



Indicators for social and economic coping capacity— moving toward a working definition of adaptive capacity

Gary Yohe^{a,*}, Richard S.J. Tol^b

^aDepartment of Economics, Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT 06459, USA

^bHamburg, Vrije and Carnegie Mellon Universities, Hamburg, D-20146, Germany

Abstract

This paper offers a practically motivated method for evaluating systems' abilities to handle external stress. The method is designed to assess the potential contributions of various adaptation options to improving systems' coping capacities by focusing attention directly on the underlying determinants of adaptive capacity. The method should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate diverse applications whose contexts are location specific and path dependent without imposing the straightjacket constraints of a "one size fits all" cookbook approach. Nonetheless, the method should produce unitless indicators that can be employed to judge the relative vulnerabilities of diverse systems to multiple stresses and to their potential interactions. An artificial application is employed to describe the development of the method and to illustrate how it might be applied. Some empirical evidence is offered to underscore the significance of the determinants of adaptive capacity in determining vulnerability; these are the determinants upon which the method is constructed. The method is, finally, applied directly to expert judgments of six different adaptations that could reduce vulnerability in the Netherlands to increased flooding along the Rhine River. © 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Adaptive capacity has worked its way, as an organizing concept, into the research structures of those who contemplate the potential harm that might be attributed to global climate change and other sources of external stress. As such, it holds the potential of being a point of departure for the construction of practical indices of vulnerability that could sustain comparable analyses of the relative vulnerabilities of different systems located across the globe and subject to a diverse set of stresses that lie beyond their control. This paper offers a practically motivated method for evaluating adaptive capacity by assessing the potential contributions of various adaptation options to improving systems' coping capacities. We expect that this method will be sufficiently flexible to accommodate diverse applications whose contexts are location specific and path dependent without imposing the straightjacket constraints of a "one size fits all" cookbook approach. It is designed to produce, nonetheless, unitless indicators that can be employed to judge the relative vulnerabilities of diverse

systems to multiple stresses and to their potential interactions. It is designed, as well, to help practitioners distinguish productively between macro and micro scale factors that work to define the underlying determinants of coping capacity—a distinction that can bring critical scale differences into clear focus.

We begin in Section 1 with a brief review of the literature in which the notions of vulnerability, exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity have been developed. We focus particular attention on the determinants of adaptive capacity and their role in defining the boundaries of coping ranges—thresholds of relatively benign experience beyond which systems feel significant effects from change and/or variability in their environments. Section 2 uses a more formal representation of vulnerability to show how overall coping capacity might be judged by contemplating the feasibility and efficacy of alternative adaptation options; and Section 3 offers some empirical justification drawn from national data for this approach. Section 4 presents the adaptation-specific foundation of proposed methodology; it builds on the determinants of adaptive capacity for each adaptation option and shows how the complications of adaptation interaction and multiple

*Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-860-685-3658; fax: +1-860-685-2781.

E-mail address: gyohe@wesleyan.edu (G. Yohe).

stresses can be accommodated. The method is designed ultimately to produce unitless and comparable indicators of coping capacity. Section 5 illustrates how the method might be applied by constructing a hypothetical example around historical flows in the Nile River before Section 6 offers a more realistic application to the Rhine Delta in the Netherlands. Concluding remarks in Section 7 finally provide some discussion of context for subsequent application in response to the call from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to identify the most vulnerable nations and communities.

1. A brief literature review

The authors of Chapter 18 of the Report of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report (TAR) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) focused considerable attention on the role of adaptation in judging the economic implications of climate change and climate variability (IPCC, 2001). Even though they concentrated on climate-related stresses, their work can be applied by those who contemplate the potential for adaptation to diminish the costs (or to enlarge the benefits) of change in the mean or variability in any variable that defines a system's environment. Moreover, the care with which they assessed the broader adaptation literature in their approach to climate issues means that it is sufficient for present purposes simply to review their work with a careful eye toward converting their insights into workable and informative indicators of coping capacity.

We begin the process by recalling four major conclusions that the lead authors of Chapter 18 highlighted in their Executive Summary (IPCC, 2001):

1. The vulnerability of any system to an external stress (or collection of stresses) is a function of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity.
2. Human and natural systems tend to adapt autonomously to gradual change and to change in variability.
3. Human systems can also plan and implement adaptation strategies in an effort to reduce potential vulnerability or exploit emerging opportunities even further.
4. The economic cost of vulnerability to an external stress is the sum of the incremental cost of adaptation plus any residual damages that cannot be avoided.

Moreover, the authors of Chapter 18 emphasized that adaptive capacity varies significantly from system to system, sector to sector and region to region. Indeed, the *determinants* of adaptive capacity include a variety of system, sector, and location specific characteristics:

1. The range of available technological options for adaptation,

2. The availability of resources and their distribution across the population,
3. The structure of critical institutions, the derivative allocation of decision-making authority, and the decision criteria that would be employed,
4. The stock of human capital including education and personal security,
5. The stock of social capital including the definition of property rights,
6. The system's access to risk spreading processes,
7. The ability of decision-makers to manage information, the processes by which these decision-makers determine which information is credible, and the credibility of the decision-makers, themselves, and
8. The public's perceived attribution of the source of stress and the significance of exposure to its local manifestations.

Finally, it is essential to note that exposure to variability and to extreme events is an important source of vulnerability. In fact, systems typically respond to variability and extreme events before they respond to gradual changes in the mean.

In summary, the vulnerability *cum* adaptation literature recognizes explicitly that systems' environments are inherently variable from day-to-day, month-to-month, year-to-year, decade to decade, and so on (see Mearns et al., 1997; Karl and Knight, 1998; Berz, 1999). It follows that changes in the mean conditions that define those environments can actually be experienced most noticeably through changes in the nature and/or frequency of variable conditions that materialize across short time scales and that adaptation necessarily involves reaction to this sort of variability. This is the fundamental point in Hewitt and Burton (1971), Kane et al. (1992), Yohe et al. (1996), Downing (1996) and Yohe and Schlesinger (1998). Some researchers, like Smithers and Smit (1997), Smit et al. (1999), and Downing et al. (1997), use the concept of "hazard" to capture these sorts of stimuli, and claim that adaptation is warranted whenever either changes in mean conditions or changes in variability have significant consequences.

