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**SUMMARY REPORT FROM THE ROUNDTABLE ON AFGHANISTAN:
GOVERNANCE SCENARIOS AND CANADIAN POLICY OPTIONS**

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Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development

October 12, 2001

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Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade

Ministère des Affaires étrangères
et du Commerce international

Canada

“The results of this roundtable exceeded our already high expectations. We are getting useful advice from highly experienced people.”

– David Mulroney, Assistant Deputy Minister (Asia-Pacific)
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

At the request of the Assistant Deputy Minister, we organized and hosted a roundtable on governance needs and scenarios in Afghanistan on Friday, October 12, 2001. We are very grateful to his highness Prince Mostapha Zaher and the other 45 participants who were able to join us on short notice. The roundtable attracted wide interest across government. We were pleased to be able to accommodate participants from several government departments and the Privy Council Office as well as Foreign Affairs Minister John Manley’s Senior Policy Advisor.

Attached you will find the report from the roundtable.

At the invitation of the Assistant Deputy Minister, I briefed 40 officials, on Wednesday, 17 October, 2001, (from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Department of National Defence, the Department of Finance, Citizenship and Immigration, and the Privy Council Office) on the highlights and recommendations from the roundtable. This began a longer inter-departmental discussion to further develop Canadian policy. Participants at that inter-departmental meeting also received a copy of this report.

Roundtable participants have made a substantive contribution to Canadian foreign policy.

Thanks once again to all who participated, who made presentations, and who provided help and advice for this event. Your comments and views are most welcome. Please keep in touch.

Sincerely,

Steve Lee
Executive Director

October 19, 2001

**REPORT FROM THE ROUNDTABLE ON AFGHANISTAN:
GOVERNANCE SCENARIOS AND CANADIAN POLICY OPTIONS**

October 12, 2001

Ottawa, Ontario

*At the request of the Assistant Deputy Minister for Asia-Pacific, David Mulroney, and in partnership with the South Asia Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development organised a roundtable on **Afghanistan: Governance Scenarios and Canadian Policy Options** (October 12, 2001). Area specialists, experts, NGO leaders, members of the Afghan community in Canada and government officials shared insights about building workable, legitimate and sustainable governance in a post-Taliban Afghanistan and Canadian policy options. Prince Mostapha Zaher joined the roundtable by phone from Rome. Other participants included Gwynne Dyer (Military Historian and Commentator), Steven Ratner (University of Texas), Adeena Niazi (Afghan Women's Organisation), Annette Ittig (Consultant), Dan Ouimet (Senior Policy Advisor, Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs), Patricia Marsden-Dole (Director General, South and Southeast Asia Bureau) and Pauline Kehoe (Pakistan and Afghanistan Division, Canadian International Development Agency). Steven Lee (Executive Director, Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development) chaired the meeting.*

1. Introduction

The Chair welcomed all to the roundtable, thanked Foreign Affairs Minister John Manley for the hospitality today, and set three closely related goals for the day:

1. To share information and insights.
2. To think about governance scenarios in a post-Taliban Afghanistan, focussing on needs and capacity.
3. To think about how Canada and Canadians can best appropriately contribute to these governance needs.

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Participants were encouraged to think about an inventory of possible Canadian measures for the longer-term reconstruction of Afghanistan while the window to do so remains open. What are the most desirable outcomes, given the lessons of history regarding not only Afghanistan itself but failed states in general? Are there templates available to help create a legitimate and sustainable post-Taliban government? What role should Canada play?

This report is divided into five sections:

1. Introduction
2. Background
3. Failed States and Governance: Lessons Learned
4. Scenarios and Recommendations for Achieving Peace and Building Good Governance in Afghanistan
5. Policy Options for Canada

2. Background

Three **central aspects of Afghan history** were highlighted at the outset of the Roundtable:

1. Afghanistan has always been a buffer zone between major power zones.
2. Afghanistan could be characterised as a mountain monarchy for most of its history (1919-1973). The mountainous character of the land contributes to a tension between would-be centralisers in Kabul and those who prefer a more decentralised mode of governance in the rest of the country. This tension is further exacerbated by an ethnically diverse population.¹
3. Afghanistan has been a target of competition among surrounding (and more remote) states throughout its history. Invaders should heed the bitter lessons learned by the British at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century and the Russians in the late 70's and 80's.

