




National  
Défense

Défense  
nationale

# *Leadership* in the Canadian Forces

CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS



Canada

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005

Published under the auspices of the Chief of the Defence Staff by the  
Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute

NDID Number: A-PA-005-000/AP-004\*

This publication is available on-line at:  
Internet : <http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca>  
Intranet : <http://cda-acd.mil.ca>

Send comments to:  
Internet e-mail: [cflilc@forces.gc.ca](mailto:cflilc@forces.gc.ca)  
Intranet e-mail: [+cflilc@cda-acd@kingston](mailto:+cflilc@cda-acd@kingston)

Art Direction ADM(PA) DMCS CS04-0197


\* A-PA-005-000/AP-004 is the second of four leadership publications  
that supersede:

NDID: A-PD-131-001/PT-001, and NDID: A-PD-131-002/PT-001

## Effective leadership in the Canadian Forces is defined as:

Directing, motivating, and enabling others to accomplish the mission professionally and ethically, while developing or improving capabilities that contribute to mission success.

Effective CF leaders get the job done, look after their people, think and act in terms of the larger team, anticipate and adapt to change, and exemplify the military ethos in all they do.





# Foreword

*I have recently released the Leadership in the Canadian Forces (CF) Manual that represents the authoritative guidance for the training, education and practise of leadership doctrine in the CF today. That manual extends many of the key ideas about military professionalism contained in Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada. Effective leadership is a core capability, embodied by both our Officer and NCM Corps, essential for the transformation from an industrial to an information age force. CF leadership is a values-based concept, evoking the attributes of duty and honour and defined as: **directing, motivating and enabling others to accomplish the mission professionally and ethically, while developing or improving capabilities that contribute to mission success.** This is what I expect of the Officers, Warrant Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers assigned leadership responsibilities and also what the Government and Canadian people expect.*

The present volume, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* provides an extended discussion of the theories and ideas underpinning the doctrinal manual. It enriches the knowledge of practising leaders and represents the primary source for the development of leader training and education programs in all CF Centers of Excellence for Professional Development. It provides a broad conceptual understanding of military leadership and a systems overview of the requirements of leadership in the CF. Building on the doctrinal guidance provided in *Leadership in the Canadian Forces* and the framework presented in this manual, the applied aspects of leadership in the CF will be addressed in the manuals being developed for leaders at the tactical level and senior leaders at the operational and strategic levels. Reading and understanding the doctrine contained in *Leadership in the Canadian Forces* is mandatory for all members of the CF. I strongly encourage all leaders to be familiar with the foundation material found here in *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*.

**General Rick Hillier**  
*Chief of the Defence Staff*



# Table of Contents

<b>Preface</b> .....	<b>vii</b>
Purpose and Scope of Manual .....	vii
Application .....	ix
Office of Primary Interest .....	x
<b>Introduction – The Changing Context of CF Leadership</b> .....	<b>xi</b>
The Globalization Era .....	xi
A Changing Security Environment .....	xiii
A Changing Human Resource Environment .....	xiv
A Changing Public Environment .....	xv
Summary .....	xv
<b>Chapter 1 – Leadership Concepts</b> .....	<b>1</b>
A Systems Perspective .....	2
Major Leadership Functions .....	4
Individual and Distributed Leadership .....	6
Direct and Indirect Influence .....	6
The Nature of Leadership .....	7
Command, Management, and Leadership .....	8
Summary .....	13
<b>Chapter 2 – Values-Based Leadership</b> .....	<b>15</b>
Values and Behaviour .....	16
Essential Outcomes and Conduct Values .....	18
Values-Based Leadership and the Challenge of Competing Values .....	23
Values-Based Leadership in Practice .....	26
Effective CF Leadership Defined .....	30
Summary .....	31
Annex A: Derivation of the CF Effectiveness Framework .....	32

<b>Chapter 3 – Leadership and the Law</b> .....	<b>35</b>
The Rule of Law .....	36
Legal Framework for the Canadian Forces .....	37
The CF and Civil Authority .....	40
Self-regulation, Discipline, and the Exercise of Discretion .....	41
Obedience and the Rule of Law .....	42
Summary .....	44
<b>Chapter 4 – Responsibilities of CF Leaders</b> .....	<b>45</b>
General Responsibilities of CF Leaders .....	46
Functional Responsibilities of CF Leaders .....	48
Understanding and Accepting Leadership Responsibilities .....	52
Summary .....	54
Annex A: The “Principles of Leadership” in a Complex World .....	55
<b>Chapter 5 – Leader Power, Leader Characteristics, and Influence Behaviours</b> .....	<b>57</b>
Classes of Power .....	58
Leader Characteristics .....	60
Basic Influence Model .....	62
Achieving the Right Balance of Position and Personal Power .....	63
Influence Behaviours .....	64
Transformational Leadership and Related Concepts .....	67
Responses to Authority and Influence .....	72
The Importance of Trust .....	73
Summary .....	74
<b>Chapter 6 – Leading People: An Overview</b> .....	<b>75</b>
Reliable and Resilient Performance .....	76
The Leader-Follower-Situation Context .....	78
Developing Individual and Team/Unit Capabilities .....	79
Building Resilience .....	80
Instilling the Military Ethos .....	82
Improving Situational Favourability .....	84
Performing Tasks .....	88
Learning from Experience .....	93
Summary .....	95



<b>Chapter 7 - Leading the Institution: An Overview</b> .....	<b>97</b>
Requisite Capability .....	98
The Leader-System/Institution-Environment Context .....	99
The Strategic-Development Cycle .....	101
Adapting to the External Environment .....	104
Influencing the External Environment .....	109
Achieving Internal Alignment .....	111
Stewardship of the Profession .....	115
Summary .....	118
<b>Chapter 8 – CF Leadership Model and Philosophy</b> .....	<b>119</b>
Integrative CF Leadership Model .....	120
CF Philosophy of Leadership .....	122
Supporting Conditions .....	124
<b>Glossary</b> .....	<b>129</b>
<b>References and Additional Reading</b> .....	<b>135</b>

### List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1-1	Systems view of institutional performance and effectiveness .....	3
Figure 1-2	Major CF leadership functions in relation to rank .....	4
Figure 1-3	Relative importance of direct and indirect influence to leadership functions .....	7
Figure 1-4	Inter-relationships of command, management, and leadership .....	11
Table 1-1	Relationship of major leadership functions to levels of conflict and command .....	12
Figure 2-1	CF effectiveness framework .....	19
Figure 2-2	Elements of values-based leadership .....	24
Figure 2A-1	Competing Values Model of organizational effectiveness .....	33
Figure 2A-2	Positive and negative value zones .....	34
Table 4-1	Responsibilities of CF leaders as they relate to major functions and effectiveness dimensions .....	48
Table 4A-1	Equivalence between traditional leadership principles and the responsibilities in Table 4-1 .....	55
Figure 5-1	Basic process model of power- and values-based influence .....	62
Figure 5-2	Spectrum of leader influence behaviours .....	64
Figure 6-1	The leader-follower-situation framework .....	78
Figure 6-2	Generic task cycle .....	89
Table 6-1	Elements of adaptive performance management .....	92
Figure 7-1	The leader-system/institution-environment framework .....	99
Figure 7-2	Generic strategic-development cycle .....	102
Table 7-1	The eight most common reasons why organizational change efforts fail .....	108
Figure 7-3	Hypothetical values-based measurement model .....	114
Table 7-2	Culture-embedding mechanisms .....	116
Figure 8-1	Integrative CF leadership model .....	121



# Preface

## Purpose and Scope of Manual

This manual is intended to provide experienced leaders at all levels in the Canadian Forces (CF) with a broad conceptual understanding of military leadership and a systems overview of the requirements of leadership in the CF. As such, it serves as both a guidance document and a single-source instructional reference for Officer and Non-Commissioned Member (NCM) leadership education. Building on the doctrinal guidance provided in *Leadership in the CF* and the conceptual framework presented in this manual, the applied aspects of leadership in the CF will be addressed in the manuals being developed for leaders at the tactical/operational level and leaders at the strategic level.

While military leadership has many things in common with leadership as it is practiced in other organizations and settings, leadership in the CF is also unique. Leadership in the CF is premised on the performance of a critical societal function – ensuring the defence and security of Canada and Canadians through the controlled application of military capabilities. These include, but are not limited to, capabilities in surveillance, communications, command and control, weapons systems, operational procedures, military tactics and strategy, transport, engineering, logistics, and so on. In performing this function, CF leaders are also expected to

serve and reflect the ideals of Canadian military professionalism, which include the values that Canada stands for as a liberal-democratic and progressive society. The treatment of leadership in this manual is thus an elaboration of the theme, duty with honour, which is the subject of the CF manual on the profession of arms in Canada. From this institutional perspective, which draws together functional and professional considerations, this manual thus emphasizes both *what* CF leadership is about and *how* the role should be performed.

**“The fundamental purpose of the Canadian profession of arms is the ordered, lawful application of military force pursuant to governmental direction.”**

*Duty with Honour:  
The Profession of Arms in Canada*

Why a new leadership manual now? Admittedly, many of the time-tested adages and principles of military leadership that have evolved in previous centuries continue to remain valid for what some are calling the post-industrial or post-modern era. There is a high degree of behavioural consistency in the history and practice of managing violence.

**“In any Army, in any time, the purpose of ‘leadership’ is to get the job done. Competent military leaders develop trust, focus effort, clarify objectives, inspire confidence, build teams, set the example, keep hope alive, rationalize sacrifice. For this century or the next, there is little mystery about requisite leader competencies or behaviors. Desirable qualities and skills may vary a bit, but the basic formula for leader success has changed little in 2,000 years.”**

Lieutenant-General (ret’d) Walter F. Ulmer Jr., US Army  
In *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence* 4<sup>th</sup> ed.

In spite of the continuity evident in the basic requirements of military leadership, lessons learned during the transition from the Cold War years and the recognition of many new leadership challenges in an altered strategic and social environment revealed that the CF leadership manuals written more than 30 years ago were lacking in some respects. Changed circumstances dictated that a more comprehensive and forward-looking approach be undertaken to leader development in the CF.

**“Peace, conflict and war have evolved and converged. War is no longer a legitimate way for us to pursue interests in many circumstances, yet it will recur. The uncertain future environment puts a premium on a broad understanding of politics, economics, military affairs, and information in the context of our own society, and those we deal with. Soldiers cannot expect to be successful if they confine themselves to the study of military or technical subjects.”**

Major David Last

*In Contemporary Issues in Officership: A Canadian Perspective*

Taken together, *Officership 2020* and *NCM Corps 2020* substantiate and provide strategic guidance for the development of the CF leadership cadre over the next decade and beyond. This leadership manual is one element of the strategic program of leadership reform that was launched to enhance leader capabilities for a variety of new and expanded roles. It contains a key part of the common body of knowledge all military professionals (Officers and NCMs, Regulars and Primary Reservists) are expected to master, and should contribute to the design of progressively structured CF leader-development programs.

- The Introduction provides a thumbnail sketch of the changing context of CF leadership, highlighting the major factors that are currently reshaping the practice of military leadership.

- Chapter 1 describes the broad functions of CF leadership in relation to institutional effectiveness, distinguishes between direct and indirect influence, provides a generic definition of leadership as an influence process, and examines leadership in relation to command and management.
- Chapter 2 introduces the CF concept of values-based leadership. The model integrates the functional and professional requirements of CF leadership and leads directly and logically to a formal definition of effective CF leadership. It is important to note that the institutional values discussed in this chapter represent *the common dimensions of CF leadership* and, therefore, apply to *all Officer and NCM leadership levels and ranks*.
- Chapter 3 extends the discourse on values-based leadership with an explanation of the ‘rule of law’ and a summary of CF leader obligations under the Constitution, statutory law, military law, international law, and the law of armed conflict.
- Chapter 4 elaborates on the meaning of effective CF leadership by specifying, for each major dimension of institutional effectiveness, the basic duties and responsibilities associated with the functions of leading people and leading the institution. Traditional ‘principles of leadership’ are included in this discussion. In contrast to the focus on common values in Chapter 2, this chapter shows how CF leadership is *differentiated across organizational levels and positions*.
- Chapter 5 shifts attention from the content, or *what*, of leadership to a series of chapters dealing with the processes, or *how*, of leadership. The chapter provides a summary of desirable leader characteristics and the various kinds of position power and personal power that are the sources of leader influence. This is followed by an overview of the influence behaviours that make up the spectrum of influence, including the pattern of influence behaviours described as *transformational leadership*.

- Chapter 6 expands on the topic of leadership processes and sketches out the 'leading people' function in relation to its task orientation and the operational requirement for *high reliability performance*. With reference to the *leader-follower-situation* framework and the focus on tasks, the chapter provides an overview of the major processes by which tactical- and operational-level leaders generate high-reliability performance: developing individual and team/unit capabilities, building resilience, instilling the CF ethos, improving situational favourability, and adaptively managing performance in the conduct of operational missions and other tasks.
- Chapter 7 provides a parallel overview of institutional leadership processes, based on a general discussion of the criterion of *requisite capability* and the *leader-system/institution-environment* framework. With reference to senior leader responsibilities for strategic and professional capability development, the chapter discusses the major processes by which senior leaders influence CF effectiveness: adapting to the external environment, influencing the external environment, achieving the internal alignment of CF systems, and exercising stewardship of the profession.
- Chapter 8 integrates concepts and material presented in previous chapters in a comprehensive systems model of CF leadership; the model is a variation and extension of Gary Yukl's Multiple-Linkage Model of leadership and group effectiveness. The remainder of the chapter outlines the CF philosophy of leadership under the rubric of *values-based distributed leadership*.
- The Glossary defines key terms that appear in the text of the manual in ***bold italic*** font.

## APPLICATION

Throughout the manual, there is considerably more emphasis on conceptual frameworks, theories, and principles than on rote lists, leadership formulas, or behavioural scripts. While drills and standard procedures work superbly in routine task environments and predictable situations, they tend to limit effectiveness in novel problem situations and in disorderly unpredictable environments. In these latter circumstances, an understanding of principles and concepts is the key to creative and adaptive behaviour. It seems a reasonable assumption that, in the kind of complex changing environment in which the CF will be operating for the next decade or more, leaders will have to be more analytical, flexible, and creative. This manual, therefore, has something to say to CF leaders at all levels about leadership as an adaptive capability and function, but should be especially helpful to experienced leaders (Officers in Developmental Periods 2 to 5, NCMs in Developmental Periods 3 to 5) in rounding out their understanding of the theoretical foundations of leadership. Because of the emphasis on the antecedents, behavioural dimensions, and consequences of effective CF leadership, it should also be of particular interest to staffs involved in leader selection, development, and evaluation.

Some people object to the use of causal models, behavioural analysis, and other systematic efforts to identify underlying regularities in leadership. Quite rightly, they claim that such knowledge will not necessarily make someone a leader, just as the mere knowledge of the principles of flight and flight rules will not make someone a pilot. On the other hand, to assert that leadership somehow defies rational analysis, or to otherwise perpetuate a leadership mystique, is not helpful. Leadership is a practical performing art, prized in military forces because of its decisive effects in preparing people for, and getting them through, trying circumstances. The point worth contemplating, however, is that leaders make use of everyday processes of relationship building and social influence to get things done. Hence, an understanding of these processes and insight into how they might be most appropriately applied can improve individual and collective performance.

It is the thesis of this manual that, as with any art, theory has practical value, and can help people who already have an interest in leading and some talent for the role to be more effective as leaders. The manual attempts to strike a balance, therefore, between the “technical” and “heroic” dimensions of military leadership. It is hoped that the concepts presented and discussed in the manual will stimulate the professional thinking of CF members who already occupy leadership positions or who otherwise aspire to lead. It is also hoped that the examples of effective military leadership illustrated throughout the manual will inspire leaders in training to be good leaders and the many fine leaders currently serving in the CF to be even better leaders.

## OFFICE OF PRIMARY INTEREST

The Director of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute is responsible for the content, production, and publication of this manual. Suggestions and queries may be forwarded to:

Director  
Canadian Forces Leadership Institute  
Canadian Defence Academy PO Box 17000 STN FORCES  
Kingston ON K7K 7B4

## Copyright Acknowledgements

The Canadian Forces gratefully acknowledges the permission of the following publishers to reprint the referenced historical vignettes:

Hyperion/Miramax Books, New York, for the passage in Chapter 6 from Rudolph Giuliani, *Leadership* (2002).

Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, for the passage in Chapter 6 from Commander (ret'd) Richard A. Lane, “The Fog of War: A Personal Experience of Command,” in Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau (editors), *The Human in Command* (2000).

McClelland & Stewart, Toronto, for the passage in Chapter 2 from George G. Blackburn, *The Guns of Normandy* (1995).

McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, for the passage in Chapter 5 from Allan English, *The Cream of the Crop* (1996).

Random House of Canada, Toronto, for the excerpts in Chapters 2 and 6 from Blake Heathcote, *Testaments of Honour* (2002), and for the passage in Chapter 8 from Pierre Berton, *Vimy* (2001).

Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, for the passage in Chapter 4 from Rear-Admiral D.E. Miller, “The Naval Commander in Joint Operations in the Gulf War, “ in Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris (editors), *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral* (2001).

# Introduction

## The Changing Context of CF Leadership

As reflected in a broad array of tasks across the spectrum of conflict, the mission of the Canadian Forces (CF) is to defend Canada and Canadian interests while contributing to international peace and security. Leadership in the CF is about serving this mission. Whether Officers and NCMs are formally appointed to positions of responsibility and authority or temporarily assume leadership roles, the primary duty of CF leaders, broadly speaking, is to use their authority and influence to accomplish the defence mission in a professional manner. Leaders in the CF have related and correspondingly broad duties to build an internally co-ordinated and cohesive institution, to take care of the men and women who serve in the CF, and to develop, adapt, and improve military capabilities in the face of changing conditions and emerging challenges.

The world has undergone a number of significant alterations since the end of the Cold War and these changes have, in turn, affected the role requirements and practice of leadership in the CF. New leader responsibilities, requiring new or enhanced competencies, have arisen as a result of globalization, changes in the security environment, a changing human resource environment, and a changing public environment.

## THE GLOBALIZATION ERA

**“The globalization system, unlike the Cold War system, is not frozen, but a dynamic ongoing process. That’s why I define globalization this way: it is the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before – in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before, and in a way that is enabling the world to reach into individuals, corporations and nation-states farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before.”**

Thomas L. Friedman  
*The Lexus and the Olive Tree*

In his 1999 book, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, Thomas Friedman explains the changeover from the Cold War world – and the way that system of power, ideas, and technologies shaped the domestic and international politics and commerce of just about every country in the world – to a new international system that goes by the name of “globalization.” Made possible by a confluence of ideas, technologies, and structures of power, globalization has also ushered in new capabilities and new threats. Microchips, computers, satellite communications, digitization, the miniaturization of technology, fibre optics, the Internet, and other information technologies have made the world more interconnected and have given individuals, organizations, and states unprecedented reach. Information travels faster and further, has greater potential for influencing at a distance, and demands quicker responses. According to Friedman, unlike the stark dualism and ponderous posturing that characterized the bipolar Cold War world, globalization’s dominant features are integration, dynamism, and speed. Industrial and military power, formerly measured in mass and weight, are now

measured in speed and agility. Meanwhile, Cold War fears of nuclear annihilation have given way to anxieties about rapid change, individual and organizational obsolescence, and the lethal potential of globally networked individuals and groups operating outside the structure and authority of the nation state.

In the domain of defence and security, there have been two major effects of globalization and its enabling technologies. First, within the battle space, however broadly or narrowly defined, it has made large amounts of information and a common operating picture more readily available to all organizational levels. This capability cuts two ways. In many scenarios, information capabilities make it possible for military leaders to decide and act quickly, and also to simplify co-ordination and delegate decision-making authority down the chain of command so that subordinate commanders can also act independently and quickly if and when necessary. On the other hand, it provides an improved facility to centralize information and decision-making (i.e., to micro-manage). Whether requirements for increased responsiveness will result in new forms of military organization and methods of exercising control (e.g., swarm systems<sup>1</sup>) remains to be seen, but the complex adaptability envisaged by some military theorists may not be achievable within traditional hierarchies or under a philosophy of highly centralized authority and decision-making. According to one view of the future military organization, the new operating environment will oblige leaders to rely less on the exercise of formal authority within an inflexible hierarchy, and more and more on informal networked communications and decentralized decision-making. These conditions and requirements clearly heighten the importance of *mission command* and *distributed leadership*<sup>2</sup> practices to effective functioning. The latter idea simply means that people at all levels are assumed to have some capacity for leadership, that they have the situational awareness to make informed judgments, and that they possess sufficient *professionalism* to take the initiative and assume a leadership role if and when circumstances require.

**“A robustly networked force will greatly improve information sharing, allowing decentralized and dispersed forces to more efficiently communicate, manoeuvre and conduct non-contiguous operations. It will be able to share a common awareness and understanding of both the battle space and the commander’s intent. Greatly enhanced peer-to-peer interactions and a rich array of connectivity will increase agility and innovative low-level problem solving abilities through shared lessons-learned and best practices.”**

CF Strategic Operating Concept

Second, and more generally, the new “Fast World” created by globalization has, as Friedman and others have noted, created a backlash among those crushed, displaced, or left behind by rapid and ruthlessly competitive change. Even in the developed world, there are many who are critical of globalization’s impoverishing and anti-democratic effects<sup>3</sup> or who otherwise resent globalization’s undermining of traditional power relationships, social structures, and values. Ironically, the very democratization of technology, finance, and information which globalization has created has also provided its critics and disaffected groups with asymmetric capabilities that they can adapt to either legitimate opposition or violent purposes.

**“Because globalization has brought down many of the walls that limited the movement and reach of people, and because it has simultaneously wired the world into networks, it gives more power to individuals to influence both markets and nation-states than at any time in history.... Some of these Super-empowered individuals are quite angry, some of them quite wonderful – but all of them are now able to act directly on the world stage.”**

Thomas Friedman  
*The Lexus and the Olive Tree*

<sup>1</sup> A swarm is a collection of autonomous members (e.g., flock of birds, swarm of insects) which behave in a co-ordinated way even though no particular member exercises control. As described by Thomas Adams, swarm systems have four characteristic features: they are self-organizing; there is little or no central control; sub-units are autonomous; and there is high connectivity among sub-units. “The Real Military Revolution,” *Parameters*, Autumn 2000.

<sup>2</sup> These terms and other terms that appear in bold italics can be found in the Glossary.

<sup>3</sup> For a critique of misguided globalization strategies, see especially Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and its Discontents* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: W.W. Norton), 2003.



## A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

**“Particularly influential trends include asymmetric warfare, the proliferation of WMD [weapons of mass destruction], and continuing instability and conflict around the globe.”**

*Military Assessment 2002*

Over the past decade or so, the unambiguous threat posed by the former Soviet Union and the stable balance of nuclear terror that characterized the Cold War have been displaced by a ‘new world disorder’ of latent threats, regional instability, and loosely networked anarchy. Historical enmities between countries and peoples have persisted in several regions, as has the threat of war between states. Technology has raised the security stakes by making it possible for even Third World nations to arm themselves with nuclear and biological weapons. Meanwhile, warfare has also undergone a major devolution – from nation-states to other entities. For example, ethnic conflicts within states involving regulars, irregular militias, and armed gangs have become more frequent and more vicious, in some corners of the world transforming the machete into a weapon of mass destruction. The parties involved in these conflicts too often show no regard for the law of armed conflict or other moral restraints, and the resulting genocides, ethnic cleansings, and man-made refugee problems create strong pressures for military-stabilization and humanitarian interventions. Similarly, fanatical cults and terrorist groups, some with global reach, attack both military and civilian targets, spreading fear and anxiety, upsetting the global economy, and necessitating extensive and costly security measures. Globally disruptive conflicts within states and threats of indiscriminate destruction by fringe groups and organizations have become normal features of the post-Cold War world.

**“Whether universally popular or not, there is growing recognition worldwide that the protection of human security, including human rights and human dignity, must be one of the fundamental objectives of modern international institutions.”**

International Commission on Intervention  
and State Sovereignty  
*The Responsibility to Protect*

What has remained constant for the CF throughout this transformation and expansion of warfare is the requirement to assure Canada’s security. What is different is that the array of threats has become broader and the frontiers of national security have moved outward and gone global. These developments have strengthened the argument for continuing to contribute to peace and security abroad. Defending Canada and contributing to international peace and security constitute the stated role of the CF, and by extension, are the chief responsibilities of the men and women in uniform who provide its leadership. Military leadership has never been an easy undertaking, but in today’s strategic, military, social, and domestic environments, it has become an especially complex and demanding activity.

In the operational arena, things that used to be distinct and separate, like peacekeeping and warfighting, have become blended activities and often also involve political, humanitarian, and nation-building dimensions. Operational forces are typically multi-national in their structure, and task-force commanders must also work in co-operation with other government departments, security forces, civil agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Reflecting these new realities, the CF Strategic Operating Concept identifies as a fundamental principle the ability to conceptualize, plan, and conduct operations within a joint, inter-agency, multi-national, and public framework.

**“While the role of the commander in an armed conflict is vitally important for victory, in the context of a limited war the commander must come to terms with an environment that can be described as confining and complex. As part of his ‘battle space’, a commander must now confront the refusal to accept any deaths – the casualty-aversion syndrome that is pervasive in American culture – as well as political constraints or interference in the conduct of the war, and the quest for a clean war without collateral damage or civilian victims.”**

Colonel Alain Boyer  
“Leadership and the Kosovo Air Campaign”

Hence, whether engaged in combined, joint, or inter-agency operations, military leaders are obliged to strive for cultural, as well as technical and doctrinal, *interoperability*. They have to be open to new knowledge and different points of view, respect differences, and be able to influence others on the basis of principles and strong interpersonal skills. Because decisions and actions taken at the tactical level can have strategic consequences, they must be skilled in reconciling politically constrained mandates with the pull of moral instincts. They must also be able to balance the freedom of military action granted under a mission-command philosophy with the restrictions imposed by sometimes complex rules of engagement. The authority of command and technical proficiency, once considered adequate for Cold War-era leader development, are not enough in today's environment. The CF needs a new type of military professional and leader, one in whom the qualities of the warrior-technician are supplemented with the skills of the soldier-diplomat. The CF needs leaders – both commissioned and non-commissioned – who are broadly educated, who understand this new interconnected and volatile world, and who are expert in conflict resolution in its broadest sense – from traditional warfighting to humanitarian and nation-building interventions.

**“The continuing revolutions in the areas of global conflict, societal values, resource management, and especially in information and technology, all demand that the officer of tomorrow possess the knowledge and skills to be an integral component of a new multi-disciplined knowledge-based generation of leaders. It seems obvious that rigorous intellectual development is becoming the overriding, if not the governing factor in the operational and corporate success and effectiveness of the future Canadian Officer Corps.”**

Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Roméo Dallaire  
Foreword to *Contemporary Issues in Officership:  
A Canadian Perspective*

## **A CHANGING HUMAN RESOURCE ENVIRONMENT**

In addition to adapting to new operational requirements, CF leaders must also adjust to the changing characteristics of the recruit pool and the equally shifting composition of the armed forces. Over the past several decades, the demographic make-up of Canada has become less Western European and more ethnically and racially diverse. In accommodating ethno-cultural value differences, the challenge for CF leaders is to promote a common understanding and acceptance of the military's professional values, especially as they relate to Canadian civic values. The CF recruit population is also becoming more varied in terms of age and marital status. The traditional youth recruitment base is shrinking, competition in the labour market is increasing, and the CF has had to make an effort to attract older and often better-qualified applicants. Meanwhile, social attitudes among Canadians have become more liberal and individually focused, largely as a result of social legislation, continuing upward trends in educational attainment, and improved access to information. One parallel development is that trust in public institutions and deference to authority are down, while independent judgment and awareness of individual and minority rights are up. Taken together, these changes mean that, to be effective in building individual commitment and teamwork, leaders will have to demonstrate strong interpersonal skills, a willingness to be open and candid with their subordinates, and behaviour that is both mindful of differences in maturity and conscientious in addressing individual and group concerns.

**“Today's soldiers are older and better educated than their World War II counterparts. Most are married, have children, and are more than capable of making their own decisions; they therefore expect and demand that their experience, expertise, and professionalism be respected.”**

Colonel Mike Capstick  
In *The Human in Command*

## A CHANGING PUBLIC ENVIRONMENT

In contrast to the ambivalence and low level of interest generally displayed by the Canadian public and the national media toward the CF during the Cold War, recent years have witnessed an increase in the attention paid to the military. A number of factors have contributed to this turnabout, not least of which are the general decline in privilege of public institutions, improvements in communications, and greatly enhanced access to official information and documents. More to the point, scandals relating to a number of serious professional failures and several reported weaknesses in the treatment and support of CF members not only provoked public concern about the internal management of the CF but have resulted in closer scrutiny of its functioning. On the other hand, the political and human-interest aspects of peace-support operations, the successes of CF units and contingents on these assignments, and the costs in lives and distress associated with such operations have elicited considerable public appreciation and support. This recent period of history underscores for all military leaders the important linkage between professionalism and public image, trust, and confidence.

## SUMMARY

Today's leaders in the CF must deliver on a broad range of demanding operational roles within a limited resource base, must continue to strive for a common identity and teamwork within a more varied and complicated human resource landscape, and must also satisfy heightened expectations of military professionalism. And all this must be accomplished in the context of traditional defence responsibilities.

In his classic work, *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington wrote that the military professional is by necessity a conservative realist, who sees the inherent weaknesses of human nature as the primary cause of conflict, and the

persistence of conflict in human history as the incontestable rationale for maintaining strong military forces. This is the continuing business of CF leaders – resolving conflict through preventive interventions if possible and force of arms when necessary, and developing the necessary military capabilities that will assure the CF's success in its military assignments. There is little indication that the need for either of these competencies will soon become obsolete, even in a rapidly changing world.

**“In the twenty-first century, realism is appropriate to a Hobbesian world in which there is no global Leviathan monopolizing the use of force to punish the Unjust.... The world is still a place where various powers representing different values and different degrees of altruism compete – often violently.”**

Robert Kaplan  
*Warrior Politics*

**“War and defense remain the ultimate rationale of nation states. One of the dubious clichés of our time is that globalization is undermining this rationale. A new interdependence might be emerging in the economic realm, but there is no discernible alternative to the nation state as the chief provider of foreign and domestic security for human populations. Commerce may be borderless, but human beings cannot be. They need secure territories to live in, and these can only be provided by states with monopolies over the legitimate use of force.”**

Michael Ignatieff  
*Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*



# Leadership Concepts



A Systems Perspective .....	2
Major Leadership Functions .....	4
Individual and Distributed Leadership .....	6
Direct and Indirect Influence .....	6
The Nature of Leadership .....	7
Command, Management, and Leadership .....	8

# 1 Leadership Concepts

The effectiveness of the CF in fulfilling the defence mission depends on many capabilities – including but not limited to information and weapons technologies, force structure and organization, equipment and personnel support systems, operational doctrine and training, the skills and commitment of both people in uniform and those who support them, communications and teamwork, and how capably all of these elements are integrated and commanded. Leadership contributes to CF effectiveness through all these dimensions, but in qualitatively different ways.

**“Leadership is at the service of collective effectiveness.”**

Stephen Zaccaro & Richard Klimoski  
*The Nature of Organizational Leadership*

In this chapter, we briefly consider leadership from five different but jointly supporting points of view:

- The *systems perspective*<sup>4</sup> of performance and effectiveness highlights the pervasiveness of leader influence. Leaders obviously influence people within their teams and units but they also influence group, unit, and organizational characteristics that contribute to performance and effectiveness. Likewise, they can influence the general environment in which their team, unit, or the CF functions. These ideas are subsequently taken up in the discussion of *direct* and *indirect influence*.
- *Stratified systems theory* is used to distinguish between the major functions of leading people in the accomplishment of

day-to-day missions and tasks and *leading the institution* by developing and sustaining the strategic and professional capabilities needed by the CF to meet future challenges.

- Leader effectiveness is usually assessed through the lens of *individual* effort and accomplishment. A complementary and arguably more powerful notion is introduced in this chapter and is periodically alluded to throughout the manual. This idea emphasizes the importance of a cohesive and professional leadership *team* to maintaining unity of effort.
- The general definition of leadership as a *goal-directed process of social influence* is used to tease out its essential characteristics – the kinds of influence implicated, the role played by intent, who can be a leader, and what criteria should be considered in evaluating leadership.
- Finally, leadership is considered in relation to the concepts of *command* and *management* – how influencing others can, and normally does, make use of the broad formal authority that typifies command and management, and how influencing others can also occur independently of formal authority and organizational position.

## A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE


Organizational theory regards individual and collective performance and effectiveness in organizations as the products of three different categories of variables: *individual* characteristics, *group* characteristics, and *organizational* or *institutional* characteristics. Performance and effectiveness are obviously affected by the skills, abilities, and other personal qualities that individuals contribute to their work groups and to the organization as a whole. Various group characteristics – structure, communication patterns, group leadership, and so on – also either function as force multipliers or, if they are not optimal, as encumbrances on individual and group performance. Similarly, features common to the entire organization (or institution) – its technology, operational doctrine, and HR policies – can enhance or hinder performance and effectiveness.

<sup>4</sup> As described in general systems theory, a system is any physical, mechanical, organic, social, or other entity that maintains its existence through the *mutual interaction* of its parts and whose *emergent properties* are greater than the sum of its parts.

Based on these ideas, Figure 1-1 provides a notional systems view of institutional performance and effectiveness as it might apply to the CF. The term *institution* is used here in the sociological sense of an enduring social structure possessing a distinctive set of *norms* and *values* and designed to serve some broad role in social life. If we distinguish between generic *organizational* characteristics arising from the CF's functional role, and *professional* attributes reflected in the CF's distinctive values and norms, the institution can be viewed as incorporating both.<sup>5</sup>

As suggested by Figure 1-1, *leadership*, whether examined at the group/unit level or at the strategic level, is only one of many variables that contribute to collective performance. On the other hand, *leaders* not only influence people, as their role is conventionally understood, but they also create and shape group and institutional characteristics.

**Figure 1-1 | Systems view of institutional performance and effectiveness.**



<sup>5</sup> By this definition, the CF and each of the Environmental Commands can be considered institutions. As Canadian military history up to unification shows, each of the former navy, army, and air Services functioned as self-sufficient organizations performing a broad professional role in society.

This systems perspective of performance and effectiveness helps to reveal the major levers that CF leaders can use to influence performance and effectiveness. Leaders can influence individual characteristics, group/unit characteristics, and institutional characteristics. At least, this is the leader's role internal to the group, unit, or CF. However, if we think of the group, unit, or CF as an *open system*, that is, as a system that interacts with its external environment in various ways, then we see that leaders can also influence individuals, agencies, and circumstances beyond the boundaries of their group, unit, or the CF (this is the leader's *boundary-spanning* role). Thus, while leaders are formed and conditioned by their social environment and culture to a significant degree, it is also true that they may reflexively shape and modify their environment. A leader's influence, in other words, is potentially without limit, and a great leader may transform a nation, the world, or history itself.

## MAJOR LEADERSHIP FUNCTIONS

According to *stratified systems theory*, leader functions differ according to the increasing complexity of tasks that occurs from the bottom to the top levels, or strata, of an organization. Tasks increase in complexity because of the greater variety of responsibilities encountered, the larger number of factors and their interactions to be considered, more uncertainties, and longer time spans of activity. For example, in the CF, there are obvious differences between what CF leaders at junior rank levels do (team, section, sub-unit) and what leaders at more senior ranks do (formation, Command, National Defence Headquarters). These differences are directly related to the scope and complexity of responsibility, size of unit led, and the time horizon for planning and action.

At lower-to-middle and some senior levels of CF rank and leadership, the primary function of most Officers and NCMs is to develop and execute near-term plans and to solve real-time problems through others. They perform tasks and accomplish missions. The dominant form of leadership involves 'leading troops' – that is, exercising direct, face-to-face influence on individuals, teams, units, and higher formations in the execution of operations and implementation of policy. In the main, we can characterize this function of the leadership cadre as *leading people*. Hence the individual attributes and competencies selected for and developed in the initial and subsequent stages of a CF leader's career should concentrate on those capabilities required for leading teams, units, and higher formations.

Conversely, at senior rank levels, the responsibility and authority to oversee system performance, develop system capabilities, and make major policy, system, and organizational changes usually increase. Moreover, the circle of people subject to routine directive leadership typically gets smaller, often limited to immediate subordinates and staff, while the collegial network on the other hand gets bigger. We can characterize the primary function of senior leaders, as well as middle-rank Officers and some Chief Warrant Officers employed on higher-level staffs, as anticipating and creating the conditions necessary for operational success and CF effectiveness, or *leading the institution*. Senior leaders sustain and develop strategic (and professional) capabilities. It follows that the competencies and skills developed in CF leaders who show potential for senior command and staff positions should be those needed for the effective performance of strategic functions.

**Figure 1-2 | Major CF leadership functions in relation to rank.**



Figure 1-2 provides a schematic representation of these broad leadership functions and how they are roughly distributed by rank level. It must be emphasized that the correlation between rank and leadership function is not perfect. For example, some officers at very senior ranks may be called upon to act as operational force commanders – a leading people function. Equally, some officers at intermediate rank levels may have duties that support strategic activities and objectives. Furthermore, between the end-points of this functional continuum, there is a transitional zone in which CF leaders may be more or less equally engaged in both functions. They may have responsibilities for the routine



face-to-face direction of large staffs and, additionally, for *managing organizational systems* or sub-systems which support or contribute to strategic CF capabilities.

