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Centre canadien pour le développement de la politique étrangère

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REPORT FROM THE DENVER ROUNDTABLE: NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

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Canada

REPORT FROM THE DENVER ROUNDTABLE:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
November 2, 2001
Denver, Colorado, U.S.A.

On November 2, 2001, the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, in partnership with the Institute of International Education (Rocky Mountain Regional Centre), organised a roundtable on ***New Directions in U.S. Foreign Policy.*** *The Roundtable was the last of six discussions which took place in the U.S. and Canada over the past eight months (San Diego - March 20, Washington D.C. - April 2, Edmonton - April 12, Toronto -May 18, and Halifax - June 15). As in previous discussions, participants examined trends and changes in U.S. foreign policy, including U.S. relations with other major powers. The Denver Roundtable also addressed energy and environment policy issues and trends. This was the only discussion to assess the implications of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. Participants included Ved Nanda (University of Denver), Paul D'Anieri (University of Kansas), Robert Lawrence (Colorado State University), Dirk Forrester (Nasource), and Karen de Bartolome (Institute of International Education). Michael Dawson (Deputy Director, United States General Relations Division), Steven Lee (Executive Director, Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development) and Marketa Geislerova (Policy Analyst/Rapporteur, Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development) joined the roundtable from DFAIT.*

For more information on the *New Directions in U.S. Foreign Policy* roundtable series and reports, go to: http://www.ecommons.net/ccfpd/

This report is divided into seven parts:
1. Introduction
2. Major Power Relationships
3. National Security
4. Networks and Terrorism
5. Environment and Energy
6. Human Rights
7. Conclusions

1. Introduction

Steven Lee (Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development) thanked the hosts for organising the roundtable and welcomed the participants. He said that the mandate of the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development (CCFPD), at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, is to connect civil society, including academics, experts, and NGOs, with policy makers on a range of foreign policy issues.

He explained that the CCFPD launched this series of discussions on *New Directions in U.S. Foreign Policy* for two purposes: first, to examine signs of shifts in U.S. foreign policy initiated

by the Bush administration early this year and second, in response to the focus on Canada – U.S. relations, provided by Canada's Foreign Affairs Minister, John Manley. Lee briefly summarised key conclusions from the previous five pre-September 11 discussions:

- U.S. foreign policy can be broadly characterised as "incoherent exceptionalism."
- There are troubling indications of an interest to weaponise space in order to project U.S. power.
- National Missile Defence can be criticised as technologically improbable, expensive and a response to a highly unlikely threat.
- There has been a tendency on the part of the Bush foreign policy team to resort to Cold War rhetoric in relation with China. There are questions about U.S. approaches to NATO and the European Union.
- "Nation building" is seen negatively.

Lee said that the Denver discussion is especially important for the series in part because it takes place after September 11. This timing provides an opportunity to examine and assess previous discussions in a new light. Among the questions that emerge are: Has the Bush administration discovered multilateralism or is the interest in multilateralism and coalition building only temporary ("cheap dates of convenience")? Did September 11 fundamentally change U.S. foreign policy, including plans to build a National Missile Defence? Have U.S. bilateral relations with China, NATO and the European Union changed? Has the war in Afghanistan changed the approach of the Bush administration toward nation building? What are the implications of the post-September 11 U.S. foreign policy for Canada? With these questions in mind, Lee said that the objectives for the day are twofold: 1) to reflect and learn from each other and 2) to provide insights for policy development needs and academic work.

2. Major Power Relations

2.1. China – Greg Moore (Centre for China-U.S. Cooperation, Denver University)

Greg Moore (Centre for China-U.S. Cooperation) said that until recently, U.S. foreign policy was perceived by the Chinese government as hawkish and unilateral – characteristics associated with a broader U.S. foreign policy approach that, indeed, could be labelled as "incoherent exceptionalism." He drew attention to a shift in discourse on China. While the country was perceived as a strategic partner by former President Clinton, President Bush prefers the term strategic competitor. The foreign policy team President Bush has assembled, including the National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice and Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, does not perceive China in a particularly favourable light. Furthermore, in contrast to the Clinton administration, no eminent Sinologists have been appointed to leading posts in the Bush administration. Preference has been given to security specialists instead. Sinologists have a more sophisticated understanding of China, security specialists tend to focus on real politick.

