



**CANADIAN AND FRENCH
PERSPECTIVES ON DIVERSITY**

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

OCTOBER 16, 2003



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Canadian and French Perspectives on Diversity
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CANADIAN AND FRENCH PERSPECTIVES ON DIVERSITY

It gives me great pleasure to introduce the proceedings from the “Canadian and French Perspectives on Diversity” conference, an initiative that addresses issues that are central to my sector, Citizenship and Heritage, in the Department of Canadian Heritage. A primary focus of this sector is to promote a greater understanding of who Canadians are by drawing together policies and programs relating to Canada’s cultural heritage, official languages, Aboriginal peoples, human rights, multiculturalism, and citizenship participation and promotion.

The papers presented in this collection reflect or are derived from presentations made at the “Diversity” conference, organized by Canadian Heritage and held on October 16, 2003 in Gatineau, Quebec. This conference was of special significance, taking place as Canada and France prepare to celebrate 400 years of French settlement in North America. Yet, “le fait français” is more than just a chapter in Canada’s history; it is an important part of how we define ourselves as a country. Through many centuries, our Aboriginal peoples, French and British settlers, and successive generations of immigrants have built a dynamic society upon a foundation of linguistic duality and rich diversity. Today, with the world within our borders, Canada regards its diversity as an enormous social and economic asset. Still, we need to make deliberate efforts to realize this potential.

In an era of disappearing borders and increased global mobility, all nations need a better understanding of the role of diversity in modern societies and of the complex issues and the sometimes-unprecedented challenges associated with making pluralism work. While Canada and France have different contexts, experiences and approaches to diversity, it is important that we share our perspectives and learn from each other.

It is through events like the “Diversity” conference that we begin to make progress. Collaborative work on this initiative began at a workshop held in Paris in 2001. This work has continued, both at the “Diversity” conference and also at a second workshop held in Paris in June 2004. This important work should continue over the coming years. Indeed, we anticipate that a growing network of experts, like those featured in the following pages, will undertake projects of comparative analyses of the specific issues that governments in both societies need to address.

I am grateful to all who participated in and supported the conference and am excited by the prospect of future endeavours. I hope the results of the “Diversity” conference, as presented in this collection, make for an interesting, informative and thought-provoking read.



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MODELS/POLICIES OF
INTEGRATION/CITIZENSHIP



THE CANADIAN MODEL OF INTEGRATION/CITIZENSHIP

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INTRODUCTION

While the content of our constitution has been contested over the past century, during the 1980s and 1990s it dominated Canadian politics. The debates of this time focused on issues of reconciliation of national, linguistic, ethnic, and regional cleavages or on working out the implications of the individual/collective rights accorded under the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. By the time the Meech Lake Accord, the Charlottetown and Quebec referendums were completed in the 1990s, “constitutional fatigue” set in and Canadians put aside these debates for the most part (McBride, 2003). Nevertheless, some groups have continued to try to reconcile their rights with those of the dominant group and have utilized a number of quiet constitutional strategies to bring about a reordering of the relationship between themselves and the government.

The concepts of “integration/citizenship” are important concepts as the diversity of our society increases and questions such as how they fit into society emerge. If we were to look back upon the integrative phases of Canada over the past, we would find five distinct phases. First there was the pioneer phase when immigrants brought with them the culture of their home country and tried to adapt it to Canada (1700-1840). The second, the laissez-faire philosophy phase, was when immigration was determined by the then National Policy¹ that allowed the market forces of supply and demand determine the number and variety of immigrants (1841-1895). The third phase involved the settlement of the west and the general philosophy was to control the source of newcomers and then to make all residents into the mold of the dominant English/French-Canadian way of life—the assimilationist period (1895-1950). The fourth, the multicultural phase (1950-1990) began after World War II and continued until very recently. More recently (1991-present), the federal government has shifted from the language of “multiculturalism” that reflected cultural retention and tolerance to that of “diversity and inclusive society”, a position that is similar to the policy of “interculturalism” that has been embraced by Quebec for the past two decades. This shift has come about because of an assertion on the part of some, that multiculturalism undermines social cohesion and a sense of community and those conservative forces have held sway in their opposition to it. There are nuances to this general evolutionary model of integration and we can debate the specific years identified as the boundaries of each period, but overall it captures the changes in the policy Canada has adopted with regard to integration and citizenship. It is this last phase that I wish to speak about today.



A BRIEF HISTORY

When the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Report was released in the 1960s, it provided the basis for the emerging “multicultural” model of integration that we find today and provided for the legitimacy of “the cultural contribution of the other groups” to the development of Canadian society. It precipitated a process by which federal legislation with regard to diversity would be enacted; a process that continues today. This report, which came from a Royal Commission, ushered in a new philosophy about how Canada would be defined. In 1971, a multiculturalism policy was enacted (a bold new experiment and the first in the world) and it was followed by a number of other actions that supported this thrust. The *Canadian Human Rights Act* (1977) protects Canadians against discrimination on the basis of “race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, disability or conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted”. The *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* was passed in 1982 and enshrined in the Constitution. This was followed by the *Official Languages Act* (1985) that provides for the formal recognition of both English and French as the official languages of Canada and ensures that they are given equal status, rights and privileges in all federal institutions.² The *Official Languages Act* not only provides formal recognition of French and English but also extends certain protections to other linguistic minorities. In 1986, the enactment of the *Employment Equity Act* defined “visible minority” and in that same year, Statistics Canada operationalized the concept. In 1988, the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* was passed, adding greater authority to the existing policy of multiculturalism. In 1997, the renewal of the Multiculturalism Policy was supported and it gave a new thrust to the multicultural policy goals. More recently the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (2001) provides legislation that deals with the admission, assessment and removal of immigrants, as well as the protection of refugees. All of these pieces of legislation and policy enactments set the stage for developing a context for immigrant integration and citizenship models that are now being applied to all Canadians (Li, 2001). All of this differs radically from the prior “Two Founding Nations” perspective that Canadians held so dear.

MULTICULTURALISM/INTERCULTURALISM/SHARED CITIZENSHIP

As Gagnon and Iacovino (2002) point out, the central foci of multiculturalism and interculturalism are the incorporation of immigrants or minority cultures into the larger political community and this is a reciprocal endeavour. In a sense, it represents a ‘moral contract’ between the host society and the particular cultural community, with the aim of establishing a forum for empowerment of all citizens—‘a common public culture’ (Gagnon and Iacovino, 2002: 327). At the same time, the federal government is encouraging and supporting a new ideology known as “shared citizenship” as the ideal strategy for nation building. This new philosophy builds upon a formal definition of citizenship as a “bundle of rights, responsibilities and obligations—civil, political, social—that are conferred upon citizens of the nation-state”. This new concept of shared citizenship takes into consideration various dimensions based on shared community, attachment, belonging, and national identity or nation-building (Aizlewood, 1999; Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). Thus, shared citizenship is being framed not only in terms of a bundle of rights and responsibilities of members of the Canadian community but also in terms of equality, reciprocity, and inclusion based upon residency in that nation-state. Before addressing this issue, let me provide you with a brief background as to how we have come to where we are today.

FIRST NATIONS PEOPLES/ABORIGINAL PEOPLES

Within this larger context then, the discussion of integration/citizenship will focus on one specific group in Canada—Aboriginal Peoples or First Nations Peoples. While this group continues to argue that it should not be subject to the integration/citizenship policies that are now being applied to “other” ethnic groups, their resistance is being severely tested. The overall attitude by the federal government has been one of “paternalism” and the federal department charged with their issues has behaved like a vigilant, coercive organization (the various departments over the years have changed names but the current unit is the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), establishing restrictive and punitive policies to deal with First Nations Peoples.

Over time, integration policy and ideas about the rights and responsibility of citizenship as they relate to Aboriginal Peoples have undergone profound changes. In the earliest phase (1500-1800), the relationship between Indians and the colonists was a symbiotic one. Indians were able to benefit from contact and new colonists likewise benefited from the expertise and knowledge of the Indians. However this would soon change to a relationship of conflict and cultural destruction as the colonists began to settle and agriculturalize the land. By 1876, a new philosophy of assimilation was promoted as being the best way to integrate Indians into mainstream society, a policy not unlike the recent assimilationist policy that has been adopted in France, whereby immigrants agree to sign an “integration contract in return for a long-term residence permit”. Moreover, in this time period, Indians were not viewed as “citizens” but rather as “wards” of the state.

The first *Indian Act* was introduced in 1876, and has remained an active piece of legislation that still controls the behaviour of Indians from birth to boardroom to death. It also was during this time that the major treaties were established by which “Indian lands” were transferred to the federal government. During the period 1860-1923, sixty-six major (and hundreds of minor) treaties were signed covering approximately 40 percent of the land in Canada.³ After 1923, Aboriginal Peoples were ignored and for the next forty years, were subjected to an isolationist policy. Placed on reserves, away from the urban and political centres, they were a forgotten people, with government arguing they would soon die out and questions related to their integration/citizenship would no longer be an issue.⁴

It would only be in the late 1960s, when the *Hawthorn Report* (1966-67) was published, that Canadians would become aware of the economic and social plight (lack of integration in all dimensions) of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada and it became a national and international issue. Nevertheless, the philosophy of assimilation/isolation continued late into the 1960s when the federal government, whose central focus was to accelerate the assimilation of Indians, introduced the *White Paper* (1969). Concurrently, a new Indian and Northern Affairs department was established whose central mandate was “Indian issues”. When Indians and a coalition of many other interest groups in Canada e.g., church groups, labour unions and social support groups, soundly rejected the *White paper*, the newly created Department of Indian and Northern Affairs began to rethink its philosophy.



However, it would not be until 1973, when a landmark decision by the Supreme Court acknowledged Aboriginal Peoples indeed have “Aboriginal Rights” that a new era of government would look at how First Nations Peoples were being integrated into Canadian society. Assessing the Supreme Court’s judgement, then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau agreed that there was a case for “Aboriginal Rights” reversing his earlier rejection of this concept. He then went forward and entrenched “Aboriginal Rights” without definition, into the Canadian Constitution of 1982 (Dickason, 2002). This court decision forced the federal government to reject its assimilationist policy and they looked to a devolutionary model, hoping it would fit within the framework of the policy of multiculturalism.

The history of Canada has, until recently, reflected the belief that Canada was formed through a compact between the English and the French. The establishment of charter groups (English and French) and the privileges and responsibilities of these groups is entrenched in Canadian culture. However, First Nations Peoples have always considered themselves as part of the founding nation and have never considered themselves as part of the multiculturalist thrust. It is equally evident that the Government of Canada does not see a nice fit between multiculturalism and First Nations Peoples. Nevertheless, this new policy displayed considerable sensitivity to the wishes of First Nations Peoples and it was perhaps as a result of the impact of the *Canadian Multicultural Act* that they have been granted some self-governing powers, as well as the right to be viewed as a “people”. Since this legal decision over three decades ago, the courts have come to support the model of self-determination while the Government of Canada is somewhat ambivalent in its acceptance. Nevertheless, the issue of a “two-nation” compact (French and English) has deep roots in Canadian society and it has only been recently that First Nations Peoples were considered to be a possible third partner in Confederation (Charlottetown Accord). However, entrenching this perspective into the Constitution has yet to be accepted, since the consequences of a ratification of it have yet to be fully understood.

Today the integrationist mandate of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (which is primarily but not totally responsible for Indian people) is to support First Nations Peoples in developing healthy, sustainable communities and in achieving their economic and social aspirations. These efforts are in addition to the responsibility the Crown has in such areas as treaty making, settling land claims, and negotiating and implementing self-government agreements. Unfortunately, it will be clear to anyone remotely familiar with Aboriginal issues that they remain far from being integrated into Canadian society in any dimension—social, legal, political, economic—despite the current \$8B budget of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada.

Two issues need to be raised that suggest that (a) government policy with regard to First Nations Peoples does not conform to the policy of multiculturalism/interculturalism and that (b) a new philosophy of “parallelism” has emerged. The latter refers to the situation where Canada and First Nations Peoples seem to have separate goals that require separate routes to achieve them and there are no attempts to intermingle or link with each other in the sojourn to achieve those goals (Cairns, 2000).

During the entire repatriation of the Constitution, there was little mention of Aboriginal Peoples and how they contributed to or fit into the new Constitution. This rejection of Aboriginal Peoples having anything to do with the development of Canada confirmed for Aboriginal Peoples that the two “founding nations” saw no place for them in Canadian society. When the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1996) submitted their report, they argued that Aboriginal organizations should be parties working close to all levels of government based on the principle of mutual recognition, mutual respect, and mutual responsibility. However, Aboriginal leaders are still excluded from the annual Premiers’ Conferences and the Prime Ministers have declined to convene a conference of First Ministers to discuss the Royal Commissions’ Report. Additionally, when the Social Union Framework Agreements (1999-2002) were being heralded as a new era of flexible federalism, Aboriginal affairs were treated as a separate file—a policy sector not directly related to the task at hand for first ministers. Their rationale was that talks involved administrative arrangements, not constitutional proposals (Prince, 2000).

BARRIERS TO INTEGRATION

For most groups, their integration into Canadian society has come about through the efforts of public service organizations, e.g., public schools, courts. While these organizations provide a minimum level of service to the general public, these organizations work within the framework of middle class values. However, because Aboriginal Peoples do not have the minimum criteria to enter these organizations, they have failed to serve Aboriginal Peoples and the latter become perpetual clients, as evidenced by the recurrent patterns of detention, high rates of hospitalization, inability to graduate from schools, and inability to leave the welfare roles. In fact, these organizations tend to present a barrier for Aboriginal integration.

As a result, new types of organizations were created to deal with those for whom the public service organizations failed. These are referred to as accommodating/aculturating service organizations and are funded by public service organizations to deal with “problematic” clients. Special programs such as the court-workers program, race relations units in municipal government, Aboriginal counselling programs and even Aboriginal educational programs attempt to protect the rights of Aboriginal Peoples and provide them with a service.⁵ However, because most of these organizations are staffed with middle class workers and operate on the basis of middle class values, and because funding is almost always “a pilot project on a limited basis” (not like public service organizations which are long term), most of the programs offered by these types of service organizations lack scope and continuity. Moreover, a closer look at “accommodating service organizations” shows that much of what they do is limited simply to registering, screening, and referring their clients to other organizations. In the end, they are unable to offer any real assistance to Aboriginal Peoples.

A third type of service organization that is used to deal with Aboriginal Peoples is that of member organizations, e.g., Friendship Centres or Aboriginal social/political organizations. Unlike the other types of service organizations, member organizations work against the assimilation of Aboriginal Peoples. These types of organizations represent the interests of Aboriginal Peoples as members of a distinct ethnic group. And, although these types of organizations provide services to Aboriginal Peoples, their effectiveness is weakened by a lack of ongoing continuity and a virtual absence of employment for Aboriginal Peoples as Aboriginal Peoples (Newhouse, 2003).



In the end, public service organizations do not have an integrative impact on Aboriginal Peoples because of their inability to meet the minimum criteria for entry.⁶ Approaching accommodating or acculturating service organizations simply allows the Aboriginal person to be certified, screened, and to enter a temporary program that has no future. In the end, the integrative forces of public, accommodating, or acculturating service organizations have a marginal impact on Aboriginal Peoples. However, the one organization that has had an impact, the member service organization, has been limited in its impact because of funding shortages and credibility. However, as more and more of member service organizations are established and become legitimate, their “anti-assimilationist” impact is beginning to be felt (Newhouse and Peters, 2003).

The Government of Canada is well aware of this new trend and yet it is stymied as to whether or not it should allow First Nations Peoples to embark upon this new parallel route that would require the government to give up the *Indian Act* or retain centralized control and continue to develop parallel policies for integration, e.g., the proposed First Nations Governance Act, while retaining the *Indian Act*.

The question as to whether or not Aboriginal Peoples will be citizens of Canada or of First Nations remains to be seen. To a certain extent, this is a question about whether or not Aboriginal Peoples are “national minorities” or “other cultural minorities”. Do First Nations Peoples simply want a “fourth level” of government (Municipal, provincial, national) or are they asking for more? For First Nations Peoples, the signing of Treaties suggests they are a people and want self-government. Yet they have not completely framed what this would look like. Nevertheless, it is clear that First Nations have never suggested a political structure that would see themselves secede from Canada. Nevertheless, without serious discussion with First Nations, the federal government has rejected this claim, because it is without boundaries. The end result has been endless court cases, numerous legislative changes, and continued conflict and tension between the two groups.

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NOTES

- 1 Prime Minister John A. Macdonald announced the adoption of a National Policy in 1878. This policy had three central and interconnected tenets: a protective tariff, a transcontinental railway and western expansion.
- 2 Note that the Government of Canada's first Official Languages Act was passed in 1969 and that much of the policy was enshrined in the Canadian Constitution via the Charter.
- 3 These treaties were actions taken to fulfill the Crown's promise to Britain to honour the provisions of the Proclamation of 1763 that stipulated that the Canadian Government, on behalf of the imperial monarch, would negotiate with the Aboriginal Peoples for the extinguishment of their title and the setting aside of reserves for their exclusive use.
- 4 For example, Indians were not given the right to vote in federal elections until 1960. In fact, until 1985, a number of Indians were disenfranchised (the individual lost his/her Indian status) when they voted.
- 5 Coincidentally, at the same time, these types of service organizations tend to render the public service organizations more efficient.
- 6 What makes this more complex is that the federal government argues that the delivery of social programs is not a federal issue but rather a provincial responsibility.



CANADIAN MULTICULTURALISM: LESSONS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY?

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CANADIAN DISTINCTIVENESS

The successful adoption of a Canadian policy of multiculturalism was dependent on five favourable conditions that historical factors made possible. This special situation makes multiculturalism, as we understand it in Canada, unexportable. Yet, European countries can benefit from lessons learned in the public management of cultural diversity even if this policy has some flaws. The conditions are as follows:

- The establishment of controls over migratory-movements, i.e. an immigration policy that sets entrance levels according to labour market needs;
- A non-discriminatory integration of immigrants in the labour market;
- The reduction of all ethno-national ideologies;
- The construction of a culture and a legal system that values individual rights, including the rights of non naturalized immigrants;
- The development of a sociological conception of the process of socio-cultural adaptation of immigrants and the idea of equal opportunity (formal equality vs. social reality).

The Control of Migratory Movements

This issue is currently being debated in Europe after 20 years of growing illegal immigration and the expansion of the Union to Eastern Europe. However, a European immigration policy to control migratory movements and the selection of immigrants seem difficult to establish due to differing national interests and a problem that Canada has not experienced, porous borders.

The European Union is at the crossroads of migratory flows from Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and any armed control of borders such as exists in the Mediterranean would only be illusionary. Also, the Union is faced with elevated migratory flows that are disproportionate to its job-creating capacity. Although it could integrate skilled immigrants into the service sector, it does not manage to attract them for two reasons that put it in direct competition with North America in the market of skilled immigrants: 1) an absence of clearly defined selection policies and 2) an inequality in the social and symbolic status of immigrants. For sure, a selection policy could raise a question that is not asked in Canada: Is it right to keep draining skilled labour out of non-Western countries?

Despite the recognized disadvantages, immigration is often considered a solution to the “demographic deficit” in Europe. This is in fact not true because the required immigration levels would be so high that they would provoke a very negative reaction in public opinion and increase unemployment. Other solutions, some definitely unpopular, are possible: increase the labour force participation rate (a solution proposed by the OECD in September 2003¹), reform pension plans, reduce social costs (e.g. health insurance) and/or increase productivity.

Both of these difficulties, the lack of regulatory control over migratory movements and porous borders, are non-existent in Canada. Canada and the United States have historically been regions of demographic and economic development through immigration. Canada’s selection policies date back to the 1960s. This means that immigration is an essential element of the Canadian reality, where immigration levels are among the highest in the Western world. In Canada, half of immigrants are selected according to their education, knowledge of one of the official languages and age and a large proportion of them have a university degree and hold high-status positions (professionals). The country of origin of these immigrants is wide ranging and varies depending on the province of residence.

Canada enjoys a favourable geographic situation as far as illegal immigration are concerned. Its only porous border is the one with the United States where immigrants prefer to go. As for the U.S., it has two borders that are as porous as those of the European Union, the one with the Caribbean and especially the one with Mexico. However, given the deregulation of the labour market, illegal immigration is useful, if not necessary, to the American economy.

THE INCORPORATION OF IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS INTO THE LABOUR MARKET

The European Union’s major difficulties do not justify the discrimination of immigrants in the labour market. This includes protectionism in employment by the quasi-closure of civil service positions to immigrants except in Great Britain, non-access to professions (37 in France), racism or xenophobia in employment. It also includes deficient education or professional job training for second generation immigrants, often in ethnically segregated establishments, especially in France, given the residential segregation of the working class in French cities (Felouzis, 2003).

In Canada, discrimination against immigrants in the labour market has always existed and a distinction is made between direct, indirect and systemic discrimination. As in all Western countries, direct discrimination according to phenotype, cultural or national origin, or religion (or gender, age, sexual orientation or disability) is against the law. Indirect discrimination exists when a policy produces an unfair effect for a group of individuals “protected” from this type of discrimination, by the law, e.g., religious minorities. It is still considered indirect discrimination even if the policy had not expressly intended to produce an unfair outcome. The Supreme Court of Canada gave legal value to indirect discrimination and defined it as “discrimination by prejudicial effect” in a 1985 decision (*Ontario Human Rights Commission and O’Malley v. Simpson-Sears Ltd [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536*). The most often cited example is the weight or height requirement for the position of police officer or firefighter.



As for systemic discrimination, it was recognized during the 1980s. The federal government², especially the municipalities with high percentages of immigrants, adopted employment equity programs with convincing results (which partly explains the growing anti-immigration lobby in English Canada). Yet, studies show the continued existence of systemic discrimination for racialized³ groups because these programs were never imposed on the private sector, except in the case of contractual obligation.⁴

Between 1971 and 1991, non-Europeans were disadvantaged in the labour market; their income was some 8% lower when compared with individuals from European countries, having the same age and education levels (Pendakur, 2000). Currently, the percentage of individuals who are “visible minorities” holding a post-secondary degree is higher than that of other Canadians. Thus, one would expect that this would be reflected in the breakdown of occupations, but this is not the case. Only the business and engineering sectors show similar employment rates between racialized and European groups (Kunz, Milan and Schetagne, 2001). The computer and advanced technologies sectors are the only real cultural mosaics in terms of the makeup of their personnel. In Québec, “visible minorities” have the lowest employment rate in all of Canada: 50% vs. 70% (Kunz, Milan and Schetagne, 2001).

Since the 1980s, systemic discrimination has grown, probably because of economic conditions and new competition in the labour market between native-born Canadians and immigrants.⁵ In 2000, according to the 2001 Census, immigrant men earned 63.1 cents for every dollar a native-born Canadian with the same education earned; the ratio was 71.6 cents in 1980 for men arriving that year. In 2000, men who had immigrated over the previous ten years earned on average 79.8 cents for every dollar a native-born Canadian earned, holding education constant. The ratio was equal in 1980 (\$1 for everyone). Until the early 1980s, immigrants took ten years to overcome the disadvantage of not having any Canadian work experience, an argument that has been used historically across Canada for underpaying them. In the case of women, the ratio was and remains more unfavourable.

THE PERCEPTION OF IMMIGRATIONS

The success of multiculturalism during the 1970-80s undeniably lies in this area of perceptions and attitudes. It transformed the perception and the status of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, and later of non-European immigrants. It was not only a management policy designed to socially, politically and culturally integrate immigrants, it was also a policy that aimed to promote the acceptance of immigrants and their descendants as legitimate Canadians in their own right by Canadians in general, public institutions, the media and large corporations. It redefined Canadian history and culture as being shaped by the establishment of successive waves of immigrant populations and affirmed a fluid and changing Canadian identity as a result of these migratory movements. This image of Canada was imposed on segments of the British population and against nationalist claims from Québec and Aboriginal Peoples. Multiculturalism aimed to weaken these segments by delegitimizing any idea of a society based on a single ethno-national community.

The government also established a program of socialization towards diversity or, to be more precise, of social control, through advertising campaigns, affirmative action in public sector employment, the education of civil servants, the financing of the cultural adaptation of federal and municipal public and para-public institutions to the presence of members of ethnic minorities, and through funding ethnic associations that allowed immigrants to form coalitions and defend their rights. These undertakings were successful if one considers the results of surveys on Canadian identity and the acceptance of multiculturalism, or the absence of interethnic violence. To appreciate the progress made since 1971, one only has to remember that Canada was then a very divided society, built on an ethnic hierarchy that placed the British in decision-making and prestigious positions, where institutional racism prevailed for nearly a century against West Indians, Asians, Syrians, Jews and Aboriginal Peoples and where French Canadians occupied the lower end of the social hierarchy. Conditions in Canada were favourable to the establishment of a multiculturalism policy because of the following factors: the absence of a national secular ideology or of any socialization about the idea of the nation, except in Québec where the fewest immigrants settled; the decline of the British empire and the ideology of British superiority; the absence of a colonial history in the Third World; a policy of neutrality on the international stage since 1956, thanks to the American military umbrella; economic growth in the 1960-70 time period; an increasing proportion of non English and non Scottish immigrants in the population; and the support of established ethnic groups such as the Ukrainians, Germans and Hungarians.

The founding of the Canadian state in 1867 did not give rise to any discourse on the creation of a political community based on the sovereignty of the people. It was a semi-colonial state, subject to London, that did not grant citizenship, could only pass domestic laws and whose laws, federal or provincial, were subject to Royal Assent. Canada used an ethno-cultural logic in its representation of itself: it was said to be the result of a negotiation between two nations, English Canadians and French Canadians, scattered throughout the land. In addition, the specific characteristics of the French-speaking Roman Catholic population were recognized. Aboriginal Peoples, slaves and freed-slaves fleeing the United States, as well as the many immigrants that started arriving in the 1870s, were all excluded from this founding myth. Later in the 1940s, just as Canada began to establish a welfare state, the Canadian state acquired a certain independence from Great Britain and Canadian citizenship was created (in 1946, for the descendants of white settlers and immigrants only). Then, throughout the 1950-60 time period, the Canadian state affirmed itself in the name of a universalistic character of citizenship and in the name of respect for individual rights, especially social, but not in the name of the history or culture of the first white groups of settlers.⁶

Despite this well established multiculturalist ideology in Canada, xenophobia exists, especially for immigrants from Muslim and Asian countries, but at this point, it does not impede their social integration as much as it does in France. According to the Ethnic Diversity Survey in 2002, 15% of “visible minorities” say that they had rarely experienced discrimination or unfair treatment over the past five years, 17% said sometimes and 3% said often, in employment.⁷ It is those who indicated that they were “Black” who reported having experienced the most discrimination or unfair treatment from the police.⁸ In terms of religious discrimination, 9% of “visible minorities” who practice a non-Christian religion said they had experienced some kind of discrimination or unfair treatment. Lastly, in terms of generations, immigrants are more often to report experiencing discrimination or unfair treatment than their descendants.



THE SOCIO-CULTURAL INSERTION OF IMMIGRANTS

The official Canadian conception of immigrant adaptation implemented through multiculturalism is based on six basic premises:

- Cultural change for immigrants is a long-term process that can span two or three generations;
- Ethnic “communitarisation” is a legitimate process. Indeed, it is an essential and useful one for allophone immigrants and/or for those from cultural worlds very distinct from the host society; the State must then foster ethnic “communitarisation” as a favourable process for the social and cultural adaptation of immigrants⁹;
- Identification with any society presupposes a strong personal identification, which presupposes and requires the social recognition of individual cultural identities and collective ethnic identities;
- Collective allegiances and identities can be multiple without jeopardizing allegiance to the Canadian state;
- The strict application of the principle of formal equality of rights produces inequalities;
- There is no hierarchy of national or ethnic cultures leading to an ideology of immigrant assimilation; only the primacy of the culture of individual rights. There is no cultural relativism in multiculturalism: the principle of individual rights and freedoms taking precedence over all other cultural practices.

THE VALUE OF RIGHTS

The policy of multiculturalism is an integral part of the affirmation of individual rights and it has led to the adjudication of social relations in Canada. This dynamic finds its expression in the adoption of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* in 1982. By emphasizing respect for fundamental freedoms and individual rights, the Charter places rights ahead of popular sovereignty of the people as the founding principle governing relations between Canadians. It contributes to the de-legitimization of the legislature as a decision-making body; and the Supreme Court to which any resident, even a non-permanent resident, can turn, now determines the outcome of a number of conflicts in values and interests that have not been resolved by the legislature.

Canadians value this foundation of the Canadian state and they rank the Charter first or second among the identifying characteristics of the federal state, according to current surveys. The existence of a culture of individual rights is important for landed immigrants, as they are afforded all rights except the right to vote. This last limitation is in fact without consequence, since roughly 80% of Canadian immigrants acquire Canadian citizenship within the first ten years of their stay; and it is an individual right to become a Canadian citizen after a three-year stay and this right is not contingent on any ministerial or political decision.

The Charter emphasizes respect for the cultural plurality of Canadian society and there lies one of the misunderstandings in Europe about the Canadian meaning of multiculturalism. The Charter does not create any collective right for any specific immigrant culture. It is geared towards individuals. Section 27 guarantees multicultural diversity in Canada, making it an interpretative clause when it comes to deciding about individual rights. It creates an obligation to preserve and promote the multicultural heritage of Canadians, but only if it does not come into conflict with individual rights.

The only recognized collective rights apply to French-speaking Canadians, the two major religions in Canada and Aboriginal Peoples. For example, if the obligation is made to ensure the equal public status of religions or the right to an education in a nonofficial language, section 27 does not annul the special status of English and French or the protected status of the Roman Catholic and Protestant religions.¹⁰ It allows for the public funding of private ethnic schools, which provide education in a heritage language or in one of the two official languages, and it protects religious freedoms and the freedom of worship. Thus, the objection to the effect that State institutionalisation of respect for cultural differences brings about the existence of separate and authoritarian communities that infringe on individual rights is unfounded in the case of Canada. Immigrant minorities do not have the institutions that ensure closed communities (e.g. schools or courts, which were requested by some Aboriginal groups). As an individual, any member or person in charge of an ethnic institution must respect the basic tenets of the Charter and any leader of an ethnic organization benefiting from public support must be elected. Abuses may occur, but how can we tell them apart from similar abuses occurring within other organizations of civil society?

Canada has the legal means to deal with conflicts over cultural or religious norms. In the 1985 decision mentioned previously, the Supreme Court created the obligation of reasonable accommodation in the event of indirect discrimination. The landmark decision came out of a case that involved a Seventh Day Adventist employee who wanted to keep her full-time job while respecting the Day of Rest on the Sabbath. It was against Simpsons-Sears Ltd who had denied the request. The Supreme Court found that an accommodation would lessen the discrimination incurred by the employee due to her faith and added that the solution to be found had to be reasonable, i.e. that no excessive constraint should be imposed on the employer, be it an excessive financial cost, significant inconveniences, the reduction of security standards or an infringement on the rights of other employees or collective agreements. In this case, the Court found that the work schedule could be accommodated. The spirit of the decision applies to other aspects of work and to other fields such as providers of goods and services in the private or public sectors. It demonstrates a central and important fact in managing diversity: the stakeholders in civil society must learn to accommodate cultural differences and negotiate. The penalty in this case is civil and not penal, as it would be in France.

FIVE POSSIBLE LESSONS

There are deep historical and socio-political differences between Canada and many European countries, including France, that explain why the policy of multiculturalism was established in Canada and not there, and was able to produce results in Canada. Nevertheless, lessons can be learned, particularly since the effects of multiculturalism have been easy to judge since the 1990s, when, following sharp criticism, mainly from the Western provinces, the federal government almost abandoned multiculturalism, hacked its budget in half and modified its programs. The negative effects of this shift demonstrate the role that the policy of multiculturalism played and could still play.

- The government's discourse and the public measures against racism and xenophobia are crucial to the recognition and acceptance of immigrants and ethnic minorities. The apparatus of the state must take the lead and demonstrate its authority in this matter, and pave the way, through the socialization of civil servants to diversity and the recruitment of ethnic minorities. It is not by chance that an anti-immigration lobby consolidated itself during the 1990s in Western Canada at the same time that the federal state was according less importance and reduced funding to the policy of multiculturalism. This situation has definitely contributed to the Islamophobia demonstrated by one part of the media in the English-speaking provinces.¹¹



- Affirmative action programs in employment in the public and para-public sectors are essential to compensate for the systemic socio-occupational marginalization of immigrants and their descendants and to facilitate their social mobility. Any discriminatory attitude on the part of agents of the State must be eliminated and indirect discrimination recognized.
- Steps towards acquiring citizenship must be facilitated, as they constitute an act of recognition that leads to an allegiance to the State (Helly, 2001).
- The Canadian experience bears witness to the importance of public schools as a setting for anti-racist and anti-xenophobic discourse and dialogue between immigrant parents and teachers who are primarily Canadian-born. Pejorative references with respect to minorities have been largely eliminated from school textbooks. Violent incidents between students, acts of discrimination on the part of teachers and the control of schools by ethnic gangs are rare occurrences. Yet, serious problems remain: an absence of learning about the history of countries other than Canada and Western Europe, the occurrence of anti-Muslim stereotypes in school books, and the concentration of ethnic minorities in some schools, are but some examples.
- The efforts of multiculturalism related to ethnic community organizations, in the form of ongoing ties between civil servants and leaders, the funding of NGOs, and efforts directed at para-public agencies, the media or organizations responsible for inter-group activities were all crucial during the 1970-80 period. They facilitated the adaptation and inclusion of immigrants as well as the control of leaders who were highly or entirely dependent on public funding. In no way did these efforts break the “social bond” or erode “social cohesion”, generate ethnic isolation, or jeopardize the allegiance of ethnic minorities to the Canadian state. On the contrary, as current surveys and polls demonstrate, it consolidated their allegiance and allowed groups without financial capital or any significant professional expertise, such as the Haitians in Québec, to “communitarize”, offer services and fight racism. However, the reduction of funding to ethnic NGOs over the past ten years, the strong interest shown for multiethnic NGOs since 1995¹² and the budget cuts to NGOs for the settlement of immigrants by the provinces and Immigration and Citizenship Canada only helped make it more difficult to incorporate newcomers. As proof, Muslim communities, which lack financial means and significant services for newcomers, have to deal with high unemployment and under-employment. They also have no ties with government organizations and lack knowledge of their activities. Immigration from Muslim countries multiplied during the 1990s, while assistance to ethnic NGOs was being reduced, the selection of immigrants was made more restrictive and the competition between native-born Canadians and immigrants grew. As a result, the Muslim community is not well organized to defend itself against prejudice and negative stereotypes (Helly, 2002, 2003, 2004) and has a rather negative view of the Canadian state and Canadian society. As for religious Muslim organizations, which raise the issue of the relationship between Church and State¹³, it is easy to encourage them to declare themselves cultural institutions and to fund them as such, a phenomenon that is emerging in Europe. As for those that refuse to characterize themselves as such, namely mosques, financial assistance can be granted for their social activities. On this issue, Canada is admittedly lagging behind, since the ties between public institutions and Muslim communities are almost non-existent given the retreat of the Multiculturalism Program from ethnic community life over the past ten years.

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NOTES

- 1 Examples include work and family-life reconciliation policies that help women not in the labour force gain easier access to the labour market, the reduction of payroll taxes on the hiring of low-skilled labour to absorb workers not active in the labour force, and the lengthening of the working age beyond the age of 60.
- 2 The Québec government adopted a similar program in 1991, without substantive results.

- 3 We do not have any data allowing us to state if there is systemic discrimination against any religious group.
- 4 For instance, when a private company signs a contract with a public agency that is in excess of \$250,000 in value.
- 5 The level of education of native-born Canadians has improved over the last twenty years. Nevertheless, 40% of immigrants in the 1990s between the ages of 25 and 54 held a university diploma compared to 23% of native-born Canadians in the same age range.
- 6 Unemployment insurance was established in 1940, diplomatic autonomy was recognized in 1946, the old-age pension system was introduced in 1951 and 1964; and citizenship was granted to Black and Asian minorities in 1948, to Inuit in 1950 and Registered Indians in 1960.
- 7 The sample includes 42,500 individuals of all origins and an overrepresentation of members of ethnic minorities.
- 8 The statistics for "Blacks" are 17% rarely, 23% sometimes and 9% often. For the Chinese, they are: 15% rarely, 16% sometimes and 2% often. The ratios are close in the three immigration metropolitan areas where immigrants are highly concentrated in Canada.
- 9 More openly political "communitarisation" is lawful in the name of freedom of association and opinion.
- 10 This explains decisions related to wearing the turban by members of the Sikh faith in the RCMP, wearing the scarf by members of the Muslim faith, the repeal of the mandatory closing of stores on Sundays in Ontario, said to be "contrary to the freedom of conscience and religion", and the elimination of religious practices in public schools.
- 11 This Islamophobia can be explained in part by the influence of the security discourse and practices of the Bush Administration.
- 12 This change in funding criteria does not seem to be systematically applied in the case of established ethnic NGOs (SSHRC project, Helly and McAndrew, 2000)
- 13 The Canadian State, which is not a "laïque" state, represents one of the many examples of different relationships between Church and State. There are only four "laïque" states: the United States, France, Mexico and Turkey. In these states, "laïque" has a totally different meaning (Helly, 2003)



OFFICIAL AND NON-OFFICIAL LANGUAGES IN THE CANADIAN MODEL OF INTEGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

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The theme of the conference emphasizes integration as a component of citizenship. I will argue that we must be broader in our scope to account for the “Canadian Model,” and we must not assume integration is the main objective or basis of citizenship or civic identity. The Canadian model of integration and citizenship involves three parallel discourses that have been unfolding with very little interaction between them. The discourse on *multiculturalism and citizenship* is often considered to be primarily an immigrant issue; the discourse on *official languages duality* is often dismissed as a remnant of the past somehow related to political battles about national unity but with little relevance for citizenship integration; finally, the discourse on and by Aboriginal Peoples seems to live in an extended parenthesis as some sort of hard to define exception to all rules.

