RELATING TO THE ANGLOSPHERE: CANADA, 'CULTURE', AND THE QUESTION OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

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INTRODUCTION: CANADA, IRAQ, AND THE 'ANGLO-SAXON' ALLIES

One immediate impact of the falling-out between America and the countries that the US secretary of defense. Donald Rumsfeld, branded 'old Europe' has been a reconceptualization, perhaps only temporarily, of Canada's own geopolitical situation. Not so very long ago, it was commonplace for observers to note how much more integrated Canada and the US were becoming in military and security matters. One word, Interoperability, summed up the process of enhanced cooperation — a process that its supporters believed would enable Canada to retain combat capability at minimum cost, by weaving Canadian units operationally into American (and other) allied deployments across all three services (or 'environments,' to use Department of National Defence jargon): the army, navy, and air force. Critics of interoperability focussed on the risk to sovereignty and other dangers they associated with a deepening of continental defence integration. Proponents countered that sovereignty's very preservation *required* such deepening. Besides, they asked, would any Canadian government be prepared to spend on defence what a more genuinely autonomous military requires? Would the Canadian public support such spending levels?[1]

Both critics and proponents agreed that the integrative trend was well in place. Never, or so it seemed, had Canada become more of a North American and less of a European strategic entity than at the start of the current decade, a trend enhanced by the terrorist attack on America on 9/11 and the ensuing anxiety, on both sides of the border, regarding homeland security. And then came the Iraq war, which has given every appearance of reversing the integrative pattern, at least insofar as concerns the 'away game' — military interventions outside of North America. Indeed, for the core group of old Europe, the Iraq war convinced them that Canada, situated on the far shores of the Atlantic, might continue to be a European place after all. Many Canadians are returning the compliment, and professing to rediscover a European component of their national identity.[2] The Germans positively enthused about Ottawa's eagerness to take their side over Iraq, and the French similarly welcomed Canadian participation in the coalition of the unwilling.

In fact, the Germans misconstrued Ottawa's position on the war: far from joining them in their count-me-out *(ohne mich)* stance on the war, Canada adopted a position more in keeping with longstanding tradition, one boiling down to 'intervention if necessary, but not necessarily intervention.' And what could make military intervention against Iraq necessary? Nothing other than the blessing of the

UN Security Council (UNSC), which in the run-up to the war 60 percent of the public deemed to be a requirement if Canada were to head off into combat (15 percent took the German position, and another 15 percent thought Canada should join the war even without UNSC approval).

But if the Germans misinterpreted Canada's stance as being identical to their own, things were different when it came to the French. For a short time during the late winter of 2003, Canada's position was so closely aligned with France's as to become virtually identical with it; and though few would actually state things as boldly as I am about to, just prior to the outbreak of the war you could say that Ottawa's grand strategy had very much become hostage to France's preferences. For, given the position of the Chrétien government, namely that Canada would only join in military action against Saddam if the UNSC approved, it was obvious that what really stood in the way of council authorization was the threat of a French veto, as both the Chinese and Russians, other veto wielders with misgivings about the looming war, had signalled a preference to abstain from a council vote on the matter. Thus if Paris decreed the war to be justified, Ottawa would have snapped to attention. That is why when France's president, Jacques Chirac, announced during a nationally televised interview on 10 March 2003 that France would not approve the war that everyone saw coming, he not only settled his own country's policy on the war, but Canada's as well.[3]

Now, there is nothing truly remarkable about a Canadian reluctance to march off into combat without UN blessing; generally, getting the latter is thought to be highly desirable. And if the 1999 Serbian war demonstrated that Canadians could go to war without such benediction (after all, Russia would hardly allow the UNSC to authorize bombing of Serbia), the view in Ottawa was that the Kosovo action could not be taken as any 'precedent' — and besides, did not the overwhelming majority of UNSC members agree that Milosevic was due for a whipping, and who better than the 'human security alliance,' NATO, to administer it?[4]

For Canada, what was truly remarkable about the Iraq war was how out of step the country could be with its two long-standing security partners in the 'English-speaking' world, the UK and the US (to say nothing of its 'strategic cousin,' Australia).[5] For sure, there have been moments ever since the historic rapprochement between the US and UK when Canada would line up with only one of the two (e.g., when it entered both world wars on England's side at a time when the US officially was trying to remain neutral, or in 1956 when Ottawa supported Washington against London during the Suez crisis), but never on a matter of such global import did Canada distance itself from both of its so-called Anglo-Saxon partners at once. Some in France could be forgiven for thinking that, at long last, Canada had freed itself from the embrace of those Anglo-Saxons who had so vexed Charles de Gaulle and countless others in Paris.[6]

TRANSNATIONAL CHARACTER? CULTURE, THE ANGLOSPHERE, AND WAR

For the past few years, it has become not uncommon to hear those Anglo-Saxons being discussed in the context of something known as the 'Anglosphere.' a term of

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singular popularity among certain conservative and neoconservative policy circles in the US and UK.[7] This was especially so during the Iraq war, when it seemed to many commentators that there existed a close, if curious, lit between a country's maternal tongue and its proclivity to engage in military interventions. After all, were not the big three of the interventionist coalition — the US, the UK, and Australia — all populated mainly by native English speakers? Could there be some link between this 'cultural' attribute and the willingness of the trio to engage in combat? Some thought there was such a link. But is there? And if so, in what does it consist?

In addressing these issues, we could do worse than to heed the words of the Phrygian philosopher of stoicism, Epictetus. Although nearly two millennia have passed since their appearance, his *Discourses* contain wisdom from which contemporary students of international security can benefit. What Epictetus had to say about appearances and realities continues to resonate, and one would be hard-pressed to outdo him when it comes to contemplating the existence of the mooted Anglosphere: '[t]hings either are what they appear to be; or they neither are, nor appear to be; or they are and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be.'[8]

In thinking about whether there is an Anglosphere, and if so what it might have to do with 'culture' and states' proclivities to engage in military intervention, we could avail ourselves of Epictetian formulation, and say one of four things apropos our topic. That it is self-evidently a feature of the international system, and widely recognized to be so. Or that it is hogwash taken seriously by no one, save perhaps a few superannuated cheerleaders of Anglo-American condominium. Or that it actually does possess policy significance, though so far its existence has transcended our ability to comprehend it intellectually. Or that it is devoid of content, but mistakenly thought to be otherwise. Figuring out which it is to be, why, and how this might apply to Canada constitutes the aim I set for myself in this article.