**Leading people involves developing individual, team, and unit capabilities and using those capabilities to execute tasks and missions.**

**Leading the institution is about developing and maintaining the CF's strategic and professional capabilities and creating the conditions for operational success.**

## LEADING PEOPLE

"In Holland on the night of 25<sup>th</sup>-26<sup>th</sup> February, 1945, the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada launched an attack on the hamlet of Mooshof, to capture ground which was considered essential for the development of future operations.

Sergeant [Aubrey] Cosens' platoon, with two tanks in support, attacked enemy strongpoints in three farm buildings, but were twice beaten back by fanatical enemy resistance then fiercely counter-attacked, during which time the platoon suffered heavy casualties and the platoon commander was killed. Sergeant Cosens at once assumed command of his platoon, whom he placed in a position to give him covering fire, while he himself ran across open ground under heavy mortar and shell fire to the one remaining tank, where, regardless of danger, he took up an exposed place in front of the turret and directed his fire.

After a further enemy counter-attack had been repulsed, Sergeant Cosens ordered the tank to attack the farm buildings, while the four survivors of his platoon followed in close support. After the tank had rammed the first building, he entered it alone, killing several of the defenders and taking the rest prisoners. Single-handed he then entered the second and third buildings, and personally killed or captured all the occupants...

The outstanding gallantry, initiative and determined leadership of this brave N.C.O. ...resulted in the capture of a position which was vital to the success of future operations of the Brigade."

Victoria Cross Citation

## LEADING THE INSTITUTION

"Vice-Admiral Harold Taylor Wood Grant, CBE, DSO, CD, took command of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) as the fifth Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) on 1 September 1947 when it was at its lowest ebb of the post-war period.

Grant faced the daunting task of rebuilding the peacetime Canadian Navy into an effective force with recruits from a society and for a nation that had both been transformed substantially by the Second World War. During his four year tenure, he would adopt Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) as the Navy's primary role and inaugurate the construction of a new fleet of Canadian designed destroyer escorts. These decisions set the course for a rapid expansion of the Navy to meet the challenges of the Cold War and large commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Grant also had to overcome severe personnel problems and reorient the administrative and cultural structure of the Navy to meet the demand for change....

He readily embraced the new commitments to NATO and the ASW role for the RCN. He was particularly vigorous in his efforts to improve professional opportunities, conditions of service, and welfare for the sailors and their families.... Grant made the difficult transition to an American orientation during his tenure as CNS... This was particularly evident in Grant's decisions to sustain naval aviation, to introduce USN standards of habitability in ships, and to adopt USN tactical doctrine and communications procedures."

Captain (N) Wilfred G. Lund  
In *Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders*

## INDIVIDUAL AND DISTRIBUTED LEADERSHIP

Another way of thinking about how leaders contribute to CF effectiveness is to distinguish between the efforts and accomplishments of singular individuals who stand out in times of danger or crisis and the combined effect of a competent leadership cadre broadly and deeply distributed throughout the organization. Conventional ideas about leaders and their influence on people and organizations tend to focus on heroic individuals and their efforts to alter circumstances or shape events in a dramatic way. But no one person can master and control everything in a large and complex organization such as the CF, nor is it reasonable to expect anyone to do so. From time to time, outstanding individual leaders will make substantial contributions to the CF, but, over the long haul, the effectiveness of the institution will depend more on developing in breadth and depth a strong Officer-NCM *leadership team* with a shared sense of responsibility, professional identity, values, and purpose.

Distributed leadership is about sharing the responsibilities of leadership, vertically and horizontally within teams, units, formations, and the CF as a whole.

## DIRECT AND INDIRECT INFLUENCE

Historically, leadership research, theory, and practical advice have emphasized the personal face-to-face nature of leadership and the associated techniques for directly influencing subordinate performance, or one or more of its behavioural elements, in a fairly immediate way. It has been increasingly recognized, however, that leaders also significantly affect behaviour and performance over the longer term by modifying situational conditions to make them more mission-favourable. These propositions logically follow from the observation that behaviour is a joint function of what attributes a person brings to a situation and conditions at play in the organization and external environment (Figure 1-1). Viewed in this way, leadership is obviously

about influencing people, but it is also about shaping the task environment. Leaders make a direct contribution to effectiveness through the immediate effects they have on people and their performance – for example, by clarifying individual and group roles and tasks, developing skills, sharing risks and hardships, maintaining discipline and morale, and encouraging high levels of effort and persistence. Leaders contribute to military effectiveness indirectly by designing and creating the group, organizational, and environmental conditions that enhance individual and collective performance, such as a professional culture and identity, cohesion, advanced doctrine, force structure, equipment, and human resource programs and services that support members and ensure their fair treatment.

***Direct influence*** – means face-to-face influence on others which has an immediate effect on their ability, motivation, behaviour, performance, attitudes, or related psychological states, or which progressively modifies the slow-growth attributes of individuals and groups. Verbal direction, goal setting, practice training, coaching, contingent reward and discipline, performance monitoring and feedback are examples of direct-influence behaviours which have immediate effects; intellectual development through education and value development through professional socialization tend to have incremental and delayed effects.

***Indirect influence*** – refers to influence on others mediated by purposeful alterations in the task, group, system, institutional, or environmental conditions that affect behaviour and performance. Changes in the content and delivery of training programs, technology, organizational structures and procedures, administrative policies and services, and organizational culture are examples of indirect influence.

**Figure 1-3 | Relative importance of direct and indirect influence to leadership functions.**



Figure 1-3 illustrates the relationship of these influence processes to the major functions of CF leadership. Clearly, *direct and indirect influence processes apply to all levels of leadership* – from every Junior NCO to the Chief of the Defence Staff – but direct influence processes are more commonly used when leading people in the performance of day-to-day operations and activities,<sup>6</sup> whereas indirect influence is more typical of institutional leadership. That said, both direct and indirect kinds of influence are critical to leader effectiveness, and the way they work can be expressed in two general principles:

- **Direct Influence Principle:** To contribute to CF effectiveness directly, leaders develop and capitalize on people’s capabilities, and take appropriate action to correct or compensate for their deficiencies.
- **Indirect Influence Principle:** To contribute to CF effectiveness indirectly, leaders establish or modify task, group, system, institutional characteristics and environmental conditions that enable or enhance individual and collective performance, and attempt to neutralize or adapt to situational factors that constrain performance.

<sup>6</sup> Because direct, face-to-face influence is the *primary* form of influence at the team, squad, unit, and formation levels, U.S. Army leadership doctrine describes leadership at these levels as Direct Leadership (Department of the Army, FM 22-100 *Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do* (Washington, DC), 1999). CF doctrine recognizes that, while influence at these levels is often exercised directly, this is not exclusively the case.

## THE NATURE OF LEADERSHIP

There are almost as many different definitions of leadership as people who have defined it. Most people who have studied and written about leadership agree that, at a minimum, it is an influence process that occurs in human groups engaged in collective action, and that those people who do more of the influencing are said to perform a leadership role. At a socio-biological level, leadership in human groups is related to the kind of *hierarchical dominance* found in all social animals and equally to the *mutual influence* that is a feature of social co-operation.

**“Whenever people become involved in joint activities, a leadership structure develops.”**

Edwin P. Hollander  
*The Handbook of Social Psychology*

Variation in the definitions of leadership is often a reflection of differences in the societal or cultural purposes leadership serves, for example, political leadership, community leadership, organizational leadership, recreational leadership, or religious and moral leadership. To varying degrees, leadership definitions tend to be functionally and culturally bounded, across both time and place. As a result, some definitions limit or qualify the importance of formal authority; others require willing compliance from followers. Some stress the importance of a shared or group objective. In the most broadly applicable and inclusive sense, however, leadership may be defined as *directly or indirectly influencing others, by means of formal authority or personal attributes, to act in accordance with one’s intent or a shared purpose*.

This definition is generic and value-neutral. It is broadly inclusive of all forms of leadership across a wide range of settings and times. It makes no statements or intimations about what might be good or bad, effective or ineffective, leadership. More specifically, this definition states or implies the following:

- Leadership may be based on either or both the formal authority that comes with rank and position and an individual’s personality and related characteristics.

- Consistent with the idea that influence may be exercised in a face-to-face way or by altering the team, unit, and organizational characteristics that condition behaviour, the dual importance of direct and indirect influence is recognized.
- Leadership is not limited to formal structures and processes of control over others. In addition to formal authority, it includes other influence processes (e.g., persuasion, consultation, exchange tactics, coalition building) that not only reach down to subordinates but also extend laterally and upward in social and organizational structures. Such influence may also be exercised outside organizational boundaries, for example, tactically in a joint, multinational, or inter-agency operation, or strategically in government, public, or international milieus to secure support for high-level military or national objectives.
- The exercise of formal authority or personal influence is purposeful. Either implicitly or explicitly, leadership is about setting, maintaining, or changing collective direction, and this distinguishes leadership from more casual forms of social influence (e.g., peer or reference-group influence). No value judgments are attached, however, to the leader's purpose; *leader intent* may fall anywhere along the continuum of destructive to self-serving to socially and organizationally beneficial behaviours.

***intent* – A mental formulation involving foresight of some possible end and the desire to seek to attain it**

*The Oxford Companion to Law*

- The exercise of formal authority or personal influence need not result in specific outcomes or the achievement of particular goals to be deemed leadership; having an effect on others is sufficient.
- The potential for leadership is tacitly recognized in all members of a group. Leadership is viewed as both a *position-based* social role, which can be obtained through usurpation, appointment by superior authority, or democratic election, and also as a *distributed* or temporarily shared role, which may be assumed according to situational demands and the capabilities and motivation of group members (i.e., ***emergent leadership***).

- Leadership may be exhibited as a continuing pattern of influence or in a one-time act.
- Finally, no statements are made about the quality of follower response. Leader intent may or may not be shared or fully accepted by followers. If it is not, then they are likely merely to comply with the leader's direction; if it is, then they are more likely to support the leader. Moreover, if they become psychologically committed to the leader's purpose, we would probably describe the leader as inspiring, charismatic, or transformational.

While the generic definition of leadership provided above is helpful in setting conceptual boundaries for the study of military leadership, it has limited practical value. It does not, for example, provide any guidance on what CF leaders ought to do or how they should conduct themselves to be considered good or effective military leaders. For the purposes of shaping and evaluating CF leader behaviour, the issue of central importance is how good or effective leadership is uniquely defined in the CF. That is the focus of this manual. As will be seen, our definition of effective CF leadership is directly tied to specific institutional values and the responsibilities and competencies that derive from such values.

## COMMAND, MANAGEMENT, AND LEADERSHIP

Command is based on *formally delegated authority*, and this feature is reflected in the NATO definition of command as “the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, co-ordination, and control of military forces.” Command may also be described in terms of an *array of functions* associated with an appointment or as a set of activities related to those functions. As functions or activities performed by a military commander, command typically includes, but is not limited to, such things as planning, problem-solving and decision making, organizing, informing, directing and leading, allocating and managing resources, developing, co-ordinating, monitoring, controlling, and so on. But the essence of command is the *expression of human will*, an idea that is captured in the concept of *commander's intent*. Nearly everything a commander does – planning, directing, allocating resources, monitoring – is driven and governed by the commander's vision, goal, or mission, and the will to realize or attain that vision, goal, or mission. As such, command is the purposeful exercise of authority – over structures, resources, people, and activities.

**“Command is the uniquely human activity of creatively expressing will, but one that can be expressed only through the structures and processes of control. A commander, as a manifestation of Command, is a human who works within a defined military position with assigned authorities (i.e., control structures) to achieve mission objectives.”**

Ross Pigeau & Carol McCann  
In *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*

Not all commanders have been or are good leaders, but leadership is obviously a role requirement of command. By means of either formal authority or personal attributes, commanders must be able to influence others to act in accordance with their intent or a collective purpose. Leadership differs from command, however, in one important respect. Whereas command authority may only be exercised downward in the chain of command, through the structures and processes of control, leader influence may be exercised downward, laterally, and upward in a military hierarchy. Leadership is not constrained by the limits of formal authority. Individuals anywhere in the chain of command may, given the ability and motivation, influence peers and even superiors. Furthermore, so-called emergent leadership operates completely outside the box of organizational authority, which is simply another way of saying that it isn't necessary to be a commander to be a leader. But to be fully effective, commanders must also be good leaders. The formal authority that comes with rank and position must be reinforced and supplemented by personal qualities and skills.

**“Leadership... can be viewed as leveraging what you are given to achieve far more.”**

Michael Useem  
*The Leadership Moment:  
Nine True Stories of Triumph and Disaster and  
Their Lessons for Us All*

Historically, CF leadership doctrine has treated management as complementary to leadership and as a subsidiary function of command. This is appropriate with respect to the resource-management function, but is an inaccurate characterization of management in general. Theoretical and empirical studies of management clearly indicate that civilian managers have many responsibilities and authorities comparable to those of military commanders. Like command, management is based on formal organizational authority, and like command, entails responsibilities for a similarly broad range of functions – planning, problem-solving and decision making, organizing, informing, directing and leading, allocating and managing resources, developing, co-ordinating, monitoring, controlling, and so on. What clearly sets military command apart from management are the unique authorities of military commanders to resort to large-scale lethal force, to compel subordinates to go into harm's way, and to dispense a distinct military justice with substantial powers of punishment. But in other respects, there are many functional similarities, including the expectation that commanders and managers will not only lead but that they will lead well.<sup>7</sup>

Rather than uncritically asserting that command and management are different constructs, or that management is a component of command, it is more accurate to say that the general management role as practiced in civilian organizations is functionally equivalent to the command role in the military. It is readily acknowledged, however, that the *resource-management* function – with its emphasis on dollars, quantitative methods, and efficiency – is a subordinate element of both general management and military command. It is this function that is often characterized as the antithesis of, but a necessary complement to, leadership and command.

<sup>7</sup> For several decades, there has been a running argument in management and leadership articles that managers and leaders are different kinds of people. Typically, managers are disparaged as status quo rule-followers while leaders are romanticized as heroic visionaries. It may be useful at times to distinguish *styles* of management and leadership in terms of a conservative-revolutionary, or passive-active, continuum, but there is no empirical evidence to support the view that people in managerial and leadership roles can be neatly sorted into these opposite types.

**“Every successful senior military commander in history has demonstrated, if not mastery of, at least competence in managing resources. Whether husbanding personnel, baggage animals, ammunition, fuel, food or forage and ensuring that these were provided at the right time and place, and in the right condition and quantity, the skilled application and employment of resources has always been an enduring characteristic of good generalship. Conflict between armed forces from peace support operations to war creates a massive demand for national resources, a demand that has increased exponentially over the past century as warfare has been successively and fundamentally altered by industrialization, mechanization and digitization.”**

Vice-Admiral Gary Garnett  
In *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*

The inter-relationships and interconnectedness of command, management, and leadership *functions* often make it difficult to disentangle the command, management, and leadership *effects* achieved by individuals in positions of authority. Hence favourable results tend to be attributed to extraordinary leadership even when they may, in fact, be the result of command or management skills, some combination of all three, or other factors – including luck. This bias in cause-effect reasoning and attribution has contributed to what some theorists have described as “the romance of leadership.”

**“Years ago, Peter Drucker wrote that the administrator works within the constraints; the manager removes the constraints. Later, Abraham Zaleznik claimed that managers merely manage; real leaders lead. Now we seem to be moving beyond leaders who merely lead; today heroes save. Soon heroes will only save; then gods will redeem. We keep upping the ante as we drop ever deeper into the morass of our own parochialism.”**

Henry Mintzberg  
“Managing Quietly”

There are, however, a couple of circumstances in which a leader’s influence is less likely to be confounded with command and management effects. One is when influence is purposefully and successfully employed to achieve personal or organizational objectives by CF members who have little or no formal authority over, or responsibility for, others. This kind of influence, as noted earlier, is called emergent leadership. The other circumstance involves position-based leadership and occurs when the conditions for effective command have not been met. For example, the Pigeau-McCann model of command<sup>8</sup> proposes that effective command depends on balancing a commander’s authority with his or her competence and level of responsibility. In the particular case where the authority granted to a commander is insufficient for the responsibility assigned (a condition likely to result in “ineffectual command”), the personal qualities and influence exercised by the commander can and may compensate for the lack of formal authority.

Figure 1-4 summarily illustrates the functional inter-relationships of military command, general management, leadership, and resource management. The boxes labelled as *military command* and *general management* signify the boundaries of formal organizational authority, and include representative functions associated with the commander and manager roles. While there is clearly an overlap of command and management functions (e.g., planning, decision making, resource management, etc.), the unique authorities of military command are also identified (i.e., the authority to use large-scale lethal force, the authority to put others in harm’s way, and the authority to dispense military justice). Leadership is depicted as a function that is partially embedded in the set of role requirements of appointed commanders and managers, but also as behaviour that occurs outside the boundaries of formal authority.

<sup>8</sup> For a more comprehensive presentation of the model, see any one of the following articles: Ross Pigeau & Carol McCann, “Re-conceptualizing Command and Control,” *Canadian Military Journal*, Spring 2002; “What is a Commander?” in Bernd Horn & Stephen J. Harris (eds.) *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership* (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing), 2001; “Redefining Command and Control,” in Carol McCann & Ross Pigeau (eds.) *The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience* (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers), 2000.

Figure 1-4 | Inter-relationships of command, management, and leadership.




As a concluding comment on the relationship between leadership and command, Table 1-1 illustrates how the major leadership functions introduced earlier in this chapter – leading people and leading the institution – line up with the *levels of conflict* and *levels of command*, as they are called, and the corresponding roles played by civilian authorities and military commanders at these different levels. At the *tactical* and *operational* levels of conflict, for instance, leadership and command are primarily exercised in a direct, face-to-face way and are focused on the planning and conduct of operations. At the *national-strategic* and *military-strategic* levels of conflict, military leadership and command are primarily concerned with developing military capabilities in support of national security objectives and

allocating those capabilities to operational commanders so that they can conduct assigned routine or contingency operations.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, at the highest level of command, the national-strategic level, senior military leaders and commanders must often apply their influence outside the boundaries of the institution. As identified in *Duty with Honour*, two dimensions of civil-military relationships with the Government are involved here. The more important one is advising Government on national security policy, the CF's capability requirements, and the employment of military capabilities. The other is securing support from, and co-ordinating activities with, other Government departments and outside agencies.

<sup>9</sup> There are some positions (e.g., SACEUR) that may require a commander to perform both strategic and operational roles, that is, to develop strategic capabilities (lead the institution) and to personally conduct campaigns or direct operations (lead people).

Table 1-1 | Relationship of major leadership functions to levels of conflict and command.



What the preceding discussion illustrates is that, even if the *concepts* of leadership, command, and management can be made reasonably distinct and clear, reality does not always present an uncomplicated or tidy picture. Command, management, leadership, and other functions are integrally rolled

up in the behaviour and actions of one person, so that sorting out what aspects of performance and effectiveness demonstrate good leadership, what shows command, and what reflects something else is not always possible.



## SUMMARY

By taking a systems view of performance and effectiveness, we can identify the major levers that leaders can use to influence individual, group, and institutional performance and effectiveness. This perspective also brings to light the influence roles that leaders play both inside their group, unit, or the CF and externally in the environment in which they operate.

From lower to higher levels of responsibility and authority in an organization, there are obvious changes in the focus, scope, and time horizon of leaders. Generally speaking, the leadership environment becomes more ambiguous and the leadership task becomes more complex with increasing rank and responsibility. At lower to middle rank levels in the CF, Officers and NCMs appointed to leadership positions are typically engaged in directing, motivating, and enabling others to accomplish the day-to-day defence missions and tasks that have been assigned to the CF. This leadership function is described as *leading people*. At higher rank levels, senior leaders and their staffs are uniquely responsible for sustaining current military capabilities while planning and developing the strategic and professional capabilities needed to ensure that the CF will remain effective into the future. This leadership function is described as *leading the institution*.

As commonly understood, leadership involves influencing people to achieve some objective that is important to the leader, the group, or the organization. Leaders also shape or alter the environment or system in which people function and, thereby, influence their behaviour and conduct. In other words, leaders can influence people either directly or indirectly. These ideas are expressed in the Direct Influence Principle and the Indirect Influence Principle. While CF leaders at all rank levels make use of both direct and indirect influence, tactical and operational leadership requires a lot of direct face-to-face influence. Strategic leadership, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with creating the institutional and environmental conditions necessary for operational success and relies on indirect influence to a greater extent.

Leadership is an essential role requirement for commanders and managers but is not the same thing as command or management. Command is bounded by the authority delegated to a commander and may only be exercised down the chain of command. Leadership, on the other hand, may be exercised by anyone, regardless of organizational position. Moreover, purposeful influence, that is, influence intended to achieve a CF objective, may not only be directed down the chain the command but also up and across the chain of command and even beyond the boundaries of the CF. In sum, leader influence works in concert with the formal authority of command and management but also works independently of such formal authority.



# Values-Based Leadership



Values and Behaviour .....	16
Essential Outcomes and Conduct Values .....	18
• Essential outcomes .....	19
• Conduct values .....	21
• Secondary outcomes .....	23
Values-Based Leadership and the Challenge of Competing Values ..	23
Values-Based Leadership in Practice .....	26
Effective CF Leadership Defined .....	30
Annex A: Derivation of the CF Effectiveness Framework .....	32

## Values-Based Leadership

In the preceding chapter, we described how leadership generally contributes to CF effectiveness, the major functions of CF leadership, distinctions between direct and indirect influence, how leadership is defined as an influence process, and the relationship of leadership to the broader functions of command and management. To this point, leadership and a number of related concepts have been treated in a value-neutral and descriptive way. No mention has been made of how good or effective leadership is to be identified among the many kinds of purposeful influence that are a common part of human social activity. Nor has any attempt been made to prescribe CF leader behaviour – to specify what CF leaders *ought* to do. This is because effective leadership can only be defined in relation to how we conceptualize organizational effectiveness. Leadership is, after all, at the service of collective effectiveness. Hence, defining effective leadership, and, more specifically, effective CF leadership, requires a discussion of what we mean by the effectiveness of the CF as a professional institution. In other words, defining effective CF leadership calls for a discussion of institutional values, those abstract qualities that tell CF members and their leaders what organizational outcomes they should strive to achieve and what professional standards they should use to guide and regulate their conduct.

A key proposition of values-based leadership is that the guidance provided by core CF values is the ultimate recourse and compass when explicit direction from superiors is lacking, when dealing with ambiguous situations, or when operating under competing demands and pressures. This chapter outlines a CF effectiveness framework built around CF values. The framework not only expresses what is of critical and enduring importance to the CF in terms of outcomes sought and the means of achieving them, but is also the basis for defining effective leadership in the CF.

Another major proposition of values-based leadership is that, in trying to be true to several values at the same time, leaders will occasionally experience tensions between two or more values. Hence, a major challenge for leaders in the CF is to try and balance the demands of equally valid but competing values. These issues are also explored in the chapter in relation to risk and risk management.

We begin with an overview of the two general processes by which behaviour is guided and regulated: the external discipline imposed by others, and the internal discipline engendered by personally accepted values. The advantages in consistency, initiative, and adaptability provided by internal discipline make the inculcation of self-regulatory ability in others a key responsibility of CF leaders.

### VALUES AND BEHAVIOUR

Behaviour is influenced and regulated in two fundamental ways – by external and internal control processes. The external regulation of behaviour involves the following basic control processes: explicit guidance by a superior authority concerning what is to be done, how, when, and to what standards; supervision and monitoring to ensure directions are being followed and the intended outcomes are achieved; and the administration of feedback or punishment to correct deviations from procedures or standards. These control processes describe the basic elements of *discipline* in both its enabling and punitive aspects.

## ***THE DISCIPLINE TO KEEP GOING – FALAISE POCKET AUGUST 1944***

“Like the men of all battalions aiming at Falaise, relentlessly urged forward these past five days – particularly those units that were chewed and decimated along Verrières Ridge... [Major] Suckling and company are carrying on in a state of utter exhaustion, both mental and physical. The long marches, weighed down with personal equipment, shovels, weapons, and extra ammunition for the Brens and Piats; the frantic digging-in at each stop to get below ground as fast as possible to gain shelter from shelling and resist the inevitable counter-attack; and the never-ending tension that comes from living, minute to minute, alert and ready to react to every rustle of air, knowing that the worst could happen at any moment – all combine to guarantee that those who do survive attack after attack after attack exist at the outer limits of their endurance, in a state of fatigue that defies description....”

How they sustain the will to carry on day after day, risking death or crippling wounds, is a mystery. Long after, reflecting on what he considered ‘the greatest problem, the constant fear and anxiety which dulls the mind and is absolutely unshakeable,’ Major Suckling will declare:... *Over the years I had been well indoctrinated with army discipline, and I’m sure this kept many other people going too. I’ve always admired the resolution of men who carry on solely because of their commitment to a cause of righteousness. In my own case, it was simply that I was more scared of what was behind me than what lay ahead of me – which is the best reason I know in favour of discipline. Weeks would pass before I got over the shell shock or anxiety neurosis, and it was much later before my mind settled down somewhat. While my body, even at the age of twenty-six, became increasingly weary to the point of exhaustion.”*

George G. Blackburn  
*The Guns of Normandy*

External regulation and control are required when people: (1) do not fully understand what is required of them, either with respect to performance outcomes or standards of behaviour; (2) lack knowledge or skill concerning how to proceed; (3) are unwilling to comply with directions and rules; or (4) are unwilling to furnish the effort necessary to fulfill their responsibilities. External regulation and control (discipline) will always be a feature of military service simply because when people join the CF, they lack the understanding, knowledge, and skills to perform effectively immediately on entry. Training and discipline develop habits that are critical for coping with the demands and stresses of typical military situations. Discipline is also useful in giving people that necessary extra push when their determination wavers or their effort fades.

As a means of exercising influence and control, however, constant telling and close supervision have some serious limitations. For one thing, the exercise of external influence and control is extremely demanding of leader time and effort. For another, everyone is bound to face a situation, sooner or later, in which there is no superior to provide direction and control, or there is no rule in the rule book to cover the circumstances. Some problems cannot be solved by habitual ways of thinking and acting. In fact, the complexity of many contemporary military operations frequently produces ambiguous and novel challenges that require individuals to act independently and creatively. Values, value-based norms of behaviour, and the processes of internal regulation and control go a long way to providing the guidance needed in such situations.

Self-regulation of behaviour depends on the acquisition, through a variety of learning experiences, of societal and organizational norms and standards of behaviour. It operates according to the following control processes: routine self-monitoring of behaviour; the evaluation of personal behaviour against internal standards; and, depending on the feelings resulting from self-evaluation (good or bad, pride or shame), either reinforcement or modification of one’s behavioural intentions and motivation.

CF values are general expressions of what the CF stands for, and they serve as institutional standards against which personal behaviour can be judged. Hence, the more comprehensively members understand CF values and the more they have internalized them, the greater their ability will be to act as expected in the absence of explicit direction or external controls. A general goal of training, education, and other **socialization** processes is to develop individual judgment and a capacity for self-regulation so that reliance on external discipline is minimized. In the CF, the individual capacity for such **self-discipline** largely depends on understanding and internalizing the values of the institution.

**“Values give an organization a self-ordering quality, a kind of organizational ballast, which provides direction and stability in periods of turmoil, stress, and change. They give both leaders and followers a basis for looking more confidently beyond the issues of the day.... Effective leaders understand that core values rooted deeply within the people who make up an organization are the essence of its organizational culture and an enormous source of strength.”**

Gordon R Sullivan & Michael V. Harper  
*Hope is Not a Method*

## ESSENTIAL OUTCOMES AND CONDUCT VALUES

In its simplest terms, a **value** is a belief about what is centrally important and hence what should take precedence in guiding decisions and actions. Values influence and regulate behaviour to the degree that they are embedded in institutional practices, are seen to contribute to decision-making, are consistently reinforced, are seen in action in critical-incident and crisis behaviour, and are commemorated in ceremonies and traditions. In this way, they become part of the military culture and ethos, and are transmitted through the general processes of instruction and socialization to new generations of military members. To be real, however, values must be credible, and to be credible they must be publicly visible, consistent patterns of behaviour, not just fine-sounding words or slogans.

CF values express what is centrally important to institutional functioning. In other words, CF values express our ideas about CF effectiveness, and thus help integrate individual and collective actions. Like values generally, these ideas about effectiveness relate to both *ends* and *means* – that is, CF effectiveness can be described in terms of **essential outcomes** and **conduct values**.

**value 1 n. The quality or property of a thing that makes it useful, desired, or esteemed.... 2 n. An abstract and general principle concerning the patterns of behaviour within a particular culture or society which, through the process of socialization, the members of that society hold in high regard. These social values, as they are often called, form central principles around which individual and societal goals can become integrated. Classic examples are freedom, justice, education, etc....**

Arthur Reber  
*The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology*

Essential outcomes refer to important and desired goals, results, or end-states – those key aspects of CF performance that must be satisfied for the CF to be considered functionally effective – for instance: is the CF successful in its missions? does it have the capabilities to ensure future success? Conduct, or instrumental, values are statements about *how* the objectives of the CF may be **legitimately** pursued. Value systems relevant to the concept of legitimacy include Canadian civic values, the law, ethical principles and values, and professional military values – all of which are embraced within the Canadian military ethos. Taken together, essential CF outcomes and conduct values are representative of the **functional imperative** to ensure the territorial and political security of Canada and the **societal imperative** to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of Canadians and the international community.<sup>10</sup> They define CF institutional effectiveness in the most complete sense.

<sup>10</sup> See Chapter 3 in *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* for a discussion of the functional and societal imperatives.

At a high level of abstraction, Figure 2-1 portrays the general structure of CF values as an effectiveness framework derived from a consideration of these imperatives and applicable models of organizational and professional effectiveness (Annex A to this chapter explains the origins of the framework). In this depiction, CF values comprise the *essential outcomes* of Mission Success, Member Well-being and Commitment, Internal Integration, and External Adaptability, and the *conduct values* collectively described by the Canadian Military Ethos (i.e., key civic, legal, ethical, and military values). To the extent that the CF generally achieves these outcomes in ways consistent with its conduct values, it will be perceived as effective and maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of the Government, the Canadian public, military allies, and the international community. Perceived effectiveness and legitimacy, in turn, affect a number of secondary outcomes which are also of interest to CF leaders: the professional reputation of the CF, trust and confidence in the CF, and public support for the CF.

**Essential Outcomes.** As shown in Figure 2-1, essential outcomes express four general dimensions of organizational effectiveness as they apply to the CF: Mission Success, Member Well-being and Commitment, Internal Integration, and External Adaptability. The tendency in practice is sometimes to put all the emphasis on mission success, or


analogous constructs, like operational effectiveness. Experience has shown, however, that when other aspects of organizational functioning are given insufficient attention, such as members' health care, conditions of service, internal regulatory systems, or adapting to strategic and social change, the effectiveness of the CF suffers and, as a rule, its image and reputation as well – hence the need for comprehensive and balanced conceptualizations of organizational and leader effectiveness:

**“We say, ‘Good leaders will always accomplish the mission.’ Yet, history provides many examples of poor leaders who accomplished the mission.... We cannot sustain an army at peak operational capability by focusing solely on mission accomplishment.”**

Colonel Peter J. Varljen, U.S. Army  
“Leadership: More than Mission Accomplishment”

- **Mission success** expresses the outcome of primary importance to the CF, and should normally take precedence in a leader's thinking over all other considerations. In every military mission across the spectrum of operations – from a search-and-rescue sortie to a campaign involving a

**Figure 2-1 | CF effectiveness framework.**



multi-national coalition – the dominant imperative is to accomplish the mission, often at some risk to the participants, and at times in spite of significant human, materiel, and financial costs. The *primacy of operations* that drives collective planning and action, and the *unlimited liability* that applies to military service, are direct consequences of the overriding importance accorded mission success as an institutional value. Commonly expressed in the priorities of “Mission, people, self,” the precedence of mission accomplishment is often interpreted as an iron rule. Clearly, in wars of national survival, or in conflicts where vital national interests are at stake, the priority accorded the mission over own troops and self is virtually indisputable. However, in missions undertaken for other reasons – combating natural disasters, resolving other people’s conflicts – it should not be assumed that mission accomplishment will always or automatically take priority over force-protection obligations or other values. Consequently, the value system (ordering of values) represented by concern for *the mission* in relation to other essential outcomes should be viewed as a flexible hierarchy of *prima facie* obligations, with mission success occasionally being assigned no more than equal weight relative to other values. In every operation, from the tactical to the strategic levels of conflict, the importance of accomplishing the mission always has to be assessed against known risks and foreseeable human and other costs.

- **Member well-being and commitment** constitute one of three value dimensions that are critical to mission success, but in a supporting or enabling capacity. This particular value set signifies a concern for people and the quality of their conditions of service – everything from the effects of organizational policies and practices to opportunities for personal growth and development, from fair treatment by peers and superiors to the intrinsic satisfaction of one’s occupation and career. The prudential rationale for valuing member well-being and commitment is that serious or chronic dissatisfaction with conditions of military service may not only have an adverse effect on performance (tasks involving discretionary participation or effort in particular), but is known to erode morale and commitment to serve. Any resulting personnel attrition represents a loss of training and developmental investments, unnecessary replacement costs, and a reduction in effectiveness through the loss of accumulated knowledge, skills, and experience.

In the CF, which relies exclusively on voluntary service, leaders at all levels have a vested interest in conserving the human resource. Hence, they assume important practical responsibilities to attend to those factors that have an impact on member well-being and commitment and to represent subordinate interests in these areas. Even in the absence of such considerations, however, CF leaders have a moral responsibility to take good care of service members. Because of the legal authority of commanders to compel members to perform lawful duties, leaders incur a weighty ethical obligation to reciprocate such member liability and the associated personal costs of military service. These costs include not only disruptions to, and stresses on, personal or family life, and some necessary limitation of individual rights and freedoms, but especially the risks and dire consequences of hazardous duty and being placed in harm’s way.

**“One concept... which is a central theme of Canadian Forces leadership, but is not necessarily thought of by many in the public at large is ‘caring.’ Reduced to its simplest form, the military ethos is rooted in caring for subordinates. This issue is core to ethical leadership. It implies caring for troops before operations by training, equipping and supporting them to have a fair chance to fight, win and come home; caring for them during operations by professional leadership and support; and caring for them after operations by meeting their needs arising from that service, as well as honouring their deeds.”**

General (ret’d) Ramsey Withers  
In *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*

- **Internal integration**, also an enabling outcome, simply means, in one respect, the co-ordination of unit or system functioning. Co-ordination is achieved in part by establishing stable structures and routines, integrating recurring practices into a coherent machinery, sharing information, and enhancing internal communications to promote a common picture of reality, as well as routinely monitoring unit or system performance and making necessary adjustments. Clear divisions of responsibility, plans and



schedules, drills, standard operating procedures (SOPs), consistent policies, standardized administrative procedures, the timely passage of relevant information, inspections and evaluations – these are all intended to link together the various parts of a team, unit, or system into a smoothly functioning co-ordinated whole. In another respect, what might be called its human side, internal integration signifies cohesion and teamwork. **Cohesion** (a sense of common identity with and attachment to others) and teamwork (the willingness to collaborate with others for the sake of a larger purpose) are force multipliers, making collective effort greater than a mere sum of individual efforts. The overall benefit of this concern for *stability* lies in the operating efficiencies that are generated by functional co-ordination and teambuilding – thereby freeing up time, attention, and other resources to deal with the instabilities, environmental shocks, and surprises that inevitably occur. In short, internal integration contributes to mission success by reducing what would otherwise be chaos to a semblance of order and predictability.

- **External adaptability**, the third of three enabling outcomes, refers to the capacity to fit into the larger operating environment and to anticipate and adapt to change. Success in adaptation pre-supposes a concern for *flexibility* and obliges leaders to actively engage their operating environments rather than work in isolation. At the tactical level, this external engagement is achieved through lateral communications, liaison, and the exchange of information, while at the operational and strategic levels, senior leaders must develop the professional networks and contacts necessary to work as part of a joint or combined team and to form collaborative relationships with other militaries and other government departments and agencies. The ability to adapt to external change also requires leaders to review unit/system performance relative to objective reference points, identify and monitor external developments and trends, project likelihood scenarios, develop contingency plans, and initiate and implement necessary change. When information from the environment is incorporated as **organizational learning**, adaptability allows military leaders to avoid repeating the mistakes studied and recorded by historians. Done skillfully, it ensures military leaders are prepared for the next conflict or organizational problem rather than the last one, thus increasing the odds of achieving mission success.

**“A learning organization is capable of examining its performance objectively against its goals and environment and adjusts so that its performance improves – ideally, improves so much that it becomes the dominant organization in its field and maintains its position over time.”**

Peter Kasurak  
“Is the Mouse Dead?”