Integration is often presented as an objective as if it were entirely benign and should be applied without distinction to all citizens. Yet many people (such as myself) have fought for the survival of Francophone minorities in English-dominant provinces. In particular, we have struggled for recognition of the idea that the sense of belonging and the sense of civic identity for certain groups of citizens rests on a *refusal to integrate* within a single model of citizenship; we have fought for a definition of citizenship which, at the very least, calls into question the assumption that integration based on multiculturalism is capable of encompassing all discourses.

To be complete, we should envision the Canadian model of citizenship and integration in a framework that is much larger than one that relates to just immigration, or for that matter, just multiculturalism. The forest in which the other trees are located, is the policy of official languages and linguistic duality. The Canadian state was reconsidered, reshaped and reconstituted primarily in the 1960s by the decision to raise the status of French and French-speaking Canadians throughout the country, all in an attempt to produce real equality as opposed to theoretical equality. The concept of the Canadian nation-state was changed and re-founded upon the concept of linguistic communities. This original reformulation grew out of the work of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Since then, limited constitutional recognition has been given to multiculturalism, and the search has begun to find a way of recognizing Aboriginal Peoples, the First Nations and Inuit, in some form of third-party relationship.

Thus as we take up the issue of the integration as citizens of persons newly arrived to this country, it is important to recognize that the Canadian concept of integration and creation of a Canadian identity is still evolving; it is a work in progress. Two main languages and two cultural mainstreams dominate the landscape. Furthermore, a federal system of government provides a framework that accommodates diversity and citizenship in more dimensions than simply French and English. Canadians vary from one end of the country to the other. When travelling in other countries of smaller size and reflecting on Canada, I am struck by how different many English-speaking Canadians are from one another. In fact, there are huge differences between people who speak English in northern Alberta and those who live in Newfoundland. These significant cultural differences go much deeper than superficial details

of how they earn a living or how the climate affects their heating bills. The reconciliation of internal differences both between Francophones and Anglophones and between English-speakers of different outlooks and origins has been one of the main preoccupations of the Canadian state. Integration has historically been about much more than the integration of recent arrivals as citizens, and it remains so today.

With the official languages model in the matter of integration, one has a double-edged sword. On one side we find the role of governments as they promote citizenship; on the other, citizens actively shape and define their own civic identities in ways that are not easily summarized

On the governmental side, one finds a federal government that has heavily involved itself in promoting social and linguistic currents to shape citizen life. However, provincial governments control the access to most of the day-to-day services that affect citizens in their relationship with government, services that the federal authorities would like to influence as a basis for promoting citizenship identity and integration. Although the cooperation between provinces and federal government is sometimes difficult, it has generally been productive. For example, in the last forty years, we have succeeded in raising the status of the French language and of French speakers in this country, a transformation that can be seen as a major victory arising out of a very complex process. A key objective of this state intervention—here I refer to the provinces as well as the federal government—has been to counterbalance what one might call the “market” forces that drive a tendency towards English language dominance, not only in North America but even in Europe. This dominance provides a vehicle for, and is reinforced by, the spread of American culture; as a result, governments actively intervene to oppose integration by forces that threaten to equate “integration” with “Americanization” through English. The threat of integration by and into a foreign culture is perhaps greater among English-speaking Canadians than among French-speakers. The outcome of these state policies for societal integration is mixed. Official languages policy has not been a panacea in dealing with the integration and identity of French-speaking Canadians, particularly the French-speaking Quebecois. However the policy has at least served as a prerequisite to the peaceful attainment of democratic compromises in a difficult area of conflicting interests in ideologies.

The other side of the sword is a vision of citizenship where Canadians must define themselves in terms of belonging to one or the other of the two main linguistic groups. While this vision of citizenship is fairly inclusive in that most Canadians can define themselves in terms of one or the other linguistic group, it does not subsume all diversities. Even if 98 per cent of Canadians claim to speak at least one of the two official languages, language is not identity. The model does not provide an option, for example, for just any citizen to become an Aboriginal person, except perhaps through marriage; conversely, many Aboriginal Peoples define themselves first in terms of their ancestry or their ancestral language without reference to the Canadian state or its models of citizenship in a nation-state.

Nonetheless, this concept of linguistic duality has achieved important successes. It has given official language minorities (Anglophones in Quebec, Francophones elsewhere) the right to educate their children in schools controlled by the minorities. This right has not always existed. As late as 1967, it was barely conceivable as a possibility; today, it is in large measure a reality from coast to coast. The majority of Canadians in all provinces support in principle (though sometimes with reservations) the Canadian model of official languages. Of course, a major outcome of the official languages model—a model that includes *both* federal *and* provincial/territorial efforts—is the improved status of French speakers and the French language throughout Canada. This is most obvious in Quebec and New



Brunswick, but it has also had an impact in the other provinces. In addition, federal policy has transformed the situation of employment in the federal government, from one where most of the jobs in it were in the hands of non-Francophones to one where Francophones have reached approximate parity.

Thus, looking back in time at the issue of integration in Canada one realizes that the main problem of integration in Canada has not been the integration of recent immigrants, but the integration of the country as a whole around an inclusive concept of citizenship. The last three and a half decades have been a period of rapid change, so rapid that if it had not occurred so peacefully, it would have been called a revolution. More recently, attempts have been made to extend the official languages model to other groups in Canadian society. The Yukon and the Northwest Territories have both accorded official status to the aboriginal languages dominant in their regions. Indeed, the creation of the vast expanse of Nunavut was a massive effort on the part of the Canadian state to give Aboriginal Peoples a form of control over their lives and a type of “integration” into the country based upon separateness and *non-integration*. This special type of integration involves political, cultural and linguistic autonomy for a group defined on the basis of an ancient culture and of a still vibrant language. Nunavut is, again, a work in progress.

One of the questions that arises out of the official languages model of integration and citizenship today is whether or not English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians have an actual right to learn the other official language. Teaching English and French as a second language in public schools has been a hit-and-miss affair. Depending upon the province and the specific place in a province where a citizen resides, the offer of quality second language teaching to children is highly variable. To the extent that full citizenship participation for Canadians should imply the right to acquire fluency and literacy in the second official language, an argument can be made that governments should have the obligation to provide access to programs of suitable quality for all children wherever they live, just like they feel obliged now to ensure that arithmetic is taught in all schools. At present, such provision is not made, but this right appears to follow immediately from the definition of the state that has been developed. Depending upon the outcome of the discussion around this point, it will impact on the rights of immigrant Canadians, who at the moment have few rights in matters of official languages, other than to be educated in the majority language of their province of residence.

While the Canadian model of integration and citizenship has been quite successful in many respects, this is not to say that all of the problems arising out of diversity have been solved. This is particularly the case when one looks beyond short-term immigrant integration to long-term issues of cultural and linguistic diversity in a country born of many races, ethnicities and linguistic origins.

An essay of mine on the development of Canadian civic identity, published by the Council of Europe, makes it abundantly clear how the Canadian model leaves out many groups.¹ The first shortcoming of the model is symbolic and is almost a necessary outcome of official languages policy; since Canada is a country of many languages, choosing to recognize two languages as official cannot fail to have a great symbolic effect for citizens whose languages are not so recognized. For some groups, the effect is perhaps negligible; for others, it could be considered an affront or an insult. I think in particular of the symbolic implications for Aboriginal Peoples, who have systematically refused reductionist integration based either upon two official languages imported from Europe or upon a multicultural window that places them in a subordinate position to the English and French mainstream societies.

Among the unresolved practical issues related to official languages and integration is our delivery of language teaching services for new immigrants to learn English and French. Present English as a second language (ESL) and French as a second language (FSL) services are disjointed, fragmented, and fail to serve the needs of many new arrivals (one is tempted to say most new arrivals). Service delivery is primarily based on language needs for getting a first job (often for only the man in the immigrant family) and it is not part of a coherent strategy for the development of a civic identity among immigrants. Language learning is treated as a by-product of the economic system: adults learn enough to get a job and then make do with what opportunities the work world offers them, and those who do not qualify for this can pick up an official language through television or contact with the world around them.

Another shortcoming is that the children of immigrants and their families who speak non-official languages at home and rightfully live within our multicultural society are not supported by bilingual education programs in provincial and territorial school systems. Integration of children from other languages and cultures into mainstream English or French schools is supposed to happen through a magical process where their teachers speak to them only in a foreign language (English or French); in most cases, some specialized teaching instruction by ESL or FSL instructors is pursued for two to three years for a small part of the school day. Then the children are supposed to be on their own, to have lost their mother tongue and to succeed in mainstream schooling like everybody else. A very small proportion of the total numbers of immigrant children are given transitional classes separate from the mainstream for a short period of months prior to integration into the school. The predictable result is that, on average, only immigrant children whose parents are comparatively well educated and whose native cultures place a great premium on schooling are given an equal chance in Canadian society. The others are to be found in our statistics on school failures, dropouts, youth alienation and anti-social youth behaviour. For some immigrant groups, notably some groups from East Asia, higher levels of parental involvement in education do help to compensate for this. But for many immigrant children this part of the model means integration as second-class citizens with second-class educational success. The very large proportion of highly educated recent immigrants from East Asia with strong traditions of family support for schooling helps cloak the failure of decades of half-hearted integration to deal adequately with the needs of immigrant children. With the sole exception of the Province of Alberta, there are no functioning systems of bilingual education in Canada of the type that exists in many American states.

On a very different scale of failure we must place the problem of the extinction or near-extinction of Aboriginal languages. The problem has reached the point where, perhaps due to negligence or perhaps for many reasons, the use or revival of some of the aboriginal languages of Canada would be very difficult. Only a few of the many aboriginal languages of Canada are the object of special measures to revive them. However, the Canadian official languages model is not the cause of the problem. The main cause is probably the historical oppression experienced by Aboriginal Peoples in the past, until the 1960s. It was a model of integration into citizenship through forced assimilation, in which language issues were only a small factor. While it needs to be recognized that the problems of social deterioration among Aboriginal Peoples are vast, it also needs to be recognized that for those Aboriginal Peoples who are in a position to begin thinking of conserving their languages, the official languages model is one to be imitated rather than opposed. This has happened in the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. We need a model that will give not protection but active support to native languages in a variety of environments throughout Canada. However successful Canada may or may not have been in integrating other groups as citizens, the result for Aboriginal Peoples has been, at best, a botched job. For many of them, integration has never occurred and first-class citizenship is a distant mirage that fades over the horizon.



Looking to the future, the Government of Canada is engaged in expanding the promotion of official French/English bilingualism among Canadian youth of all origins. However, it is facing an uphill battle. First, it is necessary for provinces to strengthen the basic integration of immigrants and their children into the mainstream languages and cultures of their provinces. At the same time, we have to defend the idea that this improvement of opportunities is not a zero-sum game where better ESL or FSL for immigrant children should mean we abandon the goals of French-English bilingualism. Remember: very large numbers of immigrant children, when offered the opportunity, become trilingual—in their mother tongue and in both French and English. A second step for future development, is overcoming apathy. Canadians are sometimes apathetic when it comes to learning other languages. In order to offset the inertia of part of the public and the educational system, it is necessary to promote a culture that values plurilingualism in and of itself. The Council of Europe has promoted plurilingualism within Europe, plurilingualism in which knowledge of several languages at different levels of competence is highly valued—from being able to converse, read and write at a high level in one language to the mundane ability to buy gasoline or fruit in another. I feel that a *symbolic* recognition of non-official languages and non-official language needs by federal institutions, along with a modest financial stimulus provided in partnership with the provinces, could mobilize new sectors of the population whose personal identity is linked to non-official languages. We need a federal/provincial partnership around the idea of creating a culture promoting multiple languages and valuing language learning. Such cooperation could mobilize public opinion, reinvigorating and supporting—rather than competing with—the expansion of programs to promote individual French/English bilingualism in Canada. The whole should have very positive effects on integration and formation of Canadian civic identity.

NOTE

- 1 Stacy Churchill, *Language Education, Canadian Civic Identity and the Identities of Canadians, Reference Study*, Strasbourg: Language Policy Division, Council of Europe, 2003.

MAKING SENSE OF IDENTITY AS A POLICY GOAL

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The Canadian Multiculturalism Policy has been implemented through a federally funded grants Program. Therefore, the Multiculturalism Policy and Program constitute what may be referred to as official multiculturalism. In this brief presentation, I will try to illustrate how the goal of identity has shifted, in the context of official multiculturalism. However, it is important not to view multiculturalism in isolation, since it is not the only policy that has an impact on identity. Other influential policies are those that address formal citizenship issues, employment and education. I will begin by introducing the multiculturalism program's areas of concentration. Following this, I will provide a brief outline of the current policy framework and then I will spend more time commenting on the emerging scope of that framework, with a focus on the evolving association of identity, citizenship, and multiculturalism.

CANADA'S MULTICULTURALISM PROGRAM: MULTICULTURALISM IN ACTION

Multiculturalism program activities include several different types of initiatives related to Research, Community Action, Institutional Development, and Public Education. Through thematic based research calls, policy-research seminars, and partnerships with academic and community organizations, the Program's research staff works to stimulate, generate, and fund research that contributes to our understanding of Canada's diversity and the interplay between diversity factors and social issues.

Community action projects facilitate community development, civic participation, equitable access and informed public dialogue about ethnic, racial, religious, and cultural diversity in Canada. Ethnic and racial minority communities in Canada still face barriers to full participation, whether cultural, social, linguistic, religious or economic. The program assists communities to identify these barriers and develop and implement programs that help find solutions to the problems they face. For example, it has provided assistance to a coalition of immigrant settlement organizations to help internationally trained professionals develop and implement a strategy to gain recognition in Canada for their foreign credentials. In addition, the Program has worked extensively with the Portuguese community to research and develop initiatives to address why Portuguese-Canadian students have one of the highest drop-out rates and lowest level of educational attainment of all ethnocultural communities.

In terms of institutional development, the Program continues to work on projects designed to increase awareness of the needs and the positive representation of diversity in the areas of health, the media, and social services. The Program is working with cultural agencies, such as the National Film Board, which supports the production of documentary films, to identify barriers to equitable access to the industry. Also, the Program maintains a good relationship with the Canadian Race Relations Foundation, partnering most recently to bring community leaders and representatives of the Toronto police force together to discuss the problem of racial profiling.



The Program's public education staff continues to run an annual anti-racism campaign and this includes a multi-faceted campaign to encourage Canadians, particularly youth, to get active in efforts to eliminate racism. A National Video competition is held to engage youth in making videos that express their views on racism.

RENEWED MULTICULTURALISM: PROGRAM AND POLICY OBJECTIVES: 1995-97

The current policy goals were implemented during the government's review of multiculturalism, undertaken between 1995 and 1997. At this time, a new project-based funding formula was introduced to correspond with three emerging program objectives; the three inter-related objectives of civic participation, social justice and identity, were designed to illustrate that an inclusive society depends on respect for all ethnic groups and the fullest possible participation of all citizens in the life of the nation. The **Civic Participation** goal addresses the capacity and opportunity of diverse communities to participate in shaping the country's future through involvement in public policy discussion and decision-making (e.g. electoral participation or membership in NGOs). The **Social Justice** objective focuses on the need to build a society that ensures fair and equitable treatment; and that respects the dignity, the values and the needs of Canadians irrespective of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious or racial origins. The **Identity** goal aims to foster a society that recognizes, respects and reflects a diversity of cultures so that citizens of all backgrounds feel a sense of belonging and attachment to Canada.

SHIFTING APPROACHES TO IDENTITY

Of the three key policy goals, it is identity that is the most elusive and at the same time the most important. I now turn to a consideration of this identity goal but in thinking about new approaches, the link between identity and citizenship must be understood because the multiculturalism program has to be understood within the context of activities that encourage greater degrees of civic participation and social justice across Canadian communities so that all Canadians will feel a greater sense of attachment to the country. However, only certain identities are at issue here. Being a chess player may be an important part of someone's identity but it is unlikely to be a barrier to equal citizenship. On the other hand, being a Canadian of African descent might be an identity that does beget the imposition of certain barriers to full participation and it is the link between this type of identity and the elimination of barriers that I am addressing when I speak of shared or equal citizenship.

Now, we can see that in the first two decades of official multiculturalism, the 1970s and the 1980s, the focus was on cultural retention. The goal, explicitly, was to assist cultural groups to retain and foster their identity—meaning their traditional cultural identity. Along these lines, funding was provided for activities expressing folkloric and artistic heritage and the approach to identity was to see individuals as part of a group with a more or less fixed set of customs. Over the years, the Program balanced out these objectives by shifting toward issues of integration, recognition and discrimination, especially in the area of race relations, the media's representation of minorities, and the significance of diversity issues to other relevant areas of institutional change. A shift in the identity goal followed this shift in objectives and the program began to reframe the identity goal in terms of the notion of shared citizenship. Once again, the new identity goal is to foster a society that recognizes, respects and reflects a diversity of cultures so that citizens of all backgrounds feel a sense of belonging and attachment to Canada.

WHO REALLY RELATES TO MULTICULTURALISM AS A CITIZENSHIP IDENTITY?

Recent public opinion polls demonstrate that a majority of Canadians support multiculturalism policy. Polling results also tell us that multiculturalism is considered, by a majority of Canadians, to be an essential part of a so-called Canadian identity. However, what people understand multiculturalism to mean might be very different from individual to individual and across different communities. This open-ended aspect of what multiculturalism means is especially important to the implementation of multiculturalism policy since program officers, who work with community representatives, need to be sensitive to the concerns that individuals and groups have about what inclusion in Canadian society might require. In this way, individuals and groups may interpret multiculturalism to mean cultural retention only, as that had been the prevailing ethos of multiculturalism for many years. Accordingly, they may see their ethno-cultural or racial identity as the most important factor influencing their participation as citizens in Canada.

Others may feel obliged to give multiculturalism a symbolic nod of approval, whenever called upon to do so, such as in an opinion poll for instance, but otherwise, in most day-to-day situations, their framework for citizenship is influenced by other identities that have, on the surface, nothing to do with multiculturalism. They may understand themselves to be Canadian—full stop—and interpret social justice issues in terms of individual rights only. They may be French-Canadian or Aboriginal and feel that their participation in society is expressed, first and foremost, within these collective identities. Still others may feel that it is their gender, sexual orientation, or disability that defines them as citizens. The current public debate over same-sex marriage in Canada provides an excellent context for this merging of identity and shared citizenship. Gay couples who support same sex marriage feel it is a matter of recognition that is at stake in having the right to be “married”, as opposed to being recognized within a “civil union”. In other words, it is a matter of equal citizenship. Amidst these competing identities a so-called multicultural citizenship identity may fall somewhere in the middle.

COMMUNITY CRITIQUE

Criticism of the new interpretation of identity has come from groups such as the Canadian Ethnocultural Council (CEC). The substance of the CEC’s criticism is illustrated in the following quote from one of its representatives:

*The new program design speaks of **identity as a process in the making**, and, arguably, an end yet to be realized, i.e., to foster a society around certain values so that they feel a sense of belonging and attachment to Canada. In this instance, the identity objective, as yet to be achieved, is **a state of consciousness**. Multiculturalism, however, as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society, implies a state of being... Either we accept the argument that a Canadian identity exists, defined here by its essential pluralism, or we do not.*

What the criticism reveals is that ethno-cultural minority community leaders, those who had been interacting with the multiculturalism program over the years, had felt well served by the early 1970s and 1980s approach to multiculturalism. For them, the key virtue of multiculturalism was that it was the opposite of a policy of assimilation or anglo-conformity. What they fear from the new approach to identity is that it no longer pursues the goal of cultural retention for its own sake. Interpreting identity as an essentialist concept, one denoting a “state of being” as opposed to a process, served the cause of non-assimilation specifically.



What the new approach appears to serve is the goal of greater integration and unity. This sounds like assimilation to the Program's traditional clients. And the CEC's criticism is accurate insofar as the new interpretation of identity does see identity as a process leading to a state of consciousness more than it understands identities to be fixed for all time. But the idea of process does not mean something mechanical. Rather, it means something fluid and evolving. Understanding identity as a process, in this organic sense, is a more accurate and relevant way of interpreting multiculturalism.

IDENTITY AS A "PROCESS"

What the new Identity goal provides the program with is an opportunity to link a multicultural citizenship identity with other Canadian citizenship identities by way of a common dialogue that promotes greater degrees of civic participation and social justice across communities. In this way, the process of identity, as it relates to citizenship, might lead to a shared, if not common, consciousness that need not result in some new form of assimilation. Therefore, the new identity goal allows the program some leeway in developing projects that focus on the intersections of identity and how multiple citizenship identities may be implicated in the struggle to overcome complex barriers to participation. An intersections approach also takes into account generational differences within immigrant communities, where the children and grandchildren of immigrants adopt new and complex ways of understanding and expressing themselves as Canadians.

In the parlance of social capital, the new identity goal provides the program with the opportunity to focus on projects that are designed to promote "bridging" (inclusive) forms of social capital across communities, along with its traditional focus on "bonding" (exclusive) forms of social capital. This is especially important because trends in immigration in Canada shift. Newer, more vulnerable communities, including immigrants from Africa, Asia, and South-East Asia, can learn a lot about integrating into Canadian society from older immigrant communities. The newer Somali, Pakistani, Vietnamese, and Korean communities in Canada could benefit from projects that link them with the older Italian, Ukrainian, Chinese, and Japanese communities.

Research also supports the idea of focusing on so-called "bridging" identities to bring people together. Bridging identities could include gay and lesbian identities since these identities are shared across ethno-cultural and racial lines. Being a parent is also a common or bridging identity, and ought to be used more as a way of bringing people together to discuss common issues. In other words, it is more likely that people will connect through their bridging identities rather than their ethno-cultural identities, which are exclusive identities. "Bridging" social capital projects will provide the Program with an opportunity to link more identities to multiculturalism and in this way meet the goal of building a greater attachment to Canada through building a greater attachment to the larger community.

THE FRENCH MODEL OF INTEGRATION

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This paper in no way attempts to present the model of integration that exists in France today. Carrying out this task would be almost impossible in so few words. Accordingly, I will limit myself to highlighting a few features of the model that emerged from philosophical debates that still prevail in present day social science discussions and controversies. Even after having limited myself in this way, this project will still not be entirely successful because only six authors will be discussed, and briefly so, as reference points that have shaped the French model of integration, i.e., Thomas Hobbes (*De Cive*, 1642), John Locke (1632-1704—*Second Treatise of Government*), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (*Le Contrat Social*, 1762), Ernest Renan (*Qu'es-ce qu'une Nation?*, 1882), Dominique Schnapper (*La communauté des citoyens*, 1992), and Didier Lapeyronnie (*Les deux figures de l'immigré*, 1997).

To begin a discussion on the French model of integration by referring to the British writers, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, is definitely a historical paradox or oddity. Yet, any historicizing of thought, ideas and social phenomena call for the discovery of points of rupture in an almost unending continuity. The school of thought pertaining to the state of nature, natural rights and later to the social contract is a true break from the political thinking that attributed sovereignty and the right to govern to some divine principle, a theocracy. In this sense, the thesis about the transition from the state of nature to society marks a rupture. The entrance into the Age of Enlightenment is characterized by a laïcisation¹ of sovereignty. In the final analysis, for the writers who refer to social contract theory and, whatever their differences, sovereignty lies with the people.

The differences between these philosophers are very important. They are sometimes diametrically opposed to each other as to the “political” conclusions that can be drawn from their reflections. However, I would mainly like to emphasize the threads of continuity in this short presentation. The universalistic model that emerged with the French Republic after the 1789 Revolution was founded on a few solid principles strongly taken up and stated in a variety of forms over the decades. Let us recall some of them: the search for peace and the preservation of one’s existence, the relinquishing of natural rights, the principle of delegation, the voluntary contract reached by free individuals, the central role of the law, and the idea that the state has the sole authority to enforce law and order.

Thus, Thomas Hobbes begins by postulating that the state of nature is a war of everyone against everyone. To get out of this unenviable situation, find peace, preserve one’s existence, and pass on one’s belongings, individuals must relinquish their “natural rights” to the sovereign, whether a human or an assembly, forming in the process, civil society.

- “If for the preservation of Peace, and the Government of Man-kind there were nothing else necessary, than that Men should agree to adhere to certaine Covenants and Conditions together, which they themselves should then call Lawes.”



- “The modern citizen holds his citizenship from the act through which he constitutes sovereignty in instituting the sovereign. The State or republic is based on the principle of sovereignty, through the contract to which modern individuals all agreed.”
- The founding act of the modern State is the original act by which the *voluntary union of a multitude* is carried out separately and simultaneously giving rise to the body of a republic, which creates the state as a sovereign power and brings about the political subject, which is the citizen as person, which is to say the physical citizen, the modern individual in his political role (Gérard Mairet, Introduction to De Cive).

The creation of a legitimate state and of society as subject is not only the product of a deliberate act, but this decision to associate is part of a formal agreement that determines the rules for “living together”. The law arising out of the agreement of all is the principle that governs the conduct of individuals. It is on this basis that society is created, allowing for the transition from the “multitude” or the “aggregation of individuals” governed or subjected to a prince, to “a nation” or an organized society. Interestingly, Ernest Renan, in examining the distinction between the multitude and society, notes that all regimes and all peoples do not make up a “nation”. This distinction is also present in the writings of modern historians of Europe who point out the major difference between the peoples who make up a nation and give themselves a “democratic” regime, whatever its form, and the empires that are built on enslaving individuals and peoples. Hobbes’ central thesis can be summarized with the following points:

- The contract that founds civil society and the state (sovereignty) is established at the expense of the renunciation by individuals-now citizens-of their natural rights.
- In exchange for civil peace that the sovereign (monarchy or republic) must provide to them, individuals put themselves under the protection of the law that makes them all equal, the weak as well as the strong. The legitimacy of the sovereign flows from the will and freedom of the individuals who decide to unite as a people.
- The sovereign is the expression of this union.
- *The power of the sovereign is without limit*: this type of State is called Despotism.

Locke’s argument is also based on the transition from the state of nature to civil and political society. However, unlike Hobbes, Locke believed that the multiplication of social relationships is what transformed the state of nature, initially peaceful, into a state of war, and gradually eliminated the equality and independence between men and put covetousness at the very heart of human relationships. To escape from the risks of insecurity to individuals and property, men bring themselves to agree on a *contract*, creating in the process, a *political and civil community*. “There and there only is political society, where everyone of its members have quitted this natural power, *resigned it up into the hands of the community* in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for the protection to the law established by it.” This is a modern idea, at the very core of the political philosophy of twenty-first century republican France.

Locke's arguments, developed in the *Second Treatise of Government* are only touched on here to highlight the significant difference that separates him, even sets him in opposition to Hobbes: despotism or a limitation of the powers of the sovereign by the people.

- A contract is an individual, free and voluntary act.
- It implies accepting the rights and obligations that form the basis of a political society.
- The latter is not given; rather, it is a construction of the social body.

In this political community:

- The people are the only sovereign;
- The people elect their representatives who make the laws in the name of the people;
- The rule is that of the majority.

The power of the sovereign is limited by the power of the people. The people alone are sovereign. After many ups and downs, this principle has been placed at the very centre of French political philosophy and the republican conception that developed in this country. It guided the drafting of the constitutions of the various republics. However, this sovereignty at issue always works on a representative basis. In delegating their power, the people relinquish it, be it only for an inter-electoral period.

Considering the goal of this work, which is to retrace the ongoing development of the French republican model, it is without a doubt Jean-Jacques Rousseau who established the foundational references that prospered during the Revolution and throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The echoes of his writings can still be heard in the current debates of the *Assemblée nationale* and the media. When looked at in the framework of the history of political thought, the writings of Rousseau represent both continuity and change. In terms of continuity there are three ideas to highlight:

- Only a freely accepted agreement can found a legitimate society.
- This agreement is founded on the *renunciation of the freedom of independence* (of the state of nature) in exchange for civil liberty, that of the citizen, member of the sovereign people, author of the laws.
- As subjects, man is obliged to abide by the law.

However, Rousseau's break with traditional political thought is also important. I list only four points in this regard:

- The sovereignty of the *General Will* arises out of the independence of individual wills.
- The Republic is the rule of the general will.
- The collective interest supersedes individual interests.
- This republic is characterized by the *requirement of universality*.



Regarding the latter point, the state that founded the “Rousseauist” society is built and works on the principle of universalism. It comes from transcendence: what is individual is subsumed within what is universal. Thus the republic tends towards universalism and if the state aims to embody the general will, it is much less a question of tendency than it is of an actual reality. In fact, for Rousseau, the contradiction that exists between the sovereign adjudicating between individual wills and the general will is never settled or completed. It is this tension that acts on the life of the political body. With the essential contradiction between the general will and individual wills being at the very heart of the social dynamic, an agent is needed to implement it. In the “Rousseauist” conception, society invests the state and law with a central role. However, and this is where the break with previous political philosophy occurs, the state and law, political instruments, deal with abstract individuals, with citizens whose political body only recognizes their rights and duties. The state and the law deal with disembodied individuals: “When I say the object of the laws is always general in nature, I mean that law considers subjects en masse and actions in abstract, and never man a particular person or action.”

The space allocated for this account does not allow me to continue reviewing the philosophical tradition that nurtured the French model of integration. Accordingly, I will not examine the thinking of De Tocqueville or even Benjamin Constant. I will leap into the modern era and concentrate on the short speech given by Ernest Renan at the Sorbonne in 1882. He entitles his paper “What Is a Nation?” Some brief propositions will allow me to present his thesis, which constitutes an important reference base for understanding the French concept of a nation. Let me begin with what is not a nation for Ernest Renan. A nation:

- It is not a race. Thus, he writes: “The idea of different races in the French population, so obvious in Grégoire de Tours’ work (538-594), does not present itself to any degree among French writers and poets after Hugues Capet (987).”
- It is not based on an ethnic principle;
- All human groups do not make up a nation.
- It is not based on a linguistic principle. (To France’s credit, it never tried to use coercive measures to obtain language unity. Is it not possible to have the same feelings and the same thoughts, to like the same things in different languages?)

Religion cannot serve as the basis of a nation either. It played a role in Athens, Sparta, in the Middle Ages.... when one could not be a citizen without practicing the religion of the City. However, “today, religion has become a personal thing. It concerns one’s own conscience. The division of nations into Roman Catholics, Protestants does not exist any more.”

In addition, Ernest Renan mentions two other facilitating factors, the “community of interests” presented as a powerful bond between men, but insufficient to give rise to a nation, and geography and borders, which trace the lines of division between nations, thereby favouring the emergence of their identities. However, according to E. Renan, “*geography and land are only stratum and man is the only thing that counts.*” Thus, nation is not race, language, interest, religious affinity or geography. So what is a nation? The answer holds in one word: a nation is fusion, the fusion of different peoples who forge an historical identity. This fusion is based on:

- Individuals agreeing to “live together”.
- Forgetting the past and even historical errors.
- A common background of shared cultural references.

However, equally, on the political side:

- “A nation is a *soul, a spiritual principle*. Two things that, in reality, are but one constitutes this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, the other in the present. One is the shared possession of a rich legacy of memories of the past, the other is a consent in the present, a desire to live together, a will to continue to make the most of an undivided heritage.”

Finally:

- If a nation is part of history and if it is established on the basis of a heritage... it defines itself in relationship to a *collective future*. “*It is a daily plebiscite*”.
- It is an historical development and as such, it has an end. Nations also die... “*The European confederation will probably be replacing them.*”

From Rousseau to Renan, political theorists established the basis of the modern conception of the French style of integration into the republic. Dominique Schnapper undoubtedly is the most accomplished scholar of this line of thought. To try and sum up her thoughts in a few words is a bit of a gamble. Let me attempt it anyway by drawing on one of her conclusions. Following in the footsteps of Rousseau, she shows that the nation rests on an essential contradiction at the very heart of the republican conception of it, between the *universalism* for which it aims and the *particularisms* that make up the context in which it evolves. All societies, all states, all political communities without a doubt must confront this contradiction or duality. However, the French republic and the French model of integration are built on a rift, a strong rift between what is private and what is public, between the individual and the citizen and between culture and politics, a rift that the term individual-citizen does not manage to erase. The credo advocated by Schnapper is without ambiguity. The political domain is its cornerstone. National ties are essentially political and it is first and foremost in political terms that a nation must be analysed. As a political community of citizens, the nation is radically different from other forms of historical and cultural (ethnic) collectivities and from the State.



On the basis of this line of thinking, Schnapper asserts that:

- “We can then examine the constituent tension inherent in the concept of nation, between the universal ambition of transcendence through politics and the concrete markers of distinctiveness of each historical nation.”
- “The very concept of an ethnic nation is a contradiction in terms.”
- “It is the effort to uproot oneself from the identities and the sense of belonging experienced as natural through the abstraction of citizenship that distinctively characterizes the national project.”

This project that involves abstracting what is universal and uprooting oneself from what is distinctive and individual is unending. It is a tension, a goal, a value that the republic strives to achieve and make concrete without ever completely succeeding. This is undoubtedly why the French style of republic functions in the exception, with strong rules that overlook differences, only to reintroduce them through the side door with amendments or special provisions for one group of individuals or another, for whom the rule could not apply itself without being prejudicial. Nevertheless, the principle rule is clear. It is based on the assimilation of differences that are blended to conform to a model that leans towards the status of universality. In this sense, the idea of nation is consubstantial with the idea of integration and by way of consequence, that of education.

As for education, it is one of the strongest pillars of the French Republic. The concept of education, says Schnapper, is based on the idea of nation. It leads immediately back to learning about “the common good”, values, norms, heritage... but also to “learning about public life.” The idea is to “*respect the practices of public life*” and to internalize the idea that there is a public domain. The basic function of education through the use of symbolic violence is to reduce political and cultural particularisms and thereby ensure domestically the effective development of the process of national integration. This process of reducing differences founds a nation that legitimates the actions of the state.

Thus, when it comes to integration in France, schools are at the centre of the arrangement. The intensity of the debates around this institution makes this abundantly clear. However, the school is but an example used here, precisely because it is central. In fact and in the final analysis, “*it is the political community that gradually imposed homogeneity/uniformity on people.*” Integration, the blending of differences into the political community, is a socio-historical process fairly easy to initiate for it merely adds the national character to the individual character. Yet, the following two conditions are required:

- That there be a political area independent of individual interests and that citizens respect the rules of its operations.
- That the existence of a collective *interest*, separate and sometimes conflicting with the individual interests, be recognized.

Lastly, before concluding, there is the issue of *citizenship*. In France, it is the process whereby individuals root themselves in what is universal through a “transcendence” effect. I will try to characterize this process with several basic ideas:

- Political society tries to develop a political body from individuals deemed to be radically independent.
- It starts from the need to regulate relations between Subjects of Law and not the face-to-face relations between people or individuals.
- In all cases, the idea is to create a political sphere ruled by common norms that function as a basis for resolving rivalries and conflicts.
- The general will is the result of this negotiation, manoeuvring and regulation. The citizen is the expression of the general will.

However, for this alchemy to work effectively, political society has to foster a process of uprooting the concrete attachments or affiliations of individuals. It implies the agreement and support of citizen-individuals. Conversely, it confers on individuals an identity and a sense of belonging to a collectivity, i.e. a community.