I am going to argue that in the matter of the Anglosphere, we can safely exclude only the second of Epictetus's categories, namely that things neither are nor appear to be. Irrespective of whether the Anglosphere really can boast of any 'objective' existence, it is obvious, as I demonstrate below, that some people take it to have a 'subjective' one: they think it exists. But excluding one of the Epictetian categories only takes a short distance on the path of comprehending the ideational construct we (or they) call the Anglosphere. In fact, our construct is going to turn out to be a bifurcated one, with both divisions bearing a 'cultural' impress.

Before we examine the two divisions, some words about culture are in order. One approaches culture with trepidation, and if there are any concepts more fraught with peril for political scientists. I cannot identify them. He may not have been addressing political scientists, but Raymond Williams certainly summarized our dilemma when he remarked that the word ranks as one of the two or three most difficult in the English language (and he could have added, in any other language).[9] Specialists in international relations with an interest in security have

of late been known to take inspiration from a modified form of this impossible concept we call culture; that modification hears the label 'strategic culture.'[10]

On one thing, these specialists seem to be able to agree: that the label first appeared in an article published by Jack Snyder in 1977.[11] But exactly *what* the term is supposed to connote remains in dispute. At the risk of seeming to be arbitrary, I am going to suggest that those who employ the concept can be placed into two broad camps. One of these is the *cognitive* camp, and indeed is the one to which perhaps the term's most oft-cited delineator, Alastair Iain Johnston, belongs. Johnston has taken a leaf from the book of Clifford Geertz and a stable of cultural theorists in seizing upon the cognitive value of symbolism as a means of coming to grips with strategic culture. As he defines it, strategic culture consists in

> an integrated system of symbols (i.e., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.[12]

There is much that is commendable about Johnston's understanding of the term, but it needs to be said that other students of the issue hold to a much different approach. If Johnston is a cognitivist, we may call these others *contextualists.* Among the deans of this second school is Colin Gray, who in a rejoinder to Johnston argued that the concept is only to be regarded as 'context,' by which he meant a category transcending both cause and effect. Gray essayed his own concise definition of the concept: 'Strategic culture is the world of mind, feeling, and *habit in behaviour.'* [13]

What culture-as-context analysts seek to do is explicate foreign policies in terms either of 1) how particular states have acted in the past (i.e., their previous behaviour is argued to have great bearing on their current and future options), or 2) how states are thought by their own and other peoples as being likely to act based on the 'way they are' (i.e., their identity, or character, is said to predispose them toward certain policies). Analysts who employ strategic culture as a means of accounting for behaviour's impact often turn to *historical sociology* for guidance; those who prefer to put the emphasis upon conceptions attending identity also avail themselves of approaches with along-established pedigree, subsumed under the rubric *national character.*

It is not my purpose here to take sides in this dispute, but merely to register it as a means of providing some help to those who might be wondering what, if anything, 'culture', military intervention, and the mooted Anglosphere might have to do with one another. For the argument I make in this article. I am going to follow a contextualist path, and ask in the first instance, to what extent identity (or character) — in particular the identity thought to inhere in their at one time having all been members of an ethnic collectivity (the British Empire, in both its earlier

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and later manifestations) — might be linked to the phenomenon of military interventionism, or if the reader prefers, war.

In a nutshell, is there something about the character of the members of the Anglosphere that makes them warlike (if that is what they are)? Even to ask the question is to run the risk of being dismissed as an eccentric, or worse. First, it is simply not done, these days, to invoke the category of national character, held by more than a few analysts to be a retrogressive notion that smacks of 'essentialist.' or 'primordialist' categories.[14] If what is being alleged is that national character has been found guilty by prior association with hereditarian or racist assumptions about international relations, then one can easily see why it should have fallen out of favour: but if it is being avoided in name (though not in practice) because it is, as are most political concepts, ambiguous and even self-contradictory, then the shunning becomes less easy to justify, given the generic problems associated with political concepts, and especially given that national character's replacement by 'national identity' — which is what has been happening — merely substitutes one essentially contested category for another, in the process violating Ockham's razor.[15]

It can come as no surprise that even those social scientists who continue to employ the concept by its name disagree over its definition. In fact, some will willingly concede that it resists defining but is nevertheless too important to discard! One such scholar is Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., for whom national character raises important questions about the ability of America's creedal (constitutional) identity to withstand the challenge of a contemporary ethnic polities subsumed under the name multiculturalism.[16] Although Schlesinger's pessimism on this score may not be justified, he is certainly correct in noting the important part played by ethnicity in discussions about national character. What this implies for some analysts who interpret strategic culture as context is, or should be, apparent: the impact of ethnicity as a conditioning element in foreign policy making is a worthy object for their scholarly attentions. Even worse than trying to extract yield from the category of national character is the attempt to impute a 'transnational character' to a collective entity, in our case the Anglosphere. For sure, transnational collective *identity* is not only said by many to exist, but has been elevated to a central place in the discipline of international relations' theoretical corpus, especially that body of work that probably comes closest to having law-like properties, namely democratic peace theory, which collapses of its own weight unless one concedes the existence of collective (liberal-democratic, in this case) identity.

In the two sections that follow, and with apologies to those who might be allergic to national character. I am going to inflate the concept and ask whether our object of inquiry, the Anglosphere, possesses certain cultural attributes linked to (British) ethnicity that predispose its members to a willingness to deploy their armed forces abroad. As we are going to see, those who profess a belief in the Anglosphere's existence do so because they further understand that its members partake of a transnational collective identity linked to *something* about their ethnic character.

Our question becomes, then. Can this 'something account for a collectivity's tendency to intervene militarily?

To answer this, let us take a closer look at this postulated, if bifurcated, collectivity called the Anglosphere.