**Conduct Values.** As embodied in the military ethos, conduct values are shown at the centre of the effectiveness framework in Figure 2-1 because they pervade all activities, simultaneously guiding, and setting limits on, behaviour. Values relevant to how military duties are performed, and conduct in the CF generally, signify a concern for *legitimacy* and include Canadian civic values, legal values, ethical values, and military values:

**“The military ethos comprises values, beliefs and expectations that reflect core Canadian values, the imperatives of military professionalism and the requirements of operations. It acts as the center of gravity for the military profession and establishes an ethical framework for the professional conduct of military operations.”**

*Duty with Honour:  
The Profession of Arms in Canada*

- **Canadian civic values** encompass the values of *liberal democracy* and *civic nationalism*. In general terms, liberal democratic values are based on freedom of choice and expression and are reflected in: governance by the rule of law; a multi-party government that provides democratic alternatives; a responsible government that respects the division of powers and is answerable to the will of the people; and free elections with universal suffrage. In such a régime, the civil authority has supremacy over the military, formulates national security policy, controls the military’s resources, and oversees military policies and activities. The values of civic nationalism (in contrast to those of ethnic nationalism) support the vision of “a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in

patriotic attachment to a shared set of political values and practices”<sup>11</sup> – regardless of race, colour, religion, language, gender, sexual orientation, or ethnic origin. For Canadians, these civic values are most forcefully expressed in the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, which, as part of the *Constitution Act, 1982*, forms the supreme law of the land. The Charter specifies, either for everyone in Canada or all citizens of Canada, their fundamental freedoms, democratic rights, mobility rights, legal rights, equality rights, language rights, and minority-language education rights.

**“The Canadian Forces is the ultimate protector and defender of the people’s rights and freedoms. It is thus vitally important that the military is imbued with the values that animate a free, democratic and tolerant society.”**

*Canadian Human Rights Commission  
Annual Report 1997*

- **Legal values** generally reflect substantive and procedural aspects of the rule of law. Deference to the **rule of law** in establishing social order and resolving conflicts between parties is a core societal value. The rule of law provides stable and consistent guidelines within which individual freedom may be exercised; within this framework, citizens acquire certain obligations and are subject to certain limitations on their freedom. The rule of law also provides for the fair and peaceful resolution of disputes. For CF personnel, the rule of law is embodied in the Constitution, the common law, statutory law (including the *Code of Service Discipline*), the exercise of the Crown Prerogative, the law of armed conflict, and international law applicable to out-of-country operations. This structure of law establishes the authority for collective and individual military action, defines the limits of such authority, and supports the administration of military discipline. Chapter 3 of the manual provides a more detailed discussion of military leadership and the law.

**“What does the rule of law mean?”**

**It means that everyone is subject to the law; that no one, no matter how important or powerful, is above the law – not the government; not the Prime Minister, or any other Minister; not the Queen or the Governor General or any Lieutenant-Governor; not the most powerful bureaucrat; not the armed forces; not Parliament itself, or any provincial legislature. None of these has any powers except those given to it by law... If anyone were above the law, none of our liberties would be safe.”**

The Honourable Eugene Forsey  
*How Canadians Govern Themselves* (5<sup>th</sup> ed.)

- **Ethical values** prescribe rules and principles governing behaviour toward others and are held to apply to all people regardless of social, cultural, or other differences. Aside from the general obligation to avoid injury to others, lists of common ethical values typically include honesty, fairness, and benevolence. The DND/CF *Statement of Defence Ethics* comprises a blend of ethical and professional values, couched in three general principles and a series of obligations grouped under the values of integrity, loyalty, courage, honesty, fairness, and responsibility. Some ethical values are unique to the military and address the obligations to others that arise in armed conflict. For example, the principles of military necessity and proportionality are intended to avoid needless destruction and suffering, while the principle of non-combatant immunity is intended to protect the weak and defenceless from harm.

**Respect the dignity of all persons.  
Serve Canada before self.  
Obey and support lawful authority.**

*CF/DND Statement of Defence Ethics*

<sup>11</sup> Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (Toronto: Penguin Books), 1993, p. 6.

- **Military values** are rooted in the ‘social guardian’ function and are extensions of the attribute that most defines the military as a profession – its unique *responsibility* to society. Ultimately, they find expression in the code of behaviour of those who accept the responsibility for protecting a society by force of arms. As described in *Duty with Honour*, duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage are especially exalted as military values, because as Sir John Hackett famously observed “they acquire a functional as well as a moral significance in the military context. . . . [I]n the profession of arms they are functionally indispensable. . . because they contribute to military efficiency.”<sup>12</sup>

**“Canadian military values – which are essential for conducting the full range of military operations, up to and including warfighting – come from what history and experience teach about the importance of moral factors in operations. . . These military values are understood and expressed within the Canadian military ethos as follows: Duty. . . Loyalty. . . Integrity . . . Courage. . .”**

*Duty with Honour:  
The Profession of Arms in Canada*

**Secondary Outcomes.** In addition to the practical outcomes valued by the CF and the inherent conduct values which also define CF effectiveness, some important outcomes shown in Figure 2-1 are not under the direct influence or control of CF leaders but depend on how the CF is perceived by others – the Canadian public, the Government, the military forces of Canada’s allies and partners, and the international community more generally. Perceptions of the CF as a military force, as an employer, as a national institution, and as a symbol of the country abroad are subject to a number of influences – including portrayals in the media – that give shape to the public image and reputation of the CF. At least two kinds of evaluations are involved in these perceptions: did the CF achieve the results one might expect of a professional military? (perceived effectiveness); and were the results

achieved in an appropriate way? (perceived legitimacy). Institutional image and reputation are important to all CF leaders because they affect the pride and morale of serving members, the enlistment propensity of potential recruits, the trust and confidence of the Government and Canadians, and, ultimately, public support for the military.

**“Legitimacy provides the moral authority underpinning the right to act, and its requirements are derived from values, constitutions, traditions, religion, culture, the law, and public perceptions.”**

Rudolph C. Barnes, Jr.  
*Military Legitimacy:  
Might and Right in the New Millennium*

## VALUES-BASED LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF COMPETING VALUES

As an influence process, leadership is a primary mechanism for reinforcing and embedding CF values. Intentionally or otherwise, leader behaviour sends signals about what is centrally important and what is not so important. To the degree that leaders consciously serve, exemplify, and uphold CF values, they affirm through their use the validity and credibility of espoused values, and provide CF members with general guidance as to how they should orient and regulate their own behaviour. This is what values-based leadership means, so that in a fundamental sense, effective leadership is about the creation, expression, and preservation of values. In identifying and clarifying what is important to the functioning of the institution, CF leaders create values. In aligning decisions, policies, practices, and the operating culture with the military ethos, CF leaders express values. In recognizing the professionalism of serving members and commemorating the achievements and sacrifices of those who have served, CF leaders preserve and perpetuate our institutional values and heritage.

<sup>12</sup> Sir John W. Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (London: The Times Publishing Company), 1963, pp. 45-46.

It may be tempting to believe that values-based leadership means nothing more nor less than being absolutely clear about what is important and simply adhering to what is important. To some extent, it is true that values-based leadership is about understanding and living the core values of the CF. Despite the unending flow of detail and the myriad demands that always seem to occupy attention and distract people from the important things, or the pressures to do what is expedient rather than what is right, effective leaders manage to reconcile the pressures to achieve the desired military outcomes with their legal, moral, and professional obligations. As depicted in Figure 2-2, *integrity* is the essential link between these value domains. (Integrity is defined here as *moral uprightness, wholeness, consistency between behaviour and moral principles and values.*)

**Figure 2-2 | Elements of values-based leadership.**



**“When we use the word *integrity* in a moral context we refer to the *whole* moral character of a person and we most frequently allude to one’s personal integrity.**

**When we say to someone, ‘don’t compromise your integrity,’ we usually mean, ‘act in accordance with your moral principles and your value system.’... If I’m a member of one of the professions, then ‘who I am’ must involve my social role as a practicing professional. My *professional integrity* will include the role-specific obligations and responsibilities of my particular profession.... What we should mean when we commit ourselves to ‘integrity first’ is that we understand the importance of both personal integrity and professional integrity... ”**

Brigadier General (ret’d) Malham Wakin, USAF  
“Professional Integrity”

The integrity of *all* CF members ensures that what is valued in terms of outcomes is achieved in ways that are consistent with generally acceptable and desirable standards of conduct. *Leader* integrity reinforces that relationship through precept, example, organizational practices, and discipline when necessary. Without integrity, it is not possible to gain the trust of others, to perform one’s duty with honour, or to preserve the reputation of the CF as a professional institution. The practical difficulty, however, in trying to live up to all institutional values at the same time is that there are inherent tensions among the value dimensions of CF effectiveness and, by extension, leader effectiveness. Issues of importance are often in competition for finite amounts of attention, time, money, or other resources. Nevertheless, choices have to be made, and these choices sometimes seem to pit one institutional value against another.

There is, for example, an unavoidable tension between the values of *accomplishing the mission* and *assuring the well-being of CF members*. This becomes obvious in operational settings where people’s health, safety, and sometimes lives must be risked to carry out a critical task. But, as discussed earlier, it is not always the case that mission accomplishment must be given automatic priority – notwithstanding the primacy of operations and the unlimited liability of members. Certainly, members are legally and ethically obligated to perform their duties, but it is both unreasonable and imprudent to expect them to perform supererogatory (beyond the call of duty) acts for any and every operational rationale. Injuries and losses of life incurred on missions with ambiguous political goals, or of questionable military importance, or with a low probability of success, may not only seriously damage morale but may undermine mission legitimacy and public support. Good leaders and commanders consider and weigh these kinds of risks before putting service members in harm’s way, and as necessary, either explain to their subordinates why the risks must be assumed, or else attempt to convince their superiors why the mission should be reconsidered. At the organizational level of analysis, the tension between operational tempo and operational stress injuries is illustrative of this problem. For instance, the desperate circumstances faced by victims of natural and man-made disasters compel us to respond with humanitarian and military assistance. But Canada’s military forces cannot be deployed to the danger zones of the world indefinitely to the point of complete burnout. Finding the right balance of risk is not an exact science and is, therefore, difficult to achieve when mission demands either stretch or exceed human capabilities.

**“A primary characteristic of... [leading], particularly at higher levels, is the confrontation of change, ambiguity, and contradiction. [Leaders]... spend much of their time living in fields of perceived tensions. They are constantly forced to make trade-offs, and they often find that there are no right answers. The higher one goes in an organization, the more exaggerated this phenomenon becomes. One-dimensional bromides (care for people, work harder, get control, be innovative) are simply half-truths representing single domains of action. What exists in reality are contradictory pressures, emanating from a variety of domains.”**

Robert E. Quinn  
“Mastering Competing Values”

Other tensions arise in the value framework shown in Figure 2-2. For example, the requirement to introduce some degree of control and stability into organizational functioning (*internal integration* values) can, in highly bureaucratized organizations, work against the need to be flexible in dealing with unique circumstances or unexpected change and catastrophe (*external adaptability* values). Likewise, the homogenizing effect of military indoctrination and the conformity induced by strong group cohesion can limit the diversity and independence of thought required to find creative solutions to novel problems.

There is also a natural tension between the imperatives to produce the desired results (*essential outcomes*) and ensuring that the ways and means of achieving them are consistent with legal, ethical, and professional standards (*conduct values*). Here, a common risk is that either externally imposed or self-imposed pressures to achieve some objective, meet a deadline, or save scarce resources influence a leader to bend or break a rule or ignore an ethical obligation in the interests of what is expedient. In the extreme, a strong culture of authority, or a results-obsessed culture, may abet “crimes of obedience”<sup>13</sup> (e.g., the My Lai massacre of the Vietnam war) and other acts of misguided loyalty. Defined as actions taken in response to actual or perceived direction from a superior authority that would be considered illegal or

immoral by a reasonable person, crimes of obedience are not confined to operational settings but also arise in political, bureaucratic, business, and administrative environments.

Finally, conflicts also arise within the domain of conduct values. A recurring feature of many peace-support operations is that restrictions on military action imposed by a *lawful authority* in the interests of neutrality are sometimes incompatible with what seems to be required by professional values and *ethics*. Forces constrained by a mission mandate to be bystanders to gross violations of civilized behaviour will experience stress or psychological trauma; on the other hand, a decision to overstep the mission mandate may have unacceptable political, civil, and military repercussions.

The major lesson of this discussion is that more of a good thing is not always better. In fact, too much emphasis on any single value dimension (e.g., mission accomplishment, efficiency, cohesion, obedience, and so on) can be decidedly counter-productive. One-dimensional approaches to military responsibilities and problems will not do. Yes, effective leaders must know, live, and uphold the core values of the CF. But, equally, leaders at all levels must be responsive to the inherent value dilemmas of the real world. They must be able to weigh the risks of favouring one value orientation over another; and they must be willing to try reconciling or balancing competing values rather than resorting to trade-offs of convenience.

To achieve this balance, *risk management* is an essential skill for leaders at all levels. Here, risk simply refers to any circumstance which may either have a negative effect or else prevent or impede the attainment of one or more objectives. Few real-world decisions are risk-free. Hence, when one value orientation (e.g., mission accomplishment) is favoured over another, special measures may be necessary to moderate the risks generated in a competing value dimension (e.g., force protection). Risk management is a systematic approach for determining the best course of action when significant risks are present; it involves identifying, understanding, assessing, and acting on risk according to its *likelihood* and *potential impact*. While a distinction is sometimes made between operational risk management and corporate risk management, risk management commonly includes a range

<sup>13</sup> Herbert C. Kelman & V. Lee Hamilton, *Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility* (New Haven: Yale University Press), 1989.

of possible actions. For low-probability and low-impact threats, they may be as minimal as the simple acceptance of risk and routine monitoring to detect any possible worsening of a situation. For high-impact risks, significant active measures may be required to offset or mitigate risk. By exception, and especially in operations, desperate situations may require desperate measures and the willing acceptance of enormous risks. But gambling and rash action are not advisable as a matter of general policy.

## VALUES-BASED LEADERSHIP IN PRACTICE

**“Values are real to the degree that we are prepared to risk something in order to make them prevail. Values are virtual when they remain rhetorical, when the commitments we make are not followed with action.”**

Michael Ignatieff  
*Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*

In the vignettes that follow, the very different experiences of two Canadian military leaders’ responses to the demands of duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage are briefly portrayed. Both are illustrative of the kind of values-based leadership that any CF leader might hope to emulate, and of the stresses and personal costs that must sometimes be borne in the service of professional values.

## ‘THE SAVIOUR OF CEYLON’ – LEONARD BIRCHALL

*Air Commodore (ret’d) Len Birchall was given the accolade ‘Saviour of Ceylon’ for warning the British fleet of an impending attack by a large Japanese fleet under Vice-Admiral Nagumo while operating at the limits of his Catalina patrol on 4 April 1942. Sending a radio signal while flying under a clear sky meant that he would be easily detected and risked being shot down by Japanese fighters, which is what happened. But his signal allowed the British fleet to disperse and Ceylon to prepare its defences. These actions thwarted the Japanese plans to proceed with the invasion of India and conquer the East. A young Squadron Leader at the time of his capture, Birchall spent the next 3 years in a series of hell-hole labour camps in Japan, trying to survive under deplorable conditions and enduring constant mistreatment and brutalization at the hands of his captors (he eventually testified at the Tokyo war-crimes trials at the end of the war). Although the principle ‘every man for himself’ was a common survival tactic in many of the POW camps, S/L Birchall, as the senior POW in most of the camps he was in, made a conscious decision to organize his fellow officers and work together for the good of all.*

*“We were taken to Yokohama and here the POW camp was brand new with us as first prisoners. It was underneath the stands in the old Imperial Oil baseball stadium. A batch of POWs arrived on the same day as we did and they were all British troops from Hong Kong. The lot that arrived in the stadium was a real rough bunch to say the least. The first thing I encountered was mass hostility from the troops. I learnt that in the POW camps in Hong Kong many of the officers had let the troops down by looking after themselves. They had more food, cigarettes, etc. The net result was that the troops held them in complete disrespect. The officers who had accompanied them to Japan were the exception.*

*The first night, we officers had a long conference in the officers’ room. I was told in no uncertain terms where I stood as senior POW. After a long debate we all settled on one objective, to do the best we could for the entire camp. In the next few days we set up sections with senior N.C.O.s in charge. We had daily sick parades and we tried to collect all the medicines and drugs we could. Here again we ran into severe hostility.*

Somehow we had to convince the troops that our greatest chance of survival lay in working together. Not an easy task when we faced death each day. The first move we made was in the distribution of food. One of the officers each day had to oversee the kitchens, the cooking of rice, etc., and its distribution. The buckets of rice were weighed in order to get some semblance of fairness in its distribution. We then put the officers' buckets out in full view and dished up our food in full view.

Anyone who thought one of the officer's portions was greater than his was free to change his bowl for the officer's. The effect of this food routine was immediate. Added to this was the decision that whenever a troop got into trouble the closest officer would jump between the troop and the Japanese. This would give time for him to get lost in amongst the POWs. The result usually was that the officer got away with a less harsh beating than the troop would have received. After a few such incidents, the respect started to build.

Thus we all started back down the long road to survival. The POWs were, as I said, a rough lot. The usual first punishment was to take away food. Our rations were at starvation level at the best of times and hence they had suffered. With lack of food our ability to combat or resist disease was reduced to as low a level as it could get, and hence these lads were all sick. They all had malnutrition diseases such as scurvy, pellagra, boils, dysentery, etc. Little by little we were able to bring a bit more health back into the camp. As we progressed so we started to be able to collect up the bits of drugs and medicines in the camp. It was obvious to the lads that only in dire circumstances would an officer be given any medicine and lots of times we went without just to prove the point. The big trouble came when we did not have enough healthy men to go out. This would bring down the wrath of all the guards on the sick. All sick would have to be paraded and they would be beaten in an effort to get them to go to work. This always ended in the officers intervening and getting a good thrashing.

The jobs we worked on were a tremendous help as we managed to make contact with the Japanese workers. We were also able to steal peanuts and coconut, a most valuable source of protein. Anything brought in was reported and used in the best interests of the camp. The sick would get a bit of peanut oil and scraped coconut on their rice. The thieves were given their share as they took the risk.

By the time the cold weather, really cold, got there, we had started to pick up. At least we were not on the razor edge and some even started to build up a bit of reserve or resistance to disease. We had now been joined by a contingent of Americans from the Philippines and even some civilian survivors from Wake Island. Once again we had the same morale problems with the new arrivals, distrust of officers, selfishness, and all the bad traits. With the good ground work done on the Hong Kong boys it was not long before we started to turn them around.

This really paid off as the first winter in Japan, 1942-43, was rough. Sickness, colds, influenza and even some cases of tuberculosis started. Once you got sick your resistance went to nil and then all the malnutrition symptoms came on; pellagra, scurvy, boils, hot feet, etc. Then when you were too sick to work, your rations were cut. This was all a most severe drain on the whole camp. But the resolution we would all make it or none, held. Thus while about 35% of all POWs in Japan died that winter, we lost only two men out of over 250.

\* \* \*

Early in 1944 the main camps, such as ours, now started to break up. I ended up with about 100 POWs in a camp for the Asano Dockyards. The work was hard and long. The food was far from plentiful. Things began to look grim. Once again the 'chronics' started to break down so that we couldn't meet our quota of workers. The first time this happened, all sick were paraded and the deficit was made up from their ranks. When the lads came back that night they carried in one of the lads with T.B. He had collapsed and was in very bad shape. We held a conference and decided something had to be done. We decided on a sit-down strike. Next morning we were short again and once again sick men were paraded. When orders were given to march out I yelled 'halt' and we all sat down. Beatings started up but I explained we would not move until the sick went back to bed. After some time the Japs gave in, the sick remained in camp and the troops moved out. The Doctor and I were kept behind. About an hour later in came a group of guards from the Omori Camp. The Doctor and I were rounded up, we picked up our few belongings and were taken to the discipline camp in Tokyo."

From the text of a speech given at the Royal Military College of Canada, 1989

## **‘THE LION OF RWANDA’ – ROMÉO DALLAIRE**

*From October 1993 until August 1994, then Brigadier-General Roméo Dallaire was the force commander for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). In spite of warnings he sent to the United Nations headquarters in January 1994 of a planned slaughter of the minority Tutsis, and a desperate plea in early April for a rapid reaction force once the killing had begun, help did not come. An estimated 200,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were systematically murdered in April alone (by the time the killing ended in July, the body count had reached 800,000, 47,000 children had been orphaned, over 250,000 women had been raped, and more than 2 million people had been displaced). Toward the end of April, General Dallaire was directed by the UN Security Council to reduce his remaining force of 450 Ghanaian soldiers to 270, but after consulting with his deputy, Brigadier Henry Anyidoho, they decided to disregard the directive in order to protect and save what lives they could.*

“The small, reduced force remained in Kigali for the duration of the war, and took it upon themselves to safeguard a number of security zones housing as many as thirty thousand refugees. Canadian Hercules pilots flew dare-devil missions into Kigali almost daily with the only supplies of food and equipment UNAMIR and the Rwandans would see until the genocide ended.

Dallaire’s concern for those under his command led him to the belief that he should not allow them to think about the circumstances they were in. ‘I conducted forced stress,’ he explained later. Dallaire describes this form of management as ‘ruthless but fair.’ The textbook on leadership would dispute Dallaire’s methods – popular wisdom dictates that soldiers should have opportunities to think and reflect, that their stress should be steamed off as often as possible. But one objective outsider, who watched Dallaire in action during those months of war, saw method in his madness.

James Orbinski is a doctor with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) who was based at the Amahoro Hostel where UNAMIR had its headquarters. Orbinski had seen every hell hole in the world by the time he arrived in Kigali in May of 1994. But here he found just about the worst conditions possible. Dallaire and his peacekeepers were surrounded by corpses, filth, and garbage. Wild dogs fed upon the cadavers clogging the streets and doorways while soldiers cooked their bad food in the midst of it all. Water was scarce, and toilets had long ago ceased to function. They were shelled frequently. They had almost no petrol and only a handful of functioning vehicles.

‘People were profoundly traumatized,’ recalls Orbinski. ‘But Dallaire was clear, firm, strong and uncompromising.’ Orbinski recognized immediately what the General was doing within his command role: ‘I had been in Somalia, Zaire, Afghanistan – everywhere. What people needed was the semblance of clarity. What are you trying to achieve here? Dallaire knew and acted upon it.’ Orbinski says that the UNAMIR mission had to maintain a charade. ‘When you are a handful of UN soldiers with a lorry full of people and you come up against this veil of force [the Hutu Power death squads], you’re operating within the tenuous promise of support from the international community that you know, and they know, is a delusion. And you are standing against thirty or forty *Interahamwe* who are drunk and have more equipment than the pea-shooter that’s on your shoulder – the last thing you want to do is shatter the delusion.’

Dallaire kept sending his men out into the danger and, even when they returned traumatized, they had to write up their reports. The headquarters was as strictly regimented as any normal mission would be, with reveille, morning prayers, and specific hours for meetings and debriefings. But all this amidst – not only a combat zone – but the wholesale slaughter of civilians. The bodies of dead Rwandans littered the fields, filled the streets, and floated ashore in the river.



In late June, Dallaire presented a series of medals to his soldiers and commended them for their work. But he added: 'It must be pointed out... that there are trying and blurred moments ahead of us. I can only advise that you all hold your composure and continue to perform your duties to the best of your ability. I am always ready and willing to give you direction that will lead to the attainment of the mission goal.'

Throughout the three months of slaughter, Dallaire spent all the hours he could spare devising a military plan to stop the genocide. In the immediate days following the President's assassination, Dallaire told New York that he would need five thousand equipped and well-motivated soldiers to stop the killing. The UN turned him down. He continued to revise the strategy and later requested a Chapter VII mission with a force capable of blowing through the Hutu Power barricades, securing the countryside, holding firm in downtown Kigali, and sabotaging the Hutu Power radio broadcasts which gave hourly instruction to the Rwandan citizenry in their 'work obligation' to destroy the Tutsi. The Security Council, particularly the United States, decided that Dallaire's plan was ill conceived. Long after the war, a panel of experts, assembled by the Carnegie Commission, would determine that Dallaire's plan would have worked and probably could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives."

Carol Off

In *Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders*

The experiences of Air Commodore Birchall and General Dallaire could not be more different in terms of time, place, and circumstances. They also differ in terms of how effectiveness was defined in each situation: for one, member survival and well-being were the dominant concerns; for the other, accomplishing the mission was the uppermost priority. In spite of these differences, there is a profound similarity in the leadership tests these officers faced. Both leaders were faced with novel situations, for which prior training had not prepared them (then-Squadron Leader Birchall did not train to be a leader in a POW camp, especially one in which the Geneva Conventions were routinely contravened; General Dallaire is on record as saying that nothing in his Cold War training for NATO operations prepared him for what he encountered in Rwanda). Nor did either leader have access to a superior who could provide him with effective direction, guidance, or counsel. What they both faced, each largely on his own, was a situation in which they had to fall back on their personal and professional values for guidance.

**"Value is a concept of the desirable. Somewhat more exactly, values are concepts of the desirable with motivating force..."**

Christopher Hodgkinson, Donald Lang & James Cutt  
"A Mirror for Leaders"

## EFFECTIVE CF LEADERSHIP DEFINED

As previously noted, leadership in the CF is at the service of collective effectiveness, and, in particular, the values that express our ideas about institutional effectiveness. It follows that effective leadership in the CF cannot be adequately defined unless reference is made to these values: the mission, our people, stability, flexibility, and legitimacy. They establish the *common foundation* of CF leadership, and, as such, should not only focus the attention of the Officer-NCM leadership cadre but should also hold them together as a professional team.

### ***Definition of Effective CF Leadership***

**Directing, motivating, and enabling others to accomplish the mission professionally and ethically, while developing or improving capabilities that contribute to mission success.**

Effective CF leaders get the job done, look after their people, think and act in terms of the larger team, anticipate and adapt to change, and exemplify the military ethos in all they do. The CF leadership model is a value-expressive model, one that gives shape to the professional ideal of duty with honour.

## ***A VETERAN'S PERSPECTIVE ON VALUES***

"I still have one more grave to visit in Holland. He was a young man I met when I was back at battle school in British Columbia. We were both instructors in Vernon, both captains, and both anxious to get back overseas. He was an only son, a fine, fine young man, just married, and he and his wife had just had their first baby. Our wives were good friends, and we were going to go into business together after the war. He went with the Irish Regiment up through Italy and finally up into northwest Europe. About ten days before the end of the war, he was killed...."

Our liberties – freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of the ballot box – all these things we take for granted were maintained at a very, very tragic cost. That is all part of our history. Some things are too precious, and without them life wouldn't be worth living: so you risk your life for them. If you do not have values that are that deep for you, I don't think life is worth living!

In the 1930s, we had a miniscule military, and yet this country of eleven million people put one million people in uniform, the third-largest army among the Western Allies. I think back to the immediate post-war years and remember feeling that this couldn't have been for nothing. The kids today know nothing about this history, and it's going to be lost unless it's nurtured.

I just hope we remember when it comes to times of remembrance, that it's not just us guys with our medals, but the ones that did not live to wear them. That's what most veterans are concerned about.

For us, the greatest satisfaction is a personal thing: when everything, our way of life, was at risk and the chips were down, we were there. No one can take that away from us. When you come to the end of your life, it's a very comforting thought to know that you were able to do that."

Barney Danson  
*In Testaments of Honour*

## SUMMARY

Values express what we consider useful, important, and desirable. They are comparable to high-level statements of intent – intentions about what we want to achieve and about how we should go about it. Because they motivate and guide behaviour, values provide a highly effective means of allowing individuals and teams considerable freedom of action while, at the same time, ensuring that their behaviour is both appropriate and professional. In an operating environment in which independent thinking and action are increasingly important to effectiveness, values-based discipline and leadership provide capabilities that procedurally driven, high-control forms of discipline and leadership cannot.

What, exactly, does the CF consider useful, important, and desirable? At all levels of functioning, the CF places a high value on accomplishing the mission, building efficient and cohesive teams, taking care of members and their families, adapting to external challenges, and conduct that is consistent with civic, legal, ethical, and military norms. These value dimensions are respectively labelled as: Mission Success, Internal Integration, Member Well-being and Commitment, External Adaptability, and the Military Ethos. They not only provide the outline of a comprehensive CF effectiveness framework, but, because leadership roles and positions in the CF exist to serve collective effectiveness, they also serve as a basic leader-effectiveness checklist: Am I doing what needs to be done to accomplish the mission? Have I established the structure, procedures, teamwork, and cohesion necessary for co-ordinated and economical effort? Am I giving sufficient attention to the needs and aspirations of my people so that they remain committed? Am I positioning my team or unit to fit into the larger operating environment and adapt to the challenges and changes that are coming? Is my behaviour consistent with the military ethos, and do I actively reinforce its civic, legal, ethical, and military norms?

To motivate and guide behaviour, values cannot be only words on paper. To be credible, they must be a living part of CF culture. This means that CF leaders must exemplify commitment to institutional values, must embed them in policies and practices, and must reinforce them through their actions. In short, leader integrity is critical in establishing and maintaining a values-based culture and organizational climate. Integrity, what some military scholars and ethicists call the master value, ensures that what we strive to achieve on behalf of the CF we do in ways that are worthy of military professionals.

CF leaders must also understand that effectiveness means paying attention to all five value dimensions. They constitute an organic whole. Hence, over-emphasizing one value dimension at the expense of the others, or ignoring any value dimension, will eventually exact a price. Moreover, in spite of the natural tensions that arise in trying to satisfy multiple obligations at the same time, leaders have to understand that a good part of leadership involves dealing with competing values, and managing the risks inherent in making choices and decisions.

# Annex A

## 2

### DERIVATION OF THE CF EFFECTIVENESS FRAMEWORK

The CF effectiveness framework in Figure 2-1 is based on Robert Quinn’s Competing Values Model of organizational effectiveness – although it also has affinities with the Balanced Scorecard approach to conceptualizing and measuring effectiveness as developed by Robert Kaplan and David Norton. Quinn’s model can be viewed as the latent structure of organizational effectiveness; it manifests the major dimensions of effectiveness commonly found across different organizations and is, therefore, generically applicable. The CF effectiveness framework in Figure 2-1 is an organizationally specific adaptation of the generic model; it is unique to the CF in some respects and therefore cannot be directly applied to other organizations.


Over the years, numerous criteria and indices of organizational effectiveness have been developed by managers, researchers, and theorists, and they are typically presented as long lists of performance or outcome variables – some similar and redundant, others highly dissimilar and independent, some with a micro orientation, others with a macro orientation. Such lists, however, lack a coherent and meaningful structure. Quinn’s model essentially reduces these lists into an integrated and economical structure that is not only diagnostically useful but is also helpful as a decision aid and guide to action.

The Competing Values Model represents the latent structure of 30 different criteria of organizational effectiveness originally collated by John Campbell in the 1970s; his list included such variables as efficiency, quality, growth, turnover, motivation, control, information management, participation, productivity, accidents, morale, conflict/cohesion, planning, training/development, and many more. The statistical reduction of this list (by multi-dimensional scaling of paired-comparison data) yielded two major dimensions: a Control-Flexibility dimension, and an Internal-External Focus dimension.

As shown in Figure 2A-1, the quadrants formed by these axes represent the four major effectiveness models that dominate organizational theory and their relationships to each other. The Human Relations model in the upper left quadrant is focussed on the commitment of people in an organization and emphasizes such things as need satisfaction, morale, and social cohesion. The Open Systems model in the upper right quadrant is concerned with an organization’s interactions with its environment (flexibility plus external focus) and consequently views effectiveness in adaptability terms. The familiar Rational Goal model in the lower right quadrant reflects a concern for competitive position and measures effectiveness in terms of productivity and related measures. The Internal Process model in the lower left quadrant, which emphasizes control and internal stability, is epitomized by Weber’s machine bureaucracy, a formalized hierarchy of clearly defined responsibilities and authorities in which decisions are based on impersonal rational considerations and people are advanced on objective merit. In addition to representing unique value orientations, each model also has two complements. For instance, the Rational Goal model shares an external focus with the Open Systems model and shares an emphasis on control with the Internal Process model.

These models represent ideal pure types, but real-world organizations embody aspects of all of them in varying degrees (military forces tend to operate mainly in the Rational Goal and Internal Process quadrants). Each model represents an organizational ‘good’, or what Quinn calls an organizational morality. Hence, to the extent that senior leaders distribute attention and resources across all value dimensions according to changing internal needs and external demands, overall effectiveness is likely to be achieved or maintained.

Figure 2A-1 | Competing Values Model of organizational effectiveness.



A defining characteristic of the Competing Values Model of organizational effectiveness, however, is that it assumes contradiction and conflict to be recurring and natural features of organizational life. The Competing Values Model captures these tensions in its oppositional structure. For example, while an organization may want to exercise effective controls over its internal processes to ensure smooth functioning and timeliness of service, it also has to be adaptable to changing circumstances and must take risks in dealing with uncertainty; but we know that most bureaucracies are not very good at coping with change or risk. Similarly, organizations

seek to maximize their operational effectiveness but also want to invest in and hold on to their people. In short, each model of effectiveness has its opposite competing-value orientation.

According to Quinn, things often take a turn for the worse in organizations when any of these strengths, or criteria of goodness, become overvalued and are emphasized in a doctrinaire or blinkered way. “When this zealous pursuit of a single set of criteria takes place, a strange inversion can also result. Good things can mysteriously become bad things.”<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Robert E. Quinn, “Mastering Competing Values: An Integrated Approach to Management,” in D.A. Kolb, I.M. Rubin & J.S. Osland (eds.) *The Organizational Behavior Reader* 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall), 1991, p. 69.


As illustrated by Figure 2A-2, when values in the middle positive zone are too zealously pursued, they become self-defeating. Hence, excessive control turns into the iron grip of uncritical tradition; aggressive efforts to do more with less and reduce costs result in perpetual exertion and burnout; anxiety about external relations becomes political expediency; unconditional support for individual development fosters rampant careerism. Similarly, a tunnel-vision emphasis on rational-goal values (e.g., profit maximization, efficiency, mission accomplishment) will typically create a toxic environment for an organization's people.

More generally, dimensions of effectiveness are inverted as a consequence of over-emphasizing one value orientation, and, in the resulting possible combinations, yield four models of ineffectiveness – the country club, the tumultuous anarchy, the sweat shop, and the frozen bureaucracy: “The major point here is that everything in the two outer circles is related. The more success is pursued around one set of positive values, the greater will be the pressure to take into account the opposite positive values. If these other values are ignored long enough, crisis and catastrophe will result.”<sup>15</sup> As for the internal negative zone, it represents what happens when organizations fail to articulate their values or exercise one or more essential moralities.

What leadership responsibilities can be deduced from the Competing Values Model? At the macro level, it says that leaders have four major priorities – getting the primary mission accomplished, maintaining the commitment of the people in the organization, establishing internal order and cohesion, and adapting to external change. It is probably not coincidental that the first two responsibilities of this set approximate the two major dimensions of leader effectiveness identified some 50 years ago in the Ohio State and University of Michigan studies of leadership: Initiating Structure (or task orientation) and Consideration (or relations orientation). The latter two correspond to Edgar Schein's dual organizational-effectiveness imperatives – internal integration and external adaptation<sup>16</sup> – or what the military sociologist, Morris Janowitz, referred to as the necessary balance between organizational stability and adaptation to rapid change.<sup>17</sup>

With respect to the CF effectiveness framework in Figure 2-1, Mission Success represents the Rational-Goal dimension of effectiveness, Member Well-being and Commitment equate to the Human Relations dimension, while Internal Integration and External Adaptability map on to the Internal Process and Open Systems dimensions respectively of Quinn's model.

**Figure 2A-2 | Positive and negative value zones.**



<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p.72.

<sup>16</sup> *Organizational Culture and Leadership* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1992.

<sup>17</sup> *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press), 1971.

# Leadership and the Law

The Rule of Law .....	36
Legal Framework for the Canadian Forces .....	37
• The Constitution .....	37
• Statutes, regulations, and orders .....	38
• Other laws and social values .....	38
• Some overriding principles .....	40
The CF and Civil Authority .....	40
Self-regulation, Discipline, and the Exercise of Discretion .....	41
Obedience and the Rule of Law .....	42

# Leadership and the Law

As discussed in Chapter 2, value-based norms operate like an internal compass, guiding decision-making and action where explicit direction may be unavailable, ambiguous, or even conflicting. This situation, of course, is not unique to the military environment, as one of the primary functions of law in all civilized societies is to establish norms that express and signal the values of society and the standards of behavior expected of its members. In the military context, however, where members are expected to adhere, almost instinctively, to professional norms, even when operating in an environment of anarchy or chaos, values-based discipline and leadership must be even more consciously and rigorously fostered. One of the key values involved is the rule of law. It is impossible to imagine effective discipline or successful self-regulation in its absence.

**“[A] world without armies – disciplined, obedient and law-abiding armies – would be uninhabitable. Armies of that quality are an instrument but also a mark of civilization, and without their existence mankind would have to reconcile itself to life at the primitive level, below ‘the military horizon’, or to a lawless chaos of masses warring, Hobbesian fashion, ‘all against all’.”**

John Keegan  
*A History of Warfare*

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the concept of the rule of law and to relate it to values-based leadership. In doing so, the legal framework that governs the CF will be briefly set out, followed by a discussion of a few central themes in which military leadership and the rule of law intersect, including the relationship of the CF to the civil authority, military law and the exercise of discretion, and finally, the recurring tension between obedience and individual choice.

