firmly focused on one priority – the best interests of Canadians. The goal, first and foremost, is to help Canadians maintain and improve their health.
- But Health Canada also plays a role in delivering a strong health products industry that stimulates R&D investment, jobs, and growth for Canadians.

The Public Interest

- The overriding concern for Canadians and their governments is access.
- Opinion research supports international regulatory harmonization, provided it results in net benefits – first and foremost, higher, more stringent international standards for safety, quality and efficacy. Canadians have to be able to trust that their government will protect them, and place their interests first.

Recent Progress in Improving Access

- The Therapeutics Access Strategy (TAS) is Health Canada's response to the Government's commitment to improve the regulatory process for drugs. Within a year, TAS will put drug approval times on a par with international standards, as well as improving transparency, strengthening post-market vigilance, forging better links across the health system, and supporting innovative new therapies.
- Over the past year, Health Canada signed international co-operative agreements with the United States, Mexico, Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom to exchange regulatory information about therapeutic products. The Health Products and Food Branch is now considering a risk-based approach to regulatory co-operation, which might entail accepting or referencing decisions made by the US Food and Drug Administration and other regulators for low-risk products.
- Canada has taken an international leadership role in regulating human cells, tissues, and organs for transplantation and the development and approval of vaccines and immuno-therapy products for SARS and new natural health product regulations.

Risks

- Joint reviews of therapeutic products may be beneficial, but there are numerous hurdles and risks, including the length of time it takes to develop common approaches (e.g., pesticides), and political differences (e.g., BSE and dietary supplements). For marketing reasons, private industry often does not submit concurrently in both countries; concurrent submissions would mean that Canada loses post-US-market data on effectiveness.

The precautionary principle elicited a spirited discussion. Bill Robson argued that we should de-mythologize the debate – especially with regard to the precautionary principle. He argued, for example, that Canada's position on Kyoto might not, in actual accomplishment as opposed to rhetoric, be that different from the US position. Bruce Doern made a similar point with respect to the US reliance on litigation to encourage high product standards as well as compliance.

The question of differences in the use of litigation to encourage high standards, as well as to enforce strict adherence to standards, was also commented on by many participants. Michael Keenan argued that market discipline in the form of brand image is often overlooked, but actually plays an important role in maintaining standards. A malfunctioning product can sharply reduce the market value of an entire enterprise.

Another participant pointed out that despite Canada and the United States having very different competition policy needs and regimes (with the United States relying more on civil law), co-operation is still achieved. Yet another participant noted that Canada-US differences in approaches to liability are overplayed. While US legal battles are often more sensational, Canada has thousands of product liability cases decided in court each year.

A number of participants weighed in on the question of science and politics. Sound regulatory frameworks based on science are running well ahead of the political will to implement them. As an illustration, both Keenan and Gorman pointed to the US political reaction in the BSE case. Of course, the public is not generally knowledgeable in scientific matters, and people typically develop opinions based on high-profile events, media coverage, and the political debate swirling around those same events.

In the end, Jean-Pierre Voyer asked whether Canadians really are more risk averse than US citizens. No one presented such evidence. Nor is it likely that one could collect definitive evidence across an entire population and a multitude of issues. Perhaps on some issues Canadians will appear more risk averse. But it is unlikely to be a cultural trait. Canadians are certainly not more risk averse on the matter of terrorism or BSE, for example. It depends on the circumstances. It is not even a function of some objective measure of risk. It matters how the question is framed and what information is provided to Canadians, or to anyone else, in determining what is a "precautionary approach."

Diane Gorman noted: "At the end of the day, Health Canada's job is to remain firmly focused on one priority – the best interests of Canadians." But Canadians cannot determine what is in their best interests unless they are given all types of information, not just information on the potential harmful effects of a product. They must receive information about the costs, in health and economic terms, imposed by restricting or delaying access to a product as well. It is not "precautionary" to ignore these other costs or delayed benefits.

And, in the end, if Canadians choose to put their trust in the Government and its regulators, then it is incumbent on those agents to take all the facts into account in their decisions. If they do not have organizational or legal structures in place to allow them to do so, then they must create these structures.

V. Maintaining Public Trust

Governments and their regulatory agencies are similar to their business counterparts in that both must maintain the trust of their consuming publics. As Diane Gorman noted: "Canadians have to be able to trust that their government will protect them, and place their interests first." As Skogstad, Porter, and others commented, regulatory processes are key to their legitimacy and to the maintenance of public trust. Any move to change those processes has to be cognizant of this important fact. It is critical that perceptions of bias be dispelled.

Louise Rozon offered some concrete advice on how to maintain and enhance legitimacy. She argued for transparency as a precondition of trust in regulatory affairs. All the known facts have to be disclosed. She also argued for objectivity in the research and in the presentation of the results. On the matter of objectivity, she argued that more than economists need to be involved. She then reminded all participants of the need for public involvement and wider public consultation.