ANGLOSPHERE LITE: POLITICAL VALUES AND INTERVENTION

Those who believe an Anglosphere exists agree on one point: that its origins must be traceable to Great Britain. This common aspect to the contrary notwithstanding, the two great divisions within the family of Anglosphere protagonists imply radically different consequences for our inquiry. As we are about to see, the first of these, which I will with some hesitation label 'Anglosphere lite.' is not particularly useful to those who want to make the connection between that collectivity's 'something' and military intervention. A connection can be made between this Anglosphere's 'essence' and interventionism, but it seems a bit strained.

The chief intellectual luminary of the Anglosphere is James C. Bennett, president of the Anglosphere Institute in Virginia, who is associated with the variant I dare to call 'lite' — a label Bennett himself would not, and does not, use.[17] There are two ironies associated with this grouping of Anglosphere adherents. One concerns the *word.* It could be remarked that there must be something derogatory in likening what is, after all, the most developed variant of Anglosphere analysis to an insipid brew — lite beer — that Americans seem to enjoy quaffing. My purpose here is not to demean, but to describe, and I use the modifier in the same way that, for instance. Michael Ignatieff employs the notion of 'empire lite.' as a means of drawing attention to policy implications.[18]

The other irony inheres in the *deed.* As I will argue, if you think culture and intervention are somehow positively correlated, then do not look to this variant of the Anglosphere to do much heavy lifting for you. When it comes to military intervention, this Anglosphere — let us call it the 'English-using' community — turns out to be very much a stay-at-home phenomenon.

In some ways it can be more than ironic to describe the most inclusionary, collective-identity based Anglosphere as lite. It can be downright insulting, for the security dispensation that we associate with a certain 'liberal-democratic' set of transnational values is and remains one of the more prominent devices for attaining world peace. That dispensation is known as a 'security community.' and it is generally argued to be an order informed and sustained by 'dependable expectations of peaceful change,' meaning that members of the community neither make war on each other nor *threaten* so to do.[19]

Closely related to, indeed virtually synonymous with, the concept of security community is the 'zone of peace', i.e., the grouping of countries held in irenic embrace by their common ascription of liberal-democratic values. In the aftermath of the intra-allied dust-up over the Iraq war, some have wondered aloud whether a 'transatlantic community of values' can still be said to exist.[20] I think such

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suppositions to be premature, at best, for I do believe there is something to the claim of 'democratic peace theory' (DPT), and I say this as someone who can be considered a classical realist. In short, I hold what DPT propounds to be consistent with the politico-strategic 'reality' (as I understand it) of the transatlantic world. I have a hard time taking seriously those realists of a more structural kidney who seem to think that another great-power war between current members of the Western zone of peace maybe in the offing,[21] though a good case can be made that a necessary condition for *establishing* the post-1945 'long peace' was the projection of American power into formerly perennial disputatious regions (such as Western Europe).

What does DPT portend? Nothing less than an international order in which not only great-power war is rendered a logical impossibility, but even some other varieties of armed conflict might become social artefacts of a receding age. We have partially entered, under the beneficent guidance of the Western tone of peace, into a 'post-modern' age, with all it promises in the way of pacific relations and rising prosperity, the two phenomena hound up in a mutually reinforcing virtuous cycle, one in which economic growth fosters democracy, and the latter peace.[22] The cycle is based on the seemingly irrefutable logic that whatever else democracies might do, they never make war on one another — or at least, hardly ever do so.[23]

Democratic peace theory rests on one basic observed regularity of international relations: for more than two hundred years liberal democracies have seldom fought against each other, a record borne out by numerous empirical studies.[24] In accounting for this, proponents of DPT have framed their arguments within two general contexts, which can be labelled the normative/cultural approach, and the structural/institutionalist one.[25]

The normative/cultural approach is the one that concerns us here, and is the reason I call our first variant, Anglosphere lite. This approach puts great stock in the shared values and internal democratic norms of liberal-democratic states.[26] States are held to externalize behavioural norms that characterize their domestic political processes and institutions, with the implication being that the *'culture, perceptions, and practices* that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to apply across national boundaries toward other democratic countries.'[27] Therefore, in relations between democracies, the same norms and behaviours that can be expected to limit 'our' aggression internally and externally can be expected similarly to limit that of other liberal-democratic states.

Now, it is no small matter to contemplate a world — or at least a portion of a world — from which the use or threat of force has been banished as a means of international dispute settlement. This is indeed an accomplishment worth celebra-ting. How can I seemingly dismiss the achievement by labelling as 'lite' an Anglosphere that many take to be the very hearthstead of the Western zone of peace? I do so because this Anglosphere, founded as it is upon collective identity derived above all else from shared political values of a British provenance, seems to be a particularly inert beast when it comes to the issue of actually using, instead of

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refraining from using, military force. In other words, Anglosphere lite may be a marvellous device for getting its members to abstain from physically bashing each other; but it is not such a good mechanism if the challenge at hand is to impel them to intervene outside their zone of peace. If culture is somehow correlated with interventionist preferences within the setting of the Anglosphere, we will have to turn to an alternative variant, because in this respect lite can at best whet, it cannot slake, a thirst for military expeditions.

Lite may, and no doubt does, contribute to helping members of the security community understand why they are linked in their irenic embrace, and can even point to some things worth doing as a means of strengthening the security community. One such advocacy along these lines has recently been made by Douglas Stuart, who finds therapeutic value in the Anglosphere as a means of reinvigorating a Western alliance that has been badly bruised by an American administration bent on 'unilateralism.' In his view, the Anglosphere can provide a bridging service to an alliance strained in no small measure because of tensions between a strutting America and a rebarbative France. What he really has in mind here is the identification of the Anglosphere with traditional 'atlanticism,' namely that cluster of values associated with the Atlantic Charter, dear for sure to the English-speaking countries, yet nevertheless appealing as well to most of the other Western states, who emphasize what is liberal and democratic about the value set, and deemphasize what might be more narrowly associated with a national or transnational collective identity arising out of a shared (English) language or shared (British) history, or both — i.e., the community of Western states for whom atlanticism does not happen to be a dirty word.[28] And since there is only one ally that is congenitally allergic to atlanticism, France, it might follow that the therapeutic application of Anglosphere lite can yield positive results.

