

MINISTER OF
NATIONAL DEFENCE'S
MONITORING COMMITTEE



Progress Report II

- *Land Force Reserve Restructure*
- *Professional Development, Education and Leadership*



June 2003

Hon. John McCallum
Minister of National Defence
101 Colonel By
National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, ON K1A 0K2

Dear Minister:

On behalf of the members of your Monitoring Committee, I am pleased to present our Progress Report II on Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) and Professional Development, Education and Leadership. This report is submitted in accordance with our mandate to monitor progress with respect to the implementation of change within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.

Yours sincerely,

John A. Fraser
Chairman

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	IV
LAND FORCE RESERVE RESTRUCTURE (LFRR)	IV
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, EDUCATION, AND LEADERSHIP	VII
PROGRESS REPORT II.....	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
ADMINISTRATION	4
<i>Decisions</i>	4
<i>Status</i>	4
<i>Observations</i>	5
MOBILIZATION, HISTORICAL CONTINUITY AND FOOTPRINT IN THE COMMUNITY.....	7
<i>Decisions</i>	7
<i>Status</i>	8
<i>Observations</i>	9
CONDITIONS OF SERVICE	12
<i>Decisions</i>	12
<i>Status</i>	13
<i>Observations</i>	14
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	16
<i>Decisions</i>	16
<i>Status</i>	17
<i>Observations</i>	17
CONSULTATION AND MONITORING.....	21
<i>Decisions</i>	21
<i>Status</i>	22
<i>Observations</i>	22
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, EDUCATION AND LEADERSHIP.....	23
BACKGROUND.....	23
<i>Observations</i>	25

ANNEX A – TERMS OF REFERENCE AND POLICY STATEMENT	30
<i>Appendix 1 to Annex A - Transmittal Letter from “In Service of the Nation”.....</i>	<i>33</i>
<i>Appendix 2 to Annex A - 1999 Terms of Reference.....</i>	<i>34</i>
ANNEX B - DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE – ORGANIZATIONAL CHART.....	36
ANNEX C – STAGES OF MOBILIZATION	37
ANNEX D – MMC CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES	38
ANNEX E – LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	41
ANNEX F – BIOGRAPHIES.....	43
<i>The Honourable John A. Fraser</i>	<i>43</i>
<i>Dr. David J. Bercuson.....</i>	<i>44</i>
<i>Mr. D. Bevis Dewar.....</i>	<i>45</i>
<i>Brigadier General (Ret’d) Sheila A. Hellstrom</i>	<i>46</i>
<i>Major General (Ret’d) Reginald W. Lewis</i>	<i>46</i>

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the second report of the Minister's Monitoring Committee on Land Force Reserve Restructure. We have been mandated by the Minister of National Defence to monitor the implementation of Government approved recommendations related to Reserves and Professional Development, Education and Leadership. In this report we offer our assessment on progress achieved up to the spring of 2003 with respect to both Land Force Reserve Restructure and Professional Development, Education and Leadership.

Overall, the Committee is pleased to report that steady progress has been observed in many areas. There are, however, still pockets of activity where greater attention is necessary.

Throughout this progress report we offer our detailed observations on the various issues under our watch. This Executive Summary highlights our major observations.

LAND FORCE RESERVE RESTRUCTURE (LFRR)

On 3 April 2003 the Minister of National Defence announced the start of Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) Phase II as per the Government Policy Statement of 6 October 2000. LFRR Phase II will provide funding for an immediate increase of 750 Army Reservists in fiscal year 2003/2004 and another 750 in 2004/2005. The overall goal, within constraints on resources, remains to increase the Army Reserve (Militia) to 18,500, and additional monies will be set aside to address the equipment needs associated with the new capabilities of the Army Reserve. On 13 May 2003 the Minister re-emphasized that "LFRR is a critical project, and I am determined that Phase 2 will preserve the Army Reserve as a national institution and transform its operational potential to meet Canada's needs in the 21st Century."¹

The Committee applauds the strong efforts that continue to be made by the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS), Lieutenant-General M.K. Jeffery, and the Project Management Office (PMO) LFRR under Major-General E.S. Fitch. Indeed, the CLS acted as a "leader of change" for the Army Reserve and the PMO LFRR rendered stalwart service as its champion. Among their many accomplishments are:

- Meeting the Army objective in determining the role of the Army Reserve (Militia);
- Conducting an ambitious series of cross-country consultations with Militia units and community leaders in local and metropolitan areas and producing a first draft

¹ *Hansard*, Number 084, 2003-04-03; and letter from The Honourable John McCallum to The Honourable John A. Fraser.

Army mobilization plan capable of generating forces up to the Stage 3 level of the four stages of mobilization outlined in the *1994 Defence White Paper*;

- Institutionalizing the concept of Command and Area Consultative and Advisory Groups, which have proven to be especially useful in maintaining harmonious relations between Reserves and Regulars and promoting the revitalization of the Militia in the 21st Century;
- Promoting the role of the Army Reserves in maintaining a federal as well as military “footprint in the community” as a matter of public policy. The increased awareness of Canadians in appreciating what the Militia can do for them in the case of recent natural disasters has additionally conditioned many of them to look to the Reserves as a first line of home defence;
- Increasing Army Reserve support to operations with the deployment of Composite Reserve Companies (CRCs) on “Operation Palladium” Rotations to Bosnia from October 2002; and,
- Supporting the introduction of a number of new capabilities that cater to Army Reserve service and which have already started to pay dividends in support of current operations.

Other accomplishments worthy of mention include:

- The second reading of *Bill C-17: The Public Safety Act, 2002* on 20 November 2002. Clause 80 of this bill proposes that “if an officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force is called out for service in respect of an emergency, the officer’s or member’s employer shall reinstate the officer or member in employment at the expiry of that service”; and,
- The Reserve Force Employment Project (RFEP) to be completed by spring 2005 constitutes the most comprehensive review of Reserve employment policies to date.

As might be expected, however, a number of challenges continue to merit serious attention, including:

- Despite Herculean efforts by some, the real streamlining of the recruiting system has yet to be achieved. The enrolment process remains the greatest problem affecting Reserve recruitment. Sadly, the CLS was never really empowered to carry out all aspects of the Strategic Plan for LFRR and, consequently, cannot alone overcome the systemic shortcomings and bureaucracy associated with enrolment;
- The CF Recruiting Group (CFRG), which is principally focussed on attracting candidates to the Regular force, relegates the Reserves to the sidelines. Much

greater effort must therefore be made to market and promote part-time Militia service as a desirable vocation in and of itself;

- Although many progressive steps have been taken to improve training delivery in order to accommodate part-time Class “A” Reservists, micro-management and the sheer weight of the bureaucratic paper load still continue to suffocate Militia units;
- As things now stand, in the realm of Militia training there are unmistakable signs of frustration that need to be thoroughly investigated and addressed. The perception of many Reservists is that courses have multiplied and are generally longer in duration, to the point that it can take years to train a corporal or trade specialist. The training system is in desperate need of stabilization as never-ending changes in course design coupled with numerous course cancellations have also created serious training backlogs;
- Equipment is another issue of key concern to the Militia and remains a critical yardstick by which progress is measured. When Militia Brigade Groups compared equipment issue numbers, they concluded that while spending had increased, the actual amount of equipment available to Reserve personnel had decreased. The Committee realizes that many initiatives aimed at reinvigorating the Militia have not yet hit the unit armoury floor, but is concerned that the actual situation at the “coal face” may not be exactly what it is perceived to be at higher headquarters;
- In the area of mobilization, the Committee remains concerned that the CF possesses no “surge capacity” to induct large numbers of Reservists in emergency. Conceptual work, however theoretical, needs also to be done on the fourth stage of mobilization. Further study to address the broader implications of home defence is additionally necessary. The development of such an all-encompassing concept, in a rational and viable way that will stand the test of time, remains a fundamental responsibility of the Department and the CF – not just the Army;
- Since most communities want local Militia units to be more closely involved in emergency planning, it is imperative that the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) begins to plan for the use of a mobilized Militia, bearing in mind that the latter may also have to participate in overseas deployments;
- Though Reserve service in the former Yugoslavia has been judged more than satisfactory from all reports, certain matters require immediate attention. Foremost is the issue of Reservists who often gave up jobs, school, and housing leases in order to take pre-deployment training ultimately being denied employment;

- At present the CF is unable to ascertain the exact number of Militia personnel on strength at any one time or *precisely* trace the disbursement of funds allocated to the Militia. These are two problem areas that need to be *immediately* addressed through better accounting procedures. In this regard, the Committee is heartened by the statement of the Minister before the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) that “what we have to do is find some safeguards, find some transparency, to ensure that what is committed to the reserves actually goes to the reserves because slippage can go either way”²; and,
- The Committee remains concerned that, while the recommendations of the Fraser Report are to serve as the Government’s blueprint for LFRR, this has not been spelled out by CF and Departmental authorities at a high level. As LFRR Phase II long-term growth occurs, both equipment and funding must be forthcoming to accommodate increasing numbers of Reserve soldiers who must be given sufficient and challenging training to be retained.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, EDUCATION, AND LEADERSHIP

In recent consultations with the CDS, ADM (HR-Mil), the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA), and the Principal of the Royal Military College (RMC), the Monitoring Committee was assured that the great majority of the concerns it had expressed in its *1999 Final Report* are being addressed.

The overarching education policy statement entitled *Professional Development: CDS Strategy and Direction* has been drafted and circulated for comment.

A revised draft Charter for the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA), which came into being on 1 April 2002, has also been produced and the Committee was particularly pleased to hear the CDS make it clear that the Commander of the CDA reports directly to him. The mission of the CDA, which is to achieve full operational capability by summer 2004, is to champion lifelong learning and to promote the professional development of all members of the CF.

The Committee felt that greater emphasis in both the Policy and Charter documents could have been placed on the part Canadian universities (outside RMC and the Canadian Forces College (CFC)) should play in the process of educating the Canadian officer and NCM corps.

The Committee received assurances that appropriate weight was indeed being given to the educational factor in general and flag officer promotion boards in spite of formal numeric rating criteria that might be construed as indicating otherwise.

² SCONDVA, Evidence Number 21, Wednesday April 9, 2003, p. 22.

When Defence Minister Douglas Young announced that a university degree would be a prerequisite to commissioning as an officer, he also stated that the Officer Professional Development Program would be improved and upgraded to reflect the reality that the vast majority of officers would possess university degrees. In a “degreed” officer corps it followed naturally that general and flag officers should possess the highest academic degrees of good quality. Personnel guidelines accordingly called for expanding degree policy to normally require a graduate degree for colonels and above. It was reasonably presumed that the pursuit of advanced degrees would raise the intellectual level of the officer corps by encouraging *substantial study over and above what had previously been the norm* for most CF officers. In the case of the Master of Defence Studies (MDS) degree offered by RMC in conjunction with the CFC Command and Staff Course (CSC), however, the Committee wanted to be assured that it met the test of a higher standard or a more comprehensive academic curriculum than that historically associated with the CSC.

The Committee was greatly encouraged to hear that efforts were being made to upgrade the CFC faculty, and especially its military component, to a high level of distinction.

PROGRESS REPORT II

INTRODUCTION

We are pleased to present our second public report on Land Force Reserve Restructure within which cover we have added our first public report on Professional Development, Education, and Leadership since 1999.

The Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) initiative was set in train by a Government of Canada Policy Statement on 6 October 2000. The great significance of this statement, for which the Minister of National Defence secured Cabinet agreement, was that it recognized the Army Reserve (Militia) as a vital component of Canada's military capability and set out clear public policy parameters within which LFRR was to take shape. It also confirmed the *raison d'être* of the Army Reserve to be mobilization, followed closely by individual and unit augmentation on peace support operations, all based on an adequate military "footprint" in 125 communities across the country to provide a framework for army expansion should the need arise. More specifically, the policy statement called for increasing the number of part-time Army Reservists to *at least* 18,500 by the end of the fiscal year 2005/06.

On 3 April 2003 the Minister of National Defence (MND), the Honourable John McCallum, reaffirmed this policy in the House of Commons by announcing the start of LFRR Phase II.¹ On 9 April 2003 before the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) he further stated that he was serious about the Reserves and that LFRR Phase II would be funded from the additional monies he obtained. He also remarked that while there had been a "lot of talk for quite a long time about ... Phase two, ... it had not been funded, despite expressions of wishes by the Government that it would be."² In the same forum the MND went on to say that the Government was committed to increasing the role of reserves in home defence and safeguarding the country against terrorist threats. As he said: "I think that's a natural role for the reserves because they're spread out across the country and they're in many small towns across the country. So we are committed to that."³ On 13 May 2003 Minister McCallum re-emphasized that "LFRR is a critical project, and I am determined that Phase 2 will preserve the Army Reserve as a national institution and transform its operational potential to meet Canada's needs in the 21st Century."⁴

¹ *Hansard*, Number 084, 2003-04-03.

² Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA), Evidence Number 21, Wednesday April 9, 2003, p. 22.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Letter from The Honourable John McCallum to The Honourable John A. Fraser, 13 May 2003.

