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Reconnecting Canada to the world (via Europe)

In his foreword to the 2005 international policy statement, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin states unequivocally, “[m]ake no mistake: we are in the midst of a major rebalancing of global power. New nations are rising as military and economic forces. Many established powers are striving to maintain their influence through regional integration and new alliances. In a world of traditional and emerging giants, independent countries like Canada—countries with small populations—risk being swept aside, their influence diminished, their ability to compete hampered.”¹ There is undoubtedly a sobering logic in the prime minister’s statement. Canada does need partners and political frameworks within which to multiply its influence in the world. And yet, for at least a decade, Canada has been to all

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¹ Paul Martin, “Foreword from the prime minister: Making a difference,” in “Canada’s international policy statement,” Ottawa, 2005, 2.

intents and purposes focused on itself and its own internal political and economic balance. During that time, it seems to have resigned itself to a minor sub-American role. Canada's many other relationships are either taken for granted or seem to be considered to be of mere historical interest. Consequently, for a country with such a rich internationalist tradition, Canada has become strangely isolated. When it comes to international engagement, Canada talks the talk but does not really walk the walk.

As a European, it is strange to see how little a role Europe, particularly the European Union, plays in Canadian thinking. This article seeks not so much to analyze the reasons for this but to offer Canadians a blunt warning: in your scramble to position yourselves in the future, do not forget the continuing power of those who made your past. The focus of this piece, therefore, whilst unashamedly on security and Canada's role therein, has implications for all of Canada's external engagements.

The effective absence of Europe from Canada's international policy statement is particularly strange when one considers that the EU contains four of the world's leading G8 economies. Moreover, in Britain and France, Europe possesses the world's second and third most effective military powers and remains the centre of gravity in NATO affairs. Indeed, the US is a member of NATO but not really part of it. The role that Canada has played in the defence of Europe and the role Europe has played in shaping Canada is clear, as is the very "European" nature of Canada's security presence and, of course, the fact that Canada shares its head of state with Europe's most dynamic power, Great Britain. Canada may indeed look south for much of its prosperity and security. It may also increasingly look west for its new prosperity. However, much of Canada's prosperity, security, and identity remains tied to Europe.

One thing that has been striking about Canada's security and defence policy over the past 10 to 15 years is how, as allies and partners have strived to first create new centres of power and then considered sources of legitimacy, Canada has chosen the obverse route. It has debated sources of legitimacy, primarily the United Nations, before considering the scope and nature of Canadian power required to render credibility unto legitimacy.

THE CANADIANIZATION OF EUROPE?

Superficially, it is easy for Canadians to dismiss Europe and much of its doings. The scramble over the EU constitution, the lack of economic reform in France and Germany, the splits that seem to emerge all too easily when-

ever a major foreign policy issue confronts Europe, can lead North American commentators in particular to write the old continent off as locked in an eternal squabble. Squabbling, in the eyes of North Americans, would seem to have replaced eternal warfare as the main European pastime. Indeed, much of the North American media seem almost to revel in treating Europe's travails as petty and parochial. Equally, with state conflict moving inexorably towards east Asia, it would also be easy to dismiss Europe as a strategic backwater. As Europe increasingly looks like a region of the world where stability, prosperity, and security seem assured, one might be tempted to forecast the steady "Canadianization" of the Old Continent, a world in which Europe's existence is undisturbed by events beyond its fluid borders.

That would be to misunderstand Europe and Europeans—or at least the leading Europeans. Moreover, from a European perspective it is Canada's policy, not Europe's, that seems particularly parochial. Indeed, if there is one thing that Europeans understand it is power, and the European Union is about power. Moreover, Europeans know that there can be no hiding place for them in a world so beset with instability and insecurity. Rich, powerful Europeans will certainly have to engage the world beyond and what one is witnessing in Europe is nothing less than a profound pluralistic debate over the nature of Europe and its place in the world. Led by a *trirectoire* of Britain, France, and Germany, Europe is slowly beginning to grapple with what it truly means to be a strategic actor in a world in which security is being globalized and traditional power marginalized.² Europeans seek ever-closer cooperation not simply to aggregate power, but because without legitimacy its impact is negligible.