For most systems, though, change and variability over short periods of time fall within a "coping range"—a range of circumstances within which, by virtue of the underlying resilience of the system, significant consequences are not observed (see Downing et al., 1997; or Pittock and Jones, 2000). There are, however, limits to resilience for even the most robust of systems. As a result, it is important to understand the boundaries of systems' coping ranges—thresholds beyond which the consequences of experienced conditions become significant. Coping ranges are not necessarily fixed over time, of course. Indeed, de Vries (1985), de Freitas (1989) and Smit et al. (2000) all make it clear

that judging adaptive capacity depends critically upon both defining a coping range *and* understanding how the efficacy of any coping strategy might be expanded by adopting new or modified adaptations.

2. Adding detail and context to the vulnerability structure

The broad relationship between vulnerability, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity illustrated in the river flow example can be expressed in its most general form with a little notation. Let \mathbf{V} denote vulnerability, \mathbf{E} denote exposure, \mathbf{S} denote sensitivity, and \mathbf{A} denote adaptive capacity, and let \mathbf{D}_i index each of the eight determinants of adaptive capacity identified in Section 1.¹ Each of these variables, except adaptive capacity, is recorded in bold because each can be a vector. Vulnerability can be measured simultaneously along many different dimensions. A system can be exposed to many different stresses simultaneously. Many different sectors and many different people can feel sensitivity to any particular exposure at the same time. All of the determinants of adaptive capacity can, in principle, be depicted in multiple ways. Adaptive capacity is uniquely represented as a scalar, because we think that a scalar can be defined to serve as an aggregate measure of the potential to cope. Formally, then,

$$\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{F}\{\mathbf{E}(\mathbf{A}); \mathbf{S}(\mathbf{A})\}, \quad (1)$$

where

$$\mathbf{A} = AC\{\mathbf{D}_1; \dots; \mathbf{D}_8\}. \quad (2)$$

Both $\mathbf{F}\{-\}$ and $AC\{-\}$ are multivariate and complex functions that are location specific and path dependent. It is reasonable to expect that vulnerability would, at least eventually, increase monotonically with exposure and sensitivity at increasing rates. It is also likely that exposure and sensitivity would fall at decreasing rates with higher adaptive capacity. The relationship between adaptive capacity and its determinants reflected in Eq. (2) would, however, be more difficult to characterize.

Functional representations of this sort are, of course, only useful if they offer ways of organizing thoughts and sifting through the complexity. Many of the variables cannot be quantified, and many of the component functions can only be qualitatively described. Still, working through their content from the bottom up can be useful in uncovering practical insights that can support the creation of indexes of coping capacity. Some of the determinants of adaptive capacity should, for example, operate on macro-scales in which national or regional factors play the most significant role, but

other determinants should function on more micro scales that are precisely location specific. This will turn out to be a useful distinction. The set of available, applicable, and appropriate technological options (Determinant 1) for a given exposure at a particular location should, for example, be defined on a micro-scale, even though the complete set of possible remedies might have macro roots. Flood control options would, for example, be determined by the local conditions of the river bed and available engineering knowledge; and this knowledge may be restricted to indigenous knowledge on the one hand or informed by worldwide consultants on the other.

Determinants 2 through 6 should all have large macro components to them, but their micro-scale manifestations could vary from location to location or even from adaptation option to adaptation option. Resources (Determinant 2) could be distributed differently across specific locations, but adaptive capacity may be more sensitive to larger scale distributional issues across different locations. The essential questions here focus on whether sufficient funds are available to pay for adaptation and whether the people who control those funds are prepared to spend them on adaptation. Empirical results reported in the next section are evidence that these questions can be critical at the most fundamental level. We will show that poorer people are more likely to fall victim to natural catastrophes than are richer people. We will also report that more densely populated areas are more vulnerable. This is as expected, because the same disaster affects more people. Moreover, we find a positive relationship between income inequality and vulnerability; i.e., people in more egalitarian societies seem to be less likely to fall victim of natural disasters than are people in a society with a highly skewed income distribution. This is expected, as well. It is consistent with the negative correlation between income and vulnerability, and it suggests that measures designed to highlight a skewed distribution would confirm the notion that the poorest communities within a country would face similar resource deficiencies when it comes to protecting themselves. Some other explanatory variables are insignificant, but it is important to note that health care and education have strong positive correlations with per capita income.

Macro-scale and even international institutions (Determinant 3) could certainly matter even at a micro level, especially in determining how decisions among various adaptation options might be made and who has access to the decision-making process. For example, the World Bank follows certain procedures in its investment decisions, and adaptation projects in countries seeking World Bank support must satisfy Bank criteria before even being considered. The European Union also has a framework (on procedures as well as consequences) into which all water management projects must fit, so macro-

¹ The exact means by which indices for these determinants might be created is, of course, problematic. Subsequent discussion will offer some initial thoughts.

scale influences can be felt even in developed countries. On the other side of the coin, though, adaptation projects in other places can be decided and implemented completely according to local custom alone. The stock of human capital (Determinant 4) could be a local characteristic, as well, but its local manifestation would likely be driven in large measure by macro-scale forces such as national support of local education.

The stock of social capital (Determinant 5) and efficacy of risk-spreading processes (Determinant 6) should be largely functions of macro-scale structures and rules; but they could again take different forms from location to location and option to option. Property rights may be well defined through national institutions, and they may be the basis of private insurance markets; but issues of moral hazard and adverse selection may or may not be particularly severe in one location or another. Risk can be spread through national markets for commercial insurance and the international reinsurance markets, but some companies may refuse to sell flood insurance. Risk can also be spread through mutual obligations in the extended family, the strength of which varies between cultures and city and countryside. By way of contrast, Determinants 7 (managing information) and 8 (attributing signals of change to their sources) may have some general macro-scale foundations, but their primary import would be felt on a micro-scale. Indeed, decision-rules and public perceptions could take on forms that would be quite particular to the set of available options.

Taken in its most general form, the vulnerability model reflected in Eqs. (1) and (2) can lead to the conclusion that everything is connected to everything else, but this is not a productive insight. A more practical approach would, instead, read carefully through the determinants of adaptive capacity to recognize that the local manifestations of macro-scale determinants of adaptive capacity are their most critical characteristics. Taking this more modest observation to heart, we will show that it is possible to build coping indicators directly from systematic evaluations of the feasibility of available adaptations, taken one at a time, and their relative efficacy in reducing either sensitivity or exposure.