The current situation in Afghanistan was described as having three key characteristics:

1. System immobilisation: There is a consistent history of thwarted reform-oriented leaders. (The reform movements have encountered strong opposition throughout Afghanistan's history.)²
2. There are political and intellectual tensions between Kabul and the rest of the country – a so called “Kabul and out” phenomenon.³
3. Afghanistan has been suffering from an "un-benign" neglect. The country has been abandoned by the superpowers at the end of the Cold War bombed, mined, and generally reduced to rubble. In other words, the attempts to integrate Afghanistan into one or the other world systems have resulted in a devastated and a collapsed state. The power vacuum left behind after the withdrawal of the superpowers was filled by individuals who legitimated their power from the barrel of their guns (trained to a large degree by either the government of the Soviet Union or the U.S.A.).

A point was made that it is necessary to consider the possible governance scenarios for Afghanistan in a regional context. (Among other reasons, Pakistan played a significant role in the creation of the Taliban regime.) **Therefore, any action in Afghanistan must be considered against the backdrop of at least three possible regional implications/dangers:**

1. escalation of the nuclear threat (especially if the situation in Pakistan destabilises due to the Western-led action in Afghanistan),
2. further consolidation of Islamic fundamentalism, and

¹ The political (and ethnic) equilibrium maintained under the monarchy was destabilised in 1973 when King Zahir Shah was removed from power and Afghanistan was proclaimed a republic. No stable government was able to replace the monarchy.

²A point was made that in some instances, reformist monarchs went too far in their zeal to Westernize the country and offended the general Afghan population.

³Kabul, a centre of mostly left-leaning or Marxist intellectuals and political parties, is isolated from the views of the rest of the country. Ethnic communities are also divided on urban-rural lines.

3. consistent/systematised recourse to terrorism (reasons for these dangerous developments may include: a backlash to the military campaign against the Taliban regime; the spread of Madrasas as alternative centres of learning in the absence of secular schools; a continuation of policies pursued by the current or a future government of Pakistan to train terrorists to fight in Kashmir).

The efforts aimed at stabilising the regime in Pakistan were broadly encouraged by the participants.

3. Failed States and Governance: Lessons Learned

The potential and limitations of an international role in Afghanistan depend first and foremost on Coalition foreign policy: How far are the Coalition partners prepared to go? Do they seek to overthrow the Taliban regime? Do they intend to install the Northern Alliance or the King, or some other combination of forces? What alternative government is possible and what do the Afghan people want? What role will the UN play in the reconstruction efforts, if any? How will Afghanistan and other countries in the region and elsewhere respond? Thinking about these questions is important, since the answers affect the role for outsider actors.

There are basically **two types of UN operations**:

1. Implementation of a peace agreement after a war: in this case parties agree on power-sharing arrangements (i.e., Bosnia, Haiti). This type of operation has always been based on two key concepts: consent (the peace agreement would invite UN troops to play a role) and impartiality (the UN is not supposed to choose sides, merely point out violations). For such an operation to be possible in Afghanistan, the various factions would have to come to an agreement. Even then, the UN could be drawn into a prolonged political struggle. The UN could potentially monitor elections. However, experiences from Angola, Cambodia, and Guatemala show that in failed states, elections do not necessarily lead to peace nor democracy.
2. International governance without an agreement: in this situation, the international community decides to support the winning side (i.e., Kosovo, East Timor).

Beyond these two types, operations can be also characterised on the basis of the depth of involvement (from assisting governance, to delegating functions, to direct administration) and the range of tasks/functions (including administrative, mediating, or guarantor functions).

