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THE POLICY CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENT

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A WORD FROM CCMD

There is a widespread perception that the policy capacity of governments has eroded since the mid-1970s. Shifts in the sources of policy advice and the increase in policy advocacy coming from the private sector present a significant challenge to those charged with adopting and implementing "good" public policy. Factors such as the globalization of the economy, fiscal restraint, the need to manage cross-cutting policy issues, and increased public consultation and concem with citizens' rights have affected the way policy is made in govemment.

The following paper, by one of the leading international scholars of public policy and administration, was prepared as a research study for the Task Force on Strengthening the Policy of the Federal Govemment led by Ivan Fellegi and Ole Ingstrup. Guy Peters is Maurice Falk Professor of American Govemment at the University of Pittsburgh, a Senior Fellow of CCMD, and a leader in CCMD's international govemance research program. In the present study, Dr. Peters discusses what is meant by "good" policy and offers a thorough assessment of the many factors currently affecting the ability of govemments to develop wise and effective policies that can be implemented successfully and reach their goals. He observes that at a time when there is a pressing need for govemments to make departures from the status quo and to consider longer-term, strategic choices, a number of conflicting factors in the environment tend to inhibit them from doing so. Of particular importance is the way in which

knowledge is made available and utilized in the formulation of policy, a subject explored in depth in this paper.

In his analysis of the process of policy making, Dr. Peters examines the relationship of line departments to central agencies in the development of government policy and discusses the changing role of senior public servants, as more emphasis is given to managerial as opposed to policy responsibilities. He concludes with a warning that the ability of govemments to deal with the increasing complexity of policy issues has been threatened by a decline in the importance attached to the public service's policy role and the loss of a generation of trained policy analysts from govemment.

The issues examined in this paper are of central importance to govemments and public servants, and to sound public policy. CCMD is grateful to Dr. Peters for this substantial contribution to its *Governance* series and to its ongoing research program.

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1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this essay is to develop an understanding of the policy capacity of contemporary govemments. There is a strong sense within a number of govemments that they are no longer as capable of formulating, implementing and evaluating policy as they were during the heyday of govemment during the 1960s and 1970s: the sense is that from the mid-1970s onward, the policy capabilities of govemments have eroded. Some observers suggest that this declining policy capacity has been the result of a more ideological and politicized style of making policy (Aucoin 1988; Savoie 1994). Others argue that this declining capacity reflects the increasingly difficult fiscal position of govemment and the lack of funds for policy initiatives (Brown 1988; Lightman and Irving 1991). Still others believe that the ironic combination of public scepticism and public consultation has made policy making more difftcult, with the latitude of govemments for autonomous action substantially reduced.

Whatever the reasons may be, the perception that the policy capacity of govemment has been seriously eroded presents a significant challenge to a public sector that seeks to adopt and implement "good" public policy. Indeed, according to many veteran observers, several of the factors that have eroded the policy capacity of govemments make the capacity to deal analytically with policies all the more important.] If there are limited financial resources, then policy analysis should be employed to enable govemments to make more sophisticated and effective choices among

alternative uses. Similarly, if there is an increased amount of policy advocacy coming from the private sector, then govemment will require more information and better analysis to sort through the conflicting private sector sources.

The numerous shifts in the sources of policy advice have tended to devalue the role of senior public servants as policy advisors. In addition to the changing role definitions of the senior public service, the interna1 resources available for career officials to fulfil their role as policy advisors also appear to have diminished significantly. There has been a "lost generation" of young policy analysts who have not been hired by govemment in most industrialized democracies. Finally, some observers (Lewis 1991) have argued that the declining morale, and declining real rewards (Hood and Peters 1994; Peters and Hood 1995) of being in the public service have driven some of the more capable individuals away from govemment careers. It is difficult to quantify the extent of this malaise in the public sector, but there is a good deal of anecdotal evidence about its existence (Peters 1991; Manion 1991). Thus, even if there were the demand for a stronger policy role for the public service, it is not entirely clear that the necessary personnel resources still exist within the bureaucracy in most industrialized democracies.

A final general consideration about the policy capacity of govemment is the increasing importance of the horizontal dimension of govemment policy. The practice in almost all govemments is for policies to emerge from the "stovepipes" that link functional experts at all levels of govemment with interest groups and with other advocates within the policy area (Atkinson and Coleman 1992; Coleman and Skogstad 1990). That isolation of policy issues and the separation of one set of programs from others no longer appear adequate for effective govemance, and there are growing concerns about coordinating policies (Boston 1992; Aucoin and Bakvis 1993). Policy-making capacity, therefore, increasingly implies being able to work across the conventional functional definitions of policies (Jobert 1985; Freeman 1985) and being able to make strategic and redistributive choices among programs.

With the need to coordinate programs corne special demands for building analytic capacity. To make decisions that assist in the coordination

of programs requires an ability to evaluate the relative merits of a number of different contributions to the dominant goals of govemment and then to make choices among those possible contributions that would produce the most desirable and efficient mix. Such calculations are important as guides for action, and they are also important for justifying the decisions to individuals and organizations which lose resources as a result of these choices. Furthermore, this application of systematic policy analysis may be especially important for assuring that a coordinating decision constitutes an effective policy choice rather than merely a lowest common denominator choice (Scharpf 1989) that makes everyone happy.

II

EXTERNAL CONDITIONS

We can begin by looking at the factors extemal to the policy process that appear to have eroded the policy-making capacity of govemment in industrialized democracies. One aspect of this apparent demise of effective govemance is the emergence of some extemal factors that minimize the capacity of govemment to govem. This would probably be as true of the govemments that appeared successful in the past as it is of govemments that have remained ineffective. Govemments will either have to recognize and live with their relative impotence, or they will have to think about using very different instruments to accomplish their tasks (Dunsire 1993).

The first of these factors is the phenomenon of globalization (Savoie 1995; Held and McGraw 1993). While this has become something of a cliché, like all clichés there is a certain amount of truth in it. Few if any policies and programs can be thought to be totally domestic, and as a consequence a govemment can exercise control over only a subset of the sources of influence in the policy area (Hutton 1993). Not only are other govemments involved in many policies, but non-govemmental organizations and the amorphous international market also have a strong influence on the success or failure of a policy (Hurrell 1994). If govemments are to be successful policy makers, they will need to adopt instruments that permit greater flexibility, speed and sensitivity in responding to extemal environmental factors.[2]

The globalization of policy is associated with another important change in the extemal environment, the increasing importance of "cross-cutting issues" in govemment and of managing "horizontal govemment." The point here is that policy issues are becoming more difficult to contain within the boundaries of conventional ministerial structures. This inability to contain issues is to some degree a function of globalization, as when concem about international economic competitiveness influences domestic policies such as social policy and education (Johnson, McBride and Smith 1994). In addition, client groups such as the elderly, women, persons with disabilities, and First Nations people often perceive govemment in terms of large clusters of issues and services, rather than as individual ministries, and would like to have more holistic services made available to them (Schaan 1994; Considine 1992). Govemments have never been very good at managing policy horizontally, and as the demands from these groups and the pressures from globalization become more significant, they appear increasingly impotent to produce effective policy coordination.