Three issues have been dominating U.S. – China relations: 1) the downed U.S. Navy surveillance aircraft incident, 2) the sale of arms to Taiwan, and 3) U.S. intention to withdraw from the Anti-

Ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty. Many observers considered that the Bush administration handled the downed aircraft incident relatively well. While the sale of weapons to Taiwan went ahead, the most controversial item – the Aegis class destroyer, was not sold. On the other hand, President Bush was the first President ever to publically declare U.S. unequivocal support for Taiwan. U.S. plans to withdraw from the ABM Treaty have also caused significant concern. Relations have somewhat improved this summer with the visit of the Secretary of State Collin Powell to China, China's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and U.S. tacit approval of Beijing hosting the 2008 Olympic Games.

The multilateral approach to addressing the September 11 attacks provides a basis for improved relations between the two countries. On the one hand, Chinese scholars and policy makers are outwardly optimistic that the two "great powers" may come together in combatting a common threat. On the other hand, the positioning of U.S. troops in close proximity to Chinese territory (along the short Afghanistan – China border) causes great concern in Beijing. **There is a possibility that an increased presence of U.S. troops in South Asia and continued bombing in Afghanistan may lead to a deterioration of U.S. – China relations.**

2.2 Russia – Paul D'Anieri (Department of Political Science, University of Kansas)

Growing evidence points to improved relations between the U.S. and Russia in the aftermath of September 11. The deployment of U.S. troops in post-Soviet Republics bordering on Afghanistan is unprecedented. This is even more significant considering the long-standing objections of the Russian government to NATO expansion. Some compare the new partnership between the U.S. and Russia to their Second World War cooperation. The problem then was that the partnership was based on a narrow mutual interest, which disappeared as soon as the war ended. The question now is whether the contemporary Coalition against terrorism, including a strengthened U.S. – Russia partnership, will meet the same fate. Is the Coalition based on temporary convenience or will it be able to withstand the pressures to tear it apart? Key decisions are yet to be made to determine the answer to this question.

In the immediate post-Cold War era, Russia was faced with two challenges: First, to adjust to its smaller size and second, to accept its new (downgraded) geo-political status in international relations. While the Russian government adjusted fairly well in the first instance (i.e., it has not engaged in "imperial over-reach"), it has had difficulties to accept that Russia is no longer a superpower in the world (on an equal footing with the U.S.). This situation poses a great challenge to the U.S. (as the sole remaining superpower) – to wield power without inspiring backlash from countries such as Russia. Until September 11, the U.S. government was not particularly successful. Both, the Clinton and Bush administrations, pursued relatively unilateral foreign policy, creating tensions between Washington and Moscow.

There is a chance now that both countries will be threatened more by common instability than by each other. The perceptions of U.S. dominance have already changed: the U.S. administration seems to have embraced multilateralism. At the same time there is a greater willingness abroad to allow the U.S. to defend itself. While the Russian government has no

intention to involve itself in another quagmire in Afghanistan, it has supported U.S. military action. One of the reasons for this is the fear that Taliban-sponsored activities and regimes may spread into Central Asia and to Russia. Nonetheless, the question remains whether the U.S. and Russia will be able to find compromise on longer-term policy issues, including NATO expansion, the accession of Russia to the WTO, and building a Ballistic Missile Defence. The future of Caspian Sea oil is also undetermined – raising concern in Moscow over the presence of U.S. troops in the area.

2.3. Europe – Frank Schuchat (Consul of Belgium)

Frank Schuchat said that the relationship between the U.S. and Europe is of enormous economic importance. However, the priorities of the European Union (EU) may not necessarily correspond to the interests of the U.S. and *vice versa* – a situation which may lead to tensions (and even conflict).

The EU priorities include:

- The stated goal of developing the most dynamic knowledge based economy in the world – a position occupied by the U.S. at the present: The U.S. government may feel threatened by the European efforts to usurp U.S. leadership of the global economy. This tension may be a basis for a potential conflict.
- Creating a common asylum and refugee policy: European immigration and refugee issues directly affect U.S. security. For instance, terrorists have a much easier time setting up and operating cells in Europe than in the U.S.
- Introducing the Euro.
- Enlargement of the European Union: The U.S. government should ensure that enlargement does not disrupt established bilateral relations between the U.S., EU and other countries.