In other words, Europeans are facing up to several fundamental questions that are as relevant to Canadians as they are to Europeans. First, what is the nature of the 21st century world? Second, what is Europe's place within it? Third, how best is security pursued in a fractured world? Fourth, how much are Europeans prepared to pay for their security and where should they spend it? Fifth, who are Europe's most reliable partners? Those are the questions that were addressed in the 2003 European security strategy, the first time Europeans as a whole had looked at the security environment and

² For an in-depth discussion of the role of Britain, France, and Germany in European defence, see Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algieri, "A European defence strategy," Gutersloh, Bertelsmann Foundation, 2004.

agreed on the ways to tackle it. It is but a start, but it is nevertheless an important start.³

Backwater or benefactor? That is also the fundamental question that Canada faces. After a decade of Canada's retreat into what was to all intents and purposes political isolationism, it is good for a European to see that with the 2004 foreign and defence policy review⁴ and now the international policy statement, Canadians have decided that they wish to reinvigorate their international presence. However, like Europeans, Canadians will face a harsh reality because the rhetoric will cost dearly, both in life and money, and it is difficult for an outsider to see the political stomach for such realities in Ottawa. Indeed, although Canada's place is a rightfully proud one in the world of security, any analysis of what Canada says it wants to do begs a rather basic question: how long can Canada go on playing high politics on a low politics budget? This is particularly apposite in the security field in which Canada endlessly talks internationalism but actually spends isolationism. If anything, the international policy statement has widened the gap between rhetoric and capabilities. Thus, Canadians face a dilemma similar to that of Europeans: they run the risk of losing credibility every time they talk big but deliver little.

IS CANADA A EUROPEAN COUNTRY?

Four years ago, in a piece entitled "Is Canada a European country?"⁵ this author looked at Canadian security and defence policy and could not but notice certain striking similarities with many of the smaller European

³ The European security strategy makes no attempt to avoid the seriousness of the international security environment. "Taking these different elements together—terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force—we could be confronted by a very radical threat indeed." See Javier Solana, "A secure Europe in a better world, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2003, 9.

⁴ The 2004 foreign and defence policy review stated that "[b]udget 2004 provides approximately \$1.6 billion in new funding over several years for National Defence and introduces plans to address the operational needs of the Canadian Forces, to modernize and acquire key capabilities and to enhance the quality of life of our members and their families." See David Pratt, "Budget 2004: Message from the minister," www.forces.gc.ca.

⁵ Julian Lindley-French, "Is Canada a European country?" in Alexander Moens, Lenard Cohen, and Allen G. Sens, eds., *NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003).

countries. The piece started by recalling Canada's unique contribution to European security and the victory of the west: the One Hundred Days, Ypres, Vimy Ridge, Paschendael, Dieppe, Monte Cassino, the Normandy beaches, assisting the British in the liberation of Belgium and the Netherlands, and, of course, the Cold War. The central thrust of the piece was that Canada, like many Europeans, had a view of its own contribution to world order founded to a significant extent upon the armed forces. However, as the gap between Ottawa's rhetoric and the underfunded reality of the armed forces increased, demands were upon placed upon Canada's armed forces that were well beyond the capabilities afforded to them. It was a policy that placed a particular burden on the selfless dedication of the superb men and women of the Canadian military who soldiered on, making do with what little they were given in a remarkable manner. Indeed, if there is one area where Canada's men and women in uniform stand head and shoulders above some Europeans, it is their deployability—the total percentage of Canada's armed forces ready for deployment at any one time. This achievement must carry lessons for the future.

Furthermore, as I wrote then, unlike some European countries, Canada at least seemed to have an idea of what its armed forces were for. The core argument was that Canada, with its emphasis on being the world's "best peacekeeper" (although the British would have something to say about that), shared a view of its role in security with that of the majority of Europeans—a view of itself that was in stark contrast to that of its large neighbour to the south. Canada, the piece concluded, would make an excellent signatory to the EU's European security and defence policy (ESDP)—for good and ill.