Lessons from consent-based UN operations:

1. Large presence of outside military troops is useless if parties are intent on breaching the accord and there is no political will to establish peace.
2. The peace agreement must be extremely *specific* (i.e., dates, times, location and other data must be included for each step), *authoritative* (i.e., the agreement should reflect the views of those who count, raising questions such as who can deliver, who should be included, and who should be excluded) and *controlling* (i.e., the agreement should spell out the consequences of non-compliance).

3. The operation can not be dominated by the concerns and interests of only one party (i.e., as was the case in Somalia where U.S. interests clearly dominated). Otherwise, legitimacy is undermined. This could be a problem for a Western dominated operation in Afghanistan. The way an operation is conducted will reveal whether the Western-led coalition cares about democracy in Afghanistan or only cares about combatting terrorism. Since the legitimacy of outside actors in affairs of relatively weaker states is continually criticised by the developing world, the Security Council (four European, Atlantic and Christian permanent veto members) will have to consult the General Assembly.
4. The depth of UN involvement over each issue must be based on a realistic assessment of the country's capacity, the centrality of an issue for the overall mandate, the willingness of local leaders to turn the issue over, and the ability of outsiders to perform. The UN does a good job in administering elections and assisting/running civil administration, in cases where there is no resistance.
5. Creating operational partnerships among local agencies and the UN is very complex, expensive and long to prepare.
6. Training civilian police takes a long time and results are not always satisfactory.
7. The development component is critical and should be central to any operation.

Lessons from operations without an agreement:

1. In the absence of an accord, outsiders must either work with respected local leaders who have wide-spread support, or be prepared to govern alone. The latter option is almost always very challenging.
2. Having a clear sense of likely outcomes is very important for a successful operation. (For instance, it was clear East Timor was on the road to independence.)
3. While there is a general sense that such operations can only be sustained for a short period of time, there is invariably a need to stay longer. This reality makes the operation very expensive.
4. "Successful" operations without an agreement have usually been confined to small areas (i.e., Haiti, Kosovo, East Timor). Attempts to assist governing in larger areas, such as Congo, for instance, failed. In these cases, operations may be limited to monitoring borders, providing economic support or checking for terrorists.

It is impossible to assess at this point which option is best for Afghanistan or whether something completely different is necessary. Nonetheless, some basic questions should be addressed: Are the parties ready for peace? If not, are we ready to impose a peaceful solution? What should the role of the outside actors be? Who will the Afghan people respect? What are their views of outsiders? Do they trust some more than others? Is there any willingness in the West to commit resources to rebuilding Afghanistan? What are the objectives of the outside states? Can they accomplish them?

4. Scenarios and Recommendations for Achieving Peace and Building Good Governance in Afghanistan

A settlement could take place at three levels:

1. *At the national level*, a mechanism could be created for the factions to come to an agreement at the centre. This effort could be aided by the National Council for Reconciliation which is soon to convene. Such an agreement would contribute to the creation of a common Afghan state, which is currently extremely fragmented, decentralised and functionally non-existent. Such a national mechanism could enable civil society in Afghanistan to organise itself and participate in governance.
2. *At the regional level*, an agreement pledging non-intervention should be reached and foreign-based support for factions ended. This agreement could perhaps be achieved through the collective efforts of the "six plus two" (Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, China *plus* Russia and the United States).⁴
3. *At the global level*, the UN could attempt to create an international environment conducive to reconciliation in Afghanistan. For instance, it could supervise regional agreement compliance.

To prevent a worst possible **transition scenario** – which could include lack of law and order, hijacking of the peace process by a faction, corruption, humanitarian disaster/famine and the continued presence of U.S. troops – efforts should aim to:

- bring in UN peacekeepers
- disarm former warring groups
- establish an indigenous security force
- begin a free process of constitutional development, preceded by national consultations
- prepare for free elections
- start extensive reconstruction and increase humanitarian aid
- begin a process of national reconciliation
- improve understanding with neighbours.