VI. A Strategy for Going Forward

Regulatory policy has had many successful reforms. Yet it is an area that many in the business community feel has defied really dramatic or comprehensive change with respect to international co-operation. Certainly, there is nothing one can point to in the arena of regulation that so expands Canada's market access as the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement or NAFTA in respect to tariffs.

Exhibit IV: "Smart Regulation for Canada: The Way Forward" by Julia Hill

- The External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation called for a new federal regulatory strategy focusing on federal regulatory co-ordination, federal-provincial/territorial regulatory co-operation, international regulatory co-operation, risk management, instruments for government action, the regulatory process, and capacity.

International Regulatory Co-operation

- International regulatory co-operation should be a part of foreign policy, and North America should be the principal focus.
- Canada-specific regulations are only justified when no international or North American approach already exists, there are unique Canadian circumstances or priorities, or there is a lack of trust in regulatory practices of trading partners.

Experience to Date and Future Potential

- Canada and the United States already work together on several fronts, such as the Canada-US Four Corners Agreement for new chemical substances, and, in biotechnology, where good interactions are taking place between Canadian and US regulators.
- There are potential gains from common Canada-US risk management approaches, joint inspection and monitoring systems, and joint emergency responses.

Future Directions

- The Regulatory Affairs and Orders in Council Secretariat of the Privy Council Office is developing a public action plan, consulting with the public, federal-provincial/territorial partners, non-governmental organizations, industry, and international organizations, and working with the Canada-United States Secretariat at the Privy Council Office to develop a North American action plan.

But a new policy initiative has appeared on the horizon. Julia Hill's presentation addressed the recommendations of the federal government's External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation and the work of her group in developing an implementation strategy. Indeed, many of the Advisory Committee's core recommendations speak specifically and forcefully to the policy agenda of the Symposium. In particular the Advisory Committee recommended:

- North America should be the primary and immediate focus of the federal government's international regulatory co-operation efforts.

- Canada should promote joint and single product reviews for multiple markets and move toward accepting the approvals and reviews of products by its US and European Union trading partners in sectors where there are well established, internationally recognized conformity assessment procedures in place.

The key question is how to move forward from here. Scott Jacobs repeatedly made reference to the innate conservatism of Canada (and the United States) compared to the European Union and a number of other OECD countries. He characterized Canada's approach as one of "glacial governance." He argued forcefully for quick action on a broad front.

Jay Myers and others expressed the view that industry strongly supports the Smart Regulation initiative. But he also noted certain scepticism, and rhetorically asked whether the Committee's recommendations were really anything more than the current Government of Canada regulatory policy. In his view, there was a need to act quickly on regulatory co-operation with the United States. Others wanted to broaden to a more international initiative, while still others argued for a North American initiative by including Mexico.

The PRI paper by Downs and Blair proposed the notion of *accelerated incrementality*, recommending that the federal government encourage regulators to make faster progress on regulatory co-operation. A number of observers, including Porter and Skogstad, thought this incremental approach was the only workable solution given the complexity of each sector. It is a matter of choosing priority areas. They also felt this approach fit with the Smart Regulation Committee's emphasis on pragmatism. Still, others wanted the emphasis placed on "accelerated" rather than "incrementality."

Political Commitment

Everyone agreed that if the regulatory co-operation agenda was to move forward then it needed clear political commitment. However, outsiders tended to question the existence of any real commitment, whereas insiders felt it was there, but that political decision makers lacked a practical plan, and a compelling organizing principle, to give it effect. This was certainly the view of Phil Ventura and Munir Sheikh.

Practical Plan

The need for a practical plan in large measure turned on the question of the scale of the first initiative. Some argued for a deep and aggressive initiative on a broad front. Robson felt there would be a lack of political commitment to an incremental initiative. He argued for going beyond the PRI proposal. Others felt it made more sense to proceed in bite-sized chunks, beginning with priority sectors. In part this was because of the complexity of each sector and the lack of uniformity across all sectors. Starting too big, they contended, doomed the process to failure.

Phil Ventura was supportive of the PRI approach, and praised it for being a non- dogmatic, saleable approach to sustained progress. There would be no need to wait for the perfect political window. He argued for doing the analysis of areas where there are the biggest payoffs to Canada, and then to proceed. Louise Rozon suggested beginning with areas of low risk to dispel public fears and lack of trust. John Kirton suggested finding those areas where US and Canadian values were similar or converging, or entirely new areas where neither country has an existing policy.

Kirton also noted that the Commission for Environmental Cooperation is a great institutional model that has been a success and where the capacity is present. Another participant, building on that idea, suggested that the environmental issues around the Great Lakes would be a good place to begin. Doern generalized the approach by suggesting doing

research on specialized institutions where there has been successful co-operation that could be replicated in other sectors. Others suggested research into the European Union approach where a "basket" of sectors would be considered.

Engaging the Canadian Public

All agreed to the need to engage the Canadian public around some central theme. A number of participants suggested that the "border" was a good organizing principle. Doern offered the idea of a package of ideas or principles, perhaps including border security, but also other issues. For example, Doern argued that given an aging population, access to new drugs might be more saleable. Ventura also argued for a broader package of initiatives including security, health, energy, and the environment.