A third extemal factor that has exacerbated the impact of the first two is the continuing fiscal restraint affecting the Canadian govemment and virtually all other govemments in developed democracies.[3] The simple fact is that govemments no longer enjoy the luxury of spending large amounts of money on new and innovative programs; they are being forced to find more cost-effective means for reaching existing policy goals, or even to reduce spending on those programs. Thus, while at one time govemments could throw money at a whole range of problems, they now must be more selective in their issues and must attempt to reach their goals through less expensive means. Govemments must also be certain that they are not funding redundant programs, or programs that do not appear to be reaching their goals.

The financial restraints also place pressures on govemment to design programs properly at the outset. Unfortunately, many problems confronting govemments are not so well defined or understood that a program can be designed correctly a *priori. The* alternative would be to use more experimental methods — that is, to attempt to find workable programs by tria1 and error. There are a number of instances in which govemments have been willing to experiment and to announce from the outset that they are not sure

about the program, but hope to leam (Passe11 1993). The idea advanced by Donald Campbell (1988) and other scholars (Majone and Wildavsky 1978) is that of the "experimenting society" in which there is a willingness to take chances and also to use multiple programs in order to reach goals, even though that strategy may generate short-term inefficiencies.[4]

A fourth factor is the increasing politicization of policy and of governance. Goveming has always been political, by definition, but the scope of influence for more manifestly political considerations and actors appears to have been increasing in almost all developed democracies (Meyer 1985; Stahlberg 1987). Associated with this trend has been the tendency of policy makers to rely more on political and ideological criteria and less on analytic criteria when justifying policy decisions. With politicization has corne a decline in the importance of analytic units in govemment and their replacement by a greater concem with public relations and "environmental scanning" as forms of policy advice (Hollander and Prince 1993, 196-7). Thus, political advice has corne to replace the more quantitative techniques usually identified as policy analysis, and even the sources of more "scientific" analysis that have survived tend to be more politicized (Fischer 1991).

A fifth factor, associated with the increased politicization of goveming as well as fiscal restraint, is the changing definition of the role of civil servants. The emerging definition is of public servants as managers, as opposed to policy advisors or even policy makers. The "new public management" (Pollitt 1990; Hood 1991) now popular in govemment argues, in a fashion reminiscent of the old politics/administration dichotomy, that the job of public servants is to implement decisions made by their political masters. Further, the importing of private sector management techniques into govemment (Pollitt 1995) has emphasized that the real task for the public service is to get on with implementing policy and running organizations, rather than worry too much about what policies those organizations should be pursuing.

Finally, public participation is now greater and it is more difficult for govemments to make decisions autonomously and then implement them. The prevailing ethos is that govemment must be more consultative and more interested in service to clients. In addition, there has been increasing political mobilization around issues of rights, and those issues are less

subject to bargaining than are issues based on economic wants (Aronowitz 1992). This participatory ethos is complemented by a growing availability of information which makes it harder for government to disguise its choices from the public.[5] While it is diffkult to argue with these participatory values on normative grounds, the populism that has been engendered does have practical consequences. They definitely make it more diffkult for the public sector to reach the demanding redistributive decisions that are often necessary to govem effectively.

III

WHAT IS GOOD POLICY?

Governments want to be able to make "good policy," but it is not clear what is meant by that deceptively simple phrase. It certainly cannot refer to the specific goals of a policy, given that there will inevitably be political and ideological disagreements about what is right for government to do. At the most minimal level, good policy is a policy that can be implemented successfully. Implementation is certainly important, but assuming this as a criterion tends to assign "feasibility" too great a weight among all the possible criteria that should be applied (Majone 1975; Elmore 1979; Linder and Peters 1989). At a second level, a good policy is a policy that actually reaches the goals set for it. Again, however, this may be a very minimal definition if it implies that only limited goals and incremental solutions are likely to be accepted in order to produce the perception of success.

If we move beyond these rather minimal definitions of good policy, we should begin to conceptualize the capacity of government to make more significant departures from the status quo and to make those changes successfully. For example, good policy making (from that perspective) would involve selecting the options in Table 1 that would drive government to make longer-term, strategic policy choices. This more radical pattern would be in contrast to the short-range, process-oriented, incremental solutions that are often characteristic of government, especially governments that are faced with external constraints and substantial internal political pressures.

Table 1

Dichotomies of Public Policy		
Synoptic	vs.	Incremental
Long-term	vs.	Short-term
Proactive	vs.	Reactive
Cross-cutting	vs.	Sectoral
Strategic	vs.	"Firefighting"
Substance	vs.	Process

The above characterization assumes that the real needs of govemment and society are best satisfied by making substantial moves away from the status quo. If we are thinking about the policy capacity of govemment, then simply making incremental choices requires little capacity, whereas more substantial departures require much more. The selection of more radical responses would, in tum, require the development of "policy indicators" (MacRae 1985) that would be suffrcient to trigger more extreme reactions by govemment, in contrast to the more modest, incremental responses that are required when the basic structure of public policy is acceptable (Weaver 1989). The problem is that there are relatively few "policy indicators" available, so that govemments must rely upon judgment and partial indicators rather than on the more powerful indicators. This is perhaps another instance in which social constructionism, that is, the capacity to generate a perception of crisis, may be crucial for manipulating the policy process (Lipsky and Smith 1989).

IV

THE POLICY CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENT

The idea of the policy capacity of govemment is difftcult to conceptualize. Does it include the implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Freudenberg and Gramling 1994) capacity of the system, or should it be concemed only with formulating clever and potentially effective policies? Also, does it include the political capacity of the system to respond to changing demands from interest groups and the mass public, or does it assume that govemment should be more autonomous? In the broadest sense a concept of policy capacity would include all the above factors, but for the purposes of this paper we will concentrate attention on two aspects of policy making.