The argument is not a bad one, but does not really require the Anglosphere as its *deus ex machina;* if the injunction to the allies is simply to be, 'thou shalt treat each other nicely,' then it seems the trick merely requires the inspiration of good-old atlanticism, or 'transatlantic identity,' for its accomplishment.[29] Moreover, should the old-time religion of traditional atlanticism fail to inspire, it is hard to understand why its more exclusionary repackaging as the Anglosphere — even the Anglosphere lite with its stress upon political values and economic practices that had their origins in the British Isles and were spread westward during the first British Empire[30] — can be expected to have greater appeal, especially when we consider that prominent exponents of the Anglosphere lite really do believe that those *political* values must ultimately depend upon a cultural formation undergirded by language. This is why, for instance, James Bennett includes only part of Canada in his Anglosphere, even though he insists that the grouping is not just, or even primarily, about language; I revisit this distinction in my conclusion.

Bennett's Anglosphere has two 'nodes': the US and the UK. It has, as well, some 'powerful and populous outliers': Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, and the Anglophone portions of Canada and South Africa. On the surface, it is hard to see this entity contributing to the solidification of the Western security community (though there is no reason why it must work to weaken that community). But

when it comes to the issue of culture and military intervention, it is apparent that Bennett's Anglosphere, which he likes to call a 'network commonwealth,' is hardly the sort of community to undertake military interventions. To the contrary, Bennett's Anglosphere 'concentrates on tending and perfecting our own garden first, on creating deep and strong ties between highly similar nations and cultures, and seeking to help other nations by serving as an example (and sometimes, as a caution). It does not impose solutions on nations and cannot benefit thereby.'[31]

If one takes inspiration from the heady stuff of 'democratic globalism',[32] and believes that the Anglosphere not only has a license but an *obligation* to spread democracy, then it is possible to imagine the liberal-democratic (i.e., 'Anglo') values being themselves generative of a compulsion toward military intervention. But those same values are more often associated with non-interventionist preferences than with interventionist ones; think of Robert Kagan's critique of European, and by extension Canadian, 'Venetians' residing in their Kantian, liberal-democratic, paradise.[33] So it really is a bit much to ask of culture that it account for military interventionism because of a presumed *need for* liberal-democratic values to be exported.

Instead, we will have to add to those Anglosphere political values another element in our perhaps quixotic quest to find a link between 'transnational character' and a collectivity's willingness to intervene militarily. Let us look for the possible connection in the second, more 'ethnic,' division of our Anglosphere, which we shall call 'Anglosphere heavy.'

ANGLOSPHERE HEAVY: ETHNICITY AND STRATEGIC CULTURE

For our second variant of the Anglosphere to be put to work — by which I mean, to serve as a cultural impulsion toward military interventionism — we will need to establish a credible connection between intervention and the character of a people. In this section, I argue that while assumptions of bellicosity attached to 'Anglo-Saxons' (or 'Anglo-Americans') have some plausibility, they also suffer from serious drawbacks.

Let us start with the controversial category of character, which in the Anglosphere context presupposes an *ethnie,* that is a collective identity predicated in some way upon ethnicity. Now, ethnicity is in its own right a large and controversial topic, but for my purposes here I rely upon Anthony Smith's understanding of the category, which holds that this variant of collective identity constitutes a 'named human population with a myth of common ancestry.'[34] And while many things can sustain the myth of common ancestry, two factors possess a particular power to support assumptions of identity: religion and language.[35] The latter, by definition, has to be of more than passing interest to students of the Anglosphere; indeed, we have already seen in the preceding section how important language can be, not only for a network commonwealth but also for the political-cultural variables (including liberal democracy) often held to be derivative of English-speaking practices.

Anglosphere heavy goes a bit further, and seeks to establish a connection between those political values and a cultural identity that, at the extreme, can be and sometimes has been invested with 'racial' or biological qualities. And though it might discomfort proponents of Anglosphere lite, who want to insist upon the non-racial content of their category, in a very real sense the current discussion of the Anglosphere is but a continuation of a debate harking back more than a century, concerning the meaning of Anglo-Saxon identity for international peace and security. On this issue, Owen Harries is correct; the term itself might be new, featuring in discussions of a latter-day 'English-speaking union' that began to make the rounds in the late 1990s,[36] but the thought conveyed by the label is old. '[W]hat some are now referring to as a political 'Anglosphere'... [is a] line of argument almost exactly replicat[ing] one advanced by a group of highly intelligent, well-educated and well-connected young men at the beginning of the last century.'[37]

Those who articulated and advanced that vision were identified by a series of names during the first third of the twentieth century, ranging from 'Milner's Kindergarten' through the 'Round Table' and eventually even the 'Cliveden Set' (though this latter is typically associated with pro-appeasement enthusiasts of the mid to late 1930s, so much so that it is easy to forget the group's principal focus, namely the fostering of closer Anglo-American ties); but whatever the name they bore, they preached the same message about the singular promise of English-speaking unity as a necessary and perhaps sufficient condition of international peace and stability.[38]

Panegyrists of this earlier collective identity made appeal to cultural solidarity, specifically to the once and future cooperative vision of a great Volk, the Anglo-Saxons, destined to prevail over the international political arena. Perry Robinson, a Briton with long experience in America, summed up the promise of Anglosphere heavy, shortly before the outbreak of the First World War. The day was fast approaching, he was convinced, when 'Universal Peace' would be accomplished through Anglo-American condominium:

> The ultimate domination of the world by the Anglo-Saxon (let us call him so) seems to be reasonably assured; and no less assured is it that at some time wars will cease. The question for both Englishmen and Americans to ask themselves is whether, recognising the responsibility that already rests upon it, the Anglo-Saxon race dare or can for conscience' sake — or still more, whether one branch of it when the other be willing to push on, dare for conscience' sake — hang back and postpone the advent of the Universal Peace, which it is in its power to bring about to-day, no matter what the motives of jealousy, or self-interest, or of self-distrust may be that restrain it.[39]

From the point of view of collective identity, the Anglo-Saxon idea was always an awkward mélange, appealing as it did both to racial and ersatz biological categories, as well as to political values that were thought somehow to be carried in the genes — or at least on the tongue. Among the latter values, none was so exalted as liberty, said to be a peculiar possession of only a lucky few peoples,

whose sources could be traced back to the 'Teutonic' forests of antiquity. Despite the analytical comfort associated with being able to take Tacitus's Germania as proof of lengthy pedigree of Anglo-Saxon virtue, the Teutonic association would turn out to have its drawbacks.