The mandatory connection between what is announced Government Policy and its Strategic Implementation has not always been well recognized within the Department of National Defence (DND), the Canadian Forces (CF), or even at times the Army. In the “Minister’s Policy Role” section set forth in the Director General Public Affairs’ Website it nonetheless states that: “When the Minister, or where necessary the Government, has taken a decision, it is the responsibility of the Canadian Forces and the Department to take the necessary action to give effect to that decision.”⁵ Government Policy should drive Strategic Implementation. This distinction is significant for it insists that Policy goals be achieved.

The policy document of 6 October 2000 unequivocally stated that the ten recommendations of the Fraser Report⁶ would serve as the Government’s blueprint for LFRR and that Lieutenant-General (LGen) M.K. Jeffery’s Strategic Plan for LFRR⁷ would be the *first* step in their implementation. The 6 October statement further specified that the Strategic Plan would fix some of the problems identified by the Fraser Report as plaguing the Militia, while laying the groundwork for the future employment of part-time citizen soldiers (of whom it also stated, “We need them more now than at any time since the Second World War”). The Strategic Plan called for two phases: Phase I, to be funded from existing resources, aimed at attaining stabilization and a strength of 15,500 by the end of March 2003; and Phase II, to be funded from additional resources, aimed at reaching 18,500 by March 2006. The problem with this Plan from a policy perspective was that it did not offer unqualified commitment to carry through with the full implementation of Policy (that is, reach 18,500 by 2006)⁸. There seems to have been no recognition that the Policy demanded a corporate response, not just an Army response, because it was only a corporate response that could reallocate sufficient budgetary funds to meet the Policy object.

As the historical record indicates, stated government policy on this issue dates back to 1995 when Defence Minister David Collenette appointed the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves (SCRR) headed by former Chief Justice Brian Dickson. At that time the SCRR was constrained by an edict not to consider a reserve army of more than 14,500. Minister Collenette did not consider this a realistic ceiling, however, and later rendered a policy decision calling for an army reserve of between 18,500 and

⁵ Director General Public Affairs’ Website 2002-12-10, Minister of National Defence, “Minister’s Policy Role,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/minister/eng/authority/OATOC_e.htm (which repeats “Minister’s Policy Role” in *Authority, Responsibility and Accountability*, The Honourable M. Douglas Young’s Report to the Prime Minister, March 25, 1997, pp. 5-6).

⁶ *In the Service of the Nation: Canada’s Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century: A Report to the Minister of National Defence*, The Honourable Art Eggleton, 19 May 2000, submitted by the Chairman, Colonel The Honourable John A. Fraser, with the concurrence of his colleagues, Mr. D. Bevis Dewar and Dr. David Bercuson (see Appendix 1 to Annex A). Hereinafter referred to as the Fraser Report.

⁷ *Land Forces Reserve Restructure Strategic Plan, September 2000* (signed by General J.M.G Baril, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and Jim Judd, Deputy Minister (DM). LGen Jeffery was Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) and Army Commander at the time.

⁸ See *Land Forces Reserve Restructure Strategic Plan, September 2000*, p. 2-41, which states that “Phase 2 growth targets are still to be determined.”

20,500. This was confirmed by Defence Minister Doug Young's subsequent assertions and, on 6 October 2000, Defence Minister Art Eggleton reaffirmed "current Government policy" by announcing a commitment to increase "the number of part-time Army Reservists to at least 18,500 by the end of fiscal year 2005/2006" (see Policy Statement at Annex A).

In emphasizing that the Fraser Recommendations would serve as the blueprint for LFRR, the 6 October 2000 Government of Canada Policy Statement also set forth the prerequisites for Phase II restructure. In the main, these are:

- Fixing what is "broken" in the workings of the Militia in such areas as administration, recruiting, and enrolment;
- Increasing the size of the Militia toward that mandated by Government policy (at least to 18,500 part-time Class "A" Reservists on the unit armoury floor by March 2006);
- Developing a force structure based on a national, as opposed to Army, mobilization plan;
- Explaining new roles and capabilities in "common sense terms";
- Rethinking conditions of service;
- Revisiting SCRR recommendations not accepted by the Department, in light of the new capability requirements alluded to in the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) document *Rethinking the Total Force: Aligning the Defence Team for the 21st Century*, 26 November 1999; and,
- Preserving the community footprint provided by the Reserves.

As indicated by the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) organizational line diagram shown in Annex B, however, many of the foregoing fields of endeavour lie outside the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) or Army Commander. For example, the national mobilization plan (VCDS), conditional enrolment (Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources-Military) (ADM (HR-Mil)) and Judge Advocate General (JAG)), recruitment and terms of service (also HR-Mil), and the annual report on the Reserves (CDS). For this reason it is imperative that the senior leadership of the CF and Department acknowledge the primacy of Policy and champion Army Reserve revitalization.

This Progress Report II on LFRR provides the Monitoring Committee's observations on progress made in Phase I since Progress Report I of February 2002. It reflects Monitoring Committee consultations conducted with 33 Canadian Brigade Group (CBG) in Ottawa 30 November 2002, 32 CBG in Toronto 8 February 2003, 31 CBG in London 9 February 2003, 38 CBG in Winnipeg 11 April 2003, and 41 CBG in Calgary 12 April 2003. It is

also based on information acquired from various other sources, including Regular force officer and NCM comments offered during the 17-24 February 2003 field visit of the Monitoring Committee to the "Operation Palladium" (Bosnia) Rotation (ROTO) 11 Composite Reserve Infantry Company. In addition, the Monitoring Committee's Director of Research visited the ROTO 12 Composite Reserve Company in Winnipeg on 28 January 2003.

ADMINISTRATION

DECISIONS

Fraser Recommendation #1: Steps should be taken and announced to fix chronic problems in the way the reserves system is administered.

- Recruiting: more flexibility and authority to local reserve authorities to design advertising to suit local conditions and needs, and to appeal to local target groups.
 - Enrolment: simplify and shorten the enrolment process. Permit conditional enrolment.
 - Training: establish standards to be achieved for qualification levels, and hold local Commanders responsible for administering them. Permit civil equivalency to be accepted in place of DND courses where possible. Allow more training at unit level and support it with training aids and equipment (including computer-based training). Where centralized training is essential, it should be scheduled in alignment with Reservists' availability; courses once set must not be cancelled.
 - Administration: relieve the excess administrative paper burden on local units and their commanding officers.
 - Pay: remove remaining irritants in the pay process.
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STATUS

The five components of this decision have received a considerable amount of attention, reflecting the focussed concern and personal influence of the CLS. Notably, CF as well as Army staffs evinced increased interest in Reserve issues and efforts were made to produce Reserve friendly recruiting and personnel policies through initiatives such as the Reserve Force Employment and Recruiting Lessons Learned Projects. The Army Reserve Force Funding Model (ARFM) was also adjusted to reflect the reality of ten rather than seven Canadian Brigade Groups (CBG), and the Army Reserve Establishment was

altered to render it more flexible and capable of meeting needs and adapting to change.⁹ The CF Recruiting Group (CFRG) Personnel Production Oversight Committee similarly expanded to include Reserve representation in addition to dealing with Reserve recruiting issues. The CF Strategic Intake Plan generated by the Directorate of Military Human Resource Requirements in ADM (HR-Mil) also included Reserve figures for each environment and advertising, both nationally and locally, showed improvement. Training delivery was further adjusted to cater to the part-time Reserve service reality. Steps taken to improve training delivery included breaking courses into shorter blocks or modules that could be taken over time to accommodate the part-time availability of Class “A” Reservists, as well as implementing “Battle Task Standards” based on “essential levels of capability” (ELOC).¹⁰ Most recently, historically high attrition levels of around 30% were being reported as improved to under 20%.

OBSERVATIONS

Although efforts have been made to improve the Reserve recruiting system, much more needs to be done. The Army lacks the authority to fix systemic shortcomings and the bureaucracy associated with enrolment – which encompasses such steps as application, interviews, aptitude testing, medical screening, enhanced reliability checks, physical fitness testing, former service verification, and job selection – still remains overly burdensome. The Committee acknowledges that many recruiters, Regular and Reserve, have worked very hard to reduce processing time. Nonetheless, many units continue to report that a two-month processing period is common. A snag in any of the steps in the process means that recruitment can take much longer. Stories of application files taking so long to process that potential recruits simply give up waiting for approval thus continue to be legion. The pity is that Canadian citizens turned off by an inefficient recruiting process may possibly never return. Blind insistence on centralized medical screening remains a major stumbling block in the enrolment process, even though it would be one of the easiest to overcome through decentralized contracting out to civilian doctors or medical centres. However, the Committee has recently been informed by the JAG Branch that in order to ensure every Canadian citizen applying to be a member of the Reserves is “treated equitably across the country”¹¹ each medical file has to be finally reviewed and approved centrally. This constitutes a practice that could hardly be sustained in either emergency or war. That the Army Commander’s 19 November 2001 recommendation¹² to streamline the medical evaluation step in the enrolment process was

⁹ The Reserve Force Employment Project (RFEP) was mandated to redesign and improve policies and practices related to Reserve employment, education, and training. The Army aimed to increase the transparency of the overall Reserve programme with the development of the Army Reserve Funding Model (ARFM) and the Army Reserve Establishment linked with the Army Reserve Field Equipment Tables. *Land Forces Reserve Restructure Strategic Plan*, September 2000, pp. 2-37, 2-39.

¹⁰ B-GL-300-008 *Training Canada’s Army*, p. 22.

¹¹ Judge Advocate General 1000-23 (JAG), 6 May 2003.

¹² On 19 November 2001 the Army Commander sent a letter to the organization in charge of CF personnel administration, ADM (HR-Mil), making specific recommendations as to how the enrolment process might be streamlined. It focussed, in particular, on the medical evaluation step.

not acted upon by the ADM (HR-Mil) further attests to the limit of the former's authority. The Army Commander, in short, never really possessed the power to carry out all aspects of the Strategic Plan for LFRR – he could only influence, not command compliance.

Among other impediments to the genuine streamlining of the enrolment system, the intricacies of the aptitude test might also be considered. Apparently often waived for reasons related to formal educational level (perhaps because professionals such as electrical engineers have failed it), its universal and even practical applicability is not entirely clear. While no doubt intended to enable the CF to make better use of its human resources in filling military occupational classifications, the question needs to be asked whether administering such a centrally-controlled scientifically complex test would be practical in an emergency situation or war. If anything, it represents (as does centralized medical screening) an astonishing lack of urgency that fails to recognize any potential need for force expansion or mobilization in the future. It further demonstrates that when CF policies are formulated but do not work from a Reserve perspective, they cannot be fixed by the Army alone. It requires a corporate response that in this case is not forthcoming.

The role of the CF Recruiting Group (CFRG) remains another case in point, for, plainly put, it relegates the Reserves to the sidelines. The CFRG is not charged with attracting candidates for the Reserve Force. With a mandate to provide the CF with personnel who are highly skilled, or have the potential to become highly skilled, the CFRG's main responsibilities are to attract, process, enroll, and provide basic training for the Regular force. In contrast, the CFRG supports the Reserve forces (comprising the Naval, Army, Air Force, and Communications Reserves and Cadet Instructor Cadre) by processing their applicants in order to ensure a consistent enrolment standard across the CF.¹³ Except for some overlap, Reserve units are left largely responsible for attracting and providing basic training for their personnel. While such devolution of recruiting has been welcome, however, the commensurate administrative capacity to support it has not always been forthcoming. In fact, CF Recruiting Detachments in Main Street Canada are only open from 0800-1600 hours Mondays through Fridays. They do not work weeknights or on weekends, which would be the most appropriate times to recruit part-time soldiers with day jobs. Much of this, of course, reflects the primarily Regular force orientation of the CFRG.

Without question the enrolment process remains the greatest problem affecting Reserve recruitment. This is doubly unfortunate, for as the Committee was told in consultation after consultation, the Militia has no problem in attracting Canadian citizens to serve their nation on a part-time basis with periods of this service devoted to overseas deployment. The problem of sustaining reserve strength is not one of attracting recruits, many of whom are turned away, but mainly one of enrolment. That the Militia also better reflects the ethnic diversity of Canada than the Regular force is a related point that should not be overlooked. In large measure, the problem of Reserve recruitment boils down to a question of attitude and will. If the will were truly there, the problem could be fixed. The

¹³ See the CFRG brochure, *You Make the Difference!* (September 2002).

result, which is attainable, would be a sharp-end orientated Militia capable of fielding substantial home defence formations and expeditionary forces. Surely there can be no more powerful and compelling vision of an Army than one that sees it springing from the people – and that when the people see it, they see themselves. There is thus very good reason to market and promote part-time Militia service as a desirable vocation in and of itself.

In this regard it must be stressed that the only real difference between a Regular and Reservist is training time. And time in service is not so critical as time in training for operations and war. Simply being in the Regular force does not necessarily make a person an expert in the profession of arms. In fact, many observers would say that far too much Regular service is devoted to matters entirely unrelated to the employment of force of arms in strategic, operational, and tactical scenarios. The great strength of the Army Reserves is that they are sharp-end orientated, that is to say the majority join up not to push paper in offices, but to practice the profession of arms in outdoor range practices, field exercises, and operations if possible. They desire and should receive this type of “hard core” army training on the unit armoury floor or as near to their home unit as possible on parade nights and weekends. But here again, the administrative tail all too often wags the operational dog. Micro-management and the sheer weight of the bureaucratic paper load continue to suffocate units. At the same time consideration should be given to revisiting the concept of training centres such as Meaford, which were originally intended for Militia use, but never set up to operate *primarily* on weekends in dedicated and *genuinely helpful* support of reserve training.

