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**REPORT FROM THE ROUNDTABLE
LIVING TOGETHER: SHARING THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE**

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On March 28-30, 2001, the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development (CCFPD) brought together a group of experts to explore the Canadian experience with "Living Together" and possible applications of this experience to problems in Cyprus. The roundtable was a follow-up to work undertaken by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS) on Cyprus in the late 1980's and an earlier CCFPD Roundtable "Cyprus: Living Together in the New Century" (February, 2001). Participants included Ergün Olgun (Undersecretary to President Rauf Denktash), Altay Nevzat (Eastern Mediterranean University), Özdil Nami (Erdil and Sons Ltd.), Ozay Mehmet (Eastern Mediterranean University), Ronald Keith (University of Calgary), Ron Watts (Queens' University), and Kate White (Black & White Communications). Tareq Ismael (University of Calgary) and Steven Lee (Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development) co-chaired the meeting.

A final roundtable, scheduled for June 15-16, 2001 (Larnaca, Cyprus), will engage Canadian experts and Greek Cypriots.

The Roundtable report is divided into 6 main sections:

1. Introduction and Context
2. Government Structures
 - 2.1. Confederation: The Last Chance for Establishing a New Partnership in Cyprus
 - 2.2. Sharing the Canadian Experience of Living Together
 - 2.3. Comment and Discussion
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 - 5.2. Comments and Discussion
6. Reflections and Closing
 - 6.1. Role of the EU
 - 6.2. What is necessary for change
 - 6.3. Role of Canada and recommendations

Key recommendations for Canada include:

- Canadian (funding) agencies could promote joint Canadian-Cypriot activities by:
 - sponsoring exchange programmes for university students and faculty
 - giving grants to joint research teams
 - helping to organise citizen engagement roundtables
- Canada could use several foreign policy levers, including quiet diplomacy, to achieve the resumption of UN-sponsored negotiations.
- Political initiatives could include:
 - work on terminology for the upcoming UN Resolution
 - attempts to influence EU members to enhance their relations with Northern Cyprus.
- Canada could help breaking the "isolation pressure" applied by the Greek Cypriots and the EU on all aspects of the Turkish Cypriot life.

Priority areas for research include: federalism studies, water resources cooperation, culture studies, civil society organisations, the role of EU in the Cyprus settlement.

Helping to organise co-operative nonpolitical events, such as art exhibitions or sport activities, would be useful and may not be perceived as too controversial.

- Canada could become involved in Northern Cyprus through the Canada Council, for instance, which helps developing countries preserve their cultures. Protecting the Northern Cypriot heritage through UNESCO could also open space for Canada's engagement.

1. Introduction and Context

Ronald Keith (Head, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary) welcomed all the participants to Alberta and to the roundtable. In his opening remarks, he emphasised the important role universities play in addressing issues deemed intractable or "too sensitive" at the political level. One of the central advantages of scholars and researchers is that "universities are not hostage to politics," he said. Instead, their resources may be used in the service of civil societies.

Tareq Ismael (Co-chair, University of Calgary) expressed his appreciation for individuals who take responsibility and contribute to the development of Canada's public policy. He commended the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development (CCFPD) for organising events such as this roundtable - they contribute not only to better policy, but a vibrant civil society. Ozay Mehmet (Eastern Mediterranean University) added that this is the first event in Canada casting light on Northern Cyprus. He extended his warm welcome to Ergün Olgun (Undersecretary to President Rauf Denktaş), Altay Nevzat (Eastern Mediterranean University) and Özdil Nami (Erdil and Sons Ltd.) who came from Cyprus to join the roundtable.

Steve Lee (Co-chair, CCFPD) expressed his appreciation to the participants for their commitment to the development of Canada's foreign policy. He drew attention to the links and partnerships the CCFPD has build with the academic community in fulfilling its mandate.

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He set two goals for the roundtable: 1) to share information and perspectives and 2) to assess the needs for foreign policy development. The participants bring together diverse experiences and perspectives that have both, global and local focus. The outcome of this interdisciplinary discussion is to better understand each other and our societies. We may then apply this understanding to our needs, including the development of Canada's foreign policy, Steve Lee said. He drew attention to two previous initiatives. The first was led by the Canadian

Institute for International Peace and Security (CIPPS) between 1988-89,¹ the second by the CCFPD.² The CCFPD-led discussion came to surprisingly similar conclusions as the former, including:

- an emphasis on bottom-up approaches
- the importance of education
- Canadian role in helping with water and other functionally based "peacebuilding" projects
- the value of sharing (exposing) the Canadian experience with governance and "living together."

This final point is the starting point for today's discussion. There are two key elements of the Canadian experience to keep in mind. First, manifested by shifts in loyalty or in approaches to the minority-majority relationship, Canada has consciously and continually altered its identity over time. This was achieved through instruments including: political discourse, institutions, and symbols. **"Identity change is possible and, perhaps, necessary for diverse societies to live together,"** Steve Lee said. Second, Canada has used federalism as a flexible tool in the service of this change: accommodating overarching national identities *as well as* geographic size and differences. Today, federalism's two objectives have to be further adapted in the context of Indigenous Peoples, their land claims and other modern governance-related issues.