3. Some empirical justification for the roles of selected factors in determining vulnerability

The determinants of adaptive capacity are based on a synthesis of many case studies in the literature on natural hazards and other risks. The determinants are hypothesized to be important, with a lot of anecdotes to back that claim, but the relative strength of the various determinants is unclear. In this section, we look at *national* data of vulnerability to natural hazards and seek to explain the observed lack of adaptive capacity

with selected proxies for adaptive capacity. We argue above that adaptive capacity is a local characteristic; unfortunately, data availability does not allow us to look at a higher resolution than country level. We do not measure vulnerability to natural hazards directly, but rather look at natural disasters and their impacts. The determinants of adaptive capacity can also only be measured by proxy, particularly notions such as social and human capital. These caveats need to be kept in mind when interpreting the results below.

The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Catholic University of Louvain, collects information on the consequences of natural and man-made disasters. Their databases are made available through the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) at <http://www.cred.be/emdat/>. The database contains information of about 12,000 disasters, covering the entire world, a range of disasters and the period of 1990–2000. Indicators included are the time and place of disaster, its type, its strength, and the damage done, measured in the number of people killed, injured, made homeless or otherwise affected and the economic damage done. Sources include (re)insurance companies, development and disaster aid agencies (non-governmental, national or multilateral), and the press.

Based on these data, we calculated three vulnerability indices. First, we computed the number of people killed by natural disasters in the period 1990–2000 in each country, and normalized this with the size of the population in 1995, the middle of the decade. Second, we calculated the number of people affected (but not killed), normalized with population. Third, we computed material damage, measured in US dollars, normalized with Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

Population data were obtained from the World Bank Group Economic Growth Research (<http://www.world-bank.org/research/growth>). From the same source, we obtained information on GDP, income per capita, enrollment in education, life expectancy, and land area. We obtained indicators of political rights and civil liberties from Freedom House (<http://www.freedomhouse.org>). The Gini coefficient, measuring the distribution of income in a country, was obtained from the UNDP World Income Inequality Database from the United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (<http://wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm>). All data are for 1995.

Fig. 1 plots the chance of being affected by a natural disaster against per capita income, and does the same for the chance of being killed. Fig. 1 also displays the annual economic damage as a percentage of GDP. The data should be interpreted with great caution. If no life loss is reported in a country like Denmark, one can be reasonably certain that indeed no one was killed. If no life loss is reported in, say, Zaire, this may be because deaths were overlooked. The problem of underreporting




Fig. 1. The relationship between the number of people killed (top panel), the number of people affected (middle panel) and the damage done (bottom panel) by natural disasters between 1990 and 2000 and per capita income in 1995.

is more pronounced for economic damages, as the data collection in less developed countries is primarily done by health and humanitarian agencies, while data for developed countries comes primarily from (re)insurance companies. Note, however, that the number of reported disasters—either per head or per square kilometer—is not correlated to per capita income; see Fig. 2.

Setting aside data problems, we obtain the following results. Table 1 shows the regressing results for the chance of getting killed, for being affected, and for damage done. After some experimentation, we settled on the following functional form

$$R_c = \alpha_c I_{ci}^{\beta_{ci}} + \varepsilon_c, \quad (3)$$

where R is the risk, I is an indicator of adaptive capacity (indexed by i), c is the index for countries, α and β are parameters and ε is noise. The multiplicative form of the superindicator of adaptive capacity corresponds to the notion in the main text that the weaker links in the adaptive chain matter most. Eq. (3) is estimated as

$$\ln(R_c) = \ln \alpha_c + \sum_i \beta_{ci} \ln(I_{ci}) + \eta_c, \quad (4)$$

The noise term η is assumed to be Normally distributed. An additional complication is that, for a number of countries in the sample, we observe a zero risk. We interpret Eq. (3) as if it would, for some countries, lead to a “negative risk”, but that negative risks are observed as zero risks. In Eq. (4), we interpret “zero” as “less than one in a thousand” or “ -7 ”. Eq. (4) can thus be estimated using censored regression. (As we do not observe zero economic damages, the damage equation is estimated using ordinary least squares.) The EViews 4.0 Professional statistical software package allows us to estimate (4). The results are displayed in Table 1.

The regressions for people killed and economic damage are not very informative. For economic damages, this probably reflects the data problems discussed above. In any case, we find a slight, barely significant positive relationship between income per capita and damage done. That is, richer people are prone to lose a higher share of their wealth to natural disaster than are poorer people. This may be because economic damages are unreported in less developed countries; it may also be because richer people accumulate more goods that can be destroyed if disaster strikes. Other explanatory variables are insignificant, and the explanatory power of the regression is very low.

For people killed, we find a negative, almost significant relationship between per capita income and risk. That is, poorer people are more likely to die of natural violence than are richer people. This is as we would expect. The fact that deaths are probably underreported in less developed countries can only make this relationship stronger. Other explanatory variables are insignificant, and the explanatory power of the regression is low. This may be partly due to the noisy link between a disaster occurring and people dying as a result.

We obtain more interesting results for the fraction of people affected by natural disasters. The data are more reliable, and the link between natural disaster, vulnerability, and observed effect is more straightforward. We again find that poorer people are more likely to fall victim of natural violence than are richer people. The relationship is highly significant. For every percent economic growth, vulnerability falls by a percent. We also find that more densely populated areas are more vulnerable. This is as expected, because the same disaster affects more people. We also find a positive




Fig. 2. The relationship between the number of natural disasters between 1990 and 2000 and per capita income in 1995. In the top panel, the number of natural disasters is normalized with population; in the bottom panel, the number of natural disasters is normalized with the size of the country.

relationship between income inequality measured by a Gini coefficient and vulnerability. As expected, people in more egalitarian societies are less likely to fall victim of natural violence than are people in a society with a highly skewed income distribution. This result is consistent with the reported correlation with per capita income on a national level.² Alternative income inequality measures like top to bottom ratios or percentages of populations below certain thresholds could easily underscore this observation and bring into focus the

notion that the poorest citizens of any country would find it difficult to devote sufficient resources to protect themselves from natural hazards.

Other explanatory variables are insignificant, but we should be aware that health care and education have a strong positive correlation with per capita income. The explanatory power of this regression is reasonable.

4. Building an indicator for coping capacity from the determinants of adaptive capacity

The construction of an index of the potential contribution of any adaptation option (to be denoted

²Our conclusion is not influenced by the fact that richer countries tend to be more egalitarian. Moreover, the reported parameters are not affected by this multicollinearity (results not shown).