The question remains: is Canada still a European country? The answer is yes, but whereas Europeans are moving on and confronting the gap between what they need to do and what they realistically can do alone, Canada still seems in some ways to be locked in a security and defence time warp. It is unsure whether to invest in armed forces, civilian rapid response teams, or a light mix of both. This singular lack of clarity over the scope and nature of Canada's engagement in the world, which neither the foreign and defence policy review nor the international policy statement have resolved, prevents Canada from deciding definitively what kind of security actor it wishes to be in the world, and who its natural partners might be. Indeed, whereas the smaller Europeans are increasingly professionalizing and specializing within the framework of both NATO and the

EU, Canada seems intent on maintaining security ambitions that are wholly incommensurate with the level of investment it is prepared to make in its armed forces.

Consequently, Canadian defence policy today seems to be an increasingly pale shadow of that of Europe's two pocket superpowers, Britain and France. The cause, in London and Paris, is partly due to the nature of the environment, partly due to history, and partly because of their endless tussle to top the European political hierarchy. However, much of their military modernization is also due, in markedly differing ways, to their respective needs to influence the Americans, the British by being America's best and closest ally (yes, the British, not the Canadians), the French by creating an alternative.⁶

This is a political dichotomy that both drives European defence forward and constrains it, as both countries seek to lead and both ultimately seek alternative strategic end-states. It is a dichotomy that has significant implications for Canada, grappling as it is with its own cultural and political divide. For obvious reasons, Canada faces the same dilemma and yet must attempt to resolve it on a budget far smaller than that of the British or the French.

Again, there is little in either the defence policy review or the international policy statement that suggests that Canada is close to resolving a strategic dilemma that has dogged it ever since the US replaced Great Britain as its most important strategic partner. In fact, both documents reflect the continuing ability of the US to influence Canadian policy indirectly even though the Americans have virtually written Canada off as a serious security player.⁷ This tension results in a most curious security and defence policy.

6 Such power pragmatism is reflected in British defence doctrine. Under the rubric of grand strategy it states, "Politics is about the capacity to influence the behaviour of others. The conduct of international politics is about applying national power, within the international political system, in support of the national and collective interest, usually in conjunction with allies and partners. The objectives being pursued, combined with the manner of their pursuit, constitutes the nation's grand strategy. The British grand strategic position is a reflection of the realities of power as exercised within the international system. Central to it is an understanding of the essential trinity of diplomacy, economic power and military power, each of which equates to an instrument of national power." See Ministry of Defence, "British defence doctrine," Swindon, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2001, 2-4; www.mod.uk.

7 It is hardly surprising that Canada has been so marginalized in American thinking. Henry Kissinger captured the American mood succinctly when he wrote, "[a]t the apogee of its power, the United States finds itself in an ironic position. In the face of perhaps the most pro-

THE CANADIAN STRATEGIC DILEMMA

Ottawa does not make security and defence policy. Rather, Ottawa attempts to interpret what the US would like it to do, to manage a delicate domestic “consensus,” and to ensure that Canada is not seen simply as an adjunct of Washington. In other words, Canadian foreign and security policy is reflective of a neurosis over identity and role that is peculiarly Canadian. The consequence is that Canada has in effect two or even three security and defence policies, each one of which would consume a defence budget the size of Canada’s and more. Martin put it succinctly himself: “Living in proximity to the world’s only superpower has engrained in Canadians both a pride in our friendship and a determination to set our own course in the world.”⁸

Security and defence policy number 1 reflects the need to be *close* to the Americans with a high-profile commitment to continental security, primarily through NORAD, a sizeable air force, and, increasingly, through joint counterterrorism activities. Security and defence policy number 2 reflects Canada’s seeming determination *not* to be American, with the high-profile protection of Canadian sovereignty and thus the maintenance of a three-ocean navy. Security and defence policy number 3 is generated by the need of Canadians to be *seen* to be a force for good in this world through the generation of advanced expeditionary humanitarian intervention/strategic stabilization forces. After all, being Canadian has always had much to do with an ability to punch considerably above Canada’s weight in the world even if Canada has never quite decided what weight of boxer it is. Consequently, Canadian grand strategy—such as it is—reflects a series of uncomfortable trade-offs. This is “non-strategy” at its most contradictory, particularly in defence.