Is it necessary to state that this model, outlined by Schnapper, is largely proven by the facts? At times, in official or expert circles, it is recognized that the French integration machine is out of order, or slowing down or that it does not work as well as it used to. Theorists then come to examine the patient and suggest in some cases, radically alternative solutions, drawing inspiration from the Canadian or North American examples or in other cases, produce critical analyses calling for significant changes to the model. The CADIS is one of the protagonists, no doubt one of the most active ones, in this debate. Among the members of this group is Didier Lapeyronnie and his article entitled “Les deux figures de l’immigré”² (The Two Faces of the Immigrant). In the media, in the political arena, and in intellectual circles, people are debating models of integration. The universalistic model versus the communitarian model, positioned on the particularistic end of the continuum—two extremes which oppose each other. However, the debate is sterile because it does not lead to any practical conclusions. To move beyond this, it would seem that it would be necessary to consider, concurrently, the following:

- The respect of individual rights and the protection of cultural minorities;
- The combination of belongings and the promotion of liberal values;
- The association between communitarianism and liberalism.

Regarding the latter, research has shown that communities are an important factor in promoting assimilation. Furthermore, national models no longer constitute very distinct empirical realities. In fact, many European countries are not that different with respect to the objective situations that immigrants face, despite very different models, e.g. Germany, Great Britain and France. Given the aforementioned elements, it seems that behind the debate of clichés, two profiles of immigrants can be constructed:

- The first profile is inscribed in the modernization process of societies that are still traditional: the *immigrant-foreigner*.
- The second profile is inscribed in the power relations within a modern society: the *colonized immigrant*.



In the first case, there is the immigrant-foreigner in traditional society. *Immigrant-foreigners* are faced with a set of very general references that they must acquire, since the references will allow them to include and blend their individual or collective characteristics into the larger collectivity. Through education and socialization, the individual must acquire the common background that draws them to what is universal. They must root out of themselves who they are and step into the active world that transcends personal attachments: work, citizenship, public life, and basically the nation. The image of the immigrant-foreigner in this framework is that of someone making the transition into the modern era. It is also the price to pay for emancipation through belonging to a modern culture and for access to individuality.

The second profile of the immigrant is that of a minority. Not having to uproot their characteristics (phase 1), stable immigrants in a modern country have to achieve self-reliance and the recognition of their existence in the face of the mechanics of power that construct them more than they oppress them. The colonized immigrant is caught in a schizophrenic situation:

- He is a moral individual or citizen while in a minority situation;
- His identity for others is independent of him;
- He is stigmatized because he is integrated, but he cannot identify himself with the image of himself constructed by society.

So, the idea here is not to uproot but to rebuild a sense of belonging and have this sense recognized: “Individuals can only exist in an autonomous manner if they are able to produce their own point of view based on their own experience and thereby challenge the viewpoint imposed on them by others.” The deceleration of the integration process radically changes the game. The assimilation process begins to idle. Integration is no longer self-evident. Imposing the standards or opposing them to call attention to one’s differences is all that is left. The minority immigrants in a post-modern or late-modernity society exist when they position themselves as different and dissenting subjects.

In short, within a society going through the modernization process, immigrants are foreigners.

- Their characteristics must be abandoned and uprooted.
- They must submit to an integration process that makes the functioning of society possible.

Within a society of “late modernity,” immigrants are colonized individuals.

- They do not have to uproot themselves from the community any more. It is the specific nature of their experience that is relegated.
- Their problem is not to individualise themselves or to integrate but rather to recover a sense of belonging that will allow them to develop an integrated personality versus an alienated personality.

In conclusion, inherited from the Age of Enlightenment, patterned on the 1789 Revolutionary ideal, the French republican model is without a doubt not only an ideal type but an ideal type that embodies a cluster of values instrumental in the building of a nation according to a specific logic, that of assimilation. In search for what is universal to successfully drive the General Will, the French melting pot is not only supposed to ignore individual differences, which must be uprooted, but it must “reduce” them, have them disappear de facto or return them to the private sphere.

As was mentioned, it is far from a model of concrete reality; the machine works and can only work if it tolerates exceptions. The school unified and indivisible, like the Republic, epitomizes the model's mode of operation. The special support measures provided to children in underprivileged neighbourhoods are indicative of the option taken by the state in recognizing differences and even inequalities. Can we then speak of an “affirmative-action policy” in this case, which would go against the republican principle? Some time ago, the conscripted army, which one in three young people eluded, also functioned according to exceptions. The distinctive religious signs provide another example. The examples are numerous and show the subtle game to which the republican universalistic model leads with respect to the issuing and application of rules. However, we can and must ask ourselves up to what point the subtle tension between the universal and particular, between standards and any deviation from them, can be maintained. Unemployment, exclusion, migratory movements, the rise of religious or ethnic demands, Europeanization and/or globalization all seem to bring into question the integrating principle that makes or was making a unified society that overlooked its differences.

No doubt in Europe, in neighbouring countries, there are other models of integration also being questioned. Similar factors, if not identical ones, can explain this common trend. How is integration possible when work is not available, when the social protection system limits benefits and leaves more and more gaping holes in the social safety net? How is integration possible when norms and values are not assured as they used to be and when the doubt of their place permits the questioning of their legitimacy? In the European framework, let us also add another factor: the progressive and regular questioning of nation-states and their growing interconnection following the Europeanization process. The French model of integration is definitely questioned in debates and in reality. At least it is being debated and criticized. Moreover, some of our neighbours can hardly understand it. The concepts of uprooting, of ignoring particularisms, of submitting the individual interest to the general interest can seem perplexing if not unacceptable to some people. However, the competing models are not shielded! Germany is reviewing its nationality code, Sweden is discovering the principle of *laïcité*... etc.

Europe is on the move. It is favouring a reconciliation that is encouraging drastic revisions. Within the European framework, the universalistic French model will no doubt be brought to accept a small dose of particularism. However, one can think that other countries will also be led to modify their manner of conceiving of integration in the European space, as much at the level of blood, as of language, religion, culture, etc. In the European space, more than ever, integration will be an affair of belonging, fusion and contract.



NOTES

- 1 Note from PCH: In France, *laïcité* refers to the separation of church and state, especially the absence of religious interference into government affairs (as well as the converse independence of religious practice). Although the concept is related to secularism, theoretically it does not imply hostility toward religious beliefs as can be perceived of secular societies. Rather, it implies the neutrality of the state concerning religious practice. There is no special status given to religion; religious activities are not considered above the law. Further, this neutrality does not protect any religions; the state's position is one of ambivalence. As such, the government refrains from taking positions on religious doctrine and only considers religious subjects for their practical consequences on the lives of French citizens. For an elaboration on this term, see Micheline Milot "The School and Religious Diversity in Canada and Quebec," in this collection. As the term is not directly translatable, *laïcité* and its derivatives will be left in French throughout the paper.
- 2 In *Une société fragmentée? Le multiculturalisme en débat*. (Michel Wievorka, ass. dir.), La Découverte / Poche Essais, 1997.



CONCEPTUALIZING AND MEASURING
DIVERSITY IN CANADA

THE DIVERSITY AND STATE OF ABORIGINAL LANGUAGES IN CANADA¹

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INTRODUCTION

There must be 50 ways to say ‘Hello’ with the many different Aboriginal languages in Canada today. Across the nation, languages indigenous to this country are many and diverse, reflecting its rich variety of Aboriginal cultures and identities. Some 50 individual languages belong to 11 Aboriginal language families: 10 First Nations and Inuktitut. Michif, a language developed by the Métis is also spoken in Canada.³ Most families consist of separate but related member languages, and within each family there can sometimes be several languages (e.g. the Algonquian language family consists of individual languages such as Cree, Micmac, Blackfoot, and Algonquin). Furthermore, each individual language can have several separate dialects; Swampy Cree, Woods Cree, and Plains Cree, for example, are some of the dialects within the Cree language. When we consider the variety of dialects within individual languages themselves, as well as that of languages within families, we have an even better idea of the real extent of diversity among Canadian Aboriginal languages.

However, there are disturbing signs that this diversity cannot be taken for granted much longer. Already great losses have occurred for Aboriginal people; nearly ten once-flourishing languages have become extinct over the past 100 years or more. Moreover, many of the 50 present-day languages are either close to extinction or endangered: “fewer than half of the remaining languages are likely to survive for another fifty years” (Kinkade, 1991: 158). Languages on the brink of extinction are those requiring immediate and sustained help to stand a chance of avoiding extinction; whereas endangered languages have enough people speaking the language to make survival a possibility if sufficient family and community interest and concerted educational programs are present. There are Aboriginal languages that can be considered viable, however, especially those few that have a large population base of speakers, or those that are spoken in isolated and/or well-organized communities where the language is an important mark of identity. It is estimated that only about a third of the languages originally spoken in Canada have a good chance of survival (Kinkade, 163). Still, trends in general indicate a continuing erosion of most Aboriginal languages, with lessening continuity and transmission to younger generations resulting in decreasing and aging populations of speakers, and with children comprising an ever-smaller part of the speaker population, especially among the endangered languages.

This paper begins with an overview of the extent of this diversity on a geographic basis, looking at variations across regions, communities and cities. In relation to these patterns of diversity, the paper examines the current state of Aboriginal languages; the implications of trends in language use and transmission for the next generation of speakers; the role of families and communities in supporting intergenerational transmission; and the outlook for future diversity of Aboriginal languages in Canada. The analysis in this paper is based on analyses of census data⁴ from Statistics Canada employing language variables on mother tongue⁵, home language⁶, and knowledge of, or ability to speak the language.⁷



Importance of Linguistic Diversity

Language remains a critical component in maintaining and transmitting Aboriginal cultural integrity and identity, and reflects a unique worldview specific to the culture to which it is linked. While loss of language does not necessarily lead to the death of a culture, it can severely handicap transmission of that culture, and its values and history. But language is not only a means of communication—it is also a symbol of group identity to the extent that language and identity are often inseparable: “Language embodies the intellectual wealth of the people who use it,” (Hale, 1992). From the perspective of diversity, the loss of any language represents a significant loss of human knowledge, and at the same time, no one language can represent the sum total of human knowledge. As David Crystal (2000, 53) asserts in his book *Language Death*: “as each language dies, another precious source of data—for philosophers, scientists, anthropologists, folklorists, historians, psychologists, linguists, writers— is lost...Diversity ... is a human evolutionary strength, and should be safeguarded as an end in itself”.

There is an increasing awareness world wide about the importance of linguistic diversity, and its links with related dimensions of traditional knowledge and with biodiversity. In their book, *Vanishing Voices: the Extinction of the World's Languages* (2000), Daniel Nettle and Suzanne Romaine discuss the striking correlations between areas of high biodiversity and areas of highest linguistic diversity, that lead to a common repository of “biolinguistic” diversity, noting that the greatest biolinguistic diversity is found in areas inhabited by indigenous peoples, who represent 4% of population, but speak at least 60% of world's languages. One international non-profit organization, Terralingua (TL), a group of professionals working in the fields of anthropology, linguistics, biodiversity conservation, and human rights, believes that the challenge of protecting, maintaining, and restoring the diversity of life on earth is the challenge of supporting and promoting diversity in nature and culture. TL has found evidence that the global patterns of distribution of biodiversity coincide significantly with the patterns of distribution of linguistic diversity (as representative of cultural diversity as a whole).⁸

At present, the linguistic heritage of Aboriginal peoples in Canada is still considerably rich and diverse, as illustrated in the following discussion. If current trends in Aboriginal language use in general continue, however, we can expect declining diversity with fewer children learning an Aboriginal mother tongue, and when the only remaining speakers of endangered languages are elderly, such that as they die off so may their languages, their knowledge and their world views.⁹

Diversity in Size and Distribution of Languages¹⁰

In Canada's 2001 Census, 203,000 persons reported an Aboriginal language as their mother tongue, a decrease (2.5%) from the 1996 Census count of 208,000. The three largest families are Algonquin, Inuktitut, and Athapaskan, which together represent 94% of the Aboriginal mother tongue population. Cree (87,555), Inuktitut (28,000) and Ojibway (25,885) (1996 figures) are the largest and most widespread languages and the only viable languages with population bases large enough to be considered secure from the threat of extinction in the long term.

The range in the size of the eleven language families in Canada is considerable. In terms of mother tongue populations, the largest family by far is the Algonquian language group. According to the 1996 census, there were 147,000 persons in the Algonquian mother tongue population, whereas corresponding counts show that the smallest families or isolates, such as Haida (240) or Tlingit (145), contain a few hundred persons or less. In 1996, the three largest families—Algonquian, Inuktitut (28,000), and Athapaskan (20,000) represented 93% of persons with an Aboriginal mother tongue. The other eight language families accounted for the remaining seven percent, an indication of their relatively small size.

PATTERNS OF DIVERSITY ACROSS REGIONS, COMMUNITIES AND CITIES


We can explore the patterns of linguistic diversity from different perspectives—in terms of regional, community, and city variations. The present-day geographic distribution of these languages reflects the different cultural areas of First Nations and Inuit. The languages with the largest numbers of mother tongue population also tend to be widespread; most notable are the Algonquian family of languages extending from the Atlantic to the Rockies (comprised of a wide range of languages, including Micmac, Michif, Blackfoot, as well as the larger Cree and Ojibway languages to name a few). Geography influences size and diversity of languages. Because of their large, widely dispersed populations, the Algonquian languages account for the highest share of Aboriginal languages in all provinces except British Columbia. While Manitoba and Saskatchewan have the largest populations of Aboriginal language speakers, B.C. has the greatest diversity—home to at least half of the Aboriginal languages in Canada.¹¹ However, because of the small population sizes of these languages, B.C.'s share of the Aboriginal mother tongue population in Canada is only seven percent.

Regional Diversity

Geography is an important contributor to the diversity, size, and distribution of Aboriginal languages across Canada's regions (see Figure 1). For example, the diversity of languages in B.C., most of them small in population, is likely the outcome of the province's mountainous geography, which would impose physical barriers to communication. In addition, given plentiful resources, it may not have been as necessary to move such as for hunting, as in the case of the more widespread Algonquian and Athapaskan populations. The population bases of the Salish, Tsimshian, Wakashan, Haida, and Kutenai languages in B.C. were never as widely dispersed as the Algonquian and Athapaskan languages that developed in the more open central plains and eastern woodlands (Priest, 1983; Grubb, 1979).



Figure 1: Aboriginal Mother Tongue Population




* Nunavut became a Territory in 1999.

** North West Territories excluding Nunavut.

Source: 1996 Census.

Diversity of Communities

Most speakers of Aboriginal languages reside in Aboriginal communities throughout Canada—including First Nation reserves and settlements, Métis communities and Inuit villages, and, to a lesser extent, in cities. The patterns of diversity of Aboriginal languages based on the population with an Aboriginal mother tongue differ from those derived for distributions at the levels of communities and cities. On the basis of 1996 census data and INAC information, 875 Aboriginal communities were classified according to the major Aboriginal language(s) of the community (see Figure 2). Based on the distribution of communities by languages, the top five languages represented by the number of communities are: Cree (23%); Salish (19%); Ojibway (17%); Inuktitut (6%); and Micmac (4%)—accounting for 69% of all communities, a ranking that is different from that based on the size of their respective mother tongue populations. For example, in 1996, the 162 Salish languages communities (Thompson (30), Shuswap (31) and Salish ni.e (101)) represented 19% of all Aboriginal communities¹² (875) classified by language (see Figure 4). In contrast, their corresponding mother tongue population represents just under 2% of the total population with an Aboriginal language, and 3.7% of the corresponding urban population reporting on Aboriginal mother tongue (see Figure 3). For Inuktitut languages, their communities represent 6% of all Aboriginal language communities, while their population share represents 13% of the total population with an Aboriginal mother tongue, and just 1.8% of urban population reporting an Aboriginal mother tongue.

Figure 2: Distribution of Aboriginal Communities by Aboriginal Languages, Canada, 1996

The top 5 languages in terms of the largest number of “language communities” are Cree (23%); Salish (19%); Ojibway (17%); Inuktitut (6%); and Micmac (4%), accounting for 69% of all communities.

Diversity Among and Within Canada's Cities

Not all Aboriginal people reside in predominantly Aboriginal communities; in the 1996 Census close to 40,000 persons, or almost one in five persons who reported an Aboriginal mother tongue were residing in major cities¹³, compared to 48% of the Aboriginal identity population residing in these urban areas. Much of the considerable diversity and extensive distribution of Aboriginal languages throughout Canada is reflected in the country's cities, such that the diversity of Aboriginal languages in urban areas varies from city to city. Yet the language composition of the urban population is not proportionately representative of that of the country overall, given that not all Aboriginal languages are similar in their degree of urbanization. For example, about 26% of the Ojibway mother tongue population resides in urban areas, compared to 17% for Cree, and consequently, Ojibway represents 18% of Aboriginal languages in urban areas, disproportionately higher than its share of the total mother tongue population at 12%. Conversely, while Inuktitut is the second largest mother tongue population in Canada and accounts for 13% of the total mother tongue population, it represents only 2% of the urban population reporting an Aboriginal mother tongue because fewer than 3% of people with an Inuktitut mother tongue reside in cities. Thus, the top five languages ranking based on the share of population in cities are: Cree (39%), Ojibway (18%), Micmac (9%), Montagnais-Naskapi (6%), and Salish (3%); which account for 75% of the Aboriginal mother tongue population within CMA/CAs, and is different from that based on mother tongue population. For the total population with an Aboriginal mother tongue population (208,000)—the top 5 languages are Cree (42%); Inuktitut (13%), Ojibway (12%); Montagnais-Naskapi (4%); and Dene (4%)—accounting for 76% of the total population with an Aboriginal mother tongue (See Figure 3).¹⁴





Figure 3: Distribution of Total Aboriginal Mother Tongue Population in Canada's Cities (CMAs and CAs), 39,600 by Aboriginal Languages, 1996



The top 5 languages in urban areas are Cree (39%); Ojibway (18%); Micmac(9%), Montagnais-Naskapi (6%); and Salish (3%); accounting for 75% of the Aboriginal mother tongue population within CMA/CAs.

In contrast, for the total population with an Aboriginal mother tongue population (208,000), the top 5 languages are Cree (42%); Inuktitut (13%), Ojibway (12%); Montagnais-Naskapi (4%); and Dene (4%); accounting for 76% of total.

THE STATE OF ABORIGINAL LANGUAGES IN CANADA

Viable or Endangered: Current Health of Languages Critical to Future Diversity

When we talk about the diversity of Canadian Aboriginal languages, it is important to consider the current state and the factors affecting the maintenance and survival of Aboriginal languages. Several factors significant to the viability of Aboriginal languages have been identified in previous work: population size, age, second language acquisition, and community. The size of the language population has an impact in ensuring the survival of the language in the long-term. Use of the language at home is vital to an assessment of a language's viability and can be established using a continuity index. Many of the larger-sized languages also have high continuity, while those with populations under 1,000 (e.g., Nishga, Haida) may be endangered or faced with extinction by low continuity. However, some of the smaller languages (e.g., Attikamek, Dene) can still be considered viable if their continuity is high. For a summary of the state of specific Aboriginal languages using selected indicators, see Table 1.

Speakers' age is also a factor in language continuity: the younger the speakers, the healthier the language. The average age of those who have an Aboriginal mother tongue or speak the language at home is an indication of the extent to which the language has been transmitted to the younger generation. Viable languages such as Attikamek, Inuktitut and Dene are characterized by relatively young mother tongue populations (average age 22-25) and corresponding high continuity. In contrast, endangered languages like Haida, Kutenai and Tlingit typically have older mother tongue populations (average age around 50) combined with very low continuity indexes. The chances of Haida being passed on to the younger generation are extremely low with only six persons speaking it at home for every 100 persons with a Haida mother tongue.

Age and continuity factors do not tell the whole story however, since second language acquisition is prevalent among younger generations. For example, the Kutenai language family has one of the oldest mother tongue populations and lowest continuity¹⁵ indexes but the index of ability (indicator of second language acquisition)¹⁶ indicates that there are two people (usually younger) who speak the language to every one individual with a mother tongue, suggesting that younger generations are more likely to learn Kutenai as a second language (since fewer of these younger speakers have acquired their Aboriginal language as a mother tongue). Second language acquisition patterns are also more highly pronounced off-reserve, especially among youth in urban areas (Norris and Jantzen). It should be noted, though, that with respect to second-language acquisition, varying degrees of fluency could be represented among census respondents reporting knowledge of the language—that is, the ability to conduct a conversation in an Aboriginal language—suggesting some caution is warranted in considering the implications of second-language acquisition for transmission and continuity.

Table 1: Selected Indicators* for Aboriginal Language Vitality, Total Population, Canada, 1996

Aboriginal Languages	Mother Tongue	Index of Continuity	Percent of children in linguistically mixed marriages	Index of Ability	Average age of Population with:			Viability Status of Language
					Knowledge of Aboriginal Language	Aboriginal Mother Tongue	Aboriginal Home Language	
Algonquian Family	146,635	70	34	117	30.5	30.9	28.8	mostly viable
Cree	87,555	72	31	117	29.9	30.2	27.9	viable large
Ojibway	25,885	55	47	122	34.9	36.2	34.4	viable large
Montagnais-Naskapi	9,070	94	19	104	25.1	25.2	24.8	viable small
Micmac	7,310	72	43	111	29.5	29.9	29.2	viable small
Oji – Cree	5,400	80	27	114	25.7	26.3	26.8	viable small
Attikamek	3,995	97	7	103	21.8	21.9	21.5	viable small
Blackfoot	4,145	61	50	135	36.4	39.7	40.6	viable small
Algonquin	2,275	58	50	119	29.8	30.7	31.4	viable small
Malecite	655	37	83	148	40.5	44.0	44.8	viable small
Algonquian NIE	350	40	75	159	47.2	52.2	46.7	uncertain
Inuktitut Family	27,780	86	19	109	23.9	23.9	23.3	viable large
Athapaskan Family	20,090	68	41	117	31.4	32.5	30.0	mostly viable



Aboriginal Languages	Mother Tongue	Index of Continuity	Percent of children in linguistically mixed marriages	Index of Ability	Average age of Population with:			Viability Status of Language
					Knowledge of Aboriginal Language	Aboriginal Mother Tongue	Aboriginal Home Language	
Dene	9,000	86	28	107	24.4	24.8	24.1	viable small
South Slave	2,620	55	45	124	35.6	37.8	38.4	viable small
Dogrib	2,085	72	29	118	28.3	29.8	30.6	viable small
Carrier	2,190	51	70	130	37.5	41.4	40.5	viable small
Chipewyan	1,455	44	82	128	39.4	40.2	40.7	viable small
Athapaskan, NIE	1,310	37	70	129	41.6	44.7	44.2	uncertain
Chilcotin	705	65	55	130	32.2	37	36.9	viable small
Kutchin-Gwich'in (Loucheux)	430	24	67	114	53	53.1	56.8	endangered
North Slave (Hare)	290	60	36	116	38.3	39.1	39.8	endangered
(Dakota) Siouan Family	4,295	67	49	111	31	31.9	28.0	viable small
Salish Family	3,200	25	79	132	42	48.7	47.2	endangered
Salish NIE	1,850	24	80	130	43	49.7	48.5	endangered
Shuswap	745	25	80	134	38.7	46.3	42.9	endangered
Thompson	595	31	80	135	43.1	48.6	48.3	endangered
Tsimshian Family	2,460	31	71	132	43.2	48	49.6	mostly endangered
Gitksan	1,200	39	76	123	41.4	45.2	45.7	viable small
Nishga	795	23	70	146	41.8	47.5	57.6	endangered
Tsimshian	465	24	83	132	50.5	55.9	52.7	endangered
Wakashan Family	1,650	27	79	118	47.3	51.3	51.1	endangered
Wakashan	1,070	24	88	129	47.7	53	53.2	endangered
Nootka	590	31	69	99	46.5	48.1	48.4	endangered
Iroquoian Family***	590	13	88	160	36.4	46.5	52	uncertain
Mohawk	350	10	100	184	36.6	46.1	60.5	uncertain
Iroquoian NIE	235	13	80	128	35.8	47	41.4	uncertain
Haida Isolate	240	6	100	144	46.7	50.4	64.6	endangered
Tlingit Isolate	145	21	100	128	45.5	49.3	41.6	endangered
Kutenai Isolate	120	17	67	200	37.1	52.3	41.2	endangered
Aboriginal Ln.nie	1,405	28	68	176	43	47.0	45.8	endangered
Total Aboriginal Languages	208,610	70	34	117	30.4	31.0	28.3	mix of viable and endangered

Source: Adapted from Norris, 1998. Statistics Canada, Census of population, 1996

* The indicators – Index of Continuity, Index of Ability and average age of Mother tongue and Home language – are based on single and multiple responses (of Mother Tongue and Home Language) combined. The Index of Continuity is a ratio of the number of persons with a given Home Language to the number with that particular Mother Tongue times 100. The Index of Ability is a ratio of the number of persons reporting knowledge of a given language to the number with that particular Mother Tongue times 100.


** The viability "status" of the individual languages is based on a classification from M.Dale Kinkade's "The Decline of Native Languages in Canada" in Endangered Languages, edited by R.H. Robins and E.M. Uhlenbeck., Berg Publishers Limited, 1991.

*** Data for the Iroquoian family is not particularly representative due to the significant impact of incomplete enumeration of reserves for this language family. Other languages such as those in the Algonquian family may be affected to some extent by incomplete enumeration.

Patterns of Viability and Continuity Vary Across Regions, Communities and Cities

The viability of languages in any area is dependent on the size of the language population and its continuity, with implications for the future diversity of regions, communities and cities. For example, while B.C. has the greatest linguistic diversity, with the largest number of Aboriginal languages, it has one of the smallest language populations and the largest number of endangered languages. In contrast, Aboriginal languages in other regions, such as Attikamek and Inuktitut in Quebec and Inuktitut in Nunavut are flourishing (see Figure 4). At the community level, among some 800 enumerated Aboriginal communities, many have small populations with an Aboriginal mother tongue: over a third (36%) of communities have mother tongue populations of less than 15; and at least half (51%) have populations of less than 50 people reporting an Aboriginal language as their mother tongue. In addition to their small language populations, prospects for continuity are also low for many communities.

Figure 4: Language Continuity by Region



* Nunavut became a Territory in 1999.

** North West Territories excluding Nunavut.

Source: 1996 Census, author's calculations.

The State of Aboriginal of Languages within Communities and Cities

Aboriginal communities, including the First Nation reserves of registered Indians and the northern communities of the Inuit, clearly support the maintenance and transmission of Aboriginal languages, as evidenced by sizable mother tongue populations and high continuity. In 1996, 52% of registered Indians living on reserves and 67% of Inuit (most of whom live in northern communities) reported an Aboriginal mother tongue, compared to only 18% of registered Indians off reserve, 6% of non-status Indians, and 7% of Métis. Shares for the total Aboriginal identity



population present a similar picture. Compared to the Aboriginal population overall, and especially with Aboriginal communities, the off-reserve Aboriginal population, particularly in cities, does not fare well in its language use. For example, only 3% of Aboriginal people in cities reported an Aboriginal home language, compared to 18% overall and 41% for reserves.

The increased challenge presented to Aboriginal languages by an urban environment is evidenced by the low continuity and aging of mother tongue populations in urban areas and the fact that Aboriginal languages are being spoken infrequently in the homes of urban residents such that children in cities are much more likely to learn an Aboriginal language as a second language.¹⁸ Within large cities, 9% of people reporting an Aboriginal identity indicated an Aboriginal mother tongue; 3% an Aboriginal home language; and 12% a knowledge of an Aboriginal language.¹⁹ Among Aboriginal Communities, prospects for language continuity are low for about a third; medium for another third; and high for the remaining third. In sharp contrast, prospects for language continuity among the 40 cities (CMA/CAs) are low for the vast majority, some 80%; in CMA/CAs with reserves, language continuity fares slightly better. These figures confirm the conclusion by Canada's Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) that many of the challenges confronting Aboriginal languages are exacerbated in an urban environment (RCAP (1996), Volume 3, 614-617).

In addition, Aboriginal languages are not uniformly healthy in all the communities in which they are spoken: significant variations can exist even among communities of the same language, often depending on their location. For example, even though Cree overall may have high continuity as a language, some Cree communities have relatively low continuity especially within more urbanized areas. Among Inuit communities while the Eastern group of dialects have high indexes of continuity, the Western groups have much lower ones.

Intercity Differences in the State of Languages

Cities differ not only in the size and diversity of their Aboriginal language populations, but like communities, also in the state of their languages. The average age of Aboriginal mother tongue populations in many B.C. cities is over 40, in Prairie cities it ranges from 30-35 years, while cities that have a reserve within their CMA/CA boundaries, such as Quebec City, have younger average ages. These figures, along with low measures of continuity indicating relatively infrequent use of Aboriginal languages in urban homes (especially among Aboriginal women in childbearing ages), demonstrate the challenges of language maintenance within urban environments, with serious implications for the intergenerational transmission of Aboriginal languages. The less the language is spoken at home, the less it is transmitted as a mother tongue (versus as a second language) to the younger generation.²⁰ According to the 1996 Census, among urban children aged 5-14, there are 160 who have an ability to speak an Aboriginal language for every 100 with an Aboriginal mother tongue, suggesting that 60 of the 160 must have learned it as a second language. In contrast, among children on reserves, the number reporting an ability to speak the language is closer to the number with an Aboriginal mother tongue, as indicated by an Ability Index of about 115.

THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION

Intergenerational transmission is vital for both language maintenance and revitalization, particularly in the case of Aboriginal languages, which cannot rely on immigration to sustain the population of speakers. Intergenerational transmission contributes to the maintenance of viable languages in communities where the Aboriginal language is both the mother tongue and main language of communication. In terms of revitalization, the capacity to transmit from one generation to the next must be restored for endangered languages in communities that are undergoing a shift to the dominant language. It is not enough to increase the number of second-language speakers; it is also necessary to increase the number of first-language speakers and to restore the transmission of that language from one generation to the next. Because we cannot rely on immigration as a source of new speakers of Aboriginal languages, intergenerational transmission is especially critical. Children are the future speakers of Aboriginal languages, and are the major consideration in language maintenance and revitalization. According to UNESCO (Wurm, 1996), a language is considered endangered if it is not learned by at least 30% of children in a community. The 2001 Census indicated that in Canada, only 15% of Aboriginal children learn an indigenous mother tongue.²¹

PATTERNS OF LANGUAGE SURVIVAL AND MAINTENANCE WITHIN FAMILIES

Family and Life Cycle Events


Understanding the process of language use and decline can be explored within the context of the family and related life cycle events. A cohort analysis of census data (1981-1996) shows that the maintenance of an Aboriginal mother tongue as a home language is related to life cycle; language loss is most likely to occur during the 'family formation' years as youth leave home, enter the labour force, marry, start families or move to a larger urban environment. The most pronounced decline, among women aged 20 to 24 in 1981 to 35 to 39 in 1996, is significant given that these are the very years during which women tend to raise young children. Compared to men, women tend to have higher rates of migration from reserves to cities, and are consequently more likely to intermarry—a factor especially relevant for endangered languages that have high rates of exogamy and urbanization (Norris, 1998).

Exogamy, Language Continuity, Transmission

A high degree of linguistic out-marriage (exogamy) is associated with diminished continuity of language. Consistent with Harrison (1997), Figure 5 illustrates the strong inverse linear association between language continuity (for all ages) and exogamy (% of children in mixed marriages) for Aboriginal languages. Viable languages with extremely high-language continuity (80%+) such as Attikamek, Montagnais-Naskapi and Inuktitut and low exogamy rates (<20%) are in the top left corner of the graph. In contrast, endangered languages such as Haida, Tlingit and Kutenai are in the opposite lower right hand corner with extremely low continuity levels of 20% or less and exogamy rates averaging some 90%. The largest First Nation language, Cree, is in the upper left quadrant with continuity and exogamy rates of about 70% and 30% respectively.



Figure 5: Aboriginal Language Continuity and Percentage of Children in Exogamous Marriages, by Aboriginal Language of Parent(s), Canada, 1996



Source: 1996 Census, from Norris and MacCon.

*Transmission from Parent to Child: Mother Tongue, Home Language, Second Language?*²²

Among a study of 58,000 children (aged 5-14) who have at least one parent with an Aboriginal mother tongue, overall 54,000 (over 90%) of these children have the ability (knowledge) to conduct a conversation in the Aboriginal language of their parent; but only 27,000 (47%) of children have their parent(s)' Aboriginal mother tongue; while only 22,000 (38%) of children speak an Aboriginal language at home (see Table 2). The erosion of home language use occurring among younger generations is most pronounced for endangered languages, which practically none of the children speak at home and which are more likely to be learned as a second language than as a mother tongue, which contributes to the aging of their first-language speakers and that ultimately could push endangered languages closer to extinction.


*Language Acquisition in Children Related to Family and Community*²³

Family and the community together play critical roles in the transmission of language from parent to child. Alone, neither family capacity nor community support is sufficient to ensure the adequate transmission of an Aboriginal language as a population's mother tongue from one generation to the next. Intergenerational transmission is maximized in Aboriginal communities among families where both parents have an Aboriginal mother tongue. Transmission can be best realized with the support of the community in those families with either both parents or the lone parent having an Aboriginal mother tongue. Furthermore, there are also gender differentials associated with the patterns and extent of language transmission by marriage and residence. Among children of exogamous couples where the husband has a non-Aboriginal mother tongue, for example, the proportion of children with an

Aboriginal mother tongue is higher when compared to the opposite situation in which the wife has the non-Aboriginal language. For both types of exogamous marriages the proportions of children with an Aboriginal mother tongue are higher within Aboriginal communities compared to cities.²⁴

Outside of predominantly Aboriginal communities, particularly within large cities, transmission and continuity is significantly reduced even under ideal family conditions of linguistically endogamous parents. For exogamous families, community effect, while positive, appears nevertheless limited in offsetting their low rate of mother tongue transmission. Trends indicate continuing declines in intergenerational transmission accompanied by a decreasing and aging Aboriginal mother tongue population and a growing likelihood that Aboriginal languages will be learned increasingly as second languages, especially in urban areas or if the language is endangered (see Figure 6 and Table 2).

Figure 6: Percentage of Children with Aboriginal Mother Tongue, by Family Type and Residence, Canada, 1996



Source: 1996 Census, custom tabulations Norris, 2003.



Table 2: Selected Language Indicators for Children of Parents with Aboriginal Mother Tongue by Language of Parent(s), Canada, 1996

Aboriginal Language of Parent(s)	STATUS of Language	Number of children	% of Children able to speak the language	% of Children with Aboriginal mother tongue	% of Children with Aboriginal home language	Index of Continuity (HL/MT)	Index of Ability (KN/MT)
ALGONQUIAN FAMILY	mostly viable	41,380	94.5	43.8	34	78	216
CREE	viable large	24,795	96.7	45.4	35.7	79	213
OJIBWAY	viable large	8,065	87.1	24.9	16	64	350
MONTAGNAIS-NASKAPI	viable small	2,015	98.5	87.3	81.1	93	113
MICMAC	viable small	1,895	96	49.3	30.9	63	195
OJI-CREE	viable small	1,465	95.9	58.0	43.7	75	165
ATTIKAMEK	viable small	970	96.9	93.3	91.8	98	104
BLACKFOOT	viable small	1,510	90.7	7.9	4.6	58	1,142
ALGONQUIN	viable small	475	89.5	56.8	17.9	31	157
MALECITE	viable small	190	86.8	2.6	7.9	300	3,300
INUKTITUT FAMILY	viable large	7,580	98.1	79	69.9	88	124
ATHAPASKAN FAMILY	mostly viable	5,575	90.9	41.4	33.2	80	219
DENE	viable small	2,425	94.4	66.8	58.1	87	141
SOUTH SLAVE	viable small	715	93.0	28.7	18.9	66	324
DOGRIB	viable small	610	96.7	50	32.8	66	193
CARRIER	viable small	530	88.7	7.5	4.7	63	1,175
CHIPEWYAN	viable small	545	79.8	11	7.3	67	725
ATHAPASKAN N.I.E	uncertain	285	80.7	12.3	7	57	657
CHILCOTIN	viable small	250	90.0	8	4.0	50	1,125
KUTCHIN-GWICH'IN (LOUCHEUX)/NORTH SLAVE	endangered	215	74.4	11.6	4.7	40	640
DAKOTA—SIOUAN FAMILY	viable small	1,360	83.1	38.6	33.1	86	215
SALISH FAMILY	endangered	615	67.5	8.9	1.6	18	755
TSIMSHIAN FAMILY	mostly endangered	590	89.8	10.2	0.8	8	883
WAKASHAN FAMILY	endangered	295	52.5	3.4	0.0	0	1,550
IROQUOIAN FAMILY	uncertain	80	43.8	31.3	0.0	0	140
HAIDA-TLINGIT-KUTENAI—ISOLATES	endangered	85	64.7	23.5	0.0	0	275
TOTAL ABORIGINAL LANGUAGES*	mix of viable and endangered	57,570	93.7	47.1	37.6	80	199

* INCLUDING Algonquian NIE

Source: 1996 Census custom tabulations, authors' calculations.