2. Government Structures

2.1. Confederation : The Last Chance for Establishing a New Partnership in Cyprus Ergün Olgun (Undersecretary to His Excellency Rauf Denktaş)

Ergün Olgun started his presentation by addressing two points raised in the opening remarks. First, he expressed his scepticism about any likely success in developing a common political identity in Cyprus in the near future. A shift toward a common identity may be problematic because the ethnic conflict on the island is rooted in a defence against an identity threat. Instead, an institutional approach to common interests is required, with the view that some common elements may grow in time. Second, appeals to future-focussed solutions are misguided: Justice can only be served by addressing past injustice.

¹See The Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Cyprus - Visions for the Future: A Summary of Conferences and Workshop Proceedings* (CIPPS, March 1990), Working Paper no. 21.

²See The Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, *Report form the Roundtable Cyprus: Living Together in the New Century* (CCFPD, February, 2001), no. 7005.2E.

He pointed out that despite the equal status of the two peoples in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots have been trying to take full control of the island in order to turn it into a Hellenic Republic, with the complicity of the international community. The right to self-determination of the Turkish Cypriots stems primarily from three sources:

- the British Parliament (which has acknowledged twice the right of the Turkish Cypriots for self determination, in 1956 and 1958)
- the 1960 Constitution (enshrining the equality of the two communities)
- international recognition and precedent (as an equal party and a subject of international law, the Turkish Cypriots, together with the Greek Cypriots, were a signatory to all the international treaties of 1960, which created the Republic).

According to Ergün Olgun, despite this clearly established right of the Turkish Cypriots to self-determination, the Greek Cypriots unilaterally changed the "equal partnership provisions" of the 1960 Constitution and ejected Turkish Cypriots from all the organs of the state in the wake of the 1963 coup. Since then, the Turkish Cypriots fought for and defended their status and rights without much international support (with the exception of Turkey). At the backdrop of intermittent violence and upheavals, two "sovereign" states developed on the island (each with a fully functioning democratic institutions, territory and distinct political, legal and economic systems). The struggle catalysed in 1974, when troops supporting the Greek junta invaded Cyprus, provoking a Turkish intervention - sanctioned by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Twenty years after the dissolution of the founding partnership, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established in 1983. In spite of these developments, the Greek Cypriots continue to claim to represent the whole island in international fora under the guise of the "government of Cyprus." Moreover, the Greek Cypriots have prevented the North from developing by imposing a crippling embargo. The embargo contributes to deepening polarisation between North and South and widens the confidence gap between the two sides.

Multilateral initiatives, including the UN process, have largely failed to bring a resolution. EU enlargement has been playing an ever increasing role. The Greek Cypriots refuse to recognise the sovereignty of the state as emanating from the two founding peoples in all these initiatives. In respect to the EU, they see their membership as a first step toward the union of the island with Greece "through the back door."

The central objectives of the Turkish Cypriots include:

- developing a self-sustaining economy without reliance on the South
- becoming a source of cooperation rather than rivalry between Turkey and Greece
- functioning as a bridge between Islam and Christianity
- playing a role in protecting (guaranteeing) Eastern civilisation on its "Western frontier"
- a united Cyprus could function as a pillar of stability and peace in the East Mediterranean (maintaining a balance of power)
- becoming empowered by using diversity as a tool to resolve tensions (rather than seeing diversity as a threat)
- cooperating with the Greek Cypriots, while retaining sovereignty
- preserving national identity and existence
- supporting and building institutions and mechanisms which would enable such cooperation and preserve national identity.

Ergün Olgun expressed the view that a confederation would address the objectives and needs of the Turkish Cypriots best. It may be the case that, as in former Yugoslavia, federal institutions would be incapable of functioning in Cyprus, he said. Confederations enable Peoples to preserve their separate national identities and political sovereignties while allowing them to build cooperative relationships based on the joint exercise of certain agreed powers and functions. Moreover, confederations may offer solutions to some globalization related challenges. In this context, a confederate Cyprus may serve well EU (and global) integration. According to Professor Daniel J. Elazar:³

Confederation and confederal arrangements are being revived as the postmodern form of federalism that seems to be particularly useful in connecting politically sovereign states that must accommodate themselves to the realities of new times. These include the growing interdependence among states deemed politically sovereign, the desire for linkage among states and peoples that will not require them to merge into new nations but enable them to preserve their separate national identities and existence, and recognition of the realities of ethnic distinctiveness and, at times, conflict.

Ergün Olgun drew attention to cases where confederations led to the establishment of federal unions. For instance, the federal union of modern Switzerland was preceded by a confederation of Swiss cantons. Germany's modern federal arrangements may be traced to the German confederation of the 19th century. The federal constitution of the U.S. is the successor to the Articles of Confederation.