Among the U.S. priorities are:

- addressing the EU Common Agricultural Policy and
- harnessing EU support for the expansion of the WTO.

The post-September 11 recession has tested U.S. – Europe relations, especially on the immigration and refugee issue. A new protectionist trend has emerged in the U.S. in the aftermath of the attacks. It is yet to be determined whether U.S. – Europe relations will be negatively affected by this trend.

2.4. Discussion

Participants speculated on the longevity of the Coalition against terrorism. Some asked how viable it was to build a Coalition with authoritarian and semi-authoritarian governments and whether this policy could come back to haunt the U.S. in the future. Others pointed out that the U.S. government had no other choice than to include such regimes – without them the effort to combat terrorism world-wide would fail.

A point was made that handling the aftermath of the September 11 attacks is a major test for the U.S. as a world leader. If the U.S. administration handles the war on terrorism in a way that is perceived as just, the rest of the world may yet accept U.S. hegemony as benign. However, bungling the counter-terrorism effort would mean isolation for the U.S. and hostility by others. Some participants suggested that in order to maintain its moral leadership role in the Coalition, the U.S. government should develop a parallel track to the military campaign to address the link between human misery and terrorism/violence. Efforts should be made to "dry up the pipeline of terrorist sentiment." In order to do so resources, equivalent to those allocated for the military campaign, should be dedicated to addressing poor social and economic conditions in the Middle East and in South Asia.

3. National Security

3.1. David Goldfisher (Graduate School of International Studies, Denver University)

David Goldfisher drew attention to the tendency of the media to compare the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan to the Vietnam war. He suggested that today, the context is entirely different: "Defeat would mean the end of America as we know it." Premature withdrawal from Afghanistan and the global campaign against terrorism would open up the U.S. to unending terrorist attacks, which may be even more devastating if (or when) the terrorists gain access to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

Homeland security has become crucial after the September 11 attacks, whereas it had been relegated in favour of offensive approaches to security until now. There are basically two reasons for this: First, since 1812 all wars in which the U.S. was engaged were fought off shore. Second, creating civil defence capability in the nuclear age may have unwittingly mobilised the public to oppose the build up of offensive nuclear arsenal. While a civil defence programme had been initiated during the Cuban Missile Crisis, it abruptly ended in hysteria. Similar attempts by the Reagan administration culminated in public demands for a Nuclear Freeze and disarmament, as predicted. **September 11 effectively ended the era of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and the reliance on offensive approaches to security. A new era of Assured Vulnerability has come of age, calling for defensive measures across the board.** In this context, Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) plans should be re-considered along with homeland defence.

Goldfisher said that the war against terrorism is taking place as the terms of "the haves" and the "have nots" fundamentally alter. Marxism and other left-wing ideologies offered systemic solutions to the "have nots" during the Cold War. Regimes rooted in the Marxist tradition (however misguided or authoritarian they may have been) promised improved material social and economic conditions for the wretched of the world. When they failed to deliver on these promises, in some places, Marxist ideologies were replaced by religious fundamentalism, which promises nothing material in this world and is therefore much harder to discredit. Coalition policy options should be considered in this context. **The U.S. government should understand that crushing the wretched of the world will not resolve the terrorist threat. Instead, the government should aim to build a more tolerable, equitable world.**

3.2. Robert Lawrence (Department of Political Science, Colorado State University)

Robert Lawrence raised the possibility of nuclear terrorism. **He said that the potential devastation warrants a policy of assertive disarmament.** Arms control regimes should be developed and implemented to control fissile material and to prevent the dispersion of devices to build delivery systems. Potential sites for the development of nuclear and radiological weapons, including research facilities, should be targeted. While the cooperation of other countries, especially Russia, would be preferable, the U.S. may have to proceed with trying to prevent nuclear proliferation, unilaterally.