There are negative consequences of a potential Northern Alliance dominated government:

1. The Northern Alliance is composed of foreign-backed factions and is fractured. Continued infighting among the various factions is guaranteed.
2. The factions are based on ethnic lines (with foreign backers fuelling these divisions). They are ethno-centric and commit crimes against other ethnic groups. Reconciliation between the perpetrators and victims is unlikely.
3. The Northern Alliance has a long history of breaking signed accords. This record puts the likelihood of a sustained peace agreement into a doubt.
4. A government controlled by the Northern Alliance would likely be opposed by Pakistan and therefore contribute to regional instability.
5. Historical experience would suggest that a Northern Alliance government would not improve the prospects for women in Afghanistan.

⁴The objective of this group is to find a peaceful solution for the Afghan conflict. The group has met more than once every year in the absence of any representation from Afghans. See [Http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~mpeia/afghanistan.htm](http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~mpeia/afghanistan.htm)

In order to build a legitimate, workable and sustainable governance in Afghanistan:

- Outside interference must end. (Some participants said that all military interference and foreign financing of factions should end immediately, since it is often the later that allows the struggle to continue. Outside actors, and the UN in particular, should play a “legitimising” role – verifying and monitoring. Some encouraged the entry of UN peacekeeping forces.)
- No significant role should be assigned to any one faction.
- Government must be inclusive and not ethnically based.
- Task forces should be identified to deal with issues including the repatriation of refugees.
- Any provisional government should be protected by UN peacekeeping forces.
- Any provisional government must remain friendly to surrounding countries.
- Employment opportunities must be created for soldiers as a viable alternative to armed struggle.

Concerns were raised about the so called **Rome peace process**, led by the former King Zahir Shah,⁵ including charges that the process:

- is not inclusive enough,
- takes on an anti-Pakistani position,
- over-relies on the Northern Alliance, and
- stereotypes the resistance groups and the Taliban.

Moreover, it was suggested that the grand assembly (Loya Jirga) is not representative.

On the other hand, some participants suggested that all possible efforts are being exhorted to include the interested parties (including women, ethnic groups and former leaders) in the peace process and to convene the *Loya Jirga* as soon as conditions permit (i.e., as soon as the lists of possible village candidates are received). Emphasis was made on leading Afghanistan toward free elections, without witch-hunts. War criminals should be brought to justice through legitimate channels, such as the International Criminal Court. (Still the question of what to do with the Taliban after the conflict ends remained largely unanswered.) High-level diplomatic efforts are also underway to assure the Pakistani government of good intentions and hope of future enhanced cooperation. **Nevertheless, it was suggested that the peace process include more Afghan groups and experts and that more efforts be made to develop understanding with neighbouring countries, and especially Pakistan. Moreover, the new Afghan leadership should strive to gain the trust of ordinary people and members of resistance parties.** Several participants criticised the bombing of Afghanistan and pointed out that **the outset of the military campaign might have hindered the King’s diplomatic efforts and boosted the chances of the Northern Alliance to retake Kabul** – a scenario some recommended against. Concerns about the military action actually thwarting chances for peace and democratic

⁵The Rome process has gathered a group of key Afghans including intellectuals, tribal leaders, former bureaucrats and former politicians. They are advocating the Loya Jirga (grand assembly) as a mechanism to allow people to decide on the future of Afghanistan through a constitution and election. See: [Http://www.loyajirga.com](http://www.loyajirga.com) or [Http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~mpeia/afghanistan.htm](http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~mpeia/afghanistan.htm)

transformation were expressed several times. Caution was raised about the implications of the military intervention not only for the people of Afghanistan and the “face of the conflict” there, but for the region as a whole.

There are **opportunities and challenges for good governance on the micro, or grass-roots level in Afghanistan**. The opportunities lie primarily with Afghan civil society groups: local NGOs and similar social structures, groups and institutions (cultural, political, or economic in focus). These diverse groups constitute a rich human resource which may well be the first point of contact for externally supported reconstruction activities.