The irony is that several of Canada’s major European partners, not least Britain, have long given up any pretensions to sovereignty protection, that

found and widespread upheavals the world has ever seen, it has failed to develop concepts relevant to the emerging realities. Victory in the Cold War tempts smugness; satisfaction with the status quo causes policy to be viewed as a projection of the familiar into the future; astonishing economic performance lures policymakers to confuse strategy with economics and makes them less sensitive to the political, cultural and spiritual impact of the vast transformations brought about by American technology.” Kissinger, like his America and unlike Canadians, is never one for understatement. *Does America Need a Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 19.

⁸ Paul Martin, “Foreword,” 3.

being the job of NATO. Rather, they have increasingly focused on doing one thing but doing it very well. London is prepared to pay for a fully elaborated advanced expeditionary capability. At the same time, the UK recognizes that such an ambition will tend to emphasise its traditional maritime/amphibious role at the expense of its heavy land component. That, indeed, was the essence of a series of strategic defence reviews over the past seven years that have driven British defence policy inexorably in that direction.⁹ The building of the new super-carriers will complete the program. British security and defence policy, founded as it has been on an expanding economy, is conceptually tight and focused, willing to give up some traditional roles to others to excel in an area the UK believes vital to its national interest. The attempt by Blair's London to be a pocket super-power for good in the world generates its own problems, but at least the British know who they are and what role they intend to play.

And therein lies that most profound of Canadian insecurities. What is the Canadian national interest? Strategically, Canada is one of the most secure countries on the planet. One can of course mouth the usual platitudes such as "there is no contradiction between Canada doing well and Canada doing good."¹⁰ The fact is that whatever Canadians do, the United States for its own reasons will protect and assure the Canadian security space, sovereignty and all. Canada clearly has a broad interest in a benign security environment, but much of the work to bring that about will in any case be done by others. What seems more important from the outside, perhaps, is not so much the Canadian national interest, but rather the impact

⁹ Whitehall Paper 50 put it succinctly: "The Strategic Defence Review represented, in certain key areas, a pre-Cold War enunciation of British interests. Britain has political and economic interests that go beyond the European theatre. Britain's vital interests, i.e. the defence of the home base, are no longer threatened but essential interests, such as the maintenance of free and open international trade require renewed vigilance...Britain's security policy should be based on three basic principles. First, the maintenance of political influence over the creation and formation of coalitions within the frameworks of the UN, NATO, OSCE and EU and, uniquely, the Commonwealth. Second, the maintenance and procurement of enough capability to be able to co-lead, at least, a coalition in which the US is not involved. Third, the maintenance of enough capability to ensure continued influence over US security policy." Lindley-French, ed., "Coalitions and the future of UK security policy," Whitehall Paper 50, London, RUSI, 2000, 9-10.

¹⁰ Paul Martin, "Foreword," 2.

of Canada's role in the world on the domestic consensus, indeed, the impact of any such role in what is an increasingly complicated society with many traditional loyalties and perceptions.

Thus, Canadian security and defence policymaking emerges from a complex domestic political sausage machine in which the role of external engagements has much more to do with creating identity than generating actual effect in the world. Indeed, one cannot help but hear another echo of the European debate as certain forces in Canadian policymaking circles push for a purely civilian Canadian presence in the world. These forces forget that effective engagement (be it effective unilateralism or effective multilateralism) continues to be underpinned by credible coercion. For this group, any and all expenditure on the armed forces is both a constraint and a waste of resources that might otherwise be invested in civilian humanitarian interventionism. As Europeans know only too well, such profound conceptual tensions within a state inevitably lead to a pretence of security.

From a security and defence viewpoint the result is sub-optimality in every area of Canada's foreign engagement. Certainly, given the defence planning dilemmas of the British and other Europeans in this regard, and the almost revolutionary choices they are making, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Canada's broad application of a very limited security investment will inexorably lead to ever more mediocrity and ever more marginalization in all three of Canada's security and defence policies. Why? Because all of Canada's limited resources go into simply maintaining a presence on the international stage without actually improving it. Make no mistake, if a country chooses not to be truly effective in any one aspect of security and defence, its efforts therein become by and large irrelevant. In such circumstances, a country such as Canada would be well advised to scrap the lot and put the money into an area where society's needs are most pressing, such as healthcare. Symbolism can be expensive.