The first of these dimensions is largely procedural; it assesses the capacity of the policy-making system to translate the wishes of the public, as expressed in elections, into public policy. Richard Rose (1974) referred to this as "the problem of party govemment." He set out eight conditions necessary for govemment to be able to do this. The first three of these conditions deal primarily with the electoral connection between government and the people, and will not be considered here. However, the remaining five points will be discussed in terms of the capacity of both political leaders and civil servants to make the structures of govemment produce policy of the type they desire.

The second approach to the quality of policy decisions is more substantive; it attempts to assess the utilization of knowledge within the policy-making process (Torgerson 1986). The examination of this second approach to quality in policy will be discussed to some extent in process terms and will focus attention on stages of the policy process. We will attempt to identify the stages in the conventional linear mode1 of the policy process (Jones 1984; Peters 1995) at which policy analytic techniques are the most applicable and at which knowledge, if utilized effectively, can have the greatest impact on the shape of public policy. Further, the points at which policy analysis is *not* applicable to solving problems will be identified (House and Schull 1988), as well as some of the features of those problems to which it is applicable. Although it is difficult for govemments to refuse to confront problems, they should be careful if they have the luxury of choosing their issues.

V

THE PROCESS OF POLICY MAKING: POLICY CAPACITY AS THE ABILITY TO MAKE DECISIONS

The question of quality relates first to how the process of policy making is structured to produce more or less effective outcomes. Rose identifies a number of barriers to the efforts of the would-be policy maker to bring into effect a specific vision of a policy (Table 2). In general, these barriers are a function of the skills and resources available to a policy maker, and of the resistance to new policy that may arise within organizations that have become accustomed to existing policy regimens. The policy capacity of govemment seen in these terms is the ability of actors to overcome those barriers and to manipulate the process in order to produce desired outcornes. These bat-tiers are usually thought of as limits on the capacity of political leaders, but they are also potentially impediments to active policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1987) within the public service.[6]

The first of these criteria, or potential impediments to success, is the command of sufficient expertise to be able to make adequate decisions. We will be dealing with access to information and analysis in detail below, but at this point we should note the extent to which the political process may advantage or disadvantage certain elements of the goveming elite. One of the most important factors here is the recruitment of those elites. Few ministers have any real experience in the substance of the policies for

Table 2

Criteria for Party Govemment
1. Ministers must have suffkient knowledge of the policy of their department to participate effectively in decisions
2. Ministers must be in suffkient numbers to control the activities of their department
3. Ministers must have the skills necessary to manage a large complex organization
4. Ministers must have the time available to manage their organization and make policy
5. The departments of govemment must be sufficiently coordinated to produce effective action.
Source: Adapted from Rose (1974)

which they are responsible (Blonde1 1985), and that certainly appears to be true in Canada (Sutherland 1991). There are some comparative examples of countries in which ministers are recruited for their technocratic abilities (Blonde1 1988). In Westminster systems, however, ministers tend to be selected for political reasons and other factors not usually associated with their capacity to manage *specific*[7] portfolios (Wilson 1994). This, in turn, means that the ministers are either dependent upon their civil servants or they bring in advisors who are personally committed to them and/or to the party. The evidence, however, is that senior civil servants are tending to spend less time in any one ministry (Carroll 1991) and hence may not be able to supply as much of the needed policy expertise as was the case several decades ago.

The need for leaders to have specific policy expertise to manage their own department can conflict with the (now) commonly articulated demands for enhanced coordination among government departments and programs. If ministers (and their public servants) are selected for their command of particular bodies of substantive information, they are less likely to be able to visualize the needs and priorities of other departments and to coordinate effectively with programs from other departments. Thus, as is so often the case in govemment and politics, there is a trade-off between two important values, with a need to balance the two or make conscious choices that maximize one or the other. Ministers who focus exclusively on understanding and advocating the programs of their own department run the risk of undermining the effectiveness of the govemment as a whole.

The second and third of the relevant criteria advanced by Rose are that the ministers (or civil servants) must have the skills necessary to manage organizations effectively as well as the time to devote to performing the policy and managerial tasks. Not only should policy makers have some substantive knowledge of the policies for which they are responsible, they should also have the skills required to put them into effect. In other words, they must be capable of managing large, complex organizations. Further, the elites must have sufficient time to manage an organization and to put the desired programs into effect.

Once again, Westminster political systems seem to rate rather poorly on the criteria for managing organizations. Ministers tend to have political rather than managerial experience and find the management of their departments difficult. For senior public servants, the increasing complexity and (frequently) increasing size of govemment departments makes management difficult, even though they are selected for their managerial skills. In addition, the demands of cabinet govemment — cabinet responsibilities, cabinet comrnittees, parliamentary and constituency duties — make the life of a minister extremely taxing. Public servants may have somewhat more time, yet this is a limited resource in view of the responsibilities they face.

The last of the criteria advanced by Rose is that all the parts of the system work in harmony to implement the policy. One of the tasks of leadership becomes that of creating agreement and unity within the organization, a task that then involves creating cooperation and some

common purpose between the political and career parts of govemment. In the contemporary environment this also requires the capacity to promote cooperation across the range of organizations that have an interest in the policy area. Govemments rarely march to the same drummer, given the number of different interests and constituencies involved.[8] Still, to be effective, the number of overt conflicts must be minimized and there must be enhanced coordination and harmonization.

The management of horizontal govemment represents a major challenge for leaders seeking to push their programs and policies through the political system. Govemment departments do not naturally want to move in any single direction, but rather may prefer to govem their own segments of the world without reference to the other policy sectors. Reforms such as consolidation of cabinet departments and the use of various budgetary techniques are all intended to enhance coordination, but have difficulty in overcoming the strength of the stovepipes that dominate most govemment policy. These techniques may be no substitute for firm leadership from the top of govemment requiring greater coordination.

VI

THE SUBSTANCE OF POLICY: USING KNOWLEDGE TO SOLVE POLICY PROBLEMS

The question of how knowledge is utilized within the policy process is central to the capacity of govemment to govem effectively. We can evaluate policy making along a variety of dimensions, but one of the most important is the utilization of knowledge and the capacity to generate and apply policy advice effectively in order to make policies "better." Govemments have any number of people who can and do provide advice about the political implications of a policy. As noted, it appears that these political considerations increasingly dominate policy, to the detriment of govemmental capacity to make and implement policies that meet the objective needs of society. These problems are especially evident when such policies require an extensive time period in which to prove effective.