2.2. Sharing the Canadian Experience of Living Together **Ronald Watts (Queens' University)**

Ronald Watts emphasised that by living together he means not integration or absorption but living side by side as distinct groups to achieve common goals. He focussed on 5 basic lessons of living together from the Canadian experience and the experience of other federations and confederations:

1. the value and limits of experiences of other countries
2. the danger of oversimplifying - perceiving federations and confederations as two different alternatives
3. special problems of bi-communal situations

³ Daniel J. Elazar, *Constitutionalising Globalisation, the Revival of Confederal Arrangements* (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 40; quoted by Ergün Olgun, "Confederation: the Last Chance for Establishing a New Partnership in Cyprus," *Perceptions* VI, no. 1 (March-May 2001): 26.

4. the importance of a supportive civil society and political culture underpinning formal structures
5. other relevant experiences with processes to break deadlock and impasses.

There is value in the experiences of other countries with federal and confederal systems for three main reasons:

1. to draw attention to possibilities
2. to point to unintended consequences from certain institutional arrangements
3. to provide positive and negative lessons - no example is useless

There are also important limitations:

- no pure models of federation or confederation are applicable everywhere - there is a need to adapt to local conditions
- applications operate differently in different conditions
- models can not be picked off the shelf.

The value of the Canadian experience includes two centuries of trying to reconcile different and distinct communities. Canadians have considered and tried various approaches (unitary, centralised and decentralised federation) and debated over federation *versus* confederation. **The value of our experience stems less from precise structures employed and contemplated, than from processes we have developed over time to reflect the need for tolerance, compromise and adjustment. Key issues have not been resolved once and for all, yet we continue trying. "Federalism in Canada is not a fixed ideal, but a process of evolution and change."**

The second point - danger of oversimplification - is particularly pertinent for Cyprus. **We must be wary of the "tyranny of terminology" or "lunacy over labels."** Terminology and labels detested by each side should be avoided. **As the debate over federation *versus* confederation in Cyprus and elsewhere demonstrates, use of terms that effectively reduce an issue to "either-or" prevents resolution.** Resolution is possible only when practical arrangements are addressed.

Both, federation and confederation combine shared-rule for common purposes with self-rule of component units for other purposes. The essential difference lies in the character of institutions for common purposes: in federations it is based on the citizens, in confederations on the constituent governments. There are enormous variations within each category of which Ronald Watts cited numerous examples. In some cases, federations may be more decentralised than confederations or contain some confederal elements.. There also exist many hybrids. For instance, the constitutional structures in 1867 Canada combined both, federal and some unitary elements. Other combinations include, for instance: confederal and federal elements (EU governing structures) or confederal and unitary elements (the original U.S. federal constitution). Despite Ergün Olgun's proposition, there are currently few examples of successful "pure" confederations in practice, he said.

Canada has a considerable experience in addressing constitutional issues in the context of a bi-communal situation. Lessons can be learned from 1840-1867 Act of Union, from the rejection of a two-unit federation in 1867, and more recently from the mega-constitutional debates 1960-2000 (which included discussion of concepts such as *status quo* federalism, renewed federalism and sovereignty-association or partnership). Like the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, French Quebecers in Canada account for about 24% of the total population. Canada has, however, important features which distinguish it from Cyprus including 10 provinces rather than 2 units, a multicultural element and a growing voice of Aboriginal Peoples. Federation with some confederal features is likely to evolve in Canada, rather than a sovereignty-association.

There are no existing two-unit confederations. Literature suggests that all two-unit federations are or have been troubled and relatively unstable. Some of the reasons include:

- insistence on unanimity in all matters has usually tended to produce impasses and deadlocks
- there is no opportunity for shifting alliances and coalitions that enable multi-unit federations to resolve stand-offs
- challenges are often reduced to a zero-sum game (every issue is seen in terms of a winner and a loser)

A possible solution is to convert into a multi-unit federation. Where not possible, federalism could be combined with confederal elements (i.e., unanimity on some agreed fundamental matters). Canada has implemented both solutions in the past.

Ronald Watts drew attention to the importance of supportive civil societies. He said that creating federal or confederal structures is not a panacea. **The experience of Canada and other federations and confederations indicates that even more important than their formal structures has been public acceptance of basic values and processes required for their operation.** Multiple identities within an overarching sense of shared purposes and objectives have to be explicitly recognised and accommodated. Essential for Canada and others has been the acceptance of diversity, tolerance, compromise and a sense of trust. The question is how to achieve these conditions when they do not exist. Undoubtedly, creating them would be a long term, step by step process. When there are conditions lacking, other solutions, including a separation, may have to be considered.

Conditions for conflict resolution do not seem to exist presently in Cyprus. Nonetheless, there are some relevant examples from around the world where deadlock was broken, including the unification of South Africa and even European integration. These cases demonstrate several important lessons:

- the value of a grand gesture to transform attitudes
- the importance of a concession from the majority, but also from the other side
- the need for each side to think not just of its own interests and needs but also of the interests and needs of the other side
- unless each side sees gains, an acceptable solution is unlikely to be found.

In Cyprus, the issues of EU membership and of Greece-Turkey relations may contribute to breaking the impasse. There may be room for a watershed gesture (action) in this context.