Among the challenges to good governance in Afghanistan is a long litany

of negative indicators on conditions for Afghan men, women and children, including estimates of literacy rates, access to and quality of education and health care. While these challenges to governance are great they are not insurmountable. They could be addressed through medium to longer term development interventions. Other challenges include human security issues, the current humanitarian crises, the current conflicts and their regional and international players as well as the lack of political will to stop them. There is a lack of banking/savings/credit facilities, making the building of sustainable livelihoods difficult. Finally, there is historically an absence of a strong centralised government: local power structures have developed largely in response to this.

A Possible Scenario

The U.S. government has decided already to commit ground troops and to invade Afghanistan. The military logic would suggest that occupation is the next step. On the one hand, the U.S. government understands the negative implications of a prolonged military campaign and has been careful not to commit a massacre. On the other hand, a "trophy" is required for the troops to exit the ground successfully. Therefore, the U.S. government will try to achieve at least one of two goals: a) capture Osama bin Laden and bring him to justice, b) unseat the Taliban government as a part of efforts aimed at combatting terrorism. Option b) may be easier and allow the necessary claims of victory. It may be also much quicker to overthrow the Taliban regime directly than arm/finance local resistance. It is likely that the U.S. will take control of Kabul,

Afghan civil society groups include:

Groups within Afghanistan:

- NGOs established by the UN as implementing partners for projects (i.e., Council for Cooperation in Afghanistan, Cooperation for Peace and Afghan Unity, etc.)
- Local NGOs which are not UN-established (i.e., locally funded home schools)
- Nascent NGOs (include professional associations)
- Private sector (some private companies provide public services)
- Religious Foundations (i.e., Emam Jawad Foundation for indigenous Shias)
- Local power structures (include *shuras* or councils, neighbourhood *maliks* and *vakils*)
- *Loya Jirga* or the grand assembly
- functionaries who carry out most public administration and would be invaluable for strengthening state infrastructures during a rehabilitation phase

Groups in countries of first asylum

Groups in the greater Afghan diaspora (including transnational professions).

perhaps without the Northern Alliance (which has been largely cut out of the U.S. drive at Kabul). While the initial transition will be driven by the Americans, they will not want to stay long, opening a path for the creation of a UN Protectorate. A U.S. invasion and occupation would see Canada in a support role.

5. Policy Options

General recommendations include:

- Do not engage in any actions in Afghanistan without a prior knowledge of the country.
- Do not engage in any actions in Afghanistan without a plan. ("Easy to get in, hard to get out.")
- Do not "cut and run" when the crisis is over (there has to be a long-term commitment, beyond supervising elections).

Policy Options for Canada:

1. Canada could use its leverage on the U.S.A. and others to create a government in Afghanistan free of old ties. The new government should not be a coalition of the existing forces (which include a large number of war criminals). Instead, it might draw heavily on the Afghan diaspora (who may, however, have their own political agendas/baggage).
2. Canada should try to dissuade the Americans from making alliances with Afghan factions for the sake of convenience.
3. At the UN Canada could assist in building an adequate peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, once the U.S.A. decides to withdraw. On the one hand, the peacekeeping force should not include troops of countries immediately neighbouring Afghanistan (or countries that are neighbours of these neighbours, or that have vested interests in Afghanistan's affairs). On the other hand, peacekeepers should be predominantly Muslim (drawing on troops from Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, etc.).
4. The new provisional government will require an army. Canada could work toward building a mechanism whereby soldiers from the various warring factions are hired by the new administration to create a formal national army.
5. Canada could assist in efforts to build a regional coalition of neutral partners to help Afghanistan.
6. Canada could assist in building political capacity in Afghanistan, drawing on the existent and nascent civil society.
7. Canada as a "middle power" could promote issue-oriented cooperation in the region. Issues could include: counter-terrorism, economic development/trade, and technology.
8. Canada could promote democratic governance in Afghanistan. For instance, drawing on traditional governing structures, Canada could assist in building strong institutions. The Canadian experience with pluralism and good governance may also be transferable. These efforts could be particularly effective at the local/community level rather than at the national level, at least initially. "There is no point in having a Ministry of Education if there are no schools."