Much of the strategic schizophrenia that afflicts Canada's security and defence policy stems from a seemingly reasonable determination by the Canadian government to seek a balance between Canada's continental and foreign responsibilities. Unfortunately, the very concept of "balance" has become synonymous with at best a loss of direction and at worst an attempt to preserve Swiss-like absolute sovereignty on a defence budget that will afford little or none.

THE VIRTUES OF MAKING DO

That said, others can learn from the Canadian experience. Canadians have, as ever, been highly creative in attempting to square a circle that will never be squared. Like all smallish countries with ambitions in the world, Canada has had to be creative and efficient with limited resources. One can detect the native Canadian genius for frugality in many of the country's efforts, and in them lie significant lessons for European countries of a similar size and security tradition. The forging of the famous "3Ds"—diplomacy, defence, and development—into an integrated security concept are rightly admired far beyond Canada's borders. The disaster assistance response team (DART) concept is to be particularly commended, and has attracted the interest of several European countries.¹¹

When it comes to the armed forces, it has been the best of times and the worst of times. Some additional \$10 billion has been pumped into the Canadian armed forces since 1999 and the 2004 budget called for a further \$1.6 billion of additional money to be invested. At the very least, the operational tempo of Canadian forces demands the increase of 5000 regular personnel and 3000 reserves, and the government is rightly committed to this. The British can tell the Canadians a thing or two about overstretch and the problem of retention. The work of the Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2)—Canada's special operations forces who so distinguished themselves in Afghanistan—is particularly to be commended.

The creation of the new Canada Command will go a significant way towards improving the efficiency of Canada's armed forces across the broad range of missions to which it is committed. Moreover, the commitment to ensuring Canada's finest are "well-equipped to do the job" is long overdue.¹² Unfortunately, given the pressures on the Canadian economy and, indeed, the complex situation in Canadian politics, only a super optimist would be confident that the changes and investment called for will be translated into changes made and money spent. Moreover, given the appalling neglect of

¹¹ It should be noted that in a February 2005 speech delivered at Laval University, outgoing US Ambassador Paul Cellucci criticized Canada, saying that weak military spending by the federal government was preventing the DART delivery of relief in a timely fashion. See "Canada's DART response slowed by weak military spending: U.S. Ambassador," Canadian Press, 9 February 2005.

¹² Paul Martin, "Foreword," 3.

the 1990s, reform and modernization of the Canadian armed forces is starting from a very low base and it will be some years before they can operate to true effect alongside their more advanced British and American partners. In other words, the Canadian armed forces still have a long way to go if they are to close the gap not just with the Americans and their leading European allies, but also with stated ambitions “to defend Canada against all threats, to protect the northern portion of our continent and to preserve our sovereignty, including that of the Arctic.”¹³

Canadians should note that despite all the rhetoric of late (and the increases), Canada still spends one of the lowest percentiles of GDP on defence of any NATO member. Moreover, it will require much investment to overcome the relative and increasing obsolescence of the armed forces’ equipment after years of serial, wilful underfunding . Finally, there simply will not be enough well-equipped and well-supplied Canadian forces to undertake both the protection and projection missions called for by the international policy statement. These considerations must be providing food for thought at DND as it contemplates taking on a complex and potentially dangerous mission in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Canada’s men and women will of course do the superb job they always do, but running a provincial reconstruction team in that part of the world might well require an augmentation of the force that will be beyond Canada’s capabilities and could put the onus back on allies who are already committed elsewhere. In other words, Canadians would be well advised not to simply assume that better-equipped allies will step in if things go wrong.

It is therefore ironic that Canadian officials have warned Europeans against developing a European security and defence policy lest it undermine NATO. The greatest damage done to NATO has been by those countries that have steadfastly refused to invest in armed forces for the future, and sadly, Canada has been in the vanguard of these.