The possibility of nuclear terrorism in the context of Assured Vulnerability poses questions for plans to deploy BMD and consequently to scrap (alter) the ABM Treaty. Some observers suggest that the U.S. deploy defensive systems in space. Others push for multilateral solutions (i.e., providing funds for Russian nuclear scientists to refocus their research, for instance, or cooperatively immobilising Russian-made plutonium). Nonetheless, "incoherent exceptionalism" will likely continue to characterise U.S. foreign policy in the future.

3.3. Discussion

A question was raised about possible reactions of the U.S. government to a potential nuclear attack in the context of the "civilisation *versus* barbarism" debate, where those individuals who target civilians for political purposes (and those who assist them) are considered uncivilised. **The moral question facing U.S. policy makers is how to adequately respond to a possible nuclear attack without resorting themselves to barbarism.**

Some participants addressed the growing pressure on the U.S. government by hardliners for a massive military build-up (including BMD) "just in case" the terrorists acquire the capability to attack with nuclear armed missiles. This pressure is countered by more moderate voices, arguing that BMD can not tackle other, often more practical, means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Moreover, BMD does not address the unending list of non-nuclear threats (from chemical and biological attacks to car bomb explosions). In this context, BMD plans will likely be downscaled to build a limited system (of about one hundred interceptors) so that equal attention can be paid to other types of defence. Multilateralism will likely continue to play a crucial role in the success of the anti-terrorism campaign, especially as (non-state) access to nuclear weapons widens. U.S. "incoherent exceptionalism" (including tearing-up the ABM Treaty) will likely not contribute to peace and stability around the world.

4. <u>Networks and Terrorism</u>

4.1. Shaul Gabbay (Institute for the Study of Israel in the Middle East, University of Denver)

Shaul Gabbay examined the importance of networks and their structure in international relations. He said a network is a relationship between two or more actors. Complex relationships, which

include more than two actors, are referred to as social networks or structures. A key characteristic of any relationship is its strength, which can be measured by several factors, including the duration of the relationship, the frequency of interaction and the feeling of closeness. A social network can either be opened or closed. An open social network is characterised by communication gaps, while a closed social network is well inter-linked.[1] If an open social network functions to the advantage of one actor – a social engineer, social capital is created.[2]

Individual terrorists likely use network strategies since they have to coordinate with each other without having any formal organisation. Moreover, terrorist cells may have to function in isolation. The strong, often life-long ties among terrorists make infiltrating their networks exceedingly difficult. Gabbay said that the experience of Israel in addressing terrorism demonstrates this point. **Despite the fact that Israeli security forces are able to uncover terrorist networks and target them with precision, they are unable to eliminate terrorism.**

President George Bush created a solid network of individuals, organisations and countries to combat terrorism. The Coalition of countries is, especially, an impressive achievement, unfathomable before September 11. Creating a Coalition which includes Muslim countries thwarted the intentions of Osama bin Laden to pit the U.S. and the Muslim world against each other. The cohesive Muslim-based network he was counting on opened (in part) in sympathy to the U.S. and other Western countries. Therefore, one of the goals of the Coalition should be creating structural gaps within the terrorist networks. The anti-terrorist networks may take on a different life in the future. The networks may also put pressure on Israel and Palestinians to resolve their long-standing conflict.

5. Environment and Energy

5.1. Dirk Forrester (Natsource)

Dirk Forrester examined the implementation of the Energy Policy Plan, initiated under the Clinton administration. Long-standing concerns about energy supply led the former administration to diversify foreign oil (energy) supply by fostering relationships with oil-rich countries like Venezuela, for instance. The continuing concerns over proliferation of nuclear materials led to active engagement of Russia on energy issues (including reorienting Russian nuclear facilities for other purposes). The multilateral initiatives to diversify supply and promote security were accompanied by efforts to improve domestic supplies of renewable resources and efficiency of appliances.

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[1]For instance, when a network has three actors: A, B, C, it is open if A has links to B and C while C shares no links with B. In a closed network all actors are inter-linked.

[2]This may occur, for instance, when A forges links separately with unconnected B and C and capitalises on their disconnectedness.