In Progress Report I the Committee was pleased to report that the pay system was now satisfactory and that Committee consultations had revealed no systemic obstacles to the delivery of soldiers’ pay.

MOBILIZATION, HISTORICAL CONTINUITY AND FOOTPRINT IN THE COMMUNITY

DECISIONS

Fraser Recommendation #2: Acknowledge the legitimacy of Stages 3 and 4 mobilization as a part of the planning process, and the need for the Reserves structure to be able to support it. Prepare a national mobilization plan as the basis for restructuring. This is consistent with the 1994 *White Paper* and SCRR, and would assure reservists they have a role beyond augmentation for current operations.

Fraser Recommendation #3: Outline proposed roles for the reserves in general terms, including some introduction of non-traditional roles. Explain in common-sense

terms why these changes are necessary under present and foreseeable conditions. Give assurance that most combat units will be retained even if some changes may be needed to ensure they are of viable size (e.g., “tactical groupings” of some units while retaining their traditional insignia).

STATUS

The Army met its objective in determining the role of the Army Reserve:

“Within the Army, the Reserves (Militia) provide the framework for mobilization, the Army’s connection with Canadians, and augmentation within the Canadian Forces [“augmentation” referring to the provision of supplementary (depth) and complementary (breadth) capabilities].”¹⁴

Having established a clear role for the Army Reserve, the Project Management Office (PMO) LFRR in accordance with the direction of the CLS coordinated an ambitious series of cross-country consultations with Militia units and community leaders in local and metropolitan areas. Between October 2002 and February 2003 a total of 17 such consultations were conducted in Land Force Western Area (LFWA), 23 in Land Force Central Area (LFCA), and one major combined consultation in Land Force Atlantic Area (LFAA). The purpose of these consultations with the extended Reserve community and general public was to develop specific missions and tasks for Reserve units and formations in conjunction with the Army Strategy and the Departmental strategy *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020*. The process involved allocating missions and tasks downwards and then, after detailed consideration, coordinating their confirmation upwards. On the whole this initiative was judged to be a resounding success for which the CLS and PMO LFRR are to be commended.

An important outcome of this consultative process was the development of a first draft Army mobilization plan capable of generating forces up to the Stage 3 level of the four stages of mobilization outlined in the *1994 Defence White Paper*. The development of this draft mobilization plan, described as a “foundation upon which to build,” finally represents concrete progress toward fulfilling SCRR Recommendations 4¹⁵ and 5¹⁶ of 1995. In assigning specific missions and tasks for the mobilization of around 40,000 citizen-soldiers in emergency, it also goes some way towards meeting the potential

¹⁴ 1901-6-1 (CLS) Staff Planning Directive 010/02 *Army Reserve Mission and Tasks*, 15 August 2002, p. 3. This role statement was approved in CDS 11 Jun 02 – *Army Reserve Role*. This role is consistent with the Government of Canada Policy Statement of 6 October 2000.

¹⁵ A national mobilization plan be drafted and put in place with all dispatch.

¹⁶ The definition of stages 3 and 4 of mobilization be amended immediately to clearly define Reserve Force roles especially the Militia, as a basis for recruitment, training, and provision of formed units.

requirements of post-9/11 home defence. For taking this vitally important initiative in a long neglected area the CLS and PMO LFRR are once more to be complimented.

Impressive progress was also made in Army Reserve support to operations. A change in deployment patterns, from individual augmentation to formed sub-units, began with Rotation (ROTO) 9 “Operation Palladium” to Bosnia (October 2001- March 2002) when a number of Reserve rifle sections were integrated into and deployed with the 3rd Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment (R22eR) Battle Group. ROTO 10 (March - October 2002) saw the deployment of formed composite reserve platoons as part of the 2 R22eR Battle Group. In October 2002 a Composite Reserve Company (CRC) deployed with the 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) Battle Group on ROTO 11. This company was almost entirely comprised of and commanded by Reservists, with the exception of three Regular force members, indicating that Reserve commanders and leaders are more than capable of exploiting their training and experience in support of CF operations. While both the sections and platoons on the earlier ROTOs were mounted on Light Armoured Vehicles (LAV) III, like individual augmentees in other companies of the Battle Group, the CRC was fielded under a new concept and equipped with Light Patrol Vehicles. The CRC, based out of Bihac, was given responsibility for a large urban area, which challenge they met in a reportedly highly professional manner. A second CRC, serving with 2 PPCLI Battle Group on ROTO 12, deployed in March 2003 and a third CRC will deploy with the Royal Canadian Dragoons Battle Group on ROTO 13 in September 2003. The CLS also recently announced that he hoped to deploy a full Reserve Battle Group sometime in the future.

At present Army Reservists can also be found manning key positions within the Stabilization Force Headquarters in Zagreb, the Multi-National Brigade North-West Headquarters (MNB NW) in Banja-Luka, and the Canadian National Support Element. Notably, a Canadian Reserve captain is currently the officer in charge of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) for MNB NW and a Reserve colonel has, for the first time, been named to command Task Force Bosnia-Herzegovina of roughly 1200 military and 250 Canadian civilian personnel.¹⁷ A Reservist brigadier-general has further assumed command of Joint Task Force South West Asia, the headquarters of which is collocated with US Central Command at MacDill Air Force Base near Tampa, Florida.

OBSERVATIONS

As indicated above, the Army is making progress toward revitalizing the Reserve Army in respect of mobilization for home defence and deployment abroad.

The Committee remains concerned, however, by reports that the CF possesses no “surge capacity” to even induct Reservists during normal winter and spring periods. This problem has been festering for years and must be solved in order to provide an expanded capability to support mobilization. One imaginative solution that has been proposed

¹⁷ Colonel Peter Atkinson handed the reins of command to Colonel Greg Gillespie on 2 April 2003.

would be to establish mobilization and rotation centres for the induction and deployment of citizen-soldier volunteers. Such centres would require an induction staff, including medical, and involve processing conditional enrolments, possibly shorter engagement periods, and improving medical processing. To consider establishing such centres today, and having them partly manned by Reservist medical personnel, would not only sensibly address the eventuality of mobilization before the fact, but go some way toward resolving current enrolment problems as well.

The Committee also feels compelled to remind that the *1994 Defence White Paper* called for four stages of mobilization: Stage 1, Force Generation; Stage 2, Force Enhancement; Stage 3, Force Expansion; and Stage 4, National Mobilization (See Annex C). The draft mobilization plan, while a highly desirable work in progress, is essentially an Army plan. Conceptual work, however theoretical, needs also to be done on the fourth stage of mobilization. Further study to address the broader implications of home defence is also necessary. The development of such an all-encompassing concept, in a rational and viable way that will stand the test of time, remains a fundamental responsibility of the Department and the CF – not just the Army. Only when the defence establishment lays out what Canada needs and expects of its military in all stages of mobilization can Canadians and the Government have the information necessary to make informed decisions on Canada's defence requirements for the future.

The Committee is encouraged to note that guidance had been issued to redefine the role and purpose of the Supplementary Reserve (Supp Res) and implement an updated restructure by late 2003. The Supp Res, with a strength of 56,671 as of 25 April 2003, is composed of personnel with previous military service who could be recalled for military service in an emergency. Civilian specialists may also enroll when there is a defined need. The result of this restructure, which the Committee will monitor with interest, will be a Supp Res more relevant to current and future operational requirements.¹⁸

It bears repeating that, as stated in the Fraser Report, meeting current operational requirements is an important task for the Army Reserves, but it must be done in concert with preserving the framework to expand if necessary. In fact, that framework is what provides the capability for individual augmentation of Regular Force units in addition to unit level domestic operations. Augmentation, or individual reinforcement of under-strength Regular Force units, and mobilization, or expansion of Regular and Reserve units, are complementary, not competitive, activities. That said, it is clear that individual and formed body Militia deployments on operations give Reservists opportunities for real experience and the development of leaders. Perhaps most importantly, to paraphrase the CLS, such deployments establish the Reserves as a credible force and value for money.¹⁹

From all reports, Reserve service in the former Yugoslavia has been judged more than satisfactory. As the Monitoring Committee discovered during its February 2003 trip to

¹⁸ *National Defence 2003-2004 Estimates, Part III – Report on Plans and Priorities*, p. 41.

¹⁹ Presentation by LGen M.K. Jeffery, CLS, at the Annual General Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, Ottawa, 28 February 2003.

Bosnia, however, there are certain matters that require immediate attention. Foremost among these is the issue of Reservists who often gave up jobs, school, and housing leases in order to take pre-deployment training ultimately being denied employment in Composite Reserve Companies (CRCs). Regular candidates never have to make such sacrifices, and, if they have to be removed from training because of health, injury, or inadequate prior training, they do not lose their pay or housing (and, in most cases, can be worked back into the system when the problem is corrected).²⁰ The Reservist perception is that the 90-day pre-deployment training period has become a competition between individuals rather than a confirmation of their fitness for pre-deployment training under the original unit and area training and selection process. This problem can be avoided by ensuring that numbers of Reservists are not sent unduly in excess of the positions available. The Committee realizes that a certain personnel margin has to be allowed in "Operation Palladium" Rotation (ROTO) preparation to take into account health, injury, and negative attitude. It is important that Reservists understand the process at the time they apply. This matter also points to the broader issues of training delivery on the unit armoury floor and the possible need for a standardized pre-deployment training regime not entirely determined by the Regular force unit being reinforced.

While the Committee will continue to analyze and report upon its findings from recent visits to various CRCs, one further observation is worth raising at this juncture as it pertains to the general need for a strong and revitalized Class A base within the Militia. LFWA with only about 4,000 Class A soldiers proved incapable of fielding two consecutive CRCs. When it fielded the ROTO 11 CRC, it was unable to produce more than one platoon for the ROTO 12 CRC, with the result that the other two platoons had to come from LFCA and LFAA. In consequence, the Regular mounting unit, 2 PPCLI, was compelled to work through nine brigades. Compounding the issue, the ROTO 12 CRC comprised substantial numbers of non-infantry Reservists who had to be re-rolled with all of the training and validation of battle task standards that this entailed. Neither of these two challenges confronted either the ROTO 11 CRC or ROTO 13 CRC to be fielded by LFCA in October 2003. Apparently, the reason that LFWA ended up having to field two consecutive CRCs was less a consequence of Militia realities than the deployment availability of two Regular force units. It has been suggested to the Committee, however, that CRC rotations planned in advance and taken in turn by Land Force Areas would be sustainable to the extent that they could lead to the fielding of a Reserve battle group as hoped for by the CLS.

The Committee is heartened to learn that the forthcoming Army Support Review will define Combat Service Support (CSS) force structure, Regular and Reserve, for the Interim Army Model and optimize the management of garrison support services within the Army. CSS means the necessary logistical support for the fighting or combat arms and includes supply, maintenance, transportation, medical, and personnel administration.

²⁰ To the great credit of 2 PPCLI on ROTO 12, more than half the Reservists denied employment in the CRC were taken on as individual augmentees. Based on the Post Operation Report of 1 PPCLI on ROTO 11, the Commander LFWA also expressed particular concern about "the whole bureaucracy of administering Class C contracts." LFWA Headquarters 3000-2/11 (Comd) of February 2003.

This support is vital, for without it the Combat Arms (infantry, armoured, artillery, and field engineers) cannot function. The Committee looks forward to following this development with interest.

The Committee could not help but note that the CDS in his 2001-2002 Annual Report called on military leaders to play an active role in building and maintaining public confidence in the CF as “we have a less visible presence in communities than we did in the past.”²¹ While this is no doubt true, especially of Regular force elements concentrated more and more in training bases away from centres of population, it reinforces the critical importance of the Militia still maintaining a visible military presence in 125 communities throughout the land. From the perspective of keeping the Army in the public eye, the Militia can play the very leading role desired by the CDS. The role of the Army Reserves in maintaining a federal as well as military “footprint in the community” as a matter of public policy can also hardly be overemphasized. The increased awareness of Canadians in appreciating what the Militia can do for them in the case of recent natural disasters has additionally conditioned many of them to look to the Reserves as a first line of home defence. Most communities want local Militia units to be more closely involved in emergency planning. For this reason, it is imperative that the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) begin to plan for the use of a mobilized Militia, which takes nothing away from the fact that the Militia does and must continue to participate in overseas deployments. The Committee notes with interest and supports the recent comments by Major-General E.S. Fitch that the Army Reserve with a “footprint” in 125 communities coast to coast, local knowledge, and the ability to maintain a continuous planning relationship, appears to be “a natural candidate” for the static, regionally based component of Home Defence. Since September 2002 it has also been organized into some 155 company/battery/squadron-sized elements assigned the primary tasks of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Force Protection.²²

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

DECISIONS

Fraser Recommendation #4: Acknowledge that NDHQ (i.e., the Regular Force) understands the different nature of reserve service (part-time, voluntary, limited commitment) and will design roles, standards and training regimes that take it into account. Consider new terms of engagement for reservists that may be needed to attract persons with developed skills in the civilian economy (e.g., civilian-military co-operation, psychological operations, vehicle maintenance). For this reason, we urge serious and urgent study of alternative terms of service, including those that

²¹ “Connecting with Canadians and CF members,” *Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff 2001-2002*, p. 18.