2.3. Comment and Discussion

Reservations were expressed about the confederal proposal suggested by Ergün Olgun. Many agreed with Ronald Watts' caution against the tyranny of terminology. On the one hand, bi-communal societies have perennial problems in reconciling differences. On the other hand, the bedrock of trust for sustaining a federal arrangement is non-existent. For both parties a confederal or a federal state is the second best solution. In reality, the number one solution for the Greek Cypriots is a unitary state. Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriots desire an independent sovereign state. The European Commission worries that a confederation would actually enable the Turkish Cypriots to develop an ultimately independent state.

Two independent states may be the least worst solution for Cyprus. For this to happen, the Turkish Cypriot side has to be much more willing to make territorial concessions. Although it is not "politically correct" for the Greek Cypriots to say so, they would be willing to have a separate state if concessions are given.

A point was raised that the focus on state-based activities may be misdirected. Understanding on the island could perhaps be reached through people-to-people contacts outside of the formal political framework. Common grass-roots interests could thus be developed across the divide. Two key problems were outlined regarding this scenario:

1. Inter-personal links, including marriages and business partnerships, are quite rare for historical and institutional reasons (for instance, the Orthodox Church does not allow inter-marriages between its members and Muslims).
2. The Greek Cypriot side prevents people-to-people interaction through a comprehensive embargo of the TRNC and the policy of "recognition by implication." The embargo is so wide-ranging that "the Turkish Cypriots can not even sell fish to their counterparts in the South." The ban on contacts, formal or informal, with the TRNC and its citizens seeks to avoid recognition of an illegal state. This policy touches all aspects of Turkish Cypriot life including sports, cultural activities and academic research. For instance, the Greek lobby in the U.S. mounted pressure against the involvement of a Professor from the Central Connecticut University in a conference held by the East Mediterranean University (EMU) in the TRNC.⁴ In a similar vein, an Internet message was sent out discouraging scholars to attend an EMU archaeological conference on the basis that it is sponsored by an illegal entity.

⁴ On this incident, see an article by Christopher Vasilopoulos in *Turkish Daily News* (March 3, 2001).

In order to build inter-personal relationships, distrust and fear will have to be eliminated. **The situation on the island begs the question – how to identify benefits for Greek Cypriots from any change in their current approach?** What are the incentives for the Greek Cypriots to build trust, to allow exchange, to give concessions, in other words, to move beyond the current stand-off?

It was argued that the questions of incentives does not take stock of historical facts. Creating incentives for the Greek Cypriots would amount to the "robbed person asking the thief how much would she want in exchange for her loot." Moreover, identifying incentives for the Greek Cypriots may be increasingly difficult within the EU context. **Unilateral admission of Southern Cyprus into the EU would likely wipe out any incentives there are to find a resolution with the North.** The fact that such a move could preclude economic ties with Turkey does not seem to be a sufficient motivator for the Greek Cypriot side.

It was noted that the incentives may rest with civil society. Just like Canadians in British Columbia who wish to resolve their relationship (including territorial) with the Indigenous Peoples, Greek Cypriots surely would prefer to live free of the stigma related to their relationship with the Turkish Cypriots. In this context, civil society may be a tool in pushing for a resolution.

Others doubted the viability of this course: for a civil society to function properly, democracy is required. The Greek Cypriot understanding of "Cyprus" is inherently undemocratic: the Greek Cypriot leadership claims sovereignty over the entire island without the sanction of the Turkish Cypriot side, the TRNC has been subjected to embargoes which effectively prevent the North from development. How can the UN (and the international community) tolerate such an abrogation of democracy by their own member? Democracy is one of the criteria for EU membership. It is difficult to understand how the EU can accept the Greek Cypriot side as the sole representative of the island without violating its own democratic principles. Civil society can be used as a tool to undermine resolution, rather than promote it, some suggested that this is precisely what is happening in Cyprus today.

3. Common Functional Arrangements

3.1. The Economics of Living Together or Side by Side in Cyprus? Ozay Mehmet (Carleton University and Eastern Mediterranean University)

Ozay Mehmet said the cost of settlement is perhaps too high for both parties today. Factors contributing to this situation include demographic and political changes. North Cyprus has experienced a remarkable population growth due to a relatively high birth rate and a pull-effect of the labour market. The latter causes the inflow of workers from southern Turkey, who now amount to about 18.4% of the population.

While the South has achieved rapid economic growth, the North has grown at a slower rate. The agricultural sector in the North is twice as large as in the South, while the secondary

and tertiary sectors are comparable. Tourism and off-shore banking are especially active in the South. The government sector in the North is considerably more top-heavy than in the South.

The embargos make Northern Cyprus financially dependent on Turkey. Unwittingly, this fiscal dependency is pushing the integration of the TRNC with the mainland. Turkey is the biggest source of imports for the TRNC. Deficits are covered by fiscal transfers, also from Turkey. There has been growth in illegal trade between North and South Cyprus in the recent past. Official and quasi-legal trade is small. Illegal trade exacts heavy penalties. Financial flows between the two parts are quite small and are intermediated through three banks. They also include illegal payments from smuggling and illegal money laundering.