From the point of view of those who championed, as did Robinson, an Anglo-American alliance, references to Teutons could give Americans the unfortunate impression that their own political virtues might have more to do with Germany than with Britain; and in fact, there occurred a period in American life when Germany was regarded as the pre-eminent example of public policy virtue on the part of American intellectuals, and it was certainly a country, in the post-Civil War decades, to which American students flocked for their graduate training.[40] Much better to vest the myth of free Anglo-Saxons in a time and place closer to home, and to have the great story of liberty and even democracy find its opening chapters in the struggle for religious freedom (of a kind) dating from sixteenth-century England, if not earlier.[41]

Cloaking so-called Teutonic virtues in English garb did not dispel category confusion, however, for even if the Saxons (and their compeers, the Angles) could be turned into Britons and effectively de-Germanized, there still remained, a century ago, the uncomfortable thought that demographic forces were bringing into existence an America that, day by day, was becoming visibly and distressingly less Anglo-Saxon. What kind of racial solidarity could be forged with such a mongrelizing breed? Homer Lea, a contemporary of Robinson's, thought he knew the answer: none. Do not look for Anglo-Saxon unity to lead to Universal Peace, said Lea, for the simple reason that the United States, a veritable smelting pot charged with too much of Europe's dross, was on the verge of tipping away from the Anglo-Saxon community. This was due to trends in immigration; it had been many decades since the Protestant precincts of the British Isles had been contributing the lion's share of US immigrants. Since the 'day of the Saxon' was drawing to its end because of developments in America, the best that Britain could hope for was to fall back upon its own Empire, and especially those reliable Anglo-Saxons in the old dominions, in a bid to assure its security.[42]

Nor did Madison Grant's ambitious attempt to document the biological origins of European (and transatlantic) civilization do anything to dispel the gloom of racial Anglo-Saxons in the first quarter of the twentieth century. For Grant, who believed 'race is everything,' the story of America was a story of a country committing 'race suicide,' as its 'Nordic' European strands were becoming submerged in a rising tide carrying to prominence Europe's other two races, the 'Alpines' and the 'Mediterraneans,' neither of which could come close to matching the sterling features of the Nordics, not least of which were their fighting qualities.[43]

Given the logical difficulties, not to say absurdities, associated with racial Anglo-Saxonism — e.g., what to do about the Germans?, how to measure racial qualities (including 'intelligence')?[44] and perhaps most importantly, what to do about the *Americans?*[45] — we might be justified in concluding that Anglosphere heavy is a notion without any content whatsoever, therefore a notion with which

we can easily and profitably dispense. I would caution against the temptation so to conclude, because while *racial* Anglo-Saxonism is evidently bunkum, there is another side of Anglo-Saxonism (and thus of Anglosphere heavy) that makes appeal to ethnic and societal, not racial, identity.

Could this side of Anglo-Saxonism supply the link between culture and intervention? Is there something uniquely warlike about native speakers of English, inherent in their *social* conditioning? Recall that our task here is to try to establish a cultural imperative toward interventionism within something known as the Anglosphere. For this demonstration to be attempted, it really is not necessary to resort to the mumbo jumbo of racial Anglo-Saxonism at all. Perhaps *national character* conceived in terms of societal folkways whose origins stem from *ethnic categories can be invoked?*

To put things bluntly, we might ask whether there is something about a social grouping that expresses itself in English as a mother tongue — no matter what its ostensible racial origins may be — that leads it toward interventionist pursuits. The question seems, on the surface, absurd, or if not absurd, then so fraught with ethnic stereotyping as to arouse our immediate suspicions. We can laugh today at the story told by an English traveller in Holland a century ago, remarking upon the cleanliness of Dutch cities and towns:

> Spring cleaning goes on here … all the year round …. Every bulwark has a washing tray that can be fixed or detached in a moment. 'It's a fine day, let us kill something,' says the Englishman; 'Here's an odd moment, let us wash something,' says the Dutch vrouw.[46]

Smile though we may, we would do well to recall that it was not so very long ago that many English-speaking policy analysts put a great deal of stock in the notion that one could ascribe martial (hence, interventionistic) qualities to a people. We called them *Germans,* and thought them to be a particularly bellicose crowd, so much so that to the extent the international system had a security problem, one could do much worse than to refer to it as 'the German problem.' It is true that even when such a problem was taken to be the principal source of upset in European and global politics, there had always been some who were prepared to accept that it was Germany's geopolitical setting and not Germans' national character that lay at the root of things; but there never was any shortage of English-speaking biographers, historians, political scientists, and even prime ministers who could assure you that most of what was wrong with the planet could be traced to the individual and social demerits of Germans.[47]

So, are there any societally conditioned traits possessed by denizens of the Anglosphere that might put a cultural impress upon interventionist practices? Phrased this way, the question sounds less absurd, particularly if one accepts the thesis that the United States remains societally what it always has been, namely a chip off the old (British) block, even if the ostensive Anglo-Saxon proportion of the country's population has never, at about 20 percent, been as slight as it is today.[48] Though the original 'germ theory' of American political and social development, i.e.,

that the country's virtues derived from its Teutonic ancestry, no longer commands any audience among serious scholars, a modified version of the theory, holding that America continues very much to be 'Albion's seed,' receives a certain degree of respect. The argument has been stated most elaborately, and eloquently, by David Hackett Fischer who claims there are four distinct British 'folkways', associated with four great waves of immigration to colonial America, and that singly and collectively they have been much more responsible for giving American political (and we could say as well, strategic) culture a peculiar stamp than have competing accounts of the development of American identity, whether those competing accounts are rooted in factors environmental (viz., the Turner, or 'frontier' thesis) or 'pluralistic' (e.g., the [s]melting pot metaphor).[49]

To Fischer, while America may have been born 'British,' it never possessed cultural homogeneity as a result. This is because those who settled the new land were so unlike each other; the only thing they had in common seems to have been their origins in the British Isles. Those four waves of settlement were Puritans from East Anglia who arrived in Massachusetts between 1629 and 1640; a Royalist elite who, with their indentured servants, left the south of England for Virginia between 1642 and 1675; emigrants from the North Midlands and Wales who settled the Delaware Valley between 1675 and 1725; and a very interesting, if excitable, group of borderers from the northern counties of England and southern ones of Scotland, who came, some after a sojourn in the north of Ireland, to settle down in the Appalachian back country between 1718 and 1775. It is Fischer's thesis that, thanks to these four groups, British folkways have remained the single most important determinant of America's voluntary society down to the present day.[50]