²² *On Track*, Volume 8, Number 1 (31 March, 2003), p. 11.

may require legislative amendment. Revisit those SCRR recommendations which were initially rejected by the Department, such as contractual obligations and job protection legislation.

STATUS

As described in the Annual Report of the CDS, the Reserve Force Employment Project (RFEP) to be completed by spring 2005 constitutes the most comprehensive review of Reserve employment policies to date. A coordinated effort to address a wide range of human resource issues, it has identified policy gaps and advanced many recommendations. The project is expected to have a positive effect on the state of the Reserves owing to the higher profile it provides for Reserve issues. Notable among recent Reserve initiatives is the Reserve employment framework, which has resulted in the provision of Regular force compensation and benefits to all Reservists on operations. The CF Pension Modernization Project has also made excellent progress in developing the Reserve Pension Plan as part of the larger Canadian Forces *Superannuation Act*. This plan will recognize the unique nature of Reserve service and will allow members to contribute to a common plan while serving full and part-time with the Regular or Reserve force.

Bill C-17: The Public Safety Act, 2002 received second reading 20 November 2002. Clause 80 of this bill proposes that “if an officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force is called out for service in respect of an emergency, the officer’s or member’s employer shall reinstate the officer or member in employment at the expiry of that service.”

A transitional Class C service²³ policy announced that henceforth Reservists employed on operations would be placed on Class C (including DCDS deployed operations, Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel crews and local contingency operations) with service in non-operational positions normally being authorized as Class B. This change ended the practice of using Class C service as a bonus to lure Reservists from Class B positions. It further removed the irritant of a Class C Reservist working in the same office as a Class B Reservist but getting higher pay.

LFRR Phase I also saw the introduction of a number of new capabilities that catered to Army Reserve service and which have already started to pay dividends in support of current operations. Reservists have been very active in the former Yugoslavia in a Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) role, which is almost completely an Army Reserve

²³ Class C Reservist “call out” service is essentially full time Regular service and is paid for out of Regular force funds. Class B Reservist “call out” service is also full time service but only at 85% Regular pay. The categories of Class B service are C1 (“call out” greater than 3 days but less than or equal to 12), C2 (greater than 12 days), T1 (temporary employment in support of Reserves), and T2 (temporary employment in support of Regulars).

capability or function. A CIMIC detachment capable of generating CIMIC cells for both deployed and domestic operations has been embedded in each Land Force Area. To this end, the detachments have effected liaison and developed relationships with other federal departments and provincial and municipal governments, as well as with Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). It was reasoned that the “citizen soldier” should be able to relate well to civilian authorities and agencies, while also offering the Army access to a large pool of untapped specialized civilian skills for “support to civil administration” operations.²⁴ Selected volunteers between the rank of sergeant and lieutenant-colonel receive CIMIC training from a variety of sources, among them the Lester B. Pearson Peace Centre and US Army. *Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre* stood up its CIMIC detachment in August 2000 and deployed on “Operation Palladium” (Bosnia) ROTOs 9 and 10. LFWA stood up its detachment in September 2000 and provided CIMIC personnel for ROTOs 11 and 12. The LFCA and LFAA CIMIC detachments were both stood up in April 2001, with the former assigned to deploy in support of ROTO 13. In Bosnia CIMIC detachments have been able to use the skills and expertise developed through their civilian employment and military training to work with local governments, NGOs, and other civilian organizations. By identifying projects and resource support for their implementation they have also been able to enhance the quality of life in the region.

Other new capabilities besides CIMIC have additionally been employed to support CF operations. A trial Movement Control Platoon established in Montreal in 2000 has been instrumental in facilitating the flow of CF equipment and personnel to both “Operation Apollo” (Afghanistan) and “Operation Palladium,” (Bosnia) as well as to numerous domestic exercises and activities. An enhanced Reserve Public Affairs presence in all Land Force Areas down to Canadian Brigade Group (CBG) level has served to improve the ability of commanders at all levels to increase the visibility of the Army Reserve in the public eye and communicate internally with Reserve units. Significant progress has also been made in assessing the viability of other capabilities such as Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) response, and Urban Search and Rescue.²⁵

OBSERVATIONS

The Committee applauds the imaginative and innovative efforts that are being made to improve conditions of service for Reserves. In Progress Report I the Committee had questioned why Reservists and Regulars working in the same environment, such as NDHQ, should be compensated on separate pay scales and this appears to have been remedied (See reference to Class C/B service under status).

²⁴ *Land Force Reserve Restructure LFCA Update*, Fall 2002.

²⁵ These have been sub-divided into Information Operations (such as CIMIC, PSYOPS, Public Affairs, and Geomatic Support) and Force Protection (such as CBRN Defence, Security Operations, Urban Search and Rescue, and Protective Construction).

Bill C-17 will ensure that following a compulsory call-up of Reserves in case of emergency, defined as “insurrection, riot, invasion, armed conflict or war, real or apprehended,” employers would be required to reinstate Reserve members in their jobs or equivalent jobs.²⁶ Such amendment does not, however, replace the need for voluntary employer support for Reserves. Job protection in non-emergency situations remains a difficult issue that may not be best resolved through legal means. While one could argue that volunteering for overseas duty in the service of the nation is as deserving of legal protection as maternity/parental leave in the workplace, giving tax incentives to employers for losing workers and having to hire replacements might be a better solution. In other words, the carrot approach may be preferable to that of the stick.

It should, however, be noted that the definition of emergency does not include natural disasters, which means that in the event of flood, fire, ice storm, or earthquake Militia personnel will not have legislated job protection.

In this regard, the efforts of the Canadian Forces Liaison Council (CFLC) have been unrelenting and steady progress is apparently being made. Judging from comments heard during consultations, CFLC programs have been effective in building employer support for Reservists.

Despite undoubted efforts to improve training within each Land Force Area there are signs of frustration that need to be thoroughly investigated and addressed. The perception of many Reservists is that courses have multiplied and are generally longer in duration, to the point that, as the Committee has been told, it can take a number of years to train a corporal and even longer in some specialized trades. The training system is in desperate need of stabilization as never-ending changes in course design coupled with numerous ~~course alterations~~ ~~course acceleration~~ serious training backlogs. The high tempo of change has further reduced or prevented the efficiencies predicted for modularization. This has consequently resulted in a lack of trained leaders within the Militia. Many are simply unable to get the requisite courses. This situation, in the view of some Reservists, has come about mainly because of a singular failure in consultation. Regular force standards officers and course planners claim to have attained Militia input, but in fact have not appreciated the magnitude of the problem. One suspects that there is a disconnect somewhere, whether because of a “left hand-right hand” system flaw in which planners are not responsible for executing the plan, or because standards cells and staff writers fail to see the actual situation on the ground.

The modularization approach to training in accordance with B-GL-300-008 *Training Canada's Army* has been a good one, but it has been suggested that modules should continue to be shortened and the two-week period viewed as an absolute maximum. As accessibility to training areas and centres also remains problematical (Meaford, in addition to its often inhospitable treatment of Reservists, is too costly a trip and takes a day's movement from Eastern Ontario), more imaginative thought should be focussed on

²⁶ Legislative Committee on *Bill C-17*, Number 004, 2nd Session, 37th Parliament, Evidence Tuesday December 10, 2002, p. 9.

resolving this conundrum. Reserve force simulation training on the computerized wargaming Joint Combined Arms Training System is a good step in this direction. Serious consideration should further be given to distance learning and correspondence course methodologies in lieu of or as part of courses. One might also question whether three courses are really even necessary to qualify a Section Commander. At the same time, the CF Military Equivalencies Programme could perhaps be speeded up in respect of granting military qualifications to civilian-trained paramedics, nurses, and vehicle mechanics. The myth that Reservists (some of whom work for General Dynamics) cannot be trained to operate the LAV III has furthermore to be immediately dispelled. Most of the problem is because Militia units have no access to LAV III on which to train.

As the Reserves begin to field new capabilities such as CIMIC, PSYOPS, and CBRN, it must not be forgotten that these are in addition to traditional war fighting functions.

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

DECISIONS

Fraser Recommendation #5: Provide reliable guarantees that the funding and equipment will be forthcoming on a continuing basis to support the new structure, including both “traditional” and “non-traditional” roles. It is important there be no “tricks” in this commitment, which is bound to be scrutinized very closely.

Fraser Recommendation #6: Bring the strength of the Reserves up to the 30,000 level (18,500-20,500 for the Army Reserves) as established in Government policy. Measures taken by implementing the above recommendations should achieve the results-oriented command and control required to attract and retain sufficient numbers of people.

Fraser Recommendation #7: A level One position should be established in the Department and the CF to act as a leader of change in carrying out the above recommendations, to keep the Minister and the CDS advised on progress, and generally to represent the needs, concerns and interests of the Reserves at the highest levels in the Department and the CF.

Fraser Recommendation #8: The Chief of the Defence Staff should include a separate section on the Reserves in his annual report on the State of the CF.

STATUS

Some new equipment is becoming available to Reserve units, among which: new CADPAT (Canadian Disruptive Pattern) combat clothing, light vehicle replacements for the Iltis,²⁷ small arms training simulators, grenade launchers and new radios.

The Army declared that it had achieved the aims for Phase I as laid out in the Strategic Plan and met the growth target of 15,500 personnel in September 2002. It also reported that as the Army makes the transition from LFRR Phase I to LFRR Phase II, “there is a renewed sense of enthusiasm in the Army Reserve. Attrition is at an all time low, largely the result of new uniforms, personal equipment, a pay system that works, focussed challenging training in Canada and with our allies, and the opportunity to make a difference by providing real support to operations both at home and abroad.”²⁸

In 2001 the then MND designated the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) as the “leader of change” to implement LFRR. The CLS and the staff of the PMO LFRR have worked, and continue to work, toward implementation of the appropriate recommendations. In Progress Report I of February 2002 the Committee drew attention to the fact that the LFRR Strategic Plan called for issuance of a Level One “action directive” assigning responsibility to each action item in the LFRR Strategic Plan. This commitment, set out in the Executive Summary of this plan, reads as follows: “A VCDS Action Directive will later assign Level 1 responsibility to each action item.”²⁹ So far as we know this has not been done.

In the latest CDS Annual Report, 2001-2002, “At a Crossroads” there is a separate section of less than two pages related to Reserves. It is entitled “Reserve initiatives.”

OBSERVATIONS

Equipment is the one issue that affects all soldiers and remains a critical yardstick by which progress is measured. When CBGs compared equipment issue numbers, they concluded that while spending had increased, the actual amount of equipment available to Reserve personnel had decreased. They complained of getting back only one-third to one-half of what was given up. There were fewer new trucks and radios (i.e., nine Light Utility Vehicles Wheeled in lieu of two dozen Iltis, twelve new radios in lieu of thirty older sets), no night vision equipment, and much equipment was not available for training on the armoury floor. Some CBGs had also only received 25-30% of promised new CADPAT uniforms. Ammunition budgets have apparently shrunk every year. The

²⁷ Within the CF the Light Utility Vehicle Wheeled project is aimed at replacing the Iltis fleet with about 800 standard military -pattern vehicles (with associated logistic support), and about 860 militarized commercial-pattern vehicles.

²⁸ CLS Army Update to the MND/DM, Director General Land Reserves/Director Land Reserve Management Perspective, January 2003.

²⁹ *Land Forces Reserve Restructure Strategic Plan*, September 2000, Executive Summary, p. 8.

Committee realizes that many of the initiatives aimed at reinvigorating the Militia have not yet hit the armoury floor, but it remains concerned that the actual situation at the “coal face” may not be exactly what it is perceived to be at higher headquarters. As LFRR Phase II long-term growth occurs, both equipment and funding must be forthcoming to accommodate increasing numbers of Reserve soldiers who must be given sufficient and challenging training to be retained.

In respect of Fraser Recommendation # 6 progress has definitely been made in changing attitudes and some in improving bureaucratic procedures, but growth has been modest and much still remains to be done. An inability to ascertain the precise number of Militia personnel on strength at any one time further appears to have compromised sound decision-making. The official Army position is that the 15,500 figure was reached in September 2002, but on closer examination one can see that this number included not just part-time Class A personnel, but full-time Class B soldiers³⁰ on “call-out” for regular force duty as well (at 85% regular pay). The Government of Canada Policy Statement of 6 October 2000 clearly called for part-time Class A citizen soldiers. Specifically, the September 2002 total of 15,488 included 3,507 Class B “call-outs” and the October total of 15,425 as many as 2,342 Class B “call-outs.” By this measure, when the Army declared that it had met the 15,500 target it may have, in fact, only reached a strength of 11,981 part-time Class A soldiers. Pay records show, moreover, that combined Class A and B figures actually fell much below 15,500 to 13,784 in December 2002 (see chart below). Meanwhile, because the target 15,500 was assumed to have been attained, Reserve recruiting was terminated in the fall of 2002. This inability to ascertain the precise number of Militia personnel on strength at any one time constitutes an extremely serious accountability problem that needs to be immediately addressed. In fact, for lack of an appropriate accounting methodology, Militia numbers can only be determined by comparing issued cheques and service numbers reflected within a pay system never set up for this express counting purpose. There is thus good reason to believe that Militia recruiting was stopped prematurely in the mistaken belief that the 15,500 personnel objective had been met, when, in reality, it had not. This decision, in turn, jeopardized the ability of the Reserves to sustain existing numbers. In light of an historic annual attrition rate of 25-35%, this was a critical aspect unfortunately overlooked.