The EU could be a relevant model for Cyprus when it is ready to formalise economic power-sharing arrangements. The approach will have to be gradual and conditions accepted by both sides. There would likely be 4 distinct stages:

1. Confidence building - in this stage the quasi-legal economic relations would be formalised.
2. Living side by side
3. Stability - during this stage efforts to achieve economic harmonisation between the two parts would be initiated. Here, the Cypriots could learn much from Canada's experience with fiscal federalism. Crucial and controversial questions will have to be addressed at this stage including who is going to pay and how. There is a considerable gap in incomes between the South and the North, making income-equalisation efforts challenging.
4. Economic union

Ozay Mehmet raised the possibility of promoting reconciliation through common water management projects. Both sides face a critical water shortage. **Irrigation technologies in the East Mediterranean may be an area for North-South coordination, especially when it comes to importing fresh water from Turkey.** With good will and help from countries like Canada there may be space for cooperation.⁵ "Even enemies need water," he concluded.

3.2. Comments and Discussion

It was pointed out that equalisation of incomes is not the goal of fiscal federalism in Canada. Equalisation schemes in Canada are aimed at "equalising public finances" among provinces so that they can offer comparable services. Confederations make equalisation efforts very difficult because approval depends on the unanimous support of the constituent units. Moreover, it was noted, that equalisation payments characterise federations because they presuppose the existence of a political nation (community). The same reasoning goes for

⁵ Canadian assistance includes, for instance, an IDRC funded EMU Third Regional Conference on Water.

economic integration. It is difficult to envisage two institutionally and politically separate communities which are economically integrated. (The economic unification of the European Union does not occur in a vacuum either. It is accompanied by extensive political and institutional adjustments on the national and supranational levels.) Others said that equal opportunity is more important for the Turkish Cypriots than equal income. Lifting the embargo and integration with the rest of the world would likely benefit the North to such a degree that equalisation of payments would not be required.

A water crisis can present real challenges, but it can also present opportunities. While a possibility of a gain is motivating, it is the possibility of a loss that drives people. In this context, water presents the ideal opportunity for cooperation because both parties are bound to lose if they do not address the water-shortage. The case of Canada-U.S. cooperation on water issues could be instructive here. The cooperation of technicians and scientists from both sides of the conflict may eventually lead to trust building.

Scepticism was expressed about joint water projects for two main reasons:

1. **The Greek Cypriots have nothing to lose by not cooperating with the Turkish Cypriots on water.** The Greek Cypriots have no interest in importing water from Turkey because they do not wish to develop a water dependency. Moreover, they have enough resources to build desalination plants (in fact they are already using this method).
2. Water can not play a role in the reconciliation process precisely because it is so essential. Each side fears that interdependence would be used against them. In this context, the Turkish Cypriots opposed an island-wide water study for fear that information in the hands of the Greek Cypriots could be misused.

There is an important role for research in conflict resolution. **Universities in the region could mobilise the exchange of unbiased expertise and promote research opportunities across borders on issues related to human growth and development.** Barriers could be slowly broken down by these "stateless" activities. Canada and others could help by funding conferences, exchange programmes, and collaborative research. Possible areas to explore include: a study of themes for the proximity talks, a hydrological study, etc. A dynamic already exists at the EMU conducive to this approach. With its network of universities, Northern Cyprus has a real potential to lead in this field.

4. The Impacts of Embargoes

4.1. Embargoes Facing Turkish Cypriot Businesses Özdil Nami (Erdil and Sons Ltd.)

Özdil Nami (Erdil and Sons Ltd.) said that since 1963, the Turkish Cypriots have not had a normal economic life. The embargo did not begin in 1973, but as soon as the inter-communal violence began in 1963. The embargo spans all aspects of life including art, music, sports and

education. Any interaction is seen as an indirect recognition of TRNC. The goal of the embargo is to make Turkish Cypriots accept the Greek regime in the South as the legitimate "government" of the island.

The embargo is one-sided: the Greek Cypriots can transact goods and services from the Turkish Cypriots but not *vice versa*. The Greek Cypriots do not accept Turkish Cypriot documents including: customs documents, health certificates, land registrations, bank guarantees and travelling documents. Ports have been declared as illegal and aircraft and boats are prevented from embarking. Professional associations, sports federations and NGOs are not recognised.

So far, the embargo has had no political impact. In economic terms, there have been several consequences:

- increased dependency of the Turkish Cypriots on Turkey for markets, capital and labour (an outcome that the Greek Cypriot side certainly did not want)
- lack of Foreign Direct Investment
- increased cost base
- brain drain

The social impacts of the embargo include:

- a growing animosity and distrust towards Greek Cypriots, the EU and the U.S.
- re-alignment with Turkey (people are exhausted from trying to deal with their southern neighbours).

In conclusion Özdil Nami said that the Turkish Cypriots are relatively weak and isolated. They wish to integrate with the world without endangering their sovereignty. Unfortunately, the EU factor has been wasted. EU membership was perceived by many as the only vision the parties in Cyprus and their motherlands share. Today, the prospect of sole Greek Cypriot accession is seen as one of the biggest obstacles to reconciliation. Nonetheless, businesses in the North are adapting to the environment by using new technologies. Soon, technological development may make embargoes obsolete. If the two sides of the island are allowed to compete under fair rules, interdependencies will form and cooperation will evolve.