For our purposes, it is only the last group that stands out as a potential link between culture and intervention, and even then only in a qualified way. These are the folk who became known as the 'Scotch-Irish' (sometimes, 'Scots-Irish'), and what makes them interesting for our story is a) their peculiar value set, and b) their recent, and surprising, rebound as one of contemporary America's dominant subcultures — if not as its dominant subculture. The borderers had known little but conflict for some 700 years prior to their arrival in America, and the constant warfare left its mark on their group identity. They fought in the old country, and they continued to fight in the new. *Lex talionus* was their quotidian rule, and their golden rule was 'do unto others as they threaten to do unto you.'

In the words of Walter Russell Mead, their value set constitutes America's 'folk ideology,' and to the surprise of many, not only did they not get subsumed by the great waves of European migration to hit America in the twentieth century, but they actually managed to expand their cultural reach from its original base in the 'Southern Highlands' to vast swaths of America,[51] more or less coterminous with the 'red state' America of recent electoral maps, so called for the colour assigned on televised depictions of states carried by Republican presidential candidates (in contradistinction to the blue states taken by Democrats). In the process, they won over considerable stretches of ethnically pluralist America, incorporating not only descendants of non-Anglo Europeans but also a fair number of African-Americans.

These are the people Mead calls the 'Jacksonians', one of four great schools, or paradigms, of American foreign policy (the other three being the Hamiltonians, Jeffersonians, and Wilsonians). They are America's martial caste, its warriors *par excellence,* and they abide by a code of values that accords pride of place to virtues imported from the ancestral borderlands, among which is a willingness to kill, and die, for country and kinfolk.[52] There is no reason to challenge Mead's assessment as to this ethnie's impact upon American foreign policy, but we do well to ask to what extent Jacksonianism in one country can be constitutive of a transnational collective identity worthy of the descriptive, Anglosphere heavy.

I think it can be taken as given that Jacksonianism finds little to no echo in Canada,[53] but what about the two states most often associated with imagery of an interventionist Anglosphere, the UK and Australia? Behavioural qualities associated with martial skills and instincts are certainly not hard to detect, in either of these two societies, but what is difficult to find is the marked presence of this particular ethnic community outside of the US, for reasons related both to demographic patterns and environmental realities in the UK and Australia. To take just the former, we can say that the 'Scotch-Irish' ethnic category finds little resonance in the UK, with the notable exception of the Ulster Loyalists, and *they* hardly constitute a dominant subculture in Britain today (just the reverse, they are held more often than not to be a source of trouble rather than of policy guidance!). As for Australia, it is conceivable, perhaps likely, that its national character has been shaped by emigrants from the Emerald Isle, albeit its southern part, today's Republic of Ireland.

Thus, while the 'contribution' made to American *national* character of the Jacksonians may indeed be formidable, it is hard to see in Jacksonianism à la Mead (and Fischer) the basis of an Anglosphere *collective* identity. So why do certain states in this mooted Anglosphere have the stomach for military intervention, and why is Canada an apparent outlier?

CONCLUSION: CANADA AS ANGLOSPHERE OUTLIER

The answer to the first part of the previous question might be traced to culture, but only if one considered 'historical learning' to be a cultural process. This can be debated either way, and there is no point trying to resolve the issue in this conclusion. Suffice it to say that, for many sound reasons, both Britain and Australia have learned to calculate their security interests in such a way as to make it likely that American support for them will be there, if needed. They sense that they have to do something to warrant the *expectation* of having that support, thus the interventionist aspects of their respective 'special relationships' with the US translate into a willingness to try to be on America's side if at all possible, partly because of the merits of the issue of the moment, but also as a kind of insurance policy against an uncertain future.

Things are different with Canada. For it, unlike Australia and the United Kingdom, there is no major downside risk in abstaining from American-led interventions. Some in the US may have been disappointed, others angered, by Ottawa's decision

not to have joined the anti-Saddam coalition, but it is simply not possible to detect any quantifiable (especially economic) costs associated with that decision. More to the point, and this sets Canada very much apart from Australia, there exists no need to buy into US interventions abroad in a bid to maximize the likelihood that America can be called upon to safeguard the country's security in the event of dire necessity. For all the inconveniences that can sometimes be associated with living cheek by jowl with the world's mightiest power, Canada possesses by dint of geography what Britain, Australia, and other allies have to earn: a credible, not so say well-nigh automatic, American security guarantee. In exchange, there are certain things that Canada must do on the continental front, the most important of these being to cooperate closely in the defence of North America.[54]

But there is something else that needs to be considered when we try to reckon where, if at all, Canada stands in the mooted Anglosphere. This additional factor very much has to be taken as cultural in nature, and it inheres in Canada's bilingual, bicultural identity. This is the Quebec factor. Though much attention is paid to the outsized importance of this province in Canadian domestic affairs, surprisingly little has been said lately about the impact of Quebec on the country's strategic culture. This is so, even though in an earlier era, no one could have been oblivious of the role played by what used to be called 'French Canada' when it came to military interventions; from the Boer War through the two world wars, decision makers in Ottawa always had to wrestle with the dicey political and national-unity implications associated with the raising of expeditionary forces. What English Canada was prepared in the main to do, French Canada was against.

And whether or not public opinion in Quebec really was the reason that Ottawa abstained from joining in the Iraq war, there can be no mistaking the linguistic gulf in public attitudes toward that war: in English-speaking Canada, the public was initially split fifty-fifty on the merits of going to war, though by the time Baghdad fell in April 2003, some two-thirds of the public outside Quebec felt that not going to war alongside the US and UK had been a mistake (this view would change by the summer, when it became obvious just how messy nation-building would turn out to be in Iraq). By contrast, in Quebec near-unanimity ruled, both before the war and after the fall of Baghdad, on the unwisdom of the war.