³⁰ SORD 2003 also stated that “Until superseded by the announcement of LFRR Phase II funding availability, the Army Reserve will sustain itself at the end-Phase I strength of 15,500 Class A and B Reservists” (LFWA – 3970, LFCA – 5080, SQFT – 3840, and LFAA – 2510), Chapter 3, Section 1B-2/6, 3/6.

Militia Class A/B Historical Strengths

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
<u>1998 (Army only)</u>				15,243	14,810	12,782	10,706	9,962	13,343	14,552	14,528	13,499
<u>1999</u>	14,842	15,020	14,795	14,759	14,589	12,821	10,912	12,073	14,491	14,014	14,008	13,231
<u>2000</u>	14,196	14,424	14,359	14,075	14,077	12,147	10,661	11,576	13,910	13,460	13,451	12,137
<u>2001</u>	13,365	13,858	14,003	13,733	13,922	12,634	11,290	12,211	14,868	14,508	14,669	13,486
<u>2002</u>	14,723	14,988	14,805	15,036	14,797	13,139	11,863	12,526	15,488	15,425	15,337	13,784
<u>2003</u>	12,684	15,226	14,869	15,150								

Figures provided by Director Managerial Accounting and Comptrollership from Revised Pay System for the Reserves

Undoubtedly, the inclusion of Class B “call-outs” in Militia parade figures contributed to the confusion in determining the 15,500 Phase I target, as only about 700 of these Class B “call-outs” were in direct support of the Militia.³¹ The remainder, though paid for out of the Militia budget, filled around 2000 Regular force positions. Strictly speaking, these positions should have been subtracted from any calculation that measured the progressive attainment of a Militia part-time Class A strength of 15,500. In fairness, such Class B costs should also have been absorbed by the Regular establishment as is done for Militia Class C call-outs on overseas duty. Based on an estimated average pay of \$40,000 per year for a Class B soldier, the total cost to the Militia approximated \$80 million (out of a Militia pay budget of around \$190 million), which sum could have been used to hire extra Class A soldiers for a year. One can fully understand, therefore, why many Reservists have come to regard the policy of using Militia funds to fill Regular force positions with Class B “call-outs” as tantamount to plundering the Army Reserve. On a higher plane it could also be construed as a short-term solution to what remains essentially a longer-range problem, which is, bluntly put, the Regular army does not have enough money to do everything it is being asked to do.

The advantage to the Regular Army of having a steady supply of Class B and C soldiers is readily apparent and one of the strongest arguments for maintaining a viable and vibrant Militia. Indeed, opening the Army up to short-term volunteer service by citizen-soldiers may also prove to be as visionary as cost-effective. It is a matter of record that Reservists constituted an average of 20% of Canadian land forces in the Balkans and even as much as 50% of the PPCLI battalion that fought a battle in the Medak Pocket,

³¹ Efficiency requires that about 10% of Reserve unit strength be on full time Class B service on the “armoury floor.”

Croatia, in 1993.³² Being able to fulfill future home defence commitments through Class B service is also likely to be more cost-effective. The problem is that Class B and C soldiers can only spring from a soundly established Class A foundation, which is why announced government policy called for stabilizing Militia strength at 15,500 part-time Class A soldiers in LFRR Phase I and raising it to 18,500 in Phase II. Without an adequate pool of Class A part-time soldiers, of course, it will become progressively more difficult, if not impossible, to continue to employ Reservists on overseas Class C duty with Regular forces starved for manpower. Given the partly uneven success of LFRR Phase I and the continued fragility of the Militia itself, however, there is a very real fear that failure to implement Phase II vigorously will result in a serious loss of momentum and risk negating whatever progress has been made to date. The great danger here is that the role of the Militia in providing the mobilization base upon which to expand the Army in time of emergency will be eroded. There is also the associated risk of re-opening old wounds incurred in the infighting that characterized the Regular-Reserve schism that plagued the Army and defence establishments in 1999. This would be a terrible pity indeed as the harmonious relations so assiduously cultivated between Regulars and Reserves since that time would surely suffer.

The irony of the situation is that the Militia actually costs relatively little in comparison to what it delivers and is potentially capable of delivering. In terms of pay, pensions, infrastructure, and personnel support, Reservists are much less costly to *maintain* than regular soldiers. This is even borne out by a DND Comptroller Branch estimate of “the overall cost of the Army Reserves within the Defence Services Programme” dated 19 March 2002, which shows the sum of \$497 million expended on “reserve pay, direct, indirect, attributed and capital costs” in FY 2000-2001. These figures, though only “considered accurate within plus or minus 30%,” amount to but 4% of the total defence budget. Given such a large margin of probable error, they also attest to the crying need for improved accounting procedures to both determine Militia numbers accurately and precisely trace the disbursement of funds allocated to the Militia. The Committee, of course, recognizes that the Regular force has produced figures indicating it has subsidized the Militia to a far greater financial extent than the reverse (presumably not within plus or minus 30%), but considers this to be an even stronger reason for establishing a better accounting system. Surely there should be no obfuscation or debate as to exactly how, when, and where public monies are actually spent.³³ In this regard, the Committee welcomes the statement of the Minister before the Standing Committee on

³² MGen J.M.R. Gaudreau, Deputy Commander United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 1992-93 observed, “I was very impressed at how well the regular and reserve team worked in UNPROFOR ... the performance of the reservists in 2 PPCLI was just outstanding.” *SCRR Report* (1995), p. 16.

³³ Especially in light of the statement in *National Defence 2003-2004 Estimates, Part III – Report on Plans and Priorities* that: “The Department of National Defence has made great strides in recent years in its efforts to maximize management effectiveness and ensure value for money in Canadian defence investments. Defence has moved forward to modernize business practices, implement modern business planning and comptrollership practices, and support the Government of Canada’s efforts to improve reporting to Parliament and results for Canadians.” (p. 15.) Yet, it cannot say how many Militia are on strength at any one time or easily trace the disbursement of the Reserve budget. There is no transparency here.

National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) that “what we have to do is find some safeguards, find some transparency, to ensure that what is committed to reserves actually goes to the reserves because the slippage can go either way.”³⁴

Concerning Fraser Recommendation #7, the CLS and the PMO LFRR have demonstrated a commitment and effort that is widely recognized. However, as pointed out elsewhere, within the structure of the Department and the CF there are important areas in which the CLS lacks authority and, as a consequence, he is limited at best to persuasion only. This is why it is important that there be an action directive from the VCDS ensuring that there is a corporate response to every aspect of the implementation of LFRR as specified in the 6 October 2000 recommendations of the MND.

As for Fraser Recommendation #8, the CDS Annual Report for 2001-2002 does include a section on Reserves, but the 1.5 pages devoted fall far short of giving the public and legislators an adequate picture of the Reserve component of the CF. The Committee urges that a far more detailed and complete report on the state of the Reserves be included in the next CDS Annual Report.

CONSULTATION AND MONITORING

DECISIONS

Fraser Recommendation #9: Promise consultation with currently serving reserve authorities, including brigade and unit leadership, and other representatives of the broader reserve community, on how to implement these changes, and commit to a phased, prudent process of implementation that will include careful assessment of results and changes to the program as necessary. This should be achieved by simply resurrecting the Command and Area Consultative Working Groups with the same membership. These seemed to work well until the proposal of April 1999 disturbed the trust that had begun to build between NDHQ and the Reserves community.

Fraser Recommendation #10: Monitoring of the implementation of Ministerial decisions arising both out of the SCRR and this report should continue.

³⁴ SCONDVA, Evidence Number 21, Wednesday April 9, 2003, p. 23.

STATUS

The Command and Area Consultative Group process has been institutionalized and includes representation from Regular and Reserve land force command and staff, NDHQ, the Council of Honorary Colonels, and Reserves 2000. The Conference of Defence Associations also sends an observer.

The Monitoring Committee conducted five consultations with Canadian Brigade Groups between November 2002 and April 2003.

OBSERVATIONS

Command and Area Consultative and Advisory Groups have proven to be especially useful in maintaining harmonious relations between Reserves and Regulars and promoting the revitalization of the Militia in the 21st Century. However, the MMC has conducted and is conducting consultations with commanding officers and senior warrant officers from each of the Reserve Brigade Groups. These are the only consultations that are completely outside the chain of command. Such consultations ensure that the LFRR process remains transparent and open to the scrutiny of interested parties and the Canadian public at large and is of importance if monitoring objectives are going to be attained. Consultations along these lines also assist in the execution of the new Army Strategy, "Advancing With Purpose," which has as one of its four objectives, "Connect with Canadians."³⁵

Cooperation between Reserves and Regulars has continued to improve, for which many personnel deserve credit. Of course, expectations have also been raised. The assignment of missions and tasks must therefore result in tangible progress, which includes issue of equipment, training, and sufficient funding.

In this regard, the Committee applauds the effort of the VCDS to find the necessary 29 million dollars to ensure the consolidation of LFRR Phase I objectives.

The Committee remains concerned that, while the recommendations of the Fraser Report are to serve as the Government's blueprint for LFRR, this has not been spelled out by CF and Departmental authorities at a high level. This could be done by expanding upon statements made within the *Department of National Defence: 2003-2004 Report on Plans and Priorities* that: "Phase 2 will focus on change and growth. LFRR is about enhancing the Army's strategic capacity and capability while supporting Army Transformation. Within the context of the Army Strategy, both the Regular and Reserve components will go through significant change between 2003 and 2007 with the intent to streamline and

³⁵ SORD 2003, *Land Force Command Strategic Operations and Resource Direction 2003*.

improve force generation.”³⁶ This would be a lot more convincing if the policy objective of 18,500 was clearly spelled out. Without question, the implementation of LFRR Phase II will be a critical issue as it is intended to expand Reserve part-time Class A numbers to 18,500 as well as increase unit missions, tasks, and capabilities. In this respect, continued monitoring will be required.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, EDUCATION AND LEADERSHIP

BACKGROUND

The *1999 Final Report* of the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change identified a need for more strategic guidance in the area of officer education. Of central import was the policy decision by the MND in his March 1997 *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces* that, in future, all CF officers would possess a university degree, except for those commissioned from the ranks. Anticipating that this development would inevitably trigger a sea change in CF officer commissioning and advancement, the Monitoring Committee ventured that:

“graduate education must become the norm for more senior officers. In particular officers in the ‘fighting’ element of the military’s occupational classification system must be more strongly encouraged and supported to pursue advanced degrees, because these officers tend to occupy senior leadership positions. Policies must support that objective.”³⁷

The Monitoring Committee further insisted that while the CF embarked on creating plans to achieve a degreed officer corps, there must be a clearly demonstrated commitment “that an educated officer has a military or operational value.” This was important because to some officers at that time the “new culture” meant little more than learning to manage with fewer resources, out-sourcing, and developing managerial as well as military skills. All of this, in the Committee’s view, attested to a much larger problem in sustaining institutional momentum, to wit:

“the defence team has applied *tactical* solutions to what it considers to be *tactical* problems. What the Committee has stressed over its tenure is that the reform program is a *strategic* challenge that requires *strategic* solutions. Two of the most salient examples of how a tactical approach to

³⁶ *National Defence: 2003-2004 Estimates, Part III - Report on Plans and Priorities*, p. 40.

³⁷ *Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Final Report - 1999*, p. 11.

reform, no matter how vigorously pursued, lacks the breadth of vision to capture the profound consequences of the original direction are reserve restructure and pursuit of the degreed officer corps.”³⁸

Suggesting that CF “culture begin to include education as a military virtue and operational necessity, rather than an activity that can be accommodated if time and resources permit,” the Monitoring Committee made several specific recommendations and observations on the professional development of officers at all rank levels in the CF. These bear repeating again for their intrinsic and benchmark value:

- 1) There are still leaders in the CF who believe that leadership training and an undergraduate education at RMC, or civilian university, amount to the same thing which is not so.
- 2) The army, navy, and air force have lacked, and continue to lack, a coordinated undergraduate education policy.
- 3) The CF still has no established forces-wide policy re: graduate education with respect to time release or sponsorship.
- 4) The undergraduate curriculum at RMC is still heavily affected by a “job training” approach as opposed to education in the liberal arts sense of the word.
- 5) There is appallingly little sponsorship of military members in non-engineering subject areas.
- 6) Despite the push for increased liberal arts military education in the United States armed forces, in Latin America, and elsewhere, the Canadian military is still acting under the assumption that subjects such as geomatics engineering are true military education fare but history or anthropology are not.

The Committee also offered several specific suggestions for the reform of senior officer professional development:

- 1) The AMSC (Advanced Military Studies Course) for colonels should continue in the three-month timeframe, concentrating on operations.
- 2) The current AMSC and NSSC (National Security Studies Course) courses content should be merged into a single nine-to-ten-month course. Candidates for this course should be selected on a competitive basis, and selection should be treated as a prerequisite for promotion to general/flag rank, as opposed to the current situation where promotion to this rank is not affected by performance in the course. The course must rigorously adhere to high academic and professional

³⁸ Ibid., p. 8.

standards in methods of teaching, course content and tenor of intellectual discourse.