Table 1

Regression results. The dependent variables are the natural logarithms of people killed and otherwise affected (normalized with population size in 1995) and damage done (normalized with GPD in 1995) by natural disasters in the period 1990–2000

	Killed	Affected	Damage
Constant	4.58* (3.52)	−4.66* (3.70)	−3.83** (1.61)
Venezuela	9.63* (5.47)		
Ln(per capita income)	−0.79* (0.44)	−1.02*** (0.17)	0.20* (0.19)
Ln(Gini coefficient)		2.21** (0.80)	
Ln(population density)		0.24** (0.10)	
Number of observations	130	108	99
Censored observations	37	10	—
R ²	0.05	0.35	0.01

90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.

by j) to an indicator of overall coping capacity (denoted by PCC_j) will begin with a step by step evaluation of feasibility factors—index numbers that are judged to reflect its strength or weakness *vis a vis* the last seven determinants of adaptive capacity. These factors will be subjective values assigned from a range bounded on the low side by 0 and on the high side by 5 according to systematic consideration of the degree to which each determinant would help or impede its adoption. Let these factors be denoted by $ff_j(k)$ for determinants $k = 2, \dots, 8$. We will argue that an overall feasibility factor for adaptation (j) should be reflected by the minimum feasibility factor assigned to any of these determinants; i.e.,

$$FF_j \equiv \min\{ff_j(2), \dots, ff_j(8)\}. \quad (5)$$

Each factor inserted into Eq. (5) would, in particular, suggest whether the local manifestations of each determinant of adaptive capacity would work to make it more or less likely that adaptation (j) might be adopted. A low feasibility factor near 0 for Determinant k would, for example, indicate a significant shortcoming in the necessary preconditions for implementing adaptation (j), and this shortcoming would serve to undercut its feasibility. A high feasibility factor near 5 would indicate the opposite situation; assessors would, in this case, be reasonably secure in their judgement that the preconditions included in Determinant k could and would be satisfied. Notice that the structure of Eq. (5) makes it clear that high feasibility factors for a limited number of determinants would not be sufficient to conclude that adaptation option (j) could actually contribute to sustaining or improving an overall coping capacity. The overall feasibility of option (j) could still be limited by deficiencies in meeting the requirements of other determinants.

The ability of adaptation option (j) to, in fact, influence a system's exposure or sensitivity to an external stress can meanwhile be reflected in an efficacy factor EF_j —a subjective index number assigned from a range running from 0 to 1. Efficacy factors will thereby reflect the likelihood that adaptation (j) will perform as expected to influence exposure and/or sensitivity compounded by the likelihood that actual experience would exceed critical thresholds if it were adopted. The potential contribution of any adaptation to a system's social and economic coping capacity can then, finally, be defined as the simple product of its overall feasibility factor and its efficacy factor; i.e.,

$$PCC_j \equiv \{EF_j\} \{FF_j\}. \quad (6)$$

Any method that focuses attention on the feasibility and efficacy of adaptation options through Eqs. (5) and (6) can be extended to handle the complication of interactions across multiple options designed to mitigate vulnerability to one source of stress and/or multiple sources of stress. The key here would involve simply keeping track of the degree to which options might serve to complement each other, to substitute for each other, or perhaps even to work at cross-purposes to each other.

To be operational, though, a feasibility-based evaluation of an adaptation's potential contribution to overall coping capacity must be informed by a compounding evaluation of feasibility and efficacy for each possible adaptation. The method described in Eqs. (5) and (6) suggests one way in which this might be accomplished. Notice, in particular, that an adaptation option could receive a low coping capacity indicator for many reasons. It might, by virtue of shortcomings in meeting the determinants of adaptive capacity, receive a low overall feasibility index. An adaptation could, as well, receive a low indicator if it were relatively ineffective in reducing exposure and/or sensitivity or if the mechanism by which it could accomplish its tasks were uncertain. It remains only to describe the how the adaptation-based PCC_j can be combined into an indicator of overall coping capacity.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that m potential adaptation options have been identified for a specific vulnerability and that they have been assigned potential coping capacity indicators $\{PCC_1, \dots, PCC_m\}$. The spirit of Eqs. (5) and (6) suggests that

$$CCI \equiv \max\{PCC_1, \dots, PCC_m\} \quad (7)$$

would be a consistent and workable indicator. It would make sense to order the adaptation options in terms of their PCC_j so that $CCI = PCC_1$. That accomplished, an index of robustness of overall coping capacity in the face of any vulnerability (denoted by R) can be defined as the ratio of the average of the PCC_j of the next two highly

rated alternatives and PCC_1 :

$$R = \{[PCC_2 + PCC_3] / 2PCC_1\}. \quad (8)$$

A high R ratio would indicate that several options of relatively comparable potential were available, but a low ratio would indicate a lack of diversity that could prove harmful if the assessment of adaptation were flawed.

5. An illustrative application to a hypothetical example

The various panels of Fig. 3 display the characteristics of a hypothetical context within which we can productively illustrate how the structure described in Section 4 might be employed. Fig. 3a establishes the point of departure by portraying annual flows in the Nile River over the 50 years prior to the construction of the Aswan Dam. A gradual increase in mean flow can be detected despite a significant degree of inter-annual variability. Panel a, also portrays hypothetical upper and lower thresholds that define a coping capacity along its banks. The upper threshold that has been set arbitrarily at 115% of the 50-year mean could, for example, indicate annual flows above which significant flooding might occur with unacceptable frequency. The lower threshold, meanwhile set at 80% of the 50-year mean, might indicate annual flows level below which existing irrigation systems would be rendered temporarily inoperable. Notice that people living along the Nile would expect to see 5 years of serious flooding over a 50-year period and only 1 year in which irrigation would be interrupted under the conditions portrayed in Panel a of Fig. 3.³

Fig. 3b portrays the same series with a gradually increasing mean added to the historical trend—the result, perhaps, of climate change or perhaps of changes in upstream land use practices. Even without any change in variation around the mean, the frequency of flooding would climb to 7 years over the 50-year period; note, as well, that the frequency of serious interruptions of irrigation practices would be unchanged. Fig. 3c adds expanding variability from whatever source to the mix. Its contribution increases the frequency of floods even more (to 12 years over half a century), and it adds one additional dry year to the series (a reflection of what would fundamentally be an ambiguous effect for irrigation relative to the historical context).

We can now begin to apply the indicator methodology of Section 4 to this illustrative example by exploring how three different adaptation options might alter either the flow of the Nile or the indicated thresholds of significant impact:

³ Thresholds of this sort have been identified for Egypt, but the time series of Nile flow has been employed here for plausible contextual purposes only. Subsequent discussion will consider only hypothetical adaptation options.