ENDING CANADA’S STRATEGIC SCHIZOPHRENIA

The result of the myriad internally and externally generated pressures on Canada is a foreign, security, and defence policy that is strategically schizophrenic along two lines of engagement. The first line concerns the pressure Canada has been placed under by allies. On the one hand, America is

¹³ Ibid., 2.

demanding that Canada buys into its overblown transformation concept and massive homeland security schemes. On the other hand, Europeans also put pressure on Canada as they steadily develop their own security concept for engagement in the world.

The second line of engagement concerns the pressure under which Canadians have placed themselves as the gap between the rhetoric of Canada's presence in the world and its reality has grown ever wider. Add to this Ottawa's determination to have the Canadian voice heard in all international forums, underpinned by Canadians' demand to see their armed forces all over the world, and it is not surprising that a force with a few great people, armed with a little bit of everything but not much of anything, is being sent to dangerous places ill-equipped and little protected.

All the solutions will cost money but the message of this article is simple. If Canada wants its voice heard in the world and if it wants to influence those partners and allies that matter to it, Canada must focus. Canada's neighbours will "do" continental security whether Canada invests in it or not. Indeed, the longest undefended border in the world will probably soon not be. Sovereignty protection? It is virtually meaningless in this day and age and in any case involves more criminal intelligence and robust policing than running expensive second-hand submarines under the Arctic. Modern states no longer defend long borders, they secure infrastructure critical to the functioning of complex societies.

Canada needs to refocus its foreign, security, and defence policies on getting the best bang for the Canadian buck in one area that will generate the most political and security and effect. Ottawa needs to achieve four things. First, it needs to maintain Canada's positive view of itself in the world for internal purposes. Second, it needs to maximize influence in key capitals, not just Washington. Third, it needs to maintain the vibrancy of its international alliance. Fourth, it needs to actually engage in a dangerous and complex world. Taken together, these four elements can forge the Canadian way of security. The defence policy review and the international policy statement are good beginnings but they are not ends in themselves. Success will need Canadians to reinvigorate their foreign policy, recapitalize their armed forces, and, above all, end the isolationism of the past decade by reengaging properly in all their strategic partnerships—not least with Europe.

From the perspective of the armed forces, Canada must focus on doing one thing and doing it exceptionally well. That means adding an effective

peacemaking string to Canada's peacekeeping bow. This is an opportunity for Canada. The 21st century will be the age of the networked multitask soldier, not the combat specialist beloved of the Americans, and that is Canada's tradition, just as it is Britain's. The Canada Command and the proposals to strengthen Canada's projection capability point in that direction, but Canada needs to go a lot further. Nothing short of a fully elaborated, cutting edge advanced expeditionary force will both buy Canada the influence it needs in key capitals *and* generate real capabilities on the ground. In other words, what is needed is a truly Canadian rapid reaction force (CRRF) that can stand alone, within the framework of the NATO response force, with a navy reconfigured to project it and sustain it, and an air force released from continental duties able to protect the deployed CRRF to effect. Of course, each of these units should be armed with the equipment of this century, not the last. Such a force will buy Canada the influence in both Washington and Europe that is frankly central to any Canadian security and defence policy. Moreover, Canada should move quickly to offer a battle group to the EU. Such a proposal would not only demonstrate Canada's interest in the ESDP but would also open up further options for Canada's security engagement. Too many Canadians dismiss the bumbling in Brussels as either irrelevant or injurious to the Alliance. On the contrary, the development of the European Union as an international security actor is as important to Canada as is American foreign and security policy.

Indeed, Canada might be geographically North American, but Canada's security culture, its way of doing business, and the size, shape, and doctrine of its armed forces are unmistakably European. Moreover, Canada will only ever operate as part of a coalition. The Americans will never be part of coalitions. They will lead, but never be part of them. Coalitions, as a way of aggregating security effect, are very much a European thing and Canada's natural security coworkers are European, not American.¹⁴

¹⁴ Douglas Bland states unequivocally: "Choosing among three obvious coalition leaders seems appropriate. Canada could continue its traditional emphasis in North America and Europe, to include perhaps, a broad definition of where Europe begins and ends, and emphasize operations with NATO. On the other hand, Canada might emphasize coalitions of the moment, usually formed under the direct auspices of the United States. Third, Canada might more closely identify its defence and foreign policy with American aims and programs and ally itself mainly with American-led coalitions. Each of these general options carries its own costs and benefits, and any decision where to go should be made in that context. "Canada and military coalitions: where, how and with whom?" *Policy Matters* (February 2002): 19-20.