9. Recognising the link between poor social and economic conditions and the rise of fundamental Islamic groups and terrorists, Canada could address the issues of poverty and lack of education in Afghanistan and the region.
10. Using existing legal mechanisms (including international treaties signed by previous Afghan governments) Canada could help ensure the equal participation of women in Afghan political, social, economic and cultural life.
11. Canada could push to open a humanitarian corridor into Afghanistan to respond to the massive humanitarian crises faced by many Afghan refugees. Resources could also be committed to alleviating the horrible conditions in existing refugee camps for Afghan people in Pakistan and Iran.

List of Participants

**ROUNDTABLE ON AFGHANISTAN:
Governance Scenarios and Canadian Policy Options
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa
12 October, 2001
A9
10:00 AM – 3:00 PM**

1.) Prince Mostapha Zaher
(by phone from Rome)

2.) Annette Ittig
Consultant

3.) Gwynne Dyer
Military Historian and Commentator

4.) Steven R. Ratner
Professor of Law
University of Texas

5.) Amir Hassanpour
Near and Middle Eastern Studies
University of Toronto

6.) Seddiq Weera
Centre for Peace Studies
McMaster University

7.) Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay
Chair, Department of Political Science
Concordia University

8.) Abdullah Mojaddedi
PhD candidate
Concordia University

9.) Sergei Plekhanov
Political Science Department
York University

10.) Elliot Tepper
Political Science Department
Carleton University

11.) Narendra Wagle
South Asian Studies
University of Toronto

12.) Omar Zakhilwal
Member, Managing Board
Institute for Afghan Studies
Ottawa

13.) Faruq Faisal
South-Asia Partnership Canada

14.) Marilou McPhedran
Centre for Feminist Research
York University

15.) Adeena Niazi
Afghan Women's Organization

16.) Nazeer Ladhani
Aga Khan Foundation Canada

17.) Fayaz Manji
Program Manager (Central Asia Programs)
Aga Khan Foundation

18.) Quentin Johnson
Consultant in Nutrition
(World Food Programme projects in
Afghanistan)

19.) Nancy Gordon
CARE Canada

20.) Assadullah Oriakhel
Executive Director
Afghan Association of Ontario

21.) Gerd Schönwälder (am)
Stephen Baranyi (pm)
Peacebuilding and Reconstruction
International Development Research Centre

Government Participants (DFAIT):

22.) Dan Ouimet

Senior Policy Advisor (Western Canada)
Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs

23.) David Mulrone

Assistant Deputy Minister for Asia-Pacific

24.) Ronald Halpin

Director General
Central, East and South Europe Bureau

25.) Patricia Marsden-Dole

Director General
South and Southeast Asia Bureau

26.) Steven Lee

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Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy
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27.) Marketa Geislerova

Rapporteur
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28.) Donald Sinclair

Director General
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29.) James Junke

Director
South Asia Division

30.) Marie-Isabelle Massip

Director
Regional Security and Peacekeeping Division

31.) Barbara Martin

Deputy Director
South Asia Division

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Deputy Director
Policy Planning Division

33.) Gerry Skinner

DFAIT

34.) Diane Gemus

Special Assistant
Office of the Secretary of State (Asia- Pacific)

35.) Arif Lalani

Counsellor (political)
Canadian Embassy in Washington

36.) Debbie Price

Canadian Permanent Mission in New York

Other Government Departments:

37.) Pauline Kehoe

Director
Pakistan and Afghanistan Division
CIDA

38.) Norman MacDonnell

Chief of Operations
International Humanitarian Assistance
CIDA

39.) Ryszard Komenda

Peacebuilding Unit
CIDA

40.) Ed Whitcomb

Intelligence Assessment Secretariat
PCO

41.) Tony Kellet

DND

42.) Major Simon Sole

DND

Biographical Sketches of Lead-off Speakers
Roundtable on Afghanistan: Governance Scenarios and Canadian Policy Options