ENDANGERED LANGUAGES: PASSING ON THE LANGUAGE TO THE NEXT GENERATION

Clearly, there are significant differentials in the pattern and the extent of parent/child transmission among viable and endangered languages. Children learning an Aboriginal language as a second language may go some way towards preventing, or at least slowing down, the extinction of endangered languages. However, if the language is not their mother tongue they are less likely to pass it on to their own children. Accompanying the increasing awareness that Aboriginal languages are endangered, is the growing realization that families, communities, education and government support, all have an important role to play in the preservation, maintenance and revitalization of these languages. As this paper demonstrates, place of residence, be it within a city or Aboriginal community, family structure and linguistic intermarriage are all important considerations in the pattern and extent of intergenerational transmission.

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND OUTLOOK

The considerable diversity that we see today among Aboriginal languages may decrease and patterns change, given that over half of Aboriginal languages are either endangered or close to extinction. Overall, declining trends in continuity/ intergenerational transmission are yielding ever-decreasing shares of children among aging populations of first-language speakers; and the likelihood of children learning an Aboriginal language as a second (rather than first) language is increasing. In terms of survival, the outlook is grim for many endangered languages, when there are practically no children using the language at home and the average age of those who do speak it at home is close to 50. For Aboriginal languages, the linguistic outcomes of children, concerning the extent to which they acquire an Aboriginal language are significant determinants not only of the maintenance of these languages but also their very survival, and hence the future diversity of languages in Canada. Also, currently viable languages may experience increasing problems of continuity with younger generations, accelerating the process of language erosion. Any prospect of increased urbanization of Aboriginal populations may also accelerate the process of language loss, given the current challenges of maintaining Aboriginal language use in urban areas. In the case of already endangered languages, extinction could be only a generation away. Thus within a generation, there may be only half as many different Aboriginal languages in use as compared to today. Furthermore, some estimates in the literature suggest that 80% of the North American languages spoken at the turn of the 20th century will die in this generation; one prediction implied is that only 20-30 Aboriginal languages could remain spoken in all of North America by the year 2040 (McConvell and Thieberger, 2001).



The implications of these trends in the disappearance of linguistic diversity are profound worldwide. In *Vanishing Voices* (2000), Nettle and Romaine explain that “the extinction of languages is part of the larger picture of worldwide near total ecosystem collapse.” In her book *Dark Age Ahead* (2004), warning about the possible collapse of Western Civilization and an end to a culture, Jane Jacobs refers to the way some Aboriginal peoples irretrievably lost their language, customs and culture all in the name of “progress”. To quote Hale (1992), “Languages embody the intellectual wealth of the people that speak them. Losing any one of them is like dropping a bomb on the Louvre.” Growing awareness of Aboriginal culture and identity may be partly responsible for interest indicated by the vast majority of Aboriginal adults in learning or relearning an Aboriginal language in the 1991 Aboriginal Peoples Survey. There is room for hope and there are signs of revitalization: accompanying the increasing awareness that Aboriginal languages are endangered is also a growing realization that families, communities, education and government support all have an important role to play in the preservation, maintenance and revitalization of these languages. And, these trends are not just unique to Canada; they are worldwide: “The last decades of the twentieth century have seen a resurgence of indigenous activism from the grassroots level all the way to international pressure groups,” (Nettle and Romaine). So as we consider the prospects and diversity of Aboriginal languages over the next generation, perhaps we could conclude with the question as to: “How many ways will there be to say ‘Hello’ with Aboriginal languages in the Canada of tomorrow?”

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NOTES

- 1 A longer version of this paper may be obtained by contacting: Mary Jane Norris, maryjane_norris@pch.gc.ca, Policy and Research Directorate, Aboriginal Affairs Branch, Canadian Heritage.
- 2 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Canadian Heritage. The author acknowledges with thanks support and editorial input provided by Sarah Vowles and Suzanne Gibeault, and comments from Norman Williams, of the Policy and Research Directorate, Aboriginal Affairs Branch, Canadian Heritage.
- 3 In the Canadian Census data on Aboriginal languages, Michif is not separately classified, but is included in the category “Algonquian n.i.e.”. Consequently, data on Michif are not separately analysed in this paper.
- 4 Findings presented here are based on analyses of census data mainly from the 1996 Census and earlier censuses from 1981 onward. Some data from the 2001 Census is included but upon publication, analysis of the 2001 data is ongoing.
- 5 Mother tongue is defined as the first language learned at home in childhood and still understood by the individual at the time of the census.
- 6 Home language is defined as language spoken most often at home by the individual at the time of the census. In the 2001 Census a new section on languages spoken on a regular basis at home was added (Statistics Canada, 2002). Here the analysis is restricted to language spoken most often.
- 7 Knowledge of (non-official) languages refers to languages other than English or French in which the respondent can conduct a conversation. In the 2001 Census Guide respondents were instructed to report only those languages in which the person can carry on a conversation of some length on various topics (Statistics Canada, 2002).
- 8 See www.terralingua.org for further information.
- 9 These trends are not unique to Canada: at least half of the world’s 6,000 or so languages could be extinct in the next century (Nettle and Romaine, 2000). “Some put the figure as high as 90% (Krauss 1992:7); while Crystal (2000) has speculated that the reduction to one language—English—by around 2100 AD, while not likely, would not be beyond the bounds of possibility at the present levels of attrition,” (From McConvell and Thieberger, 2001).
- 10 Much of this section is derived from Norris, 1998.
- 11 This share is based on the number of individual languages as classified in the census. If many of the smaller individual languages not coded separately by the census are considered, then B.C.’s share of Canada’s 50 Aboriginal languages would be even greater than their census-based proportion, given that many of these smaller “close to extinction” languages are in B.C.
- 12 Aboriginal Communities are based on Census Subdivisions enumerated in the 1996 Census, including reserves, settlements, northern communities etc. Not all of these communities have populations reporting an Aboriginal mother tongue (MT): of the 800 enumerated in the census, about 8% have none. In the case of no Aboriginal MT population or incompletely enumerated communities (75), Aboriginal language was assigned from INAC sources.
- 13 For sake of simplicity, the term “cities” is used interchangeably with the Statistics Canada definition of Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) and Census Agglomeration (CA).
- 14 Cities vary in both the size and diversity of their populations with an Aboriginal mother tongue. Winnipeg has the largest population reporting an Aboriginal language as a mother tongue (5,120), followed by Edmonton (2,905), and Vancouver (1,750). If we look at the composition within cities, Winnipeg is very homogeneous in that mainly Cree and Ojibwa are the only two spoken. The composition of Aboriginal languages within Vancouver is quite diverse, reflecting the diversity of B.C. languages as well as effects of migration. At the same time though, Vancouver has a very low proportion of Aboriginal speakers who are also an older population as compared to other cities.
- 15 Index of Continuity (HL/MT) measures language continuity, or vitality, by comparing the number of those who speak a language at home to the number of those who learned that language as their mother tongue. A ratio less than 100 indicates some decline in the strength of the language (i.e., for every 100 people with an Aboriginal mother tongue, there are fewer than 100 in the overall population who use it at home). The lower the score, the greater the decline or erosion.

- 16 Index of Ability (KNVMT) compares the number of people who report being able to speak the language with the number who have that Aboriginal language as a mother tongue. If for every 100 people with a specific Aboriginal mother tongue, more than 100 persons in the overall population are able to speak that language, then some learned it as a second language either in school or later in life. This may suggest some degree of language revival.
- 17 This section is derived from Norris and Jantzen, 2003.
- 18 The transmission of Aboriginal languages as a mother tongue from parent to child is clearly jeopardized in an urban environment given the small share of Aboriginal persons speaking an Aboriginal language at home. About 28% of people aged 65 and over, residing in cities, reported an Aboriginal mother tongue compared to just over 5% of young adults (15-24). Overall, the average age of the population reporting an Aboriginal mother tongue is about 30.7 years, whereas for many cities, their Aboriginal mother populations tend to be even older, especially in B.C. where there are already many endangered languages.
- 19 The comparable numbers for those on reserves are 51% of people reporting Aboriginal mother tongue; 41% reporting an Aboriginal home language; and 55% reporting a knowledge of an Aboriginal language.
- 20 The association between low continuity and aging mother tongue populations is reflected in cities. For example, in Vancouver, where Aboriginal languages are spoken relatively little as a home language, as illustrated by an extremely low Continuity Index of just over 10, the average age of the population with an Aboriginal mother tongue is 45. In contrast, in Prince Albert, where a Continuity Index of close to 50 indicates that Aboriginal languages are being spoken more in the home, the average age of persons reporting an Aboriginal mother tongue is just over 30. While the urban environment poses a challenge to Aboriginal languages in general, some of the inter-city differences seen here also reflect differences in diversity and viability among the individual languages themselves. For example, Cree, which is the largest and most viable indigenous language in Canada, is the major Aboriginal language in Prince Albert, representing close to 90% of the mother tongue population; whereas in Vancouver, language composition is much more diverse, with several languages represented and many of which, apart from Cree and Ojibway, are considered endangered. Also, some cities contain reserves within the CMA/CA boundaries, some of which represent a significant share of the CMA/CA mother tongue population.
- 21 Trends indicate that many languages will be confronted with the challenges of continuity for the next generation. Language vitality has declined between 1981 and 2001, indicating steady erosion in home language use and an increasingly older mother tongue population. The average age of the mother tongue population rose by 5 _ years to 33 in 2001, and children represent a decreasing share of the population with an Aboriginal mother tongue. Between 1986 and 2001, the percentage of speakers who were children aged 0 to 19 declined from 41% to 32% while that of adults aged 55 and over increased from 12% to 17%. Census 2001 data revealed that, for first time since 1981, the population with an Aboriginal mother tongue declined, from 208,600 in 1996 to 203,000 in 2001.
- 22 This section is derived from Norris and MacCon, 2003.
- 23 This section is derived from Norris (2003).
- 24 For further discussions on patterns of parent-child transmission within families, by linguistic intermarriage, family structure, place of residence within communities and cities, and parent gender differentials please see Norris and MacCon (2002) and Norris (2003).



OFFICIAL LANGUAGES AND DIVERSITY IN CANADA

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To understand diversity and Official Languages it is necessary to explore the demographic aspects so as to examine how we can link Official Languages and diversity. There are two major factors: on one hand, official languages is an inherent part of Canada(s diversity; and on the other hand, Official Languages communities can have identity characteristics related to religion, immigration, being a visible minority, Aboriginal citizenship, or Aboriginal heritage.

From its inception, Canada has incorporated diversity as an essential, even defining, element. At the time of Confederation, duality was at the heart of the matter and was expressed in ethnic, linguistic, and religious terms. In 1867, education rights were extended to minority religious groups, providing Protestants in Quebec and Catholics in Ontario with some guarantees of public funds to support education. By the 1980s, these minority education rights were cast in linguistic terms and were extended across the country.


While we tend today to view our diversity in dual terms, essentially French, Catholic descendants of immigrants from France on one side, versus British Protestant English speakers from the British Isles, on the other side, even before Confederation, there was the notion that this dual diversity was better than a single representation. In 1866, in *The Confederation Debates*, Georges-Étienne Cartier proclaimed “British and French Canadians alike can appreciate and understand their position relative to each other...It is a benefit rather than the inverse, to have a diversity of races.” With our knowledge of Canadian history we can all appreciate that it could not have been otherwise, that there had to be an accommodation from the beginning. So we would make the point that at least in terms of the historical evolution of Canada, Official Languages are in some way the first expression of diversity. This diversity has of course evolved.

One of the things that is important to remember in terms of Canadian diversity, especially the Official Languages aspect, is that we have shared jurisdictions over a lot of the areas that are important to the way people live out their lives linguistically. The provincial governments have legislation, policies, and programs governing language use and recognition. The federal government has the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and *The Official Languages Act*, which offers certain guarantees. It is clear that we do not have a uniform system coast to coast and that there are enormous variations in terms of linguistic arrangements that govern Canada and Canadians. It is the interplay between this shared jurisdictional responsibility for official languages policy and the diversity of geographical, historical and demographic circumstances that contributes to the richness of our Canadian experience.


At one level and from an Official Languages perspective, we see that Official Languages equals diversity and that there are two aspects to this. The first aspect relates to the French fact in Canada. A quarter of Canadians have French as their mother tongue. Regarding the ethnic origins of Canadians, one of the strands that runs through this is that the French ethnic origin remains strong. It is the British that have spread out more, as well as changed.

One of the consequences of Official Languages diversity is that two million Canadians live as members of Official Language minority communities. So Francophones outside of Quebec and Anglophones in Quebec live that experience, where their language is not necessarily the mainstream, where they are in some way trying to provide the institutional support for community development, for community survival and so on (see Figure 1).

Figure 1



The second aspect relates to the diversity within those Official Language communities. For some of the characteristics of diversity, or some of the expressions of diversity, we find that Official Language minority communities actually have a stronger measure of diversity than the majority. So, for example, Francophones outside of Quebec are more likely to be immigrants than are Francophones in Quebec. Quebec Anglophones are more likely to be immigrants than are Anglophones outside of Quebec. The same trend follows in terms of visible minorities characteristics as well. When you compare the Anglophone and Francophone communities vis-à-vis their majority counterparts (those who share the language but live in a majority context), we find, in fact, that the minority communities are sometimes more diverse than the majority communities (Table 1).

**Table 1: Proportion of Immigrants in Canada's Official-Language Communities, 2001**

Province/Territory	Official Language Minority Community			Majority Community			Minority/ majority index
	Total	Immigrants	Proportion of immigrants	Total	Immigrants	Proportion of immigrants	
Newfoundland and Labrador	2,098	208	9.9%	505,413	7,708	1.5%	6.49
Prince Edward Island	5,268	90	1.7%	128,078	4,030	3.1%	0.54
Nova Scotia	33,768	1,275	3.8%	862,973	39,555	4.6%	0.82
New Brunswick	238,453	2,680	1.1%	480,928	19,610	4.1%	0.28
Quebec	918,955	284,115	30.9%	6,149,340	386,090	6.3%	4.92
Ontario	527,715	61,023	11.6%	10,531,470	2,781,448	26.4%	0.44
Manitoba	43,383	1,813	4.2%	1,051,263	126,023	12.0%	0.35
Saskatchewan	16,553	658	4.0%	943,598	45,903	4.9%	0.82
Alberta	58,828	5,938	10.1%	2,851,963	408,603	14.3%	0.70
British Columbia	59,373	13,628	23.0%	3,707,773	909,778	24.5%	0.94
Yukon Territory	888	118	13.2%	27,573	2,863	10.4%	1.28
Northwest Territories	913	50	5.5%	35,803	2,295	6.4%	0.85
Nunavut	415	15	3.6%	22,775	425	1.9%	1.94
Region							
Atlantic	279,585	4,253	1.5%	1,977,390	70,903	3.6%	0.42
Quebec	918,955	284,115	30.9%	6,149,340	386,090	6.3%	4.92
Ontario	527,715	61,023	11.6%	10,531,470	2,781,448	26.4%	0.44
Prairies/Territories	61,263	2,535	4.1%	2,053,438	174,645	8.5%	0.49
West/Yukon	119,088	19,683	16.5%	6,587,308	1,321,243	20.1%	0.82
Community							
Canada, Official-Lang, Minority Communities	1,906,605	371,608	19.5%	27,298,945	4,734,328	17.3%	1.12
Official-Language minorities- Francophones	987,650	87,493	8.9%	21,149,605	4,348,238	20.6%	0.43
Official-Language minorities- Anglophones	918,955	284,115	30.9%	6,149,340	386,090	6.3%	4.92

Source: Official Languages Support Programs Branch, Department of Canadian Heritage, based on the 2001 Census of Canada, Statistics Canada, 20% sample.

Notes: Language definition is First Official Language Spoken with dual responses distributed equally.

Another observation relates to the embodiment of diversity characteristics when we rank four communities: Anglophone, Francophone, inside Quebec and outside of Quebec. It is Quebec Anglophones who are generally at the top of the list in terms of being the most diverse in areas such as religion, visible minorities and immigration. So once again, we have an Official Language minority community which is in itself very diverse.

This analysis is based on census data, and in the Canadian census there are a richness of language-based questions (See Table 2). Let us start with the notion of home language. If we were to define Anglophones and Francophones by the language they use at home, we would come up with only 1.3 million minority citizens. If we were to define them by their mother tongue, that is the language they learned as a child, and can still speak, we would come up with 1.5 million minority Canadians. But if we look at the variable that is derived from three census questions, that of First Official Language Spoken, which would include the two criteria just mentioned along with a third, referred to as knowledge of Official Languages, we come up with a larger number of 1.9 million minority Canadians.

Table 2: Official Language Minority Communities in Canada, 2001

	First Official Language Spoken			Mother Tongue			Home Language		
	single	adjusted	cumulative	single	adjusted	cumulative	single	adjusted	cumulative
Newfoundland and Labrador	2,050	2,098	2,145	2,180	2,351	2,525	895	995	1,100
Prince Edward Island	5,235	5,275	5,315	5,665	5,883	6,100	2,710	2,818	2,925
Nova Scotia	33,175	33,768	34,360	34,025	35,379	36,745	19,000	19,789	20,610
New Brunswick	237,620	238,453	239,285	236,665	239,357	242,060	215,055	217,771	220,495
Quebec	828,730	918,955	1,009,180	557,040	591,379	627,505	700,885	746,893	796,855
Ontario	489,905	527,708	565,510	485,630	509,266	533,970	289,530	307,297	326,030
Manitoba	42,415	43,383	44,350	44,335	45,926	47,555	19,685	20,893	22,130
Saskatchewan	16,210	16,553	16,895	17,780	18,629	19,515	4,405	4,806	5,220
Alberta	55,645	58,823	62,000	58,645	62,241	65,995	18,705	20,673	22,745
British Columbia	51,975	59,373	66,770	54,400	58,887	63,620	14,485	16,907	19,515
Yukon Territory	850	883	915	890	933	975	420	435	450
Northwest Territories	875	915	995	950	1,000	1,050	360	393	425
Nunavut	385	415	445	395	408	425	220	225	230
Atlantic	278,080	279,593	281,105	278,535	282,969	287,430	237,660	241,373	245,130
Quebec	828,730	918,955	1,009,180	557,040	591,379	627,505	700,885	746,893	796,855
Ontario	489,905	527,708	565,510	485,630	509,266	533,970	289,530	307,297	326,030
Prairies/Territories	59,885	61,265	62,645	63,460	65,963	68,545	24,670	26,316	28,005
West/Yukon	108,470	119,078	129,685	113,935	122,060	130,590	33,610	38,014	42,710
Minority Anglophones & Francophones	1,765,070	1,906,598	2,048,125	1,498,600	1,571,638	1,648,040	1,286,355	1,359,892	1,438,730
Minority Anglophones	936,340	987,643	1,038,945	941,560	980,258	1,020,535	585,470	612,999	641,875
Minority Francophones	828,730	918,955	1,009,180	557,040	591,379	627,505	700,885	746,893	796,855



The notion of First Official Language Spoken (FOLS) is interesting since it is based on one's knowledge of Official Languages, on one's mother tongue and thirdly on one's language used at home. A kind of linguistic identity can be derived from these three questions, and the end result is that 98.5% of Canadians can be classified as either Anglophone or Francophone. So in this sense, the linguistic definition is an inclusive one. It includes the vast majority of Canadians. The exceptions would tend to be immigrants who are not necessarily active either in an educational setting or in the workplace, who are perhaps isolated in a home situation or who have not had the opportunity or the desire to learn either English or French, which in turn could be related to their recency of arrival. Thus the working hypothesis in this analysis is that in using our definition of linguistic belonging, First Official Language Spoken, which is not based solely on ethnicity, although it is heavily influenced by mother tongue, Official Languages would be quite complementary to multiculturalism; they are not in opposition.

When one looks at linguistic duality in Canada with these concepts in mind, one still sees that Anglophones and Francophones can sometimes find themselves in both a majority and a minority situation (Table 3). In Quebec, Francophones form the majority. They represent 87% of the population. Anglophones in Quebec are the minority, forming 13% of the Quebec population. When one looks at Canada, excluding Quebec, Anglophones are in the majority, at 95.6%, and Francophones are in a minority at 4.4%. When we look at Canada as a whole, Anglophones are in the majority (at about 76%). Therefore, we can see that geography is one of the keys to the complexity of our linguistic arrangements and also an expression of our diversity. Anglophones or Francophones can be found in either majority or minority situations. It is certainly more frequent for Francophones, depending on the level one looks at, because Quebec Francophones, though they are a majority in their province, are a minority in Canada and certainly they are a minority in North America.

Table 3

	Quebec	Canada, less Quebec	Canada
Anglophones	Minority (12.9%)	Majority (95.6%)	Majority (75.9%)
Francophones	Majority (87.1%)	Minority (4.4%)	Minority (24.1%)

Looking back at Figure 1 (displayed earlier), the higher proportion of Official Language minority communities are represented by census divisions where there are more than 50,000 in the minority group. One can also see that there is a pretty strong concentration of Anglophones in southern Quebec, and eastern and northern Ontario. One can see that in northern New Brunswick, there are important concentrations of Francophone Acadians, and in the west, in Calgary and Edmonton, one can find some important concentrations of Francophones. One of the differences between the western communities and the eastern ones, is the nature of the community. Many Francophones in the West are immigrants, or interprovincial migrants, and they are in an urban setting where their concentration is fairly low. Thus they may have numbers on their side, but they do not necessarily have a local weight or visibility. In eastern Canada, Francophones have a high level of concentration. Again, looking at proportions, we see that in eastern Canada, there are a number of census divisions where one finds the Official Language minority communities,

comprising 20% or even more than 50% of the local population. Thus, in some regions outside and inside of Quebec, Francophones and Anglophones, respectively form either a strong local minority, or in fact, a local majority. However, this is definitely not the case for Francophones in Western Canada, where the absolute numbers are high but their concentrations are low. (see Table 4)

Table 4: Proportion of Visible Minorities in Canada's Linguistic Communities, 1996





Table 5 looks at four linguistic communities: Anglophone, Francophone, minority and majority, in Quebec and Canada. Looking at the proportion of those who are visible minorities, the proportion who are immigrant, the proportion who have a religious affiliation other than Christian, those who have multiple origins, and finally those who have Aboriginal roots, we find that the Anglophones from Quebec are much more likely than other Canadians to be members of visible minorities. They are much more likely to be immigrants; in fact, 31% of the Anglophones from Quebec are immigrants. They are much more likely to have “a religious affiliation other than Christian”; in fact, it is about 15% or almost 16%, which is two and a half times higher than the level for the rest of the Canada. So Anglophones from Quebec represent a high degree of diversity.

Francophones outside Quebec and Francophones from Quebec generally have low levels of diversity. Eighty-five percent of Francophones outside of Quebec, for example, are Catholic while 90% of Francophones from Quebec are Catholic. One can see that for religious expression, Anglophones inside and outside of Quebec are much more diverse. A very interesting, positive and recent development, which is partly a sign of things to come, is that in the 1996-2001 period, the proportion of those who are Francophone and immigrant, both inside Quebec and outside of Quebec, has increased at a higher rate than the Canadian average.

**Table 5: Indicators of Diversity in Official Language Groups, Canada**

		visible minorities (1996)	immigrants (2001)	religious affiliation, other than Christian (2001)	multiple ethnic origins (1996)	Aboriginal roots (1996)
Canada	Total	11.2%	18.4%	6.1%	35.8%	2.8%
Canada	Anglophones	high (1.12)	high (1.15)	high (1.15)	very high (1.20)	very high (1.22)
	Francophones	very low (0.34)	very low (0.54)	very low (0.30)	very low (0.46)	very low (0.30)
Quebec	Anglophones	very high (1.65)	very high (1.68)	very high (2.59)	similar (0.95)	bas (0.85)
	Francophones	very low (0.34)	very low (0.28)	very low (0.28)	very low (0.40)	very low (0.25)
Canada, less Quebec	Anglophones	high (1.09)	high (1.12)	high (1.09)	very high (1.21)	very high (1.24)
	Francophones	very low (0.35)	very low (0.48)	very low (0.43)	low (0.85)	very low (0.61)

Notes: Analysis by Official Languages Support Programs Branch, based on data from Statistics Canada, 1996 and 2001 Census of Canada, 20% sample.

The figures are relative indices which compare the value for the sub-group to the value for the entire Canadian population.

Language definition used is First Official Language Spoken with dual responses distributed equally.

To give an example using Franco-Ontarians, there were 48,000 Francophones in Ontario in 1996 who were immigrants. Today, there are 61,000. There has been an enormous increase in terms of the arrival of immigrants over the last five years who have French as their First Official Language Spoken. Will they become members of the Francophone community? Will they form identities similar to those of native-born Francophones in their province of residence? This remains to be seen. However, at least as far as the notion of attracting Francophone immigrants from other parts of the world is concerned, there appears to be some reason to be optimistic in this regard.

ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND CONCENTRATION IN THE THREE GATEWAY CITIES OF CANADA

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One of the striking features of the contemporary Canadian population is its remarkable ethnic diversity. There are more than 200 ethnic groups identified in the 2001 census and the proportion of foreign born is 18.4%, the highest in 70 years. This diversity has been achieved over a period of time by the changing ethnic composition of the immigrants. While western Europeans predominated before 1960, in the 1960s and 1970s most immigrants were primarily from Southern and Eastern Europe. Since then, however, the majority of immigrants are from the Third world countries. More than half of the immigrants since 1980 were the so-called “Visible Minorities”, among whom Blacks, South Asians and Chinese form about two-thirds. Further, the immigration of visible minorities in the recent decade 1991-2001 doubled compared to the previous decade.

ATTRACTION OF THE GATEWAY CITIES

This rapid growth of ethnic and racial minorities raises questions about their integration into Canadian society. Integration can be conceptualized at various levels: economic, social, cultural, spatial etc. Spatial integration would mean that immigrant groups are distributed similar to the rest of the population. This is hardly the case with respect to the recent immigrants to Canada. Nearly three-quarters (73%) of immigrants who came in the 1990s lived in Montreal, Toronto or Vancouver. This trend is not surprising. Employment opportunities and the presence of large numbers of the same ethnic group predict such a pattern. Moreover, a large part of immigration is chain immigration where a new immigrant follows an earlier immigrant who is a relative or friend. In Canada as a whole, the proportion of the population that is visible minority increased from 11.2% to 13.4% during 1996-2001. The proportions in Montreal were similar to national figures: 12.2% in 1996 and 13.9% in 2001. However, the attraction of Toronto and Vancouver was overwhelming. In Toronto, the proportion of the population that can be classified as visible minority, which was already at a high of 31.6% in 1996, increased substantially to 38.7% in 2001 and in Vancouver from 31.1% to 38.7%.

CONCENTRATION WITHIN THE CITIES

Just as ethnic populations are unevenly distributed across the regions, provinces and metropolitan areas, they are also non-randomly distributed within cities. Spatial residential patterns of ethnic and racial groups have been a long-standing area of interest for social scientists, urban planners and political policy makers. Urban literature contains many studies of Chinatowns, Little Italies, and Portuguese, Greek or Black neighbourhoods. In U.S. cities, Blacks and Hispanics are often found to be highly segregated, a cause of concern for policy-makers. One of the reasons for the interest in residential segregation is that it is often seen as a measure of how well or how poorly a group has integrated into the society at large. The assumption is that a group isolated in a particular area is probably



not participating in housing and labour markets to the fullest extent. It is argued further that living in close proximity to others of the same ethnic or racial background, while increasing interaction within the groups of concern, reduces interaction outside the group. Thus, while residential segregation maintains ethnic identity, it reduces integration into the wider society, economically, socially and politically.

There are three main reasons for ethnic residential segregation. First, ethnic segregation might reflect social-class differences among the ethnic groups. Ethnic groups in Canada migrated at different points in time and vary considerably by their socio-economic background, language proficiency, and educational and occupational skills. The lack of economic and social capital, force recent immigrant groups to live in the poorer areas of the city, often in the city core. As their conditions improve, they are able to disperse to more desirable neighbourhoods. With increased integration into the country's occupational and industrial structure, ethnic residential segregation should decrease. This perspective, basically a human ecological one, stresses the economic dimensions and puts less emphasis, if any, on cultural and psychological factors in settlement patterns. While many studies have shown the importance of social class in residential segregation patterns, others have conclusively proven that much residential segregation remains, even after one controls for social class, and after alternative explanations have been explored. The continued high segregation of Blacks, Native peoples, Chinese and South Asians in Canada and the United States, in spite of their socio-economic advancement over the decades, lends support to this perspective.

Second, ethnic residential segregation might be due to the social distance among the ethnic groups. Social distance can be measured by factors such as the acceptance of a particular ethnic group as colleagues, neighbours, close friends or spouses. Greater social distance should be reflected in higher levels of residential segregation. One can expect prejudice and discrimination, strong indices of social distance to be correlated to residential segregation. Not surprisingly, many studies have found a parallel between social distance and residential segregation.

Third, ethnic residential segregation might be due to the differences among the ethnic groups, in the level of ethnic identity and ethnic cohesion. This is fundamentally different from the two earlier reasons, which were based on the premise that residential segregation is due to involuntary causes such as one's social class or social status. In contrast, this ethnic-identity hypothesis postulates that people of the same ethnic ancestry choose to live in proximity so that social interaction can be maximized, and group norms and values maintained. Size and concentration provide distinct advantages. Many institutions such as ethnic clubs, churches, heritage language newspapers, stores specializing in ethnic food, clothing, etc., require threshold populations concentrated in geographic space. Thus, ethnic residential segregation has certain merits, whether or not it is perceived as such by the ethnic group. The greater the self-identity of an ethnic group, the more likely they will be residentially segregated. The level of self-identity between ethnic groups may vary for several reasons. Apart from historical and political causes, it could be due to the strength of commonly held beliefs and values, kinship networks, and feelings of solidarity.

Residential segregation in three cities is investigated using census tract data on ethnic populations. Census tracts in the three metropolitan areas were arranged in decreasing order of ethnic population in 2001, and the cumulative proportions were calculated. The extent of concentration is measured by the proportion of tracts in which 50% and 90% of an ethnic group population is found. There is a low concentration of people of British and French origins in all the three cities. Though the British are a minority in Montreal, they do not show a high level of concentration. About a fifth of the tracts have to be covered to account for half of the British origin population, and more than two thirds of them have to be taken into consideration to account for 90% of the population. Although the French are

a much smaller group in Toronto and Vancouver, they show very little concentration. Concentration is also low for the western, central and eastern European groups, though slightly more than for the British. Italians are somewhat more concentrated than the other European groups, probably a function of their more recent migration to Canada. Half of the Italians in Montreal live in 12.3% of the census tracts, in Toronto they live in 13.6% of the tracts.

The most residentially concentrated minority group in Canada is the Jewish community. In 2001, half of the Jewish population in Montreal lived in 2.4% of the census tracts, and 90% in 13.6% of the tracts. They are also highly concentrated in Toronto, the corresponding figures being 3.8% and 26.2% respectively. They are somewhat more dispersed in Vancouver, with half the Jewish population living in 14.3% of the tracts. It is interesting to note that the two Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs), Montreal and Toronto, where two thirds of all Jewish people in Canada live are also where they are most concentrated. It seems size has a positive effect on concentration for the Jewish populations, even though they are not recent immigrants, and not in the lower socioeconomic classes. Their concentration is probably more a function of a strong cultural bond.

After the Jewish population, visible minorities are the most concentrated groups in the three cities. In Montreal, half of the South Asians live in 4.6% of the tracts, and 90% in 27.2% of the tracts. Among the visible minorities, the South Asians are the most concentrated. However, they are less concentrated in Toronto and Vancouver, where most of them live. Half of the South Asians live in 13.7% of the tracts in Toronto and in 10.4% in Vancouver. The Chinese show somewhat lower concentrations than the South Asians in Montreal, but in Toronto and Vancouver their concentration is about the same. Half of the Chinese live in about a tenth of the tracts in all the three CMAs. The Black population, whether of African or Caribbean origins show a significantly lower concentration than the other two major visible minorities groups in Canada, the Chinese and the South Asians; this constitutes a striking difference from U.S. residential patterns. This is surprising given their lower socio-economic position compared to the Asian population and their not too different position in the social distance scale. One may surmise that a greater cultural diversity within the Black population relative to the Asian population may have something to do with this pattern.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS:

Within the three metropolitan areas, the rank ordering of the concentration of selected ethnic-origin groups have remained basically the same when compared to studies done for the earlier periods. British, French and Western European groups are the least concentrated, other European groups somewhat more concentrated, and the visible minority groups most concentrated. The persistence of this pattern of a relationship between segregation and the social prestige of the ethnic group is an important observation of considerable social significance. Is it due to differences in social class, social distance or cultural cohesion? Because these factors are related to each other, it is not possible to separate the effects of all of the causal factors involved in concentration. However, some general observations can be made. Long established groups of European origins in the higher socio-economic classes seem to be least concentrated. Here again Jewish people are an exception. They have the highest concentration; clearly there is the powerful influence of cultural factors at work in their desire to live in close proximity to each other. One cannot make this same generalization across societies. For example, Asians enjoy a greater social status than the Blacks in the U.S. and this is clearly reflected in concentration; the U.S. Black migration to American cities



and settlement patterns within them reveal a long history of discrimination in housing. Slavery and its consequences were instrumental in black settlement in the central core of cities in the northern United States and subsequent movements within cities were dominated by the racial factor. These factors are largely irrelevant to the Canadian urban growth.

In the Canadian case, concentration of minority groups does not mean that there is only one ethnic group cluster in a city. Maps of the proportion of an ethnic population in the census tracts show multiple clusters in the three cities. For example, the Chinese in Toronto are not only concentrated in the downtown area in Chinatown; they are also found in large clusters in Scarborough and in the west in the Brampton area. Similarly, different clusters can be identified with regard to other visible minorities such as the South Asians and Blacks. They are found not only in city cores but also in the suburban areas. Moreover the areas often do not overlap, indicating differences in their residential preferences. One is tempted to conclude that voluntary causes probably outweigh the involuntary causes in the Canadian case.

The fact that certain ethnic groups are highly concentrated needs further investigation. Is high concentration a characteristic of poor neighbourhoods? This is clearly the case of Blacks in many U.S. Cities, but it is less evident in Canadian cities. Jewish neighbourhoods are not poor nor are some Chinese neighbourhoods in Scarborough. At the same time there are many neighbourhoods that are poor that show high concentrations of Blacks, Portuguese, Vietnamese, etc. The crucial policy question is whether concentration of an ethnic group can lead to neighbourhood poverty? U.S. studies have shown that as Black concentration increases in an area, the overall socioeconomic status of the area goes down. In Canada some studies have suggested that as the Aboriginal population of a neighbourhood increases, the real estate prices fall, and so does the desirability of the neighbourhood. Some real estate agents may direct Aboriginal Peoples to certain neighbourhoods and not to others. This can lead to high concentrations of Aboriginal Peoples in a small number of neighbourhoods in many Canadian cities. Whether such discriminatory practices have affected the concentration of other visible minority groups, such as the Chinese, South Asians or Blacks is not known, but should be explored.

It is possible that a great deal of the concentration of many minority groups in Canada is due to voluntary causes rather than due to class differences or social distance. A certain threshold population size may enable a minority group to establish an ethnic neighbourhood with many advantages. Specialized social institutions such as an ethnic community club, ethnic food stores and restaurants, entertainment places, religious institutions such as an ethnic church or temple, synagogue etc. become viable in an ethnic enclave. Canada's multiculturalism policy supports the development of such social institutions and encourages individuals to maintain their cultural heritage. Policy oriented research should examine whether ethnic enclaves enable its inhabitants to develop and enjoy a culturally and socially rich life, rather a degenerative life that leads to a ghetto with all its negative images of poverty and crime. One way to investigate this policy would be to compare members of an ethnic group who live inside to those who live outside of an ethnic enclave.

It has been argued that the residential segregation of a minority group will decrease with subsequent generations. Those who are born and raised in Canada will adopt the lifestyle and customs of the wider society; they would have gone through the educational system in Canada and would have lost most of their heritage language facility. They are likely to have greater social networks outside their ethnic community and greater chances for social mobility. The advantages of living in an ethnic neighbourhood may be less attractive to them. They are also more likely to intermarry and develop multiple ethnic loyalties. We find decreasing segregation for the older European groups as expected, but not so for the visible minority groups. Because of the problem of small numbers, we are not able to go beyond the second generation, but we find little difference between the first and second generations. Why there is a persistence of segregation in the second generation is a worthwhile area to investigate. We need survey data on attitudes and behaviour to get to the core of this issue. The strong bond between generations involving expectations and obligations varies between ethnic groups. Similarly if a high level of social distance persists even in the later generations, this could be an explanation for the continuance of segregation levels in the second generation.