Elinor Chelimsky (a senior officia1 responsible for evaluation in the US. General Accounting Office) notes the following:

> What then are the mismatches that continue to prevent research from supporting decision needs appropriately? 1 see at least three: (i) when political requirements are SO overwhelming that information simply will not be sought; (ii) when information is sought, but contextual or resource constraints impede researchers from actually producing the information needed for decision; and (iii) when the

> "state of the art" research problems allow only inconclusive answers to decision-makers' questions. (199 1,226)

This assessment of knowledge utilization and availability is far from encouraging, but it does point to the multiple problems encountered in attempting to provide usable information for decision makers.

The political context of decisions is a paramount concem. The development of scientific and social scientific information as a basis for decisions is a more difficult task than predicting the political coalitions affecting a policy decision. There is, however, a growing mismatch between the focus on short-term political consequences and the nature of the policy problems with which govemments are confronted. The more technical forms of knowledge are increasingly important as govemments are called upon to legislate in policy areas with a significant scientific content, to cope with social problems about which there is no agreed-upon methodology for producing the intended social changes,[9] and to make decisions that have significant long-term consequences.

As we approach the question of the capacity of govemments to utilize knowledge in policy we will attempt to answer the traditional five questions addressed by joumalists as they write an account of an event: who, what, when, where and why. However, we will answer these questions in a somewhat different order than the conventional one, beginning with "What?" In the context of policy making by govemment and the capacity to make good policy, the issue of what sort of information is needed, whether it exists, and what to do if it does not exist is in some ways the most difficult and most crucial of these questions. Govemmental capacity is often seriously constrained by the unavailability of the right information, so that one element necessary to building capacity is to address those issues.

WHAT? WHAT DO GOVERNMENTS NEED TO KNOW TO MAKE GOOD POLICY?

Contemporary govemments operate in an environment which is increasingly rich in information. The development of "information highways" and other technical breakthroughs appear to make all the information that

any govemment could need readily accessible to it. At one level that is true, and there is to some extent an overload of information. One of the more difficult tasks in which govemments must engage is that of sorting through the mountains of data, evidence, and advice that flows in every time there is a policy to be made. Much of this information is biased and is being used as a tool to influence the decision. Still, it is information that, with careful evaluation and sorting, could improve the quality of the decisions made.

On the other hand, there are any number of issues with which govemments must deal that are "ill structured" (Dunn 1988) and about which there is no agreement as to what information is actually relevant to a decision. Unfortunately, govemments are not always absolved of the requirement to act, even when their informational resources and the probability of making good policy is limited. Therefore, one of the important but often underrated policy-making capacities of govemment is the capacity to deal with uncertainty and with risk. Decision makers and citizens usually want a sure thing, but often are faced with decisions that are little more than sophisticated gambling (Dror 1983).

There are still other issues about which there is a shortage of information, especially information that is available to govemments in a readily usable form. Govemments therefore must get into the business of mandating information, or bargaining with private sector actors in order to acquire the information they require. Possessing adequate information provides govemment with the capacity to act more autonomously and probably more precisely as well. It also places govemments in a more equal position vis-à-vis private sector actors who may want to retain their monopoly of information as a means of exerting their power over a particular area of the economy or society.[10]

Figure 1 describes a set of possible situations in which govemments may find themselves in terms of the availability of knowledge for making policy decisions. The most comfortable position for a govemment is obviously in Case 1 in which there is adequate information available and govemment has easy access to that information. This situation is to be expected in policy areas that have been a part of the concerns of govemment for some time and in which there is relatively little disagreement about cause and effect relationships, and therefore little disagreement about

the forms of intervention that may be required. Decisions in a policy area such as this can be described as "programmed" (Peters and Barker 1993, 16). Although most people working in govemment would not think that their policy fits into this category, some areas do — at least at the level of more *technical* decision making. (Of course, the *political* ramifications of those decisions may still be pronounced and therefore certainly not programmed.)

Figure 1
Relationship of Knowledge to Government



Case 1: The necessary information exists and govemment has sufficient access to it.

Case 2: The necessary information exists but is held outside government. The holders of the information are cooperative in sharing the information.

Case 3: The necessary information exists but is held outside govemment. The holders of the information are not cooperative in sharing the information.

Case 4: The necessary information does not exist.

At the other extreme, policy questions that fall into Case 4 are the most troubling for govemment. Not only does govemment not possess adequate information on which to base decisions, but that information does not, in fact, exist at all. In this case govemments must make decisions by "inspiration" rather than through the easier programmed manner. If this is a "one-off" problem, then govemment can attempt either to dodge the decision or to find some incremental move from existing policies and programs that can at least address the issue. The incremental response (Hayes 1992) has the advantage of doing *something* but not appearing to engage in bold new adventures which may invite political repercussions.

If, however, it appears that govemment will be faced with the problem for some period of time, then other responses may be necessary to increase the policy capacity of govemment. One possible response is "knowledge mandating," or "technology mandating," to develop solutions for the problem (Rudig 1994). An example of this occurred in the United States under the *Clean Air Act* of 1972. This act required attaining improvements in emissions from automobiles that were far in excess of the existing technology (Jones 1975), yet advisors to Congress argued in favour of passing the standards into law, in essence requiring the automobile manufacturers to develop the technology to meet these standards. In the end this strategy worked, with emission standards exceeding the mandates within the period specified. Similar strategies have been advanced for "encouraging" the automobile makers to meet gasoline mileage standards.

This mandating can be successful in some policy areas, but may not be so in others in which the information and technology requirements are less obvious than in the case of air pollution. While the reduction in automobile emissions was a simple engineering application, for many social problems knowledge mandating may not be so easy. Govemments are confronted with the paradox of the "Moon and the Ghetto" (Nelson 1978): they have been very successful at doing seemingly impossible tasks like putting a man on the moon or completing massive public works projects, but they have not been at a11 successful in solving the human problems so clearly seen in the ghettos of large cities. The difference, of course, is that the former problems are simple engineering writ large, while there are no formulae as yet available for solving the latter set of problems.