- 3) Candidates chosen for this course should be treated as an elite group who have earned the privilege of attending the College and the opportunity to be promoted accordingly.
- 4) The CF should make liberal provisions for students' stay at the College, including family leave or accommodation, travel allowances and students' accommodation. Furthermore, candidates should be seconded from their positions, and not required to continue performing their duties while on course.
- 5) Those who are responsible for administering, organizing and teaching at the College should be a mix of top-notch civilian academics or military professionals with strong academic credentials.³⁹

In keeping with its mandate to continue monitoring the implementation of government-approved recommendations related to CF professional development, education, and leadership, the Monitoring Committee conducted numerous consultations throughout 2001 and 2002 (most of 2000 having been devoted to Land Force Reserve Restructure). In six separate letters the Monitoring Committee also provided comments to the MND on officer professional development, the Enhanced Leadership Model, and the Canadian Defence Academy. As in its *1999 Final Report*, the Monitoring Committee felt compelled to express certain doubts about the priority CF leadership was according the issues of leadership and education.

OBSERVATIONS

In consultations with the CDS, ADM (HR-Mil), the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA), and the Principal of the Royal Military College (RMC) on 25 March 2003, the Monitoring Committee was assured that much of the concern it has expressed in its *1999 Final Report* is being addressed. A culture change in respect of the promotion of education within the CF appears to be taking place, for which the leadership should be commended.

*Officership 2020*⁴⁰ was signed by the MND in May 2001 and directed the development of three capstone CF manuals: *The Profession of Arms in Canada*; *The CF Leadership Manual*; and a joint and combined operations manual to be produced under the guidance of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. *Officership 2020* also charged ADM (HR-Mil) with the promulgation of an education policy that embraced philosophy, accreditation

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

⁴⁰ *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century: A Detailed Analysis and Strategy for Launching Implementation (Officership 2020) Strategic Guidance for the CF Officer Corps and the OPD [Officer Professional Development] System.*

objectives, and the reaffirmation of a “degreed” officer corps, including graduate degrees for colonels and above. *Officership 2020* also referred to a “Canadian defence university,” which came into being as the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) on 1 April 2002.

The overarching education policy statement entitled *Professional Development: CDS Strategy and Direction* has since been drafted and circulated for comment. The importance of such a document should not in the Committee’s view be underestimated. It should stand distinctly and sublimely alone in providing a statement of purpose and vision of the kind of person the CF is trying to produce as a future officer and leader, so that interested parties will clearly understand what the CF is trying to achieve. Manuals should flow from this policy, not the other way around.

A revised draft Charter for the CDA has also been produced in response to what we understand is Ministerial direction that it be visionary in thrust and purpose. The Committee was particularly pleased to hear the CDS make it patently clear that the Commander of the CDA reports directly to him. The mission of the CDA, which is to achieve full operational capability by summer 2004, is to champion lifelong learning and to promote the professional development of all members of the CF. Its objectives are to ensure coherent and integrated CF education and professional development programs, ensure academic rigour and accreditation for professional development, and enable and encourage CF personnel in the development of their intellectual potential. In fulfilling its mission and objectives the CDA will integrate the strategies of *Officership 2020* and *NCM Corps 2020* into the CF professional development system.

In repeated discussions with the MND the Committee stressed the importance of including among the educational opportunities available, the option of liberal arts as equally important to science, technology, and business administration. We are satisfied that the document *Professional Development: CDS Strategy and Direction* now reflects that concern and we quote with approval the following: “members of the CF must acquire a balance of the humanities/social science, natural and technological sciences and leadership knowledge.”⁴¹ Although stating that the most complete definition of this common body of knowledge is found in the Core Curriculum of RMC, it also called for officer professional development programmes with proven academic credibility and rigour to meet common Canadian university standards for critical thought and self-expression. As of the date of this report, it is important to note, *Professional Development: CDS Strategy and Direction* is still a draft document.

The Committee felt that greater emphasis in both the Policy and Charter documents could have been placed on the part Canadian universities (outside RMC or the Canadian Forces College) should play in the process of educating the Canadian officer and NCM corps. The Committee believes that the importance of this should be clearly spelled out before either the draft Policy and Charter documents are made final.

⁴¹ *Professional Development: CDS Strategy and Direction (draft copy)*.

The Committee received assurances that appropriate weight was indeed being given to the educational factor in general and flag officer promotion boards in spite of formal numeric rating criteria that might be construed as indicating otherwise.⁴²

The CF Leadership Institute (CFLI) was set up in the summer of 2001 as a research institute intended to keep the CF abreast of the latest developments in leadership concepts and theories. To do this it carries out liaison with allied nations, Canadian universities, and other agencies. It has also been charged with producing capstone manuals on “Leadership” and “The Profession of Arms,” both of which are to be published by summer 2004. Apart from collecting current information on leadership and creating doctrinal manuals, the CFLI also collects, collates, and disseminates leadership “lessons learned” based on the debriefing of officers and NCMs with recent experience in the field. Although currently dominated by psychologists, the CFLI recognizes the multi-disciplinary nature of leadership and is accordingly engaged in hiring colleagues from other disciplines such as sociology, philosophy and ethics.

The Canadian Forces College (CFC) in Toronto, a CDA constituent, is a national institution dedicated to professional military education across the full spectrum of conflict with an emphasis on the operational and strategic levels. The CFC is responsible for six major programs of study: the Command and Staff Course (CSC) for selected majors/lieutenant-commanders and lieutenant-colonels/commanders; the Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC) for selected lieutenant-colonels/commanders and colonels/naval captains; the National Security Studies Course (NSSC) for selected colonels/naval captains and general/flag officers; the Joint Reserve Command and Staff Course for senior reserve officers; the Joint Staff Operations Course for captains/naval lieutenants and majors/lieutenant-commanders occupying positions in the CF Joint Operations Group and NDHQ Joint Staff; and the National Securities Studies Seminar.

Substantial progress has been made in awarding academic equivalencies for course programs being offered through the CFC. Of these programs, three permit the application of credits toward several academic degrees. RMC offers six senior credits, equivalent to six one-term courses, towards a Bachelor of Military Arts and Science to candidates who successfully complete the CSC. At the graduate level, CSC students may pursue either an academic or professional program to attain an advanced degree. RMC currently grants CSC credits toward two academic degree programs: up to three for a Master of Arts in War Studies or five for a Master of Arts in Defence Management and Policy. For each of these programs, concurrent or deferred (up to three years), further “top-up” studies are

⁴² Selection board criteria for regular force promotions from BGen to MGen and from MGen to LGen in 2001 were: Performance – 60 points; Second Language Ability – 5 points; and Potential – 35 points. Points within Potential were allocated as follows: Education – 2 points (0 points for High School Diploma, 1 point for undergraduate degree and 1 point for postgraduate degree); Professional Development – 2 points (2 points for National Security Studies Course or equivalent); Leadership – 10 points (includes intellectual, relationship, and management competencies); Experience – 4 points (reflection of diversity of employment as an indicator of adaptability and flexibility); and Professional Attributes – 15 points (courage, judgement, self-development, ethical behaviour, self-confidence). Email from Colonel R. Romses, Director Senior Appointments, NDHQ to Mr. E.J. Lang, Executive Assistant to the MND, 14 November 2002.

required. RMC also offers a single credit toward a Master of Arts in War Studies for the successful completion of the AMSC. RMC additionally grants one credit with no “top-up” for the successful completion of the NSSC and a second credit with “top-up” if a student so chooses. NSSC graduates are further eligible for six credits, four with “top-up” requirements, for RMC programs leading to a Master of Arts in Defence Management and Policy or a Master of Business Administration. Seven credits are also available, four with “top-up” requirements, for the RMC program leading to a Graduate Diploma in Executive Defence Management. As the Master of Arts in War Studies calls for a minimum of five courses or three courses and a thesis, the academic course credits attainable through attendance on CFC courses appear to be reasonable.

When Defence Minister Douglas Young announced that a university degree would be a prerequisite to commissioning as an officer, he also stated that the Officer Professional Development Program would be improved and upgraded to reflect the reality that the vast majority of officers would possess university degrees. In a “degreed” officer corps it followed naturally that general and flag officers should possess the highest academic degrees of good quality. *Officership 2020* accordingly called for expanding degree policy to normally require a graduate degree for colonels and above. As previously stated, in our 1999 Monitoring Committee *Final Report*, we had also ventured that graduate degrees would become a benchmark qualification for senior officers and that those earmarked for the highest leadership positions should be more strongly encouraged and supported to pursue advanced degrees. Only in this manner, we argued, would CF culture begin to regard education as a military virtue and operational enhancer, rather than just another activity to be accommodated if time and resources permitted.

It was reasonably presumed that the pursuit of advanced degrees would raise the intellectual level of the officer corps by encouraging *substantial study over and above what had previously been the norm* for most CF officers. In the case of the Master of Defence Studies (MDS) degree offered by RMC in conjunction with the CSC, however, the Committee wanted to be assured that it met the test of a higher standard or a more comprehensive academic curriculum than that normally required by the CSC. A CSC student has to do three things to get an MDS: first, be judged academically acceptable by RMC; second, maintain a B- course average; and, finally, receive a passing grade from a Ph.D. qualified academic advisor for completion of a 12,000 to 14,000 word thesis project/research essay in lieu of a 4000-5000 word essay required of the non-MDS student.

It is clear from documentation acquired by the Committee, however, that some extra substantive work over and above the three criteria listed was originally expected by consultants engaged in the appraisal of the MDS program. On the basis of this information and consistent with the policy vision of advancing higher education within the CF, the Committee wished to confirm that the MDS graduate degree would be positively viewed by the academic community at large.

The Committee was impressed and appreciative that the CDS actively participated throughout the full afternoon of discussion on 25 March 2003. The conclusion of this

discussion was that measures would be taken to address the concerns expressed about the MDS, and to this end the RMC review process for Ontario Council on Graduate Studies appraisal would begin before Christmas 2003.

The Committee was greatly encouraged to hear that efforts were being made to upgrade the CFC faculty, and especially its military component, to a high level of distinction.

ANNEX A – TERMS OF REFERENCE AND POLICY STATEMENT

October 2000
(Reconfirmed August 2002)

Terms of Reference

The Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces was first established in the Fall of 1997. Following the publication of reports in 1998 and 1999, the Committee was reconstituted and mandated to continue monitoring the implementation of government approved recommendations related to Reserves and Professional Development, Education and Leadership. In addition to the monitoring role, the Chair of the Committee, the Hon. John A. Fraser, was requested to provide the Minister with specific advice on the process for the restructuring of the Reserves (LFRR). That report "*In Service of the Nation: Canada's Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century*" was presented in June 2000.

The Minister's reform endeavour continues with his decision to prolong the Monitoring Committee's mandate to allow for the ongoing monitoring of the implementation of the *Fraser Report* recommendations.

The following Terms of Reference have been defined for the Committee Members:

1. The role of the Committee is to ensure that the recommendations of the *Fraser Report* are implemented in keeping with the Minister's Policy Statement on Reserves Restructuring (LFRR).
 - The Committee will monitor the LFRR Implementation Plan and provide progress reports to the Minister, the CDS and the DM
 - The Committee will liaise with the Reserves community and the CLS throughout the restructuring process to ensure that the exercise is conducted in as open and transparent a manner as possible
 - The Committee will also act as mediators should any issue arise which would create a potential impasse in the implementation
 - The Committee will have access to all relevant information and may meet and/or visit any individuals and locations which they deem necessary in their review
 - The Committee will be served by a Secretariat providing administrative, research and analytical support as required.
2. The CLS will provide a step-by-step plan and critical path for each recommendation which the Committee will use as a focus for their review. He will also identify any OPIs whom he tasks with specific responsibilities and with whom the Committee may liaise as required.

3. In addition to the reports to the MND, the CDS and the DM, the Committee will provide the Reserves community with a report on the progress of implementation of LFRR, on Professional Development and Education.

6 October 2000

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA POLICY STATEMENT
LAND FORCE RESERVE RESTRUCTURE (LFRR)

I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge and express my appreciation for the many individuals and organizations who have worked so hard to get us to the point where we can move forward in the LFRR process. The late Chief Justice Brian Dickson, Dr Jack Granatstein and LGen Charles Belzile (ret'd) began the current process in 1995 with the Special Commission on Reserve Restructure. The Defence Team, particularly the Land Staff, worked thereafter for many years to evaluate the Army Reserve in order to implement the recommendations of the SCRR. The knowledge and experience gained in that exercise have been of invaluable assistance to those doing recent work on the policy and institutional parameters for reserve restructure. The Hon. John A. Fraser and the members of the Minister's Monitoring Committee, D. Bevis Dewar and Dr. David Bercuson, have monitored progress on reserve restructure. At my request, they have also provided me with advice on how to deal with the impasse reached last year in consultations between the Army and the reserve community. LGen Mike Jeffery, also at my request, consulted widely in search of common ground among the stakeholders that would provide us with the ability to launch LFRR. These individuals, along with Departmental and CF staff, have wrestled this very complex problem of reserve restructure to the ground. Having reached common ground among stakeholders, I am pleased to re-affirm current Government policy and begin implementation of LFRR.