Another important policy concern is whether residential concentration is a reflection of occupational concentration. New immigrant groups might often be concentrated in certain occupations such as construction, manufacturing, garment making, etc. This might be due to their limited skill levels on arrival, official language facility, etc. It is expected that with time they will be able to move into other occupations. Our findings for 2001 show that residential concentration is at about the same level as in 1991. The 1991-2001 time period was one of high immigration, but many immigrants come to Canada with higher levels of education and job skills than earlier arrivals. With increased economic assimilation and social mobility, one would have expected residential concentration to decline. This has not happened to date to any significant degree in the case of visible minority groups. However, with the passage of time and increased social mobility, it is possible that residential concentration in Canada will decrease among the minority groups, though some level of concentration will remain, if only because of discrimination, prejudice, and the desire of ethnic groups to live in proximity.

The future is hard to predict. The high level of segregation among some ethnic groups such as “visible minorities” has been sustained by many factors, such as their size and recency of immigration, lack of official language facility, and cultural differences. It might also have been influenced by discrimination and prejudice experienced by them, actual or perceived, in their interaction with the largely white host society. With time, the impact of these factors on residential location should decrease. Intermarriage between white European groups and visible minorities will be a powerful factor in reducing segregation. There is evidence of greater acceptance of ethnically diverse groups by the host society, especially among the youth. Though the government of Canada’s policy of multiculturalism might help preserve ethnic identity, over time, there is bound to be an erosion of the cultural heritage of many groups. As we try to understand the dynamics of ethnic diversity in Canada, it is clear that their spatial dimension is an integral part of the overall picture.



IMMIGRATION IN FRANCE: CONCEPTS, MEASUREMENT AND SURVEYS

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This paper¹ looks at the issue of diversity in France, from the perspective of immigration, and examines how public statistics measure this phenomenon. After a brief introduction to the French context, it examines the evolution of the concepts and categories associated with immigration, in particular from those associated with “foreigner” to those associated with “immigrant”, along with the statistical construction of them, based on the population census. Finally, some French surveys that allow for the analysis of these populations are mentioned. It is important to touch on certain elements of the French context to understand the use and evolution of the various categories associated with immigration and the developments stemming from research, particularly quantitative studies devoted to this theme and immigrant populations.

INTRODUCTION

Immigration is an old phenomenon in France, the primary country for immigration in Europe until the 1950s. However, France is “a country of immigration which ignores itself” (Noiriel, 1988, translation by PCH). The republican model of integration renders immigrants “invisible.” Viewed for many years as a topic not deemed legitimate for study, immigration remains to this day a sensitive subject. For these reasons, this field of study has only recently come into its own. Furthermore, the image of the foreign worker dominates; it was not until the border closings in 1974 and the introduction of family reunification that work began on the schooling of children of foreign origin.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, profound changes have come about. As a result of these changes, immigration is now recognized as a social problem and a legitimate object of research. Political and social debates on immigration have spawned new work and surveys. This has had an impact on statistical production and on the emergence of the category of “immigrant”. More recently, faced with rising unemployment, quantitative studies have developed on the integration into the work force of young people whose parents are immigrants (see bibliography).

THE EVOLUTION OF CONCEPTS

The evolution of concepts and categories is tied to historical and political contexts. The change from the category of “foreigners” to that of “immigrants” took place gradually. Studies undertaken before 1990 often focused on foreigners, with the emphasis placed exclusively on the legal criterion of nationality. The use of this indicator rather than another is tied to the French republican model, i.e. one is French or one is not French. However, since the 1990s, researchers have widely criticized this approach for various reasons. In particular, it is a heterogeneous category; it is static and it does not take into account individual trajectories. It is largely an institutional category with little pertinence for research. The construction of the category of “immigrant” in France, that is, someone born outside of France and now living in France, which evolved to replace “foreigners” because of the shortcomings of the latter, is based on sounder sociological and demographic foundations. It allows for a dynamic view that takes into account the phenomenon of migration. From the standpoint of research and leaving aside the polemics about the possible stigmatization of these populations within the category, this new category allows for the study of the trajectories followed by populations who have experienced immigration and of the process of integration. It also allows for the detection of discriminatory processes, which these immigrants can be subjected to, even after they have become French citizens. Once discrimination has been identified, it is possible to denounce it and develop measures to eradicate it.

THE EVOLUTION OF MEASUREMENT (BASED ON THE POPULATION CENSUS)

While the category of “foreigner” is determined by nationality, that of “immigrant” is based on two indicators: nationality and place of birth. The statistical construction of the latter represents sociological reality better than any statistical construction of the former. Proposed by demographer Michèle Tribalat (1989), the category of “immigrant” was adopted in 1990 by the Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE) and institutionalized by the Haut Conseil à l’intégration (HCI).² This is a real break with French statistical tradition. It took a surprisingly long time to adopt this approach despite the fact that the variables on which it is based have existed for a long time, notably in the population census. As the questionnaire bulletin in the Annex (Figure 1) reveals, the nationality variable allows for three basic responses: born French, became French through naturalization and foreigner. The census also collects detailed data on the nationality of foreigners and on the previous nationality of naturalized residents since 1962.

The data collected and used to construct the category “immigrant” are declarative. The statistical definition aims to be objective as opposed to subjective (and as opposed to the definition used in Canada), even though it leaves the nationality code open to interpretation. Thus, there is no direct question about immigration, it being too sensitive a question to ask, but an immigrant category can empirically be constructed from the variables by grouping those who are French by acquisition and born outside of France with those who are foreigners and born outside of France (see Table 1).



To give you an idea of the size of the immigrant population according to the 1999 census, 4.3 million immigrants lived in France, representing 7.4 percent of the total population. This ratio has been stable for 25 years. However, the composition of this segment of the population has evolved; it consists of people with diverse origins and from distant places (outside the European Union) in recent years (see Figure 2). Portuguese and North Africans, especially Algerians and Moroccans, are the largest groups in this population.

Gradually, researchers have come to take into account the heterogeneity of the immigrant population not only in terms of geographic and cultural origins, but also in terms of migratory characteristics. Thus, the “immigrant” category groups individuals born and socialized in various countries at various times, some having come to France as children, others as adults. The age on arrival in France is useful in understanding a migratory characteristic that influences schooling and the integration into the work force of immigrants and the children of immigrants. Over the last decade, research on the children of immigrants has multiplied and questions about origins have been asked, although these issues are not readily apparent in the statistics. A new statistical category is emerging, based on data having to do with the place of birth of the parents, although this information is not yet available on a regular basis. However, the debate continues within the scientific community on the use and composition of these newly emerging categories.

In summary, the census gathers information on current and prior nationality and place of birth, allowing researchers to construct an immigrant category, and since 1999, it has gathered information on the year of arrival. However, the census does not collect information on the country of birth or nationality of parents, ethnic origins or identification, language or religion. The collection of this information is prohibited by the Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés [CNIL], whose role it is to protect individual freedoms. At this level, several important differences are immediately apparent between France and Canada.³

WHICH SURVEYS FOR WHICH RESEARCH?

There are other large French surveys that allow for the study of the immigrant population. The *Mobilité géographique et insertion sociale* (MGIS) survey conducted in 1992 by the Institut National des Études Démographiques (INED), in conjunction with the INSEE, was designed to measure the degree of integration of the immigrant population. It was the first French quantitative survey centred on immigration (Tribalat, 1992). The variables necessary for identifying immigrant populations are gradually appearing in other surveys. For example, the professional mobility of immigrants can be studied using INSEE’s surveys on Training and Professional Qualification (especially in 1985; the sample was reduced in 1993). Their situation in the labour market can be studied using the annual surveys on Employment undertaken by INSEE, since the place of birth was added as a variable in 1993. Studies can also be undertaken on the educational investments made by immigrant families (*Efforts d’éducation des familles*, INSEE INED, 1992), on the schooling of the children of immigrants (based on the data from the Panel du Ministère de l’éducation nationale—the 1989 panel and especially the 1995 panel, since the place of birth of parents is available) and, finally, on the integration of immigrant youth into the labour market (since 1997, based on surveys undertaken by CEREQ, Centre d’études et de recherches sur les qualifications). From the perspective of French-Canadian comparative studies, these are a few representative examples of French surveys.

APPENDIX

Figure 1: Recreation of Translated Excerpt from the 1990 census¹

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	
Born the _____ (day month year)	
at [commune]: _____	
Département ³ : _____ (country for foreigner, French overseas territory)	
NATIONALITY	
• French from birth (including through reintegration)	<input type="checkbox"/> 1
• Became French (by naturalization, marriage, declaration or on reaching the age of majority)	<input type="checkbox"/> 2
Specify previous nationality : _____	
• Foreigner Specify nationality :	<input type="checkbox"/> 3

Source: Excerpt from the 1990 population census, INSEE

- 1 For the original, see the French version of this paper.
- 2 Not directly translatable, “commune” is a basic unit of administration; there are approximately 37,000 in France.
- 3 Not directly translatable, “Département” is a larger geographical unit; there are 95 in France as well as 4 overseas.

Table 1: Categories according to place of birth and nationality

	French natives French by acquisition born in France	<i>French</i>
<i>Immigrants</i>	French by acquisition born outside France Foreigners born outside France	
	Foreigners born in France	<i>Foreigners</i>





Table 2: Population living in France according to nationality and place of birth in 1999 (thousands)

Nationality	Place of birth		Total
	France	Foreigners	
French natives	51,340	1,560	52,900
French by acquisition	800	1,560	2,360
Foreigners	510	2,750 (4,310 immigrants)	3,260
Total	52,650	5,870	58,520

Source: 1999 population census, INSEE.

Figure 2: Immigrants According to Country of Birth, censuses of 1990 and 1999



Source: xxx

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NOTES

- 1 This text resumes the paper presented within the framework of the conference, Canadian and French Perspectives on Diversity, held in Gatineau, PQ on October 16, 2003. Some references have been added to the end of the text.
- 2 The HCI is a state authority that aims to collect data on the integration of foreign residents or on those of foreign origin.
- 3 However, it should be noted that the main objective of the census is to count the population.



CHALLENGES FACING CANADA'S FRANCOPHONE MINORITY: A MACROSCOPIC PERSPECTIVE¹

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In this article we will outline the status of francophone and Acadian communities in the provinces outside Quebec and in the territories, while clearly presenting the main challenges related to their ethnolinguistic vitality. Following a brief analysis of the current demolinguiistic situation, we will present a conceptual scheme, a problématique of the minority experience, that we propose as a backdrop for understanding the nature and scope of the challenges to be overcome to ensure the continued development of francophone and Acadian communities. This conceptual framework gives us a glimpse into the many elements that form an integral part of an effective overall approach to planning community and government action. It is only once the reality of linguistic minorities is understood in its complexity that we are able to make intelligent changes to the conditions that govern their ethnolinguistic vitality.

ETHNOLINGUISTIC VITALITY OF FRANCOPHONE AND ACADIAN COMMUNITIES

The francophone and Acadian communities of today constantly struggle to maintain their ethnolinguistic vitality. There are nonetheless marked differences according to the inhabited regions of the country. Despite these obvious regional differences, certain demolinguiistic trends emerge. One would be the territorialization of the official languages in Canada (Castonguay, 1998; Landry and Rousselle, 2003). Anglophones in Quebec and francophones outside Quebec are becoming proportionally fewer in number, while the French language is seeking to assert itself in Quebec and the English language is becoming increasingly dominant outside Quebec. Between 1951 and 2001, the proportion of anglophones in Quebec dropped from 13.8% to 8.3%, while the proportion of francophones outside Quebec went from 7.3% to 4.4%.

A second trend is the growth in the number of Canada's allophones. In 2001, allophones made up 18% of the Canadian population: 20.4% of the population outside Quebec and 10.3% within Quebec. This growth through immigration reinforces the trend toward the territorialization of the official languages, since language transfer toward French for allophones occurs almost exclusively in Quebec, and language transfer rates toward English are extremely high in provinces for which anglophones are the majority (Statistics Canada, 2002).

A third trend is the force of the social attraction for English throughout North America and the world (Phillipson, 1992 and 1999). This trend is particularly pronounced for francophones outside Quebec, where there has been a drop in the language continuity rate, which refers to the number of francophones who use French most often at home. In 2001, this rate varied from 89.5% in New Brunswick to 25.2% in Saskatchewan, for an overall average rate of 61.6%. Regarding this phenomenon, it is necessary to add to this the transmission of French as a mother tongue. This rate was only 74% in 1996 for francophones outside Quebec (O'Keefe, 2001). Even in Quebec, where anglophones make up only 8.3% of the population, the proportion of language transfer toward English for allophones

is higher (22.1%) than toward French (20.4%—Statistics Canada, 2002). The irresistible social attraction of English in Canada and North America explains a fundamental difference between the two official language minorities. As shown in Table 1, the number of people in Quebec who speak English most often at home is still higher than the number of people whose mother tongue is English. Outside Quebec, the phenomenon is reversed for francophones. The number of people who speak French most often at home is still lower than the number of francophones. Furthermore, the differences between these two trends are becoming more pronounced.

Table 1: Ratio of Language Spoken/Mother Tongue for Both Language Minorities (Based on the 1971 to 2001 Censuses)

	1971	1981	1991	1996	2001
Francophone minority					
Language spoken at home	675,925	666,785	636,640	618,522	612,985
Mother tongue	926,400	923,605	976,415	970,207	980,270
Ratio of language spoken/mother tongue	0.73	0.72	0.65	0.64	0.63
Anglophone minority					
Language spoken at home	887,875	806,785	761,815	762,457	746,845
Mother tongue	788,830	693,600	626,200	621,858	591,365
Ratio of language spoken/mother tongue	1.13	1.16	1.22	1.23	1.26
Difference in ratios	0.40	0.44	0.57	0.59	0.63

Source: Landry and Rousselle (2003): calculations based on data provided by Marmen and Corbeil (1999) and Statistics Canada (2002).

Another trend is the growing rate of exogamy, or marriage between persons of different languages. In 2001, the proportion of francophones with an anglophone spouse was 37.1% (Statistics Canada, 2002). However, since this phenomenon is even greater in young couples of childbearing age, 63% of children under 18 years of age come from exogamous couples (Government of Canada, 2003). This phenomenon has a significant impact on the number of children of francophone parents who attend French language schools (Martel 1991 and 2001; Paillé, 1991 and 2002; Government of Canada, 2003; Landry, 2003). In 2001, for exogamous families, the rate of transmission of French as the mother tongue to children was only 22.6% and the retention rate for French as the main language used at home was only 14.8%. Moreover, in these families, only one out of three children (33.2%) use French “at least regularly” at home. Given that 44.6% of these children have a sufficient knowledge of French to carry on a conversation, it is presumed that school plays a role in the transmission of knowledge (Landry, 2003). Lastly, increased urbanization and migration from rural to urban regions have a not-insignificant impact on weakening francophone and Acadian communities (Beaudin, 1999; Beaudin and Landry, 2003).

A PROBLEMATIQUE OF THE MINORITY EXPERIENCE


Since research on linguistic minorities is often reduced to the perspectives of a single academic discipline (Fishman, 1999), the phenomenon studied is often the result of a certain degree of disciplinary reductionism. Thus, demography often tends to explain the phenomenon through numbers. Political science links survival of a minority



to certain forms of political or administrative nationalism or certain types of governance (Safran and Maiz, 2000). Sociology focuses on forms of social organization (Allardt, 1984), the source of the concepts of “community life” (Fishman, 2001, 1990 and 1989), “institutional completeness” (Breton, 1964) or “diglossia” (Fishman, 1965). Social psychology emphasizes intergroup relations (Giles *et al*, 1977; Bourhis and Leyens, 1994) and identity processes (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Allard, 2002). Education focuses on school governance (Martel, 1991; Bourgeois, 2002) and teaching (Cummins, 2000; Landry, 2002; Landry and Allard, 1999) or types of school programs (Baker, 2001). Sociolinguistics attempts to understand the social factors associated with different variations in codes, blending of languages or the frequency of language use, and even language ecology (Boudreau *et al*, 2002).

The problematique of the minority experience illustrated in Figure 1, without claiming to be exhaustive, attempts to emphasize the importance of taking a multidisciplinary approach and on many fronts in a synergetic and consistent manner. Therefore a macroscopic perspective has been taken here (De Rosnay, 1975). It is only by acting on the many factors linked to the survival and development of a linguistic minority that its vitality can be restored or trends in language transfer reversed.

Figure 1: Diagram Illustrating the Problematique of the Ethnolinguistic Minority Experience



The vertical axis in Figure 1 clearly shows the scope of activity to consider since it places the problematique relating to the minority experience on a continuum reaching from societal and global forces down to social representations and individual actions. The horizontal axis shows that there is a power relationship along the vertical axis between a minority group, the “endogamous group,” and a majority group, the “exogamous group.” The minority group is the endogamous group since that is the perspective we are analyzing.

The power relationship or balance of power between the endogamous and exogamous groups takes different forms, depending on whether it is in the macrosocial realm, in other words, in an *ideological, legal and political framework* and in an *institutional and social context*, or instead in the more microsocal realm, linked to the *linguistic and cultural socialization* of members of the group. The power relationship is also experienced at the psychosocial level, that is to say in all of the variables associated with their *psycholinguistic development*. For example, based on an individual’s language experience, social representations of the vitality of the groups in contact (or their *subjective vitality*) may internalize the power relationships observed and experienced between the endogamous and exogamous groups in the regions where they live (Bourhis *et al*, 1981; Allard and Landry, 1986 and 1994). Based on the social comparisons they will make of the groups in contact (Tajfel, 1974), their desire to integrate with endogamous and exogamous groups will vary (Allard and Landry, 1992 and 1994; Landry, 2002). In terms of their ethnolinguistic identity, individuals may experience certain identity-based tensions, on the one hand, due to an experience of “solidarity” with members of their endogamous group, forming emotional bonds. They will be emotionally attached to their endogamous group. On the other hand, due to the “diglossic” context of a minority situation (Fishman, 1965; Landry and Allard, 1994a), their contacts with the “high” language or the language of status of the exogamous group will exert a strong social attraction on them, encouraging them to learn and use the dominant group’s language in many social contexts (for example through the media or in many socio-institutional contacts), going as far as instilling a desire to belong to and identify with the dominant group. Bilinguality acquired in this manner can then be more or less “subtractive” (contributing to the loss of the endogamous group’s language) or “additive” (contributing to the acquisition of a second language without any negative effects on retaining the endogamous group’s language—Lambert, 1975).

Identity-based tensions may be particularly accentuated in exogamous situations where primary relationships of solidarity with family members and other relatives are experienced with members of the minority and majority groups. Indeed, an exogamous anglophone-francophone family can be seen as a microcosm of Canada’s linguistic duality, with the power relationship experienced at the macrosocial level of society imposing on the exogamous family, the same social norms as those that reflect the dominance of the majority anglophone group in society (Landry and Allard, 1997; Landry, 2003). We have also recently proposed that anglophone-francophone exogamous families are not necessarily a serious problem and a cause of linguistic assimilation into the anglophone group, but can also turn out to be hidden potential leading to revitalized francophone and Acadian communities (Landry, 2003). It is up to exogamous couples to recognize the equality of the official languages within their family, in the same way that the country does in its constitution.

The problematique of the minority experience illustrated in Figure 1 also shows that the challenge of maintaining the vitality of the minority endogamous group is a major one given the strong “social determinism” experienced by members of the endogamous group. The more frequent and more intense the contacts with the language of the majority exogamous group become, the stronger the social attraction to the dominant group and the more subtractive



bilinguality becomes (Landry and Allard, 1994a). Various forms of “social naïveté,” that is to say, an absence of a “social conscience”, reinforce this social determinism. This social naïveté is expressed through a lack of awareness of the social forces contributing to subtractive bilingualism, such as when francophone parents in environments where they are by far a minority, persist in believing that 50/50 education (half the time in French and half the time in English) is the best method to ensure a high degree of bilingualism in their children (Deveau, 2001; Landry and Allard, 1994b, 1997 and 2000). Social naïveté is also expressed by a lack of awareness of the collective consequences of individual actions. For example, many minority francophones are unaware of the perverse effects of their bilingualism. They justify the lack of public services in their language by the fact that they are bilingual and understand English very well, without realizing that when this attitude is widespread, the French language becomes redundant.

In order to counter the social determinism pertaining to the minority experience, it is important to optimize the “self-determination” of linguistic behaviours and identity affirmation by developing a “social conscience” in both individuals and communities. Moreover, self-determination is favoured by “empowering and enlightening” experiences that promote the satisfaction of the basic needs of all humans: the need to belong, the need for autonomy, and the need for competence (Deci and Ryan, 1985, 2000 and 2002; Ryan and Deci, 2000; Vallerand, 1997; Vallerand and Ratelle, 2002). Current research aims to demonstrate that as the empowering and enlightening experiences of minority francophones meet these three basic needs in French, their intrinsic motivation toward the French language and their francophone identity become stronger and their linguistic behaviours become more self-determined (Landry et al, 2003; Landry *et al*, 1999).

CHALLENGES RELATING TO THE ETHNOLINGUISTIC VITALITY OF FRANCOPHONE AND ACADIAN COMMUNITIES

This last section discusses the challenges facing the francophone and Acadian communities with reference to the three levels on the vertical axis in Figure 1.

Ideological, Legal and Political framework

The existing power relationship between the English and French languages in Canada is first of all consistent with the relationship between, on the one side, the international francophonie and, on the other side, the hegemony (some would say imperialism) of the English language (Phillipson, 1992 and 1999). The proximity of the United States, the strong Anglo-American cultural influences in the media and the economy, and the demographic dominance of English in Canada result in the English language having a profound dominance in the Canadian context and a daily influence in the experience of minority francophones. Nonetheless, certain legal analyses conclude that Canada has constitutional obligations to protect linguistic minorities, even a fiduciary responsibility toward them, which require the federal government to “enhanc[e] the vitality of the English and French linguistic minority communities in Canada and support[...] and assist[...] their development.”² The Canadian ideological and legal context (Bourhis, 2001; Bourhis and Marshall, 1999) regarding official-language minorities is therefore favourable to concerted action to achieve “real equality” between the two official-language minority communities. However, since its “quiet revolution,” Quebec, the main francophone force in Canada, has gradually distanced itself from what was commonly called the French-Canadian nation, restricting its efforts instead to revitalize French in its own territory. In Quebec, French-Canadian identity has given way to a uniquely *Québécois* identity, leading francophones

outside Quebec to regionalize their identity as well. They have become *Franco-Ontariens*, *Franco-Manitobains*, *Fransaskois*, and so on. This fragmentation in identity has led to a relative isolation of francophone and Acadian communities to the point where their very survival is threatened (Thériault, 2002).

One of the main ideological, legal and political challenges facing francophone and Acadian communities will be redefining the French-Canadian community and forging a closer relationship with Quebec's francophone community in a bilingual and multicultural Canada that respects its Aboriginal populations. It is uncertain whether this challenge necessarily involves renewed federalism, but it would seem to us that it would be difficult to ensure the long-term survival of francophone communities that are legally and geographically isolated.

It terms of policy, it will also be necessary to strengthen the implementation of immigration policies that favour francophone and Acadian communities. Immigration is now the main source of Canada's population growth. Practices in place have favoured growth mostly in anglophone populations, both inside and outside Quebec (Jedwab, 2001; Quell, 2002). In the new *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (2001), the federal government has for the first time identified the development and vitality of official language minority communities as a clear immigration policy objective (Quell, 2002). Policies and structures for welcoming immigrants that are designed to integrate more francophone and francophile immigrants into francophone communities outside Quebec, could contribute to their vitality.

Another challenge lies at the level of federal-provincial relations. There are important systemic inconsistencies in terms of Canadian federalism. The federal and, exceptionally, New Brunswick governments have the obligation to promote official-language equality and to enhance the vitality of the English and French minority communities in Canada and support their development. Section 23 of the Charter requires the provinces to provide education in the language of the official-language minority. However, government services that can facilitate the pre-school socialization process in the minority language (e.g., children's services) are under provincial jurisdiction: the provinces are not obligated to promote linguistic duality with respect to children's services. The absence of early childhood support services in French is a factor causing many children, especially from exogamous families, to have a knowledge of French that is insufficient to enable them to attend French-language school (Gilbert, 2003; Landry, 2003; Martel, 2001). *The challenge would therefore be to extend the school system's linguistic duality to other childhood services in order to encourage to the greatest extent possible the socialization of pre-school children in the minority language* (see the following paragraphs for challenges relating to section 23 of the Charter).

Institutional and Social Context

Following the enactment of the *Official Languages Act*, 1988, the federal government signed a series of agreements with official language minorities (e.g., Canada-community agreements) and also with the provincial and territorial governments in order to solidify its commitment toward the development and blossoming of anglophone and francophone minority communities. Despite the tangible progress made in certain areas such as education, health care and human resources development, a recent study on official language minority governance in Canada found that there is an apparent lack of an "effective coordination of action" (Cardinal and Hudon, 2001).



A minority's survival depends not only on its numerical strength but also on its "institutional completeness" and its status within society (Breton, 1964; Giles et al, 1977; Landry and Allard, 1996). Under section 23 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, well established by case law, particularly by the Supreme Court of Canada, francophone and Acadian communities have made significant progress in gaining access to educational institutions governed by the francophone minority (Ducharme, 1996; Landry and Rousselle, 2003; Martel, 1991 and 2001; Riddell, 2003). Nonetheless, a high proportion of children entitled to receive education in French under section 23 of the Charter do not attend French language school (between 32% and 46% according to estimates)—(Government of Canada, 2003; Landry, 2003; Landry and Rousselle, 2003; Martel, 1991 and 2001; Paillé, 1991 and 2002). The longstanding problem of access has prolonged itself in the form of a contemporary problem of participation. *One of the most urgent challenges will be to ensure high participation rates of francophone children entitled to attend French language schools.* Non-participation in French language schools is closely linked to a high rate of exogamy and the high proportion of the target school clientele that is from exogamous families (now reportedly estimated at 63%). We recently recommended a tripartite strategy, with one component to address the need to set up early childhood services in French (Landry, 2003) in order to maximize the participation of children entitled to attend French language schools and, above all, provide for early socialization in French to promote access to French language schools.

A powerful concept created in Canada in order to provide greater institutional autonomy to urban minority francophones is the "school-community centre" (Allain and Basque, 2001; Delorme and Hébert, 1998; Bisson, 2003). In addition to promoting access to education in French, these centres provide a certain degree of "community life" to francophones who are often widely spread out in an urban area. *The growing number of francophones in urban areas will make it necessary to build a greater number of school-community centres and also operate them in a more creative and extensive manner.*

Access to French language post-secondary education remains a challenge in many regions of Canada (Churchill, 1998). However, a minority needs to groom its future leaders, in particular, making them aware of the challenges awaiting them. *Added to this challenge is encouraging young francophones to return to their community following post-secondary education.* These young francophones do not always have the opportunity to pursue their careers in their communities, or they may prefer not to return.

Lastly, access to educational institutions governed by the francophone minority is essential but not enough to enhance the community vitality of a minority. Research on minority francophones reveals the vital importance of schools as a source of francophone socialization, but also the need to have access to other sources of socialization in French.³ However, school is often the only Franco-dominant institution in the community. *One of the main challenges facing francophone communities will therefore be to aim to strengthen their control over certain institutions connected to French-language educational institutions.* As shown in the conceptual scheme presented in Figure 1, those institutions and social contexts that have the most influence over the linguistic socialization process have turned out to be the most relevant. Extending the linguistic duality recognized in educational institutions to all early childhood services could serve as an excellent way to reduce linguistic assimilation and increase francophone school enrolments (Gilbert, 2003; Landry, 2003). *Increased access to francophone media is another critically important area, especially for young francophones.*

Linguistic Socialization

The institutional and social challenges facing francophone communities amount to developing “community life” in French that is able to provide the basic socialization that contributes to identity development. While “administrative” nationalism through the control of certain local institutions may prove to be a satisfactory solution in certain regions (Bourgeois and Bourgeois, 2003), at a minimum all communities must have access to institutions that foster a strong francophone enculturation (early childhood, education, the media) and, therefore, a certain degree of “cultural autonomy.”

It is obvious, as demonstrated in Figure 1, that a strong presence of institutional and social “francophone spaces” (Gilbert, 1999; Stebbins, 2001) is positively associated with the francophone socializing experience. The stronger a francophone socializing experience, the weaker is the social determinism favouring integration into the dominant exogamous group. In order to facilitate the development of a social conscience and stronger autonomy in terms of linguistic behaviour (see the left side of Figure 1), it is necessary, however, to work not only on the quantity of linguistic contacts (the socializing experience), but also on their quality (the empowering and enlightening experiences)—(Landry and Rousselle, 2003; Landry *et al*, 1999). French-language school, through its “actualizing and community-building pedagogy” (Landry, 2002), may be the institution *par excellence* to ensure this “internal socialization” aimed at developing a social conscience and greater self-determination. To this end, it has been proposed that francophone and Acadian communities fully exercise the “exclusive powers” they have received through court decisions based on section 23, including the one granting control over school curricula with respect to everything involving language and culture (Landry and Rousselle, 2003). *There is good reason for francophone and Acadian communities to take control of their educational mission and ensure the excellence of pedagogic interventions.* The curriculum is defined as being “community-oriented” since its goal, through the implementation of an “actualizing” pedagogy, is the full actualization of the students’ human potential and, through “community-focused” teaching, the implementation of a family-school-community partnership that encourages the community to take part in school life and the school to take part in community life. The important elements proposed in this community-oriented curriculum are: active francophone enculturation, development of self-determination, maximized actualization of the learning potential, awareness-raising and commitment, and community entrepreneurship (Landry, 2002; Landry and Rousselle, 2003).

A challenge linked to implementing a community-oriented curriculum is that of professional development in education. This is a considerable challenge. It covers teaching staff, administrative and support staff and must involve on-going training and initial training. Most of all, it involves a real paradigm shift in the vision and action of teaching that is tailored to the ethnolinguistic minority experience. Educators have been trained to consider teaching as “external socialization.” They are trained to define objectives, present content that conforms with those objectives and guide learning and evaluation activities from the outside. They are, however, less equipped and prepared for “internal socialization,” which means leading students to become responsible, to take control over their own learning activities and become more self-determining in their linguistic behaviours and in their affirmation of their identity.



CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we wish to stress the importance of taking a macroscopic perspective when analyzing the challenges and when planning community and government action. The macroscope (De Rosnay, 1975) is a conceptual tool designed to understand the whole and the parts of a complex system at the same time. The lens of the macroscope may be adjusted, and the focus can be placed on one aspect or on the greater whole. What is important is that the whole not be forgotten when we consider a part and that we always remember how the parts of the whole fit together. To date, we continue to believe that there have been few attempts to adopt an overall plan for measures to promote and protect official language minorities. The federal context and the need or the desire to respect the jurisdictions of the various orders of government has led to somewhat uncoordinated and disjointed efforts. The very recent *Action Plan for Official Languages* initiative (Government of Canada, 2003), which was developed to give “new momentum to Canada’s linguistic duality,” is probably the most ambitious and complete effort undertaken since the enactment of the *Official Languages Act, 1988*. It proposes three main axes for action: education, community development and the public service, and it includes an accountability framework intended to hold the various federal departments accountable for their assigned actions. It also proposes a partnership with the community. It is rather early to make a definitive evaluation, but it may be asked whether the plan’s macroscope is open wide enough to be able to identify all the challenges and determine whether there is an interrelationship between the plan’s components and whether these components are sufficiently synchronized in their interventions to achieve maximum benefits. Most of all, we have not yet seen in it the effort needed to arouse the collective conscience of Canadians.

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NOTES

- 1 For a more detailed version of this article, please contact the author at landryro@umoncton.ca.
- 2 *Official Languages Act*, S.C. 1988, ch. 38, s. 41(a), (Part VII).
- 3 For a summary, see Landry and Allard (1996).



3

VALUES, IDENTITY, CITIZENSHIP AND
ATTITUDES TOWARDS DIVERSITY



THE VALUES OF FRENCH PEOPLE: COMPARISONS WITH OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Pierre Bréchon


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Synthesizing and summarizing the culture of a country is always extremely complex, particularly if we do not want to do an interpretative essay but instead want to base our assertions on data from surveys. The data that I use here come from the European Values Survey for the years 1981, 1990 and 1999, which allows for an analysis of how values have changed over close to a twenty-year period.¹

Starting with religious values, France is a country with a Catholic tradition but today it is one of the most secularized countries in the European Union. This can be seen very well, for example, in the rate of non-belonging to any particular religious group—43% of the French say that they do not belong to any religion—and the French share the European record with the Netherlands in this regard. It is also in France that one can find the highest percentage in the European Union that report being “confirmed atheists” (14%). The French are not as much opposed to religion, as they are indifferent to it. Catholicism, which remains the dominant religion in France, has weakened a great deal in terms of membership but also in terms of its influence on French culture and society. One observes in the surveys, a weakening of a number of religious indicators. That said, there are religious indicators where one gets the impression of small upturns. For example, people believe a little more strongly than before that there is something after life. This is an indicator that has increased a little, especially for young people. However, one can conclude that it is not really a return to the religiosity or religion of the past. Rather, there are reconstitutions on the basis of beliefs that are very fluid and fuzzy; one believes less and less in precise religious accounts or in a body of established religious dogma. However, one easily wishes for a possible future after death. This first tendency seems very important to understanding values in France today.

Secondly, there is the issue of moral principles. In the three value surveys, we asked the French whether they make decisions to take actions on the basis of tangible principles or whether they make their decisions on the basis of the circumstances at hand. In all three surveys, about one quarter of them said they base their decisions on principles and about two-thirds of them said they base their decisions depending upon the circumstances at the time. This does not mean the people no longer believe in certain principles, rather that they are relativized. They are used, discussed and their nuances are considered. People individualize them, personalize them, and change them to suit their tastes. In other words, what comes out of these surveys is evidence of a very strong increase in the values of individualization. France has passed from a society of fundamental and uniform values to a society where values are individualized.

In order to investigate more fully the question of morals, people were asked if they found a series of behaviours to be never or always justified (they were to give a score ranging from 1 for ‘never justified’ to 10 for “always justified”). In the list of behaviours taken into account, some related to private life while other related to social life (behaviour in society, in the public sphere). What is remarkable is that the conduct considered to be the most admissible, the most legitimate, all relate to private life and individual autonomy (see Table 1): divorce, euthanasia, abortion,



homosexuality and suicide. These behaviours were once considered to be deviant. They are accepted today in the name of individual liberties: society should not control the private acts of individuals. However, there is almost the same level of disapproval today as in 1981 for things such as taking a car for a joyride, littering in a public place, driving under the influence of alcohol, accepting a bribe in the exercise of one's duties and taking drugs. These behaviours for which there is strong disapproval are social behaviours that affect public order. In brief, what comes out of these surveys is the idea that private life is the domain of the individual; society should not stick its nose there. An individual can behave as he wishes in the private domain; it concerns only the individual. Public life, in contrast, is not the domain of the individual; it must be regulated. According to the results of the last survey, it is the changes with regard to youth that are the most interesting. For values relating to the private domain, youth continue to be slightly more permissive than adults. However, what have changed are youth's perceptions about public order. From this point of view, there has been a strong change in French society, especially with regard to French youth. More and more, there is the feeling that one lives according to a central maxim: Do what you want in your private life but respect public order.

Table 1: The Five Most Disapproved of Behaviours and the Five Most Permitted

	Average score	18-29 years old	More than 60 years	Difference 99-81
Taking a car for a joyride	1.35	1.53	1.22	- 0.11
Throwing away litter in a public place	1.60	1.87	1.40	—
Driving under the influence of alcohol	1.87	2.14	1.57	—
Accepting a bribe in the line of their duty	2.07	2.61	1.80	- 0.33
Taking drugs—marijuana or hashish	2.13	2.77	1.40	+ 0.40
Suicide	4.31	4.36	3.72	+ 0.97
Homosexuality	5.26	6.19	3.91	+ 2.23
Abortion	5.66	5.92	4.63	+ 0.90
Euthanasia	6.17	5.98	5.74	+ 1.65
Divorce	6.33	6.54	5.46	+ 1.13

Let us now consider sociability and trust in others. What characterizes French society and almost all southern European countries is that trust in others is not spontaneous. While northern Europeans automatically trust people they do not know, in France, as in the south of Europe, people are automatically suspicious of new acquaintances. In the survey, people were also asked what type of neighbour they would not want to have, that is to say, what category of people do they tend to reject. In this area, the French scored around the European average, though all Europeans are now slightly more likely to reject neighbours of a certain type than they were in the 1980s. Also, it is interesting to note that this rejection of certain types of people constitutes hard and fast racism. In principle, everybody is considered equal. Thus, one does not say that he wishes to reject people of another race or Jewish people or even immigrants. However, when the question about neighbours makes reference to types of people that could be “a problem” the percentages increase a great deal. Only 6% or 7% say they would exclude from their neighbourhood people of this or that race, but 39% say they would exclude Gypsies. One can see then, that it is not racism in principle; all are equal as human beings. However, if the category of people is perceived as likely to cause problems in the neighbourhood, they are clearly enough rejected. Thus racism is not frequent in France but

a type of utilitarian or pragmatic xenophobia does exist. One sees it as well when one asks the French if jobs should be reserved for nationals. Half of the French population believe that when jobs are rare, they should be reserved for nationals.