Obviously, how any initiative, even a "packaged" initiative, is framed, in terms of serving the "best interests of Canadians" or the "collective interests of North Americans", is key. The initial characterization or framing of the policy is likely to determine the course, and indeed the outcome, of any public debate.

Why Would the United States Engage?

It is clear that the United States would have an interest in security issues, but probably also energy and health care products. Scott Jacobs also addressed this question of why the United States would be interested in such an initiative. He argued that the United States is cautious, but that Canada is highly trusted. In his view, the timing is right for the right kind of proposal. What is needed is a trilateral initiative, not just bilateral, to capture US attention. Also, there has to be leadership at a high level in each government. Regulatory quality is critical to the United States and must be high on the agenda.

Need Internal Organizational Focus

A good political strategy has to be supported by a sound internal organizational framework. Munir Sheikh argued for an internal process that required departments to start with the US regulations, in terms of standards and expected outcomes, and deviate only where clearly justified by information and analysis. Robson argued for a similar approach. Myers suggested that the new *User Fees Act*, which requires departments to set standards and develop international benchmarks, is a good platform for moving forward.

Phil Ventura argued that the government already had a sound organizational model in the Smart Borders exercise. In that instance, there were three pages of risk-based principles followed by 30 specific actions with timelines. A traffic light approach was used, and departments did not want to be in the yellow or red. Moreover, he pointed to the fact that the Government has a Cabinet level political decision body ready to deal with Canada-US issues and initiatives.

Will Parliament Go Along?

Bruce Doern cautioned that we have a changing political situation in Canada, and Parliament wants a bigger role in shaping regulations by pre-approving regulation, or through including more details in statutes that it passes. Louise Rozon argued for a parliamentary committee to be established with respect to any major initiative on regulatory co-operation with the United States or within North America. Clearly, any political strategy must include the role of Parliament.

VII. The Way Ahead

The Symposium produced a framework for a strategy to move forward on a selective front. Overall, the key observations and conclusions from the discussion can be summarized as follows.

- There is a strong case for increasing Canada-US or North American regulatory co-operation.
- The political will to move forward exists, but a clear, practical plan is required.
- The plan should focus on selected priority sectors , taking account of both costs and benefits as well as current best practices.
- The plan must be supported by sound internal organizational and decision making structures, and provide a role for parliamentarians.

The final critical piece is the matter of the political strategy that will frame the initiative, and make it saleable to both Canadians and other North Americans.

Appendix 1 - Agenda

Symposium On Canada-US Regulatory Cooperation

"Charting A Path Forward"

Friday, October 29, 2004

Old City Hall, Fuller Room, 111 Sussex Drive, Ottawa

Event Objectives

- Present results from the PRI's Interim Report on Canada-US Regulatory Cooperation;
- Seek input from senior government officials, academics and other experts on empirical findings and policy implications of PRI's research to date;
- Identify areas for further research towards the completion of the project on Canada-US Regulatory Cooperation;
- Identify key policy and operational challenges that need to be addressed in order for regulators to move forward in the immediate, medium and longer term with greater Canada-US regulatory cooperation; and
- Discuss an implementation strategy/critical path forward.

Agenda **October 29, 2004**

8:30 **Continental Breakfast**

9:00 **Opening Remarks**

Jean-Pierre Voyer, Policy Research Initiative

9:15 **Plenary Session: Policy Research and Direction**

Chair **Bryne Purchase**, Former Deputy Minister, Government of Ontario

Speakers

Smart Regulations – Recommendations and Implementation
Julia Hill, Executive Director, Implementation, Smart Regulations Secretariat, Privy Council Office

PRI's Research into Canada – US Regulatory Cooperation
André Downs and **Doug Blair**, Policy Research Initiative

10:00 **Comments**

Tony Porter, McMaster University
Jay Myers, Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters
Bill Robson, C.D. Howe Institute

Discussion

11:00 **Break**

11:15 **Plenary Session: Lessons From the Field**

Chair **John Higginbotham**, Vice-President, Research and University Relations, Canada School of Public Service

Speakers

Canada – US Regulatory Cooperation and the Therapeutic Access Strategy **Diane Gorman**, Assistant Deputy Minister, Health Canada

Regulatory Cooperation in the Agri-Food Sector
Michael Keenan, Director General, Strategic Policy Branch, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada

12:00 **Comments**

Grace Skogstad, University of Toronto
John Kirton, University of Toronto
Louise Rozon, Option Consommateurs

Discussion

1:00 **Lunch**

1:45 **Plenary Session: Charting a Path Forward**

Chair **Jean-Pierre Voyer**, Policy Research Initiative

Panel **Munir Sheikh**, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, Expenditure Review
Phil Ventura, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Canada – US Relations Secretariat
Scott Jacobs, External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation
Bruce Doern, Carleton University and University of Exeter

Discussion

3:45 **Closing Remarks**