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
October 12, 2001

Gwynne Dyer (Military Historian and Commentator)

Gwynne Dyer is a London-based independent journalist who has lectured extensively on Middle Eastern Studies and Military History. Dyer spent much of 1988-90 in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; one of the results was a seven-part radio series called 'The Gorbachev Revolution' that was broadcast by the CBC 'Ideas' and 'Sunday Morning' programmes in 1990, and subsequently in a number of other countries. He spent the first three months of 1991 reporting on the Gulf War. His new TV series, 'The Human Race', a personal enquiry in four parts into the roots, nature and future of human politics, premiered on CBC in September, 1994. He is now working on a book of the same title, and on a six-part radio series on global cultural convergence for the CBC 'Ideas' and 'Sunday Morning' Programmes. Dyer's principal current activity remains his twice-weekly syndicated column on international affairs, which he has been writing regularly since 1973. It is published by approximately 150 papers in some 30 countries. He holds a Ph.D. in Military and Middle Eastern History from King's College, University of London.

Annette Ittig (Consultant)

Dr. Annette Ittig is an area specialist and international development practitioner with extensive project management experience in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. She has worked with several UN and international NGOs in both Taliban and Northern Alliance Afghanistan, including assignments with UNICEF, the World Food Programme, UNOCHA, Deutsche Welthungerhilfe and the International Rescue Committee. These missions have variously involved refugee, returnee and IDP programming and program evaluation; microenterprise development; post-disaster relief and reconstruction; human rights (Western and Islamic) and IHL. Dr. Ittig's most recent assignment in Afghanistan was as the Principal Researcher for the 2001 World Bank/UNDP Afghanistan watching brief on remittances. Each of these missions has involved extensive interaction with local communities, including male and female civil society groups. Dr. Ittig holds her Ph.D. from University of Oxford, England. She is currently under contract to the Pakistan/Afghanistan Division, Asia Branch of CIDA.

Steve Lee (Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, DFAIT)

Steve Lee is the Executive Director of the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development (since its founding in 1996) at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. He is a former Adjunct Professor UNESCO Chair for Human Rights, and a former Research Associate at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. He is a graduate of the American-European Summer Academy, Austria, a Norman MacKenzie (undergraduate) scholar at the University of British Columbia, and holds an MA (Honours, Political Studies) University of Auckland, New Zealand. Most recent publication is "Real Borders in a Not So Borderless World" in *Canada Among Nations* (Oxford), June 2000.

David Mulroney (Assistant Deputy Minister for Asia-Pacific, DFAIT)

Mr. Mulroney is currently Assistant Deputy Minister, Asia-Pacific in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and is responsible for the management of Canada's relations with the countries of the region. He was Executive Director of the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei (1998-2001), Executive Director of the Canada China Business Council (1995-1998), Commercial Counsellor in the Canadian High Commission in Kuala Lumpur (1992-1995), and served as Executive Assistant to Canada's Deputy Minister for International Trade (1990-1992) during a period that included the start of NAFTA negotiations and the final stages of the Uruguay Round. Mr. Mulroney graduated with a B.A. in English from the University of Toronto where he was Gold Medallist in English in 1978. He joined the Foreign Service in 1981, and has had previous postings in Seoul, Shanghai and Kuala Lumpur.

Steven Ratner (University of Texas)

Currently Professor of Law at the University of Texas, Professor Ratner worked in the Office of the Legal Advisor at the U.S. State Department before joining the faculty in 1993. His research focuses on new challenges facing emerging democracies after the Cold War, including ethnic conflict, territorial borders, accountability for past human rights violations, and the role of international institutions in these issues. His work for the UN Secretary-General and the State Department investigating atrocities of the Khmer Rouge has attracted national and international media attention. Among his many publications are two books: *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War* (St. Martin's, 1995) and *Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy* (Oxford, 1997) (co-author). A member of the Board of Editors of the *American Journal of International Law*, Professor Ratner was a Fulbright Scholar at the Hague during 1998-99. (MA 1993, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales (Geneva) JD 1986, Yale; AB 1982, Princeton)