4.2. Comments and Discussion

The way Cyprus is functioning now amounts to a *de facto* secession. There are enormous obstacles to an integrated peaceful solution. Each side “suffers” and there is “too much history, too close to the surface.” Both parties use the term “right” in their discourses (i.e., right to security, right to property) – a tendency which contributes to intractability. The proposals made today for reconciliation are identical to those made in 1974. Many of the same people are also involved. There seems to be no better alternative than the *status quo*, besides the preferred options (outlined in earlier remarks).

A catalyst is needed to move the stalemate. Possibilities include:

1. A change of regime in the North (left-wing parties are more amenable to resolution).
2. An increased economic burden on the TRNC (which would pressure Turkey to increase its commitments).
3. South Cyprus could enter the EU alone.
4. South Cyprus could decide to separate or "bolt." While this may sound improbable, one could recall the peaceful separation of former Czechoslovakia.
5. South Cyprus could recognise the TRNC.

There are two scenarios the Greek Cypriot side is pursuing:

1. Due to harsh economic conditions, the Turkish Cypriots will elect leaders who are more amenable to concessions.
2. The growing economic and financial burden Northern Cyprus imposes on Turkey will lead to a shift in the approach of Turkey towards the Greek Cypriot position (*vis a vis* EU membership, etc.)

5. Cultures and Identities

5.1. The Turkish Cypriot Identity

Altay Nevzat (Eastern Mediterranean University)

Altay Nevzat (Eastern Mediterranean University) said that with the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus, toward the end of the 16th century, two main groups came to occupy the island: Orthodox Greeks and Muslim Turks. For close to four centuries these groups interacted relatively peacefully and cooperatively, but never integrated into a single people. Though religious identity was initially the main dividing line between the two groups, it was not the source of any major social friction.

By the 19th century the two communities began to develop competing national identities that failed to coexist with the same ease that their religious, cultural and linguistic identities had done in the past. Mass education during the British period served to strengthen the divergent and conflicting aspects of the two identities. The British allowed both sides to develop separate educational systems, with many teachers and textbooks brought in from Greece and Turkey.

The growth of two national identities in Cyprus was due to several factors including:

1. the spread of nationalism to the Ottoman Empire
2. the Greek War of Independence and the adoption of the Megali Idea (the dream of a Greater Greece)
3. the growth of Turkish nationalism.

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries the Greeks and Turks on the island began to develop mutually exclusive nationalist sentiments and political aspirations. The Greeks identified with Greece and viewed the full Hellenization of Cyprus through ENOSIS (Union of Cyprus with Greece) as the only acceptable political outcome. Meanwhile, the Turks began to react by

identifying first, with the Ottoman Empire and later, with the new Republic of Turkey. Initially, they began to call for the island to revert to Turkish rule once the British left. By 1950's they stood for the division of the island between Greece and Turkey.

Neither side, then, saw itself as part of a common Cypriot nation with shared political aspirations and goals, but rather as integral parts of the Greek and Turkish nations respectively. This one highly relevant fact, the lack of any common national identity, still holds true to this day.

Some argue that the establishment of the 1960 bi-communal partnership Republic could have been a positive turning point. The Constitution provided for each side to regulate its own cultural, educational and religious affairs, made Greek and Turkish both official languages, and provided legal mechanisms for preserving a virtual equality between the two sides. The overwhelming majority of Turkish Cypriots were satisfied with this compromise. However, for the Greek Cypriot leadership, under Archbishop Makarios, the 1960 Republic was never perceived in good faith. Instead, it was viewed as a "means to an end," a stepping stone for the achievement of ENOSIS and the final Hellenization of the island. The onslaught directed by the Greeks against the Turks from December 1963 onwards changed Turkish Cypriot identity. Any residual trust in the Greek Cypriot good faith disappeared and was replaced by the fear of the "other."

Thereafter, according to Altay Nevzat, the Turkish Cypriots were trying to preserve not so much their identity as their very existence on the island. The Turks were physically attacked, forced into enclaves and encouraged to leave the island. The situation became so grave that Turkish Cypriots would conduct conversation amongst themselves in subdued tones so that they would not be overheard and identified as Turks. The 1974 coup gave Turkey the opportunity to intervene and provided a secure environment for the Turkish Cypriots. Without it, the Turkish Cypriot identity would likely have disappeared.

Today, any attempt to construct a political and constitutional framework must take account of the needs of the Turkish Cypriots: the preservation of their identity and security. Repeating history, particularly the continuation of pre-1974 Greek Cypriot attitudes, must be avoided. Altay Nevzat said:

The experiences of the past show us that we cannot afford to disassociate the protection and preservation of our identity as Turkish Cypriots from the political and constitutional structure of a settlement in Cyprus.