The response Of governments to policies for which there are no clear answers and inadequate information may be conceptualized in another way — as "fuzzy gambling" (Dror 1983). This idea comes from the mathematical concept of fuzzy sets, or sets for which the parameters are not fully known (Treadwell 1995). For example, probabilities of the occurrence of certain events constitute the basis for risk assessment crucial to making regulatory decisions. In the case of nuclear power plants, there are not as yet sufficient data to provide good probability estimates of accidents. Therefore, any existing regulations are to some extent gambling on a very large societal scale. Although less dramatic, other policy issues may have some of the same indeterminate qualities. [11]

Ravetz describes the same problems as being those of "usable ignorance." He argues that most policy problems can be characterized as ones in which "facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high, decisions urgent and where no single one of these dimensions can be managed in isolation from the rest" (1987, 99). If that characterization is correct, and many people in govemment would think that it is all too familiar, then policy making by inspiration is all too necessary. Again, the difficulty lies in convincing the public and other policy makers that experimentation and inspiration are necessary, if not really desirable, in the best of all worlds.

The other two cases of Figure 1 present different types of problems for govemment. In Case 3, the private sector has the information required for govemment to make good decisions but is withholdiig it. This may be a wilful attempt to minimize the capacity of govemment to regulate, or it may be simply that govemment has not thought to ask for the data it really needs. For example, in the first energy crisis, the government of the United States found that it did not have any reliable information about the amount of gasoline and other petroleum products on hand in the country. The oil companies certainly knew themselves what their stocks were, but did not want to share the data with govemment (or with their competitors). Subsequent legislation has required data to be shared with the Department of Energy, albeit denied to competitors.

Even if the information is available (Case 2), it may not reside at the most appropriate places within the complex environment of modem government. Increasingly, public policy problems are "cross-cutting," so

that actions of one department or organization affect the programs of others. Coordination among departments has always been a problem for govemment, but has become a more prominent concem in recent years (Boston 1992), and that is as true for the possession and utilization of necessary information as it is for any other aspect of goveming. Again, the tendency of organizations not to share information freely may be purely a function of ignorance about the needs of other organizations, or it may be a more conscious choice about using information as one more weapon in bureaucratic struggles over policy and influence (Stinchcombe 1990; Tullock 1965).

The importance of controlling information was ver-y clear in the continuing bureaucratic wars between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States. Both were supposed to control espionage, but federal laws confined the CIA to operations outside the United States while the FBI was given domestic surveillance responsibilities (Riebling 1994). To do the job properly required effective coordination and blending of the two sources of information, but that almost never happened. Both organizations held on to their information to use in their battles with each other and with their Congressional committees.

WHO? THE HOLDERS AND CREATORS OF INFORMATION FOR POLICY MAKING

Public policy is a game that almost any number can play. One of the important capacities of govemment in making policy is the ability to sift through the numerous sources of information, solicited and unsolicited, that are available to them. They must then decide which definitions of the problem and which suggestions about solutions are most valuable. Governments have rarely had a monopoly over information relevant for policies, even in policy areas such as defence which have been subject to greater secrecy and govemment domination.[12] As we will point out in more detail below, the policy capacity of govemments may be enhanced by promoting controversy and conflict in advice rather than the uniformity and agreement

that has characterized most governments over the past several decades. While agreement is comfortable and reassuring, it unfortunately is unlikely to produce the best policies (Janis 1982; t'Hart 1990).

Sources of Information within Government

Govemments are a major source of their own information and analysis. When we talk about the policy capacity of govemment we are usually thinking of this interna1 source. Do govemment organizations have the capacity to collect, process, and present information to decision makers in a manner that will improve the quality of the public decisions made? In most countries this capacity appears to have eroded in the face of ideological leaders who have believed that they knew the answers to policy questions without extensive policy analysis. Further, as there have been pressures on public expenditure, the analytic capacity of agencies has been more expendable than have the programs that deliver services to the public.

When thinking about the holders of knowledge within govemment it is common to assume that the major actors will be the analytic units that exist in departments and agencies, or perhaps within the central agencies. While that is to some degree true, these organizations run the risk of marginalizing themselves by being merely analytical and by thinking only about formulation. Organizations do not always *make* policy at pre-announced times and through predetermined methods. Rather, policy often arises out of decisions that must be made about implementation (Lipsky 1980; Majone 1989), or about how to get a piece of legislation through Parliament. Therefore, the isolation of analytic units and their lack of familiarity with implementation and other aspects of the department's activities may simply make them appear "academic," in the pejorative sense of that term.

The reduction of the analytic capacity in govemment has not, however, been uniform across govemment. There has been a tendency for line departments and agencies to lose their capacity while central agencies retain or enhance theirs. The same logic that has driven general reductions in analytic capacity has tended to enhance the capacity of central agencies to impose their wills on the line departments, especially about budgets

(Clark 1994), and their desire to do so. Central agencies have been given the responsibility for controlling spending and driving down the size of the public sector and their analytic capacity is an essential component of that task.

Furthermore, in the United States and to a lesser extent in other countries, there has been an increase in analytic capacity associated with "regulatory review," or the use of devices such as cost-benefit analysis to assess the likely impacts of regulations (Novak 1993). The retum to "rationality" in regulation (McGarity 1991) can be thought of as an increase in the policy capacity of govemment, but it can also function as a barrier to that capacity. The question that arises is whether the analytic capacity is being used to produce a superior decision, or whether it is used as a means merely to block action and generate reasons for not engaging in more rapid action, The current advocacy of regulatory analysis by Republican critics of "big govemment," for example, largely reflects a desire to slow or kill implementation rather than improve the content of regulations. It also tends to privilege certain types of costs and benefits (largely economic) as opposed to others (Schwartz 1985).

Private Sector Sources of Information and How to Tap Them

The private sector is also a major source of information for government, but govemments must be structured to receive it and must also develop procedures for receiving and evaluating that information. Further, they must be cognizant of the different sources of information and the different ways in which it may have to be used in the policy process.

One way in which to conceptualize the availability of information for policy making from private sector actors is as a set of "epistemic communities" (Haas 1990), "technical communities" (MacRae 1987), or "policy networks" (Knoke and Laumann 1987; Rhodes and Marsh 1992).[13] That is, each policy area will be populated by a number of interest groups, think tanks, university institutes and departments, and a host of other sources of information and advocacy. These information and organizational structures will vary in the extent to which there is a comrnon set of definitions of the

problems and of the possible solutions to those problems. This set of factors will be in part a function of the knowledge intensity of the issues involved (Leeuw 1991). Some of these, such as nuclear power or complex environmental issues, have high thresholds of entry while others, such as education policy, appear much more open.

The participants in a policy network will be attempting to shape both the definition of the problem and the solutions (Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Schon and Rein 1994). Issues do not corne to the public sector already defined and associated with particular government organizations that should resolve them. Rather, problem definition is a crucial part of the policy process and can often predetermine the outcome of the process if a particular interest is able to dominate. One of the classic cases of this is the way in which drug policy has been designed in many societies — that is, as a problem of enforcement rather than as a problem of education or social assistance.