Elliot Tepper (Carleton University)

Currently a professor of political science and specialist on politics and development in Asia. In 1986, he was given an award by the Government of Bangladesh for his contributions to the country's development, and he has had numerous travel and academic awards for field work in South and Southeast Asia, Taiwan and China. He also is active in the field of human rights, multiculturalism, immigration and refugee affairs. He was recently President of the Canadian Asian Studies Association, and of its South Asia Council. He was recently Chair of the millennial conference of the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security (CANCAPS), and last year organized and chaired a large international conference on human development, commemorating the life work of Mahbub ul Haq. He provides frequent commentary in the public media, provides policy advice to national and international organizations, and has chaired or been a member of government expert panels on South and Southeast Asia, immigration and the environment. Recent research has focussed on security, human security and regional cooperation. Dr. Tepper has also worked with international organizations including the International Development Research Centre, the Canadian International Development Agency, USAID, and Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Reeta Tremblay (Concordia University)

Reeta Tremblay is Associate Professor of Political Science. Her current research interests are comparative politics, South Asian political economy, nation-state and secessionist movements in India, and Indian popular culture. Recent publications include *Interfacing Nations: Indo/Pakistani/Canadian Reflections on the 50th Anniversary of India's Independence* (B.R. Publishing Corporation, New Delhi, 1998), "Inclusive Administration: Feminist Critiques of Bureaucracy" in O.P. Dwivedi and Keith Henderson *Alternative Administration* (MacMillan Press, 1998), "Growth with Justice: Understanding Poverty" in C. Steven LaRue ed. *India Handbook: Prospects into the 21st Century* (Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, Chicago, 1997), and "Nation, Identity and the Intervening Role of the State: A Study of the Secessionist Movement in Kashmir", in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.69, No.4, Winter 1996-97, 471-497.

Seddiq Weera (Centre for Peace Studies, McMaster University)

Seddiq Weera was born and raised in Afghanistan where he studied in the Faculty of Medicine, Kabul University (graduated in 1983) and practiced as a physician. Seddiq was imprisoned by the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul three times between 1978 and 1984 for a total of about five years. As a refugee in Pakistan between 1988 and 1991, besides working as a general practitioner, Seddiq assisted the Ministry of Public Health, Afghan Interim Government in developing Provincial Public Health Plans and establishing provincial public health offices in Afghanistan. He gained his first research experience by conducting and leading province-wide public health surveys in 1989 and 1990. After immigrating to Canada in 1991, Seddiq pursued his interest in population well-being by completing a Master's degree in medical and health research and continuing his work toward a PhD degree in the same field. Seddiq's passion for the rights of the Afghan people to peacefully and freely elect their government and his antagonism to dictatorship, violence, corruption and injustice has inspired him to continue his struggle for peace and social justice to this date. Presently, Seddiq is leading a peace education project in Afghanistan under the auspices of the Center for Peace Studies, McMaster University in Canada. He is the founding co-chair of the Canadian Landmine Research Network and the Canadian Coalition for Afghan Peace and Development.

Prince Mostapha Zaher

Prince Mostapha Zaher is the grandson of the exiled former King, Mohammed Zaher Shah deposed King of Afghanistan. He is the special assistant and security adviser to the former King of Afghanistan. Most recently his role has been to bring together delegates from various factions to discuss a post-Taliban scenario for Afghanistan in which the royal family may play a role. He formerly attended Queen's University studying politics. He left Canada in 1991 to assist his grandfather in diplomatic efforts to help millions of Afghan refugees and orphans.

Omar Zakhilwal (Institute for Afghan Studies)

Omar Zakhilwal is a Senior Research Economist with Statistics Canada. He also teaches economics at Carleton University. He is a member of the managing board of the Institute for Afghan Studies, a non-profit and non-political independent research organization founded and run by young Afghan scholars from around the globe. Omar holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Carleton University.