## THE RULE OF LAW

As introduced in Chapter 2, *the rule of law* represents a core value in a liberal democracy. As a high-level civic value, it is so fundamental that the opening words of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, which forms part of our Constitution, make special reference to the rule of law: “Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law...” According to the Supreme Court of Canada, the rule of law means at least two things:

- the law is supreme over officials of government as well as private individuals, and thereby preclusive of the influence of arbitrary power; and
- it requires the creation and maintenance of an actual order of positive laws which preserves and embodies the more general principles of the normative order.<sup>18</sup>

The rule of law is more, however, than simply a collection of laws. Under the rule of law, the law is the means by which social order is established. Laws not only set out the structural framework for the governance of society; they also express and codify the central values of society. Competing forms of social control, such as rule by arbitrary power or force, offer little protection for the rights and security of individuals. The rule of law, on the other hand, means that the conduct of *all* members of society will be regulated in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor subject to the improper exercise of discretionary authority, and that the Crown and officials of government (including CF members in positions of responsibility and authority) are required to act only according to lawful authority and not arbitrarily. In addition to protecting individual liberty, the law provides stability, predictability, and a means by which actions contrary to society’s interests can be controlled, or punished if necessary. The legal framework provides for courts and administrative tribunals, which are empowered to resolve conflicts and disputes

<sup>18</sup> Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 at 748-9.



between society and its citizens, and between citizens themselves, in a peaceful and fair way. For the Canadian Forces, the rule of law establishes the relationship of the military to civil authorities, governs the relationship between leaders and subordinates, and is a critical element in decision-making for leaders at all levels. It applies in all conditions: war, peace, and all other operations that make up the spectrum of conflict.

A military force in a democratic country has a special relationship to the rule of law. A judge of the Supreme Court of Israel described that relationship in the following manner:

“When the cannons roar, the muses are silent. But even when the cannons roar, the Military Commander must uphold the law. The strength of society to withstand its enemies is based on its recognition that it is fighting for values worthy of defense. The rule of law is one of those values.”<sup>19</sup>

## LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES

Obviously, no society can claim to be governed by the rule of law if the relationship between its civil authority and its military forces is not subject to its principles, nor if within the military itself these principles do not apply. As noted in *Military Justice at the Summary Trial Level*, the “military in a democracy is unique in that the most physically destructive power of the state is concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of non-elected government officials. This unique status inevitably leads to a large number and variety of laws designed not only to control the armed forces, but also to assist in ensuring that the values of broader society are maintained within the social fabric of the military.”<sup>20</sup> It is important, therefore, that military leaders at all levels have an understanding of the legal framework that governs the CF.

The supreme law of Canada is contained in our Constitution, which takes precedence over all other statutes (including the *National Defence Act*). There are three subsidiary types of law: statutory law, judicial decisions (otherwise known as the common law), and the exercise of the executive authority of the Government through the Crown Prerogative. Of these

three types, statutes are the single most important source of law. The enactment of a law by Parliament is in many ways the ultimate political act, as it serves as a record of the decisions made by democratically elected officials and clearly illustrates the exercise of political control over society through the law.

**The Constitution.** In Canada, the legal framework governing the CF provides a solid foundation for the application of the rule of law, a framework that commences with the Constitution. Under section 91 of the *Constitution Act, 1867*, the federal Parliament is empowered to make laws for the “Peace, Order and good government of Canada” as well as in relation to a number of specifically enumerated matters, including “Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence.”

Another part of our Constitution, the *Constitution Act, 1982*, contains the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* which enshrines a number of *fundamental freedoms* (such as freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of thought, belief, opinion, association, peaceful assembly, and freedom of the press); *democratic rights* (such as the right to vote and the requirements for Parliament to sit); *mobility rights*; *legal rights* (such as the rights to life, liberty and security of the person, the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure or arbitrary arrest or detention, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, the right not to be subject to any cruel and unusual punishment); and *equality rights* (which include the right to equal protection and benefit under the law without discrimination on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability).

These rights and freedoms reflect basic values of Canadian society and are intended to protect individuals and groups against arbitrary and unreasonable action by the state. It is important in this context to recognize that within the *Charter of Rights*, there is only one specific reference to, or exemption for, the CF. Paragraph 11(f) of the Charter provides that a person has the right to trial by jury where the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five years or more, or a more severe punishment, *except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a military tribunal.*

<sup>19</sup> H.C. 168/91 *Marcus v. The Minister of Defense* 45 P.D. (1) 467, 470-471.

<sup>20</sup> B-GG-005-027/AF-011 *Military Justice at the Summary Trial Level*, p. 1-2.

Beyond that exemption, the Charter “guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”

For CF leaders at all levels, there are two key principles they must understand. First, CF leaders have a duty to uphold the Constitutional rights and freedoms of CF members. Second, CF members are protected by the Charter to essentially the same extent as the rest of Canadian society, so that any limitation on the rights and freedoms of CF members, resulting from policies, decisions, or practices, must be justified and must be prescribed by law. “The key to justifying the limitation on the constitutional rights of a service member is identifying the core principles, or tenets, of military service.”<sup>21</sup> An example of this is the restriction in regulations which prohibits Regular Force members of the CF from engaging in certain types of political activities. The justification for limiting this democratic right is the competing value of maintaining a politically neutral military, something considered essential in a free and democratic society.

**Statutes, Regulations and Orders.** As mentioned earlier, the Constitution empowers the federal Parliament to enact laws related to defence. The principal piece of defence legislation is the *National Defence Act (NDA)*. This Act, among other things, establishes the Department of National Defence and the CF as distinct entities, sets out in broad terms the nature and conditions of service within the CF, and establishes the *Code of Service Discipline*. Note that the *NDA* also, consistent with the rule of law, reflects the ultimate civilian control over the CF. While the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) is assigned responsibility for the “control and administration” of the CF, exercise of this command is subject to the direction of the Minister of National Defence. Indeed, it is the Minister who has the “management and direction” of the CF on all matters relating to national defence and who authorizes the organization of its units and other elements (except that the Governor in Council authorizes the maximum number of members in the CF).

As well, pursuant to the *NDA*, regulations may be made by both the Governor in Council and the Minister of National Defence for the organization, training, discipline, efficiency, administration and good government of the CF, and by the Treasury Board in relation to certain matters of financial

compensation. The vast majority of these regulations are collected in the *Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces (QR&O)*.

For the purpose of understanding the legal aspects of leadership in the CF, some of the more important chapters of *QR&O*, aside from those dealing with the *Code of Service Discipline* in Volume II, are Chapter 3 (Rank, Seniority, Command and Precedence), Chapter 4 (Duties and Responsibilities of Officers), Chapter 5 (Duties and Responsibilities of Non-Commissioned Members), and Chapter 19 (Conduct and Discipline).

Together, the *NDA* and *QR&O* address a number of basic values of service life which distinguish it from civilian life:

- concepts of duty and the unlimited liability assumed by members on active service,
- subordination and obedience to authority,
- the strict obligation to obey lawful commands,
- individual and collective discipline, and
- the obligation to promote the welfare of subordinates.

The *NDA* also contemplates that, in addition to regulations, orders and instructions will be issued to the CF. *QR&O* Chapter 1 amplifies the *NDA* by providing by whom and under what conditions such orders and instructions will be issued. Although they come in many forms, the most common written orders of general application to the CF include CDS orders published as part of the *QR&O*, and other orders or instructions issued by or under the authority of the CDS in Canadian Forces Administrative Orders (CFAOs) and Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs). Orders of more specific application include command orders, unit standing orders and routine orders. With respect to the *NDA*, the *Security of Information Act*, regulations, and other orders, all CF members, and especially CF leaders, have a positive duty to “become acquainted with, observe, and enforce” them.

**Other Laws and Social Values.** As a basic principle, it is important to bear in mind, that “though a soldier... incurs from his position legal liabilities from which other men are exempt, he does not (generally speaking) escape thereby from the duties of an ordinary citizen.”<sup>22</sup> With respect to the criminal law of Canada, for example, members of the CF are

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1-7.

<sup>22</sup> A.V. Dicey, *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution*. (London: MacMillan & Co Ltd ), 1939, p. 194.

in a fairly unique position. Under the *Code of Service Discipline*, federal offences, such as those found in the *Criminal Code* or the *Controlled Drugs and Substances Act*, are also service offences that may be dealt with under military law. However, CF members do not acquire any general immunity from the civilian criminal law by virtue of their military status. Instead, they remain subject to the general standards of behaviour demanded by Canadian society at large, in addition to the considerably more exacting standards required in a disciplined professional armed force with its own codes and norms.

The values affirmed by Canadian society, and the resulting standards imposed, are not, obviously, limited to those found in the criminal law. The *Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA)*, for instance, is intended to give effect “to the principle that all individuals should have an opportunity equal with other individuals to make for themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have and to have their needs accommodated, consistent with their duties and obligations as members of society, without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by discriminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability or conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted.”<sup>23</sup> To that end, the *CHRA* prohibits various forms of discrimination that cannot be justified within the specific criteria established under the law.

Another domestic law which impacts directly on the CF and indeed on government officials in general, is the *Financial Administration Act (FAA)*. This legislation, among other things, sets out the norms and expectations in respect of financial management, including the collection, management and disbursement of, and accounting for, public money.

In addition to the *CHRA* and *FAA*, laws such as the *Employment Equity Act*, *Official Languages Act*, the *Privacy Act*, and the *Access to Information Act* also reflect how a number of important Canadian concepts and values apply to the exercise of government: the Government serves the population; the Government should be representative of the population it serves; and the Government should be as transparent as possible. The CF, as a government institution, shares with other government institutions the organizational responsibilities

imposed by legislation related to the framework of government. Its senior leaders in particular have a special responsibility to ensure that these organizational responsibilities are fulfilled, while CF leaders generally have specific obligations arising out of the application of these Acts.

The values of Canadian society with which CF leaders need be both conversant and compliant do not, however, end with domestic civil and military law. Members of the CF, perhaps more than most other Canadians, are responsible for both understanding and following certain essential tenets of international law.

International law regulates the affairs between states and, like domestic law, establishes norms and standards of conduct for government organizations and their agents. Broadly speaking, for example, international law determines when states may resort to the use of force and how they may conduct hostilities during armed conflict. The law of armed conflict, which is derived from both customary international law and from treaties and conventions (such as the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, and Additional Protocols I and II to those Conventions) reflect standards of conduct that apply to Canadian military forces and individual members. These laws bind the CF in the conduct of operations in the international arena either by customary law or because the Government has signed and ratified the relevant treaties and conventions. As agents of the state, CF Officers and NCMs are bound by Canada to follow the provisions of international law when conducting military operations.

The purpose of the law of armed conflict is to regulate the conduct of hostilities and to protect the victims of armed conflict and, in doing so, safeguard the fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of an enemy, such as prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians. It is also designed to spare the civilian population from the dangers arising from military operations and to protect combatants from unnecessary suffering.<sup>24</sup> Reflective of the Canadian value that the nation’s armed forces will perform their international tasks with humanity, it is CF policy that the CF will apply, as a minimum, the principles and spirit of the law of armed conflict in all international operations.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>23</sup> *Canadian Human Rights Act*, section 2.

<sup>24</sup> B-GG-005-027/AF-021 *The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level*, p. 1-1.

<sup>25</sup> *CDS Guidance to Commanding Officers*, Chapter 7: Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level.

**“The concept of ‘international law’ promulgated by Hugo Grotius in seventeenth-century Holland, in which all sovereign states are treated as equal and war is justified only in defense of sovereignty, is fundamentally utopian. The boundaries between peace and war are often unclear, and international agreements are kept only if the power and self-interest are there to sustain them. In the future, do not expect wartime justice to depend on international law; as in ancient times, this justice will depend upon the moral fiber of military commanders themselves, whose roles will often be indistinguishable from those of civilian leaders.”**

Robert Kaplan  
*Warrior Politics*

Of course, the law cannot be applied without knowledge. Consequently, as a party to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Canada has a positive duty in times of both peace and armed conflict, to instruct the CF on the law of armed conflict and to include the study of law of armed conflict in military instruction programs.<sup>26</sup> Commanders therefore have dual responsibilities. First, they must ensure that their subordinates are sufficiently instructed in the law of armed conflict. Secondly, they must then ensure that the subordinates act in a manner consistent with that law. If they do not, the commanders, as well as the subordinates, may be held personally and criminally responsible in respect of illegal acts. Further, the commander’s responsibility for illegal acts of subordinates extends not only to acts which the commander knew were being committed, but also, owing to the circumstances prevailing at the time, *should* have known were being committed.<sup>27</sup>

**“Sun Tzu said patiently, ‘If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, then the general is to blame’.”**

Foreword to *The Art of War*

**Some Overriding Principles.** This is, of course, a very abbreviated outline of the legal framework in which CF leaders must operate. However, it should be sufficient to indicate that, in their many roles and relationships, CF leaders must be guided by a number of important principles derived from the rule of law. Some of these key principles are:

- the military is under civilian control,
- the state and its institutions must act only under lawful authority,
- the Government and its officials are accountable for their actions,
- accountability applies in both the domestic and international arenas,
- the law applies equally to all, and
- where there is room for the exercise of discretion, it must be exercised in good faith and for a proper purpose.

These principles determine the CF’s relationship with the civil authority, and, for the individual leader, affect perhaps even more directly the leader’s relationship to his or her subordinates.

## THE CF AND CIVIL AUTHORITY

As indicated earlier, the military in Canada is subject to the civil authority, that is, the duly elected federal Government as represented by the executive branch. This relationship is established by the Constitution and clearly reflected in the *NDA*. In a democracy, decisions of the Government are carried out through and under the law, and the military is but one instrument for carrying out Government direction.

<sup>26</sup> Additional Protocol I, article 87.

<sup>27</sup> 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 28(1)(a).

**“[T]he military professional has a sense of responsibility to the state and, because the soldier controls deadly force, this responsibility is all important. In a democracy like Canada, the soldier accepts, acknowledges and understands that the political power has the supreme authority and the ultimate responsibility. The government lays down policy and the soldier follows it... The army can agree or disagree about these policies, but it has the responsibility to obey its political masters and not to assume that its judgment should supercede that of the elected leaders.”**

Jack Granatstein  
*Canada's Army – Waging War and Keeping the Peace*

For the individual leader in the CF, this obligation has important implications. The leader derives his or her formal or “legal authority,” from outside the military, namely, the Government. This authority is not conferred to enable the leader to act on his or her own behalf, or indeed, only on behalf of the military in which he or she serves. The powers conferred on military leaders are extraordinary and they are conferred so that the leader may advance the goals of the state in accordance with the law. Misuse of these powers will undermine both the legal authority and personal influence necessary for effective leadership. Hence, for a misuse of powers, the leader may be formally relieved of command.

As part of the responsibilities of the positions they occupy, senior CF leaders may and should attempt to influence the civil authority's defence decisions and policy direction. The provision of professional advice is an important element of the civil-military interface at the national-strategic level of command and leadership. However, once lawful Government direction is issued, it is the leader's duty to ensure that such direction is carried out, regardless of whether the leader personally agrees with the decision or the direction provided.

## SELF-REGULATION, DISCIPLINE, AND THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION

As a part of Canadian society, the armed forces must share society's basic values and beliefs. However, the CF must also maintain the values and norms necessary to enable it to carry out its unique role and functions. Consequently, in contrast to the *Criminal Code*, which sets out the minimum standard of conduct expected of all members of Canadian society, with prescribed punitive sanctions for breach of that standard, the *Code of Service Discipline* does something more. While it includes the prohibition of criminal conduct, the *Code of Service Discipline* is also intended to instill in CF members a sense of duty, integrity, and cohesion significantly beyond that which may be achieved through the imposition of a minimum standard. It is, therefore, instrumental in ensuring that CF members attain the high standards of conduct expected of professionals.

The traditional purposes of military discipline are to control the armed forces to ensure that it does not abuse its power, to ensure that members carry out their assigned orders efficiently and effectively – particularly in the face of danger, and to assimilate the recruit to the institutional values of the military.<sup>28</sup> Its importance has been recognized by Canada's highest court:

“The safety and well-being of Canadians depends considerably on the willingness and readiness of a force of men and women to defend against threats to the nation's security. To maintain the Armed Forces in a state of readiness, the military must be in a position to enforce internal discipline effectively and efficiently. Breaches of military discipline must be dealt with speedily and, frequently, punished more severely than would be the case if a civilian engaged in such conduct.”<sup>29</sup>

Implicit in the Court's affirmation of the need for a separate system of military justice is also a recognition of the critical requirement of the profession of arms to regulate and police itself. As indicated by the discussion of self-regulation in *Duty With Honour*, this “control is accorded the profession by society at large because its function is essential to the well-being of that society and the ability to execute it cannot be

<sup>28</sup> *Military Justice at the Summary Trial Level*, *supra* p. 1-9.

<sup>29</sup> *R. v. Genereux* [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259 at 293.

found elsewhere.<sup>30</sup> Self-regulation of the military profession in Canada does not detract from the military's accountability to the civil authorities, described earlier. On the contrary, effective self-regulation is necessary to sustain the trust and confidence of both the Government and the society served by an armed force.

The legal instruments for self-regulation in the CF were set out earlier: the *NDA*, *QR&O*, and other orders and instructions. However, whether these instruments are effective in maintaining the required level of discipline in the CF depends in large measure on the skill with which leaders exercise their judgment, where they have some degree of discretion.

Within Canadian military law, it is clear that the maintenance of discipline is a function of leadership at all levels and that the authority to maintain discipline at the unit level is concentrated in the hands of the commanding officer. While the *Code of Service Discipline* contains many provisions to ensure procedural fairness, the chain of command must necessarily exercise discretion in all phases of the enforcement of discipline. There is discretion in selecting the appropriate form of investigation and in deciding whether charges are to be laid or proceeded with, in the decision of the presiding officer at a summary trial as to the evidence he or she accepts and the weight that is assigned to it, in deciding whether the burden of proof has been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, and in selecting an appropriate punishment if the person is found guilty.

The proper exercise of discretion is one of the essential tenets of the rule of law. It requires that when decisions are made in applying the law, the decision-maker must act in good faith and must not abuse his or her powers or exercise them dishonestly or arbitrarily, or to achieve an improper purpose. The decision-maker must consider only relevant information and must not discriminate on any inappropriate basis. While there obviously cannot be more than one standard of obedience in an armed force, and while the rules of procedural fairness must be followed in every case, the power to exercise discretion does permit that different cases will be decided differently. The protection that the rule of law provides is that the standard of conduct required of an individual must be established in advance, it must be made known, and it must be enforced evenly and fairly. Whether the system is seen as just or not will depend not only on conformity with the

procedural rules prescribed in the *Code of Service Discipline*, but also on subordinates' evaluation of the manner in which their leaders exercise their discretion in the disciplinary process.

**"It is from military law that the serviceman receives his most tangible indication of the relationship between himself and those who command... If the military law is a just system, then it will be recognized as such by the serviceman and thus it will promote and support the discipline upon which the military organization is based."**

J.B. Fay

"Canadian Military Criminal Law:  
An Examination of Military Justice"

The proper exercise of discretion as a leadership imperative extends, of course, beyond the disciplinary process. It is also fundamental in administrative actions that are routinely taken within the CF, such as those relating to relief from the performance of duties, adjudication of grievances, the administration of counseling and probation, and release decisions. While they may have more profile in the administration of discipline, the values of honesty, fairness, and openness should be inherent in all facets of the relationship between leaders and subordinates.

## OBEDIENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW

It has been said that in order to transform a civilian into a disciplined soldier, the soldier must "upon entering the service, come to live in his relation to command, and to respect it much as he does the force of gravity, or the march of time."<sup>31</sup> The training régime within the CF is one of the positive means designed to instill the habit of obedience. As well, the personal example of the leader, including his or her integrity, skill, and knowledge, is another important factor. Finally, where obedience cannot be ensured by willing compliance, coercive measures, such as those provided by the *Code of Service Discipline*, are available. The *CSD* prescribes a number of offences relating to

<sup>30</sup> *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, p. 59

<sup>31</sup> C.E. Brand, *Roman Military Law*. (Austin: University of Texas Press ), 1968, p. xii.

obedience: section 83 – disobedience of lawful command; section 85 – insubordinate behaviour; and section 129 – conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline.

However, a recurring challenge for both leaders and their subordinates is the extent to which discipline requires *unquestioning* obedience. This issue typifies the tension between the military norm of instinctive obedience to authority and the broader cultural value of individual freedom and self-determination, as well as the tension that sometimes arises between legal and moral obligations. The starting point for resolving this issue is found in *QR&O* Chapter 19. Article 19.015 provides that “Every officer and non-commissioned member shall obey lawful commands and orders of a superior officer.” That direction is amplified by guidance provided in Note B to that article: “Usually there will be no doubt as to whether a command or order is lawful or unlawful. In a situation, however, where the subordinate does not know the law or is uncertain of it he shall, even though he doubts the lawfulness of the command, obey unless the command is manifestly unlawful.”

The concept of “manifestly unlawful” is explained further in Note C to article 19.015: “A manifestly unlawful command or order is one that would appear to a person of ordinary sense and understanding to be clearly illegal; for example, a command by an officer or non-commissioned member to shoot a member for only having used disrespectful words or a command to shoot an unarmed child.”

Additional guidance has been provided by Canada’s highest court. In a case involving war crimes committed in Hungary during World War II, the Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that *military orders must be obeyed unless they are manifestly unlawful*. The Court acknowledged that a primary and necessary objective of military training is to inculcate in every recruit the necessity to obey orders instantly and unhesitatingly, and that, in action, the lives of every member of a unit may depend on instantaneous compliance with orders. In answering the question “When is an order from a superior manifestly unlawful?” the Court ruled:

“It must be one that offends the conscience of every reasonable, right-thinking person; it must be an order which is obviously and flagrantly wrong. The

order cannot be in a grey area or be merely questionable; rather it must patently and obviously be wrong.”<sup>32</sup>

In short, the rule of law always applies. Obedience to lawful orders is mandatory. Likewise, disobedience of manifestly unlawful orders is not only permissible but is also required. Carrying out a manifestly unlawful order is an offence, and, as previously noted, commanders, as well as subordinates, may be held personally and criminally responsible for illegal acts.

The critical criterion in deciding to disobey is that the authorized disobedience of a command must be based on manifest illegality and not on a differing moral choice. This dilemma of moral choice versus the duty of obedience arises perhaps most compellingly in international operations, and has already been alluded to in Chapter 2. The telling point is that, if decisions were based primarily on the moral views of individuals or groups, questions would arise as to whose moral view takes precedence, and whether, for example, the morality is based on a particular religion, or social upbringing, or the views of the majority of soldiers present.

To provide leaders with general guidance in understanding the inter-relationships of the rule of law, obedience, and moral choice, particularly in an operational context, the following summary observations are provided:<sup>33</sup>

- One of the principles underpinning Canadian defence policy is the belief that the rule of law must govern relations between states.
- As professional soldiers, CF members perform a role in maintaining the rule of law both in Canada and beyond our shores.
- Military operations in which Canada participates will be based upon an appropriate lawful authority; internationally, that authority may, for example, be a United Nations Security Council Resolution.
- During operations, the law directly impacts on how, and the degree to which, force may be applied by states, commanders, and individual military personnel and are specified in rules of engagement.

<sup>32</sup> *R. v. Finta* [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701.

<sup>33</sup> These points are drawn from Colonel Ken Watkin, “Warriors, Obedience and the Rule of Law,” *Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2000/2001.

- The international laws to which Canada is bound or has agreed will apply in the conduct of military operations and bind all commanders to comply with them; therefore, a commander's intent can never be to countenance disobedience of the law of armed conflict.
- Values reflected in the law take precedence over the moral views of individuals and groups and adherence to the law must be demanded by leaders at all levels.

In short, the rule of law applies at all levels of an operation, commencing with the legal authority to conduct it and flowing to the acts of the individual soldier.

## SUMMARY

The rule of law affirms:


- that the social order established under reasonable laws made by reasonable people is preferable to other forms of social order;
- that the law is the supreme authority in society; and
- that everyone is equally subject to the law, including government officials, the armed forces, and private individuals.

For CF leaders, the law generally stipulates both what leaders have to do and must also avoid doing in regard to their obligations to the Government and the Canadian people, the conduct of operations, and the control and administration of CF members. Under the rule of law, CF leaders have obligations (1) to obey the law, that is, to use any authorities and powers provided by the law in accordance with the law, (2) to instruct CF members on their obligations under the law, and (3) to uphold the law, that is, to defend the rule of law as an important societal value and to enforce discipline and obedience to the law. Relevant laws include, but are not limited to, the Constitution, federal statutes (such as the *National Defence Act*), regulations, orders, and international law (in particular, the law of armed conflict).

To paraphrase John Keegan, cited at the beginning of this Chapter, disciplined, obedient and law-abiding armies are a mark of civilization. Armies of this quality are not established or maintained without effective leadership. It is the leaders who ensure that the values of society are both protected and respected by its armed forces. It is the leaders, too, who foster the values and norms unique to the military. Their navigation through the complexities of these responsibilities will be assisted by one of the central values of Canadian society – the rule of law.



# Responsibilities of CF Leaders



General Responsibilities of CF Leaders .....	46
Functional Responsibilities of CF Leaders .....	48
• Responsibilities for leading people .....	50
• Responsibilities for leading the institution .....	51
Understanding and Accepting Leadership Responsibilities .....	52
Annex A: The “Principles of Leadership” in a Complex World .....	55

# Responsibilities of CF Leaders

Chapter 2 outlined a five-dimensional institutional-effectiveness framework that served as the basis for defining effective leadership in the CF (Chapter 3 elaborated this framework in reference to the rule of law). At a high level of generality, the CF effectiveness framework and the resulting definition of effective CF leadership assert that the duty of CF leaders can be summarized in terms of five broad value or effectiveness dimensions: accomplishing the mission, structuring and integrating teams and units for optimum efficiency and co-ordination, ensuring member well-being and commitment, establishing and maintaining capabilities to adapt to change, and regulating conduct in accordance with the value systems of the Canadian military ethos. While these high-level statements are useful generalizations that are applicable to all CF leaders, they are not sufficiently specific as guides to leader behaviour, training and development, or performance evaluation.

Experience and research have shown, however, that there are clearly definable instrumental tasks that must be performed by military leaders if they are to achieve the desired results. Such obligations are often formally specified in duties and responsibilities – statements of what the organization expects of its leaders. They describe, in effect, how leaders

should use their authority and influence in the service of collective effectiveness. This chapter expands on the effectiveness framework in Figure 2-1 and provides a more detailed description of the responsibilities of CF leaders as they relate to the general functions of leading people and leading the institution.

**“Leaders adapt their behavior to the role requirements, constraints, and demands of the leadership situation. One theory for describing how the situation influences behavior is *role theory*.... The role expectations from superiors, peers, subordinates, and outsiders are a major influence on a leader’s behavior.”**

Gary Yukl & David Van Fleet  
In *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.)

## GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CF LEADERS

The responsibilities of appointed CF leaders are communicated to them in a variety of ways. For example, regulations convey in a summary fashion the general responsibilities under military law of all Officers and NCMs – namely, the regulation of conduct and enforcement of discipline, support of the civil authority, promotion of subordinate well-being, and conscientious resource management. In the main, these legally mandated responsibilities (*Queen’s Regulations & Orders* 4.02 and 5.01) fall within the purview of Officers and NCMs in leadership roles.

In very broad strokes, role expectations relating to the exercise of authority, training, and discipline are similarly communicated in the commissions and warrants granted to Officers and Warrant Officers. At a very fine-grained level of analysis, the Officer General Specification (OGS) and the NCM General Specification (NCMGS) detail basic military and *common leadership* responsibilities and tasks across career development periods, as well as the knowledge and skills needed for each task or cluster of tasks.

#### QR&O 4.02 – GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF OFFICERS

An officer shall:

- (a) become acquainted with, observe and enforce:
  - (i) the *National Defence Act*,
  - (ii) the *Official Secrets Act*,
  - (iii) QR&O, and
  - (iv) all other regulations, rules, orders and instructions that pertain to the performance of the officer's duties;
- (b) afford to all persons employed in the public service such assistance in the performance of their duties as is practical;
- (c) promote the welfare, efficiency and good discipline of all subordinates;
- (d) ensure the proper care and maintenance, and prevent the waste, of all public and non-public property within the officer's control; and
- (e) report to the proper authority any infringement of the pertinent statutes, regulations, rules, orders and instructions governing the conduct of any person subject to the Code of Service Discipline when the officer cannot deal adequately with the matter.

#### QR&O 5.01 – GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF NON-COMMISSIONED MEMBERS

A non-commissioned member shall:

- (a) become acquainted with, observe and enforce:
  - (i) the *National Defence Act*,
  - (ii) the *Official Secrets Act*,
  - (iii) QR&O, and
  - (iv) all other regulations, rules, orders and instructions that pertain to the performance of the member's duties;
- (b) afford to all persons employed in the public service such assistance in the performance of their duties as is practical;
- (c) promote the welfare, efficiency and good discipline of all who are subordinate to the member;
- (d) ensure the proper care and maintenance and prevent the waste of all public and non-public property within the member's control; and
- (e) report to the proper authority any infringement of the pertinent statutes, regulations, rules, orders and instructions governing the conduct of any person subject to the Code of Service Discipline.

## FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CF LEADERS

Table 4-1 provides a summary of CF leader responsibilities as a set of middle-range descriptions falling somewhere between the generality of the five dimensions of effective CF leadership and the detail of occupational specifications.

Responsibilities are broken out in relation to the two kinds of effectiveness dimensions described earlier – essential outcomes and conduct values. In a very real sense, they flesh out the concept of *duty* as a professional, moral, or legal obligation (discussed in Chapter 2 of *Duty with Honour*) and what it should mean to CF leaders.

**Table 4-1 | Responsibilities of CF leaders as they relate to major functions and effectiveness dimensions.**

Effectiveness Dimensions	Major Leadership Functions	
	Leading People	Leading the Institution
<b>Mission Success</b>	<p><i>Achieve professional competence &amp; pursue self-improvement.</i></p> <p><i>Clarify objectives &amp; intent.</i></p> <p><i>Solve problems; make timely decisions.</i></p> <p>Plan &amp; organize; assign tasks.</p> <p><i>Direct; motivate by persuasion, example, &amp; sharing risks and hardships.</i></p> <p>Secure &amp; manage task resources.</p> <p><i>Train individuals &amp; teams under demanding &amp; realistic conditions.</i></p>	<p>Establish strategic direction &amp; goals.</p> <p>Create necessary operational capabilities (force structure, equipment, command &amp; control).</p> <p>Exercise professional judgment in relation to military advice &amp; use of forces.</p> <p>Reconcile competing obligations &amp; values, set priorities, &amp; allocate resources.</p> <p>Develop the leadership cadre.</p>
<b>Internal Integration</b>	<p>Structure &amp; co-ordinate activities; establish standards &amp; routines.</p> <p>Build teamwork &amp; cohesion.</p> <p>Keep superiors informed of activities &amp; developments.</p> <p><i>Keep subordinates informed; explain events &amp; decisions.</i></p> <p>Understand &amp; follow policies &amp; procedures.</p> <p>Monitor; inspect; correct; evaluate.</p>	<p>Develop a coherent body of policy.</p> <p>Support intellectual inquiry &amp; develop advanced doctrine.</p> <p>Manage meaning; use media &amp; symbolism to maintain cohesion &amp; morale.</p> <p>Develop &amp; maintain effective information &amp; administrative systems.</p> <p>Develop &amp; maintain audit &amp; evaluation systems.</p>
<b>Member Well-being &amp; Commitment</b>	<p><i>Mentor, educate, &amp; develop subordinates.</i></p> <p><i>Treat subordinates fairly; respond to their concerns; represent their interests.</i></p> <p>Resolve interpersonal conflicts.</p> <p>Consult subordinates on matters that affect them.</p> <p><i>Monitor morale &amp; ensure subordinate well-being.</i></p> <p>Recognize &amp; reward success.</p>	<p>Accommodate personal needs in professional development/career system.</p> <p>Enable individual &amp; collective mechanisms of voice.</p> <p>Ensure fair complaint resolution.</p> <p>Honour the social contract; maintain strong QOL &amp; member-support systems.</p> <p>Establish recognition &amp; reward systems.</p>

**Table 4-1 | Responsibilities of CF leaders as they relate to major functions and effectiveness dimensions. (cont.)**

Effectiveness Dimensions	Major Leadership Functions	
	Leading People	Leading the Institution
<b>External Adaptability</b>	Maintain situational awareness; seek information; keep current. Anticipate the future. Support innovation; experiment. Learn from experience & those who have experience. Develop effective external relationships (joint, inter-agency, multi-national).	Gather & analyze intelligence; define future threats & challenges. Initiate & lead change. Foster organizational learning. Master civil-military relations. Develop external networks & collaborative strategic relationships. Conduct routine external reporting.
<b>Military Ethos</b>	<i>Seek and accept responsibility.</i> Socialize new members into CF values/conduct system, history, & traditions. Exemplify and reinforce the military ethos; maintain order & discipline; uphold professional norms. Establish climate of respect for individual rights & diversity.	Clarify responsibilities; enforce accountabilities. Develop & maintain professional identity; align culture with ethos; preserve CF heritage. Exemplify and reinforce the military ethos; develop & maintain military justice system. Establish an ethical culture.

What the Table also illustrates, in a fairly convincing way, is that, at the level of responsibilities, there are qualitative differences between the functions of leading people in the CF and leading the CF as an institution. The responsibilities listed in this table include:

- traditional principles of military leadership (shown in italics and discussed further in Annex A);
- common and relevant dimensions of leader behaviour found in empirically derived inventories;
- representative leadership tasks from the OGS and NCMGS; and
- responsibilities identified in charter documents for CF leader development over the next decade or more (e.g., *Officership 2020*, *NCM Corps 2020*) and in contemporary studies of strategic leadership.

At first glance, many of the responsibilities listed in Table 4-1 seem to have little to do with conventional ideas about leadership as a real-time process of purposefully influencing performance and conduct. Some obviously are (e.g., ‘Direct; motivate by persuasion, example, and sharing risks and hardships,’ ‘Establish strategic direction and goals’). And this is also why responsibilities relating to discipline and professional values (e.g., ‘Reinforce the military ethos; maintain order and discipline; uphold professional norms’) are included in the Table.

Other behaviours, by way of contrast, have a developmental or pro-active quality. Some, for example, relate to personal development (e.g., ‘Achieve personal competence and pursue self-improvement,’ ‘Learn from experience and those who have experience’), but they are included here because they enhance a leader’s personal power and the potential to influence others. Several behaviours have general motivational properties whose payoffs will occur later (e.g., ‘Mentor, educate, and develop subordinates,’ ‘Manage meaning; use

media and symbolism to maintain cohesion and morale'). A number build trust and commitment (e.g., 'Treat members fairly; respond to their concerns; represent their interests,' 'Honour the social contract; maintain strong QOL and member-support systems'), essential pre-requisites for the willing acceptance of leader direction and influence. Many are developmental behaviours (e.g., 'Train individuals and teams under demanding and realistic conditions,' 'Support intellectual inquiry and develop advanced doctrine,' 'Build teamwork and cohesion,' 'Develop external networks and collaborative relationships'), designed to augment performance capabilities and thereby facilitate direction and influence at some point in the future. One of the keys to understanding the responsibilities in Table 4-1 lies in recognizing the real-time and future-oriented dimensions of military leadership. All of the behaviours in the Table have something to do with influencing mission performance or the capability and potential to perform missions. Effective leaders *direct, motivate, and enable others* to perform, but they also *develop and improve individual, group, and organizational capabilities* that contribute to performance.

**"Performing one's duty embraces the full scope of military professional excellence. It calls for individuals to train hard, pursue professional self-development, and carry out their tasks in a manner that reflects pride in themselves, their unit, and their profession."**

*Duty with Honour:  
The Profession of Arms in Canada*

**Responsibilities for Leading People.** In exercising direct influence related to the mission success dimension of effectiveness, CF leaders are expected to prepare for, and conduct or support, operations, and generally implement the policy direction of superiors. Here, in the commander or director role, the emphasis is on getting the job done in a professional manner. As such, leaders at all levels are expected to exemplify professional competence and commitment, train hard to improve individual and team performance, set and clarify goals, plan and execute tasks, allocate and manage task resources, and supervise individual and group performance.

With respect to the *internal integration* domain, the primary roles of the Officer-NCM leadership team are those of co-ordinator, team-builder, and monitor. In the co-ordinator role, leaders provide a common understanding of activities, maintain good internal communications, and establish routine procedures to facilitate coherent action. As team-builders, the leadership cadre creates a sense of shared identity, and orchestrates training experiences that build mutual support and teamwork. In the monitor role, leaders continually assess the operating status of the unit or sub-unit, by generally ensuring compliance with rules and standards, conducting evaluations and inspections, reviewing reports, and holding subordinates accountable for their actions.

The primary leader roles pertaining to the *member well-being and commitment* dimension of effectiveness are those of sustainer and developer. In the sustainer role, the Officer-NCM leadership team is responsible for enhancing the meaningfulness of individual tasks and jobs, establishing a healthy unit climate, managing interpersonal conflict, responding to complaints and concerns, representing the individual and collective interests of their people to administrative staffs and superiors, and generally monitoring and building morale and commitment to serve. In the developer role, leaders protect depth and continuity in teams and units by cultivating potential replacement leaders. They mentor people in apprenticeship positions and challenging assignments, and encourage and support subordinate participation in educational, professional, and personal-growth activities over the career span.