He disagreed with the proponents of a federal solution. Federation would not, as some argue, provide the Turkish Cypriots with sufficient safeguards. He was sceptical of Professor Eric Neisser's proposition that a federation can safeguard the rights of communities through individual rights provisions. (Neisser proposes that the success of the black community in the U.S. in defending its rights through federal courts may be instructive for Cyprus.) This proposition presupposes that 1) the federal judiciary is reliable and credible and 2) enforcement

of judicial decisions is effective and fair. Both presuppositions are highly unrealistic at the present. **Therefore, the individual rights of the Turkish Cypriot people can be guaranteed within a confederation, where as Professor Elazar notes, "it is the task of the constituent polities to protect individual liberty."**

5.2. Comments and Discussion

A participant drew attention to the *World Values Survey* conducted by a Yale University Professor Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues during the 1980's and early 1990's.⁶ This comprehensive survey, conducted in reference to a representative sample of 43 countries, aimed at determining whether there had been a shift from so called modern values to post-modern values. Two major conclusions came out:

1. The findings demonstrated a trend, beginning during the late 1970's, in which attention shifted from material values to cultural values. The notion that governments should provide public goods shifted to the idea that governments should be engaged in addressing or redressing fundamental philosophical issues (such as guaranteeing rights or resolving issues pertaining to cultural identities). Issues pertaining to economic distribution are divisive but are relatively amendable to compromise. On the other hand, issues pertaining to rights and culture are perceived as questions of good *versus* evil, on which compromise is hard to achieve.
2. Another trend identified by Inglehart was a shift from overwhelming trust in government to overwhelming distrust and cynicism across most societies. A trend of contempt and disdain for government had emerged, accompanied by a perception that politicians are generally self-interested and corrupt. Despite this finding, the historical record suggests, that government corruption has not increased in the last generation. On the contrary, it has likely diminished. There are two possible reasons for this contradiction: first, the public is evaluating their leaders and institutions by more demanding standards than in the past. (However, it is not clear that this is the case for all societies.) Second, the cultural issues governments are asked to address may contribute to the low confidence levels. Cultural issues are not only less amendable to compromise, they are not necessarily amendable to solution. The means by which they were resolved in the past, such as elite accommodation, have been discredited and rejected today.

Federalism, as a tool of change, has been used most effectively in Canada, and likely elsewhere, when the public perceives that it is an active participant. Accordingly, one must not just search for institutional accommodation (i.e., federation *versus* confederation) but

⁶See: <http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/>

rather for a popular or participatory framework. "A constitution is not worth the paper it is written on unless it involves a will to make it work. The will can be generated by popular participation."

There has been a proliferation of literature in the last decade on the shape of the world to come. According to Samuel Huntington, it will not be defined by economic issues, but by cultural identities. Authors disagree to which degree the world has become culturally homogenous - we were also treated to Benjamin Barber's thesis in mid-1990's which posits that the world is and will be divided roughly into two forces: Jihad *versus* McWorld. Many miss Barber's central point which is that the cultural war can be avoided by ensuring citizen participation.

Drawing on Barber's point, it was suggested that **difficult cultural issues and citizen disengagement may be redressed by creating models that invite citizen participation or that empower people.** As Peter Jay pointed out in his book the *Wealth of Man*, all economic change has been managed by governments. **Cultural change or accommodation must likewise be so managed through a certain citizen democracy.** It would seem that the chances of developing such a participatory framework in Cyprus are quite low, especially given the Greek Cypriot unilateral approach. International pressure and support are required for any model to work. This begs the question – what has the international contribution to reconciliation on the island really amounted to?

One participant suggested that it is impossible to separate political, social, economic and other aspects of one's identity. Identity should be perceived in a more integrated way instead. She also pointed out that the overwhelming pessimism around the table is misplaced. By the virtue of being here - exchanging and articulating views and possible solutions, we are *de facto* "negotiating." "We are here because we agree that conflicts can be resolved."

The value of polling was noted. Mapping out what communities are really made of could expose a large middle ground amendable to negotiation that does not deny history. This would be especially valuable because the media only notes the extremes. Common symbols, such as geography, do exist. Work of artists, creators, volunteers and academics that overcomes the identity boundary deserves support.

It was pointed out that not one person in Cyprus is prepared to die for the Cypriot flag. The reality is that there are two distinct peoples living on the island. Imposing solutions from the outside will not work. The infusion of Turkish settlers to Northern Cyprus alters the identity of Northern Cypriots and makes the situation even more difficult. The new settlers tend to vote for more nationalistic parties and push for better ties with Turkey. The situation of Cyprus is especially complex because of exogenous factors including external strategic interests in oil, EU interests, the interests of the U.S. and the British, and so on. **It is clear that these interests would be served best by a settlement. However, an endogenous need for mutual cooperation between the two sides does not exist.** In this context, it was argued, the Cyprus "problem" is constituted externally (internationally) rather than internally.

6. Reflections and Closing

In the closing session three themes dominated the discussion including the role of the EU, what is necessary internally and externally for change, and what the role for Canada might be.