RECONNECTING CANADA TO THE WORLD (VIA EUROPE)

Canada needs to make up its strategic mind. Canadians need to decide what it is that they need to do, want to do, and can do in this world. Clearly, the need to influence the United States will continue to be a cornerstone of Canadian policy. However, simply providing a small, marginal adjunct to America's enormous security effort will never really buy Canada influence in Washington. Make no mistake, the United States will ensure continental security whether Canada invests in it or not because the Americans will never rely upon others for their security.

The stakes are high. Allies and partners—both old and new—are watching to see if the stirrings in Ottawa amount to more than the empty security and defence rhetoric of the past decade. After years of effectively writing Canada off, expectations have now been raised and delivery is thus vital. Get it right and Canada will once again take the place its past sacrifice should have earned it as one of the west's leaders. Get it wrong, and Americans and Europeans alike will conclude that Canadians are not serious security actors and are all too happy to be carried along by their more energetic partners. That is why the defence policy review and international policy statement are more than just statements of intent. They are political affidavits against which Canada will be judged—by allies and partners as much as by its own citizens.

Thus, Canada faces some difficult security and defence choices that have to be made now. Canada cannot keep up with the Americans in extended homeland security unless Ottawa invests much more in the kind of doctrine, technologies, and agencies it is procuring. The decision not to participate in missile defence has sent a clear signal to Washington that Canada does not wish to play in its version of continental security, even if Ottawa says it does. Canada certainly cannot keep up with the Americans, British and/or French in the transformation of advanced expeditionary robust peacekeeping and peacemaking unless Canadians invest (and focus that investment) much more to get Canada's armed forces "there," keep them there, make them effective whilst there, protect them whilst there, and get them back again. Ask Washington and London. Make no mistake, Canada's major allies are transforming their armed forces and leaving those proud bearers of the maple leaf far behind.

And one other thought. There is no such thing as a peacekeeping force. The days of a few Canadian soldiers holding peace together armed with the power of the blue helmet and the maple leaf are past. Peacekeeping is des-

tined to become but a minor part of Canada's responsibilities. Peacekeeping forces will still be needed, but the strategic stabilization missions of the future demand a new form of engagement—"three-block robust peace enforcement"—in which one can be keeping the peace down one end of the street, making the peace in the middle, and fighting a war at the other end, all at the same time. That is what peacekeeping for a global NATO will entail, and if NATO really matters to Canadians it is the kind of capacity in which Canada must invest.

The world needs Canada. The Canadian way is invaluable because it is not American, British, or French. It is pragmatic, understated, and by and large ego-free. That is what has made the Canadian armed forces so effective in the past. The world has moved on, America has moved on, and so has Europe. Even we British set limits to our nostalgia. On a recent visit to Ottawa, this author was told that Canada had a right to be included in British security and defence thinking because Canadians are "family." That was then and this is now. Martin is right when he suggests that traditional powers are engineering new alliances and groupings. Equally, they are rediscovering and reinvesting in traditional alliances and groupings and in a world of such complexity that Canada's old relationships will matter as much to Canadians as the new. Canada will matter to the British as much as the British and other Europeans matter to Canada. Canada needs to reinvest in those relationships or partners will move on. As far as Canada's security and defence policy goes, with genuine and deep respect, the past was even more *then* and today is even more *now*. What matters to Canada's friends and allies is the present, not the past.

To conclude, it is worth reminding the Canadian government of its own ambitions as laid out in the 2004 foreign and defence policy review. "The Government has set an ambitious agenda for this country [that] includes restoring Canada's place in the world, strengthening Canada's relationship with the United States and enhancing the safety and security of Canadians. Defence will be an important player in helping the Government achieve its objectives and implement its priorities".¹⁵ Right on!

¹⁵ David Pratt, "Budget 2004," www.forces.gc.ca.