To enhance the *external adaptability* of teams and units and their preparedness for potential demands and challenges, leaders at all levels must be learners and innovators. As learners, leaders seek to understand the context of tasks and assignments, keep informed and up to date on the bigger picture, draw on the knowledge of more experienced unit or staff members to prepare their teams and units for both known scenarios and unpredictable contingencies. They are skilled in exercising influence in joint, inter-agency, and multi-national environments. Following exercises, operations, projects, and other activities, they conduct lessons-learned reviews to improve operating procedures and practices. As innovators, leaders support the DND/CF philosophy of continuous improvement, and are open to experimenting with procedures and structures to strengthen

## LEARNING FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHERS – NAVAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN THE GULF WAR, 1990

“One can always learn from those who went before. We obtained the post deployment reports from both the UK and US operations in the Arabian Gulf during the ‘Tanker War’ and the UK Armilla Patrols. We had action teams in Halifax to pass on these lessons... En route we took advantage of several NATO nations who helped us with services and training to prepare us fully for any eventuality. We pre-ran every scenario we could think of including all-out war in our Fleet School and Warfare Centre in Halifax before we left. Each watch from each ship went through this training. We knew how best to use each ship, the Task Group and our sailors from everything from boarding unco-operative merchant ships to firing missiles. Asking the ‘what if this happens’ questions prior to any mission is essential. Knowing from your allies what those situations could be and asking for their help is also critical.”

Rear-Admiral D.E. Miller

In *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*

team and unit capabilities. Consistent with this philosophy, they foster initiative, innovation, and experiential learning in their subordinates.

With respect to the *military ethos*, the Officer-NCM leadership team has a joint responsibility for continuing and extending the professional socialization of new members that begins in entry training. Individually and collectively, they must, at a minimum, maintain the military’s traditions of good order and discipline. Over and above that, they have to create the conditions that will foster acceptance and internalization of the ethos. In part, this means they have to be good teachers, but, more importantly, it means that they have to exhibit military professionalism and professional cohesion in their day-to-day behaviour.

**Responsibilities for Leading the Institution.** To support the objective of *mission success*, senior leaders must perform the roles of visionary, entrepreneur, and political advisor. In the visionary role, the senior leadership team must anticipate the future, both realistically and imaginatively, and establish a comprehensive strategic direction for the CF over the long term. As entrepreneurs, senior leaders must set achievable goals, match resource allocations to goals and priorities, and build the operational capabilities necessary to fulfill today’s and tomorrow’s defence tasks, including, in particular, the development of the next-generation leadership cadre. In the advisor role, the senior leader must be capable of securing the trust and confidence of the top levels of military and civilian leadership, and must be able to provide, taking into account requirements and capabilities, judicious professional counsel concerning the deployment and use of military assets.

In support of *internal integration* objectives, senior leaders communicate their strategic intent and provide authoritative guidance through a body of coherent policy and advanced doctrine. They also play the roles of spokesperson and system manager. As a spokesperson for the institution, the senior leader creates a common picture of reality through the effective use of symbols and media, performs ceremonial functions, and represents the CF to the public. As a system manager, the leader must ensure that various support systems of the organization function as a co-ordinated and integrated whole, while ensuring that the effectiveness and efficiency of all systems are periodically evaluated to determine their utility and efficiency.

At the institutional level of leadership, effectiveness in assuring *member well-being and commitment* calls for senior leaders to assume the role of personnel champion. In this capacity, senior leaders must thoroughly understand **social contract** principles,<sup>34</sup> must be pro-active in providing satisfactory conditions of service, and they must ensure that fair mechanisms exist to respond to members’ concerns about their treatment. They must manage the personal expectations of members while fostering their commitment to serve through appropriate reward and recognition practices. Similarly, senior leaders must also try to balance the obligations of military service with the ability to accommodate individual needs.

<sup>34</sup> As discussed in *Duty with Honour*, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs identified the following five principles of commitment to CF members and their families: fair and equitable compensation; ready access to suitable and affordable accommodation; access to support services; suitable recognition, care, and compensation for veterans and those injured in the service of Canada; and reasonable career progression and respectful treatment during service, including the provision of appropriate equipment and kit for tasks.

Ensuring the *external adaptability* of the CF is a crucial strategic-leadership responsibility, requiring senior leaders to take on the roles of broker and change-leader. In the broker role, the senior leader must develop and manage external relationships with the Government, government departments (especially DND) and other central agencies, other militaries, and private and public organizations. To position the CF favourably in terms of influence and collaborative arrangements, senior leaders must have a thorough understanding of Canadian society and its institutions and must be able to explain the CF to the Government, central agencies, external organizations, and the Canadian people. Both formal linkages and personal networks are equally important to this role. As a change agent, the senior leader develops and makes the most of capabilities in mid- to long-range environmental scanning and analysis, thereby acquiring advance understanding of the forces of change and the ability to develop competitive advantages through transformational initiatives.

**“Effective executives are not passive recipients of environmental contingencies; instead, they seek to engage the environment and shape these contingencies.”**

Stephen Zaccaro  
*Models and Theories of Executive Leadership*

Within their broad responsibilities for stewardship of the profession, senior leaders have an obligation to promote policies and programs that sustain the health of the profession, especially in the areas of professional development, history and heritage, and military justice and discipline. With particular reference to the *military ethos* dimension of effectiveness, this entails a combination of personal example, systematic instruction, and institutional reinforcement, namely: serving as a role-model of professional conduct that is above reproach; establishing broadly based programs of education and training in law, ethics, and military history; and aligning the CF’s culture in use (its decisions and practices) with the values and ideals of the military ethos.

## UNDERSTANDING AND ACCEPTING LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES

Leadership performance, like performance generally, depends on a mix of individual and situational factors. Relevant individual factors include: *understanding* the leadership task, having the requisite *ability* and *motivation* to lead, and having *confidence* in one’s ability to perform as a leader. Situational factors comprise all those *external conditions* (e.g., people, time, equipment, guidance and support, physical environment, etc.) that could enable or hamper performance of the task. Obviously, the first proviso for success in this ‘performance equation’ is understanding the task. A leader’s understanding of what he or she is expected to do sets the course for everything that follows – the direction and level of personal effort, the application of professional knowledge and skill, and how authority and influence are exercised. The duties and responsibilities summarized in Table 4-1 are intended to instill that basic understanding.

While much of what is expected of CF leaders is communicated to them by superiors – as a set of role responsibilities such as those in Table 4-1, through terms of reference for a position or appointment, or as real-time directives and orders, leader action may also be reactively driven to action by some chance event or crisis. Similarly, leaders’ actions may be triggered by the detection of an individual, group, or system deviation from a performance standard. Or they may be initiated by leaders themselves to address a requirement they have independently anticipated or identified. In other words, the locus of control over leader activity will often be external to the leader but also resides within the leader. This distinction is important because it speaks to a qualitative aspect of leadership. When a leader demonstrates a behavioural pattern that is essentially reactive to external direction or conditions, we tend to label this as a passive or custodial leadership style. On the other hand, when a leader exhibits a pattern of self-direction and internal control, we typically think of the leader as having an active or dynamic leadership style.

Dynamism and the associated qualities of energy, initiative, and boldness are considered hallmark attributes of effective leaders. Such leaders are not satisfied with either “Good enough” standards or with “This is the way we’ve always done things” explanations. Experienced leaders who have achieved technical and professional mastery and a mature self-confidence are, at the very least, expected to question if not challenge the status quo, to demonstrate initiative, and generally to make things happen. In fact, the more senior the



leaders and the greater their power, the stronger the expectation is that they will act this way – assertively, and at times forcefully, but without necessarily being aggressive. In sum, to discharge their responsibilities effectively, CF leaders do *what they are expected to do* and *what they determine is necessary to do* in order to accomplish CF objectives. The success with which they discharge their responsibilities ultimately depends on the leader’s intrinsic sense of duty and the willingness with which the responsibilities of leadership are accepted.

**“Leaders venture out.... All leaders challenge the process. Leaders are pioneers – people who are willing to step out into the unknown. They search for opportunities to innovate, grow, and improve.”**

James M. Kouzes & Barry Z. Posner  
*The Leadership Challenge*

### **ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY – KOSOVO AIR CAMPAIGN, SPRING 1999**

“On 24 March, 1999, just before midnight, four CF-18 Hornets launched from Aviano Air Base in Italy en route to a pre-planned target located in Kosovo. . . . Over the ensuing 78 days and nights, the six, then twelve, then eighteen Canadian CF-18s from Aviano flew a total of 678 sorties over nearly 2600 flying hours. . . .

As the intensity of the conflict increased, so did the Canadian commitment to the NATO force. . . . Extraordinary performance became commonplace, but some individuals gave even more. One of these was Sergeant D.M. Neal of 1 Air Maintenance Squadron from Cold Lake. In addition to his full-time task of building some two dozen laser-guided bombs each day, Sergeant Neal often visited the flight line where he could share his experience with newly trained Weapons Load Officers, ensuring that they were fully prepared for the hectic pace of operations. He also set up training programs to qualify load crews on the newly cleared GBU-10 two-thousand pound laser-guided bombs, and made suggestions and adjustments to improve the safety and efficiency of combat operations. Leading through tireless example, Sergeant Neal was frequently on the job for continuous eighteen-hour days during the

conflict. He established a superb rapport with co-located USAF armament personnel, routinely negotiating for the loan of spare parts needed to sustain Canadian production of bombs.

As the stocks of modern GBU guidance kits began to dwindle for all NATO forces, the allies were compelled to use less-than-modern guidance kits. This brought about a great deal of extra work for all national contingents in Aviano as they required an individual laser code to be manually ‘burned’ into their circuits. Faced with this problem, Sergeant Neal, on his own initiative, became the local expert on this guidance system. Through tireless research he determined the Americans were incorrectly using their own system to burn laser codes, and then tactfully showed the USAF armament technicians how to do it properly. This enabled the Americans to salvage over 90 percent of the bombs previously considered to be unserviceable, saving them literally tens of millions of dollars. Of greater importance, Sergeant Neal’s initiative and ingenuity saved the bombing campaign from suffering critical shortages, as bomb stocks had been severely depleted by this point.”

Lieutenant-Colonel David L. Bashow, et al.

“Mission Ready: Canada’s Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign”

## SUMMARY

In very general terms, leaders in the CF – both formally appointed leaders and emergent leaders – are responsible for: accomplishing the mission, structuring and integrating teams and units for optimum efficiency and co-ordination, ensuring member well-being and commitment, establishing and maintaining capabilities to adapt to change, and regulating conduct in accordance with the value systems of the Canadian military ethos. Many of these responsibilities are reinforced in the statements of duties found in regulations and in the role expectations symbolically communicated through warrants and commissioning scrolls.

More detailed guidance concerning the responsibilities of CF leaders is summarized in Table 4-1. Although not exhaustive, the Table describes most of the things leaders at the tactical/operational levels (leading people) and at the strategic level (leading the institution) should do to achieve important CF outcomes in a professional manner. In effect, Table 4-1 summarizes the CF's basic expectations of its leaders.

In addition to satisfying these particular expectations, CF leaders are also expected to act like leaders – that is, to be ahead of issues and problems, to be dynamic, to actively apply their intelligence, imagination, and judgment, and to challenge the status quo with fresh ideas and disciplined independence. Leaders are expected to “venture out” and take calculated risks. In fact, a leader's freedom of action is limited only by his or her imagination and resolve. Thus, in addition to carrying out assigned responsibilities capably and efficiently, effective CF leaders also apply their intelligence, imagination, and initiative and do *what they decide* is necessary to make their team, their unit, or the CF stronger and more effective. This is the broader meaning of duty as it applies to leaders in the CF.

# Annex A

## THE “PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP” IN A COMPLEX WORLD

Earlier versions of CF leadership manuals endorsed ten principles of leadership as enduring guides to effective leadership practice in the CF. The leadership manuals of some allied forces list similar principles (for example, the current Australian Army manual does, whereas the latest

U.S. Army manual does not). Most serving members of the CF are familiar with these principles, even though they have been subject to changes in wording between the 1973 and 1978 versions of CF leadership manuals. In the present statement of leadership doctrine, the essence of these principles has been preserved. The relationship between the traditional principles and the leader responsibilities listed in Table 4-1 is shown below in Table 4A-1.

**Table 4A-1 | Equivalence between traditional leadership principles and the responsibilities in Table 4-1.**

<i>1973/1978 Principles of Leadership</i>	<i>Equivalent Responsibilities in Table 4-1</i>
Achieve professional competence.	Achieve professional competence & pursue self-improvement.
Know your own strengths and limitations and pursue self-improvement.	
Seek and accept responsibility.	Seek and accept responsibility.
Lead by example.	Direct; motivate by persuasion, example, & sharing risks and hardships.
Make sure that your subordinates know your meaning and intent, and then lead them to the accomplishment of the mission.	Clarify objectives & intent.
Know your subordinates and promote their welfare.	Treat members fairly; respond to their concerns; represent their interests. Monitor morale & ensure subordinate well-being.
Develop the leadership potential of your personnel.	Mentor, educate, & develop subordinates.
Make sound and timely decisions.	Solve problems; make timely decisions.
Train your subordinates as a team and employ them up to their capabilities.	Train individuals & teams under demanding & realistic conditions.
Keep your personnel informed of the mission, the changing situation, and the overall picture.	Keep subordinates informed; explain events & decisions.

Some of the original principles have been shortened; a few have been expanded. In any case, what this comparison reveals is that the “principles of leadership” remain valid as basic statements of a military leader’s responsibilities. In this sense, they represent a condensed version of the wisdom of the tribe, lessons learned from hard experience and passed on to succeeding generations.

What the comparison also shows, however, is that the traditional principles of leadership do not tell the whole story about the duties and responsibilities of military leaders. All of the original principles are oriented to the tactical level of leadership, and many of these are primarily concerned with accomplishing the mission, while a few address issues related to subordinate welfare. With regard to other important areas of effectiveness and responsibility, on the other hand, the principles are silent – for example, maintaining professional standards of conduct and discipline. Furthermore, no reference is made to leader responsibilities at the institutional level.

Evidently, the principles of leadership as taught until now have essentially focussed on leadership at the team level, and, in that respect, they do provide a beginning leader with useful guidance on the basic responsibilities of team leadership. But with greater experience, responsibility, and authority, leaders have to acquire a more extensive understanding of their duties and responsibilities if they are to deal effectively with the many demands of a complex world, a complex operating environment, and a correspondingly complex role. Beyond basic leadership training, this will include the full range of responsibilities shown in the left-hand column of Table 4-1. And ultimately, in preparation for senior appointments, CF leaders will have to understand and take on the responsibilities listed in the right-hand column of Table 4-1.

# Leader Power, Leader Characteristics, and Influence Behaviours

Classes of Power .....	58
Leader Characteristics .....	60
Basic Influence Model .....	62
Achieving the Right Balance of Position and Personal Power .....	63
Influence Behaviours .....	64
Transformational Leadership and Related Concepts .....	67
• Charismatic leadership .....	67
• Transformational leadership .....	68
• Visionary leadership .....	70
• What transformational leadership means in the CF .....	70
Responses to Authority and Influence .....	72
The Importance of Trust .....	73

# Leader Power, Leader Characteristics, and Influence Behaviours

5

A good deal of what CF leaders are responsible for must be accomplished through others. Hence to lead is to influence others. What makes influence possible is social power, in all its variety. As used here, social power should be understood simply as the *potential* to influence others. In other words, it is the capacity to affect the beliefs, values, attitudes, behaviour, or performance of individuals or groups to achieve some purpose. When social power achieves its intended effect, it becomes actual influence. The mere possession of a certain attribute or talent (analytical ability for example) is not the same thing as power. To translate into power, some characteristic of the person or the person's position must be perceived as situationally relevant or meaningful by others. For example, a Chief Petty Officer First Class (CPO1) introducing himself at a neighbourhood barbecue will be treated like 'just one of the neighbours.' But presenting himself to a group of sailors, he will be treated with greater deference because the power associated with his rank and experience is relevant and meaningful to their lives aboard ship and in the navy.

**"Power is defined... as the potential ability to influence behavior, to change the course of events, to overcome resistance, and to get people to do things that they might not otherwise do."**

Jeffrey Pfeffer

*Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations*

Previous chapters have addressed much of what is often described as the *content* of leadership, what leadership in the CF is about – the major functions performed by CF leaders, the values that are intended to guide leaders, and their responsibilities. This chapter continues that theme with a description of the major sources of leader power and influence. A basic distinction is made between the power that is conferred on individuals through rank and appointment and the power that individuals acquire through personal development, that is the development of personal knowledge, skills, and other qualities necessary for the performance of leadership roles in the CF.

The chapter then directs attention to basic *process* issues in leadership, specifically, the different kinds of behaviour leaders use to influence others and the circumstances in which they are most appropriate. Additional attention is given to the topic of transformational leadership, a way of specifying the superior leadership required in achieving changes in people and organizations and when the trust and commitment of others are critical to performance and effectiveness. Differences in how subordinates may respond to leaders are also explained, and the chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the trust relationship.

## CLASSES OF POWER

There are two major classes of social power: *position power*, which reflects attributes of an appointment or rank within a larger social structure of authority and power; and *personal power*, which reflects the socially valued or useful qualities of an individual. Position power is conferred, and is, therefore, temporary. People gain and lose position power on occupying and leaving certain positions, appointments, or ranks. But appointed leaders can also compromise their legitimacy by improper conduct or ineffective performance, and, in some cases, may be relieved from duty as a result of such conduct or performance. Personal power, on the other hand, is earned entirely by individual effort and adaptive

learning, and therefore is highly portable. However, like position power, it too is maintained by effective conduct and performance.

The fact that leader power, the potential to influence others, is not a static thing, but can be increased or diminished by the conduct and performance of the leader, has some important implications. Because power is an attribution made by others, and because leaders cannot control how others perceive and interpret their behaviour, leaders have to be mindful of the fact that they are always 'on parade' and that their conduct and performance will add to, or detract from, their power credits (this is one of the reasons military professionals emphasize the notions of military service as a way of life and the 24/7 applicability of the military ethos and *Code of Service Discipline*). To the extent that leaders demonstrate personal competence, good conduct, consideration of others, character, and other valued qualities, and to the extent that they use their authority appropriately and fairly, they will accrue power and enhance their capacity to influence others. Conversely, professional lapses or failings will erode their power, perceived legitimacy, and capacity to lead.

Five sub-classes of power are associated with hierarchical position or rank – legitimate, reward, coercive, information, and ecological:

- **Legitimate power** is the capacity to impose a sense of obligation or duty on another, and may be based on law, other formal authority such as terms of reference for a specific role or position, and/or social norms and stabilized expectations for a role or position. The formal authority of commanders and other superior officers in the CF is a central feature of military organization under the *National Defence Act*, and is reflected in the importance attached to rank, marks of respect, the integrity of the chain of command, and the rites and symbols of promotion, commissioning, and change of command.

**"Authority specifies an organizational member's perceived area of freedom of action and interaction, along with the formally delegated or informally recognized right to initiate action."**

Bernard M. Bass  
*Bass and Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership*

- **Reward power** is the capacity to provide others with things they desire or value. Rewards may be tangible (financial, time off), symbolic (promotion, military honours), or social (praise, recognition, support for personal endeavours). In the CF, the power to distribute tangible rewards increases with rank and centrality of authority, but leaders at all rank levels are equally capable of demonstrating appreciation for exceptional effort or a job well done.
- **Coercive power** is the capacity to take away rewards and privileges or administer sanctions and punishments. Coercive actions may be moderate (pressure/intimidation tactics, warnings, counselling and probation) or more severe (formal punishments such as reprimands, fines, detention). Although severe punishments, such as detention, may only be awarded by commanding officers or military judges, coercive power is broadly distributed in the CF and derives from three sources: (1) superior rank and the latent disciplinary power it represents; (2) the formal duty of every officer and NCM to enforce the *Code of Service Discipline*, either by laying a charge or by reporting an offence to someone with the authority to lay charges; and (3) the discretionary authority of superiors to assign tedious or unappealing duties to subordinates, to withdraw privileges, or to adversely influence career recommendations and decisions.
- **Information power** is the capacity to access and distribute important information,<sup>35</sup> which is typically a function of where one is located in the military hierarchy and communications stream. Because organizational centrality is a determinant of information power in the CF, staff who work closely with people in key appointments also acquire considerable information power.
- **Ecological power** refers to control over the physical and social environment, resources, technology, and organization of work and thus creates the potential for indirect influence over others. As previously noted, indirect influence of this kind is distributed across rank levels in the CF, but the authority to make major changes in organizational structure, technology, and both the physical and cultural environments is proportionally greater at senior levels of leadership.

<sup>35</sup> As defined by information theory, information is any signal that reduces uncertainty, or what might be taken as "news." It usually has transient value because it can only be used to advantage when it is not common knowledge or does not require special skills to use it, in which case it becomes an element of expertise.

Personal power includes three sub-classes – expert, referent, and connection:

- **Expert power** is the capacity to provide others with needed knowledge or advice. Expert power derives from unique knowledge, skill, or experience and gives rise to the technical-proficiency model of leadership that distinguishes professional armed forces from other forms of military organization. The extensive investments made in training and education in the CF attest to the high value placed on military expertise and proficiency. As a unique body of knowledge and skill, expertise also confers considerable power and influence potential on those specialists who are able to manage an organization's strategic contingencies (e.g., military lawyers when human rights challenges imperil operational capability; information technology specialists as the importance of information dominance and reliance on computer and communications technologies increase).
- **Referent power** is the capacity to provide another with feelings of personal acceptance, approval, efficacy, or worth. Referent power is generally based on the respect and esteem of followers for a leader. It may also derive from followers' identification with and desire to emulate a leader. Qualities that increase referent power include friendliness and likeability, concern for and loyalty to others, courage, authenticity, integrity, and other forms of selfless and benevolent behaviour.
- **Connection power** refers to the capacity to access useful information, resources, and opportunities. It is similar to information power but should be understood as a broader property of *personal* networks and relationships, and so, unlike information power, is not tied to a position. Personal contacts and ties with other military professionals, influential figures, or sources of valued expertise represent several forms of connection power, or what is sometimes described as **social capital**.

Personal power is based on individual characteristics that are acquired with varying degrees of difficulty and at different rates of development. Many performance skills are easily taught and can be rapidly acquired. Personality traits, on the other hand, take time to develop and can be difficult to modify.

## LEADER CHARACTERISTICS

Among the individual qualities that regularly turn up in the research on what makes leaders effective, we find such characteristics as: intelligence, competence, integrity, fair and considerate treatment of others, open and progressive thinking, and, additionally in the military literature, courage. Many other characteristics could be added to the list, and various compilations of essential leadership qualities show both similarities and differences. Much of the variation is probably due to differences in the methods used to identify desirable leader qualities (case studies, direct observation, surveys, critical-incident techniques, etc.), differences in the groups sampled (superiors, peers, followers, other observers), and differences in the language or terminology used (different words are often used to describe the same concept). Nevertheless, attempts to describe a simple structure of requisite leader characteristics have evolved from an original triad of technical, conceptual, and interpersonal skills to a contemporary five-dimensional model based on the following generic domains of human capability – *knowledge and skills, cognitive ability, social capacities, personality, and motivation and values*. Although there is neither a definitive list of essential leader qualities nor any guarantee that the possession of all or most of the commonly identified attributes will result in effective leadership, the probability of effective leadership is improved if CF leaders acquire and develop relevant skills and capabilities in each of these domains:

- **Knowledge and skills.** A high level of proficiency in one's military specialty is mandatory for leaders in command and other direct-leadership positions. While in-depth knowledge and procedural expertise obviously impart the competitive advantage essential to mission success, they also reduce the operational risk to subordinates who have less-than-competent leadership. Technical competence is both a functional necessity and an ethical imperative. This is especially true at junior to intermediate levels of leadership, where leaders are involved in a hands-on way with the technology and techniques of their occupational specialty. Although technical proficiency decreases in relative importance at senior levels of leadership, other, broader forms of military knowledge and expertise relating to systems and institutional functioning increase in importance.



- **Cognitive ability.** Intelligent problem-solving ability (involving both analytical reasoning and creative thinking) has always been a reliable general predictor of leader performance. At senior leadership levels, the ability to take a systems view of situations, to handle abstract ideas, to build conceptual models, and to identify patterns and relationships acquires additional importance. In a related vein, the capacity to view problems and challenges in terms of centrally important ideas and values, to reason through them in a principled way, and to convey solutions and plans to others in a compelling or inspiring manner is a defining feature of transformational leadership.

**“Leadership in the final analysis is not about style but about ideas. Ultimately, it is ideas that motivate followers, and concepts powerful enough to energize people are typically broad, transcendent, even ‘philosophical’ in nature. Such ideas are not learned by the mastery of technique, nor are they acquired through the application of psychological instruments... Lincoln never took a Myers-Briggs test; Gandhi never got ‘360° feedback.’ The ideas that are the currency of such great leaders are ‘idealized’ images of a better tomorrow based on fundamental moral principles and universal values.”**

James O’Toole

*Leading Change: The Argument for Values-Based Leadership*

- **Social capacities.** At all levels of leadership, empathy, listening skills, negotiation and persuasion skills, conflict-management skills, and other interpersonal skills are critical to the establishment and maintenance of effective working relationships with others. Social/interpersonal skills are not only the basic tools of influence behaviour but they also facilitate the development of personal networks and connection power. At senior levels, a sophisticated repertoire of social-influence skills is considered essential to handle the complexity of lateral, upward, and boundary-spanning relationships that typify strategic roles and functioning. Superior communications skills (explanation, negotiation, inspiration) are also required to effectively represent the institution to external agencies and to secure commitment to organizational change.
- **Personality.** Many military professionals consider *personal integrity* to be the foremost military virtue and an essential attribute in leaders. Like most character traits, integrity, is

a way of being, a habit, formed from repeated action, reflection, and the effort to improve. It is indispensable to the development of respect for and trust in leaders. Among the other slow-growth dispositional, or personality, characteristics identified in the research on effective leaders, a cluster of attributes that may be grouped under the rubric of *adaptability* consistently shows up: openness to experience, flexibility, and self-assurance. One of the five major dimensions of contemporary personality theory, openness to experience enhances a leader’s ability not only to take contingent change in stride but also to learn from experience and initiate purposeful change. Flexibility of thought and behaviour is, moreover, the wellspring of resourcefulness and adaptability. From a crisis-management point of view, one of the most important traits in a leader’s repertoire is the ability to monitor one’s own behaviour and its effects on others, and to maintain composure and self-control in high-demand situations. As a correlate of adaptability, self-assurance, reflected in confidence in one’s abilities and the capacity to remain poised under fire, is critical to effective information processing and decision making by leaders. Furthermore, leaders’ modelling of self-control and effective coping behaviour can have a generally beneficial effect on the performance of others. Conversely, emotional volatility is often a contributing factor in the derailment of some missions and leaders’ careers.

**“Most relevant to combat effectiveness were high ratings given [by enlisted ranks] to courage and coolness (twice as important as all other rated characteristics), followed by attention to men and demonstrated competency.”**

Roger Beaumont & William Snyder

*In Combat Effectiveness*

- **Motivation and values.** The motivation to assume a leadership role is distributed unevenly in the population and is differentiated in terms of the underlying power motive. The consensus opinion is that effective leaders require a *socialized power motive*, oriented to the use of influence for collective betterment, rather than a self-serving power motive. In this vein, *professionalism*, a motivational complex of attitudes and value orientations, reflects: an intrinsic attraction to the military profession, a high valuation of professional competence and an associated

desire to excel in military skills, strong commitment to the responsibilities and aims of the profession (professional integrity), and a personal identification with the values of the Canadian military ethos. A desirable quality in all CF members, professionalism is indispensable in those who would lead others.


Because many of the attributes that underpin effective leader performance are acquirable to a greater or lesser degree, there are things leaders can do to prepare themselves for leadership roles. By taking full advantage of professional development opportunities and pursuing a personal program of self-improvement, Officers and NCMs performing leadership roles can ensure that they will be ready, confident, and able to lead.

## BASIC INFLUENCE MODEL

As a first step toward building a detailed and comprehensive leadership model, Figure 5-1 pulls together the key concepts discussed to this point: essential outcomes and conduct values, leader power, leader characteristics, direct and indirect influence, and the human and situational factors influenced by leaders.

The model in Figure 5-1 is based on Gary Yukl's Multiple-Linkage Model of leadership and group effectiveness and can be viewed as a preliminary version of the more fully developed model discussed in Chapter 8. What should be noted is that the model consists of four major structural elements: (1) *leader* variables, such as individual characteristics and personal power; (2) *situational* variables, such as position power and task, unit, system, institutional, and environmental characteristics; (3) *individual* and group

Figure 5-1 | Basic process model of power- and values-based influence.



capabilities, behaviour, and performance; and (4) critical *outcomes*, such as mission success. In relational terms, moreover, the model illustrates the basic processes by which leader intent or purpose results in the outcomes of immediate importance to the CF. For example, leader knowledge, skills, personality, and other attributes are the bases of personal power and have a significant effect on leader behaviour, including the formulation of intentions and objectives. The model also highlights the role played by a mix of ‘hard’ position power and ‘soft’ personal power in the practice of leadership. Leader intent initiates and drives action, while power is the medium. Power translates leader intent into direct influence on individual or group capabilities and performance. Power also produces changes in task, group, system, institutional, and environmental characteristics that indirectly influence the capabilities and performance of others or otherwise contribute to key outcomes.

Hence, from the perspective of power and the ability to influence others, leadership development in the CF may be viewed as the related processes of learning how to use position power effectively and establishing or improving one’s capacities for personal influence. Opportunities for such learning arise through a combination of training, education, experience, and self-development.

Figure 5-1 also illustrates how institutional values and individual integrity fit into this evolving picture. Essential outcomes provide the basic goal orientation for CF leaders, directing influence efforts toward mission success, member well-being and commitment, internal integration, and external adaptability. Comprising part of the situational context, civic, legal, ethical, and military value systems (the military ethos) pervasively affect leader behaviour, unit climate and CF culture, and individual/group norms and conduct. Leader integrity, a personal attribute and source of referent power, serves as a critical linking element, moderating and legitimizing leader intent and influence. Likewise, the integrity of persons subject to a leader’s influence moderates their thinking and behaviour.

## ACHIEVING THE RIGHT BALANCE OF POSITION AND PERSONAL POWER

The distinction between position power and personal power is an especially important one in military forces in that the CF grants substantial formal authority to novice leaders whose expertise and other forms of personal power are, in most cases, either rudimentary or not fully developed. Leadership in the CF is grounded in command and the authority of the state, and the primacy of position power is clearly and forcefully expressed in two ways. First, pursuant to section 19 of the *National Defence Act, Queen’s Regulation and Order* 19.015 establishes the legitimate authority of superiors as follows: “Every officer and non-commissioned member shall obey lawful commands and orders of a superior officer.” Second, section 83 of the *Code of Service Discipline* provides a coercive support to this legitimate authority: “Every person who disobeys a lawful command of a superior officer is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to imprisonment for life or to less punishment.” The defence of Canada and Canadian interests is a serious matter, and so the authority conferred on appointed military leaders is commensurate with that responsibility; it allows them to ‘push their followers by force of law if they cannot always pull them by force of character.’<sup>36</sup> Legitimate authority allows military leaders, even of junior rank, to get difficult things done, while coercive power is essential insurance for the maintenance of military discipline.

**“Some coercive power is necessary to buttress legitimate and expert power when a leader needs to influence compliance with rules and procedures... Likewise, coercive power is needed by a leader to restrain or banish rebels and criminals who would otherwise disrupt operations, steal resources, harm other members, and cause the leader to appear weak and incompetent.”**

Gary Yukl  
*Leadership in Organizations*

<sup>36</sup> Norman Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence* (London: Jonathan Cape), 1977, p. 215.

While legitimate authority may be the cornerstone of military leadership, it is not the entire foundation and it is not sufficient to make a good or complete leader. In fact, there are several drawbacks to an over-reliance on *authoritarian leadership* (which may be defined as the arbitrary exercise of authority backed up by the implied or actual use of coercive power):

- Substantial power applied with little consideration of its consequences is equivalent to the abuse of power and authority, and, over time, will create a psychologically stressful and toxic environment.
- Authoritarian leadership is generally incompatible with mainstream liberal-democratic values, so that it tends to have a demoralizing effect on people accustomed to a high degree of personal choice.
- When knowledge and experience are lacking, the willful exercise of authority can be both ineffectual and dangerous.
- A pattern of authoritarian leadership not only stifles creative thinking, initiative, and commitment, but also provides few opportunities for subordinates to learn and develop.
- Authoritarian leadership is inappropriate in an organization that values professional relationships, teamwork, collective learning, and improvement through rational inquiry.

As a check on the potential misuse of authority by novice CF leaders, their legitimate authority is initially limited. Moreover, they rarely operate independently; rather, they function as organizational *linking pins*, that is, simultaneously acting as a superior to others and as a subordinate under the watch of their superiors in the chain of command. Only as CF leaders demonstrate their competence, accountability, and the potential for greater responsibility, are their position authority and autonomy increased.

## INFLUENCE BEHAVIOURS

Leaders use a number of ways to communicate their intent and to influence others – behaviours that vary in their content, tone, intensity and other qualities. Such influence behaviours may be deliberately selected or shaped to achieve a particular effect; or they may be unconscious and habitual forms of social interaction (hence the importance of leader self-awareness and the rationale for 360-degree evaluations). Generally speaking, the effectiveness of influence behaviour depends on leader power, but its form is often important too, and, to be optimally effective, influence behaviour should be appropriate to the circumstances and the desired effect on others.

Figure 5-2 | Spectrum of leader influence behaviours.



Broad patterns of influence are commonly termed *leadership styles*. For instance, one of the earliest studies of leadership styles (or social climates as they were then called) identified three broad patterns of influence: authoritarian, democratic, and *laissez-faire*. Additional and more differentiated influence behaviours have been specified in subsequent theorizing and research, and Figure 5-2 provides a reasonably comprehensive inventory of leader influence behaviours as they are currently described.<sup>37</sup>

As illustrated by the structure of Figure 5-2, leader influence behaviours may be differentiated and roughly ordered by the amount of control employed by the leader, ranging from the total control that characterizes authoritarian leadership to the complete absence of control that one observes in *laissez-faire* leadership. Conversely, subordinates' latitude for discretion generally increases from left to right across the spectrum of influence behaviours. The influence behaviours that define and are associated with transformational leadership (discussed in a subsequent section) largely overlap with the centre-right part of this spectrum (i.e., *idealized influence* maps on to facilitative behaviour, *intellectual stimulation* and *inspirational motivation* correspond to persuasive influence and achievement-oriented behaviour, and *individualized consideration* incorporates elements of supportive and participative behaviours). Descriptions of the leader influence behaviours identified in Figure 5-2 follow:

- **Authoritarian** influence is, as discussed earlier, based on the legitimate power of the leader backed up by an implicit or explicit threat of punishment, that is, coercive power. Authoritarian behaviour is manifested in unreasonable demands, aggressive pressure tactics, an insistence on unquestioning obedience, and close supervision. Influence seems to be exercised in an arbitrary way because it actually reflects a lack of trust in the reliability of subordinates and/or a lack of respect for their capabilities and intrinsic worth.<sup>38</sup>

- **Directive** influence is also based on the legitimate power and rights of the leader to task subordinates or issue authoritative orders. Direction involves telling subordinates what they are to do and, possibly, when, how, and to what standard. Directive behaviour may be couched as a simple request, a formal order, or something in between. It is appropriate when conveying and implementing a superior commander's intent, when subordinates lack information or experience and need guidance, when allocating and co-ordinating tasks, to stiffen the resolve of individuals or a group when they are at risk of faltering in their efforts, and in emergencies and high-stress situations when subordinates may be temporarily disoriented or their thinking may be impaired. Unlike authoritarian leadership, directive influence is exercised in an ethical way that respects the dignity of subordinates.

- **Contingent reward and punishment**, based on reward and coercive powers, are reactive forms of influence intended either to reinforce desirable behaviour or discourage undesirable behaviour. 'Contingent' refers to the fact that rewards and punishment are administered conditionally, that is, after the event and subject to the adequacy of individual conduct or performance. Rewards and punishments may be either social (e.g., recognition or praise, disapproval or reprimand) or tangible (e.g., time off, a fine). Based on principles of operant conditioning, the contingent allocation of rewards and punishments is a very powerful technique for entraining or conditioning many kinds of behaviour. Performance-based compensation is a well known organizational application, while the general strategy of providing various benefits in exchange for extra effort is a defining feature of *transactional leadership*. Although easy to apply and effective in the short term, contingent reward and punishment do not guarantee maintenance of the desired behaviour. Not only does the

<sup>37</sup> Several researchers have elaborated a sub-category of organizational influence behaviours that they refer to as *influence tactics*. As a class of behaviours, they share two principal features: they are all pro-active, as opposed to reactive, influence behaviours; and they are primarily intended to motivate or energize someone to do something, rather than teach, shape, reinforce, or discourage a specific behaviour. The *exchange* tactic, for example, involves offering an incentive or an exchange of favours to secure agreement with a request. Influence tactics may be used singly or in combination and some are more useful than others, depending on whether the direction of influence is down, lateral, or up in the hierarchy of authority. Empirical findings indicate that the most effective influence tactics are: *rational persuasion* (using logic, reason, and supporting information and evidence to obtain agreement or support) for upward, downward, and lateral influence; *inspirational appeals* (invoking organizational or other values that arouse an emotional response) for downward influence; *consultation* (asking for advice, suggestions, or opinions and inviting participation) for downward and lateral influence; and *collaboration* (offering to assist or provide support and resources to obtain agreement) for downward and lateral influence. For additional information on influence tactics, see: David Kipnis, Stuart M. Schmidt, & Ian Wilkinson, "Intraorganizational Influence Tactics: Explorations in Getting One's Way," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 65, 1980; Gary Yukl & Cecilia M. Falbe, "Influence Tactics and Objectives in Upward, Downward, and Lateral Influence Attempts," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 75(2), 1990; and Chapter 6 of Gary Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations* 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall), 2002.