Fig. 3. Annual flows of the Nile River into Lake Nassar contrasted against hypothetical impact thresholds. Panel a, depicts the historical time series from 1910 through 1960. Panel b, adds a climate induced trend to that series; and Panel c, reflects a climate induced increase in inter-annual variability.

Option A: Construction of a series of protection levies.

Fig. 4 portrays the possible effect of building protective levies by expanding the upper threshold of the coping range. The frequency of flooding would




Fig. 4. The effect on the upper threshold of building levies over a 5 year period beginning in the fifth year.

be reduced in all cases, but there would be no change in exposure to flows that fall below the lower threshold. Flooding could be eliminated, at least for the historical period, if the levies were large enough; but levies constructed to accommodate historical experience could still be overwhelmed if mean flow or variability rose unexpectedly over time. Construction and maintenance costs would be incurred, to be sure, but local environmental effects, local amenity costs, and increased flooding downstream of the levies could also be experienced.

Option B: Building a dam upstream.

Fig. 5 portrays the effect of building a dam like the Aswan upstream by reducing the variability in observed river flow at our location. This option would, in particular, allow managers to release water from the dam during low flow periods and retain water during high flow periods so that the actual flow below the dam would be a moving average over the past few years. Fig. 5, in fact, depicts observed flow as a 4 period moving average; it reflects the calculation that Lake Nasser can hold more than one year's flow at any one time. Exposure to flooding could, with a dam of sufficient capacity, limit variability in actual flow to the size of the original coping range of Fig. 3. This option therefore holds the potential of eliminating vulnerability to crossing either the high or the low threshold; but it, too, could fail to accommodate an unexpected change in the underlying mean or variance. Construction and maintenance cost would again be incurred, as well as significant environmental impact upstream; but energy, recreational, and tourism benefits could be created.

Option C: Periodically dredging the river.

Fig. 6 portrays the hypothetical effects of periodic dredging as a saw-toothed pattern for the upper threshold. Dredging would allow the Nile to accommodate more water and thereby increase the upper




Fig. 5. The smoothing effect on inter-annual variability of building an upstream dam.




Fig. 6. The effect on the upper threshold of periodic dredging of the river bed.

threshold, but this benefit would depreciate over time as silt re-deposits on the riverbed. To maintain long-term benefit, therefore, dredging would have to be repeated on a regular basis. This option also holds the potential of eliminating exposure to flooding, but only for short periods of time. On the other hand, opting for dredging regime could allow managers to accommodate unexpected changes in the underlying mean or variance by increasing or decreasing the frequency of dredging operations. The recurring cost of dredging plus some environmental damage could be expected as well as increased flooding risk downstream.

These adaptations would clearly have different effects, but diversity is a fact of life. Indeed, any useful indicator of coping capacity will have to be able to handle this sort of diversity in a consistent and comparable way.

The point of this section is to show how the method described in Section 4 might be applied by demonstrating how feasibility factors and coping capacity indicators might be assigned in this river flow example. Assume, to that end but only for the time being, that any of the options listed above would work as displayed in Figs. 4–6 to reduce the vulnerability of study location to variability and/or change in the flow of the Nile. Table 2 lists some assumptions that describe pertinent characteristics for each of the three options upon which hypothetical judgments about their feasibility factors might be based.

Differences in magnitude and distribution of cost across the population and over time would surely be critical in contemplating the potentially limiting role of resource availability (Determinant 2) for options A through C. If the threats appeared when modest resources were available to the host economic/political/social systems, for example, assessors might find levies or dredging more attractive than building an upstream dam, and we could assign feasibility factors of 3 or 4 to those options and 0 or 1 to the dam. If resources were limited but relatively certain over the foreseeable future, however, we might lower the factor assigned to levies to 0 or 1 but hold the dredging option at 3 or 4. And if the systems had access to significant resources from home or abroad, then we might give values of 4 or 5 to all three options. In any case, these feasibility factors would not represent the likelihood that any adaptation option might be implemented; they would simply reflect an assessment about whether or not requisite financing could be found.

Resource distribution would also play a role, here. The general population might be unwilling divert limited resources from efforts designed to address other sources

of stress to dredging the river, but one of its superrich or a political leader could decide that an upstream dam would a suitable monument to his or her stature in the community. It might even secure his or her place in history. Less prestigious adaptation options such as levies and dredging might then be assigned feasibility factors equal to 0 or 1 while an upstream dam could score 2 or 3 or perhaps higher. The key here would be to decide if there were other potential projects around that would be equally noticeable so that the investment decision could actually turn on personal stature and not necessarily social usefulness.

Determinant 3 speaks to institutional requirements for each adaptation option and the decision-making frameworks with which they will be evaluated. Both need to be considered, and both can be evaluated independently of resource availability. Table 2 notes that building levies would require some mechanism for modest takings of riverside property and that building the dam would require a mechanism that could sustain significant takings of upstream property. If no such mechanisms existed, low feasibility factors would have to be assigned to both options. If a modestly robust mechanism existed, though, then levies might see a factor of 3 or 4, but the dam could still suffer a 0 or 1 assessment. If government had the power to take whatever land it deemed necessary, however, then the dam could be given a score as high as 5. Meanwhile, the dredging option would require that an authority exist that both acknowledges the responsibility to maintain the river flow and has routine access to requisite funds; feasibility factors could be assigned accordingly. Assuming that these institutions and/or mechanisms existed, of course, different decision criteria might still be applied.

Table 2
Hypothetical characteristics for the illustrative Nile application^a

Option A: Levies

Cost: Largest initial investment; modest on-going expense; modest environmental impact; modest amenity cost; downstream flooding possible
Benefit: Reduction in the frequency of flooding in the study location
Institutional requirements: Mechanisms to sustain modest land taking required
Risk: Possibly vulnerable to change in flow regime over the medium term

Option B: An upstream dam

Cost: Largest initial investment; large on-going expense; large environmental impact
Benefit: Reduction in the frequency of flooding in the study location and downstream; modest amenity gain; additional power capacity; recreational benefit; increased tourism
Institutional requirements: Mechanisms to sustain significant land taking required
Risk: Possibly vulnerable to significant change in precipitation and run-off patterns over the long term

Option C: Dredging

Cost: Largest on-going expense distributed unevenly over time; modest environmental impact possible; downstream flooding possible
Benefit: Reduction in the frequency of flooding in the study location
Institutional requirements: Management authority with the authority and responsibility to dredge as necessary
Risk: Amenable to “mid-course” adjustments in the frequency of dredging as conditions warrant

^aThese characteristics are representative of plausible judgments for each option, and they are offered for illustrative purposes only. They do not reflect historical conditions along the Nile, nor are they the result of any systematic analysis of current conditions.