While the Clinton administration promoted the idea that emission trading was the most effective way to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere (at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system), the Bush administration surprisingly decided to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, which laid the formal foundation for such a system.[3] Instead, the Bush administration has been moving toward a free market system for energy, which will likely be based on the cheapest commodity – coal. In order to mitigate the potential negative effect of coal-based energy generation, deregulation should be accompanied by efforts to reform the Clean Air Act and to better control green gas emissions.

By withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. administration has also sent a signal that the process whereby the U.S. has been using energy issues (i.e. sustainable development) as a form of dialogue with countries such as Russia, China, and Brazil, has come to an end. The U.S. withdrawal from the Protocol will also mean a loss of markets for some U.S. firms. However, this will not be the case for larger, multinational firms which will have to meet the Kyoto Protocol targets in their offshore operations, whether the U.S. signs or not.

European and other countries are resigned to the fact that they will have to begin resolving global warming without the U.S. While there has been a shift toward multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy after September 11, no outward-looking energy policy has been articulated yet. **For now energy problems are being resolved by a policy of "punching holes into the ground," at the expense of other, more sustainable types of energy supplies (generation).** This situation is not sustainable in the longer-term (i.e., free-rider problem). The administration will have to come up with proposals/infrastructure to address climate change, whether outside or inside the Kyoto Protocol.

5.2. Karl Rabago (Rocky Mountain Institute)

Karl Rabago suggested that recent trends in the business sector point in a different direction than the current energy policy of "drill, dig, dam and glow," articulated by the Bush administration. **If the U.S. energy policy continues on its current track, the U.S. will soon lose its global leadership and may drag other countries, including Canada, along.**

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[3]The Kyoto Protocol, agreed in December 1997, sets legally-binding greenhouse gas emission objectives for each industrialised country, as listed in its Annex B. These countries should, as a whole, achieve at least a 5% reduction in emissions from 1990 levels over the 2008-2012 period, a significant departure from current trends. To that aim, the Protocol indicates areas for action, and sets up a number of mechanisms for international cooperation, such as emissions trading. Among other things, further work will be needed to elaborate the rules for these mechanisms and to agree on measures to be taken by Parties in case of non-compliance. See http://www.iea.org/ieakyoto/index.htm

The major trends and drivers in the business sector include:

- increasing liberalisation/market forces (through privatisation and deregulation)
- increasing unit scale and concentration of energy/emergence of right sized energy resources (the bigger the better principle is on the retreat)
- increasing de-carbonisation of energy fuels/emergence of carbon free energy resources
- growing role of civil society/low cost industrial development (increasing the pressure for low-cost solutions and low environmental costs)
- declining governmental structural protectionism/growth of industrial adaptability or flexibility
- downstream shift in economic focus from supply to end use/emergence of a business model based on service value (i.e. customer value choice may be wind-power or other "friendly" energy).

There have been three major surprises:

- Negawatts
  - big savings can cost less than small ones
  - huge overhang may be bought
- Hyper-cars
  - the biggest industry-changer since chips
  - a nega-OPEC: ~9 million bbl/d in North America
  - soon a major distributed power generator
  - key to a rapid hydrogen transition
- Distributed energy resources
  - microturbines, renewables, now fuel cells
  - distributed benefits

Rabago outlined four main principles for a new business model labelled "Natural Capitalism," they are:[4]

- **Radically increased resource productivity.** Through fundamental changes in production design and technology, leading organizations are making natural resources stretch 5, 10, even 100 times further than before. The resulting savings in operational costs, capital, and time quickly pay for themselves, and in many cases initial capital investments actually decrease.
- **Ecological redesign (biomimicry: closed loops, no waste, no toxicity).** Natural Capitalism seeks not merely to reduce waste but to eliminate the concept altogether. Closed-loop production systems, modeled on nature's designs, return every output harmlessly to the ecosystem or create valuable inputs for other manufacturing processes. Industrial processes that emulate nature's benign chemistry reduce dependence on nonrenewable inputs, eliminate waste and toxicity, and often allow more efficient production.
- **Shift economy from production of goods to creation of flow of services.** The business model of traditional manufacturing rests on the sporadic sale of goods. The Natural Capitalism model delivers value as a continuous flow of services – leasing an illumination service, for example, rather than selling light bulbs. This shift rewards both

[4]For more information on Natural Capitalism, see the Rocky Mountain Institute website: http://www.rmi.org/sitepages/pid268.php

provider and consumer for delivering the desired service in ever cheaper, more efficient, and more durable ways. It also reduces inventory and revenue fluctuations, disposal liabilities, and other risks.