<sup>38</sup> A defining characteristic of authoritarianism and the authoritarian personality is the emphasis on strict obedience and submission to authority. Authoritarianism received considerable research attention in the 1940s and 1950s in response to the spread of fascism in the pre World War II and war years.

controlling power of rewards and punishments depend on consistent application, but people may also respond negatively to obvious attempts at manipulation and control. Moreover, the efficacy of rewards and punishments can be undercut by rewarding *individuals* for *team* accomplishments or punishing *groups* for *individual* transgressions. The unfair distribution of rewards and punishments presents other problems: dissatisfaction, complaints, and grievances. The challenge for leaders is to be fair in meting out both rewards and punishments. Equity generally prevails when rewards are proportional to merit, punishments are consistent and appropriate to offences, and neither rewards nor punishments are allocated randomly or arbitrarily.

- **Achievement-oriented** influence may be based on several sources of power – referent, expert, legitimate – and is primarily concerned with developing the competence and self-efficacy of subordinates. This kind of enabling influence reflects a mission emphasis, and typically involves: setting difficult but achievable goals, expressing confidence in the ability of subordinates or others to achieve the goals, and providing general encouragement. The phenomenon of communicating positive expectations to others and seeing them realized as a consequence of increased effort is a special case of the self-fulfilling prophecy known as the Pygmalion effect. Achievement-oriented influence is appropriate across a wide range of developmental and performance situations where either proficiency or confidence is in doubt.
- **Persuasive** behaviours are primarily intended to influence decision-making and motivation (manifested in the direction, level, or persistence of effort) by explaining to, or convincing, others why a certain course of action is necessary. Persuasion could involve a broad range of specific behaviours, including but not limited to: rational arguments based on facts, reason, and logic; inspirational appeals which arouse emotions or make professional values salient; and apprising subordinates or others of potential side-benefits to them. In sum, persuasive influence behaviours may draw on expert, information, or referent power and are appropriate to secure agreement or commitment and when particularly high or sustained levels of effort are required.

- **Facilitative** influence often means securing the necessary task resources so that individuals and groups can effectively complete their tasks and missions. It also involves modeling, coaching, mentoring, guidance, and other types of leader behaviour that either demonstrate a desired behaviour for others or enable its performance by others. Facilitative influence may be based on ecological power (e.g., resource allocation), expert power (e.g., modeling or demonstrating a skill to allow imitation by others, coaching subordinate performance or conduct to reinforce effort and correct mistakes), or referent power (e.g., setting an example of professionalism and values-based conduct). Exemplary task dedication or risk-taking can also facilitate imitation, but only if the leader is respected or trusted; subordinates will not willingly follow the example of leaders they consider to be incompetent, stupid, over-zealous, or reckless. Facilitative influence is generally appropriate to any situation involving the achievement of performance standards, the establishment of behavioural norms, or satisfying the task-support needs of subordinates.

**“The first and greatest imperative of command is to be present in person. Those who impose risk must be seen to share it...”**

John Keegan  
*The Mask of Command*

- **Supportive** influence, which may be based on information, ecological, or connection power, reflects a concern for the general welfare of subordinates and is intended to assist them in resolving personal problems or to improve their morale and well-being. Supportive behaviours include: recognition of and responsiveness to individual needs, demonstrations of understanding and empathy, offers of help or collaboration, representing subordinate interests to administrative authorities, and efforts to improve working conditions and unit climate.
- **Participative** behaviours involve sharing decision authority with others. The two basic methods of obtaining advice, opinions, and recommendations are: individual or group consultations; and joint decision-making. The primary objective of participative methods is to improve the quality and/or acceptance of decisions. The use of participative methods depends on the availability of sufficient time to involve others, but they are considered essential

when subordinates or others possess critical information or expertise, and when the acceptance of a decision or plan by subordinates or others might mean the difference between implementation success and failure – for example, subordinates expect to be consulted on decisions that primarily affect them. Participative methods may also be used to develop the problem-solving and interpersonal skills of subordinates.

- **Delegation** entails a transfer of specific authorities from the leader to one or more subordinates. Provided delegated tasks and authorities are not trivial, delegation usually has an enriching effect – increasing the meaningfulness of a role or assignment, autonomy, motivation, and satisfaction. The fact that these effects are more likely when personal growth and development are important to the subordinate underscores the importance of understanding subordinates' needs and goals. A general devolution of authority is usually not advisable, as the success of delegation depends on the competence and willingness of subordinates to handle additional authority. When these conditions exist, however, delegation is appropriate to relieve a leader's task overload, to maintain tempo and enhance responsiveness, or to develop subordinates for higher rank or more challenging assignments. When authority is delegated, it is essential that the leader's accountability be protected; influence may continue to be exerted by obtaining routine reports from subordinates, monitoring performance indicators, or conducting personal check-ups and inspections.
- **Laissez-faire** (let do) leader behaviour amounts to the wholesale transfer of leader authority to subordinates. Leader influence is suspended and subordinates are given a free rein to do as they please. In theory, this approach could work with well trained, highly committed professionals who understand what is expected of them, except that *laissez-faire* leadership also fails to preserve the monitoring and reporting controls that the principle of accountability requires. In this important respect, *laissez-faire* leadership differs from delegation and amounts to an abdication of leadership.

## TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND RELATED CONCEPTS

Transformational leadership is a general pattern of influence that incorporates and combines several of the influence behaviours in Figure 5-2. As commonly used today, the term *transformational leadership* refers to a pattern of leader

influence intended to alter the characteristics of individuals, organizations, or societies in a fairly dramatic or substantial way so that they are somehow more complete, or else are better equipped to deal with the challenges they face or are likely to face. In this general sense, transformational leadership reflects the ordinary dictionary meaning of the word *transform* – *make (especially considerable) change in the form, outward appearance, character, disposition, etc.* of something. In the social sciences, transformational leadership has a more specialized meaning that overlaps with the related concepts of *charismatic leadership* and *visionary leadership*.

**Charismatic Leadership.** Among the three concepts, ideas about charisma have the longest pedigree and were originally applied to people who were perceived to have exceptional and awe-inspiring qualities (from the Greek root *kharisma*, favoured, graced, gifted). In contrast to typical superior-subordinate relationships, followers of charismatic leaders tend to identify strongly with, to be emotionally attached to, and to be deeply committed to the persona of the charismatic leader. Contemporary studies suggest this is due to several characteristics which charismatic leaders possess to some degree: the ability to project self-confidence and dominance, strong convictions which supposedly tap into the latent hopes and desires of their followers, the ability to express their beliefs convincingly and powerfully, and the willingness to take risks or act on their beliefs in unconventional but symbolic ways. Charismatic leaders are, in other words, high in referent power.

**“Charisma is the term commonly used in the sociological and political science literature to describe leaders who by force of their personal abilities are capable of having profound and extraordinary effects on followers.... It appears that most, if not all, writers agree that the effects of charismatic leadership are more emotional than calculative in that the follower is inspired enthusiastically to give unquestioned obedience, loyalty, commitment and devotion to the leader and to the cause that the leader represents.”**

Robert J. House

“A 1976 Theory of Charismatic Leadership”

In evaluative terms, charismatic leaders may be sub-divided into those who are driven by a personal power motive and those who exhibit a socialized power motive. Charismatic leaders of the first kind are self-aggrandizing; they manipulate and use others to achieve a personal agenda or attract personal devotion, and, in the extreme, may display signs of megalomania. Theorists who have examined this “dark side of charisma” propose three varieties of harmful charismatics:<sup>39</sup> (1) high-likeability floaters – exceptionally pleasant, well liked, supportive, uncomplaining, and uncritical leaders, but who take no stands, avoid conflict, and accomplish little of substance; (2) *hommes de ressentiment* – charismatic leaders who are also extremely bright and charming but who disclose little about themselves and who are motivated by a hidden destructive streak of resentment and hostility; and (3) narcissists – overly confident, self-absorbed, aggressive leaders who exhibit a strong sense of entitlement and special privilege, reject advice and criticism, and bully or exploit subordinates to enhance their interests while ingratiating themselves with superiors.

In contrast to these egocentric types, charismatic leaders who possess a socialized power motive are, more often than not, unpretentious and work for the benefit of others. They emphasize ideological rather than personal goals, and empower followers to achieve them rather than exploit them for other purposes.

**Transformational Leadership.** Charismatic leaders possessing a socialized power motive come closest to the definition of transformational leaders as developed by the political scientist, James McGregor Burns. According to Burns, transformational leaders are moral agents, whose efforts are directed toward the realization of important social values and principles. What sets them apart as leaders is their ability to alter the moral awareness of others, to sharpen their sense of discrepancy between what is and what could be, to provide a path for social change, and thereby to rouse followers to collective, sometimes revolutionary, action. Follower attraction to the transformational leader may be based on: a strong sense of identification with the leader; and/or internalization of the message and values communicated and exhibited by the leader.

**“At the highest stage of moral development persons are guided by near-universal ethical principles of justice such as equality of human rights and respect for individual dignity. This stage sets the stage for rare and creative leadership....”**

**The leader’s fundamental act is to induce people to be aware or conscious of what they feel – to feel their true needs so strongly, to define their values so meaningfully, that they can be moved to purposeful action... Transformational leadership is more concerned with end-values... Transforming leaders ‘raise’ their followers up through levels of morality ...”**

James MacGregor Burns  
*Leadership*

The results of theorizing and research conducted during the 1980s and 1990s have expanded the original, morally based concept of transformational leadership to include all leaders who attract high levels of respect and trust, and who, consequently, are able to elicit extraordinary levels of performance from their subordinates or followers. Typically, such leaders display many or all of the following behaviours:

- They exemplify personal, sometimes self-sacrificing, commitment to the mission and their ethical ideals (idealized or facilitative influence).
- They stimulate the thinking of their subordinates and encourage innovation and creativity (achievement-oriented influence).
- They take time to explain the meaning and importance of subordinates’ tasks in relation to super-ordinate goals (rational-persuasive influence).
- They exhibit optimism and use inspirational appeals that arouse emotions or evoke important individual and group values (emotional-persuasive influence).
- They provide individualized consideration of the social, emotional, and developmental needs of their subordinates (supportive influence).

<sup>39</sup> So-called “toxic leaders” constitute a broader category of harmful leaders and includes leaders who are not necessarily charismatic but who are insensitive or indifferent to human relationships, psychologically insecure, or just hostile; they tend to be viewed by subordinates as arrogant, self-serving, inflexible, petty, and unconcerned about subordinate well-being. See Colonel George E. Reed, US Army, “Toxic Leadership,” *Military Review*, July-August 2004.



**“Superior leadership performance – transformational leadership – occurs when leaders broaden and elevate the interests of their employees, when they generate awareness and acceptance of the purposes and mission of the group, and when they stir their employees to look beyond their own self-interest for the good of the group.”**

Bernard M. Bass

“From Transactional to Transformational Leadership:  
Learning to Share the Vision”

In this broader performance context, transformational leadership may be understood to operate through a *general* motivational process based on a shared understanding of the task and mutual commitment and trust, rather than through a strictly *moral* motivational process as originally described by Burns.

Often contrasted with *transactional leadership* – the economic exchange of skill and labour for a salary, benefits, and other inducements offered to satisfy basic material needs – transformational leadership in its broader sense is about *providing a sense of personal meaning, value, and purpose* through work or service in a collective undertaking. It must be noted, however, that both transactional and transformational kinds of motivation succeed because people have several kinds of needs – existence needs, social-relatedness needs, and growth needs. Not only do the salience and relative importance of these needs differ from person to person, but, even within the same person, they change over time – hence the effectiveness of a transactional-transformational mix. Transformational leadership simply extends and supplements, rather than replaces, transactional leadership, but addresses higher-order individual needs. These may ultimately be satisfied in a number of ways. It may be through an opportunity to achieve something unique, to do something in an accomplished manner, to render a service to others, or to change the way things are for something better.

**“It seems to me that the ultimate problem of motivational psychology is to understand how man searches for and finds meaning. One cannot reach adulthood without having considered what is worthwhile, what is interesting, what is true, what is worth doing.”**

Salvatore R. Maddi

“The Search for Meaning”

Transformational influence behaviours have been demonstrated to be applicable to leaders at all levels. They have been found to be especially effective in building subordinate trust and commitment, reducing stress, and generally effective in enhancing subordinate performance and morale across a wide range of circumstances. Moreover, examination of historical figures considered to be exemplary and superior leaders invariably reveals that they would score high on transformational characteristics.

## **BUILDING SUBORDINATE TRUST AND COMMITMENT – RAF 76 SQUADRON, 1943**

“Recent research confirms what was learned about leadership in World War II, namely that the most trusted commanders are those who demonstrate professional competence; are credible in their role as purveyors of information; and devote care and attention to their subordinates. For air forces, we should add another characteristic: the willingness of commanders to share their subordinates’ risks from time to time. In World War II, Leonard Cheshire epitomized these qualities, and the record of his command demonstrates the importance of leadership in the CSR [combat stress reaction] equation. Cheshire... was CO of Bomber Command’s 76 Squadron during the first four months of 1943, and was one of the RAF’s most celebrated leaders. Some COs got the derisive nickname ‘François’ from their subordinates because they usually participated only in relatively safe raids on France, but not Cheshire. He deliberately elected to fly ‘with the new and the nervous’ as second pilot on dangerous raids. In this way he demonstrated his competence and his willingness to take risks. He also ‘inspired loyalty and respect’ because he got to know all of his air gunners (the aircrew with the lowest status in the eyes of many in Bomber Command) and ground crew. By the end of the war Cheshire had earned a Victoria Cross, three Distinguished Service Orders, and a Distinguished Flying Cross, and had become a ‘legend.’ ”

Allan English

*The Cream of the Crop: Canadian Aircrew 1939-1945*

**Visionary Leadership.** In response to the acute environmental demands and pressures exerted on many organizations, senior leaders who are able to revitalize organizations on the brink of failure, or otherwise radically change modest organizations into powerhouses and position them for the future, are often described as strategic visionaries. They have many qualities in common with transformational leaders – they have keen insights into the requirements of the situation they face; they develop a big idea or a vision of a preferred alternative to the status quo; they are deeply committed to their goals; they possess the ability to articulate the need for change and to inspire followers to support it; they are persistent; and they characteristically pursue change by involving subordinates in the process, delegating authority to them, and encouraging initiatives that are consistent with key values and the mission or vision. But they differ in one important respect; the primary object of the transformation effort is the organization rather than the people in it (however, it is often the case that transforming the thinking and motivation of people is a necessary intermediate step toward organizational transformation). Weak versions of visionary leadership result in little more than the production of a vision statement and a lot of enthusiasm; more robust approaches require the discipline of systems thinking to clarify cause-effect relationships and the skilled use of change strategies and influence processes to ensure that new ideas get implemented. In any case, this strategic visionary leadership is also frequently labelled transformational leadership.

**“Models of inspirational leadership argue that the formation and articulation of a vision is central to the activities of senior organizational leaders.... A number of characteristics can be discerned... The first is that visions often represent an idealized representation of what the organization should become.... Also, visions are not rigid, static, or inflexible. Instead, they are adaptable to environmental events.... A final characteristic of visions is that they become symbols of change used by executives to reorient the collective behavior of organizational members.”**

Stephen J. Zaccaro  
*Models and Theories of Executive Leadership*

**What Transformational Leadership Means in the CF.** As used in the CF, *transformational leadership* is rooted in the value systems of the Canadian military ethos and may refer either to the transformation of people or to organizational transformation. While all leadership involves changing or altering something, transformational leadership in the CF is characterized by a shared commitment to the values of the military ethos and a relationship of trust between the leader and led, and by the intent to bring about significant reform or radical change in individual, group, or system capabilities and outcomes. The leader behaviours that are most often associated with transformational leadership are neither new nor magical, but transformational leaders bring together a mix of insight, imagination, rational persuasion, values-based inspiration, and concern for followers in one package. Especially valuable in an environment of multiple adaptive challenges and where the trust and dedication of others are critical to success, transformational leadership is, in effect, just another name for effective or superior leadership. Superior CF leaders, or transformational leaders, give followers valid reasons to be hopeful and committed.

**“Leaders are agents of change – persons whose acts affect other people more than other people’s acts affect them. Leadership occurs when one group member modifies the motivation or competencies of others in the group.”**

Bernard M. Bass  
*Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook of Leadership* 3<sup>rd</sup> ed.

Transformational leadership may be exercised by a talented individual with a compelling idea and the skill to communicate it to others, or by a leadership team united by conviction in its transformational aims. At an advanced stage of organizational development, transformational processes may also be institutionalized in cultural norms and practices. In this regard, the professional socialization of new CF members into the military ethos and its values represents the institutionalized transformation of people as envisaged by Burns – raising others up through levels of awareness and morality. Similarly, the adoption of CF-wide practices that enable organizational learning and promote continuous

improvement represents institutionalized transformation of the organization. At any level of CF functioning, from individual to organizational, the principal benefits of transformational leadership are increased follower trust, commitment, and effort, which often translate into performance beyond leader expectations, as well as high levels of individual and group confidence and morale.

## ***TRANSFORMING PEOPLE AND THE CF***

“If there was ever a time for a progressive, transformative agenda, that time is now. To do so, in my view, we must move forward aggressively and accelerate our efforts to transform the Canadian Forces and our national defence and security apparatus on three levels.

### **First, we must transform the way we perceive and think.**

While the pressure to transform is being driven largely by new technologies, transformation itself is not only about technology. It is about changing human, organizational and warfighting behaviour. It is about building new capabilities and processes that capitalize on new technologies to make our warfighters more effective. And that requires new thinking. We are moving from an industrial, hierarchical mode of thinking to a world powered by collaborative human networks. We must learn to think, behave, and act as a node in a collaborative network that includes our warfighters, all three military environments, our civilian colleagues in the department and broader public security portfolio, as well as our allies.

**Second, we must transform our management structures and decision-making processes.** We must evolve to a much more adaptive and flexible organization. We have all personally witnessed a multitude of ways in which information technologies are accelerating decision-making cycles and empowering our front line commanders, soldiers, sailors, and air personnel. Through data fusion, we can get an integrated view of the battlespace faster and more quickly than anything conceived of in the past. Through modern journalism and reporting, the news cycle has been reduced to minutes, and tactical events in theatre can have virtually an immediate impact on politics among nations. At the same time, it can take years to conceive and build new capabilities and doctrine.

If we are to succeed in the years ahead, we must become a much more nimble organization capable of making decisions and acting on them faster. Put simply, we must build management structures and decision-making processes that facilitate timely, but accountable decision-making by the right decision-makers at the right time, from the soldier on the ground right up to Government when necessary.

**Third, we must transform our force structure.** Since the rise of industrial age armies, western militaries have emphasized tonnage and ‘mass’ as the most important elements of a modern, military force. Generally speaking, the industrial age logic was often, ‘the bigger, the better’. This logic produced bigger and heavier guns, artillery, tanks and ships, and faster and more agile fighter planes. While the capabilities provided by these platforms remain relevant, the logic is obsolete. We are moving from an age of achieving military objectives through massed, heavy, ponderous forces, to an age of applying lethal force as precisely as possible through the use of nimble, mobile, and smarter forces. At the dawn of the information age, it is already clear that the scalpel is better than the bludgeon, quality is more important than quantity, fast is better than slow, and lethality is more important than tonnage.

My priorities for the Canadian Forces follow from these challenges. My prime objective in setting these priorities is to enable and capably support transformation.”

Message from the Chief of the Defence Staff  
*A Time for Transformation: Annual Report of the CDS 2002-2003*

## RESPONSES TO AUTHORITY AND INFLUENCE

“Subordinates are not passive organisms but are purposive and active participants in this whole affair. Leadership should be viewed as a continuous process that involves the development of implicit role contracts,... reciprocal influence between superior and subordinate, and chains of behavior rather than isolated units.”

John P. Campbell  
In *Leadership: The Cutting Edge*

“Commitment . . . represents a state in which an individual identifies with a particular organization and its goals and wishes to maintain membership in order to facilitate those goals.... It involves an active relationship with the organization such that individuals are willing to give something of themselves in order to contribute to the organization’s well being. Hence, to an observer, commitment could be inferred not only from the expression of an individual’s beliefs and opinions but also from his or her actions.”

Richard Mowday, Richard Steers & Lyman Porter  
“The Measurement of Organizational Commitment”

5

Because people’s behaviour is not programmed but reflects their individual perceptions, choices, and goals, they differ in how they respond to leaders. Generally speaking, however, individuals and groups will respond to the exercise of authority and influence with either commitment, compliance, or resistance – responses that may be compared and contrasted in terms of an observable behavioural component and a private attitudinal component:

- **Commitment** signifies behavioural conformity with superior direction plus attitudinal support for such direction; behaviour and attitude are congruent. Committed followers identify with, accept, and internalize leaders’ goals or organizational norms of duty and will maintain effort in pursuit of those goals without promise of reward or threat of punishment (e.g., the Hercules crews who kept the supply lines open in Kigali in 1994, the RCR and R 22e R battle group that opened the Sarajevo airport in 1992, the helicopter and ship’s crews who regularly venture out in extreme weather to pluck people from the water or the decks of sinking vessels). Conformity to superior direction and intent is willingly provided.

- **Compliance**, also termed obedience, refers to behavioural conformity combined with attitudinal neutrality, reluctance, or opposition; behaviour and attitude are more or less incongruent. Compliant subordinates are ambivalent to some degree and may pursue leaders’ goals only to the extent that their behaviour and performance are closely monitored and controlled (e.g., Iraqi conscripts in the 1991 Persian Gulf War). Behaviour and performance depend on rewards or threat of punishment, strong cultural norms of obedience to authority, or attachment to and influence of the primary group.
- **Resistance** refers to delaying, avoidant, or non-compliant behaviour coupled with attitudinal opposition; behaviour and attitude are congruent but negatively so. Resistant or oppositional followers either refuse to pursue leaders’ goals or else pursue antithetical goals (e.g., American soldiers who engaged in mutiny and “fraggings” in the Vietnam War) and cannot be reliably controlled by organizational norms, promise of reward, or threat of punishment.

Commitment is what CF leaders should strive to earn from followers and subordinates since it delivers certain advantages which compliance may not. Commitment often translates into extra effort and persistence and, hence, enhanced performance. It fosters self-discipline and correspondingly diminishes the requirement for imposed discipline. Committed followers usually require minimal direction and supervision (provided their training is adequate to the task) and, consequently, can be reliably assigned extra responsibility and authority. To secure the commitment of subordinates and to influence peers, superiors, and people

in general requires qualities associated with personal power – competence, personal dedication, integrity, respect and concern for others, and similar characteristics that, over time, help to create a *trust* relationship. Conversely, leaders who rely exclusively or primarily on their position power will exhibit a token and rigid kind of leadership, and can only be assured of subordinate compliance. Moreover, position power carries little or no weight with peers and cannot be used to influence superiors or people outside the chain of command.

## THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUST

Generally speaking, issues of trust arise in groups: (1) when people are dependent on others, or have to work with others, to achieve important outcomes; (2) when there is some degree of uncertainty about the behaviour of others or there is a risk of negative outcomes; and (3) when acting on trust incurs a personal vulnerability to loss or injury. All three conditions are in play in operational missions, and may also arise in other military tasks. Hence trust among peers, and between leaders and subordinates, represents an important human dimension of military effectiveness.

Trust in leadership is positively related to individual and group performance, persistence in the face of adversity, the ability to withstand stress, job satisfaction, and commitment to continued service. A climate of trust between leaders and led is also positively related to such ‘good soldier’ qualities as conscientiousness, fair play, and co-operation. It follows that an important part of the leader’s job is to build and maintain healthy trust relationships with subordinates, peers, and superiors.

Leaders build and maintain trust through their decisions, actions, and interactions. Trust relationships take time to develop but can be easily broken by a significant breach of the expectations that others hold. Three major personal qualities are critical to the development of trust in leaders: leader competence, the care and consideration for others displayed by a leader, and leader character (integrity, dependability, and fairness). Hence effective CF leaders at all levels:

- demonstrate high levels of proficiency in the performance of core functions and take advantage of opportunities to enhance their professional expertise and competence;
- exercise good judgment in decisions that affect others and do not expose people to unnecessary risks;

- show trust and confidence in their subordinates by giving them additional authority and involving them in decisions where circumstances allow;
- demonstrate concern for the well-being of their subordinates, represent their interests, and ensure they are supported and taken care of by the organization;
- show consideration and respect for others, treating subordinates fairly – without favour or discrimination;
- focus on the mission, maintaining high standards and honest and open communications;
- lead by example, sharing risks and hardships and refusing to accept or take special privileges; and
- keep their word and can be counted on to honour their obligations.

**“Trust affects both how leaders make decisions and the quality of their decisions. People who trust increase their vulnerability to other people whose behavior they do not control. People can be friendly and courteous, but that does not mean that they trust each other. People show trust by how they handle three closely linked factors: information, influence, and control. Trust regulates the disclosure of information – how open people are with relevant information, including their intentions and judgments; trust regulates mutual influence – how receptive people are to each other’s goals and concerns; and trust regulates control – the intention to fulfill the spirit of a decision and the willingness to rely on another person to implement her part of the decision.”**

Dale E. Zand  
*The Leadership Triad: Knowledge, Trust, and Power*

## SUMMARY

Influence is often described as the essence of leadership. Influence is based on social power, which comes in a variety of shapes and sizes. The two major classes of social power are position power (legitimate, reward, coercive, information, and ecological) and personal power (expert, referent, and connection). The legitimate and related powers that come with rank and position in the CF represent an initial line of credit that junior officers and junior NCOs are given to get them started as leaders. Whether they become fully developed effective leaders depends on how carefully they use their position credits and what they do to invest in and augment other capacities for influence. The kinds of personal skills and attributes relevant to leader development include technical knowledge and skills, general cognitive abilities, social skills, personality traits such as integrity and adaptability, and the motivation and professional values to serve effectively in a leadership role.

Generally speaking, influence behaviours are differently suited to different purposes and circumstances. As described here, authoritarian leadership and *laissez-faire* leadership are considered ineffective and inappropriate influence behaviours for CF leaders. All other influence behaviours identified in the spectrum of influence are considered effective when used in the appropriate circumstances: directive, contingent reward and punishment, achievement-oriented, persuasive, facilitative, supportive, participative,

and delegation. The influence behaviours cited in the definition of effective CF leadership (“directing, motivating, and enabling others...”) can be considered as an abbreviated representation of this range of leadership behaviours.

The paradigm of the transformational leader, which emphasizes a particular sub-set of the above influence behaviours, is a practical model of what CF leaders should aspire to be in an operating environment which demands a clear understanding of the CF’s professional purpose and, on occasion, extraordinary personal commitment. In the CF, transformational leaders base their actions on and are guided by the core values of the CF as a professional military institution. They seek to attain significant improvement or change in individual, group, system, and institutional capabilities. And they regard respect and trust as necessary conditions of follower commitment and resilient performance.

Considering influence from the receiving end, there are three qualitatively different ways subordinates or others can respond to a leader’s influence attempts, namely, commitment, compliance, or resistance. Leaders should strive for commitment, but, to obtain the commitment of others, leaders must be respected and trusted. Hence, a significant part of the leader’s relational task involves earning and maintaining the respect and trust of others.

# Leading People: An Overview

## CHAPTER 6

Reliable and Resilient Performance	76
The Leader-Follower-Situation Context	78
Developing Subordinate & Team/Unit Capabilities	79
• Task proficiency, teamwork, confidence, cohesion, distributed leadership	79
Building Resilience	80
• Stress-prevention measures	81
• Situational awareness	81
• Improvisational skills	81
Instilling the Military Ethos	82
Improving Situational Favourability	84
• Unit/organizational characteristics	84
• External relations	85
• Relationships with superiors	87
Performing Tasks	88
• The task cycle	88
• Adaptive performance management	90
Learning from Experience	93

# 6 Leading People: An Overview

It was remarked in Chapter 1 that, at tactical and operational levels of activity and command, the primary function of CF leaders is to influence people in organized teams, units, and formations in a direct face-to-face way to execute near-term plans and solve real-time problems. At the tactical and operational levels, leaders develop individual and collective capabilities and use their authority and influence to accomplish missions and tasks through others.

**“The whole purpose of leadership is simply to accomplish a task. That may sound too simple, but that’s what a leader is expected to do. He gets a TASK in the form of a mission or order, and then he gets that task done through the efforts of his followers.”**

Colonel (ret’d) Dandridge Malone, US Army  
*Small Unit Leadership: A Commonsense Approach*

Missions and tasks are undertaken within the broad CF effectiveness framework described in Chapter 2. This framework designates Mission Success as the outcome of primary importance, with Internal Integration, Member Well-being and Commitment, and External Adaptability identified as enabling outcomes or force multipliers. The framework also stipulates that outcomes are to be accomplished in ways that are consistent with the value systems that comprise the Military Ethos. Chapter 4 laid out the basic duties and responsibilities that must be discharged by CF leaders to be effective in their leadership roles and to achieve desired outcomes. Chapter 5 extended the discussion to include a consideration of the sources of leader power and the various processes by which leaders influence others.

In this chapter, we put a spotlight on the task-performance aspect of leadership at the tactical and operational levels of activity and command. Two concepts serve as keys to the discussion. One is the critical requirement for high reliability performance and resilience in operational teams, units, and formations. The other key idea is the context of mission/task leadership, which is conventionally described in terms of the leader, the followers, and the situation. Leader activities related to developing individual and team capabilities, and processes for executing and managing task performance, are organized around these ideas.

## RELIABLE AND RESILIENT PERFORMANCE

What makes military leadership especially difficult and challenging is the requirement for military units, especially operational teams and units, to function and perform like high reliability organizations. As a rule, *high reliability organizations* operate in complex environments, are subject to a variety of demands, and must often contend with extreme, variable, and unpredictable conditions. They use sophisticated technologies (e.g., surveillance, communications, weapons platforms, and weapons systems) and rely on large numbers of people with diverse skills to perform their functions. The primary distinguishing feature of such organizations, however, is that the consequences of error can be catastrophic.

In military operations, which are intrinsically risky and dangerous, performance errors may, for example, lead to widespread loss of life or serious injuries, mission failure, loss of or damage to high-value materiel and equipment, environmental degradation, significant collateral damage to civilian communities and populations, or negative political repercussions at the local, national, or international level. Experience shows that individual and group misconduct may also result in equally negative consequences. Hence military units, like other high reliability organizations, must strive to achieve consistently high levels of proficient performance while keeping the risks of serious error in check. Generally speaking, the odds of achieving high reliability performance can be enhanced by careful planning and rigorous preparation, capitalizing on the pool of expertise available within the team or unit, maintaining high standards of professional conduct, developing error-recovery capabilities, learning from mistakes and near misses, and constant monitoring of and adjustment to the operating environment.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>40</sup> For a more detailed discussion of high reliability organizations and how they meet their performance challenges, see Karl W. Weick & Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, *Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High Performance in an Age of Complexity* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 2001.



Thorough planning, mission-focussed training, and other preparatory activities go a long way to ensuring proficient performance. Nevertheless, even the best plans and preparations have to be supplemented by capabilities to deal with unexpected events and emergency or traumatic situations. It is a truism of group behaviour that leadership matters most and is most severely tested:

- when plans go awry and mission failure threatens;
- when the unexpected happens, it is not clear what needs to be done (either tactically or ethically), and the consequences of error are high; and
- when casualties are taken or the group is in psychological shock and team members become disheartened or immobilized.

These kinds of situations, which require composure under pressure, adaptive problem solving, and decisive action, distinguish operational settings from non-operational environments (routine and predictability are more typical of the latter). They define what some have called *the leadership moment* or *leading at the edge*, that is, a turning point in an unfolding scenario when success is on the line and the safety or lives of others may depend on the actions of appointed or emergent leaders.<sup>41</sup> When danger is also involved and the leader is obliged to assume or share a high level of risk to catalyze or sustain group effort, we tend to classify this kind of leadership as “heroic.”<sup>42</sup>

Such defining moments may occur rarely or never in a CF leader’s experience. But they are latent in every operational mission and task, and, if and when they do occur, the consequences of ineffective leadership can be disastrous. As noted, the best defence leaders can take against the likelihood of mission failure in crisis moments and other high-demand situations is to prepare themselves, their people, and their organizations. But they must also develop the resilience in their organizations to adapt to and handle the unexpected and the uncertain.

**“Leadership is a product of both today’s actions and yesterday’s groundwork.”**

Michael Useem  
Introduction to *The Leadership Moment:  
Nine True Stories of Triumph and Disaster and  
Their Lessons for Us All*

### ***THE VALUE OF PREPARING FOR THE UNEXPECTED – NEW YORK, 11 SEPTEMBER 2001***

“As shocking as this crash [airliner attacks against the World Trade Center towers] was, we had actually planned for just such a catastrophe. My administration had built a state-of-the-art command center, from which we handled the emergencies that inevitably befall a city like New York, such as the West Nile virus, blackouts, heat waves, hurricanes, snowstorms, the Y2K (the year 2000)....

Throughout my time as mayor, we conducted tabletop exercises designed to rehearse our response to a wide variety of contingencies. We’d blueprint what each person in each agency would do if the city faced, say, a chemical attack or a biomedical attack. We went through how we’d act in the event of a plane crash or a terrorist attack on a political gathering. We didn’t just choreograph our responses on paper, either, but did trial runs in the streets, to test how long the plans took to put into practice.... We did not anticipate that airliners would be commandeered and turned into guided missiles; but the fact that we practiced for other kinds of disasters made us far more prepared to handle a catastrophe that nobody envisioned. The goal was to build a rational construct for myself, and for the people around me. I wanted them ready to make decisions when they couldn’t check with me. The more planning we did, the more we could be ready for surprises.”

Rudolph Giuliani  
*Leadership*

<sup>41</sup> For a cross-section of case studies on leadership in crisis situations, see Michael Useem, *The Leadership Moment: Nine True Stories of Triumph and Disaster and Their Lessons for Us All* (New York: Three Rivers Press), 1998, and for an extended case study of leadership under extreme conditions, see Dennis N.T. Perkins, *Leading at the Edge: Leadership Lessons from the Extraordinary Saga of Shackleton’s Antarctic Expedition* (New York: American Management Association), 2000.

<sup>42</sup> For a comprehensive treatment of heroic military leadership, which he defines in terms of “aggressive, invasive, exemplary, risk-taking... but, above all, exemplary risk-taking”, see John Keegan, *The Mask of Command* (Toronto: Penguin Books), 1988.

## THE LEADER-FOLLOWER-SITUATION CONTEXT

As suggested by the basic model of power and influence presented earlier in Figure 5-1, the leadership field of action at tactical and operational levels consists of the leader, the followers, and the situation. Leading involves interactions among all three elements. This way of looking at influence and leadership is widely accepted and is more clearly portrayed in Figure 6-1 below; that is, the leader, whether appointed or emergent, operates *within* a group of subordinates or followers, and they are all *in* the same objective situation, though they might, and often do, perceive it differently.

Figure 6-1 | The leader-follower-situation framework.



In most leadership theories, it is taken for granted that the relationships among the leader, followers, and the situation are dynamic, with a variety of forces either reinforcing or working against the leader's intent. Multiple factors are at play in the situation, some subject to leader control, others not. Subordinates, for example, have individual, as well as shared, priorities. The leader influences followers and the situation, but is also influenced by followers and the situation. Hence, in any mission or task, the leader's efforts are, in a general sense, occupied in *aligning followers' priorities with his or her intent and in making situational conditions as favourable as possible for mission or task completion*. The general principles of direct and indirect influence epitomize this idea of alignment.

**"A soldier entrenched in a position surrounded by the enemy might well consider his physical safety – escape from a sniper or falling shells – as the most critical issue, to the exclusion of all others.... Different priorities are perceived by different soldiers according to their personal disposition, the information available to them, as well as according to the formal or informal roles they have within the organization.... The more similar the priorities of the group, the more effective will be their action.... The role of a leader – whether the platoon commander or the head of state – is to create this similar perception and similar priorities for all members of the group."**

Ben Shalit

*The Psychology of Conflict and Combat*

Thus, within the leader-follower-situation framework, we can identify at least five general ways in which tactical and operational leaders work to achieve reliable and resilient performance and thereby influence the professional accomplishment of missions and tasks:

- *developing individual and team capabilities to ensure reliable and proficient task performance;*
- *building individual and group resilience, that is, developing various individual and group capabilities that allow rapid adaptation to unexpected conditions or recovery from setbacks;*
- *instilling the military ethos to ensure high standards of professionalism and self-discipline;*
- *shaping or influencing unit and situational conditions to facilitate or enhance task performance; and*
- *effectively employing individual and collective capabilities to accomplish the mission while correcting or compensating for any deficiencies that might constrain performance.*

## DEVELOPING INDIVIDUAL AND TEAM/UNIT CAPABILITIES

In general, the necessity for leaders to direct and motivate subordinates to any significant degree will largely depend on their state of development. The ultimate objective of military training and socialization is to transform green recruits into fully capable, confident, professionals – who know what they are supposed to do and why, who can operate as a cohesive team, and who are capable of acting independently if necessary to fulfill their commander’s intent. Effective CF leaders work toward the completion of that developmental arc, by and large employing influence behaviours characteristic of superior or transformational leadership. In the ideal end-state, the leader’s job should become almost superfluous, so that much of what needs to be done can be confidently delegated. The following paragraphs summarize key individual and team/unit areas of development and transformation: task proficiency, teamwork, confidence, cohesion, and distributed leadership.