The Army Reserve is a vital component of Canada's military capability. Indeed, the Defence Mission requires the cooperation of both the Regular and Reserve components of the Canadian Forces. Located in communities throughout Canada, the Army Reserves exist primarily to provide the framework for expansion should the need arise. This is the *raison d'être* of our Reserve Force, which is characterized by its role as a "footprint" in communities across the country. Its significant social role of fostering the values of citizenship and public service is one which, as Canadians, we have come to cherish and must protect.

However, Army Reservists also help us to augment our Regular high readiness forces when committed to operations. Since the end of the Cold War, our reliance on these augmentees has increased due to the high tempo of our operational activity. We aim now to have Reservists provide up to 20% of the personnel for these deployments. The Army Reserves are even more prominent in our defence against natural disasters and local emergencies, such as the Saguenay and Red River floods and the Ice Storm of 1998.

The Fraser Report and LGen Jeffery's Strategic Plan for LFRR are the key ingredients to the success of this process. The recommendations of the Fraser Report will serve as the Government's blueprint for LFRR, and LGen Jeffery's Plan will be the first step in their implementation. This strategic plan provides for fixing some of the problems plaguing the Militia identified in the Fraser Report. It will lay the groundwork for developing future policies to fit the lives of our part-time citizen soldiers. We need them more now than at any time since the Second World War. They provide the framework for expansion should we require mobilization of forces; for individual and unit augmentation on peace support operations; and, to represent the military footprint in communities across the country. The Strategic Plan, combined with some additional actions I am taking, will ensure that the CF Reserves will continue to be both operationally sound, while contributing to the development of citizenship and to local emergency preparedness.

These actions are taken to clarify public policy as it relates to the Army Reserves and to facilitate the timely and effective implementation of LFRR. Specifically, they include:

- Increasing the number of part-time Army Reservists to at least 18,500 by the end of fiscal year 2005/06;
- Further consideration of national mobilization planning;
- The appointment of a senior official to manage LFRR;
- The appointment of the Hon. John A. Fraser and MGen Reginald Lewis (ret'd) to monitor LFRR;
- Clarify the authority and role of the Chief of Reserves and Cadets.

These measures demonstrate our commitment to an open and transparent process that will facilitate the participation of the broader reserves community, and the Canadian public, in developing a citizen soldiery ready for the challenges of the 21st century.

Restructure will proceed, and succeed, only with co-operation among the key stakeholders. We have therefore taken a prudent, cautious approach to reserve restructure. As a national institution and a valuable strategic resource serving communities throughout the country, the Militia is synonymous with Canada's proud military heritage. This legacy will remain and be protected as restructuring moves forward. Furthermore, as a matter of public policy, reserve restructure will continue to include the advice and engagement of key stakeholders. These decisions, along with my recent announcement of the expansion of the Canadian Ranger and Junior Canadian Ranger programs, demonstrate the Government's support for our part-time Reservists, and confirms that the CF's presence will continue to be felt across the country.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A -
TRANSMITTAL LETTER FROM “*IN SERVICE OF THE NATION*”



National Defence
Minister's Monitoring
Committee on Change

Défense nationale
Comité de surveillance des
changements

May 19, 2000

The Honourable Art Eggleton
Minister of National Defence
National Defence Headquarters
101 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, ON K1A 0K2

Dear Minister:

Last fall, you asked me to provide you with advice on how to resolve the impasse in the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) process. With the concurrence of my colleagues D. Bevis Dewar and Dr. David Bercuson, an interim report was submitted to you on March 30, 2000.

As you are aware, we have consulted widely across Canada with and have received submissions from Regular and Reserve serving officers, warrant officers and other ranks, as well as the broader reserve community. We have given careful consideration to everything we heard and read and have assessed the implications of the options available.

Our final report and recommendations, entitled *In Service of the Nation: Canada's Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century*, is respectfully submitted for your consideration.

Yours sincerely,

John A. Fraser
Chairman

222 Queen Street
Suite 701
Ottawa, ON
K1A 0K2

222, rue Queen
Suite 701
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0K2

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A -
1999 TERMS OF REFERENCE



NOV 17 1999

Mr. John A. Fraser
Chairman
National Defence Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change
222 Queen Street, Suite 701
Ottawa ON K1A 0K2

Dear Mr. Fraser:

Thank you for your letter of October 25, 1999, concerning the roles of the reconstituted Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change.

I would like to confirm our mutual understanding of how these separate roles will be addressed:

- A reconstituted Monitoring Committee, consisting of Messrs. Daniel B. Dewar, David Bercuson and you, will continue to monitor the implementation of reforms primarily in the areas of leadership and the Reserves, providing me with a final report in the fall of 2000; and
- As Chair of the reconstituted Monitoring Committee, you will personally arrange to have the Committee review the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) process and provide me with advice on this matter. I understand that you will report your advice to me in late spring 2000. Furthermore, in order to fulfil your duties in this regard, you will consult with Major-General Stuart McDonald, Lieutenant-General Ray Crabbe (retired), Major-General Frederick Marriage (retired), and others as appropriate.

.../2

- 2 -

As discussed in our telephone conversation of October 21, 1999, the existing Monitoring Committee's Secretariat will continue to assist you and the Monitoring Committee with both functions.


I appreciate the quality of work that has been produced so far by the Monitoring Committee and look forward to your advice and reports in the year 2000.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Arthur C. Eggleton', with a large, stylized initial 'A'.

Arthur C. Eggleton

ANNEX B - DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE – ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



ANNEX C – STAGES OF MOBILIZATION

Mobilization

The new strategic environment has prompted the Government to reconsider the traditional approach to mobilization planning. Mobilization plans must provide for a graduated and orderly transition from routine peacetime operations to higher levels of involvement, which ultimately could include the total mobilization of the nation. Accordingly, mobilization plans will be revised on the basis of a new, four-stage framework.

- The first stage of a response to any crisis or emergency would involve “force generation”; that is, all measures needed to prepare elements of the Canadian Forces to undertake new operational tasks, and to sustain and support them. These functions will be undertaken within the existing resource framework of the Canadian Forces. They will include the training and preparation of reservists to augment the Regular Force.
- The next stage, “force enhancement”, would involve the improvement of the operational capabilities of the existing forces through the allocation of more resources. It would be undertaken without permanent change in the posture or roles of the Canadian Forces, although the formation of temporary units or specialist elements could prove necessary. This level of mobilization is similar to actions taken in response to the 1990 war in the Persian Gulf and all current peacekeeping commitments.
- “Force expansion”, the third stage, would involve the enlargement of the Canadian Forces - and perhaps selected elements of the Department of National Defence - to meet a major crisis or emergency. It will involve permanent changes in the roles, structures, and taskings of the Canadian Forces - and could call for the formation of new units, the enhancement of existing facilities, and the procurement of additional equipment. This stage is similar to the structural and role changes undergone by all elements of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence in 1950-1952, when Canada provided armed forces to the United Nations’ multinational force in Korea, and to the newly formed NATO in Europe.
- Finally, while a major global war is highly unlikely at this time, it remains prudent to have ready “no-cost” plans for total “national mobilization”. This fourth step could touch upon all aspects of Canadian society and would only come into effect with the proclamation by the Governor-in-Council of a “war emergency” under the *Emergencies Act*.

(1994 Defence White Paper, pp. 44-45)

ANNEX D – MMC CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES

The Minister's Monitoring Committee pursues its information gathering in several ways including discrete research and interviews. For its mandate, pertaining to LFRR, the Committee also uses consultation as a valuable source of insight, ideas and verification. Our consultations on the Army's structure in Canada will take place in the four Areas: Land Force Western Area, Land Force Central Area, *Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre* and Land Force Atlantic Area.

This is the schedule of consultations with the ten Canadian Brigade Groups in the years 2002 and 2003.

- Ottawa, November 30, 2002 - 33 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- Toronto, February 8, 2003 - 32 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- London, February 9, 2003 - 31 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- Winnipeg, April 11, 2003 - 38 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- Calgary, April 12, 2003 - 41 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- Quebec, June 21, 2003 - 35 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- Montreal, June 22, 2003 - 34 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- Moncton, September 13, 2003 - 37 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- Halifax, September 14, 2003 - 36 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.
- Vancouver, October 10, 2003 - 39 Canadian Brigade Group and its units.

Visit our Website at www.frasercom.ca to learn more about the Minister of National Defence's Monitoring Committee consultation activities.

List of Participants

<i>NAME</i>	<i>ORGANIZATION</i>
Capt Doug Agnew	CO, 2 Intelligence Platoon
CWO Alkema	RSM, 48 th Highlanders of Canada
MWO Alden	RSM, 18 Air Defence Regiment
Col S. Anema	Commander, 38 CBG
LCol D. Atwell	CO, The Fort Garry Horse
Capt L. Baspaly	DCO, 17 (Winnipeg) Medical Company
LCol B. Batter	CO, 17 (Winnipeg) Service Battalion
LCol R.N. Bell	CO, 23 (Hamilton) Service Battalion
LCol P.A. Berthiaume	CO, The Essex and Kent Scottish Regiment
Maj Shawn Bindon	CO, 3 Field Engineer Squadron (M)
LCol Brazill	CO, 7 Toronto Regiment (RCA)
Maj P. Brunberg	G1, 32 CBG HQ
CWO Brunelle	RSM, 15 (Edmonton) Service Battalion
Capt K. Bueckert	64 Field Battery, 10 Field Artillery Regiment (Rep. of CO)
LCol M.K. Campbell	CO, 4 th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment

LCol J.P. Celestino	CO, The Windsor Regiment (RCAC)
Capt H. Chafe	Public Affairs Officer, 31 CBG
LCol Chin	CO, 2 Field Engineer Regiment
Maj Roy Clarke	DCO, Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders
MWO Clark	Rep. the RSM, The Queen's York Rangers
MWO D.W. Coxall	CSM, 8 Field Engineer Regiment
MWO G. Craig	CSM, 41 CBG
CWO Crngarov	RSM, The Governor General's Horse Guards
CWO Darling	RSM, Brigade Battle School, 32 CBG
LCol Steve Delaney	CO, Governor General's Foot Guards
Col R. DesLauriers	Comd, 32 CBG
CWO Dool	RSM, 14 (Calgary) Service Battalion
LCol J. Dorfman	OIC LFRR, 32 CBG HQ
CWO C.F. Draper	Brigade SM, 31 CBG
Maj R.S.J. Dwyer	CO, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment
LCol R.W. Elliott	CO, 11 th Field Artillery Regiment
LCol R.G. Elms	CO, The Argyle & Sutherland Highlanders of Canada
BGen J.I. Fenton	Deputy Commander, LFWA
Capt T. Fletcher	Assistant Public Affairs Officer, 31 CBG
Maj Daniel Fontaine	CO, The Ceremonial Guard
LCol Fotheringham	CO, Queen's Own Rifles of Canada
Maj Frederico	Brigade Chap, 32 CBG
LCol Rick Garber	CO, The Brockville Rifles
Maj Gidlow	Rep. the CO of The Royal Regiment of Canada
LCol Gludo	Deputy Commander, 41 CBG
LCol Bruno Gobeil	CO, 2 nd Bn, Irish Regiment of Canada
MWO Gordon	RSM, 6 Intelligence Company
LCol Ray Goulet	CO, 28 (Ottawa) Medical Company
MWO Granger	SSM, 2 Field Engineer Regiment
CWO Griffith	RSM, The Calgary Highlanders
LCol Hodgson	ACOS, 41 CBG
Col A.R. Halfper	Assistant COS, LFCA
LCol R.J. Hallas	ACOS, Ops & Trg, 31 CBG
Capt Halton	Adj, 32 CBG HQ
CWO Halton	RSM, The Royal Regiment of Canada
Maj J.R.D. Hamelin	CO, 21 (Windsor) Service Battalion
LCol D.G. Hamilton	CO, 56 th Field Artillery Regiment
Maj B.N. Harris	DCO, 22 (London) Service Battalion
LCol R.J. Harris	CO, The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry
Maj B. Hrycyna	CO, Saskatchewan Dragoons
LCol Kelly	Brigade Medical Advisor, 32 CBG
Col Daniel Lafleur	Commander, 33 CBG
Maj R. Lalande	CO, 31 Combat Engineer Regiment
Maj Lepine	CO, 18 Air Defence Regiment
LCol William Leavey	CO, The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment
BGen A.B. Leslie	Commander, LFCA