It would be wrong to ascribe Quebec's attitude to its being pro-French, or anti-American; but it would also be wrong to overlook the strongly, and long-held, anti-militarist strain in the province's public opinion.[55] Needless to say, Canadian federal governments will be solicitous of Quebec opinion; it cannot be otherwise, and in fact for nearly all of the past four decades, the prime minister has hailed from that province. Because of its outsized role in Canadian politics (even though its share of the total population continues to slip, and is down to 23 percent today), the Quebec 'fact' in Canadian political culture, coupled with the involuntary American security guarantee, makes it always a dubious undertaking to include Canada as a whole-hearted player in Anglosphere heavy. Canada may be, and is, a partial player in Anglosphere lite, but it is an outlier when it comes to the heavier variant of the club. Not only this, but it is also a matter of indifference to most Canadians that the Anglosphere has so little salience to them.

NOTES

[1] See my 'From Empire to Umpire to Empire: Canada and the Dilemmas of Military Interoperability,' in *The Canadian Forces and Interoperability: Panacea or Perdition?,* ed. Ann L. Griffiths (Halifax: Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2002), pp. 109-17.

[2] Lawrence Martin, 'A Tale of Two Models: How We Remain a European Nation,' *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 2 June *2005,* p. A19; and, especially, Philip Resnick, *The European Roots of Canadian Identity* (Toronto: Broadview, *2005).*

[3] 'Chirac dit non a la guerre américaine contre l'Irak,' *Le Monde, 12* March 2003, pp. 1, 2.

[4] See Kim Richard Nossal and Stéphane Roussel, 'Canada and the Kosovo War: The Happy Follower,' in *Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?,* ed. Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 181-99.

[5] For the familial imagery, see John C. Blaxland, 'The Armies of Canada and Australia: Closer Collaboration?' *Canadian Military Journal* 3 (Autumn 2002): 45-54.

[6] There is an abundant literature on tensions between the 'Anglo-Saxon' leaders and de Gaulle during and after the Second World War. See, for instance, Raoul Aglion, *Roosevelt and de Gaulle: Allies in Conflict, a Personal Memoir* (New York: Free Press, 1988); François Kersaudy, *Churchill and de Gaulle* (New York: Atheneum, 1983); John Newhouse, *De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons* (New York: Viking, 1970); Mario Rossi, *Roosevelt and the French* (Westport: Praeger, 1993); Milton Viorst, *Hostile Allies: FOR and Charles de Gaulle* (New York: Macmillan, 1965); and Dorothy Shipley White, *Seeds of Discord: De Gaulle, Free France and the Allies* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964).

[7] The term itself first appeared in print in Neal Stephenson's science fiction novel, *The Diamond Age: Or a Young Lady's Primer* (New York: Bantam Books, 1995).

[8] Quoted in John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith, 'Foreword,' in *Image and Reality in World Politics,* ed. Farrell and Smith (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. v.

[9] Williams, cited by William H. Sewell, Jr., 'The Concept(s) of Culture,' in *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture,* ed. Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 35-61. For an extensive catalogue of culture's many, and at times contradictory, meanings, see A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (New York: Vintage Books, 1963).

[10] For a discussion, see David G. Haglund, 'What Good Is Strategic Culture? A Modest Defence of an Immodest Concept,' *International Journal* 59 (Summer 2004): 479-502.

[11] Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1977).

[12] Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 36-37. Also see his 'Thinking about Strategic Culture,' *International Security* 19 (Spring 1995): 32-64.

[13] Colin S. Gray, 'Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back,' *Review of International Studies* 25 (January 1999): 49-69, quote at p. 58 (emphasis in original).

[14] This critique is made by Paul A. Kowert, 'National Identity: Inside and Out.' *Security Studies* 8 (Winter 1998/99-Spring 1999): 1-34.

[15] For a sharp critique of those who would steer clear of national character while embracing identity and other such vague, not to say self-contradictory, categories, see Dean Peabody, *National Characteristics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[16] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society,* new and rev. ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998), p. 169. Also see, on this theme, Samuel P. Huntington. 'The Hispanic Challenge,' *Foreign Policy,* no. 141 (March/April 2004), pp. 30-45.

[17] See James C. Bennett. *Anglosphere: The Future of the English-Speaking Nations in the Internet Era* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 2004).

[18] Though as Ignatieff uses it. lite stands as code for a variant of interventionism, which he calls 'temporary imperialism'; my usage tends in the other direction, away from the willingness to project military force. See Michael Ignatieff. *Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan* (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2003), p. vii.

[19] See Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, 'Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of Security Communities.' *Ethics & International Affairs* 10 (1996): 63-98. quote at p. 73; Idem, *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Adrian Hyde-Price. 'Security and Integration in Mitteleuropa: Towards a New Research Agenda' (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1997).

[20] See John J. Miller and Mark Molesky. *Our Oldest Enemy: A History of America's Disastrous Relationship with France* (New York: Doubleday. 2004).

[21] In particular, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy *of* Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton. 2001).

[22] An illuminating discussion of the extensibility of the post-modern community of states is found in Robert Cooper. *The Post-Modern State and the World Order* (London: Demos, 1996); and Idem. *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press. 2003).

[23] On this point. Michael Doyle reminds us that '[I]f the liberal thesis is anything like normal social science, we will discover exceptions — interliberal wars or interliberal crises — with some of the latter resolved by (from the liberal view) luck rather than by principled respect, institutional restraint, and commercial interest.' Doyle. 'Reflections on the Liberal Peace and Its Critics,' in *Debating the* Democratic Peace, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). p. 361.

[24] For examples. see Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, 'Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986', *American Political Science Review* 87 (September 1993): 624-38; and *Zeev* Maoi. and Nasrin Abdolali, 'Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976,' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33 (March 1989): 3-35.

[25] See Immanuel Kant. 'Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.' *Kant's Political Writing,* 2nd ed., ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): Michael W. Doyle. 'Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs.' *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Summer 1983): 205-35; Idem, 'Kant. Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs. Part 2.' ibid. 12 (Fall 1983): 323-53; and James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), pp. 4-6.

[26] Norms can be taken, in the words of two students of DPT, to be 'rules of conduct that provide standards by which behavior is approved or disapproved.' Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, 'Polities and Peace.' in *Debating the Democratic Peace,* pp. 239-62. Also see Michael Hechter. *Principles of Group Solidarity* (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1987).