Table 2 also records broad outlines of the issues that would have to be considered if benefit-cost criteria would be applied in each case. The three options have different structures of direct and indirect costs; and they have different benefit profiles over time and space. Assigning feasibility factors for each option in this regard would only reflect the likelihood that its internal rate of return would be greater than the applicable rate of interest plus some risk factor. The ability of the system to afford any option that would be judged worthy of consideration on the basis of the cost-benefit calculation is already reflected in the assessment of Determinant 2. Other decision criteria exist, of course; but the approach in evaluating feasibility with regard to Determinant 3 would be the same. In any case, though, the scope of authority, both thematic (flood management versus river management versus river-bed management) and geographic (river basin management versus management of political units) must be included in the calculus.

Human capital and social capital are the broad categories identified in Determinants 4 and 5. Both could play a role in this example in many ways by working through the definition of property rights and effective access to the decision-making process. We have already noted that constructing levies or the dam would require the taking of land that would either be used to support the levies or be inundated by the upstream lake created by the dam. The definition of property rights would, therefore, implicitly identify who would be hurt if either option were implemented. Levies could, though, benefit riverside property-owners. If that were perceived to be the case, then a high feasibility factor of 4 or 5 could be assigned to indicate the high likelihood that the people who would be harmed by their construction could be convinced that they would see a compensatory benefit. The people harmed by the construction of the dam would, by way of contrast, not necessarily benefit from downstream flood management; nor would they necessarily be compensated fully by associated recreational or energy benefits. If their access to the decision-making process gave them sufficient power to block the construction of the dam and if institutions did not exist that could compensate them fully for their losses, then this access could be reason to assign a low feasibility factor for the dam.

Determinant 6 speaks to systems' sensitivities to various exposures because it focuses attention on their ability to spread or reduce the risk. Suppose, in our example, that the broader community were "plugged into" global markets so that it could compensate easily for agricultural shortfalls caused by interruptions of irrigation practices. The macro-scale system would then be able to spread the risk of these shortfalls, and the feasibility factor assigned to any adaptation whose implementation would reduce vulnerability to low river flow, the dam in this case, should the decline irrespective

of the decision rule applied in Determinant 2. By the same token, if sensitivity to flooding were fundamentally financial, then private or social insurance programs could spread risk, reduce the damage, and thereby diminish the feasibility of any of the specific options listed above. Notice, however, that both of these stories rely on structures and institutions that have not yet been introduced; and so the ability of these structures and institutions to accommodate additional stress needs to be evaluated. Indeed, the best approach in any case where access to risk spreading mechanisms might lead to assigning low feasibility factors to any specific adaptation would subject exploiting or enhancing these mechanisms to the very same feasibility assessment methodology.

Determinants 7 and 8 highlight informational needs, perceptions, and decision-making credibility. The significance of each depends upon decision-making structures drawn from macro sources that can have parallel effects on all three options. Perceptions about the sources of the vulnerability to flooding could have a significant effect on the derivative perception that any or all of the options would work. Perceptions about the significance of the vulnerability, independent of its source, could also have comparable and consistent effects on the likelihood that any option would be contemplated. Low confidence in attribution or low opinion of significance would make all of the options relatively less feasible because none of them would be subjected to serious evaluation; low feasibility factors should then be assigned. High confidence in attribution and widespread recognition of significant exposure would, of course, have the opposite effect. Some options, like the dredging option in this example, could add micro-scale dimensions to feasibility considerations in this category, as well. Since dredging would be repeated as needed as the future unfolds, its feasibility would additionally depend in part on the ability of river managers to collect information and to process it properly so that renewed dredging could be implemented in a timely fashion. Absent this ability, a low factor would be assigned to dredging.

Determinant 6 identified access to risk-spreading mechanisms, and so it highlighted the need to describe risk appropriately. The previous discussion highlighted the possibility that spreading risk might diminish a system's sensitivity to a given exposure, but there is another side of the risk equation that also needs to be evaluated. Will the adaptation options evaluated for their feasibility in terms of Determinants 2 through 8 actually work to reduce exposure or diminish sensitivity? This question leads directly to assessments of the second factor in Eq. (5)—assigning efficacy factors for each option.

To see how all of these observations might fit into the method described in Section 4, Table 2 finally offers a

representative characteristic for each of the three options that expose each to its own peculiar vulnerability. The ability of levies adequately to protect property from flooding would, for example, depend upon changes in mean flow or variability of the sort displayed in Figs. 3b and c. Assigning an efficacy factor in this case would therefore require some notion about the frequency of high-flow events (caused by change in the mean and/or variability) and the feasibility of building the levies with surplus capacity (or at least preserving the ability to add capacity as needed). This evaluation could direct attention back to earlier cost considerations that play directly into Determinant 2 because adding capacity would add expense, but a tradeoff between efficacy and feasibility could be explored explicitly in terms of the coping capacity indicator. In any case, a high efficacy index would indicate a low likelihood of significant change in the environment, a high degree of relatively inexpensive flexibility in the construction of the levies, or both. By way of contrast, a low efficacy index would indicate a high likelihood of significant change in river flow characteristics, relatively expensive accommodation of a need for higher levies, or both.

Building the dam could, meanwhile, expose the system to fixed and long term investment into physical capital that could, over the long term, be in located permanently in the wrong place if climate and precipitation patterns change. Assigning a low efficacy index to this option would then fundamentally be a judgment that there is a significant chance that this might happen. Finally, the dredging option would be most amenable to “mid-course” correction if conditions change; and so it could receive high efficacy marks that could improve its contribution to coping capacity.

Turning now to consider how the three options might be considered together, Table 3 indicates that levies and/or dredging might be considered substitutes to building a dam, in terms of flood control at least; but Table 3 also

indicates that levies and dredging could actually complement each other if they were implemented together. If this complementarity could be exploited, then each option could perhaps be pursued less vigorously (smaller levies and/or less frequent dredging). The cost of achieving any degree of flood protection might thereby fall if the costs of either or both of the individual adaptation options increased with scope at an increasing rate. Binding resource constraints might thereby be relaxed so that the feasibility scores of either or both options might climb (if resources were the most binding determinant constraint). The efficacy factor for a combined approach could be higher, as well, so the overall indicator of potential coping capacity could increase significantly. Evaluating the feasibility a fourth adaptation option—a convex combination of Options A and C in this case—in terms of Determinants 2 through 8 would be an effective way to accommodate this complication.