Sabatier (1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) has conceptualized the policy process as a learning process, with the various members of the policy networks vying to control the policy, using information as the major weapon for that competition. The members assume that policy decisions must corne about through the use of ideas and information to persuade decision makers of the appropriateness of a position. Even if the decision does not conform with the a *priori* preferences of one or another of the actors, there can still be a decision, provided that decision does not go against fundamental values. If the differences are only in the derivatives from core ideas, then agreement can still be reached.

There are limits to the extent to which govemment can effectively utilize private sector policy analysis. Boston (1994), for example, points to the limits of contracting out policy analysis. Outside organizations do not have the commitment to solving problems that govemments must have, nor do they have the continuing responsibility to the public. Hence they may be willing to give advice that is clever and/or fits with their particular perception of good policy, but then can simply walk away from any negative consequences. Further, in Westminster systems, norms about secrecy may prevent outside organizations from being effective participants in the policy process (Jarman and Kouzmin 1993).

The above comments about the role of private sector sources of information are not intended to deny the value of those sources. There is simply too much information being created by non-govemmental sources to permit govemment to ignore them (see Davidson 1988). The sources of data and advice are not uniform, however, and thought needs to be given to the differential roles of universities, "think tanks" (whether tied to parties or interest groups or not), research arms of interest groups and trade associations, and a host of other sources. All of these sources can have value, so the principal point must be to tap all of them without becoming tied to any one, especially one with a particular ideological or interest group connection.

Con tending Sources of Information

If we assume that good policy results from contending ideas and sources of information, then it is important for govemment to be able to structure those multiple sources in ways that promote effective policy making and learning. The Anglo-American tradition in epistemology and in law is that truth emerges from a contest (Sartori 1969; Kelman 1992) rather than from excessive conformity. The literature on organizational leaming also points to the necessity to balance agreement and conflict in order to produce the best leaming environment (Leeuw, Rist and Sonnichsen 1994). In particular, Crossan, Lane and Hildebrand (1991) argue that two variables — the degree of agreement on values and the extent of preconceptions about the facts of an issue and the processes — are crucial to explaining successful leaming within organizations.[14]

In the scheme proposed by Crossan et *al.*, the best leaming occurs when there is agreement on values but little preconception of the processes of causation occurring in the policy area. On the other hand, they argue that agreement on both values and facts will produce "group think" and a failure to consider a wide range of possible solutions to the problem at hand. Similarly, differences both in values and in models of causation lead to "contentious leaming," or perhaps no leaming at all. Finally, when there is agreement on processes but not on values, then there is "politicized

learning" in which debates over the basic pur-poses of programs tend to prevent any real progress on addressing the issues underlying the policy.

The task for govemment in attempting to enhance its policy capacity is to try to make as much disparate information available as possible, within the context of broad agreement on goals. While it may be assumed that by virtue of being part of the same govemment the agreement on goals should be understood, that may not be the case. The problems of coordination, cross-cutting issues, and commitment to departmental and sub-departmental goals make such agreement difficult. Likewise, it may be difficult to generate a sufficiently wide range of ideas about policy when sources of information tend to be associated with the same organizational and profes-sional barriers as those that differentiate goals (Michael 1993).

WHEN? IDENTIFYING TEMPORAL TARGETS FOR INFLUENCE

If policy capacity in govemment is to be enhanced and lcnowledge use improved, choices will have to be made about when and where to intervene. By *when* we are referring not so much to chronological time as to the stage of the policy process at which information and analytic capacity are most likely to be influential and are also most likely to alter the outcomes of the process for citizens. While it is conventional to think of analysis occurring primarily at the stage of formulation, there are a number of other points at which analysis and knowledge can be applied with good effect, and at these points there is frequently a greater need to apply these resources than is often understood.

It has become conventional in discussions of the policy process, espe-cially when undertaken from a political science perspective, to think about a linear policy process beginning with problem identification and agenda setting and going through to evaluation and feedback (see Figure 2). That feedback then can be conceptualized as initiating another round of policy making, albeit under altered circumstances because of the previous cycle (Hogwood and Peters 1983; Starkie 1984). While this mode1 of the process has a number of weaknesses if assumed to be identical to the "real" policy

process in govemment (Nakamura 1987; Sabatier 199 1; deHaven-Smith 1988) it nonetheless is a useful heuristic device for looking at what must happen for policy to be made. It can also serve as a guide for the would-be policy maker conceming where to intervene in the process.

At the initial stage of the policy process, policy analysis is more useful than sometimes thought to be in terms of shaping and defining the nature of the problems being addressed. Problems do not corne to govemment neatly labelled and ready to be acted upon by a clearly identifiable organization. Rather, most policies have to be created, or "framed," through a social and political process (Best 1995; Schneider and Ingram 1993) and greater analytic capacity should be applied at this early stage of the process than is usually the case. Although problem definition is in some ways an exercise of political and organizational power (Dery 1984; Miller and Holstein 1993), it also can involve the exercise of analytic power, *even* if it is in the direct service of those political forces. For example, govemments often do not know the true dimensions of problems such as drugs, spousal and child abuse, homelessness (Hopper 1991) or AIDS (Root-Bemstein 1993; Day and Klein 1989) when they first burst onto the policy scene.

Figure 2
Linear Mode1 of the Policy Process



The Stage Of formulating responses to policy problems and those issues that are on an active agenda[15] of govemment is one of the usual places at which one expects policy analysis to be employed, and one locus at which the policy capacity of govemment is most important. Governments attempt to develop an efficient and effective means of solving the problems that they have decided are worthy of public attention. The difficulty is to make this stage of the process open to analysis and to the input of career public servants. Increasingly, formulation decisions — especially if they are to be more than incremental adjustments — are political and ideological and may require (or even permit) a minimum of analytical input.

If the logic of competing sources of information and analysis is taken seriously, then at the legitimation stage there may be a need for independent sources of analysis for the legislature. In most parliamentary regimes there has been some attempt to develop more capable and independent legislatures (Norton 1993; Olson 1992). Legislatures have built this capacity through separate analytical bodies, more adequately funded and staffed auditing bodies, and enhanced staffing for legislative committees. While legislatures still have less access to information and less analytic capacity than cabinets and ministers, in many cases they now have some alternative to simply accepting the information and analysis offered to them by the bureaucracy.