**Task Proficiency.** Attaining a state of development in which individuals and teams can be counted on to perform effectively requires that they be trained, coached, and mentored to high levels of competence and readiness. Performance-oriented skill training only provides individuals with the basic know-how to perform a skill properly. Unit-level training provides them with the extensive practice necessary to perfect skills, develop team protocols, and achieve an operational level of proficiency.

**Teamwork.** Most military tasks involve interdependencies of some kind. Such interdependencies are characterized as either *pooled* (effectiveness depends on the sum of individual contributions – for example, a section’s firepower) or *serial* (effectiveness depends on the successful performance of a sequence of actions by several people – for example, the operation of a crew-served weapon or weapon platform). One of the key functions of collective training and exercises is to allow crews, teams, units, and formations – whether they are engaged in combined or joint operations – to work through and hone the communications protocols and operating procedures required for a co-ordinated effort. Leaders must be sensitive to task interdependencies at all levels of operations and generally strive to strengthen functional linkages.

**Confidence.** A secondary, but highly desirable, outcome of training and development, and a performance enabler in its own right, is *confidence or self-efficacy* – the belief held by individuals and teams that they can face any challenge and overcome any obstacle by dint of skill and effort. The processes of testing performance limits, making improvements, and providing opportunities to experience success – buttressed by the support of competent leaders – builds the confidence necessary for mission success.

**“Nothing is quite so effective in building up a group’s morale and solidarity . . . as a steady diet of small triumphs. Quite early in basic training, the recruits begin to do things that seem, at first sight, quite dangerous: descend by ropes from fifty-foot towers, cross yawning gaps hand-over-hand on high wires . . . and the like. The common denominator is that these activities are daunting but not really dangerous . . . The goal is not to kill recruits, but to build up their confidence as individuals and as a group by allowing them to overcome apparently frightening obstacles.”**

Gwynne Dyer  
*War*

**Cohesion.** Similarly, social cohesion enhances performance while also taking up some of the leadership burden of psychologically supporting troops who may be called upon to perform under chronic or extreme stress.

Cultivating social cohesion takes time and can be especially challenging in highly diverse groups. It helps to emphasize common professional values, the norm of respect for others, and the achievement of super-ordinate goals. Nothing, however, will transform a collection of individuals from different social backgrounds, military specialties, and environments into cohesive teams as effectively as a series of successes achieved under difficult conditions that they have all shared. Once teams and sub-units have formed a sense of unity and collective esprit, experience indicates that it is important to keep them reasonably intact and to minimize personnel turnover in order to maintain cohesion.

**“Social cohesion appears to serve two roles in combat motivation. First, because of the close ties to other soldiers, it places a burden of responsibility on each soldier to achieve group success and protect the unit from harm. Soldiers feel that although their individual contribution to the group may be small, it is still a critical part of unit success and therefore important.... The second role of cohesion is to provide the confidence and assurance that someone soldiers could trust was ‘watching their back.’ This is not simply trusting in the competence, training, or commitment to the mission of another soldier, but trusting in someone regarded as closer than a friend who was motivated to look out for their welfare.... Once soldiers are convinced that their own personal safety will be assured by others, they feel empowered to do their job without worry.”**

Leonard Wong, Thomas A. Kolditz, Raymond A. Millen & Terrence M. Potter  
 “Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War”

**Distributed Leadership.** Appointed leaders can strengthen the capability for independent problem-solving and action in their teams and units: by establishing a climate that supports initiative and emergent leadership; by developing potential replacement leaders (to ensure continuity of leadership and command); and, commensurate with subordinates’ competence and motivation, by routinely delegating greater authority to them. The fundamental message that leaders have to get across is that everyone has to take some responsibility for the effectiveness of the team or unit and practice good “followership” (or upward influence), in addition to exercising the emergent leadership and peer leadership (or lateral influence) that are hallmarks of a mature profession.

## BUILDING RESILIENCE

In addition to developing individual and collective task proficiency, a major purpose of military training and development, especially for operations, is to mitigate and counteract the disorienting and disabling effects of unexpected events and operational stress. While all operations bring on stress, high-intensity conflicts and peace-enforcement operations in particular expose people to both chronic and acute stressors: long periods of heightened vigilance and anxiety; physical hardships; privation;

extremes of climate; threats of attack; fatigue; witnessing the suffering, death, or injury of others; fear; separation from loved ones. How people react to these conditions will vary from person to person, and reflects, to some degree, individual differences in psychological hardiness (or vulnerability to stress) and situationally relevant problem-solving skills. Stress is a highly idiosyncratic phenomenon. It is also true that, while everyone may experience stress, debilitating stress is not the norm, even in the worst circumstances. That said, some events, more so than others, always have the potential to impair performance by narrowing attention, constraining thinking, and limiting behavioural flexibility.

**“Attention is a bottleneck... because more information must be absorbed more quickly at the very time when stress narrows attention. Analysis is a bottleneck because people revert to more primitive frames of reference and hold to them more tightly as stress increases. And action becomes a bottleneck as stress increases because people do what they have practiced most often (e.g., when fired upon, soldiers drop where they are), not what they have practiced most recently (e.g., when fired upon, go to cover).”**

Karl E. Weick  
*In Leadership on the Future Battlefield*

Unexpected events represent another latent threat to performance. The shock value and psychologically disabling effects of surprise are well documented in military history and doctrine. It follows that, because many contingencies in an operation cannot be accurately predicted and some contingencies cannot be predicted at all, the ability to adapt to a changing situation, handle broken plays, and solve problems on the fly is a critical mission-accomplishment and survival skill.

To deal with these human dimensions of operations, there are measures that tactical and operational leaders can take to offset the potentially disabling effects of stress and there are skills that they can develop to cope with the unexpected. In either case, the common intent is to build team and unit resilience, that is, the ability to bounce back from setbacks and catastrophes. The following paragraphs briefly address stress-prevention measures, situational awareness, and improvisational skills.

**Stress-prevention Measures.** Because stress can short out people's thinking and action circuits, over-learning core skills and practising them beyond the point of sufficiency help to ensure that they become dominant and instinctive responses. Habits formed through training and practice will often take over under stress and facilitate appropriate and effective performance. Similarly, training for likely scenarios under realistic conditions acclimatizes team members to high-demand situations and serves to inoculate them against the surprises and shocks that they might otherwise experience.

As noted earlier, social cohesion appears to enhance individual and group performance. The social support afforded by cohesive groups also plays an important role in limiting or neutralizing the effects of stress. As evidenced by the experiences of a broad range of people across an equally broad range of difficult circumstances, feeling alone or isolated, even in the company of others, can be highly stressful and may aggravate the effects of other stressors. Although the stress-buffering dynamics of social cohesion are unclear, it is generally true that a sense of belonging and attachment to one's team or unit alleviates felt stress while raising the threshold for stress tolerance.

Leadership is also part of the stress-prevention equation. Competent leadership that begets confidence in the skill and judgment of the leadership team has a reassuring effect. Furthermore, the modeling of effective problem-solving and stress-coping behaviours by either appointed or emergent leaders teaches and enables others to cope.

**Situational Awareness.** In a constantly changing environment, situational awareness is critical to resilient performance. It enables people to exercise some degree of control over events rather than to be entirely at their mercy. In simple terms, situational awareness refers to knowledge of what is happening in the task environment. Technical descriptions typically mention features such as the following:

- the continuous extraction and interpretation of environmental information;
- the integration of this information with previous knowledge to develop an accurate mental representation of reality;

- understanding the dynamics of the task environment; and
- using such information and understanding to project and anticipate future environmental conditions.

Situational awareness is subject to the availability, quality, and timeliness of information, as well as differences in individual attending and perceptual processes. Hence, a leader's understanding of the situation will never be perfect or completely up to date. It will have gaps and errors. Nevertheless, to the extent that a leader's situational awareness is a reasonably good approximation of reality, it will enable the leader to project situations over time, make good pre-emptive plans and decisions, and exercise directive, motivational, and enabling influence in a timely and appropriate way.

**Improvisational Skills.** When bad things happen to good plans or reasonable expectations, improvisational skills provide leaders with capabilities to cope with setbacks and convert them to opportunities. Improvisation, like jazz, refers to the ability to perform a task without a script or a plan. As a way of adjusting to the unexpected, improvisation may involve the use of general-purpose problem-solving routines or the creation of novel solutions. In either case, fortune favours the prepared leader. Prior practice in carrying out problem-solving routines and in being creative makes for better leader improvisation and performance.

**“Improvise! Adapt! Overcome!”**

Sergeant Tom Highway (Clint Eastwood)  
*Heartbreak Ridge*

For example, with respect to *general-purpose problem-solving* routines, investing time in practising and over-learning algorithms associated with the preparation of estimates, planning, and transmitting orders (e.g., battle procedure) develops the general skill of doing a quick study and the confidence to take charge in volatile situations.<sup>43</sup> However, the development of these skills and the necessary confidence to use them requires a training environment in which subordinate leaders are trusted, they are given considerable decision-making latitude, initiative is both encouraged and

<sup>43</sup> Training in improvisational routines was first systematically introduced into officer corps training in the German Army in the late nineteenth century, and subsequently perfected in later decades, as part of the mission-oriented command doctrine of *Auftragstaktik*, which emphasized speed, initiative, and decisive action. See, for example, John T. Nelsen II, “*Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Combat Leadership*,” in Lloyd J. Matthews & Dale E. Brown *The Challenge of Military Leadership* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's), 1989, and Martin van Creveld, *Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press), 1982. This sort of leader training is widely employed in most modern military forces.

recognized, and mistakes based on reasonable judgments are tolerated. When performing and improvising under pressure, achieving a perfect solution is not the objective; coming up with and implementing a workable solution quickly is the appropriate measure of success.

When *creative solutions*<sup>44</sup> are required – breaking out of mental habits or procedural routines, challenging taken-for-granted assumptions, generating new uses or alternatives – experience in the domain of practice is usually a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for this kind of improvisation. Whether in the arts or sciences, good creative ideas are rarely produced by novices; mastery of what is already known seems to be a necessary foundation for new thinking. Active learning, paying attention, analyzing, searching for patterns, and storing information and concepts provide the raw materials for creative improvisation. Luck and chance also play a part. That said, numerous *heuristic techniques* have been invented to help stimulate the imagination and generate original ideas. Among the aids that are most useful in operational settings, are such techniques as *reframing* (looking at a problem from different perspectives), *group brainstorming* (without criticism, the freewheeling production of ideas by group members), and their variants. In any case, the quality of the creative ideas produced by such techniques will still depend to some degree on task-relevant knowledge and experience.

**heuristic A method for discovery, a procedure for solving a problem, a technique that operates as a vehicle for creative formulation. Essentially, a heuristic is any sophisticated, directed procedure that functions by reducing the range of possible solutions to a problem or the number of possible answers to a question.... Compare with *algorithm*, which is a procedure that guarantees the finding of a solution, which heuristics do not.**

Arthur S. Reber  
*The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology*

## INSTILLING THE MILITARY ETHOS

To ensure individuals and groups can be counted on to conduct themselves in a professional manner, unit-level leaders have important responsibilities to instill and uphold the military ethos. The most effective way leaders can do this is by establishing and reinforcing team or unit rules of conduct that reflect the values of the ethos. As a property of the group, culturally appropriate and deeply ingrained norms of conduct can substitute for, and reduce the requirement for, a lot of hands-on directive leadership and external control and discipline.

Group norms can form in at least two ways: they can develop gradually and informally as members establish preferences for how they should operate and interact, or they can be intentionally shaped by the leadership team. In the absence of strong unit norms or effective leadership by those in positions of authority, group opinion leaders and other influential individuals in a group will tend to establish their own behavioural expectations and standards, which may not always be consistent with the values of the military ethos (e.g., mistreatment of weak performers). Similarly, a leader's precedent-setting actions (e.g., being permissive about heavy drinking and rowdy behaviour) may send out the wrong message and contribute to the development of dysfunctional group norms.

**“Group norms are the informal rules that groups adopt to regulate and regularize group members’ behaviour.”**

Daniel Feldman  
“The Development and Enforcement of Group Norms”

There are, however, actions the leadership team can take to set the right professional and ethical tone and to maintain appropriate norms. These include such socialization practices as:

- clarifying expectations about professional conduct and explaining the purpose of such standards,

<sup>44</sup> Although definitions of creativity vary, the general consensus seems to be that “Creativity is the ability to produce work that is both novel (i.e., original, unexpected) and appropriate (i.e., useful, adaptive concerning task constraints.” Robert J. Sternberg & Todd I. Lubart, “The Concept of Creativity: Prospects and Paradigms,” in Robert J. Sternberg (ed.) *Handbook of Creativity* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 1999, p. 3.

- commemorating unit historical events and observing traditions that reflect institutional values,
- personally exemplifying professional and ethical standards and consistently reinforcing them, and
- taking prompt action to quash the emergence of counter-norms.

For individuals and teams who have attained a high level of professional capability and readiness, one of the few significant functions left to the leader may be simply to provide the

enabling resources so that they can accomplish their tasks. In groups possessing superior knowledge and skills, substantial experience, a professional orientation, and other characteristics that reduce the need for detailed direction and close supervision, effective leadership often means getting out of the way. Responsible delegation, however, also means that leaders must continue to monitor individual and group performance.

### ***ENGINEER PARATROOPERS ON THEIR OWN – NORMANDY, 1944***

“Leading up to D-Day, the brigadier met with the officers. We didn’t know what the objective was going to be, but he just kept repeating, ‘There’s gonna be chaos and confusion and it’ll never be otherwise. So bear that in mind. You’re gonna require leadership and initiative.’ We were finally alerted and lifted from our camp into a secure staging area enclosed by barbed wire. That’s where Normandy was first mentioned and we were shown photographs and sand-table models....

Our drop zone in Normandy was very close to a town called Ranville, which was the battalion’s objective. The main mission was to move in behind the German defences and seize all the bridge crossings across the Dives River to prevent armour and reinforcements reaching the beach. It was a matter of blowing the bridges up, or, failing that, holding them and stopping any reinforcements from crossing....

In retrospect, the intelligence information provided to us was not complete. We had daylight photographs of the drop zones, which were no bloody good at night because we were in total darkness. The other problem was that there had never been an assault in darkness. The airlift was taking off from English

airfields scattered all over the country and we had to link up and hit the drop zone at roughly the same time, five minutes after midnight, in radio silence. It’s no secret that the Normandy airborne invasion was almost a total disaster....

When I dropped, it was pitch black – not even any moonlight. That’s quite unnerving to parachute down in, particularly when you’re alone and looking for your buddies. Gradually, over a period of a half-hour or an hour, your group maybe found an officer, or a half a dozen guys that you knew. Somebody puts a fighting group together, says ‘I think the objective is that way,’ and away you go....

But because of the training and the emphasis of the brigadier on initiative, our fellows that dropped anywhere near the drop zone may have been lost for hours, but they gathered people together and eventually, with compasses and maps, figured out where the hell they were. Within two days, we got to all the bridges, seized them, and blew them up or contained them. But there were a lot of lives lost and an awful lot of equipment lost on the drop.”

Andy Anderson, RCE, 1<sup>st</sup> Cdn Para Bn  
In *Testaments of Honour*

## IMPROVING SITUATIONAL FAVOURABILITY

In many missions and tasks, situational factors often seriously constrain action or threaten successful execution of the leader's intent and plan. To improve situational favourability in such cases, and thereby improve the chances of mission success, leaders must take steps to overcome obstacles, counter threats, or otherwise neutralize them. Leaders can also structure characteristics of the operating environment to support and enhance direct influence. Three areas of potential leverage and influence are briefly examined here: unit/organizational characteristics, external relations, and relationships with superiors.

**Unit/organizational Characteristics.** Depending on their level of authority or influence, leaders can pro-actively engineer certain features of the unit environment to enhance situational favourability. These include elements of individual jobs, operating procedures, and unit climate. For example, job-rotation and job-enrichment strategies are intended to increase the responsibility, meaningfulness, and intrinsic satisfaction of tasks and jobs. For routine operational and administrative scenarios, the development of standard operating procedures and immediate-action drills can effectively negate the requirement for leader direction in many routine scenarios, freeing up the leader for other tasks. Similarly, by creating a supportive *unit climate*<sup>45</sup> leaders can build up reserves of commitment and performance.

More commonly, improvements in situational favourability result from initiatives to adapt equipment or its applications and to develop new tactics and procedures to deal with novel threats or operating conditions. These work-redesign aspects of “technical” leadership<sup>46</sup> may be developed spontaneously in the press of operations or as part of a program of continuous learning and improvement. After-action reviews and other procedures for capturing and disseminating lessons learned from firsthand experience or other sources contribute directly to the evolution of doctrine and professional expertise.

## IMPROVING SITUATIONAL FAVOURABILITY THROUGH INNOVATION – RCAF EASTERN AIR COMMAND, 1942

“[S/L N.E. ‘Molly’ Small’s skill and initiative resulted in Eastern Air Command’s first U-boat kill on 31 July 1942. It was also under his leadership that 113 Bomber Reconnaissance (i.e., Maritime Patrol) Squadron achieved the best record of successful attacks on U-boats of any squadron in Eastern Command in 1942 . . . RAF Coastal Command’s tactical innovations had been instrumental in Small’s destruction of *U-754*: he had taken the German submarine by surprise because the bottom of his aircraft had been painted white, and he was flying at an altitude of 3,000 feet instead of the Eastern Air Command standard of 500 feet. His astute attention to developments in maritime air power tactics (technical leadership), and his ambitious efforts to act on fresh intelligence had produced Eastern Air Command’s first U-boat kill. He also demonstrated excellent leadership skills by ensuring that his entire squadron utilized the tactical innovations that he himself developed as well as those he borrowed from RAF Coastal Command. A few hours after Small’s destruction of *U-754*, Pilot Officer (P/O) G.T. Sayre of 113 Squadron carried out an attack on *U-132*. Although he did not destroy the boat, Sayre’s attack had been launched because of fresh DF [Direction Finding] plots phoned to RCAF Station Yarmouth, and he employed the new tactics Small had introduced to the squadron. On 2 August, Small made another attack on a U-boat, this time *U-458*, and only three days later he followed it up with one more, this time on *U-89*.”

Richard Goette

“Squadron Leader N.E. Small:

A Study of Leadership in the RCAF’s Eastern Air Command, 1942”

<sup>45</sup> Climate is a measure of members’ perceptions of the work environment. Generally taken to indicate the extent to which the environment is judged as personally beneficial, climate dimensions include: role stress and clarity, job challenge and autonomy, supportive and facilitative leader behaviour, and work-group co-operation and friendliness.

<sup>46</sup> For a speculative discussion of the differential importance, or weight, attached by navy, army, and air force cultures to ‘technical’ leadership (the ability to influence others based on specialized knowledge) and to ‘heroic’ leadership (the conspicuous sharing of risks with subordinates), see Allan English, “The Masks of Command: Leadership Differences in the Canadian Army, Navy, and Air Force,” paper prepared for the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Conference, 25-27 October 2002, Kingston, ON.



**External Relations.** The effective management of external sub-unit and unit relationships represents another area where the investment of time and effort can result in multiple downstream benefits. With the increasing frequency and importance of joint, inter-agency, and multi-national operations, leaders at all levels must make a special effort to explain their role and capabilities to others and to understand the roles and capabilities of other organizations in their neighbourhood. The purpose of these undertakings is to establish mutually acceptable protocols for working co-operatively, as well as independently, in the same theatre of operations or in the same jurisdiction.

In developing this framework of understanding, it follows that leaders must be sensitive to and try to accommodate cultural and other differences, including different assumptions about leadership and authority.<sup>47</sup> Essential cross-cultural skills include: understanding how one's leadership style affects and is perceived by others; openness to new knowledge and different points of view; awareness of and respect for diverse ethnic and religious customs; the ability to understand cultural similarities at the level of values and basic assumptions; and principle-based reasoning. So-called *boundary spanning* activities (e.g., liaison, consultation, goodwill gestures of assistance, sharing resources, etc.) are especially helpful in peace-support operations where sensitivity to local customs and good relations with civil authorities, other military forces, NGOs, and the civilian population may be instrumental in accomplishing mission objectives.

### **IMPROVING SITUATIONAL FAVOURABILITY THROUGH CIMIC – KOSOVO, 1999-2000**

"By the time the last soldier boarded the plane bound for Canada, the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group had, during its tour of duty in Kosovo, managed the refurbishment of three schools, co-ordinated the delivery of over six thousand shelters, facilitated the regular provision of food aid to over eighty thousand persons, assisted in the provision of medical care to thousands of local inhabitants, harmonized the efforts of several de-mining organizations, made extensive repairs to the local road network, and arranged for the provision of safe drinking water to numerous war-affected towns and villages. These efforts, in turn, helped the Battle Group win the hearts and minds of the residents of the Canadian Area of Operations and so, contributed to the sustainment of a stable and benign operating environment. The operational impact of Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) was both real and positive."

Major Douglas E. Delaney

"CIMIC Operations During Operation KINETIC"

At the operational level of command and activity, military commanders will often be obliged to interact with senior political leaders. And, occasionally, they may be required to

influence political leaders or other officials to take actions that will support the achievement of both military security objectives and broader political objectives.

<sup>47</sup> See Martin Chemers, *An Integrative Theory of Leadership* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum), 1997, for a summary of cross-cultural ideas about appropriate authority relationships and leader behaviour.

## ***INFLUENCING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY – SARAJEVO, 1992***

“The story of how Canadian soldiers formed the first battalion to run the [Sarajevo] airport and how Lewis MacKenzie became the commander of sector Sarajevo is now so well known it has become legendary. In a meeting on 6 June 1992, Brigadier-General MacKenzie, as Chief of Staff [for UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia], gave his assessment of troop availability. Everyone in attendance... knew that it would take months to organize a peacekeeping force for the airport. Sarajevo was not even part of the UNPROFOR mandate. The notoriously slow and bumbling United Nations would never supply the needed troops in time...

MacKenzie volunteered the Canadian battalion located west of Croatia as the only one available for the mission....

The UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had declared Sarajevo to be the most dangerous city in the world. The bulls-eye of that danger zone was the Sarajevo airport. Brigadier-General MacKenzie, himself, recognized it as possibly the most dangerous mission Canadians had been on since Korea.

MacKenzie led an advance party to the city in mid-June where he found that the siege, and the violence, had actually intensified since he had left several weeks earlier. The airport agreement [between the Bosnian Serb leadership of Radovan Karadzic and the multi-ethnic Bosnian government headed by President Alija Izetbegovic] had sparked off a fierce battle for as much control of the area around the landing strip as possible, and no one was in any mood to accommodate UNPROFOR’s demands to honour the cease-fire....

MacKenzie’s reconnaissance group could see that they had an airport agreement but no airport. It was almost impossible to function in the area because of the shelling....

On 20 June, three Canadian soldiers in the recce group were wounded when their jeep was hit by shrapnel.... It was a taste of what UNPROFOR soldiers could expect for the next three

years: they would become casualties in continuous cross-fire, and they would be deliberately targeted by both sides of the conflict. When they were not casualties, they would become hostages....

On 28 June, in the midst of this violence, Brigadier-General MacKenzie had a surprise visit from a very influential head of state. François Mitterrand, President of France, decided to spur on the UNPROFOR mission to Sarajevo by proving to the world that planes could actually land there, and the first aircraft would be his. Instead of admitting there was no way to guarantee the president’s safe arrival, MacKenzie ordered UNPROFOR to prepare the runway for the aircraft to land. Mitterrand and his entourage arrived in two Super Puma helicopters. One of them took machine gun fire as it landed. Undaunted, the President of France decided to make the best of the visit – and so did Brigadier-General MacKenzie.

In later interviews, MacKenzie stated that the Mitterrand visit was the one time in his life when all his military and diplomatic experience jelled into effective action.... MacKenzie knew he had only a few hours to convince Mitterrand that the airport could be open for business. ‘When he and I discussed it and when I asked him to send humanitarian aircraft, I knew the media would cover it. And I knew that every friggin’ country in the world watching television would want to part of the action for their six o’clock news’...

During the limited time available to persuade the French President of all of this, the General was successful. Mitterrand departed – following a final hail of shells and sniper fire – having agreed to send French planes to Bosnia. As MacKenzie predicted, other countries followed suit; soon relief flights were pouring in from all over the world – from countries that had been helplessly watching the deterioration of Sarajevo from a distance.”

Carol Off

In *Warrior Chiefs*

At all levels of activity, the news media serve as an extremely influential link between the military and the various audiences addressed by print, television, and radio journalists. Although the representatives of different media have different objectives, methods of working, and time pressures, most see themselves as providing an essential information service, as well as an independent perspective on events. How the CF is portrayed and treated in the media, even when dealing with a “bad news” story, will largely depend on whether military spokespersons can demonstrate that they are credible and trustworthy.

The news media are not only the primary sources of blunt facts and unvarnished opinions about the CF for many military members and the public, but they also shape the perceptions of these audiences. Hence, stonewalling, deception, and attempts at manipulation cannot and will not serve CF interests. Experience has clearly shown that openness and transparency are the best policy. This means that, subject to any privacy or security considerations that may apply, leaders should take pains to be as open and candid as possible with journalists and reporters – as appropriate, making themselves available for briefings and interviews, establishing information web-sites, and granting access to junior service members. Not only does media coverage get the CF’s story out, but the perception of media impartiality also allows leaders who are forthright in their views to send other important signals to a wider audience. By default, the interested audience will always include members of the CF, but may also include the Canadian public, the Government, or other communities and governments. Because the signals sent will sometimes be unintended, leaders should also consider how their comments will contribute to or detract from mission accomplishment, whether they will bolster or undermine confidence in the CF and its leadership, and the short-term versus long-term costs and benefits of their statements.

**“Commanders do not have to wait to be interviewed. Presumably, generals and admirals can all write. Just about every newspaper in the world has a comment page or equivalent for op ed commentary.... [But] Canadian commanders at home and abroad rarely take advantage of the opportunity to comment in writing, which represents missed opportunities.”**

Major-General (ret’d) Lewis W. MacKenzie  
In *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*

**Relationships with Superiors.** Because leadership is not constrained to downward influence, a discussion of the ‘leading people’ function would not be complete without also considering how individuals, *in any position*, can use their expertise, information, experience, and other qualities to influence superiors. Through such influence, any subordinate can improve situational favourability for the team or unit or generally contribute to collective effectiveness. Although this facet of leadership has not been extensively studied, it has become increasingly important with the emergence of new power arrangements in organizations in recent decades. Not only have attitudes toward authority become less deferential, but some organizations have also become more collegial and democratic in the way they operate. They have become more responsive to subordinate voice and more willing to share leadership responsibilities. One of the reasons for this shift has to do with the increased complexity of systems and operating environments; commanders and managers have become more dependent on the knowledge, skills, and experience of their subordinates. Hence, what might have been taken for presumption on the part of subordinates in years past is more likely to be viewed as necessary advice and good “followership” today.

**“To be effective as a leader, it is necessary to influence people to carry out requests, support proposals, and implement decisions. In large organizations, ... effectiveness ... depends on influence over superiors and peers as well as influence over subordinates.”**

Gary Yukl  
*Leadership in Organizations*

<sup>48</sup> Senior NCOs and warrant officers view the coaching and advising role as an important part of their professional relationship with ‘green’ junior officers.

Appropriate upward influence takes three general forms:

- dissenting with and counter-arguing received direction, where the objective is to dissuade superiors from pursuing a flawed, illegal, or unethical course of action;
- coaching and advising, where the objective is to assist superiors in achieving their objectives by providing them with specialized expertise, essential information, or the benefit of greater experience;<sup>48</sup> and
- proposing original plans and ideas, where the objective is to persuade superiors to accept a course of action that will improve some facet of collective effectiveness.

Whether the objective is dissuasion, advice, or persuasion, there are a number of factors that increase the chances that a subordinate will be successful in exercising upward influence:

- demonstrating reliability, loyalty, and discretion, and establishing a reputation for expertise, effectiveness, and professionalism;
- taking the time to understand the superior's perspective, goals, pressures, priorities, and operating style;
- offering needed information, suggestions, or time and effort to help a superior solve a problem he or she is wrestling with;
- having the courage to be candid in the interests of team, unit, or CF goals and effectiveness, while maintaining a professional manner and tone;
- picking an appropriate time and place to present advice and ideas;
- being well prepared when presenting ideas, namely, supporting recommendations with objective facts and data, and using allies to advantage;
- not getting upset when a superior exercises his or her decision authority and chooses not to accept or act on advice or recommendations offered.

In sum, the ability to influence superiors is largely a matter of performing well to establish credibility and earn trust, building successful working and professional relationships, and developing sound ideas and coherent positions before presenting them.

## PERFORMING TASKS

At the tactical and operational levels of activity, individual, team, and unit development is ultimately validated in the conduct of routine and contingency operations. The general process, or sequence of actions, by which leaders logically and efficiently structure and carry out an operation, or any other task, is captured in the planning and executive phases of the *task cycle*. In addition, the processes by which leaders manage individual and group performance, from task initiation to completion, are described in a blended version of several contingency theories of leadership that we call *adaptive performance management*. Both the task cycle and adaptive performance management can be viewed as integrative approaches to influencing and controlling mission or task performance.

**“Organizational behavior is made up of a series of tasks. Tasks are iterated and the sum of those iterations totals up to the work of unit or the individual.... This perspective of task iteration led to the notion of the task cycle, in that repeated performance of a task involves repeating a process – a systematic series of actions directed to some end.”**

Clark L. Wilson, Donald O'Hare, & Frank Shipper  
In *Measures of Leadership*

**The Task Cycle.** As shown in Figure 6-2, the task cycle<sup>49</sup> consists of a general sequence of four thinking and action steps – (1) analyze requirement; (2) formulate intent and plan; (3) direct, motivate, enable; and (4) monitor and adjust performance. These steps successively address the following questions: What should I do? How should I do it? How do I implement intent? How do I ensure task accomplishment?

Simple, routine, well practiced tasks, conducted under typical conditions, will normally call up fairly automated behavioural sub-routines and drills, requiring little in the way of analysis and planning. On the other hand, ambiguous, complex, or novel tasks will engage the sequence of controlled thought and action depicted in the task cycle. The cycle has broad applicability – from large-scale

<sup>49</sup> The task cycle can be considered a special case of the operational Decision-Action cycle. Operational doctrine describes the Decision-Action cycle in terms of a continuous Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action (OODA) loop. While the OODA loop works well as a broad and clinical description of just about any kind of activity, it does not provide a very accurate description of what goes on in leadership or social-influence terms – formulation of intent, directing and influencing others, monitoring and managing performance.

Figure 6-2 | Generic task cycle.



campaigns and projects to discrete work assignments – and undertakings of both short and long duration. Its phases are described as follows:

- **Analyze requirement.** When given or faced with a task, the first thing leaders in training are taught is to think before acting or reacting. The *analysis* step (or diagnostic, or estimate of the situation) involves systematically considering the friendly-force, enemy, and situational factors relevant to the task (including any legal and ethical constraints), thinking through their implications, and identifying possible courses of action. The leader may carry out the analysis alone or jointly with other team members (i.e., may make use of participative influence).
- **Formulate intent and plan.** The leader must then decide – again, alone or in concert with others – on the best course of action under the circumstances, taking into account the relative risks and chances of success among the alternatives, and make a plan that both expresses his or her *intent* (or a superior commander’s intent) and serves as a guide to action. At the decision stage, several factors have the potential to affect mission success:
  - One is whether the leader has *sufficient information* to make a high-quality decision alone. When faced with a task that is outside the range of their experience, leaders should not hesitate to draw on the expertise and

experience of superiors, colleagues, and subordinates. Asking for and using such advice increases the chances of success and reinforces co-operation and teamwork.

- Another consideration is the *time available* for analysis, which, if extremely limited, as is often the case in operational scenarios, may compel a unilateral assessment and decision even if requisite mission or task information is incomplete.
- A third factor is the relative importance of *subordinate commitment* to the decision. As a rule, when commitment is important but also in doubt, leaders must, at a minimum, do a convincing job of explaining and rationalizing their decisions and intentions. Time permitting, consultative and participative forms of decision-making<sup>50</sup> and planning may enhance decision acceptance.
- **Implement intent.** At this stage of the task cycle, the leader directs, motivates, and enables others to carry out his intent and the resulting plan, using the most appropriate influence behaviours to achieve the desired levels of commitment, effort, and performance. While leader influence is most evident in this executive phase of the task cycle, leader influence pervades all interactive aspects of planning and executive processes.

<sup>50</sup> For a fairly sophisticated treatment of the principles involved in participative decision making, and their application, see Victor H. Vroom & Arthur J. Jago, *The New Leadership: Managing Participation in Organizations* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall), 1988.

**“The most important troop-leading steps are telling your troops exactly what they are supposed to do, and why it’s necessary to do it. It’s also the very least soldiers deserve because if they know what’s expected of them and why it’s necessary, things have meaning and meaning sparks interest. When troops are interested they stay alert and stay alive longer. They will also come to trust that you know what you’re doing.”**

Major-General (ret’d) Guy S. Meloy, US Army  
“Reflections of a Former Troop Leader”

- 6**
- **Monitor and adjust performance.** To ensure the plan is carried out in accordance with his or her intent, the leader must monitor subordinate behaviour and performance. This can be accomplished through first-hand observation, status reports, or the successful achievement of intermediate milestones. Feedback so obtained will indicate whether adjustments are required to the plan or if additional direct influence is necessary. The cycle is effectively completed when an after-action review is carried out to identify what worked well, what didn’t work well, and any changes necessary to improve performance.

Each iteration of the task cycle works as a learning trial for both the leader and followers. In addition to becoming more proficient in executing the task cycle, leaders, for example, learn about the capabilities of their subordinates and how they interact. They develop expectations about how subordinates are likely to respond to certain situations, so that they can modify their influence behaviour accordingly – exercising either more or less control. Similarly, followers develop stable expectations about how the leader is likely to behave in different situations, so that they are better able to understand and interpret the leader’s intent. They also learn about the leader’s competencies, motives, and values, and how much trust and confidence they can place in him or her. In this way, stabilized leader-follower relationships develop over time. The more they are based on mutual trust, the more professional and effective they will be.

**Adaptive Performance Management (Situational Leadership).** In addition to pro-actively developing capabilities and initiating activity and behaviour, leaders must also be responsive to and manage individual and collective performance. Performance management ensures that appropriate

actions are taken in accordance with the leader’s intent, that standards of performance and norms of conduct are adhered to, that progress toward objectives is made, and that desired outcomes are eventually achieved. As might be deduced from the leader-follower-situation framework, performance management involves the following basic processes:

- *monitoring* the changing psychological states and behaviours of followers, as well as conditions in the environment (situational awareness); and
- *influencing* followers or situational conditions to maintain or alter behaviour and performance.

These features of adaptive performance management are recurring themes in most *contingency theories* of leadership.

Contingency (or situational) theories of leadership claim, with some empirical support, that leader effectiveness is optimized when leaders accurately *identify performance requirements or the causes of performance deficits* in a task or problem situation and focus their influence behaviour on those areas. What constitutes appropriate leader behaviour is contingent, or depends, on the nature of the situation to some extent, which is why leaders must be skilled across the spectrum of effective influence behaviours and use them to suit the situation. Success in applying these ideas rests on three assumptions:

- that leaders can and will monitor performance and accurately assess the key requirements or deficiencies in a task or problem situation,
- that individuals and groups are more effective when leader behaviour is responsive to and fits the requirements of the situation, and
- that leaders are capable of demonstrating a reasonable degree of behavioural flexibility in using their influence to modify behaviour and performance.

**contingency theories** A term used occasionally for those models of behavior that stress the role of context and circumstances in controlling human action.

Arthur Reber  
*The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology*

Implicitly or explicitly, situational leadership theories subscribe to roughly similar cause-and-effect models of individual, team, and organizational effectiveness. This suggests that the leader's performance-monitoring and performance-management role is to ensure that all the elements necessary to be effective are in place or at the right strength. *Individual performance*, for example, is commonly understood to be a function of: task understanding or role clarity, ability to perform the task, task motivation, self-confidence, and task support. Thus, to ensure effective individual performance on any given task, the adaptive or contingent part of the leader's job, simply put, amounts to figuring out where individuals stand on each of these variables and providing whatever might be missing – direction on what to do and how to proceed if they do not fully understand the task.

By extension, at the team level of analysis, *group performance* can be viewed as a function of aggregated individual capabilities *plus* such group-process characteristics as shared understanding, task interdependencies, internal communications, co-operation and teamwork, morale, and cohesion. Hence, ensuring effective team performance is slightly more complicated because there are more variables in the effectiveness equation. But the leadership principle is the same. The leader attempts to influence individual and group characteristics to increase the chances of success.

As a way of fleshing out these notions, Table 6-1 lists the key variables that underpin or moderate individual and group performance and, for each variable or capability, lists a set of possible corrective actions to be taken by the leader or leadership team when a specific requirement or deficiency is

identified. The most common contingencies, as assembled from a number of leadership theories,<sup>51</sup> and the corresponding corrective actions, are couched as sets of “IF...THEN...” guidelines (i.e., if condition A is observed, then take action B<sub>1</sub>, B<sub>2</sub>, or B<sub>3</sub>, etc.). Overall, the practical guidance provided by this Table indicates that, when it comes to managing performance, leaders are presented with a broad array of leverage points and choices.<sup>52</sup> What leaders must understand is that there are several dimensions to individual and group effectiveness, and that they have to identify and influence the right leverage points to achieve the desired result.