6.1. Role of the EU

EU members will be asked to ratify accession of new candidates. It is unlikely that countries like Germany, Holland, Italy and France would support a move which would effectively locate the Cyprus problem in their backyard. Instead, they would prefer a solution prior to accession. Moreover, EU members are aware that there is a security risk involved with isolating Turkey. The prediction that Turkish Cypriots will succumb to economic pressure and will become more accommodating is suspect. It underestimates the viability of the Turkish Cypriot resistance at the expense of long-term security of the region. It is likely that when the crunch comes some EU members (Parliaments) will oppose accession without prior resolution.

A point was also made that Greece may block the accession of Eastern European candidates (strongly desired by Germany), if resolution prior to accession is required. This may work in the Greek Cypriots' favour.

The signals coming from the EU are ambiguous. The Greek Cypriots seem to believe that a resolution is not required prior to accession, while Ankara seems to think the contrary.

Leaving the North out would enhance the possibility that the island remains split. Moreover, this scenario has serious consequences not only for northern Cyprus, but for regional stability:

- The Turkish Cypriots would have to develop a strategy whereby staying outside of the EU would be beneficial to them (like Monaco, for instance).
- It is difficult to predict how Turkey would react. Despite the fact that Ankara refrained from projecting its power in the region since the intervention of 1974, a threat of possible war should not be dismissed.

Some suggested that any threat by Turkey would not motivate Canadian assistance and would trouble UN members. Others said that the threat posed by isolating Turkey (Turkish Cypriots) needs to be addressed. The possibility of war between Greece and Turkey should not be entirely ignored. Conditions in Turkey may be amendable to military intervention, while a psychology of despair prevails in northern Cyprus.

The EU is clearly biased toward the Greek Cypriot side, by the virtue of Greek membership (in the EU). However, there may be derogations which could provide the Turkish Cypriots with safeguards (against the richer Greek Cypriots sweeping the three freedoms) and ensure that the TRNC is not further isolated in case the EU accepts only the Greek Cypriot side as a member.

6.2. What is necessary (internally and externally) for change

- Due regard must be accorded to vital interests of both sides. Otherwise, there is a danger of "balkanisation" in the region.
- Hostile activities must stop in order for the two sides to cooperate. You can not claim you are pursuing peaceful negotiations and militarise at the same time. Similarly, you can not speak of partnership while you impose embargoes and act unilaterally.
- Addressing the constitutional agenda while pursuing confidence building may be a mistake as long as the two sides live in isolation.
- There is a need for a transforming gesture (moment). The prospects for this gesture seem to be pinned on EU membership.
- A better understanding of the Turkish Cypriot position is needed within the EU and around the world. Scholars from EU countries and Turkey could be brought together to address the role of the EU in Cyprus.
- An island-wide census could be conducted, involving scholars from both sides, to reveal and understand better civil society attitudes. Through the census, people who are amenable to negotiation or feel abandoned could be identified and empowered to rise above the ethnically predetermined positions and to make a difference.

6.3. Role of Canada and Recommendations

Among the main reasons why Canada continues to be involved in Cyprus are:

- 29 years of peacekeeping duties, during which 27 Canadians died
- common membership in the Commonwealth
- common institutional traditions, such as the parliamentary and the legal systems.

Canada's experience with federalism may be instructive for the Cypriots. Moreover, the fact that Canada does not have vested interests in the Cyprus solution, to the same degree as the EU, the U.S., Greece or Turkey, may also be useful.

Canadian foreign policy toward Cyprus is largely determined by membership in the UN. While UN resolutions regarding Cyprus are a reality the UN members have to live with, there are ways of creating new realities. This has not been easy on the diplomatic level. However, research may well develop a basis for a shift.

Canada could play an important role in Cyprus for two main reasons. First, Canada's interests differ from those of the U.S., in that they are more outward-looking and humanistic. Second, enhancing relations with Canada would diversify Cyprus' international relations.

Specific recommendations for Canadian engagement include:

- Canadian (funding) agencies, including the CCFPD and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, could promote joint Canadian-Cypriot (both Greek and Turkish) activities:
 - sponsor university students and faculty exchange programmes
 - provide grants to research teams
 - sponsor roundtables with citizen engagement.

Priority areas for research include: federalism studies, water resources cooperation, culture studies, civil society organisations, the role of EU in the Cyprus settlement.

- Canada could use several foreign policy levers, including quiet diplomacy at the multilateral and bilateral levels, to achieve the resumption of UN-sponsored negotiations (which are now suspended).
- Political initiatives would require an enhanced Canada-TRNC relationship and consultation. They could include:
 - work on terminology for the upcoming UN Resolution
 - attempts to influence EU members (in particular the U.K. and France bilaterally) to enhance their relations with the TRNC.
- Canada could help breaking the "isolation pressure" applied by the Greek Cypriots and the EU. Helping to organise co-operative nonpolitical events, including art exhibitions or sport activities, would be useful and may not be perceived as too controversial.
- Canada could become involved in Northern Cyprus through the Canada Council, for instance, which helps developing countries preserve their culture. Protecting the Northern Cypriot heritage through UNESCO could also open space for Canadian engagement.

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