The stage of legitimation also may be the most important for resolving horizontal issues in govemment. Cabinet and Parliament are the locales at which horizontal issues must be resolved, given the difficulty of getting individual departments and ministers to give up their own influence over some aspects of horizontal issues. Further, if analysis is indeed a significant force in resolving these horizontal issues, then the application of those techniques becomes essential. There will be difficulty, however, in interjecting analysis into settings that are already highly charged politically and are also dependent upon other forms of analysis, as noted above by Chelimsky.

Implementation is often considered to be the stage of the policy process least amenable to the input of analysis and also the aspect of the process that appears least directly related to the "policy capacity" Of govemment. Implementation frequently is considered to be simply the basic work of administering a program, a management rather than a policy question. That

is an obvious overstatement of the position, yet the case must be made for the place of implementation studies (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Goggin 1987) in the analysis of policy capacity. There appear to be several relevant points about the role of implementation in building policy capacity. First, implementation suggests another way of thinking about the problem of horizontal govemment. One way to resolve horizontal policy issues is to press for their resolution from the centre of govemment, but the other way would be to have service delivery coordinated in the field, through implementation. Service providers in the field would have to be empowered, and encouraged, from the centre if this form of coordination is to occur, but it is another means of addressing certain types of horizontal issues.

Another way in which implementation feeds into the policy capacity of govemments, other than the obvious one — the necessity of having a program delivered — is in the initial design of the program. We argued previously that feasibility concerns can have an excessive influence over policy, but the opposite problem, that feasibility and implementation will be ignored by the centre when it is designing programs, can also arise. In federal systems this might involve ignoring the necessity of taking the needs and capacities of the provinces (states) into account. Any attempt to create a program without adequate concem for its implementation is unlikely to produce effective policies.

WHERE? IDENTIFYING INSTITUTIONAL TARGETS FOR INFLUENCE

In addition to identifying the points in the process that are most amenable to intervention, it is important to consider the differential capacity of various institutions to utilize information effectively. As has been implied, it is customary, and usually correct, to view the public bureaucracy as the most capable organization for generating and using information. Further, other govemment institutions (Parliament, for example) tend to be working at a severe disadvantage when attempting to make use of information, given that they often lack the time, skills and/or organizational supports needed to process information for policy decisions.

Legislatures, despite attempts to enhance their capacity to gather and analyze information, still tend to work at a disadvantage. Even political executives tend to rely upon their public service colleagues rather than develop alternative sources of information. This is not to say that the information from the public service is wrong or biased, but only that independent checks may be desirable.

The Role of the Senior Civil Service

Added to the general waning of policy capacity in the system is the sense that senior civil servants have become less capable of influencing the course of policy decisions. This diminished influence, in tum, can be taken to some extent to constitute an erosion of the policy capacity of govemment in itself. That is, if senior public servants are not being used to channel the ideas and information from their department upward to ministers, some of the capacity of the system to make good decisions has been eliminated. This is not to say that career officials in cabinet departments are the only, or even necessarily the best, source of advice and ideas for policy makers. They are, however, one major source, and for some policy areas in which the public sector tends to have a virtual monopoly, they may well be the most important resource.

The changes in the policy roles of senior public servants, whether real or assumed, can be attributed to several factors. One is, as noted previously, the fundamental change in the nature of governance. Ideology and political allegiance appear to have become more important for gaining influence over policy than is the command of the relevant information that might be needed for making "good policy." The creation Of politically appointed officials to "shadow" top career officials in Canada and elsewhere is one indication of this change (Plasse 1992). Associated with the politicization of policy has been the spread of the ideology of managerialism in the public sector and with it an emphasis on the managerial role, as opposed to the policy advisor role, of senior public servants in industrialized democracies (Pollitt 1990; Massey 1993).

Further, given that much of the task of policy advice has been assumed by non-career appointees, the career public servants are often left in the role of "brokers," attempting to create coalitions around their department's policies rather than directly influencing the contents of those policies (Aucoin 1988). In the good old days of policy making there was a greater emphasis on strategic decision making and an orientation toward long-term policy.[16] It can be argued, then, that there has been a fundamental role reversa1 in the manner in which policy is made. According to the traditional model, senior public servants were the source of policy advice and it was they who funnelled ideas from the department upward to ministers. The ministers (and any political staff they had) then managed those ideas and created the necessary coalitions to have them adopted. It now appears that the policies are settled at the political level and much of the brokerage is being performed by the civil service (Campbell 1988).

Even though the senior civil service may have been somewhat disempowered by recent political changes, the public bureaucracy still has a major role to play in making policy and in applying information to the construction of that policy. If we remember that the majority of decisions in govemment are not made by legislatures or even by senior public servants, then the importance of other levels of the public bureaucracy becomes evident. In particular, the process of writing secondary legislation is a crucial and often overlooked aspect of policy that involves the direct application of data and information. Most legislation coming from parliaments or other legislatures tends to emerge as broad enabling acts, with the details being filled in by the bureaucracy (Kerwin 1994; Bryner 1987). Often that process of coming up with "regulations" requires using advice and knowledge in order to make appropriate decisions.

Policy Analysis in Legislatures

Policy analysis has found a less comfortable place in legislative bodies, especially those in parliamentary regimes. Parliaments have tended to rely on their cabinets (and therefore the civil service) for analysis. If, however, parliaments do want to have an independent source of analysis and policy capacity, they must develop some mechanisms for this activity. The basic

need is to create "counterbureaucracies" that can compete with the bureaucracy in providing advice. These organizations, internal to parliaments, can be designed to provide a different, perhaps sceptical, view of the policy proposals being advanced from cabinets and ministers.

Those counterbureaucracies can be created either for Parliament as a whole or for parts of Parliament, for example by expanding the powers of committees and their staffs. As is often the case, either of these strategies will encounter some difficulties. An organisation that provides analysis to the legislature as a whole can provide broader advice to parliaments but runs the risk of being too broad and therefore unable to focus enough analytic power on any particular issue to be able to compete with the bureaucracy. On the other hand, dividing the analytic capacity among a number of different committees runs the risk of merely replicating the stovepipes that have dominated policy making, usually not in an entirely beneficial manner. Thus, analysis needs to be focused yet capable of working horizontally.

WHY? THE USES OF POLICY ANALYSIS

The final consideration conceming the application of analysis and knowledge is *why* the analysis is applied to a particular question. The instntmentalist assumption would be that the purpose is indeed to make the policy better, and that the analysis is involved in the creation of the policy decision. In this view, analysis and advice are at the service of rational policy makers who perceive their task to be that of creating the best possible solution to a clearly and objectively defined problem in society.