LCol Leslie	CO, 15 (Edmonton) Medical Company
CWO Brian Lypps	Brigade SM for 33 CBG
CWO MacFarlane	RSM, 25 Medical company
Maj McAuley	CO, 33 Field Engineer Squadron
CWO McEvoy	RSM, The King's Own Calgary Regiment
Maj R.C. McGill	The Hastings & Prince Edward Regiment
LCol McKinnon	COS, 41 CBG
LCol Gord McNeil	CO, 26 (North Bay) Service Battalion
Maj Manley	CO, The Calgary Highlanders
LCol Mann	CO, Brigade Battle School, 32 CBG
LCol A.F. Markewicz	CO, 8 Field Engineer Regiment
LCol Martin	CO, 14 (Calgary) Service Battalion
LCol J.W. Martin	ACOS, Honoraries, 31 CBG
LCol Miller	CO, The Grey and Simcoe Foresters
Col J. Milne	Commander, 41 CBG
CWO Mundorf	RSM, The Loyal Edmonton Regiment
LCol J.H. Murray	ACOS, Administration, 31 CBG
CWO Newton	RSM, 32 CBG
LCol Nickel	15 (Edmonton) Service Battalion
Col G.J.P. O'Brien	Commander, 31 CBG
Maj D. Parry	DCO, The Ontario Regiment
MWO Patterson	Rep. the RSM, Queen's Own Rifles of Canada
LCol K. Peachey	CO, 16 (Saskatchewan) Service Battalion
LCol D. Penner	CO, North Saskatchewan Regiment
CWO Perry	RSM, 25 Toronto Service Battalion
LCol R.A. Phillips	COS, 31 CBG
LCol Racine	CO, 25 Toronto Service Battalion
LCol Mike Rafferty	CO, 28 (Ottawa) Service Battalion
LCol Rice	CO, The Loyal Edmonton Regiment
Maj Roach	CO, 2 Intelligence Company
LCol Cam Ross	CO, 49 th Field Artillery Regiment RCA
LCol Sargeant	CO, 48 th Highlanders of Canada
LCol Paul Scagnetti	CO, The Algonquin Regiment
LCol Shaw	CO, The Governor General's Horse Guards
CWO Sherriff	RSM, The Lorne Scots
LCol Stafford	Deputy Commander, 32 CBG
LCol Stanton	CO, The King's Own Calgary Regiment
LCol C.G. Thompson	CO, 1 st Hussars
LCol Trayner	CO, The Toronto Scottish Regiment
Maj Vandertogt	CO, 41 CBG
LCol Von Bulow	CO, 25 Medical Company
LCol Wadsworth	COS, 32 CBG
Maj Welsh	Rep. the CO of The Lorne Scots
LCol Mark Wilkinson	CO, 30 th Field Regiment RCA
LCol K.R. Winiarski	CO, The Queen's York Rangers
BGen Young	Deputy Commander, LFCA

ANNEX E – LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADM (HR-Mil)	Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Military)
AMSC	Advanced Military Studies Course
ARFM	Army Reserve Funding Model
BGen	Brigadier-General
CADPAT	Canadian Disruptive Pattern
CBG	Canadian Brigade Group
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CDA	Canadian Defence Academy
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CFC	Canadian Forces College
CFLC	Canadian Forces Liaison Council
CFLI	Canadian Force Leadership Institute
CF	Canadian Forces
CFRG	Canadian Forces Recruiting Group
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CLS	Chief of the Land Staff
Comd	Commander
CRC	Composite Reserve Company
CSC	Command and Staff Course
CSS	Combat Service Support
DCDS	Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
DM	Deputy Minister
DND	Department of National Defence
ELOC	Essential Level of Capability
FY	Fiscal Year
JAG	Judge Advocate General
LAV	Light Armoured Vehicle
LFAA	Land Force Atlantic Area
LFCA	Land Force Central Area
LFRR	Land Force Reserve Restructure

LFWA	Land Force Western Area
LGen	Lieutenant-General
MDS	Master of Defence Studies
MGen	Major-General
MMC	Minister's Monitoring Committee
MND	Minister of National Defence
MNB NW	Multi-National Brigade North-West
NCM	Non Commissioned Member
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NSSC	National Security Studies Course
OCIPEP	Office of Critical Infrastructure and Emergency Preparedness
OPD	Officer Professional Development
PMO	Project Management Office
PPCLI	Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
R22eR	<i>Royal 22^e Régiment</i>
RFEP	Reserve Force Employment Project
RMC	Royal Military College
ROTO	Rotation
SCONDVA	Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs
SCRR	Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves
SORD	Strategic Operation and Resource Direction
SQFT	<i>Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre</i>
Supp Res	Supplementary Reserve
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

ANNEX F – BIOGRAPHIES

THE HONOURABLE JOHN A. FRASER CHAIRMAN

John Allen Fraser, P.C., O.C., O.B.C., C.D., Q.C., was born December 15, 1931, in Japan and raised and educated in British Columbia. He was called to the Bar in 1954 and practised law until his election to the House of Commons in 1972. He was re-elected in 1974, 1979, 1980, 1984 and 1988. In opposition he served as critic on Environment, Labour, Post Office, Solicitor General and Fisheries matters. He was Minister of Environment and Postmaster General (1979-80), and then Minister of Fisheries (1984-85).

In 1986, Mr. Fraser became the first Speaker of the House of Commons to be elected by secret ballot by Members of Parliament. He served as Speaker until February 1994. His accomplishments as Speaker include the establishment of the Central and Eastern European Parliamentary Cooperation Program; the creation of the House of Commons Public Information Office; and the establishment of the House of Commons environmental program, Greening the Hill. In 1986, he established a House of Commons Task Force on the Disabled and Handicapped to ensure access and employment opportunities on Parliament Hill for the disadvantaged. He also commissioned the recent publication, *The House of Commons at Work*.

Over the years, Mr. Fraser has had a continuing interest in resource matters including fisheries and forestry and has demonstrated a profound commitment to environmental causes both as a lawyer and a parliamentarian. He has received a variety of national awards for his valuable contributions and tireless efforts in the area of sustainable development. In addition to these many awards, he has been active with a number of boards and foundations, and was awarded an honorary professorship from the Beijing Medical University (China) in 1992.

In 1994, Mr. Fraser was appointed Canada's Ambassador for the Environment, a position held until September, 1998. In 1995, in recognition of his many contributions to Canada, he was awarded the Order of Canada. He is also a member of the Order of British Columbia and holds the Canadian Forces Decoration. He continues to be active in environmental protection and resource conservation and was appointed Chair of the Pacific Fisheries Resource Conservation Council in September 1998.

Mr. Fraser has been associated with the Canadian Forces since 1950, when he first enlisted as a private soldier with the West Coast Signal Regiment. After two years with Canadian Officer Training Corps, he was commissioned as an infantry officer and posted to Germany in 1953 with the First Canadian Highland Battalion of the 27th Brigade. From 1954 to 1962, he served as an officer in both the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada

and the Canadian Scottish Regiment. Mr. Fraser was appointed Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel, the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, in 1994 and is currently the Regiment's Honorary Colonel.

In October 1997, Mr. Fraser was appointed a member of the National Defence Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change. He is currently Chair.

DR. DAVID J. BERCUSON

MEMBER

David Bercuson was born in Montreal in August, 1945. He attended Sir George Williams University, graduating in June 1966 with Honours in History and winning the Lieutenant-Governor's Silver Medal for the highest standing in history. Bercuson pursued graduate studies at the University of Toronto, earning an MA in history in 1967 and a Ph.D. in 1971.

Dr. Bercuson has published widely in academic and popular publications on a wide range of topics. He specializes in modern Canadian politics, Canadian defence and foreign policy, and Canadian military history. He has written, coauthored, or edited over 25 popular and academic books and does political commentary for CBC and CTV television. He has written regular columns for the *Globe & Mail*, the *Financial Post* and other newspapers.

In 1988 Bercuson was elected to the Royal Society of Canada and in May, 1989, he was appointed Dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies at The University of Calgary. Since January 1997 he has been Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary.

His book, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*, won the Wilfred Eggleston Award for nonfiction at the Alberta Book Awards in May 1997. Another recent book, *Deadly Seas: The Story of the St. Croix, U305 and the Battle of the Atlantic*, coauthored with Dr. Holger Herwig, was on the *Maclean's* Bestseller list for several weeks. His most recent books *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War* was published in September, 1999 and *The Patricias* was published in May 2001. His new book, *Bismarck!*, co-authored with Holger Herwig, was published in New York and Toronto in the fall of 2001.

Dr. Bercuson was appointed Special Advisor to the Minister of National Defence on the Future of the Canadian Forces from January to April 1997.

MR. D. BEVIS DEWAR**MEMBER**

Bevis Dewar was born in Kenmore, Ontario in August 1932. He studied at Queen's University where he obtained an Honours Bachelor of Arts degree in history, economics and political science in 1953, following which he pursued postgraduate studies in Canadian history also at Queen's. While at university, Mr. Dewar served in the University Naval Training Division at Kingston, Halifax and Esquimalt.

In 1954, he joined the Public Service of Canada and was appointed to the Cabinet Secretariat in the Privy Council Office where he was secretary to Cabinet committees dealing with matters of interdepartmental liaison and policy development, mainly regarding external affairs and defence.

In 1963, he became a program analyst in the Treasury Board Secretariat. His duties consisted of program and expenditure budget analysis and of presenting recommendations dealing with defence production, industrial development, foreign affairs and defence. In 1968, he was named Assistant Secretary of the Program Branch at the Treasury Board Secretariat, responsible for analyzing and making recommendations on expenditure budgets of all federal departments. The following year he became Deputy Secretary of the same Branch.

Mr. Dewar was appointed Assistant Deputy Minister, Medical Services Branch, Health and Welfare Canada in September 1973. From September, 1975 to August 1979, he served as Assistant Secretary for the Government Branch of Science and Technology Canada, responsible for the International Division, the Government Projects Division, and the Project Review and Assessment Division.

In August 1979, Mr. Dewar was appointed Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Operations) in the Privy Council Office. He was responsible for secretariats on economic policy, government operations, foreign affairs and defence, native and social affairs, communications, emergency planning, labour relations, and legislation and House planning. From November 1982 to May 1989, Mr. Dewar served as Deputy Minister of National Defence. He was appointed Associate Secretary of the Cabinet and Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council in May 1989. In October, 1990, he was named Principal of the Canadian Centre for Management Development.

Mr. Dewar retired from public service in August 1992.

BRIGADIER GENERAL (RET'D) SHEILA A. HELLSTROM
MEMBER

Brigadier-General Hellstrom is a native of Lunenburg, Nova Scotia. She graduated from Lunenburg County Academy in 1953 and attended Mount Allison University in Sackville, New Brunswick where she earned a Bachelor of Science degree in biology and chemistry. While at Mount Allison, she enrolled as a flight cadet in the Royal Canadian Air Force University Reserve Training Plan. She received her commission in 1956 and transferred to the Regular Force in the personnel administration branch.

Brigadier-General Hellstrom's career included administrative appointments at military establishments in Gimli, Winnipeg and Rivers, Manitoba, Senneterre and Montreal, Quebec, North Bay and Toronto, Ontario as well as Baden-Soellingen Germany and Metz France. At National Defence headquarters Ottawa, she served as Director Women Personnel and acting Director General Conditions of Service.

In 1987 she became the first woman in the Canadian Forces to achieve general officer rank and was appointed Director General Personnel Careers Officers. At the same time, she served as Chair of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces, a group of senior officers from the NATO nations concerned with the effective utilization of women in the armed forces of the Alliance.

Brigadier-General Hellstrom is a graduate of the Canadian Forces Staff College, Toronto and of the National Defence College in Kingston. In 1989, she received an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from Mount Allison University.

Now retired from the Canadian Forces, Brigadier-General Hellstrom resides in Ottawa where she is former chair of the Board of Governors of the Ottawa Division Canadian Corps of Commissionaires, and a member of a number of defence-related organizations. She has also served on the Minister's Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the Canadian Forces and the Ottawa Police Services Board's Advisory Committee on Race Relations and Employment Equity.

MAJOR GENERAL (RET'D) REGINALD W. LEWIS
MEMBER

Major General Reginald W. Lewis, C.M., C.M.M., C.D., was born in London, England and was raised and educated in the United Kingdom. He became a Certified General Accountant in 1962 and a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Secretaries and Administrators in 1965. General Lewis is the immediate past Chairman of the Honourary Colonels' Council of Canada. In October 2000, General Lewis was named a member of the Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces phase III which focuses on the monitoring of Land Force Reserve Restructure.

General Lewis' military career began when he joined his school's Cadet Corps. He joined the British Army in 1948 and served in the Royal Army Ordnance Corps in the U.K., Egypt, Turkey, Greece and Eritrea. In 1954 he came to Canada and joined the militia and subsequently commanded the Toronto Service Battalion, Toronto Militia District, Central Militia Area – the largest command in the Reserves – before being appointed Special Project Officer Reserves, NDHQ. Thereafter, he was made Chief of Reserves.

Relinquishing the appointment of CRes in 1988, he became the International President of the Interallied Confederation of Reserves Officers of NATO (CIOR), an organization based at NATO H.Q. in Brussels, representing 800,000 Reserve Officers of the Alliance. Subsequent to the Presidency of CIOR he was appointed the Honourary Colonel of the Royal Regiment of Canada.

Over the years, General Lewis has continued to have an active involvement in civilian matters. Among his many accomplishments, he has been President of the Parking Authority of Toronto, Chairman and CEO of the Toronto Economic Development Corporation, and Chairman of Defence Construction Canada Ltd. Recently, he was appointed a Director of Parc Downsview Park, Inc. and he has served as a judge of the Citizenship Court.

General Lewis has also been extensively involved in community and military associations throughout his career. A member of the Board of Trade of Toronto, he is the Chair of its Military Affairs Committee. He has been Chairman of the Toronto and Region Canadian Corps of Commissionaires, Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations as well as President of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps Association and of the Canadian Forces Logistics Association.

General Lewis has received numerous orders and decorations throughout his career. Included among them are the Canadian Forces Decoration (three clasps) (CD); the Commemorative Plaque, City of Amsterdam; Member, Order of Canada (CM), Commander Order of Military Merit (CMM), and Commander, Order of St. John (CStJ).

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