Table 4 finally offers insight into how the complication of the system’s vulnerability to other stresses might also be incorporated into an evaluation of overall adaptive capacity. It shows how each of the original adaptation options identified in the river flow example as possible responses to threats from flooding and uncertain power generation might influence three other sources of potential social, political and/or economic vulnerability. Table 4 is built, in particular, on an assumption that the larger community might also feel vulnerable to anticipated shortfalls in energy supply, variable sources for irrigation required to accommodate planned switching to more profitable crops, and anticipated increases in the demand for river-borne transportation. It shows potential complementarity between building a dam for flood control and the supply of energy. Note that “++” is recorded in the first column of the second row because the dam could easily provide a new source of hydroelectric power. In addition, the dam’s reducing flow variability could

Table 3
Interactions among the river flow adaptation options^a

	Option A Levies	Option B upstream dam	Option C dredging
Option A	–	+
Option B	–	–
Option C	+	–

^aThese characteristics are representative of plausible judgments for each option, and they are offered for illustrative purposes only. They do not reflect historical conditions along the Nile, nor are they the result of any systematic analysis of current conditions. A “+” indicates complementarity in the economic sense—investment in one increases the marginal productivity of investment in the other. A “–” meanwhile indicates a high degree of substitutability in the opposite economic sense—investment in one reduces the marginal productivity of investment in the other.

Table 4
Interactions with other sources of vulnerability^a

	Power supply	Irrigation	River transport
Option A	+	0	0
Option B	++	+	+ or –
Option C	+	–	0

^aThese characteristics are representative of plausible judgments for each option, and they are offered for illustrative purposes only. They do not reflect historical conditions along the Nile, nor are they the result of any systematic analysis of current conditions. A “+” indicates complementarity in the economic sense—investment in one increases the marginal productivity of investment in the other. A “–” meanwhile indicates a high degree of substitutability in the opposite economic sense—investment in one reduces the marginal productivity of investment in the other.

provide complementary services for improved irrigation as well as increased reliability for in-river transportation (“+” is recorded across the rest of the second row). The dam could, however, also eliminate upstream navigation, so a “–” is also recorded as a possibility in the right column. Table 4 meanwhile shows no interaction between building levies and any other three sources of vulnerability; but it shows a possible negative correlation between dredging and irrigation. Indeed, the “–” entry in the last row of the second column simply reflects the potential that harmful pollutants might be released from the river bottom by the dredging process.

The insights drawn from constructing tables of cross-vulnerability interactions can be employed to revise the original feasibility factors of each option. It is within the context of multiple stresses that the relative significance of their associated vulnerabilities would, for example, be assessed. Absent interactions of the sort illustrated in Table 4, rankings based on macro-based preferences could materialize and work through the perception Determinant 8 to give options for adapting to some of the stresses high marks while assigning consistently low marks to options designed to reduce vulnerability to others. This ranking would surely assume more power if resources available for adaptation, broadly defined, were relatively scarce; and this added complication should be reflected in evaluations of resource availability (Determinant 2). Complementarity across options of the sort reflected in Table 4 could, however, work to reduce either or both of these adjustments—increasing the feasibility factors assigned to specific adaptations for the resource and perception Determinants (again, 2 and 8).

6. A casual application to the Rhine Delta

Tol et al. (2001) report on an extensive assessment of adaptation against increased risk of flooding in the Rhine Delta. Six options for the Netherlands were identified:

1. Store excess water in Germany.
2. Accept more frequent floods.
3. Build higher dikes.
4. Deepen and widen the river bed.
5. Dig a fourth river mouth.
6. Dig a bypass and create a northerly diversion.

Reviewing the supporting documentation, we can characterize the adaptive capacity of Dutch society through the determinants identified above. Taken in turn with numbering consistent with the list provided in Section 1,

1. The range of available technological options for adaptation is fairly large; the six options listed above

each have a number of variants, and can of course be combined. These options were identified by a major civil engineering consultancy as technically feasible. Macro-scale forces tend to dominate in this setting, so evaluations of the strengths of each of the underlying determinants should be consistent. Qualitatively, then,

2. The availability of resources is substantial. The Netherlands is the 11th largest economy in the world (by PPP). The distribution of resources across the population is relatively equal but irrelevant for this paper, as flood protection is in the hands of the national government.
3. The structure of critical institutions, the derivative allocation of decision-making authority, and the decision criteria that would be employed may be more problematic. The main problem with institutions is the separation between water management and land use planning over various agencies and ministries. The flood plain is increasingly used for housing, industry and infrastructure, increasing the flood risk and limiting the options for water management. Managing a river in a crowded flood plain requires solving conflicts of interests between many stakeholders. Dutch decision making is consensus-oriented, while public works decisions are increasingly advised by public consultations. This typically leads to long delays and hinders radical decisions. However, if needed, the government can be very autocratic, and the population tends to trust the government in that (van der Grijp et al., 2001). The crucial decision criterion in Dutch flood management is a high level of safety, with little geographical variation (Olsthoorn, 2001). Adaptation is thus almost automatic (but see above), but not necessarily efficient.
4. The stock of human capital including education and personal security is very high in the Netherlands. Dutch water engineers are the best in the world.
5. The stock of social capital is also high. The Netherlands is a consensus-oriented society in which the collective need is an effective counterweight to individual interests (van der Werff, 2001). Property rights are clearly defined, and the judiciary is independent.
6. The system’s access to risk spreading processes is limited. Flood insurance cannot be purchased. On the other hand, the government guarantees compensation for flood damage, and charity is strong in times of need. For instance, after the floods of the Meuse river in late 1995, the money raised in a national collection exceeded the damage done. Also, few of the evacuees in the same period (1 in 60 of the total population) used government shelters, as the supply of privately offered housing was so great (van der Grijp and Olsthoorn, 2001).