The alternative assumption is that the real use of policy analysis is really for the *ex post* justification of decisions that have been made for other reasons. In this view policy analysis is not a fully objective "science" but rather is more of an art, and is definitely more politicized than one might expect a more scientific enter-prise to be (Wildavsky 1979). Policy analysis is simply employed after the fact to provide the rationalization of decisions that have been made for other, usually more political, reasons. Science is

not important here, and in fact may be an impediment to the implementation of policies that are perceived to be necessary and desirable on other grounds.

The justification of decisions through policy analysis may have several relevant targets. At the first level, analysis can be utilized to justify decisions made by the bureaucracy and the political executive to the legislature. Even in parliamentary govemments a Parliament can exercise some independent scrutiny of decisions, and therefore it is important for the executive to provide legislators with convincing justifications for its policy choices. In addition, govemments must be able to justify their decisions to the public, whether the mass public or the more attentive and organized public in the for-m of interest groups. No amount of analysis is likely to satisfy a group which is losing some important benefit for its members, but it does make the decision appear less arbitrary. Further, the sense of rational consideration in itself can be important for making it appear that government is not simply making decisions to suit its own values and interests.

VII

CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion has pointed to several major points necessary to build, or rebuild, greater policy capacity in govemment. The first is that the issues with which govemment must contend are becoming increasingly difficult to manage. Govemments cannot determine what issues will be presented to them or in what form they will be presented, but they can develop the mechanisms for managing cross-cutting issues and making govemment work better in a horizontal manner. This management may involve either the construction of issues in a way that permits their being processed in a more integrated fashion or the development of institutional mechanisms to resolve any conflicts.

A second dominant change that tends to diminish the policy capacity of govemment is the general erosion of the public service. This has been true in several ways. First, the politicization of goveming and the declining real rewards of participation by public servants has caused many senior executives to leave govemment and has reduced the influence of those who remain. Also, there have been several lost generations of younger public servants, especially trained poiicy analysts, who could supply ideas and analysis to decision makers. This further implies the loss of a potential cadre of future senior managers who would have been trained to think analytically about policy matters.

A third general factor has been the replacement of policy analysis with political advice. Even in cases where policy analysis still plays a role, it

tends to be unidirectional and driven by political rather than analytical values. If, indeed, better policies do emerge from a contest over values and an open debate, then the premature closing of the policy process to more diverse views is less likely to produce "good" policy. This closure may corne about if only a restricted number of views are sought on the issues; it may also result from a process that involves only those actors associated with a particular stovepipe.

Fourth, the increasing variability and integration of policy issues requires more flexible and creative forms of intervention. Thus, to build the policy capacity of govemment may require the adoption of instruments that respond to a wider range of conditions on the target variable than do the policy instruments developed for a more stable world (Linder and Peters 1989a). The instruments with which govemments intervene have a number of important economic, political and ethical consequences, and the capacity to intervene effectively will be significantly related to successful policy rnaking.

Finally, the policy process and policies themselves must be seen as socially constructed rather than as naturally occurring sets of issues and solutions. The process of defining problems and placing them on the agenda of govemment is perhaps the most important manner in which organizations contend for power over policy. Further, the construction of issues in certain ways makes them more or less amenable to solutions, solutions that lead to greater coordination with other programs and make possible the application of knowledge. Building policy capacity therefore may require starting rather early in the policy process, and assuming that issues need to be framed before they can be solved.

In summary, there is evidence that the capacity of govemments to make and implement policy has been diminishing over the past several years. This appears to contradict the perception that a number of reform efforts in European and North American govemments have been extremely successful. These reforms have succeeded in reshaping the public sector itself, but in some ways have reduced the capacity of govemment by eroding the quality and confidence of the public service in many systems, and eliminating the ability of govemments to respond to policy problems (as opposed to administrative problems) in creative ways. The public sector may be more efficient, and even that is not certain, but it almost certainly is not more effective.

NOTES

1. The nostalgia about the good old days may be overstated, but there is certainly some objective difference between then and now.
2. At the extreme are theorists (Luhmann 1990; in t'Veld 1991) who argued for "self-referential systems" in which society will always seek to avoid control and will be able to evade control. In such a mode1 of the world policy becomes to some extent an impossibility, *or* at best the residual of largely individual choices.
3. The possible exception is Norway which has been running a budgetary surplus because of oil and gas revenues.
4. This is not only advocated by "impractical" academics. Franklin Delano Roosevelt practised such a strategy during the New Deal Era, and Bill Clinton has advocated experimentation for problems of job training for which there are few effective models of intervention.
5. Samuel Huntington (1974) argued that the increasing complexity of government programs, combined with the participatory ethos, would produce growing public disaffection. The public is generally more capable of participating but the technical content of programs and their interconnections makes effective participation less likely.
6. For a general discussion of the role of the public service in making policy conceptualized in the same manner, see Peters (1985).
7. They are, however, frequently selected because of more general managerial and executive skills.

8. Even the military, which is thought to be somewhat better organized than the rest of government, frequently has its own interna1 conflicts and absence of coordination (Allard 1990; Ponting 1986, 98-99).

9. Many older social programs such as pensions have a simple mode1 of causation and an effective methodology for delivery. As governments enter policy areas with more complex models of causation, for example, family policy or addiction, there is substantial disagreement about causes and modes of intervention, Even the methodology of education has become more problematic.

10. Analogous to Niskanen's (1971) models of bureaucratic bargaining, private sector actors may bargain with government, trading information for influence over the decisions.

11. Dror argues that "fuzzy gambling" is most common in foreign and defence policy issues where the behaviour of the adversary is largely an unknown.

12. The U.S. Department of Defense, for example, found it desirable to create several quasi-private "think tanks," such as the Rand Corporation, specializing in defence policy issues in order to have some independent views of the issues in this area.

13. There has been considerable debate over the terms to be used and the conceptualizations of these terms. In general, "community" implies greater agreement on problems and solutions than does the term "network."

14. For a not dissimilar typology of policy making, see Thompson and Tuden (1957).

15. It has become conventional to distinguish between the systemic agenda of a11 the issues that government has accepted as matters of public policy and the active institutional agendas that include only those issues under consideration at the time.

16. It is easy to romanticize about this period but it does appear that there was more of a strategic orientation in policy (see Aberbach and Rockman 1989). That was, of course, facilitated by the (relative) availability of funding for programs.

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