With regard to family values, there is a great deal of individualization as well. A great deal is still invested in the family but it is no longer the same kind of family. Today's ideal family is one that is built on the relationships between the various members; each family member is seen as autonomous and one constructs the family on individual values. Rich interpersonal communication is seen as the supreme value of a successful couple. Whether the individuals that make-up the couple have the same social origins, the same religion or whether or not they have money are all considered secondary. What is important is communication, to solve problems together; this is the gage of success for a couple today. The value of fidelity has increased again in France, for youth as well, which means that many youth would like this ideal family to be constructed on interpersonal relations—and therefore fragile—and to last.

To turn to political values, the French have never been strongly politicized; they are much less politicized than northern Europeans. While the level of politicization in the French population has remained stable, reaffirmed by an average that has remained unchanged, there has been a declining trend among youth. The stability in the level of politicization among the French has been accompanied by a decline in electoral participation, which has been quite clear for fifteen years, for those less than forty years of age. This increase in abstention from voting, which relates to intermittent abstention since permanent abstention has remained stable, can be explained by developments in the meaning of the vote. It is again at the level of individuation of political values that this growth in intermittent abstention can be explained. People do not go to the ballot box unless they feel it is important for them to vote.² While electoral participation is somewhat on the decline in France, this is not the case for other forms of political participation, notably protest-related activities such as demonstrations and petitions. Protest-related activities have increased in the French population as a whole as well as for youth. France has never experienced so many demonstrations and petitions and French youth are socialized to carry out these activities from secondary school onwards (see Table 2).

Table 2: Percentage Reporting At Least Two Acts of Protest by Birth Cohort

	1981	1990	1999
From 1973 to 1981	—	—	40
From 1964 to 1972	—	29	35
From 1955 to 1963	27	32	45
From 1946 to 1954	38	44	47
From 1937 to 1945	21	40	40
From 1928 to 1936	23	27	36
From 1919 to 1927	21	21	22
From 1910 to 1918	16	17	—
From 1901 to 1909	8	—	—
Average	24	32	39



In conclusion, as far as the changes in the values of the French are concerned, two scenarios for the future can be envisioned. The first is optimistic. France continues to experience individualization, particularly in the private domain. Youth begin to rediscover a sense of public order. One hopes that the continuance of these two trends will lead to a society like those in northern Europe, with both strong values of individuation and strong social bonds or relations. The pessimistic scenario rests on the risk of a turn towards individualism, not simply individuation. With so much individual liberty in private life, will one lose a sense of collective belonging? Social relations could thus be endangered. The values of individuation would continue towards social atomization. In the event that it is this pessimistic scenario that prevails, it would seem that French public policy makers would do well to pay a little more attention to social relations and from this point of view, the population would probably have much to learn from Canada.

NOTES

- 1 The French team that worked on this survey published its results in 2000 in a book entitled *Les valeurs des Français*. Armand Colin published it under my direction. It was republished in November 2003 with a new forward as *La France dans L'Europe*. Another book, *Les valeurs des jeunes* was published in 2001 (under the direction of Olivier Galland and Bernard Roudet) by L'Harmattan, and at the level of European comparisons, *Futuribles (no. 277, July-August, 2002)* compared the values of different European countries over a twenty-year period.
- 2 See Pierre Bréchon, *La France aux urnes. Soixante ans d'histoire électorale*, La documentation française, collection Les études, 4ième édition, 2004.

TRUST, SOCIAL CONNECTEDNESS AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT: A COMPARISON OF THE IMMIGRANT AND NATIVE-BORN POPULATIONS

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
My intention is to present some of the results from a study I undertook with Antoine Bilodeau entitled “Trust, Tolerance, and Confidence in Institutions: Evidence from the Canadian World Values Surveys, 1990-2000”.¹ Part of that study compares the immigrant and native-born populations with respect to trust over time as well as with respect to the relationship between trust, social connectedness and civic engagement.

There are a couple of important features of the 2000 round of the World Values Survey (Canada). It has a boosted sample of immigrant respondents, which is called the New Immigrant Survey. The latter is a replica of the core questions of the World Values Survey (WVS), asked to an additional 600 new immigrants. This means that together with the number of immigrants in the core sample, there are now enough cases to undertake meaningful analysis of immigrant subpopulations and to compare the immigrant subpopulations to the native-born one. One of the subpopulation elements of special interest here, which was explored in the 2000 round, concerns the impact of length of residence in Canada.

TRUST

A substantial body of evidence suggests that trust is an important orientation that shapes people’s social relations in profound ways (Gabriel 1996). Trust mediates relations between social groups; it is related to how people navigate their institutional environment (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995), and it is a foundation for individual level reciprocal transactions (Coleman 1987; Putnam 1993). However, trust is not an undifferentiated concept and levels of trust are likely to vary depending upon what social object is under consideration. The WVS contains a variety of indicators of trust and constitutes a good place to begin an assessment of how respondents, both immigrant and native-born, are distributed across various dimensions of trust. Five dimensions of trust will be considered:

- *Trust in family.* This indicator measures trust in primary relationships, and as such, it can serve as a benchmark indicator. There is no reason to expect immigrants and native-born Canadians to differ on this dimension.
- *Trust in Canadians.* This indicator has a communal dimension; it measures levels of trust in the broader political community.
- *Whether “most people can be trusted”.* This indicator is now routinely used to measure social capital (Coleman 1987, 1988; Putnam 1993; Norris 1999). It will be referred to in this study as General Trust I and it is a standard indicator of interpersonal trust.
- *Whether respondents anticipate that others will “take advantage of you”.* This indicator is referred to as General Trust II and is a new addition to the WVS.
- *Trust in recent immigrants.* This dimension of community trust is particularly relevant to the focus of this study.



The basic WVS 1990 and 2000 results from all five measures of trust are reported in Table 1. That summary reports the data for each time period and, in the case of the 2000 WVS data, the results for immigrants according to length of residence in the country. At issue is the question: is length of immigrants' residence in Canada related to any changes in levels of trust? There are several core findings worth noting:

- 1) All respondents, regardless of whether they were born in Canada or not, exhibit very high levels of *trust in their own family*. Since family is a basic social unit, these results come as no surprise. Nor is it surprising that length of residence in the country has no bearing whatsoever on levels of family trust. These results correspond to expectations.
- 2) When it comes to *trust in Canadian people*, there is evidence of some change between 1990 and 2000. However, there is no evidence, at either point in time, of significant differences between native-born Canadians and immigrants. By most comparative benchmarks, Canadians' 1990 levels of trust in their co-nationals rate as high (Nevitte 1996; Newton 1999). The percentage point decline is statistically significant but not large and, by cross-national standards, the levels of trust that Canadians had in their fellow co-nationals in 2000 still qualifies as relatively "high". On this dimension, people born in the country and immigrants appear to rise and fall on the same tide.
- 3) The pattern of response is somewhat different when it comes to *General Trust I*, relating to whether *most people can be trusted*. Immigrants are more trusting than native-born Canadians in this case, and this finding is consistent across the decade. Also, length of residence in country is a significant source of variation for immigrants. When immigrants first come to the country their levels of trust are quite high but those levels erode quite quickly. After five years of residence in Canada, immigrants' levels of interpersonal trust gravitate to the mean. With respect to interpersonal trust, then, immigrants seem to learn communal standards, which in this case means a progressive lowering of levels of interpersonal trust.
- 4) The response patterns for *General Trust II*, relating to whether *most people would try to take advantage of you* are somewhat different. In this case, there are no substantial differences between the proportion of new immigrants who say that people would not try to take advantage of them if they had a chance but would rather try to be fair, and that of native born Canadians (65% vs. 67% respectively). Nor is there evidence of variation with length of residence in Canada.
- 5) Results for *trust in recent immigrants* are in line with expectations. People are more likely to trust the familiar than the unfamiliar; they are more likely to trust people who are more like them. Thus we find in both 1990 and 2000, that immigrants' levels of trust in "recent immigrants" is higher than that found among respondents born in Canada. Further, native-born Canadians exhibit higher levels of trust in "the Canadian people" than in immigrants. It is also worth noting that, in both 1990 and 2000, immigrants' trust in "the Canadian people" is higher than their levels of trust in recent immigrants. Immigrants' trust in recent immigrants is unrelated to length of residence in Canada.

The most significant finding emerging from Table 1 concerns the evidence of a substantial overall drop in levels of interpersonal trust between 1990 and 2000. In 1990, 53% of native-born Canadians (and 59% of immigrants) thought “most people can be trusted”. By 2000, only 39% of native-born Canadians said this (compared to 42% of immigrants). Native-born Canadians and immigrants, once again, seem to rise and fall on the same tide. To the extent that interpersonal trust is a vital pillar of social capital then the potential implication of this finding is clear. If the norms of reciprocity are eroding, the corresponding expectation is that such a shift could have substantial reverberations for, among other things, inter-group relations, evaluations of how democratic practices are working, and possibly, confidence in institutions (see Nevitte and Bilodeau, 2003, for further analysis of these issues).

TRUST AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

Central to contemporary research on social capital is the important argument that there is a link between civic engagement and interpersonal trust (Putnam 1993, 2000). The broader cross-national findings on the nature of that linkage, however, are somewhat uneven (Newton 2000). Furthermore, these alternative findings have prompted debates that fix on both conceptual and measurement concerns. First, there is the question of whether interpersonal trust is conducive to a more cooperative society (Fukuyama 1997; Levi 1997, 1998) or the other way round (Putnam 1993, 1995). Gellner (1988), for one, sidesteps the problem of causal direction and simply argues that social cohesion is only possible in a civil society where there are thick, embedded relationships (Levi and Stokes 2000). Even so, there is no clear consensus about what is the best measure of civic engagement.

What qualifies as ‘engagement’? Is simple (passive) membership in civic associations a sufficient indicator of engagement? Does engagement entail more active involvement? Does it require that an individual’s investment of time in civic associations be taken into account? The most open ended empirical approach to that question, perhaps, is to compare the connection between inter-personal trust and a) simple membership in civic associations and b) active involvement in those associations. To explore that matter empirically we rely on indices that measure respectively a) the number of types of groups in which respondents are members (and members only), and b) the number of types of groups in which respondents are actively involved. It is not entirely clear that these measures of civic engagement adequately capture all the relevant dimensions of the phenomenon. These indicators may be inadequate and partial for two reasons. First, they tap only the number of ‘types’ of groups in which respondents are involved. They provide no information whatsoever about the number of groups in each category in which respondents might be involved. Second, they do not provide any information about the amount of time respondents spend in those groups. An alternative indicator, a more encompassing measure of what might be called “general social connectedness” of individuals, could be constructed from WVS data to provide a richer measure of the density of respondents’ social network in which norms of reciprocity and inter-personal trust might be expected to flourish. The 2000 WVS asks respondents:

For each activity, would you say you do them every week or nearly every week; once or twice a month; only a few times a year; or not at all: spend time with parents or other relatives, spend time with friends, spend time socially with colleagues from work or your profession, spend time with people at your church, mosque or synagogue, spend time socially with people at sports clubs or voluntary or service organizations?



These WVS indicators allow one to capture dimensions of social connectedness that are broader than just formal engagement in civic associations and to take into account how much time respondents invest in those social networks. The research question to be explored, then, is does this broader measure of respondents' social connectedness exhibit a stronger association with inter-personal trust, and is the relationship between them the same for both the native-born and the immigrant population?

INDICATORS OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND SOCIAL CONNECTEDNESS

Differences in the level of civic engagement of immigrants and native-born Canadians are quite modest. On average, native-born Canadians belong to about 1 type of civic association compared to 1.4 types for immigrants. The figures are quite similar for the types of groups in which respondents are actively involved (1 for native born Canadians and 0.9 for recent immigrants). Immigrants' level of civic engagement with the passage of time hardly varies at all, and there is no evidence of any significant cross-time changes in respondents' levels of civic engagement between 1990 and 2000, for either native-born Canadians or immigrants.

As for social connectedness, on average, immigrants and native-born Canadians spend about the same amount of time in clubs and associations. About 41% of immigrants say they spend time in clubs and associations at least once per month compared with 39% of native-born Canadians. On balance, then, immigrants and native-born Canadians are similarly engaged; they are involved in about the same numbers of groups and spend about the same amount of time in those groups. There are no substantial variations between recent and long time immigrants with respect to this indicator. Significant differences do emerge, however, when it comes to the patterns of social networks in which these two groups are involved. Immigrants spend more time socially with colleagues or with people in religious organizations than do native-born Canadians. Upon arrival in Canada, 64% and 49% of immigrants respectively spend time socially with colleagues and in religious organizations at least once per month compared to 40% and 26% of native-born Canadians. Moreover, there is clear evidence that the composition of immigrant social networks do shift with the passage of time. The longer immigrants live in Canada, the more their social network habits come to resemble those of native-born Canadians. The proportion of immigrants who spend time socially with colleagues and in religious organizations at least once per month declines after immigrants have lived more than 5 years in Canada.

Immigrants and native-born Canadians spend about the same amount of time with friends. More than 90% of immigrants and native-born Canadians say they spend time with friends at least once per month. In addition, the pattern is stable regardless of how long immigrants have lived in Canada. It comes as no surprise at all to find that when immigrants first arrive in the country, they spend less time with their family and relatives than do their native born counterparts; 80% of native-born Canadians say they spend time with their parents and other relatives at least once per month compared to 58% for recent immigrants. However, these differences erode the longer immigrants have resided in Canada. The explanation for why new immigrants spend less time with their family might be quite straightforward: upon first arriving in Canada, some new immigrants may not yet have family in the country or the city where they live. Aside from the case of family and relatives, immigrants are either as socially connected, or more connected, than native-born Canadians.

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND INTER-PERSONAL TRUST

How, then, are civic membership, civic involvement and social connectedness linked to the three indicators of trust? As Table 2 demonstrates, for native-born Canadians, civic membership is as strongly correlated with each of the three indicators of trust, as is civic involvement. Significantly, however, the social connectedness index (that combines all 5 indicators of social connectedness) is more strongly correlated with each of the three trust indicators than with either measure of civic engagement. It is also significant that, overall, both civic engagement indicators and the social connectedness index are more strongly correlated with General Trust I than with the other measures of trust. The correlation coefficients are slightly weaker for General Trust II and weaker still for “trust in Canadians”. The pattern of linkages is substantially different in the case of immigrants, however. Overall, both civic engagement indicators and the social connectedness index are weakly correlated with each measure of trust. Civic involvement is the indicator that presents the strongest correlation with all three measures of trust, the strongest correlation being General Trust I.

Once the estimations take into account the socio-economic characteristics of native-born Canadians, the social connectedness index is a significantly more powerful predictor of trust than either civic engagement indicators (see Table 3a). This finding holds across all three measures of trust. Native-born Canadians who spend more time with other people are more likely to say that they can trust other people, that people would not try to take advantage of them if they had the chance, and that they trust other Canadians. However, the conventional measures of civic membership and civic involvement do not seem to be associated with an increase (or decrease) in respondents’ levels of trust regardless of which indicator of trust is considered.

Findings show that immigrants who spend more time with other people are more likely to say that people would not try to take advantage of them if they had the chance, and to say that they trust other Canadians (see Table 3b). Civic membership and civic involvement have no impact on immigrants’ levels of trust for these two indicators. The findings are somewhat different for General Trust I. In this case, immigrants’ level of civic involvement decreases the likelihood of saying that other people can be trusted, whereas civic membership increases the likelihood. Putnam’s version of social capital would lead us to expect that civic engagement increases trust in other people. Intriguingly, the two measures of civic engagement provide inconsistent results. However, it is worth noting here that the social connectedness index is not significantly related to General Trust I for immigrants and the reason seems to have to do with the specific influence of time spent with people in religious organizations. This last indicator of social connectedness is, when examined separately, negatively related with General Trust I. When time spent with people in a religious organization is removed from the social connectedness index, the newly formulated index exhibits results consistent with those observed for other indicators of trust; immigrants who spend more time with other people are more likely to say that they trust other people. For reasons unexplained, time spent with people in a religious organization is negatively related to this particular trust indicator only, and only for immigrants.



CONCLUSIONS

There is evidence of a significant decline in interpersonal trust in Canada (Trust in Canadians and General Trust I) and this decline is observed among both native-born Canadians and immigrants. In fact, the decline is of the same magnitude for both groups. One possibility, suggested by Putnam's version of social capital theory, is that such a decline could be attributable to a corresponding fall in rates of civic engagement. However, that explanation is not compelling for two reasons. First, we have shown that civic engagement is a weak direct predictor of interpersonal trust. Second, there was no decline in the rates of civic engagement over the 1990-2000 period. One possibility is that variation in interpersonal trust is due to factors other than civic engagement. Another possibility is that interpersonal trust may lag behind civic engagement. Determining more precisely the origins of this substantial decline in interpersonal trust would require a more detailed and focused investigation.

While differences between immigrants and native-born Canadians were found with regard to levels of trust, (immigrants having higher levels in some dimensions), these differences decreased as length of residence in Canada increased. Differences between these two populations were also found with regard to the nature of their social connections. However, as with trust, immigrants' outlooks and behaviour adjust with the passage of time in Canada. As they settle down in Canada, immigrants adopt levels of trust and social networks that come to resemble those of native-born Canadians. In this respect, the process of immigrants' adaptation to the new environment can be characterized as one of integration.

Social connectedness increases interpersonal trust (all three indicators) for native-born Canadians but it only increases levels of "trust in Canadians" for immigrants. Especially in the case of native-born Canadians, social connectedness has a stronger impact on levels of trust than either civic involvement or membership; this was expected. For the most part, both civic involvement and membership nonetheless affect levels of trust for native-born Canadians. However, only civic membership affects the trust levels of immigrants.

When variation in the socio-economic characteristics of the native-born and immigrant populations is taken into account, the impact of social connectedness and civic engagement or membership on levels of trust in the two populations is still different. When socio-economic characteristics are controlled, social connectedness remains more important for levels of trust in the native-born population than the immigrant one and neither civic membership nor involvement affect the trust levels of native-born Canadians in a statistically significant fashion as social capital theory would lead one to expect. However, civic membership and involvement did have an affect on General Trust I for the immigrant population. Further research is needed to explain the variation in these effects.

Table 1: Stability and Change in Levels of Trust 1990-2000

Dimensions	1990		2000			
	Native-born Canadians	Immigrants >10 yrs	Native-born Canadians	Immigrants 1-5 yrs	Immigrants 6-10 yrs	Immigrants >10 yrs
Trust in Own Family (% saying they trust completely or a little)	98	99	96	99	98	98
Trust in Canadian People (% saying they trust completely or a little)	80	80	75	78	77	75
General Trust I Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? (% saying people can be trusted)	53	59	39	47***	39	38
General Trust II Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair? (% saying people would try to be fair)	N/A	N/A	67	65	62	63
Trust in Recent Immigrants (% saying they trust completely or a little)	44	55	46	58**	48	56
N =	1423	206	1551	397	217	329

*** p<.001, ** p<.05, * p<.10: significant differences for native born Canadians when controlling for socio-economic situation of respondents (Number of children, number of children still living at home, religious affiliation, identification with Canada, employment status, occupation, income, gender, education, age and province of residence) based on Logit estimates. Number of cases may vary for each item.

Note: These are weighted data.

Source: World Values Surveys 1990 and 2000 (including 2000 NIS).

**Table 2: Inter-Item Correlation for Civic Engagement and Trust****Native Born Canadian**

	General Trust I	General Trust II	Trust in Canadians
Civic Membership	.09**	.07**	.04
Civic Involvement	.12**	.08**	.03
Social Connectedness	.16**	.13**	.08**

** p<.01

Immigrants

	General Trust I	General Trust II	Trust in Canadians
Civic Membership	.08*	.06**	.07*
Civic Involvement	-.06	-.01	-.02
Social Connectedness	-.03	-.01	.09**

** p<.01

* p<.05

Note: Reported figures are Pearson's R coefficients

Note: These are weighted data.

Source: World Values Surveys 2000 (including the 2000 NIS).

Table 3a: Impact of Civic Engagement and Social Connectedness on Trust (Native born Canadians)

	General Trust 1—LOGIT		General Trust 2—LOGIT		Trust in Canadians—OLS		
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	
Socio-economic Status							
Married/living as married	.04	.14	.10	.14	.08	.03	***
# of children still at home	-.03	.06	-.03	.06	.01	.01	
Religion (protestant)							
Catholic	-.29	.16	-.25	.18	-.01	.03	*
No religion	-.13	.17	-.28	.18	-.03	.03	
Other	-.70	.36	-.55	.37	-.16	.07	**
Employed	.31	.16	.41	.15	.02	.03	***
Occupation (manager/prof.)							
Supervisor	-.32	.23	-.11	.26	.04	.04	
Non-manual	-.35	.18	-.10	.21	.01	.04	*
Manual	-.58	.17	-.46	.19	.01	.03	***
Income	.06	.03	.05	.03	.01	.01	**
Female	-.18	.13	.24	.13	-.05	.02	***
Education	.49	.12	.26	.12	-.01	.02	**
Age	.01	.00	.01	.00	.00	.00	*
Province (Ontario)							
Atlantic	-.10	.17	.00	.18	.02	.03	
Quebec	-.66	.20	-.60	.19	-.10	.04	***
West	-.09	.18	.23	.20	-.09	.03	***
Civic Engagement and Social Connectedness							
Civic Membership	.02	.05	-.03	.05	.00	.01	
Civic Involvement	.04	.06	.02	.06	.00	.01	
Social Connectedness index	.25	.07	.14	.07	.03	.01	**
Constant	-2.62	.57	-.91	.56	.56	.10	***
N	1372		1355		1381		
Cox and Snell/ Adjusted R-square	.121		.084		.053		

*** p<.001, ** p<.05, * p<.10

Note: These are weighted data.

Source: World Values Surveys 2000 (including the 2000 NIS).

**Table 3b: Impact of Civic Engagement and Social Connectedness on Trust (Immigrants)**

	General Trust 1—LOGIT			General Trust 2—LOGIT			Trust in Canadians—OLS		
	B	SE		B	SE		B	SE	
Socio-economic Status									
Married/living as married	.54	.21	***	.36	.21	*	.07	.04	*
# of children still at home	-.14	.09		-.13	.09		.00	.02	
Religion (protestant)									
Catholic	-.86	.30	***	-.41	.29		-.02	.05	
No religion	.24	.27		.36	.29		.03	.05	
Other	-.55	.28	*	-.45	.28		.11	.05	**
Employed	.10	.21		.29	.21		.01	.04	
Occupation (manager/prof.)									
Supervisor	-.42	.36		-.65	.35	*	.02	.07	
Non-manual	-.15	.24		-.48	.24	**	-.01	.04	
Manual	-.47	.21	**	-.44	.21	**	.03	.04	
Income	-.02	.03		.03	.04		.00	.01	
Female	-.15	.18		.26	.18		-.01	.03	
Education	.48	.20	**	.27	.19		.01	.04	
Age	.01	.01	*	.02	.01	**	.00	.00	**
Province (Ontario)									
Atlantic	-.94	.52	*	.31	.46		.07	.09	
Quebec	-.45	.22	**	.17	.21		.09	.04	**
West	.14	.20		.57	.22	***	-.02	.04	
Civic Engagement and Social Connectedness									
Civic Membership	.12	.06	*	.06	.06		.01	.01	
Civic Involvement	-.12	.06	**	-.01	.05		.00	.01	
Social Connectedness index	.08	.10		.17	.10	*	.04	.02	**
Constant	-2.02	.84	***	-1.72	.82	**	.40	.15	***
N	705			691			710		
Cox and Snell/ Adjusted R-square	.116			.091			.039		

*** p<.001, ** p<.05, * p<.10

Note: These are weighted data


Source: World Values Surveys 2000 (including the 2000 NIS).

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NOTE

- 1 The full study can be obtained by emailing sradoc_docras@pch.gc.ca.



THE ADVANTAGES OF ANALYZING ETHNIC ATTITUDES ACROSS GENERATIONS—RESULTS FROM THE ETHNIC DIVERSITY SURVEY

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The Statistics Canada's 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS) results were released at the end of September 2002.¹ This post-censal survey includes 42,500 non-Aboriginal respondents who were fifteen years and older. Respondents were selected on the basis of their 2001 Census responses to the Place of Birth questions and the Ethnic Origin question. The EDS questionnaire explores the concepts of ethnic ancestry, ethnic identity, race, religion, and language. It also asked respondents about their place of birth, their parents' and grandparents' places of birth, family interaction, social networks, civic participation, whether respondents reported feeling uncomfortable or out of place, whether they perceived discrimination or unfair treatment, hate crimes, sense of belonging, trust and satisfaction. This survey allows for two types of intergenerational analysis, intergenerational transmission within a family and the number of generations a respondent's family has resided in Canada (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4^{th+} generations).

This paper will concentrate on data pertaining to two questions on the EDS: 1) general trust and 2) sense of belonging to an ethnic or cultural group. Results will be provided, where possible, for 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th generations in Canada, and for selected ethnic ancestries. The reporting patterns of selected broad ancestries (e.g. African) and selected reported ancestries (e.g. East Indian) will be examined. The question that I am posing is whether attitudes change with each generation in Canada and, if they do change, do they reflect the reporting pattern of the total population?

CATEGORIZING ETHNIC ANCESTRY

Before discussing the results of the survey I will define the units of analysis. Each generation is defined as follows:

- 1st generation refers to those individuals that are foreign born, with recent arrivals indicating those who arrived after 1991, and longer-term arrivals indicating those who arrived before 1991.
- 2nd generation refers to those individuals who were born in Canada and who have one or both parents born outside Canada.
- 3rd generation refers to those individuals whose parents were both born in Canada and who have at least one grandparent born outside Canada.
- 4^{th+} generations refers to those individuals whose parents and grand-parents were all born in Canada.

Once the EDS data was weighted the 4^{th+} Generation (34%) comprised the largest proportion, followed by the 1st (25%), the 3rd (22%), and the 2nd (19%) generations.

To attain information on Canadians' ethnic ancestry the EDS asked two questions:


1) *I would now like to ask you about your ethnic ancestry, heritage or background. What were the ethnic or cultural origins of your ancestors?* (ID_Q010)

This question asked for “the origins of your ancestors”, from both sides of the respondents' family. Interviewers were provided with a basic definition for ancestors—someone from whom you have descended and are usually more distant than a grandparent—but they were directed not to provide this definition during the survey.² This question refers to a person's background and should not be confused with a person's citizenship, nationality, or identity.


2) *In addition to “Canadian”, what were the other ethnic or cultural origins of your ancestors on first coming to North America?* (ID_Q020)

The second question had a distinct purpose. In Canada there has been a debate as to whether respondents can legitimately report Canadian and other New World ancestries³ when, in theory, apart from Aboriginal respondents, all other Canadians should be able to trace their origins to ancestors from other continents. A number of factors, which have been discussed in detail elsewhere⁴, resulted in “Canadian” in English or “Canadien” in French, becoming one of the most frequently reported responses to the 1991 Census Ethnic Origin question and thereby becoming the first example on the list of “most frequently reported ancestries” provided to respondents on the 1996 Ethnic Origin question.⁵ This second question was only for respondents who reported a single response “Canadian” or “Canadien” to see if they did indeed know the origins of their ancestors. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on what respondents reported in the first question only, so that results will be based on what respondents reported as their ancestry.

According to the results from “the origins of your ancestors” question, the top fifteen ancestries represent Canadian, British and French (CBF), European and non-European ancestries (see Graph 1). With each passing Census, the proportion of respondents that report ancestries other than CBF increases. Results from the EDS indicate that 50% of the non-Aboriginal population that is fifteen years and older reported ancestries other than Canadian, British or French.




Graph 1: Top Fifteen Reported Ancestries, 2002 EDS



By asking respondents about their ancestry and combining it with generational information, as shown on Graph 2, we get a reflection of Canada's multicultural history. The 4th generations are dominated by CBF responses (84%). In the 3rd generation, CBF ancestries are the most frequently reported at 80%, but European ancestries, at 48%, are starting to comprise a larger proportion of the population.⁶ In the 2nd generation, European ancestries were more frequently reported than CBF ancestries (37% compared to 33%), while non-European ancestries were reported by 15% of that generation. Finally, the 1st generation reflects that the immigration laws were liberalized in the early 1970s and increased immigration flows from non-European sources; 51% of the 1st generation reported non-European ancestries compared to a CBF reporting only 13%.

Graph 2: Ethnic ancestry reporting by generation reflects our multicultural heritage



The top ten ancestries from each generation provide us with an indication of what reported ancestries are found in each generation. Table 1 highlights that a majority of respondents in 4th generations category are from the CBF category which includes many of the New World ancestries.⁷ The top ten ancestries in the 2nd and 3rd generations reflect that while immigrants were arriving from the British Isles, and to a lesser extent from France, European immigrants such as Germans, Ukrainians, Dutch and Italians were also making Canada their home. The top ten 1st generation ethnic ancestries illustrate the transition from European to non-European immigration sources (e.g. Chinese, East Indian).⁸




Table 1: Top Ten Ethnic Ancestries by Generational Status

1 st Generation	2 nd Generation	3 rd Generation	4 th Generation
Chinese 14%	English 24%	English 35%	French 27%
East Indian	Scottish	Scottish	Irish
Italian	Irish	Irish	English
English	German	German	Scottish
German	Italian	French	Canadian/Canadien
Scottish	Canadian/Canadien	Canadian/Canadien	Quebecois
Filipino	Dutch	Ukrainian	French-Canadian
Portuguese	Ukrainian	Polish	German
Polish	French	Italian	—
Irish	Polish	Dutch	—

“—” indicates inadequate counts to show the last two categories


Since I will be examining selected ancestries across generations, it is also important to see how these ancestries are distributed generationally. As shown on Graph 3, over 30% of respondents reporting Canadian, British Isles or French ancestries are distributed across all four generational categories. The reporting of French New World ancestries⁹ (Canadien, Quebecois, and French-Canadian) is concentrated in the 4^{th+} generations; 79% of French-Canadian, 88% of Canadien and 90% of Quebecois are in the 4^{th+} generations category.

Graph 3: Selected Canadian, British and French Ancestries by Generational Status



Graph 4 illustrates how respondents of European background have been immigrating to Canada over numerous generations and how the pattern of arrival has varied depending on the ancestry. Respondents that reported German, Norwegian, and Ukrainian are represented in the 4^{th+} generations category, but the majority of their populations are in the 2nd and 3rd generations and less than 20% is in the 1st generation.¹⁰ Respondents that reported Russian, Polish, Dutch and Italian have a majority of their populations in the 2nd and 3rd generations, but have a small proportion, if any, in the 4^{th+} generations, and over 20% of the population of each group is in the 1st generation. Of the selected European ancestries, Portuguese (68%) and Italian (36%) report the highest proportion of respondents in the 1st generation. At issue for European ancestries is whether, after several generations, their reporting patterns have dramatically changed?


Graph 4: Selected European Ancestries by Generational Status



A majority of the respondents that were fifteen years and older reporting non-European ancestries were in the first generation. However, as shown on Graph 5, all of the selected ancestries are represented in the 2nd generation and, in the case of Chinese ancestries, a small proportion in the 3rd generation. The 2nd generation, or the children of immigrants, have started to come to age in Canadian society and an important question for researchers is whether these children of immigrants will have the same attitudes and behaviour as their parents?



Graph 5: Selected Non-European Ancestries by Generational Status



By rolling information into generational and ethnic categories, we miss the fact that each generation has respondents from very different backgrounds whether they are New World, British Isles, French, European or non-European. The combination of ethnic ancestry and generational results provide deeper insight into the reporting patterns of these ethnic categories over generations. Here some of the results from the survey modules pertaining to Trust and Sense of Belonging will be presented first from a generational perspective, second from an ethnic ancestry perspective, and third ethnic ancestry and generational results will be combined.

TRUST QUESTIONS

The EDS asked several questions on trust. The questions were as follows:

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or you cannot be too careful in dealing with respondents? (TS_Q020)

Using a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means cannot be trusted at all and 5 means can be trust a lot, how much do you trust each of the following groups

- *People in your family? (TS_Q030)*
- *People in your neighbourhood? (TS_Q040)*
- *People that you work with or go to school with? (TS_Q050)*

Discussion on General Trust Question

This paper will focus on results from the General Trust (TS_Q020). Of respondents in Canada, 50% reported that most people could be trusted. Responses across generations indicate that 52% of the 1st and 2nd generations reported that most people can be trusted, while this increased to 58% for the 3rd generation, then dropped to 42% for the 4th generation. These findings raise several questions: Why do the 1st and 2nd generations have lower levels of trust than the 3rd generation? What is happening between the 3rd and 4th generations to result in a decline in trust? Do respondents whose families have lived in Canada for multiple generations have lower trust no matter what their ancestry?

When one looks at the results for Canadian, British Isles and French ancestries, the generational results become more comprehensible (see Table 2). Respondents of Canadian and British Isles ancestries have higher levels of trust than those of French or French New World ancestries. The French and French New World ancestries are concentrated in the 4^{th+} generations category and their lower trust levels pull down the results for the 4^{th+} generations. One cannot ascertain, by just looking at the generational data, whether respondents of British Isles ancestries, which are spread across all four of the generational categories, also have lower levels of trust in the 4^{th+} generation, or whether this is just a French and French New World response pattern.



Table 2: Percentage of Selected Ancestries Reporting that Most People Can Be Trusted by Generational Status, 2002 EDS

Ancestry Group	Total	1 st Generation	2 nd Generation	3 rd Generation	4 ^{th+} generation
Total EDS Population:	50%	52%*	54%	58%	42%
English	61%	67%	61%	60%	62%
Irish	58%	68%	61%	60%	56%
Scottish	61%	61%	63%	62%	62%
Canadian	55%	56%	61%	58%	50%
French/ French New World:					
French	46%	51%	60%	55%	42%
French Canadian	42%	—	56%	64%	38%
Canadien(ne)	25%	—	—	—	24%
Québécois	30%	—	—	—	31%
European:					
German	60%	60%	60%	64%	57%
Ukrainian	59%	55%	54%	—	—
Dutch	59%	64%	63%	58%	54%
Norwegian	59%	—	58%	65%	—
Polish	56%	56%	54%	62%	—
Russian	62%	62%	56%	62%	—
Italian	45%	40%	45%	53%	—
Portuguese	57%	63%	45%\$	—	—
Non-European:					
Chinese	59%	60%	53%	—	—
East Indian	50%	52%	43%	—	—
Latin, Central and South American	48%	50%	46%	—	—
Arab	47%	47%	43%	—	—
Filipino	40%	39%	48%	—	—
African	37%	35%	44%	—	—
Caribbean	32%	28%	40%	—	—

* When the first generation is divided into recent and longer-term arrivals, the recent arrivals average 53% while the longer-term arrivals average 52%.


When the results of English, Irish, Scottish and Canadian ancestries are run by generational status, as shown on Table 2, there does not appear to be a persistent pattern. Scottish and English did not have lower proportions of general trust in the 4^{th+} generations. In fact, for English it was slightly higher than the 2nd and 3rd generations, while the 1st generation had the highest proportion of respondents reporting trust. For Canadian and Irish, the 4^{th+} generations did have the lowest proportion of respondents reporting general trust. In the case of Irish the 1st generation has the highest proportion of respondents reporting general trust, while for Canadian, the 2nd generation has the highest proportion of respondents reporting general trust. However, of these ancestries Canadian consistently has the lowest proportion of people reporting general trust. Also, for British Isles ancestry, in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th generations, the proportions reporting General Trust are similar.

The results for French and French New World ancestry by generational status also highlight some interesting points. Information for respondents reporting Canadian and Quebecois ancestry, which are concentrated in the 4^{th+} generations category, is only available for the 4^{th+} generations¹¹ and in both cases the proportion of respondents reporting general trust was the lowest of all the selected ancestries. For French and French-Canadian, where information on some of the other generational categories was available, the 4^{th+} generations have the lowest proportions of respondents reporting general trust. In fact, the 3rd generation French-Canadians (64%) and 2nd generation French (60%) reported high levels of trust. In the 4^{th+} generations categories French (42%) and French-Canadian (38%) had relatively low proportions of people reporting general trust, but not as low as that found amongst Quebecois (31%) and Canadian (24%).¹²

The story is a little different when you run the data for European ancestries (see Table 2). Most of the European ancestries have similar proportions of their population reporting “trust in people” to those from the British Isles ancestries. However, Italians (45%) are the exception in that they have lower trust than any of the other selected European categories, one which is similar to that found for French and French-Canadian ancestries. One may suggest that trust is low for respondents of Italian ancestry because they have a large immigrant component, however, Portuguese ancestry, which has a larger 1st generation population, has a higher proportion of respondents reporting trust.