- **Reinvestment in natural capital.** Any good capitalist reinvests in productive capital. Businesses are finding an exciting range of new cost-effective ways to restore and expand the natural capital directly required for operations and indirectly required to sustain the supply system and customer base.

The U.S. energy policy has been remarkably consistent, elements include:

- cheap energy (low cost, low quality)
- mass flow model of wealth (i.e., bigger = wealthier)
- government-assisted credibility
- security of supply is a major driver.

Energy Security entails:

- freedom from fear of privation or want
- positioning two sets of values:
  - privatisation vs. socialisation
  - isolationism vs. engagement
- increasingly concentrated, and therefore brittle systems reveal new supply integrity risks

Rabago also examined the proposed U.S. energy policy:

- ANWR – brittle, worthless
- Oil, coal, gas subsidies
- nuclear subsidies
- rejection of transportation efficiency opportunities
- bill-pay support programmes for the poor
- modest support for clean energy.

Emerging markets:

- distributed energy resources (generation, management, efficiency, storage)
- green power markets
- markets in intangibles

Other indicators of new directions in the energy sector include:

- The rejection of the Kyoto Protocol restricts the opportunity to participate in global emissions markets.
- Incremental approach to energy development restricts the opportunity to support leap-frogging.
- Deferral of sustainable profitability focus restricts opportunities to take leadership in new markets.

6. Human Rights

6.1. Jack Donnelly (Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver)

Jack Donnelly said that while human rights have become a part of U.S. foreign policy, there is a disconnect between policy statements/initiatives and programming. Democratisation is under the rubric for programming (spending), while raising human rights violations falls under policy statements. The two tracks run simultaneously, in parallel to each other. He encouraged bringing the two tracks together.

The Bush administration is not particularly concerned about human rights and relies to a large degree on the bureaucracy. It is perhaps surprising that President Bush made no symbolic gesture (i.e., downscaling attention to human rights) toward his "clientele" following the elections. The current U.S. human rights policy could be characterised as bi-partisan, since it is basically the same as the Clinton policy.

Donnelly suggested that September 11 will likely have a negative impact on human rights in the longer-term. The war in Afghanistan is the litmus test of U.S. foreign policy. **When foreign policy becomes ordered around an ideological goal, it is likely that human rights, both domestic and international, will be trampled on.** Statements such as "we cannot afford human rights" may start emerging, as the U.S. builds partnerships with authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

6.2. Discussion

A point was made that the U.S. human rights policy may not be as incoherent and ineffective as the presentation suggests. The resources the U.S. allocates to human rights around the world are relatively high. The U.S. was the last country to give up on post-Tianamen Square China sanctions and promoted human rights in Indonesia, for instance. However, the U.S. government undermines this good work by making high-profile (symbolical) mistakes. This includes, for instance, the decision not to sign the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

A participant asked whether it was possible to promote democracy around the world without selling Coke and McDonald's at the same time. Donnelly said that human rights are not neutral to political systems and social structures. Historically, human rights have been closely connected with the "West" – as a place where states and markets have achieved a relatively high level of development. However, promoting human rights should not be related to culture *per se.* Culture should be separated from social and political issues.

Donnelly suggested that the prospect of developing the sense of social and economic rights in the U.S. is slim. A majority of Americans is obsessed with the virtues of free markets and is unwilling to accept the markets' possible negative impacts, except at home. The most movement one can expect is the softening of the Washington consensus. This view is reflected in the U.S. human rights policy, which does not draw links between human rights and aid (nor human rights and trade) – contrary to countries such as Canada, Norway, and the Netherlands.

7. Conclusions

The over-arching issue addressed by the participants throughout the day was whether post-September 11 U.S. multilateralism will last. Is it credible to assume that a common terrorist threat could bring enhanced cooperation between the U.S. and its traditional adversaries (i.e., Russia and China)? Doubt was raised about the ability of the U.S. to transcend its differences with other Coalition partners as soon as the present crisis subsides and when other long-term interests reappear on the foreign policy agenda (including NATO expansion, scrapping the ABM Treaty, building a BMD, etc.).