[27] Bruce Russett. Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1993), p. 31 (emphasis in original).

[28] Douglas Stuart. 'NATO's Anglosphere Option: Closing the Distance Between Mars and Venus.' *International Journal* 60 (Winter 2005): 171-187.

[29] On that identity, see Thomas Risse, 'Transatlantic Identity and the Future of Canada-UK Relations.' in *Transatlantic Identity? Canada, the United Kingdom and International Order,* ed. Robert Wolfe (Kingston. Ont: Queen's University School of Policy Studies. 1997), pp. 27-29.

[30] Some even hold this Anglosphere to be primarily an economic entity, in which 'the Anglosphere balances the world's macro-economy.' through its members serving as 'spenders of last resort.' See Martin Wolf, 'Big Spenders Keep the Economy Moving,' *Financial Times,* 27 April 2004, online edition. And though he does not use the term *per se,* it is obvious that Niall Ferguson also makes the link between Anglosphere culture and economics, by labelling 'Anglobalization' the process by which the British empire fostered global economic interdependence. See Niall Ferguson. *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. xxvi.

[31] James C. Bennett, 'The Emerging Anglosphere.' *Orbis* 46 (Winter 2002): 111-26, quote at p. 122. Also see this same author's 'Networking Nation-States: The Coming Into National Order,' *National Interest,* no. 74 (Winter 2003/4), pp. 17-30.

[32] The term is sometimes said to be Charles Krauthammer's; for a critique of its practical applicability, see Francis Fukuyama. 'The Neoconservative Moment.' *National Interest,* no. 76 (Summer 2004), pp. 57-68. Krauthammer himself insists his vision is a more limited one, and goes under the name 'democratic

realism.' See Charles Krauthammer, 'In Defense of Democratic Realism,' ibid., no, 77 (Fall 2004), pp. 15-25.

33 Robert Kagan. Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Vintage Books, 2004).

34 Anthony D. Smith, 'The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism,' *Survival* 35 (Spring 1993): 48-62, quote at p. 50.

35 On the role of the latter, see John Edwards, *Language, Society and Identity* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985).

36 Advocacies made, *inter alios,* by Robert Conquest, *Reflections on a Ravaged* Century (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000); Idem, 'Toward an English-Speaking Union,' *National Interest,* no. 57 (Fall 1999), pp. 64-70; and Conrad Black. 'Britain's Atlantic Option, and America's Stake.' *National Interest,* no. 55 (Spring 1999), pp. 15-24.

37 Owen Harries, 'The Anglosphere Illusion.' *National Interest,* no. 63 (Spring 2001), pp. 130-36, quote at p. 130.

38 This epistemic community originated with the group of young, mainly Oxford-bred, enthusiasts working on postwar reconstruction for Lord Alfred Milner, British High Commissioner in South Africa, in the immediate aftermath of the Boer War. See Norman Rose. *The Cliveden Set: Portrait* of *an Exclusive Community* (London: Jonathan Cape. 2000).

39 H. Perry Robinson, The Twentieth Century American: Being a Comparative Study of the Peoples of the Two Great Anglo-Saxon Nations (Chautauqua, NY: Chautauqua Press, 1911). p. 19.

40 See, for this period. Ido Oren, 'The Subjectivity of the 'Democratic' Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany.' in *Debating the Democratic Peace. pp.* 263-300; Price Collier, *Germany and the Germans: From an American Point of View (London; Duckworth,* 1913): and Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 21-23.

41 See Richard T. Vann. 'The Free Anglo-Saxons: A Historical Myth,' *Journal* of *the History* of *Ideas* 19 (April 1958): 259-72; and Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins* of *American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 10-24.

42 Homer Lea. *The Day of the Saxon* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1912).

43 Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great Race, or the Racial Basis of European History (London: G. Bell & Sons. 1919), pp. 91-100.

44 For an indictment of those who sought to impart a 'scientific' basis to racial categorizing, see Stephen Jay Gould, *The Mismeasure* of *Man* (New York: W. W. Norton. 1981).

45 Nor was it only Anglo-Saxons who espied America's slipping from the fold; a leading French sociologist of the early twentieth century was just as convinced that America was fully and irreversibly shedding its Anglo-Saxon identity, with implications impossible to predict. See André Siegfried, *Les Etats-Unis d'aujourd'hui (Paris:* Armand Cohn, 1927). This theme has recently reappeared in Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).

46 E. V. Lucas, A *Wanderer in Holland* (London: Methuen, 1905), p. 5.

47 Balanced discussions of the issue are provided in David Calleo, *The German Problem Reconsidered* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); and Dirk Verheyen, *The German Question: A Cultural, Historical, and Geopolitical Exploration* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991). For a less balanced account that stresses national character, see *A. J. P. Taylor, The Course of German History* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1946).

48 Alexander De Conde, *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992), pp. 184-186.

49 Ralph Waldo Emerson was the first to popularize the 'smelting pot' metaphor, but over time it ceded place to the related, though somewhat different, image of the 'melting pot.' Technically, the former is used to separate a metal from its mineral, while the latter is used to blend metals into alloys. For the metaphor and its evolution, see Denis Lacorne, *La Crise de l'identité américaine: Du melting-pot au multiculturalisme* (Paris: Fayard, 1997), pp. 198-203.

50 David Hackett Fischer, *Aibion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, *1989).*

51 The region comprises three zones, running from east to west: the Blue Ridge Belt, the Greater Appalachian Valley, and the Cumberland Belt; it covers portions of Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,

Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky, as well as all of West Virginia. See John C. Campbell, *The Southern Highlander and His Homeland* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1921).

[52] Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001), pp. 231-250.

[53] Or so I have argued in 'Whose Divergence? Canada-US Relations in a Period of Jacksonian Ascendancy,' Policy *Options 25* (October 2004): 34-40.

[54] Joel J. Sokolsky, 'Northern Exposure? American Homeland Security and Canada,' *International Journal* 60 (Winter 2004-5): 35-52.

[55] See, on this strain, Jean-Sebastien Rioux, 'Two Solitudes: Quebecers' Attitudes Regarding Canadian Security and Defence Policy,' a paper prepared for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute's *Research Paper Series,* February 2005.