When we run the General Trust data for European ancestries by generational status we find that there is no consistent reporting pattern (see Table 2). German ancestry matched the overall generational pattern. Ukrainian and Dutch have almost opposite reporting patterns; 4^{th+} generations Ukrainians have the highest proportion of respondents reporting trust, while 4th generation Dutch have one of the lowest proportions of respondents reporting trust. Italian ancestry shows gains in general trust over the generations, but when compared to other European ancestries, it continues to have the lowest proportion of respondents reporting General Trust for each of the generational categories.

For the respondents reporting non-European ancestries, there appears to be variation between ancestral categories for those respondents reporting General Trust (see Table 2). At 59% reporting General Trust, Chinese ancestry would be ranked among British Isles and European ancestries, while Caribbean ancestry, at 32%, has one of the lowest proportion of respondents reporting General Trust. Non-European results cross-tabulated by generational status highlight some new reporting patterns. For the top five ancestries—Chinese, East Indian, Latin, Central and South American, and Arab—the 1st generation has a higher proportion reporting trust in people than the 2nd generation. For the Filipino, African and Caribbean ancestries we see a reverse pattern whereby the 2nd generation has a higher proportion than the 1st generation reporting trust in people. Therefore the General Trust gap between ancestries is wider for the 1st generation than for the 2nd generation; for the 1st generation it went from Chinese at 60% to Caribbean at 28%, while for the 2nd generation it went from 53% for Chinese to 40% for Caribbean ancestry.



The General Trust results suggest that the low proportion of respondents reporting French New World ancestries are due more to ethno-cultural rather than generational differences. In the case of some non-European and European ancestries it may be for ethno-cultural reasons that their trust is high or low, making ancestral comparison questionable. Over the generations the trust gap seems to decline (e.g. Italians, Chinese), and among European ancestries we see them level out in the 3rd generation. In the future, it will be interesting to see if 3rd generation non-Europeans' proportions level out. Combining ancestral and generational data reveals we have a powerful tool for understanding specific ancestries' attitudes over generations.

SENSE OF BELONGING TO ETHNIC OR CULTURAL GROUP

The EDS asked a battery of questions on Sense of Belonging. The questions were as follows:

Some respondents have a stronger sense of belonging to some things than others. Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not strong at all and 5 is very strong how strong is your sense of belonging to:

Your family (AT_Q010)

Your ethnic or cultural group (AT_Q020)

Your town, city or municipality (AT_Q030)

Your province (AT_Q040)

Canada (AT_Q050)

North America (AT_Q060)

In this paper I will focus on sense of belonging to ethnic or cultural group (AT_Q020).

Discussion of Sense of Belonging to Ethnic or Cultural Group

Responses to this question are particularly interesting when you think that the respondent has already been through questions that probe their ethnic ancestry and how important it is to them. As shown in Table 3, the 1st generation have the highest proportion of respondents reporting a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group. These proportions decline over the 2nd and 3rd generations, but for the 4th generations they increase almost to the same level as the 1st generation. Does this mean that all ancestries' sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group declines over time and then raises again in the 4th generation?

Table 3: Percentage of Selected Ancestries Reporting that Respondents have a Strong* Sense of Belonging to the Ethnic and Cultural Groups, by Generational Status, 2002 EDS

Ancestry Group	Total	1 st Generation	2 nd Generation	3 rd Generation	4 ^{th+} Generation
Total:	50%^a	57%**	47%	40%	54%
British Isles and Canadian:					
English	43%	45%	44%	41%	46%
Irish	41%	47%	42%	41%	42%
Scottish	38%	47%	38%	36%	39%
Canadian	53%	64%	47%	50%	58%
French/ French New World:					
French	53%	44%	44%	42%	59%
French Canadian	59%	—	47%	51%	63%
Canadien(ne)	69%	—	—	—	70%
Québécois	59%	—	50%	—	61%
European:					
German	33%	39%	33%	32%	33%
Ukrainian	33%	56%	38%	30%	—
Dutch	36%	37%	37%	36%	—
Norwegian	30%	—	34%	29%	—
Polish	39%	50%	39%	32%	—
Russian	35%	44%	39%	29%	—
Italian	56%	62%	63%	37%	—
Portuguese	65%	71%	54%	—	—
Non-European:					
Chinese	58%	59%	53%	—	—
East Indian	65%	66%	65%	—	—
Latin, Central and South American	57%	57%	61%	—	—
Arab	52%	55%	54%	—	—
Filipino	78%	80%	61%	—	—
African	71%	73%	68%	—	—
Caribbean	68%	70%	65%	—	—

* Strong indicates a 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale.

** When the first generation is divided into recent and longer-term arrivals, the recent arrivals average 62% while the longer-term arrivals average 55%.



Table 3 raises an interesting question around what is happening to those ancestries found in the 4^{th+} generations. According to Table 3, the 4^{th+} generations are highest because of a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group among those respondents reporting the New World ancestries of Canadian and Quebecois. Respondents reporting these two ethnic ancestries have reported low levels of trust but a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group.¹³ The British Isles ancestries have a much lower proportion of their population reporting a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group, however, these ethnic categories are spread over several generations and are less concentrated in the 4^{th+} generation. Therefore, British Isles ancestries' low responses are not enough to pull down the overall proportion for the 4^{th+} generations.

When we look at selected ancestries by generational status the picture becomes even clearer. Respondents of Canadian and British Isles ancestries have similar reporting patterns. The 1st generation has a stronger sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group than the 2nd and 3rd generations, while the 4th generation has a slightly higher proportion reporting a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group. Therefore, the increase in the 4^{th+} generations is not artificial for CBF, however, the degree to which it is higher is what should be further investigated.

For respondents of French and New World ancestries the pattern is different. Where generational data is available, it is possible to see that not all respondents reporting these ancestries report a high sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group. The high proportions are focused among those respondents that are in the 4^{th+} generations, and unlike with the British Isles example, the difference between the 2nd and 3rd generations to the 4^{th+} generation is more pronounced. Since these ancestries are concentrated in the 4^{th+} generations, their high proportions of sense of belonging to ethnic or cultural group push up the 4^{th+} generational results.

Sense of belonging to ethnic or cultural groups for European ancestries is seen on Table 3. European ancestries, especially those that have relatively large proportions of their population in the 3rd generation, have smaller proportions of their population reporting as strong a sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group.¹⁴ Those ancestry categories that have larger immigrant populations (e.g. Portuguese and Italian) have a higher sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group, however, the correlation between immigration and sense of belonging requires further investigation to be validated.

When European ancestries are cross-tabulated by generational status, a similar reporting pattern emerges whereby the 1st generation has the highest proportion of respondents reporting a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group, and this proportion declines, in most cases, for the 2nd and 3rd generations.

Dutch ancestry had the lowest proportion of respondents in the 1st generation reporting a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group, while the proportion of respondents reporting this sense of belonging did not dramatically drop for the 2nd and 3rd generations. In fact, among the selected ancestries from the 3rd generation, Dutch had the second highest proportion of respondents reporting a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group.

Italian ancestry also provided some interesting results in that the 2nd generation had a slightly higher proportion of respondents reporting a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group. The proportion of 3rd generation respondents of Italian ancestry with a strong sense of belonging to ethnic or cultural group declines compared to the 1st and 2nd generation, however, they still have the highest proportion of respondents with a strong sense of belonging to ethnic or cultural group when compared to the other selected European ancestries.

European ancestries, especially those that have relatively large proportions of their population in the 3rd generation, have lower proportions of their population reporting as strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group. However, pinning higher or lower proportions on a higher proportion of immigrants is questionable since in some cases, 1st generation Europeans also have higher proportions than some 1st generation non-Europeans ancestries.

The main issue for Europeans, just as for the CBF category, is the degree of difference between generations. In some cases like German, Dutch, and Norwegian, where the proportion of people reporting a sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group was already relatively low, the degree of decline between generations was relatively small, whereas for Polish, Ukrainian, or Portuguese, where the 1st generation had higher proportions of belonging, the decline was more intensified. Interestingly, though there was a lot of variation among the 1st generation, by the 3rd generation European ancestries were reporting similar proportions.¹⁵ The 1st generation ranges from 62% for Italian to 32% for Dutch, while the 3rd generation ranges from 37% for Italian to 29% for Norwegian and Russian. By the 3rd generation the gap seems to be closing between these minority ancestries and we will have to wait another generation to see whether the 4th generation will increase in its proportion as seen among the CBF ancestries.

Sense of Belonging to ethnic or cultural groups for non-European ancestries is seen in Table 3. Non-European ancestries have high proportions of their population reporting a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group, even higher than the New World ancestries.¹⁶ However this varies by ancestry. Filipino (78%) has a very high proportion of respondents reporting a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group while Arab (52%) has a lower proportion than some of the European ancestries (e.g. Italian and Portuguese).

For the non-European ancestries, in all cases except Latin, Central and South American¹⁷, there is a decline from 1st to 2nd generation in the sense of belonging to ethnic or cultural groups.¹⁸ In some cases the decline is much steeper than in others. For example, Filipino ancestry reporting dropped from 80% to 61% for 1st and 2nd generations respectively, while East Indian dropped from 66% to 65% for 1st and 2nd generations respectively.

As with the European ancestries, non-European ancestries appear to be no different in that as generations in Canada increases, there is a reduced sense of belonging to their ethnic and cultural group and a levelling of the proportional gap between these selected ancestries. In the 1st generation, Filipino ancestry at 80% had the highest proportion of its population reporting a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group, while Arab at 50% had the lowest proportion. For the 2nd generation the gap has reduced: African had the highest proportion at 68% and Chinese had the lowest at 53%. It seems, if we take into consideration the results from these two generations, that European and non-European reporting patterns are somewhat similar and it will be interesting to see if in the future 3rd generation non-Europeans report even lower levels of sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group.



CONCLUSION

This analysis has shown that by combining ancestral and generational results, we get a clearer understanding of reporting patterns. It was shown that studying the reporting patterns of ethnic ancestries or generational status in isolation may result in misleading findings, whereas combining information from these two concepts will provide a more comprehensive picture. By combining the generational and ancestry results we were able to see how, in the case of non-CBF ancestries, over the generations the attitudes of these broad categories began to level out. For some ethnicities, such as Italian and Chinese, this seemed to be taking a little longer than others (e.g. Filipino); sharp declines were noted between generations. For CBF ancestries there was a divide between the Francophone¹⁹ (Quebecois, French, French-Canadian, Canadien) and Anglophone (English, Irish, Scottish, and Canadian) ancestries and this resulted in very different reporting patterns. The EDS provides a unique opportunity to combine these two concepts and as a consequence a more robust understanding of how different ethnic ancestries' attitudes change over the generations.

The results from the General Trust and Sense of Belonging to Ethnic or Cultural Group questions, when generational results are not used in combination with ancestry, could easily be misinterpreted. For example, by only looking at generational results, it seems that the 4^{th+} generation is less trusting and has a much higher sense of belonging than the 2nd and 3rd generations. The fact that ancestries have different distribution patterns across generations, that cultural norms and values play a role in how particular ancestries report, and that there can be major differences in how specific ancestries report over generations, needs to be taken into account.


This type of research will enrich our understanding of how selected ethnic categories are reporting and it will provide some insight into how people from different backgrounds are attitudinally integrating into Canadian society. In both cases, the generational gap began to close over the generations indicating that for non-CBF ancestries it was quite possible to see a levelling off of attitudes.

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- Boyd, Monica. "Canadian eh? Ethnic Origin Shifts in the Canadian Census," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 31, no. 3 (1999), 1-19.
- Bourhis, Richard Y. "Measuring Ethnocultural Diversity Using the Canadian Census." *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 35, no. 1 (2003), 9-32.

NOTES

- 1 As a result of discussion between Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage concerning design and measurement issues with the 2001 Census ethnic origin question, it was recommended that the two departments conduct a post-censal survey on ethnicity. Statistics Canada's 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey is the result of a partnership between Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage.
- 2 It should also be noted that respondents were not provided examples of ancestries and they were permitted to report multiple responses.
- 3 In this paper, New World ancestry refers to those ancestries that are specific to Canada (e.g. Newfoundlander, Acadian and Quebecois). Later in the paper I will also refer to French New World ancestries and English New World ancestries. French and English in this sense are not referring to their ancestries, but to the fact that a majority of the respondents reporting these ancestries have in the case of English an English mother tongue and in the case of French a French mother tongue.
- 4 Monica Boyd, "Canadian eh? Ethnic Origin Shifts in the Canadian Census," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 31, no. 3 (1999), 1-19, and Richard Y. Bourhis, "Measuring Ethnocultural Diversity Using the Canadian Census," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 35, no. 1 (2003), 9-32.
- 5 Note that Canadian and Canadien have been separated since the two terms mean different things. In English, it usually means someone whose family has been in Canada for multiple generations. In French it is referring to "Les Habitants", settlers of New France during the 17th and 18th Century, who earned their living primarily from agricultural labour.
- 6 Of the four generations, it is the 3rd which has the largest proportion of respondents reporting multiple responses that contain combinations of CBF and/or European and/or non-European ancestries (e.g. Norwegian and Canadian).
- 7 Ancestries such as Quebecois, French-Canadian, Canadien and Canadian are specific to Canada and are usually reported by respondents whose families have been in Canada for multiple generations.
- 8 It should be highlighted that there has been non-European immigration to Canada for numerous generations, however they were not the main source of Canadian immigration as they are now.
- 9 These will be called "French New World" ancestries since the majority of respondents in these ethnic categories are Francophones.
- 10 Respondents from these ancestral categories often reported multiple responses.
- 11 Information was not available since the counts were too low for Statistics Canada to release the weighted data.
- 12 When compared to all the other selected ancestries only 4th generation Norwegians had a higher proportion of respondents reporting that they trust people.
- 13 The Sense of Belonging battery have been asked by EKOS for the Department of Canadian Heritage over many years and this finding is in keeping with past results. The difference here is that we usually complete analysis at the Provincial level (those respondents in Quebec) rather than for particular ethnic ancestries.
- 14 As mentioned earlier in this paper, some of the European ancestries are reported as a multiple response, often in combination with CBF ancestries and this may have further diluted some of these respondents' sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group.
- 15 I excluded Portuguese since 3rd generation information is not available.
- 16 As mentioned earlier in this paper, some of the European ancestries are reported as a multiple response, often in combination with CBF ancestries and this may have further diluted some of these respondents' sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group.
- 17 The Latin, Central and South American increase could be due to a number of factors such as each generation representing a different ancestral category.
- 18 Where information is provided on roll-ups (Latin, Central and South American, Arab, West Asian, African and Caribbean) rather than reported ancestries (East Indian, Chinese, Filipino) it is difficult to know whether respondents are from the same ancestral category. For example, West Asian includes respondents from Afghanistan and Iran—two categories that have different immigration patterns.
- 19 It would be very interesting to complete a follow-up to this finding and see whether Francophones living outside Quebec report the same way as Francophones living inside Quebec.



PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS MULTICULTURALISM AND BILINGUALISM IN CANADA

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Today I am going to discuss Canadian public attitudes toward multiculturalism and bilingualism. I will present graphics that report the overall percentage of Canadians who share a particular opinion based on public opinion surveys. Most of the survey data are taken from Environics Focus Canada surveys, which are based on samples of 2000 Canadians. Two other sources are the Charter Study conducted in 1987, and a survey that Environics undertook for the Centre for Research and Information on Canada (CRIC) in 2002.

Canada has always been a multicultural and a bilingual society, but we have not always appreciated these facts about our national life. Acceptance and support for multiculturalism, ethnic diversity, and bilingualism have evolved over the last 30 years, as the social values of Canadians changed dramatically. These value changes were spearheaded by the baby-boom generation that was born between 1946 and 1962. That generation had very different social values from the previous generation. The new social values included rejection of authority and lack of deference to authority, while attitudes like deferred gratification were thrown out the window. Deferred gratification in the 1950s was of primary importance. If you went to church you'd go to heaven; if you ate your carrots you could get dessert—that kind of thing.

Deferred gratification, hierarchy and other cherished values of the 1950s were rejected and were replaced by values such as pragmatism, empowerment, egalitarianism and hedonism: not putting the fun off to the future but having fun today and enjoying life today. Among the changing social values, there was also a change toward acceptance and support for ethnic diversity. Supporting and celebrating ethnic diversity was related to emerging egalitarian values. It was also related to hedonism in the sense that it is more interesting to live in a society where you can talk to and meet different people from different backgrounds. It is more fun to live in that kind of society than in one that is closed off, which was the kind of society that I recall Canada had in the 1950s.

With these changing social values, the stated and unstated assumptions of the previous decades—assumptions of the superiority of some groups and the inferiority of other groups—gave way to the claims for recognition and equality being made by all powerless groups. Aboriginal groups, French Canadians, women, racial and ethnic minorities, gays, victims of domestic violence, victims of abuse; these and other powerless groups rejected the stereotypes of the past and claimed social justice, recognition and inclusion in all of the good things that society had to offer. That was part of the value-change that we experienced as Canada moved through the decades of the 1970s, 80s and 90s.

These value changes—toward egalitarianism, respect, and inclusion—lead to legislation creating the Official Languages policy in 1969 and the policy of multiculturalism in 1971. I think we are still in the process of accepting and developing these values in our society today. This can be seen in the debate about, and what I think will be the ultimate acceptance of, same sex marriages. Same-sex marriage is precisely related to the values of inclusion and respect and how they are continuing to evolve.

But as these values evolved, there were other forces in the early 1990s that worked against these long-term value changes. In particular, the recession of the early 1990s was a very difficult time for people. That was a time of great dislocation for many Canadians. It was a time in which real incomes declined. It was a time of high unemployment. It was a time of eroding public services, as governments tried to respond to the fiscal crisis and pulled back spending from many areas.

We saw in our public opinion research during that period that Canadians became less open and less accepting. They pulled back and they “circled the wagons”. They became less generous. People felt less secure, and therefore they were less open and less accepting of others. The acceptance of diversity that had been growing and developing over the previous two decades was challenged and eroded, because some people were feeling threatened and dislocated by the developments of that period.

We could see this, for example, in the communities across the country which passed unilingual municipal laws. We saw a rejection of some aspects of bilingualism in the Spicer Commission. We also saw this change in hardening attitudes towards immigration: attitudes toward immigrants became more negative in the early 1990s. Canadians did not start feeling more secure until relatively recently. Even though the recession itself was confined to the early 1990s, the feelings of insecurity lasted well into the late 1990s. We can see this when we look at some survey data. Environics has been asking Canadians about their awareness of multicultural policy since 1976, in the question “Is there a federal policy of multiculturalism?” (Figure 1). We saw awareness growing until the 1990s when it fell. It started to pick up at the end of the 1990s, and in 2002, we see that the vast majority of Canadians—79% in this survey—tell us that, in fact, there is a policy of multiculturalism. So we saw an increase in awareness, then a decline during the 1990s, followed by an increase in this new decade.






Figure 1: Multicultural Policy—Awareness, 1976-2002



We asked Canadians if they approve or disapprove of a federal policy of multiculturalism (Figure 2). Approval started out at 63% the first time we asked the question in 1989. You can see the trend line going down in the early 1990s and then picking up from the mid-1990s until 2002. I note that this is after September 11, 2001, and the tensions about multiculturalism that supposedly resulted; a full 74% of Canadians said they support the policy of multiculturalism in 2002. This is a very significant finding and shows that Canadians maintain a strong allegiance to this policy.

Figure 2: Multicultural Policy—Approval



We can see a positive trend when we look at the responses over time to a number of questions about the effects of a policy of multiculturalism (See Table 1). For virtually every aspect of multiculturalism, Canadians have become more favourable over the 1989-2002 time period.

Table 1: Effects of Multicultural Policy, 1989-2002

	1989		1997		2002	
	Would	Would Not	Would	Would Not	Would	Would Not
Greater understanding between different groups in Canada	67	21	63	24	77	18
Greater equality of opportunity for all groups in Canada	62	23	59	28	73	20
Greater national unity	—	—	46	35	65	28
Some groups getting more than their fair share of government funding	53	27	50	31	51	40
Greater conflict between racial and ethnic groups	43	41	36	47	33	59
Erosion of Canadian identity and culture	35	48	36	49	32	59


Beginning at the bottom of Table 1, we asked: “Does multicultural policy lead to the erosion of Canadian identity?” We see that 59% disagree with this in 2002. The percentage rejecting this idea has actually increased. This indicates again a greater acceptance and support for the policy of multiculturalism.

A second question we have asked over time is: “Does multicultural policy lead to greater conflict between racial and ethnic groups in Canada?” Fifty-nine percent of Canadians now reject this as an outcome of multicultural policy compared to 47% in 1997 and 41% in 1989. Again that figure is higher today than ever. Only one-third of Canadians think that a multicultural policy would lead to more conflict among groups, and this figure has declined.

A third question we have asked over time is: “Does multicultural policy lead to some groups getting more than their fair share of government funding?” Just over half of Canadians agree with this, and this percentage has declined only slightly, but nonetheless declined since 1989.

A fourth question we asked is: “Does multicultural policy lead to greater national unity?” The percentages who say that unity is promoted have increased from 46% to 65% between 1997 and 2002. This is yet another dimension where we see an improvement, a more positive perception over time.

A fifth question asks “Does multicultural policy lead to greater equality of opportunity for all groups in Canada?” Here 73% of Canadians say that equality is enhanced, and that figure has tended to increase.




Finally, we asked “Does multicultural policy lead to a greater understanding between different groups in Canada?” Seventy-seven percent of Canadians say that it does, and this percentage has also increased across our study time frame.

Thus, to reiterate, I think it is fair to conclude that there is considerable acceptance and support for the policy of multiculturalism in this country today. Canadians consider it is a positive policy, and they clearly see positive effects of that policy.

When we look at support for bilingualism in each province, we see a similar pattern, though not quite as pronounced (see Figure 3), with support falling slightly in the mid-1990s and then increasing toward the end of the decade.

Figure 3: Support for Bilingualism, 1977-2003



As well we asked Canadians if they support bilingualism for all of Canada (see Figure 3). Support started out at 51% in 1977, then fell after 1988, and then began a continuous rise in 1991, ultimately to 56% in 2003.

Figure 4: In Favour of Bilingualism for all of Canada—1977-2003






Figure 5: In Favour of Bilingualism for own Province—1988-2003




The most significant differences in support for bilingualism for all of Canada are between English and French-speaking Canadians. Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate strong support among French Canadians and less support among English Canadians. However, for both linguistic groups the trend is toward increasing support since the low points in the early 1990s.

We see a similar, albeit slightly different, pattern by linguistic group for the question as to whether people favour bilingualism for their own province. We see the trend lines diverging in the early 1990s, going up very strongly for French Canadians, but dropping for English Canadians. Support has tended upward since that time, particularly for Francophones.



Finally, Figure 6 compares data from the Charter Study of 1987 to a survey Environics conducted for CRIC in 2002 asking how important Canadians think it is to preserve English and French as the two official languages in Canada. Support started at 77% in 1987, and there it is again at 77% in 2002. Thus, Canadians went through a period of doubt and questioning in the early 1990s and ended up with a high level of support for bilingualism today.

Figure 6: Importance of Bilingualism—Very or Somewhat Important—1987-2002



We have other survey data that show that Canadians think bilingualism and multiculturalism are important for the Canadian identity. In my opinion, this is further evidence that Canadians support these institutions. But we have also seen from our surveys how opinions can change, and how larger events outside of the area of language and ethnic diversity can impact and affect attitudes and public acceptance. When the economy declines, when our larger institutions are being threatened, and when Canadians themselves feel threatened, we see that support for diversity can be challenged. Thus, one of the challenges of our country is to keep the larger institutions strong and stable. Bilingualism and multiculturalism cannot rely on our social values alone, regardless of how supportive these values may be. We also need a strong economy and institutions that support equality of opportunity.

CITIZENSHIP ISSUES AND OFFICIAL LANGUAGES IN CANADA

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
I would like to present, in the pages allocated to me, the complexity of the Canadian linguistic question and some of the citizenship issues. I would particularly like to stress the contradictory logic that determines the paradigms of linguistic citizenship in Canada.

OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: A SOCIETAL LANGUAGE

It is important to clarify at the outset that the Canadian linguistic question does not raise either politically, or sociologically, the question of minority rights or of the recognition of minorities. Politically, English and French in Canada have equal status; they are both official languages. In Quebec, French is the official language and Quebec's language policy reflects a desire to have it as the common public language. Certainly, under article 23, the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* recognizes for official language minorities, at the level of educational rights, the right to instruction in the other official language (French outside Quebec and English in Quebec). However, this right is recognized by virtue of membership in one of the official language groups of Canada and not by virtue of minority rights (this is why the other minority language groups do not have such a right).

Sociologically, the matter is a little more complex. French in Canada is in a minority situation, even in Quebec, given the circumstances of its language in the Canadian and North American context (less than 25% of the Canadian population is French speaking, as is only about 3% of the population of North America). French is in a precarious situation everywhere. It is markedly at risk of being assimilated outside Quebec, with the exception of the province of New Brunswick where its erosion is slow. It is in a situation of relative stability in Quebec, in spite of language laws that have, some thirty years, aimed to promote its usage. But even here, neither the activists of the francophone linguistic cause, nor the courts called regularly to rule on linguistic rights, grasp this situation in terms of ethno-linguistic minorities.

When, for example, the courts make a "generous" interpretation of the recognition of rights for the official language minority group, that is when the court recognizes not only the right to be served or educated in the official language of one's choice, but also recognizes the obligation of governments to promote the minority language, to give institutions to the minority groups (as in the recent case of the Montfort Hospital, where the rights of francophones in Ontario to a francophone hospital, by virtue of the fact that the hospital was an institution participating in the survival of the group, were recognized); the courts established this right on the basis of the idea that communities have institutions that are necessary for their preservation as a society.¹ In other words, the courts do not recognize minority rights in the strict sense of the word, as doing so could extend to immigrants, but rather, it recognizes the right of a national minority to possess and to develop its own societal institutions. As mentioned by Will Kymlicka, by rejecting assimilation, a national minority requires the development of a parallel society, which is very different from the demands of ethno-linguistic minorities who seek a differentiated inclusion in the dominant society.²



The policy of official languages in Canada and in Quebec does not therefore proceed from a policy of multiculturalism (or rather multilingualism), which would voluntarily recognize minority languages in partnership with it or with the dominant languages. Language policy in Canada, as in Quebec, is more a classic policy of national language, sometimes put in terms of a bi-national state, sometimes in terms of national minorities. Moreover, looking back in Canadian political history, multiculturalism was widely developed, if not in opposition, at least in an effort to limit nationalistic demands associated with official languages (notably demands stemming from the francophones). Bilingualism and multiculturalism in Canada are two different ways to manage diversity, two ways that do not always respond to the same imperatives.

BILINGUALISM AND BI-NATIONALISM

With these distinctions made, I would like to return more particularly to the issues of citizenship, particularly Canadian linguistic conflicts and the logics of the opposition that stimulates them. I think about the opposition between the Canadian linguistic register (Pan-Canadian bilingualism) and the Quebec linguistic register (French unilingualism). I also think, however, of an opposition of a more sociological order; that is the tendency of English unilingualism that marks the society of English Canada (francophones are less than 5% of English Canada and less than 10% of the population in English Canada is bilingual) and of actual bilingualism that marks Quebec society (more than 10% of the Quebec population speaks English at home and more than 40% declare themselves bilingual—Statistics Canada 2001). This reflects political logic that opposes itself, but at the same time, political logic that goes against the sociological reality of languages. It is in the interweave of these contradictions that the citizenship issue of linguistic policy is decided.

Canada has not always been a bilingual country. The project of the majority of its Founding Fathers in 1867 was to create a great Anglo-British nation. This proposition was thwarted by the elites of Quebec who demanded a decentralized regime and minimal linguistic and religious protections to be a part of it. The “Constitution” of 1867 is relatively silent on language. It recognizes the bilingual character of Quebec legislation and of the federal parliament, but does not say anything about the language of the federal administration and of linguistic rights for francophones. It recognizes the right of existing separate schools, which will protect above all the confessional character of them (Catholic or Protestant) and not the French character of them, at the expense of the francophone minorities of the English-speaking provinces.³

During the 1960s, language became a true citizenship issue. The main impetus of this movement was the neo-nationalism of Quebecers whose aim was to redefine the pact of Confederation on the basis of an equality between the two “founding nations”. An important commission of inquiry was put in place from 1963 until 1969, the *Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, which had, in effect, a mandate to propose the reforms necessary to respond to the requirements of French Canadians. As its name indicates it, this Commission was not exclusively linguistic. It was interested in the bicultural nature of the country and its recommendations supported a political bilingualisation and a biculturalisation of Canada. The Commission especially stressed the political, economic, cultural and linguistic inequality in which the French Canadian community had been maintained. If the Commission proposed measures aiming at the equality of the founding peoples, it made the sociological observation that in fact, there was in Canada a dominant majority and a dominated minority and that linguistic policies were to be written in an effort to correct this situation.

The proposal of a refounding of Canada on the basis of linguistic duality would be accepted by the federal government, but not any proposals to transform the “de facto” French Canadian minority into an egalitarian community. In 1969, the federal government adopted a law on bilingualism. However, it refused to associate the recognition of linguistic duality with a recognition of a national duality. Canadian bilingualism would rest principally on the individual freedom of each Canadian, all across Canada, to use one or the other of the official languages in the public sphere. As for the bicultural character of Canada, the federal government completely reversed the logic of the Royal Commission and proposed, in 1971, a policy of multiculturalism that would endorse the idea “that cultural pluralism is the very essence of the Canadian identity.”⁴


POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN OPPOSITION

The language policy which will follow and which still governs the intervention of the federal government in this domain, aims to dissociate the language from its community or particular cultural content. In doing so, the federal government created de facto linguistic minorities in its territory (the francophones outside Quebec and the anglophones of Quebec) which, in requiring the making of an actual linguistic equality, reintroduced a link between language and culture. Thus, the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (enshrined in the Constitution of 1982) under article 23, obliges governments (above all provincial, since education is a provincial responsibility) to provide education and to supply educational institutions to linguistic minorities, where numbers justify it.

In recent years, the Supreme Court of Canada has tended to interpret generously the clause of language laws, which means that it has forced governments not only to provide services in two official languages, but also to promote the development of the minority linguistic communities when they are in a minority context. This also means, by virtue of the same principles, that the Supreme Court has invalidated certain measures of the linguistic legalization of Quebec that aim to promote French as being contrary to the linguistic equality promoted by the Charter and to the respect of linguistic minorities (notably in the restrictions imposed in Quebec on enrolment of the Anglophone Canadians in English schools or again in the French unilingualism of the public signs).⁵

One has to see that at the same moment the federal government gave itself a linguistic regime favouring Pan-Canadian bilingualism and promoting official language minorities in the provinces where they are a minority, the successive governments of Quebec have taken an inverse direction. On one hand, Quebec’s nationalist movement, which was at the root of the politicization of the linguistic issue at the beginning of 1960s, became more and more autonomist, which means that it perceived Canadian duality at the national level as well as Canadian linguistic duality in Canada, less as a characteristic of the Canadian nation, but as an arrangement between two nations, each having its own linguistic territory.

The linguistic intervention of the successive governments of Quebec have been supported, on the other hand, by the acknowledgement that the government of Quebec is the only government with a majority of French-speakers in its territory. Quebec has a particular duty to protect and to promote at the same time the language and societal institutions necessary for it to flourish. One must understand that acknowledgements are compatible with the idea that has already been presented as the primary intention of the *Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, according to which language and cultural community are intimately related and that, in fact, in Canada, there exists sociologically, a single real linguistic minority in terms of official languages: the French language. That is why it is



justifiable to establish legislation, even in Quebec, that aims to protect it and in consequence to limit the presence of English. It is in this framework that Quebec's principal language laws, particularly Bill 101—the *Charter of French Language*—, have stipulated the clear predominance of French in Quebec's territory and has clarified the means to arrive there.

TWO LINGUISTIC PROJECTS, TWO CITIZENSHIP PROJECTS

In brief, there exists in Canada and in Quebec two linguistic regimes both of which have claimed to define the linguistico-national space in a different manner. One presents an instrumental conception of languages where they should be at the undifferentiated service of the individual citizens. The other one presents a version more communitarian where the promotion of the language contributes to the cultural project to build a francophone nation in North America.⁶ They are two regimes which oppose and mutually nullify each other. By its promotion of bilingualism, the linguistic policies of the federal government directly contradict, on the territory of Quebec, the effort of this government to make Quebec's territory the only political space in America where the common public language is not English. Paradoxically, the efforts of the Canadian government—further began following the *Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* with the aim of promoting the French language in order to assure linguistic equality among Canadians—ends up opposing the most systematic effort to enhance the political prestige of this language by the language policies of Quebec. Conversely, Quebec's language policies, developed to a major extent on the sociological acknowledgement of French as a minority language in North America, came into opposition with the rights of official language minorities.⁷ One even saw the Quebec government supporting the refusal of Anglophone provincial governments to broaden the educational rights of the francophone minorities on the basis, evidently, that it would be dangerous if these expanded minority rights were extended to Quebec's Anglophone "minorities".

One needs to see that the opposition between the linguistic regimes stems from the existence of two projects of national construction, the Canadian and the Quebecois. This is because each of these projects has a hegemonic claim that ends up making it difficult, if not impossible, to recognize the asymmetry of the linguistic situations. The simple idea, for example, that French while being on an equal political plane with the English language, on a sociological plane, it is in a minority situation (even in Quebec). If the existence of two national languages in the same political union leads to incompatibilities that affect the equality citizens, this is nothing compared to the difficulties realized in Europe where some fifteen languages claim to be at the same time national and citizenship languages.

NOTES

- 1 Regarding the question of rights and francophone minorities see Linda Cardinal « Droits, langue et identités : La politique de la reconnaissance à l'épreuve de la judiciarisation », p. 269-294, dans Alain G. Gagnon et Jocelyn Maclure, ed., *Repères en mutation : identité et citoyenneté dans le Québec contemporain*, Montréal, Québec-Amérique, 2001 ; Joseph Yvon Thériault, 2003, « L'identité et le droit du point de vue de la sociologie politique » *Revue de la Common Law en français*, Vol. 5, No 1, p. 43-54, March 2003.
- 2 Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995, p. 10.
- 3 Consult the recent synthesis of the history of the legal recognition of languages in Rodrigue Landry and Serge Rousselle's *Éducation et droits collectifs*, Moncton, Les éditions de la francophonie, 2003, p.15.
- 4 François Houle, « Citoyenneté, espace public et multiculturalisme : la politique canadienne du multiculturalisme », *Sociologie et sociétés*, vol. XXXI, No 2, autumn 1999, p. 101-123.
- 5 For a study of the evolution of linguistic policies in Quebec: *Le Français au Québec. 400 ans d'histoire et de vie*, under the direction of Michel Plourde, Fides, Les Publications du Québec, Québec 2000.
- 6 Regarding this issue see Charles Taylor, *Reprocher les solitudes. Écrits sur le nationalisme au Canada*, Les Presses de l'université Laval, Québec, 1992.
- 7 This conclusion is also expressed by Léon Dion in « Les incidences démolinguistiques sur les institutions canadiennes », p. 54-75, *Tendances démolinguistiques et évolution des institutions canadiennes*, numéro spécial, Thèmes canadiens, Association d'études canadiennes, Montréal, 1980.



LAÏCITÉ¹ AND THE CRISIS OF THE NATION-STATE

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The Constitution defines France as a laïque republic without defining laïcité. However, many definitions have been brought forward. The first theoretical text on laïcité, dated 1883 and penned by Ferdinand Buisson, presents laïcité as a consequence of a long-term socio-historic process, and the end of theocracy—a process in which a double movement occurs—a movement of institutional differentiation and freeing of the state, the nation and institutions with regards to religion. Buisson provides various examples of the significance of these two affirmations. In his view, “the laïque character” of a country is not an absolute; it is the product of an evaluation in terms of more or less. Laïcité depends on a process of laïcisation and takes place in various domains.

I am attempting to develop an ideal type of laïcisation. In confronting this ideal type, it is like an empirical laïcité, which is to say the laïcité of a given time and place, there emerges a connection between proximity and distance with this ideal type. The ideal type consists of a measurement instrument allowing for a study to take place, to unite researchers from various countries and, notably in this case, to produce comparative analyses between France and Canada. At this level, laïcisation takes place in various domains as well as in the empirical, with different notions and realities stemming from other notions.

The first dimension of the process where laïcisation takes place is the state. Here, it is the dependency, more or less great, between the state and religion in terms of equality of civil and political rights. Empirical French laïcité will be a mix that is more or less between laïcité and what is called Gallicism. However, to arrive at a more expanded notion, one has to consider the term regality, or the supremacy of the state in all matters. Regality is ambivalent in relation to laïcisation since, in France, decisions regarding laïcisation were made by the state. Yet, through regal power, the state attempts to control religion; therefore, regality goes against this mutual independence and attempts to favour a type of religion, which seems to coincide with the values on which the state bases its actions.