Another common theme was the future of the U.S. global leadership. Many participants agreed that the anti-terrorist campaign poses a great challenge to the U.S. as the sole superpower in the world. The manner in which the U.S. government handles the war in Afghanistan and the campaign in general will determine whether the international community will continue to accept the privileged position of the U.S. in the world, or whether it will mount resistance and demand change. The U.S. government should take care to project power/influence in a way that does not generate a backlash. Eliminating terrorism should include efforts to create a more equitable world. The U.S. simply must invest in nation building and good governance for broken, desperate societies – bombing the wretched of the world will not accomplish anything in the long run.

U.S. plans to engage the United Nations in a reconstruction effort in Afghanistan after the war and the pay-back of UN dues may point to the recognition on the part of the U.S. government that the UN is the only viable (legitimate) global mechanism to address peace and security in the world. Strengthening and reforming the United Nations in the anti-terrorist campaign and beyond could be the first step toward building a more just and equitable world.

New security concepts were addressed during the discussion. A point was made that the era of Mutually Assured Destruction was being replaced by an age of Assured Vulnerability. The new security environment supports the argument for nation building since, **as the experience of Israel demonstrates, no matter how much a state spends on defence and intelligence, terrorists find new, innovative ways to penetrate and strike.**

A concern was raised that the post-September 11 environment/rhetoric does not bode well for the future of U.S. human rights policy at home and abroad. There is a possibility that the new security concerns will relegate human rights to a mere afterthought.

New directions in energy and environmental policies were also examined. Experts warned that if the current U.S. energy policy is not reversed, the U.S. will soon lose its global leadership position. Canadians should take note that the U.S. energy future is not necessarily a future of more oil and coal. Canada should move to be ahead of the new curve of hydrogen, water-based and other energy sources and technologies. The need for the U.S. government to address climate change, outside (or inside) the Kyoto Protocol was emphasised.

New Directions in U.S. Foreign Policy
AGENDA

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Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development
Rocky Mountain Regional Center of the Institute of International Education

November 2, 2001

8:00 - 8:30am **Registration and Continental Breakfast**

8:30 - 8:45am **Opening Remarks**

Ved Nanda, Vice Provost, Office of Internationalization
Director, International Legal Studies Program
University of Denver

Steven Lee, Executive Director
Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development

8:45 - 9:30am **Major Power Relationships**

China: Dr. Greg Moore
Assistant Director, Center for China-U.S. Cooperation
University of Denver

Russia: Dr. Paul J. D'Anieri
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science
University of Kansas

Europe: Mr. Frank Schuchat
Consul of Belgium
Partner; Ireland, Stapleton, Pryor, & Pascoe

9:30 - 10:15am **National Security**

Dr. David Goldfischer
Associate Professor, Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver

Dr. Robert M. Lawrence
Professor, Department of Political Science
Colorado State University

10:15 - 10:45am **Break**

10:45 - 11:30am **Regional Conflicts/Terrorism**

Dr. Shaul Gabbay
Director, Institute for the Study of Israel in the Middle East
University of Denver

11:30am - 12:15pm **Environment and Energy**

Mr. Dirk Forrester
Managing Director, Natsource

Mr. Karl Rabago
Consultant, Rocky Mountain Institute

12:15 - 1:30pm **Luncheon**
Renaissance Room South, Mary Reed Building

1:30 - 2:15pm **Human Rights**

Dr. Jack Donnelly
Associate Dean
Andrew Mellon Professor, Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver

2:15 - 3:00pm **Wrap-Up and Closing Remarks**

Ved Nanda, Vice Provost, Office of Internationalization
Director, International Legal Studies Program
University of Denver

New Directions in U.S. Foreign Policy
Participant List

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Speakers

Paul J. D'Anieri
Associate Dean, Office of International Programs
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science
University of Kansas

Jack Donnelly
Associate Dean & Andrew W. Mellon Professor
Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver

Dirk Forrester
Managing Director, Natsource

Shaul Gabbay
Director, Institute for the Study of Israel in the Middle East
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