Table 5
Quantifying the details of adaptation options for the lower Rhine Delta

Determinant	Options					
	Store water	Accept floods	Higher dikes	River bed	Fourth mouth	Bypass
2. Resources						
Total costs	3	5	4	4	1	2
Distribution ^a	1	3	4	5	1	1
3. Institutions						
Structure ^b	1	4	5	4	2	3
Participation ^c	2	2	3	5	1	2
Criteria ^d	2	1	5	4	3	2
4. Human capital	1	2	5	4	4	3
5. Social capital	1	3	4	5	2	2
6. Risk spreading	2	1	5	4	4	3
7. Information						
Management	1	3	5	4	2	2
Credibility	1	2	4	5	3	3
8. Awareness	3	3	5	5	3	3
Feasibility Factor (FF) ^e	1	1	3	4	1	1
Efficacy Factor (EF)	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.6	0.8	0.6
Coping Index (PCC)	0.8	1.0	3	2.4	0.8	0.6

^aThe distribution of the costs and benefits of implementing an option.

^bThe degree to which the current mandates of bureaucracies are inadequate for the problem, essentially, how much integration of land use and water management is needed for successful implementation.

^cThe degree to which the decision making process is likely to be hindered by “not in my backyard” phenomena.

^dThe degree to which the option fits in with current decision making criteria.

^eRanking (minimum of the weighted scores).

7. The ability of decision-makers to manage information, the processes by which these decision-makers determine which information is credible, and the credibility of the decision-makers themselves are all high. Dutch bureaucrats are typically well-educated and supported by able consultancies. Water management is controlled by an “old-boys” network of professors, civil servants and consultants; however, this network is fairly large and open-minded (to ideas, not to other people’s competence). Dutch water engineers are held in high regard, and civil servants are largely trusted by the population.
8. The public as well as the water managers are well aware of climate change and its implications for flood risk, as well as of the confounding influences.

Table 5 offers expert judgment into how these macro-scale observations might be translated into the micro-scale determinants of each option listed above.⁴ A multitude of factors lead to a low feasibility factor for storing water in large measure because of the international cooperation that would be required to implement and to manage such a scheme. Accepting floods,

creating a fourth mouth for the river, and constructing a bypass score equally low marks, but their determinant deficiencies are far less ubiquitous. Specific determinants, like distributional ramifications and/or risk spreading are their downfalls; and the same determinants identify areas where concerted effort might increase coping capacity by increasing feasibility. Higher dikes and manipulating the river bed score higher feasibility scores, but neither is perfect. Indeed, manipulating the river bed would appear to be most feasible, but it is hampered by a relatively low efficacy factor; such a plan could not eliminate the risk of flooding. On the other hand, higher dikes face participation difficulties on the feasibility side, but could offer extremely effective flood protection. Of the six options, in summary, higher dikes and working the river bed display qualitatively larger potential coping indices; and raising the dikes seems most attractive. Notice, though, that it would be difficult to bring any of the other options up to the potential coping standard of either of these alternatives. Three of them have very low marks (of 1) for multiple determinants; and the fourth alternative (the bypass option) displays multiple limiting marks (of 2) that would impede feasibility even if its distributional shortcomings were overcome. Table 4 finally indicates that the overall coping capacity indicator for flooding along the Rhine would be derived

⁴The criteria were judged by a single expert (Richard Tol), who has led a 5 year, multidisciplinary research project on these matters, including broad, multi-method consultations with other experts and stakeholders.

from building higher dikes, with a score of 3.0 out of a possible maximum of 5.0. Moreover, the relatively high-scoring second ranked option combines with a relative low score for the third ranked option to produce a robustness indicator of $\{2.4 + 1\} / \{6\} = 0.57$ out of a maximum of 1.0.

7. Concluding comments—gleaning general insight from the two examples

Readers may have noticed, quite correctly, that the method described here has the feel of a welfare economics model rooted in evaluations of feasibility; a referee certainly did. The motivation was, however, quite practical and its construction was decidedly bottom-up rather than top-down. This insight into the nature of the method could, nonetheless, offer a general context within which elaboration and revision might be efficiently organized as efforts proceed to discover which determinants might be more limiting than others across multiple situations. We cannot, at this point, answer that question. Our empirical analysis at the country level with imperfect data is too crude, and our application to the Lower Rhine offers only one “datum”.

Focusing on the specific sources of the feasibility and efficacy of specific adaptation options can, however, allow judgments of their potential contribution to overall coping capacity based on a “weakest link” approach to the problem. That is to say, the potential contribution of any option would be constrained by its smallest feasibility attribute. At a minimum, the method described here forces one to think systematically about adaptive capacity. Frankly, the result of the application to the Lower Rhine did not confirm our priors.

This approach has three additional advantages. First of all, it can identify where effort to expand coping capacity can have an impact in improving the potential of the best adaptation or adding diversity to the suite of potentially effective alternatives. Simply focus attention on enhancing the most binding underlying micro-scale determinant for any specific option or on enhancing the macro-scale determinant that binds most severely across multiple options. Increasing the availability of resources could, for example, improve coping capacity by increasing the feasibility of one or more options, if Determinant 2 were uniformly the “weakest link”. Eq. (2) reveals that the advantage of making such an investment would not be unbounded. It would, instead, be limited by a variety of determinants across one or many adaptations whose constraints were the next most binding and by their relative efficacy factors.

Secondly, the corollary of this last observation teaches that releasing the constraint imposed by one determinant on one option or another need not increase its

contribution to overall coping capacity. Such an effort would be ineffective if it were directed at an inferior option or accomplished without recognizing the limitations imposed by feasibility factors assigned to other determinants. Adding to the resource base may, for example, have no effect on coping capacity if institutional processes or decision-making structures would block the implementation of any adaptation option for other reasons.

It also follows that there might be many or few ways to build adaptive capacity, as reflected by coping capacity indicators that were built from the determinants of adaptive capacity. Working to improve specific coping capacities by working to enhance one or more of its underlying determinants can build adaptive capacity for reducing vulnerability to a specific stress. But highlighting efforts to enhance some of the more macro-scale determinants whose influences might extend across the adaptive capacities of multiple stresses can underwrite progress in many dimensions. Note, in this regard, that adaptive capacity as defined here is not just adaptive capacity for climate change; instead, we set up our definition broad enough to measure adaptive capacity to a range of stresses.

Finally, the methodological structure outlined here has the advantage of producing unitless indicators that can be compared across potential adaptations to multiple stresses in the same region and/or the same stresses across multiple regions. Notwithstanding problems of providing consistent data in support of the judgments required to assess the underlying feasibility factors, it could therefore play an important role in ranking the relative vulnerabilities of multiple regions to different stresses, regardless of their sources.

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