In France, it must be said that at the global level, the process of laïcisation has taken place within the framework of the development of the importance of the state, and laïcisation has been primarily in the regal domain. Today, the state sees its status minimized because of globalization and the emergence of the new European order. It does not appear as simply as it did before as the universal mediator, notably because laïcisation happened in reference to the equality of rights. Today, European authorities are ultimately responsible for ensuring freedom of religion and conviction. It is possible to appeal cases relating to human rights to the European court. In Europe, there is a contrast between the diversity of religious regimes and a process of relative standardization of the practices, and the interpretation of rights in matters of conviction and religion. Also, in Europe, there is an emerging notion of indirect discrimination in relation to sexual preference, which is likely to extend to other realms, such as beliefs. However, the dominant French mentality of regalism seems to have difficulty assimilating this notion of indirect discrimination because the representation of the individual in the abstract, as Jean-Charles Lagrée has mentioned.



Also, today, the discussion regarding the status of religion is focused more at the European level than at the French level. Current debate about article 51 of the Constitution, which recognizes that religions have a place in social life, is quite meaningful in this regard. The problem is in defining that place. Does it stem from participation in the debates of civil society or is it an attempt to impose religious standards? Evidently, the second aspect would be more delicate in the context of laïcisation.

As to Islam and the creation of the Comité Français du culte musulman, regal aspects came into play, since the state intervened in the creation of this Committee. Paradoxically, and going against the dominant French mentality, the laïque aspect of the Comité stems from its refusal to limit itself to “moderate” Islam or “republican” Islam,” a sort of Gallican Islam, and, as such, to integrate all manifestations of the Muslim faith in France. However, it is important to note that this was done against the wishes of the majority of the public.

The second part of the process of laïcisation touches on the institutions of socialization, namely the school. At this level, laïcisation and the limitation of religion—or its disappearance—as an institutional authority of socialization, be it a case of socialization more or less socially obligatory, becomes a facilitator of socialization. Here, empirical laïcité is a mixture of secularization and laïcisation. Therefore, one finds an ambivalence of secularization relative to laïcisation.

On the one hand, it leads to a certain laïcisation, and France, the United Kingdom and Germany are good examples of this. On the other hand, secularization limits laïcisation. Germany is a concrete example. It is as secularized as France, but religion has kept an institutional character, notably with regards to social and medical assistance. In France, the process of laïcisation has resulted from a strong cultural homogeneity of the secular institutions of socialization, particularly the school, with the underlying idea that scientific and technical progress as well as knowledge, and its transfer, and socialization based on republican democratic values would foster social and moral progress. At the same time, there were hopes of intellectual and social advancements and moral progress. Victor Hugo used to say: “Each time you open a school, you close a prison.” This is because one does not think in terms of rights within these institutions, particularly in the school. There was no recourse to tribunals, since the idea of the school was so liberating. Rights, such as women’s right to wear pants and the right to be left-handed, had no value in the school, especially in the case of religious rights.

Today, the secular institutions of socialization are in crisis. Scientific-technical progress raises new social and moral questions about mass culture, the environment and biotechnology rather than about belief in conjunction with progress. Trust in institutions has been replaced by consumerism. This is apparent by the fact that students and parents of students are alternating between public and private schools and are using private schools as a sort of recourse when they are unhappy with public schools. Interestingly, 95 percent of private schools are Catholic.


The other change is about claiming rights. In July 1989, a law officially recognized the rights of students, and three months later, the first *hijab* affair appeared. It is interesting to note that there is practically no internal mechanism left today forbidding legal recourse, because it is believed that these internal mechanisms are apt to increasingly violate rights and freedoms.

One must analyze the new religious demands in schools within this double context of consumerism and demands for rights. It is not a return to pre-laïcisation; these are demands being made in a new context. For example, in cafeterias, the demands for specific foods—which have been granted—have now given way to demands for separate dishes by certain Jews and Muslims. There are demands for holidays, and the problem of the *hijab*, the *kippa* and absences from certain classes, including Saturdays for Jews, biology courses for some Muslims, and the authority of some female teachers is sometimes challenged. These multiple demands, their nature and their diversity, are causing anxiety, but also the fear that they will be a driving force. People fear that if they concede on one issue, they will have to give up on everything. They refuse to allow the *hijab* for fear of also having to give up on other things, like course issues or the acceptance of female teachers, etc. In other words, the notion of reasonable accommodation, if it is sometimes practised intuitively, is neither made explicit, nor culturally integrated. The problem is both basic and complicated: it boils down to clarifying the difference between the relatively trivial and the truly threatening.

The third dimension of the process is the nation. The process of laïcisation consists of the weakening of religion—if not the more or less total suppression of it—as a dimension of national identity. As for empirical laïcité, there has always been a blending of laïcisation and civil religion. The concept was introduced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and revisited by various sociologists. Civil religion is ambivalent about laïcisation. On the one hand, it favours a dissociation between social ties and the hegemony of a religion, while on the other hand, it carries out a transfer of the religious by consecrating the collective identity shared by the whole community, namely the nation.

In the conflict between the two Frances, two concepts of nation are playing one against another: France as the “eldest daughter of the church” and France as the daughter of the Revolution with its republican religiosity. What is surprising today is the disappearance of the links between the representation of the state and politics, which is devalued, and a representation of a national identity that expounds “republican values,” which were criticized in 1968. There is also the possibility of a “catho-laïcité,” likened to a “French styled civil religion.” François Mitterand’s funeral was an interesting example in this regard.

Globalization diminishes the nation. The local, disconnected from the traditional, finds itself in a direct relationship with the global. The problem of identity is reduced; French passports bear two names—European Union and French Republic—and two flags—the French flag and the European flag. New identity claims, religious and/or cultural, are also within this double context, and they do not constitute a return to former particularisms. Quite often, they have become deterritorialized, and it can be said that there is a crisis of territory; within certain immigrant populations, they no longer feel either a bond to their old country or one to their new country. There are also new means of communications, which allow for the possibility of “virtual communities” where it becomes possible to ignore one’s neighbour and communicate through the Internet, by cable or satellite, with people who live several thousand kilometres away. Thanks to cable, for instance, many preachers from the Middle East are heard by French Muslims, and therefore there is a great deal of talk about developing training for imams in France. This would not solve the problem, although it might be a partial solution given that there is still the possibility of having a “virtual community.” One can also say that there is a relationship between identity and identification, and identification is made largely through the media. The French nation becomes the “homeland” when it wins a world soccer championship. However, this does not happen every day and charismatic leaders evidently from various countries around the globe can also be a very strong means of identification.



The last problem within this third dimension is the way in which global society is identified. The perception of others is often the perception of the majority that make up the community, creating communitarianism,² a popular term in France these days in spite of the fact that it is often poorly defined, and there are several possible definitions. Several questions arise, like the need to create a new French myth which takes into consideration changes in the populations which make up the nation, or the question of public and statutory holidays, which are currently all based on Catholicism when there is a religious connotation, or the question of the “values of the republic,” namely whether they are inclusive and whether they constitute an auto-legitimization of the “old French” or of the “new French” of non-European origin, and non-Europeans living in France.

The last point concerns the final stage of the process: the individual. Laïcisation, in this framework, is respect for freedom of thought and of conscience, which creates the right to belong, to change one’s affinities and to refuse to belong. Empirical laïcité is linked to a representation of society that separates the private space from the public one. There as well, one observes an ambivalence to such a representation because on the one hand, this representation of the public and private space is indispensable to the avoidance of official religion or state atheism. On the other hand, it is impossible for the public space to be truly neutral. The public sphere is organized based on the history and culture of the dominant group or on a compromise between two groups, which currently seems to be the case between the democratic laïque tradition and the Catholic one.

Laïcisation has caused a dissociation between citizenship of religious belonging, and the insistence on conscience, both the manifestation of the individual and the global as representative of moral values, moral values that could be disconnected from religion with the laïque moral, as well as the civic insistence on the joint responsibility of all. It seems that secular moral is distanced from the notion of the abstract and philosophical individual. It is far more pragmatic and grounded. There is currently a return to Condorcet, to the age of Enlightenment, to the representation of the abstract individual, at a time when the emphasis is on the duty to reach one’s full potential—promoted by the media—to be autonomous, to be responsible for one’s self, which all take precedence over joint responsibility. This places constraints on the development of individual identities, often producing adverse effects and malaise in response to constructions of identity, that wish to help individuals, or take into account individuals’ constructions given their necessary obligation to fulfill themselves. The new religious claims must be understood in this context.

In conclusion, one wonders if the current crisis is in the transmission of laïcité or in the creation of a new form of laïcité. One also wonders if laïcité has been a dialectic movement focusing religion and also respecting it. In this new religious context, what should be attributed to the focus on religion and to the respect for religion? Finally, how will France position itself faced with an evolution in the representation of human rights, the conception of fundamental rights, specifically the problem of indirect discrimination and reasonable accommodation? Regarding this last question, a franco-Canadian reflection would undoubtedly prove to be both interesting and fruitful.

NOTES

- 1 Note from PCH: In France, *laïcité* refers to the separation of church and state, especially the absence of religious interference into government affairs (as well as the converse independence of religious practice). Although the concept is related to secularism, theoretically it does not imply hostility toward religious beliefs as can be perceived of secular societies. Rather, it implies the neutrality of the state concerning religious practice. There is no special status given to religion; religious activities are not considered above the law. Further, this neutrality does not protect any religions; the state's position is one of ambivalence. As such, the government refrains from taking positions on religious doctrine and only considers religious subjects for their practical consequences on the lives of French citizens. For an elaboration on this term, see Micheline Milot "The School and Religious Diversity in Canada and Quebec," in this collection. As the term is not directly translatable, *laïcité* and its derivatives will be left in French throughout the paper.
- 2 From PCH: It should be noted that understandings of communitarianism in Canada and France are markedly different. In France, it is perceived as negative and exclusive or insular, threatening national unity by, in part, guaranteeing certain rights to certain individuals at the expense of the rights of the collectivity who compose civil society, in part, by creating "ethnic" enclaves perceived to exist apart from the rest of society. Communitarianism is also seen as a threat to *laïcité*, a fundamental principle of the French Republic. Conversely, in Canada, communitarianism is seen as positive and inclusive, meant to define community-building endeavours that are not specific to any one group, be it ethnically or "racially" defined.



THE SCHOOL AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN CANADA AND QUÉBEC

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In this article, I examine the relationship between the school and religions in the context of the challenges it reveals for democracies in the management of diversity. This includes the legal and political dimensions of the challenges as well as the concept of citizenship which determines its management. I approach this question in the manner of a *problématique* capable of defining certain axis or lines of inquiry for a program of comparative research between Canada and France. I focus on the impact of the judicial system on political governance and the concept of citizenship. I begin by painting a broad picture of the Canadian situation with respect to the explicit legal framework as it relates to religious diversity. I then develop some examples capable of leading to comparative *problématiques* on the political governance of religious diversity, particularly in the educational milieu.

THE CANADIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Since Confederation in 1867, education has been under provincial jurisdiction. However, the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* is an integral part of the 1982 federal Constitution and normative for the entire federation. Among other things, this means that any laws adopted by the provincial legislatures (as with those adopted by the Canadian Parliament) must comply with the Charter.

Contrary to American or French law, the state's duty of neutrality is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. There is no mention of separation or *laïcité*.¹ In accordance with common legal tradition, the "duty of neutrality" was established by nineteenth century jurisprudence and is closely linked to two fundamental rights: freedom of conscience and religion, and equality, which the Supreme Court of Canada has reaffirmed many times.

Even if some provinces upon entering the Canadian federation negotiated a constitutional guarantee to maintain religious education in their public school system for minority groups, these same provinces, namely Quebec and Newfoundland, are now facing growing religious diversity and have requested a revocation of these guarantees.

The rights that frame the management of diversity in order to avoid discrimination based on religion in the various institutions, including schools are:

1. *The freedom of conscience and religion*: This is set out in the Canadian (1982) and Quebec (1975) charters (the Quebec charter is of quasi-constitutional value to the province). This provision excludes any form of direct or indirect pressure to "conform" to dominant norms or values.

The courts (particularly *R. v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd.* [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295) determined that freedom of conscience and religion in the broadest sense implies the absence of coercion and constraint, and the right to manifest one's beliefs and practices, subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Coercion includes not only blatant forms of constraint exercised in the direct form of ordinances to act or refrain from acting under threat of penalty, but also indirect forms of control which determine or limit possibilities in the manifestations of beliefs.

2. *Equality*: Section 15 of the Canadian Charter (like section 10 in the Quebec Charter) guarantees the right to equality and lists grounds for which discrimination is explicitly prohibited: race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age and mental or physical disability (the Quebec Charter adds pregnancy, marital status, language, political beliefs and sexual orientation to the list).


Moreover, the *R v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd.* [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 landmark decision indicated that “the protection of one religion and the concomitant non-protection of others imports disparate impact destructive of the religious freedom of the collectivity,” (Justice Dickson). In other words, inequality brought on by an absence of neutrality is equivalent to denying religious freedom itself. For instance, the right to equality requires that support for all religions be the same. In the provinces that fund private denominational schools, for example, the right to equality requires that they do so without favouring any one religion.

3. *The duty of reasonable accommodation*: When a justified rule or regulation or an act adopted by the state, or an institution or company is indirectly discriminatory for one individual or a group of individuals, Canadian courts clearly established the duty to respect the right to accommodation.

This right can, for instance, involve exempting the individual who is indirectly the object of discrimination from the rule or providing that individual with a benefit to compensate for or mitigate the discriminatory effect. The right is asserted in matters of dress (wearing a scarf, a turban or a kirpan) and holidays for religious reasons in the workplace.

POLITICAL GOVERNANCE

The guidelines for the type of political governance that Canada and France can exercise with respect to religion at school are set *in fine* by their respective constitutions, whatever legislative scheme governs the local school administration. In Canada, what guides the state in its conception of the management of diversity is reflected largely in the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, which, as I indicated earlier, is an integral part of the Constitution. In France, *laïcité*, which was included in the 1946 constitution, although not defined, constitutes the normative ideal of citizenship in a pluralistic society. The reference to human rights is part of the preamble of the French Constitution.



Despite the structural difference with respect to the status given to fundamental rights and the framework in which they must be interpreted, we can nevertheless put forward that the two modes of governance tend ideally to conform to what the spirit of constitutional law demands with respect to the freedom and equality of citizens.

However, it is interesting to examine the marked differences between the two countries and one can avoid setting the French “republican” model against the more “communitarian” Anglo-Saxon model in a simplistic opposition because this typification is misleading and even outdated when the social and political public debates on religious diversity are examined closely. However, the differences are evident, as much at the level of the state’s understanding of its duty to manage religious diversity, as at the level of the dominant social representations of the degree of acceptance of it, of diversity’s contribution to the ideal of shared citizenship, or its potentially adverse affect in it.

Through a few examples, I will show the problems that religious diversity raises in the school setting: teaching religion and support for denominational schools, wearing religious symbols by children, and the qualifications and beliefs of teachers.

The Status of Schools and the Teaching of Religions

In the school system, can parents demand that teaching be done in accordance with their beliefs? Is the teaching of religions, regardless of denomination, compatible with the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* or *laïcité*?

As for the orientation of the schools’ curriculum and the teaching of religion (from the perspective of the governance of religious diversity), the Canadian case presents a more asymmetric portrait than the French system. In Canada, one observes the existence of four main models of management between schools and religions: a completely *laïcisé* model in which any denominational reference is prohibited as far as schools and religious teaching are concerned (Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick and British Columbia); a second model that grants the constitutional right to non-denominational religious teaching (Newfoundland); a third model in which denominational rights *per se* are constitutionally recognized through a special provision drafted when entering the federation, but in which the application of such rights is left to the discretion of the school councils and translate into separate schools (Ontario, Nova Scotia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba); and lastly, a *laïcisé* model that derogates from the Charters of Rights and Freedoms to maintain the denominational teaching of two traditions, Roman Catholic and Protestant (Quebec), a derogation that is being re-evaluated.

International instruments (such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights signed by Canada) bind states to *respect the rights of parents to ensure the moral and religious education of their children in accordance with their own beliefs* and recognize the right to private education, but not the right to funding. In Canada, as a general rule, the financial support of provincial governments for denominational schools outside the public system is much less generous than what is offered to free schools in France.

The Ontario court decisions (to which other provinces can refer) as much as international precedents consider that the cultural teaching of religion or the history of religion does not adversely affect the freedom of conscience and religion of those receiving it, as long as it is done in an objective and neutral way. Public education including the teaching of a religion or a specific belief is incompatible with the statement of the International Covenant (article 18, paragraph 4) unless it provides for exemptions or the possibility of non-discriminatory choices that are in accordance with parents' wishes, which is very difficult to realize in practice, unless there are several religious groups that are quantitatively similar. For this reason, an exemption is considered (Court of Appeal for Ontario) to be contrary to freedom of conscience because such an exemption: 1) forces the child or his/her parents to pronounce their beliefs or their absence of belief, which the state cannot impose on anyone; and 2) has the effect of marginalizing the children who request it.


What happens to the content of teaching that is not directly religious but includes behavioural models that some citizens condemn due to their religious beliefs? What requirements with respect to citizen education can reasonably be expected in the governance of a diversity of moral and religious concepts?

In the *Chamberlain vs. Surrey School District No. 36* affair of 2002, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) found that a school council's resolution that refused to approve three school books that showed same-sex parent families (because parents morally condemned the lifestyle), to be unreasonable and illegal. In a majority decision, the SCC found that the school council should not let any religious or moral opinion dictate its conduct and that it should act in compliance with the principles of the *School Act* of British Columbia that affirms the laïque character of schools, a laïcité that reflects the diversity of Canadian society and aims to foster a climate of tolerance and respect. Laïcité is not only legally recognized but it is explicitly linked to diversity, tolerance and respect. Parents do not have to give up their personal beliefs or opinions concerning the "undesirable" character or behaviour of others, but they must accept that a whole range of family models be presented in the classroom to foster an understanding of others and that the teachers have the educational tools to do so.

In this case, as in several others, one can observe that laïcité is seen in a highly pragmatic manner as a framework that should foster tolerance and respect for diversity and does not stem from a political statement (even if the positive value given to diversity is recognized as such in many political statements). This pragmatism is not just procedural, it is part of a very broad "pluralistic" conception of freedom of conscience and religion.

Wearing Religious Symbols and the Equality of Treatment of Various Groups of Beliefs

The reactions surrounding the wearing of the headscarf at school is a symbolic indicator of the relationship between religious freedom and the concept of citizenship. Underlying these reactions of acceptance or prohibition are some fundamental questions that could be stated as follows: is the implicit definition that the political system gives to religion based on a Christian reference? Is religious diversity perceived as an obstacle to a citizenship conceived in terms of the autonomy of the individual, gender equality, and the ability of individuals to place distance between themselves and their community roots? In other words, can believers whose beliefs which determine their personal behaviour in public life but do not correspond to the liberal democratic ideal, be good citizens?



While it is politics in France that determines whether the wearing of the headscarf complies with school *laïcité*, in Canada, a statement supporting the wearing of the headscarf issued by a Human Rights Commission, which defended the action according to freedom of conscience and religion, the right to equality, and the duty of reasonable accommodation, was enough to quiet debate.

French political governance seems to recognize a duty on the part of the state to protect conscience from the influence of representations deemed radically contradictory to reason and autonomy: the argument of freedom of thought seems to outweigh that of freedom of religion, at least in political statements and public debates, as demonstrated by the creation of a list of sects, perceived as potentially dangerous because of their members or for social equilibrium, by an interdepartmental mission on the fight against sects (MILS—February 7, 2000).

In Canada, the release of such a list would undoubtedly be deemed contrary to the Constitution. The state would be accused of abandoning its position of neutrality if it ordered what is religiously correct or what complies with the most commonly shared values, because this distinction would be considered discriminatory.

The Religious Beliefs of Teachers and their Competency in Public Schools

In Canada, we make a distinction in matters of discrimination between the content of a belief and public behaviour in relation to others. The content of beliefs that discredits those of others or that disapprove of lawful behaviours do not necessarily imply a discriminatory behaviour toward others. One cannot reasonably or legally fear discriminatory behaviour on the part of individuals just because they hold beliefs that disapprove of the behaviour of others. In other words, the freedom of belief is broader than the freedom to act on the strength of a belief. On this point, the Supreme Court of Canada came to a conclusion only recently in a specific case (*Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers*, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772).

Trinity Western University (TWU) is a private institution located in British Columbia and associated with the Evangelical Free Church of Canada. Trinity Western established a teacher-training program leading to an undergraduate teaching degree after five years, four of which are at TWU and the fifth under the aegis of Simon Fraser University. Trinity Western asked the British Columbia College of Teachers (charged with the accreditation of teacher training programs) for permission to take full responsibility for the teacher-training program to ensure that the program reflects its Christian vision of the world. The College of Teachers denied the request, because it feared the community standards of TWU, applicable to all students, teachers and staff, would discriminate against homosexuals. This fear stemmed more specifically from the list of “practices that the Bible condemns,” which includes “sexual sins, including...homosexual behaviour.” The members of the TWU community were required to sign a document in which they agreed to abstain from engaging in any such activity.

The Court found that “It cannot be reasonably concluded that private institutions are protected but that their graduates are *de facto* considered unworthy of fully participating in public activities...There is nothing in the TWU Community Standards, which are limited to prescribing conduct of members while at TWU, that indicates that graduates of TWU will not treat homosexuals fairly and respectfully.” In other words, the view is in keeping with the presumption of innocence in Canadian law. The TWU teacher who, in the public school system, would manifest a discriminatory behaviour, could then be subject to disciplinary or legal proceedings.

An infringement on the freedom of conscience and on religion must be appreciated in relation to the “facts” that prove this infringement. “Potential dangerousness” for the rights of others and social order cannot be presumed from religious doctrines, that is, on the basis of a hypothetical link between adhering to a system of beliefs and the feared restraint on the exercise of one’s citizenship.

Many Avenues of Thought are Opening from the Standpoint of Comparative Analysis. To name only a few:

It can be theorized that the differences between Canada and France concerning the governance of diversity stem not from constitutional law but from the social practice of the law on the one hand and the influence afforded to politics in public debates (more so in France than in Canada). The social practice of the law and the weight given to politics significantly affect the social concepts of what is acceptable or not in terms of the leeway given to the expression of religious diversity in schools and in the interpretation of what constitutes discrimination.

How can political governance foster, in a context of religious diversity, a participatory conception of citizenship and the fulfilment of a social role by individuals with views of the world that reject, even partially, values fundamental to the ideal of liberal citizenship?


More specifically with regard to that melting pot for citizen integration, the school, by what method does the democratic tradition in each country come to terms with the diversification of conceptions of meanings.

ANCILLARY NOTES

Religious exercises—Quebec legislation does not say anything about religious exercises. Once again, it is in Ontario that jurisprudence has established that religious exercises in public schools constitute an infringement on the freedom of religion, even if an exemption could be granted. In effect, by asking for an exemption, individuals have to express their beliefs and are marginalized, depending on circumstances, if they do not want to participate in the exercises. That is why the provisions in the rules and regulations of the Protestant committee that provide specifically for an exemption would infringe the on freedom of conscience and religion of those making such a request.

Denominational requirements of certain jobs—Only private denominational schools can use their religious nature to require religious qualities of all or some of their employees. However, public schools cannot avail themselves of their laïc nature to refuse to hire a candidate whose teacher training would have been entirely provided in a private denominational university that teaches, for instance, traditional Christian values according to which homosexuality is a sin (*TWU vs. BCCT*).

Religious teaching—The act provides that students or the parents of minor children have the right in any public school to choose either Roman Catholic religious teaching, Protestant religious teaching or laïque moral teaching, which schools are required to provide. As for the teaching of other religions, the commission can organize it on request from the school council.



From the standpoint of equality, the system is clearly discriminatory since it grants to the Catholics, Protestants and the non-religious a benefit that it does not grant to others. In addition, it is contrary to section 41 of the Quebec Charter that recognizes without distinction the parental right to demand religious teaching in public schools that is in accordance with their beliefs. In the eyes of section 10 of the Charter, discrimination appears even more evident. In the event that the objective of the chosen settlement should be neutral, such as favouring the moral training for citizens, this discrimination would not be justified given the provisions of section 1 of the Canadian Charter, because there is no rational link between the idea of favouring this moral training and that of reserving religious teaching to two religions.

In this regard, legal clarity is lacking. Indeed, given the dispensatory provisions that shelter the rights and privileges of the Catholic and Protestant religions from legal challenges, no one to this day has been able to legally verify whether or not religious teaching in public schools in Quebec infringes on the freedom of conscience and religion of individuals who do not practise these religions.

NOTE

- 1 Note from PCH: In France, *laïcité* refers to the separation of church and state, especially the absence of religious interference into government affairs (as well as the converse independence of religious practice). Although the concept is related to secularism, theoretically it does not imply hostility toward religious beliefs as can be perceived of secular societies. Rather, it implies the neutrality of the state concerning religious practice. There is no special status given to religion; religious activities are not considered above the law. Further, this neutrality does not protect any religions; the state's position is one of ambivalence. As such, the government refrains from taking positions on religious doctrine and only considers religious subjects for their practical consequences on the lives of French citizens.

EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN FRANCE

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
(Unité Mixte de Recherches EPHE/CNRS)

One cannot broach the subject of education and religious diversity in France without also considering the relationships between political unity and religious and cultural diversity in general and examining how the missions of schools in this regard are developed. The first striking aspect is that public debate on this subject in France is highly dramatized and ideologized, as demonstrated by two examples: over the last few years, the issue of the *hijab* being worn in schools has raised much debate and the fact that some have alluded to a “Munich of the republican school” is an indication of the intensity of the debate; when Prime Minister Lionel Jospin drafted legislation on Corsica that pertained to teaching the Corsican language in public schools, he was accused of “digging the Republic’s grave,” an expression which is also telling of the level of controversy raised by this issue. These reactions reveal the degree of passion associated with this debate in France and that, in fact, we are touching upon a certain idea that France has formed of itself. Any analysis of the issue must strive to emphasize the differences between some of the rhetoric regarding the French model of citizenship and the practices and developments which occur, since there have been changes in spite of some major roadblocks.

Three major points will be raised here: first, political unity and cultural and religious diversity; second, the dispute between Catholic schools and *laïque*¹ schools (or public non-religious schools) in the context of public education construed as a political institution of national integration; and third, cultural and religious diversity in schools.

POLITICAL UNITY AND CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

The relationship between political unity and cultural and religious diversity, that is, the integration of cultural and religious differences into the political community formed by the French Republic, is a major challenge for France, a country distinguished by its political heritage bent on centralization and homogenization, which did not favour the development of a perspective on integration. Borne of a concept that the legitimate social bond is based above all on the political bond, France is struggling with the notion that public space can also serve as a forum for expressing various cultural and religious identities. In France, political unity has evolved more through the struggle against plurality than through trying to accommodate plurality. This is especially obvious when it comes to languages, where unity has been based on assimilation rather than any attempt to deal with linguistic diversity. France does not try to deal differently with religious diversity than it does with language differences or regional differences. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that it is particularly difficult for France, with its traditions linked to centralization and homogenization, to manage not only matters tied to the symbols of membership within a certain religious group at school (as in the *hijab*) but also issues such as that of Corsica or the creation of Breton schools. This political model based on assimilation was strengthened by the fact that it evolved as a program for the regeneration of man and that it was construed as the necessary path to modernity, with the state being presented as the major



thrust for emancipation. Therefore, in the name of equality among all individuals in the eyes of the law, that is, the principle of non-discrimination and universality of citizenship, the notion of minority group is completely excluded from French law, as illustrated by the three following examples:

- The official French doctrine denies the existence of ethnic or linguistic minorities in France. The act of June 25, 1980, which authorizes France to enter into the United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, also introduces a provision stating there are no ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities in France. Furthermore, since no such groups exist in France, article 27 of the United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees collective rights to those belonging to those minorities, does not apply to France.
- The Constitutional Board, in its ruling of May 9, 1991, on the statutes of Corsica, states that the mention made by the legislator that "Corsicans form a part of the French people" goes against France's Constitution which recognizes only one French people, without distinction of origin, race or religion.
- In June 1999, the Board also declared unconstitutional the *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages* signed by France on May 7, 1999. The Charter was deemed such because it grants specific rights to groups speaking regional minority languages within the territories where these languages are in use. Also, the Charter was said to infringe upon the constitutional principles of the indivisible nature of the French Republic, of equality before the law and of unicity of the French people.

The above examples reveal a cautionary attitude toward the allowance of cultural differences, particularly linguistic differences. It is interesting to note France's paradoxical attitude in that it defends its linguistic and cultural specificity internationally, but at home, it is only with reluctance that it recognizes the public expression of cultural and linguistic identities. As such, President Jacques Chirac, in addressing a commission looking at ethnic diversity in Paris in February 2003, emphasized that cultural diversity belongs to the common heritage of humanity that there is not just one language but several, and that the universality of man is really based on individual nature. However, within the internal political context, such views are not particularly popular when it comes to cultural diversity within the French territory. In other words, France is assimilationist within its own boundaries while showing a greater tendency to differentiation on the international scene.

THE DISPUTE BETWEEN CATHOLIC AND LAÏQUE SCHOOLS IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC EDUCATION CONSTRUED AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

It must be recalled that the emergence of political sovereignty in France was marked by a direct struggle with the Catholic Church, a dominant religious institution that was considered a potential or real threat to the political sovereignty of the state. I maintain that the French singularity of the relationship between church and state is due to the fact that this relationship has been shaped by four major factors.

The first of these factors is the issue of the confrontation between church and state since the French Revolution and the civil constitution of the clergy, which raises more conflict in France than in other countries. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the place and role of religion within the national community was a central issue and led

to huge rifts. The degree of religious integration and cultural practice of the Catholic Church remains the most enlightening variable of political behaviour and of the distribution over the left and the right. The second factor is the fact that the problem is highly ideological in nature and has taken on a greater importance in France compared to other countries (specifically other European countries) relative to philosophical and political interpretations which question religion on the weight of free thought among those with Marxist and freemasonry views. The third factor is the marked affirmation of the state's supremacy and its power over civil society, which makes France both an enlightened state characterized by an emancipatory tradition and a state bent on centralization and homogenization. The fourth and final factor is the marked reluctance to allow public expression of religion which leads to the privatization of religious life, a trend more marked in France than in other countries.

With such a backdrop, it is understandable that the rivalry between state and church has become focused in schools, as the symbol of power over minds. Charles Renouvier, a philosopher partisan of Kant and great inspirer to the Republican Party stated, in the 1870s, that “[*translation*] the state is the home of moral unity of the people. It is responsible for peoples' souls just as churches are, but in a more universal manner.” A whole political philosophy is enshrined in those few words, which reflect the necessarily competitive and difficult ties between it and the dominant religion in France.

Therefore, this rivalry between state and church became focused in education and led to the theme of “two Frances” in opposition to each other. This opposition became particularly apparent in education and schools, a school of thought, which historians of the Revolution and others, such as Mona Ozouf, declare as melding with the Revolution; it is tasked with preventing the dissolution and appeasing the torment of a society formed of individuals who are equal and free. Its mission is to imagine a belief system capable of sustaining and rallying these individuals, now independent, by giving it, if possible, a seductive power and a strength comparable to that of the religion whose hold has just been shaken, to create a common patriotic and moral conscience similar to the enterprise which the revolutionaries deliberately undertook, which explains the state's heavy investment in schools as a political institution of national integration. With legislation on the laïcisation of schools introduced in the 1880s, moral and religious education was replaced by moral and civic instruction. The importance placed on education became even clearer through the state's attempts to take it over. It all ties into the issue of public schools versus private schools (essentially, Catholic schools). The recognition of the part played by Catholic schools in the interest of public service through national education came about with great difficulty, although it did finally prevail. For a long time, the prevalent view was “private school, private funds, public school, public funds,” emphasizing the status difference of these schools. The question was whether both could provide the same level of education.

The 1959 *Dubray Act* generated a great deal of reaction and criticism, but it nonetheless appeased the conflict within the educational system. However, in 1984, the problem resurfaced because the Education Minister at the time wanted to provide a vast and unified laïc educational system to all students. The project caused considerable outcry, including an important protest in Versailles attended by thousands of French men and women, and led by bishops. The project actually led to the government's demise and was abandoned. As a matter of fact, educational pluralism is now protected by article 9 of the *European Convention on Human Rights* and by article 2 of the Additional Protocol which states: “In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religions and philosophical convictions.” There has been institutionalization of the diversity of teaching



institutions, but it is important to note that to some union representatives and certain proponents of *laïcité*, such as the philosopher Pena-Ruiz, the situation has not been truly accepted and integrated as some wish to question the balances, which have been achieved.

CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN SCHOOLS

Civic universalism, as it has been construed in education based on a break from individual cultures, has tended to transform schools into a veritable sanctuary of the universal, free of specificities. However, this model of schools as a sanctuary of the universal has been questioned by many sources over the last few decades. For example, Pierre Bourdieu's analysis, which indicated that schools duplicated social inequities and even made them worse, rather than resolving them, has a considerable impact. Today, some are even going so far as to question the mixing of boys and girls in public schools given their differing educational paths and success levels. The relationship between school and diversity is also brought into question in the context of language and regional cultures, as well as religion. However, things are changing, particularly with regards to religious diversity. An education act passed in 1989 explicitly states that students must be allowed to freely express their spiritual beliefs at school. Therefore, *laïcité* in schools rests primarily with teachers and curriculum and does not forbid the attendance of students with their own particularities.

Each year, the Education Ministry puts out an official bulletin listing religious holidays in addition to the Christian holidays which are part of the calendar of official holidays: they are the religious holidays observed by Armenians, Buddhists, Jews, Muslims and Orthodoxes, and students belonging to those groups do not have to attend classes on the religious holidays. Therefore, even within a *laïc* regime, there exists an implicit regime of religious belief, recognized through religious holidays, which allow for absence from class. It is difficult to avoid recognizing certain faiths or to avoid taking others into consideration. I will paraphrase my colleague, Philippe Portier, who commented on the notice of the State Council on the *hijab*: students are allowed to express their religious beliefs in school as long as there is no evangelical proselytizing or ostentatious or conspicuous attempt to do so. The whole problem revolves around the definition of ostentatious, although it is important to note that the possibility is recognized. In 2004, an act was adopted prohibiting the "wearing, at school, of symbols or apparel through which the students ostentatiously express their belonging to a religious faith." The issue of determining at which point a religious symbol becomes ostentatious or conspicuous is open to various interpretations.

Another factor is the important initiative on the lack of consideration given to religious aspects in school curricula, which followed the findings of an increasing lack of religious culture among students since the publication of Rector Philippe Joutard's report in 1989. This initiative has encouraged public administrations to consider religion in education (report by Régis Debray in 2002).

In conclusion, a limited awareness of cultural and religious diversity on the part of the state, particularly in schools, shows that the government is not keeping up with the times. There is much talk, within this context, of a reform of the state and restructured public intervention. If we look at Ross Poole's work, for example, who insists on the need for ties between political affirmation and cultural expression of this affirmation, he greatly emphasizes the fact that democratization in many countries has been linked to various forms of nationalism. Is there a link between the affirmation of the citizens' republic and French nationalism? This promotion of civic detachment with regards

to specific cultures was aided by the fact that national mobilization was strong. The Republic tried to assimilate as many people as possible and as such, was promoting a national culture bent on integration and mobilization which went hand in hand with certain forms of cultural and political nationalism which were highly successful through vast socialization bodies such as the army, schools and the Catholic Church, given the weight that it has in France.

If today France has trouble recognizing that it is through specific cultures that people learn how to become full citizens, it is because the political link was developed in opposition to the assimilation of individuals in certain social settings as this assimilation was perceived as constricting and infringing upon individual freedoms. Nowadays, the situation is completely different as political sovereignty is being imposed on people who are already emancipated. This tradition of a state intent on centralization and homogenization and wishing to emancipate individuals from this milieu is playing against a completely different sociocultural situation, one in which individuals are discovering that it is from assimilation within a particular culture that they are able to accept citizenship.

NOTES

1 Note from PCH: In France, *laïcité* refers to the separation of church and state, especially the absence of religious interference into government affairs (as well as the converse independence of religious practice). Although the concept is related to secularism, theoretically it does not imply hostility toward religious beliefs as can be perceived of secular societies. Rather, it implies the neutrality of the state concerning religious practice. There is no special status given to religion; religious activities are not considered above the

law. Further, this neutrality does not protect any religions; the state's position is one of ambivalence. As such, the government refrains from taking positions on religious doctrine and only considers religious subjects for their practical consequences on the lives of French citizens. For an elaboration on this term, see Micheline Milot "The School and Religious Diversity in Canada and Quebec," in this collection. As the term is not directly translatable, *laïcité* and its derivatives will be left in French throughout the paper.