Generalizing across this systems view of the individual, group, and situational factors that contribute to performance and effectiveness (introduced in Figure 1-1), we are brought back to the principles of direct and indirect influence:

- **Direct Influence Principle: To contribute to CF effectiveness directly, leaders develop and capitalize on people's capabilities, and take appropriate action to correct or compensate for their deficiencies.**
- **Indirect Influence Principle: To contribute to CF effectiveness indirectly, leaders establish or modify task, group, system, institutional characteristics and environmental conditions that enable or enhance individual and collective performance, and attempt to neutralize or adapt to situational factors that constrain performance.**

<sup>51</sup> These contingencies are particularly well summarized in Gary Yukl's Multiple-Linkage Model of leader effectiveness (*Leadership in Organizations* 5<sup>th</sup> ed). Table 6-1 is an adaptation and extension of his set of intervening variables (Task Commitment, Ability and Role Clarity, Organization of Work, Co-operation and Mutual Trust, Resources and Support, External Co-ordination).

<sup>52</sup> Situationally adaptive performance management incorporates a cross-section of features found in a number of contingency theories of leadership, as well as Yukl's Multiple-Linkage Model and Bass and Avolio's Full Range of Leadership Model. The Full Range model positions transformational leadership as the most active and effective form of leadership and laissez-faire leadership as the most passive and ineffective form, with passive management by exception a close cousin. In the middle range of effectiveness, they place two forms of transactional leadership: contingent reward, and active management by exception. For details, see Bernard M. Bass & Bruce J. Avolio (eds.), *Improving Organizational Effectiveness Through Transformational Leadership* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications), 1994; Bruce J. Avolio & Bernard M. Bass, *Developing Potential Across a Full Range of Leadership™: Cases on Transactional and Transformational Leadership* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum), 2002.

**Table 6-1: Basic elements of adaptive performance management.**

**Task Understanding:** *If subordinates are unclear about what to do...*

- Clarify assignments/roles; provide structure and procedural direction.
- Set specific performance goals/standards and provide performance feedback.
- In crisis situations, provide decisive direction.

**Task Proficiency:** *If subordinates lack skill or use inefficient procedures...*

- Arrange instruction if requisite training has not been provided.
- Provide practice and coaching if performance is inconsistent or sub-standard.
- Develop clear plans; consult subordinates to improve procedures.
- Organize task teams to ensure best mix and fit of skills, equipment, and other resources.
- Make people aware of task interdependencies; improve sequencing; strengthen internal communications.

**Motivation:** *If subordinates are reluctant to perform task or unwilling to furnish sufficient effort...*

- Set personal example of commitment and effort.
- Increase potential for intrinsic satisfaction by aligning subordinate's interests and abilities with tasks, or by broadening responsibilities.
- Consistent with subordinate's ability and maturity, delegate authority and increase autonomy.
- Use rational persuasion to enhance subordinate's understanding.
- Appeal to professional values to strengthen subordinate's sense of purpose and commitment.
- Time permitting, ask subordinates for help and advice, and involve them in planning and decision making.
- Offer to assist subordinates, or to provide extra resources and support for difficult undertakings.
- Identify subordinates' concerns and be willing to negotiate non-critical elements.
- Look and listen to identify major dissatisfiers in the work environment; encourage suggestions for improvements; remedy problems promptly.
- Recognize effort and achievement; make rewards contingent on effective performance.

**Confidence:** *If subordinates lack confidence in personal or group capabilities...*

- Express confidence in subordinates' abilities to attain objectives.
- Devote extra practice to difficult performance tasks.
- Maintain composure under stress; use humour to lighten the load.
- Share hardships and risks faced by subordinates.
- Acknowledge individual and group progress and successes.

**Teamwork & Cohesion:** *If members of group do not co-operate well or do not identify with unit...*

- Reinforce norms of self-discipline, respect, and collaboration.
- Emphasize group goals, common interests, and shared values.
- Engage in team-building activities in which success depends on co-operation and trust.
- Use symbols, ceremonies, history, and heritage to develop identification with the unit and shared values.
- Create outlets for stress, frustration, and boredom; defuse interpersonal conflicts promptly.

**Professional Conduct:** *If individuals engage in behaviour that is contrary to professional standards...*

- Take corrective action in response to mistakes that are attributable to a lack of knowledge or experience.
- Take immediate and progressive disciplinary and/or administrative action against behaviour that is willfully unlawful, rebellious, delinquent, careless, or otherwise reflects poor judgment or a lack of professionalism.



**Table 6-1: Basic elements of adaptive performance management. (cont.)**

<p><b>Resources:</b> <i>If group lacks necessary equipment or resources to perform effectively or safely...</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Request, borrow, or scrounge necessary resources; ration resources if necessary.</li><li>• Prioritize, obtain budget for, and initiate improvement projects; improvise if necessary.</li><li>• Lobby superiors for improvements/resources and be persistent.</li></ul>
<p><b>External Relationships:</b> <i>If co-ordination with other units or agencies is weak...</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Explain roles and capabilities to other units/agencies and make an effort to understand their mandates and capabilities, capitalizing on areas of common interest.</li><li>• Develop professional cross-boundary relationships to facilitate co-ordination of effort.</li><li>• Be willing to do favours for others and ensure favours received from others are reciprocated.</li><li>• Keep superiors and collateral leaders informed of activities.</li><li>• Take the initiative to resolve small problems with collateral leaders before they become big problems.</li></ul>

### LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE

Situational leadership assists in ensuring that performance is adaptive to changing conditions not under a leader’s control. Done skillfully, it also enables human ingenuity to compensate to some extent for human mistakes as well as deficiencies in equipment, doctrine, resources, command and control, and accepted practices. At the very least, strong adaptive leadership can call forth the courage to try. Some lessons of experience, such as the operational failure of the Ross rifle in World War I, are obvious. Some, like the 1942 Dieppe raid, are painful. Still others, such as recent CF experience with Gulf War syndrome, point to complex problems and yield controversial conclusions.

If people and the CF are to reap the benefit of their experiences, no matter how dismal, they have to be routinely documented, analyzed, and their implications translated into necessary improvements and changes. At all levels of

functioning, in training and operations, CF leaders must constantly ask themselves if there isn’t a better way. Teams, units, systems, and the CF as whole have to review what they did (and what others did) with a critical eye, and determine what worked and what didn’t work. This ability to acquire new knowledge and bootstrap the necessary transformation of skills and behaviours can take many forms – from routine “hot washes,” after-action reviews, and lessons-learned drills to the more formal and rigorous processes of summary investigations, boards and commissions of inquiry, audits and in-depth reviews, benchmarking comparisons, and historical case studies. Regardless of the form taken, what leaders ultimately need to understand is that the CF has to be a learning organization in order to ensure high reliability performance. Too often, the human costs of failing to learn from experience are unacceptably high.

## SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN HMS COVENTRY – FALKLANDS WAR, 1982

“In the spring of 1982, Britain’s Royal Navy (RN) went to war.... My responsibility as the operations officer and on-watch anti-air warfare officer was to maintain the ship’s operational state and to conduct the air battle by helping to provide an umbrella of air defence to other ships in the force. Achieving this requires the skills of leadership, communication, and quickness of thought. Traditional military training plants the seeds of these requirements, and long professional warfare courses provide the deep knowledge; thereafter, one improves through experience. However, I wonder whether the traditional leadership tests – the kind that, for example, assess an officer candidate’s ability to get a team to move an oil drum across a stretch of water, armed only with some rope and a few wooden poles – have relevance to leading a command team in a modern warship. In training, ‘taking charge’ of a squad of recruits to accomplish an unusual task hinges on the crisply barked order – the louder the better. This command style was once appropriate for gunnery officers controlling manual gun systems from windswept gun direction platforms. However, it does not transfer well to the quiet, computerized modern operations room. The order of the day involves having situation awareness and communicating that awareness to the team....

On May 1, the maritime exclusion zone was extended to 200 miles and became a total exclusion zone. The task force entered it and . . . settled into an air defence posture, with the Type 42s *Sheffield*, *Glasgow*, and *Coventry* stationed 40 miles up-threat and spread across the threat axis. Sea Harrier fighters from HMS *Hermes* and HMS *Invincible* were flying combat air patrol sorties. The mood of *Coventry*’s crew was dogged and resolute; no longer did I hear complaints of boredom (typical in peacetime operations!) despite the long hours of watching and waiting. There were, however, rumours that some sailors, of all ranks, were having premonitions of death. This I found to be unnerving.... In my view, the problem was that we had too much time for thinking; if we kept ourselves busy, perhaps those morbid thoughts would recede. Thereafter, I spent long hours talking to my teams about anything at all – from what we ourselves were doing to the state of world politics. They had to be kept diverted.

The following days saw the task force settle into routine operation. We had taken to bombarding Argentine troop positions ashore and using Harriers to attack strategic points, including the airfield at Stanley....

It was becoming increasingly clear that the Argentines saw *Coventry* as the unit that was hindering their efforts: a dedicated attack on our ship was therefore looking more and more likely.... [On May 25] a flight of four air force A-4 Skyhawks was launched to attack the surface-to-air missile combination of *Coventry* and *Broadsword*, which was on patrol to the northwest of Pebble Island.... The A-4 raid had been detected 150 miles to the west of us, before it descended toward the island.... Ten miles abeam of our formation, they turned out to sea and commenced their attack.... The leading pair of A-4s passed overhead... *Broadsword* was hit astern by a 1,000-pound bomb that came out of the flight deck and took the nose off the Lynx helicopter.... The ops room was ethereally quiet, except for the constant tapping of computer keys as the operators tracked aircraft, the murmuring of voices as information was passed, and the background noise as one of our Oerlikon 20mm guns was being fired at a target. It was exactly as I had expected it ought to be: quiet, professional, and without panic.

Until my tactical display erupted before me!

We had been hit by three 1,000-pound bombs, each of which had exploded. Several seconds later, I came to beneath a radar display that had fallen on top of me. The sights and sounds were horrific: little pockets of fire spread over the deck; cabling was sparking; emergency lights glowed; smoke was everywhere; and screams emanated from someone in the computer room below. I crawled over and tried to pull him out, but he slipped from my grasp and fell back into the inferno that had been his work station a few moments earlier.

Even before I got to my feet, it became clear to me that the ship was in terminal decline. We were heeling at a ridiculous angle, and it was getting worse.... At that moment, all I knew was that although a minute earlier I had been defending the ship against attack, I now lay dazed and injured in the corner of the ops room. The sailors who were left with me wandered

aimlessly about in shock and needed to be got out to the upper deck. I did not have time to debate, either within myself or with anyone else, whether I should take action or even whether my injuries would allow me to do so. Those sailors needed to be ordered, herded, and guided to safety through passageways now full of twisted metal and up through hatches where the ladders had been burned away – all in pitch darkness and smoke. A firmer, harsher form of leadership was now required; basic training was to be of use after all! I distinctly remember standing astride a hatch with the deputy weapons engineer officer, each of us cajoling and pulling sailors through. Ultimately we reached the highest space we could attain adjacent to the gun direction platform....

During the operations, the ship's company had answered the call to action for 25 days. Everyone had withstood horrendous hours on duty, the pressure of attack, endlessly malfunctioning equipment, and, during off-watch periods, uncertainty about what was happening. They had responded to praise, cajoling, and, of course, during quiet periods, reassurance that everything was going to be all right – they depended on that. But during the attack's immediate aftermath, leadership methods had to be much more direct. Evacuation and survival need a much firmer, and louder, leadership style. There is no single approach to command. Command must adapt to the situation."

Commander (ret'd) Richard Lane, RN

In *The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience*

## SUMMARY

In very simple and basic terms, leadership at the tactical and operational levels of command and activity is about influencing people to accomplish missions and tasks. Because of the potentially disastrous consequences of human performance errors in military missions and tasks, and of setbacks caused by unexpected events, leaders in tactical and operational teams and units must strive for highly reliable and resilient performance. Acquiring these capabilities demands substantial investments in individual/unit training and development and in other preparatory activities. Leaders must also develop the real-time crisis-recovery skills that will allow them to improvise quickly and effectively when plans go off the rails or when they are taken by surprise. Similarly, leaders have to ensure that whatever lessons experience teaches are well learned.

A commonly accepted way of thinking about the context in which missions and tasks are carried out is in terms of the leader, the followers, and the situation. Viewed through this lens, the leader's job can be understood as a process of aligning followers (direct influence) and improving situational conditions (indirect influence) to better achieve the leader's intent. From these considerations, we can identify five major ways in which tactical and operational leaders are able to influence mission performance and effectiveness:

- developing the individual and team capabilities of followers (task proficiency, teamwork, confidence, cohesion, and distributed leadership) to ensure high reliability mission performance;
- building individual and collective resilience (stress-prevention measures, situational awareness, improvisational skills) to allow people to withstand the stresses of operations and recover from misfortune or adversity;
- instilling the military ethos (socialization practices, establishment and reinforcement of appropriate group or unit norms) to ensure high standards of professionalism and self-discipline;

- altering or improving situational conditions (unit/organizational characteristics and procedures, external relations, relationships with superiors) to facilitate or enhance performance; and
- effectively employing individual and collective capabilities (understanding and mastery of the task cycle and its interactive elements, adaptive performance management) to accomplish missions, and making a deliberate effort to improve future performance by reviewing such experiences and adopting any lessons learned.

# Leading the Institution: An Overview

## CHAPTER 7

Requisite Capability .....	98
The Leader-System/Institution-Environment Context .....	99
The Strategic-Development Cycle .....	101
Adapting to the External Environment .....	104
Influencing the External Environment .....	109
Achieving Internal Alignment .....	111
Stewardship of the Profession .....	115

# Leading the Institution: An Overview

As we have seen, leadership at tactical and operational levels is primarily about accomplishing missions and tasks through direct influence on others. In higher headquarters, or at the strategic level of the CF, leadership requires a broader perspective and is uniquely about developing and maintaining the capabilities that will enable success at tactical and operational levels of command, both today and tomorrow. Consistent with the distinctions made in Chapter 1, influence on organizational performance at this level is typically indirect. The objective of strategic leadership is to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the CF: through the internal integration and management of organizational systems, and by positioning the CF favourably in relation to its environment. Leadership at this level both supports national-strategic interests and is concerned with acquiring and allocating military-strategic capabilities. Leadership at this level is also occupied with the professional health of the CF. In this sense, institutional leadership, like institutional effectiveness, encompasses both organizational and professional functioning.

**“A key responsibility of the senior leadership in war is to provide the strategic vision that enables tactical applications to win. In peace, it is to maintain the strategic vision of what is required to win in war – the culture and associated norms that must be carried into battle.”**

T. Owen Jacobs & Elliott Jaques  
In *Handbook of Military Psychology*

Senior leaders are guided by the same value structure as tactical and operational leaders, namely, the common organizational and professional values depicted in the CF effectiveness framework of Figure 2-1. Representative responsibilities within this general framework are described in Chapter 4 and reflect the different roles that senior leaders must play as national-security advisors, force commanders, forward-thinking visionaries, entrepreneurial developers, system managers, personnel champions, change leaders, partnership brokers, and stewards of the profession. As discussed in Chapter 5, senior leaders are granted substantial formal authority to conduct the CF's business, but, with an increased requirement to use lateral, upward, and external influence to achieve their objectives, they must also possess a well rounded and fully developed suite of personal competencies.

In this chapter, we examine more closely the general strategy-development processes of senior leadership. As in the previous chapter, two concepts are used to organize the discussion. One guiding idea is that of requisite capability, which refers to the key outputs senior leaders must deliver so that the CF is able to meet its commitments. The other describes the context in which senior leaders operate. With reference to senior leaders' responsibilities for sustaining the profession, a brief discussion of cultural change and maintenance processes concludes the chapter.

## REQUISITE CAPABILITY

In the ordinary dictionary sense of the word, *capability* refers to the *power or means to do something*. As described in Defence Planning and Management documents, military capability is generated when plans, people, and equipment are combined to achieve Government goals.

Because of the proliferation of security threats in the post-Cold War world and the related difficulty of identifying dominant or imminent threats, the CF has adopted a capability-based approach as its strategic-planning tool of choice. In this context, the notion of *requisite capability* addresses the question: ‘What capabilities must be developed to ensure operational effectiveness and mission success, given, among other things, a long list of actual and potential military tasks, competing interests and priorities, a constrained resource envelope, and the unavailability of risk in making planning decisions?’ The solution matrix for this problem set is called the Canadian Joint Task List (CJTL), a capability array defined by a list of capability areas on one dimension and different operating levels of joint tasks on the other dimension.<sup>53</sup> Each cell contains an indication of requisite capability (high, medium, or low), taking into account the need to be frugal with resources and the associated risks of coming up short in any one area. The principal benefit of this approach is that it provides the best assurance of robustness across a range of plausible futures. In any case, requisite capability is the centrepiece of strategic planning and strategic leadership.

**“Planning for the future is always imprecise, but during the Cold War the predominance of a single overwhelming threat at least provided a relatively clear, if unpleasant, focus. With no single threat to guide planning, the challenge of developing appropriately adaptable and effective military forces is immense. Using capability descriptions such as ‘multi-purpose’ and ‘adaptable’ provides some flexibility to policy, but translating a vague generalization into people, equipment, doctrine, and organizations that can actually accomplish missions is never going to be easy.”**

*Strategic Capability Planning for the Canadian Forces*

## THE LEADER-SYSTEM/ INSTITUTION-ENVIRONMENT CONTEXT

As outlined in Chapter 1, the world of the senior leader<sup>54</sup> is a complex one – broader responsibilities, more uncertainties to deal with, webs of interpersonal relationships to manage, longer time spans of activity. In general, senior leaders are responsible for managing large CF systems and sub-systems, ensuring their efficient and effective internal management and their adaptability to future requirements. Moreover, as a consequence of this extremely broad scope of responsibility, senior leaders operate in a social environment consisting of numerous collaborative relationships, as well as competing interests and points of view, and requiring the application of 360-degree influence.

The relevant field of action for senior leaders, depicted in Figure 7-1, consists of: (1) the leader; (2) major systems of the CF up to and including the whole organization (in this respect, the CF can be viewed as a system of systems); and (3) the external domestic and international environments in which the CF carries out the defence mission. This framework is analogous to, or can be considered a high-level version of, the leader-follower-situation framework of Chapter 6.

**Figure 7-1 | The leader-system/institution-environment framework.**



<sup>53</sup> Five major capability areas are identified in the Planning, Reporting, and Accountability Structure (PRAS): Command and Control (Command, Information & Intelligence), Conduct Operations (Conduct Operations, Mobility, Force Protection), Sustain Forces, Generate Forces, and Corporate Policy & Strategy. There are three levels of joint tasks: Military Strategic, Operational (Domestic, International) and Tactical.

<sup>54</sup> In the context of institutional or strategic leadership, the terms *senior leaders* and *senior leadership team* refer to General and Flag officers in top command and staff appointments as well as the senior officers and chief warrant/petty officers who work directly for them in key appointments and who assist them in developing and sustaining some aspect of CF strategic or professional capability.

With regard to influencing the various internal systems of the CF (human resources, information, materiel acquisition, financial services, etc.) and their inter-relationships, we can describe this part of the senior leader's job as ensuring *congruence among the working parts of a system or across the whole of the CF*. These parts, notionally portrayed in Figure 1-1, consist of the CF defence tasks, the people who perform the tasks, the formal characteristics of the organization (structure, processes, technology, authority structure, etc.), and the informal characteristics of the organization (patterns of communication, culture, etc.). The personnel system, for example, consists of several functions and structures (strategic analysis and planning, policy development, recruiting and selection, individual training and education, career management, compensation and benefits, personnel support, health services, research and evaluation), each of which interacts in various ways with other functions and structures. Co-ordination is largely achieved through downward influence over a subordinate cadre of mid-level commanders, managers, and staff, and lateral influence with military and civilian counterparts – either directly or through staff representatives. From this systems and organizational point of view, it is clear that strategic leaders shape and influence the task environment inhabited by operational-level and tactical-level leaders.

Senior leaders must also manage the interactions of the CF and its major systems with the external environment. This part of their job is about maintaining or improving the *institution-environment fit* vis à vis: (1) the international environment<sup>55</sup> (military and security threats, alliances and coalitions, regional and global governance structures, the world economy and resource distribution), (2) the domestic environment (national priorities, foreign policy, national security requirements, the economy, the defence budget, the federal regulatory framework, societal values and social change, personnel supply and demographics, the physical environment, public and media relations), and (3) the military environment<sup>56</sup> (technological advances, evolving concepts of operations). To achieve the right match of capabilities to requirements, senior leaders must exercise lateral influence with their peers, upward influence in the bureaucratic and political venues of civil-military relations,

and external influence with other military and security forces, government and private-sector agencies, the media, and the public.

Accordingly, within this leader-system/institution-environment framework, we can identify four major ways in which senior CF leaders achieve requisite capability and influence performance and effectiveness.

- **adapting to the external environment through strategic forecasting, planning, and the initiation and implementation of strategic change;**
- **influencing the external environment through direct advice, partnerships or co-operative arrangements, public affairs activities, and professional networks;**
- **achieving alignment across organizational systems and sub-systems through the communication of strategic intent, formalization of policy and doctrine, control of activities and resources, and performance management; and**
- **exercising stewardship of the profession through the strengthening of professional capabilities and culture.**

As several theorists have remarked, the orientation to the external environment is a defining feature of strategic leadership. To senior leaders falls the responsibility of ensuring that the CF satisfies the requirements of the Government's national security policy and is ready for whatever an uncertain future may bring. The CF cannot be caught unprepared. Consequently, senior leaders have no choice but to be agents of change. To ensure continuing readiness, they must have an in-depth understanding of the environment in which they operate and how it might look five, ten, and twenty years from now. They must have an accurate and reliable appreciation of security threats. They must be familiar with the nature and causes of the many social and military conflicts in which the CF may become involved. They must be knowledgeable about the workings of international alliances and keep abreast of advances in military technology. They must have a deep understanding of Canadian culture and values and maintain strong connections with society. And they must comprehend and work within, influencing where possible, government policies and priorities. This is situational awareness writ large.

<sup>55</sup> The *Strategic Overview* provides an annual DND/CF assessment of the international environment.

<sup>56</sup> The *Military Assessment* provides an annual DND/CF prospectus of developments in military art and science.



These requirements to have a global perspective on things, to take the long view, and to work through uncertainty, mean that effective institutional leadership is not simply a linear extrapolation of operational leadership and command. While some senior Generals and Flag Officers will periodically be assigned to force commander roles, most of their time will be devoted to providing advice on national security matters, planning and leading change, managing large complex systems, and stewarding the profession. For this reason, individuals destined for senior leadership roles should have the opportunity to broaden their professional and formal education and should be exposed to a series of progressive staff appointments. These experiences should provide them with the competencies needed to anticipate the future, lead change within a strategic context, and ensure continuing and effective operational capabilities.

### ADVICE FOR STAFF DEVELOPMENT

"My initial assignment to National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) did not happen until I was a Brigadier-General, and then only after two postings in that rank elsewhere. That NDHQ assignment lasted only one year before I was sent back 'to the field.' Thus I was faced with a learning curve that meant I was not able to work at an optimum level during my first year in Ottawa nor in subsequent appointments there....

As uninteresting as work at National Defence Headquarters may seem to some, it is important that those who may eventually rise to senior rank have the opportunity to serve there as early as their required operational postings permit. Each of the fields of strategic planning, policy, personnel, procurement, and finance have a system that must be understood if informed advice on them is to be given to politicians and if the interests of the Armed Forces are to be served. Ministers of Defence can only run the Department and the Armed Forces effectively if they have sound advice from knowledgeable and experienced officers and public servants. It is a requirement of generalship that their knowledge be comprehensive and their advice well founded."

General (ret'd) John de Chastelain  
In *Warrior Chiefs*

While strategic leadership is expected of the officers who occupy the most senior appointments in the CF, it must be emphasized that the staffs who work for and support them must share their understanding and world view if they are to be fully effective. Consistent with the strategic direction and intent set by senior leaders, they too are engaged in leading the institution, and will occasionally find it necessary to exercise downward, lateral, and upward influence along these lines. In fact, because ideas are the currency of strategic leadership, anyone with sufficient knowledge, creativity, motivation, and persuasive skills has the potential to influence some aspect of the CF's strategic or professional capability.<sup>57</sup>

### THE STRATEGIC-DEVELOPMENT CYCLE

Senior leaders exercise direct influence on their subordinate commanders and staffs and, increasingly, as they attain higher rank, must also rely on direct influence with peers and other colleagues to achieve horizontal co-ordination across interacting and sometimes interdependent systems. Shared developmental experiences help build the personal connections and networks that facilitate such lateral influence. In many key areas, however, the influence of senior leaders is indirect and is achieved through policies, programs, and structures intended to provide requisite military capability out to one or more future time horizons.<sup>58</sup>

**"We can now arrive at a shorter definition of strategy as – 'the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy'."**

B.H. Liddell Hart  
*Strategy*

<sup>57</sup> Professionalism means taking an interest in strategic issues. For example, in its guidelines for the submission of manuscripts, the *Canadian Military Journal* states that it "...welcomes the submission of manuscripts on topics of broad significance to the defence community of Canada, including, but not limited to, security and defence policy, strategic issues, doctrine, operations, force structures, the application of technology, equipment procurement, military history, leadership, training and military ethics. Forward-looking pieces which present original concepts or ideas, new approaches to old problems and fresh interpretation are especially welcome."

<sup>58</sup> DND and the CF make use of three planning horizons: **Horizon 1** (1-5 years), which focuses on maintaining and enhancing current capabilities; **Horizon 2** (5-10 years), which focuses on replacing or enhancing capabilities; and **Horizon 3** (10-30 years), which focuses on acquiring new capabilities.

Strategic planning is driven by national-strategic objectives and is the first step on the road to requisite capability. However, the function of strategic planning will vary in accordance with the degree and rate of environmental change experienced. In placid and predictable environments, the strategic plan is a relatively rigid control mechanism. In volatile and unpredictable environments on the other hand (i.e., the post-Cold War world), plans look like doomed attempts to control the uncontrollable and so tend to have a short shelf life. As a result, planning must be dynamic, a cyclical revisionist activity that takes into account the lessons of recent experience as well as updated organizational information and environmental intelligence. The purpose of the strategic plan in this context is to provide a common but flexible framework for action, and is more likely to be expressed as a statement of principles and broad objectives.<sup>59</sup>

**“Strategy 2020 identifies both the challenges and opportunities facing the Department and the Canadian Forces as they adapt to change in a rapidly evolving, complex and unpredictable world.... Designed to ensure a focus for defence decision-making, the strategy will be updated periodically and used to guide our planning, force structure and procurement decisions, as well as our investments in personnel, education and training.”**

*Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces:  
A Strategy for 2020*

Several different conceptual frameworks have been put forward to describe the major steps or phases of what is variously called strategic planning, strategic leadership, or strategy development. For example, a fairly recent integrative review of theories and research on executive leadership<sup>60</sup> portrays leadership at the systems level in terms of two broad categories of activity: (1) Boundary Spanning and Direction Setting, and (2) Operational Management. These correspond closely to the Change Agenda and Sustaining Agenda in the Defence Planning and Management Framework, illustrating just how similar many of these models and frameworks are. A generic strategic-development model, incorporating the conceptual similarities of several theoretical models and descriptive of the key processes involved, is depicted in Figure 7-2.<sup>61</sup>

**Figure 7-2 | Generic strategic-development cycle.**



<sup>59</sup> For an overview of plans, strategic planning, and the concept of dynamic planning, see Stephen A. Stumpf & Thomas P. Mullen, *Taking Charge: Strategic Leadership in the Middle Game* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall), 1992. For a discussion of the limitations of strategic planning, see Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning* (New York: Free Press), 1994.

<sup>60</sup> Stephen J. Zaccaro, *Models and Theories of Executive Leadership: A Conceptual/Empirical Review and Integration*. (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences), 1996.

<sup>61</sup> The Defence Planning and Management Framework, which is a prescriptive process, consists of six interdependent and linked elements: Strategic Visioning, Capability-Based Planning, Resource Prioritization, Business Planning, In-Year Management, and Performance Management.

The strategic-development process is shown as a cycle because of the requirement to refresh analyses and plans in a changeable environment (the DND/CF defence strategy, for instance, will be reviewed and revised on a recurring five-year cycle). Four major activities are included in this generic process, and are just as applicable to major elements and component systems of the CF (e.g., *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*, *Military HR Strategy 2020: Facing the People Challenges of the Future*) as they are to DND and the CF as a whole. Brief descriptions of each phase follow:

- **Conduct external and internal analyses.** This is the most critical step in attempting to position a large organization or system for continuing effectiveness. This part of the planning cycle – the strategic estimate – entails a comprehensive and reliable assessment of the organization's present state, its strengths and weaknesses, and an equally comprehensive scan and diagnosis of the external environment, the challenges and opportunities it presents and the strategic imperatives suggested by these conditions.<sup>62</sup> The assistance of various subject-matter experts is usually indispensable during this phase.
- **Formulate strategic vision and plan.** The identification of strategic imperatives is the baseline for generating solution options. Once a consensus of opinion has been established on options, they can be tested against likely scenarios with a view to identifying, on the basis of the senior leadership team's 'best professional judgment' and supporting risk analyses, the most satisfactory – in the present environment, most robust – option. As was the case in the formulation of *Defence Strategy 2020*, senior leaders are then in a position to create a vision description for the future force or organization. A follow-on gap analysis, comparing present capabilities to the desired future state, can then be used to identify *change objectives* and both near-term and long-term schedules for implementation. Allocating resources to the change objectives completes the essential outline of a change plan.
- **Implement change.** Implementing large-scale change in any organization is typically a difficult undertaking. Besides managing the mechanics of technological, process,

or structural change, leaders must also get the people who have to implement the change on side. Change can only be achieved *through* people. There are several reasons for difficulties in change implementation, many of them reducible to the fact that not everybody recognizes the need for change at the same time or accepts the kind of change being proposed. Hence leaders not only have to convince people of the necessity for change, but they have to communicate their vision and plan in a way that garners support and overcomes inertia and resistance. While strong communication skills are essential, the persuasive effects of reason and inspirational rhetoric can be enhanced by a variety of other *change-implementation methods* that draw on one or more bases of leader power.

- **Control, evaluate, and re-assess.** The only way senior leaders can be sure that they are in fact developing and maintaining necessary strategic capabilities is: (1) to ensure that appropriate control processes are put in place to guide activities and regulate resource consumption, and (2) to ensure that system performance is actively managed. From an influence perspective, clarifying goals and accountabilities, requiring periodic reports, routinely capturing and querying performance indicators, conducting formal evaluations and audits – all focus the attention and effort of others. What leaders pay attention to and evaluate signals what interests them. Clearly, what should interest them are measures of the major dimensions of CF effectiveness. In other words, the strategic *performance measurement framework* should mirror the *institutional effectiveness framework*.

The successful implementation of strategic change is obviously key to developing requisite CF capabilities. What should not be overlooked is the importance of sustaining existing capabilities through the same control and performance - management processes used to achieve on-time and on-budget change objectives. Together, the sustainment of existing capabilities – both technological and human – and the development of future capabilities create the conditions for institutional effectiveness and mission success.

<sup>62</sup> A product of what Henry Mintzberg calls the 'Design School' of planning, SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis is one of the more widely known analytical tools and was used, for instance, in the development of *Defence Strategy 2020*. The method requires the enumeration of organizational strengths and weaknesses with a view to identifying distinctive competencies and a parallel listing of environmental threats and opportunities to identify key success factors. In addressing threats, the resulting strategy uses strengths to exploit opportunities and seeks other means to compensate for weaknesses.

## ADAPTING TO THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

Viewed as a set of related activities, the major phases of the strategic-development cycle – conduct external and internal analyses, formulate strategic vision and plan, implement change, performance management – constitute the most systematic means of *adapting to the external environment* and influencing performance and effectiveness. These phases are explored in more detail below, except for performance management, which is discussed under the topic of internal alignment.

**Strategic Analysis.** Strategic analysis is not a simple mechanical exercise in data-based rationality – input the data, turn the cogs and wheels, out come the answers. While technical analysts can provide a useful baseline of relatively hard descriptive information and appropriate interpretation about many areas of interest, what is harder to divine is national-strategic direction. The government policy environment tends to be fuzzier. This is because government operates much like an open marketplace, consisting of both co-operative and competing interests.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, the process of policy development and decision-making is messy. Notwithstanding the iron ways of the machinery of government, the development of policy direction, as reflected in the Speech from the Throne and the Budget, is subject to multiple influences and constraints, including the legacy of previous Government decisions and commitments, external constituencies and stakeholders, public opinion, media editorials and event coverage, partisan politics, lobbyists, in-house policy research and analysis, and the opinions of research institutes and advisory councils. Hence, military strategic analysis involves not only purely military considerations but must also take into account political objectives and priorities. And whatever plan is generated by strategic analysis will represent a negotiated integration of Government policy and military-strategic imperatives.<sup>64</sup>

Leaders, especially senior leaders, can exercise considerable influence during the analysis and integration phase. In defining reality for others, they may draw on value-based ideological positions (well founded or not so well founded) to advance and defend their views, they may make extensive

use of facts and figures to support an argument, and they may also draw on the intuition and tacit knowledge that come with specialized or extensive experience to qualify objective information. Information and its meaning are debated, and, moreover, should be debated. Debate is a healthy and essential element of effective problem definition and problem solving. In the end, the extent to which senior leaders are influenced by staff analysts, and senior leaders influence each other and Government officials, will largely depend on the climate for discussion and debate and the credibility of individuals presenting particular views. This is upward influence writ large.

**Strategic Visioning and Planning.** The strategic vision is a verbal picture of where the organization wants to be in the future. It is, in effect, a high-level version of the commander's intent. A well constructed vision statement effectively communicates the leadership team's message. It has motivational properties which encourage and support attitudinal and behavioural change as well as the alignment of organizational culture with the direction set by senior leadership. For this reason, many writers on strategic leadership draw attention to the language of vision statements and whether they convey an imagery that is at once forceful and believable. Too many organizational vision statements are long, meandering, bureaucratic tracts that fail to focus either attention or effort. Length in itself is not necessarily the problem,<sup>65</sup> but sometimes simplicity and brevity are better if the resulting vision statement has impact, as in the U.S. Air Force's vision of "Global vigilance, reach, and power."

**"Quite simply, a vision is a realistic, credible, attractive future for your organization. It is your articulation of a destination toward which your organization should aim, a future that in important ways is better, more successful, or more desirable for your organization than is the present.... Vision always deals with the future."**

Burt Nanus  
*Visionary Leadership*

<sup>63</sup> For an introduction to the federal policy process as both a marketplace and as a planned system, see Glen Milne, *Making Policy: A Guide to the Federal Government's Policy Process* (Glen Milne: Ottawa), 2004.

<sup>64</sup> On the relationship between civilian policy and military strategy, see Chapter 3 of *Duty with Honour*.

<sup>65</sup> See, for example, Martin Luther King Jr.'s frequently cited "I have a dream" speech, delivered during the 1963 civil rights march on Washington.

Complementary to the vision, the strategic plan provides essential information and guidance about how the vision and intermediate strategic objectives are to be achieved. Consistent with the *cascading of objectives* principle, high-level plans usually provide general guidance only, that is, a framework for the development of detailed supporting tasks and objectives, resource allocations, and milestones.

## MARITIME FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

It should be noted that, while the purpose of *Leadmark* is to chart the course into the future for Canada's navy, development work is divided into three planning phases, all proceeding concurrently. This gives rise to the concept of Three Navies:

- **The Navy of Today** – is managed in the present and projected out to a period of one to four years (Horizon 1), (the current Defence Plan [DP] and Maritime Capability Planning Guidance [MCPG] business planning cycle). Development work in this context is concerned primarily with the allocation and management of resources. It is our current navy.
- **The Next Navy** – is being designed and built to exist within the window from five to approximately fifteen years (Horizon 2). The Next Navy planning process is concentrated on the development of a program that will realise a modernised navy, within imposed policy and resource constraints. The end date of this period cannot be precisely defined because it is dependent upon many factors, including equipment in- and out-of-service dates, and the introduction of the Navy After Next.
- **The Navy After Next** – will always be conceptual, and will therefore never actually exist. The Navy After Next planning process is concerned with the window beyond the Next Navy time frame, from 10 to 30 years (Horizon 3). This window is beyond current fiscal and policy constraints (although it will obviously be informed by such experience), but it is within the time period when some technological developments can be predicted. The Navy After Next is concentrated on the relatively unconstrained development of a conceptual model of a future navy, including personnel, doctrine and materiel capabilities.

*Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*

**Implementing Change.** Change efforts come in different sizes. At the large end of the scale, we find strategic top-down planned change initiatives, whose intended effects are often transformational. At the small end of the scale, we find grass-roots incremental-change activities, which seem to work best when embedded in a culture of *continuous improvement*.<sup>66</sup> DND/CF strategic development, as outlined in the Defence Planning and Management Framework, relies on both kinds of change, seeking the enhancement of capabilities in the near to medium term, and the replacement of capabilities and acquisition of new capabilities in the medium to long term.

It should be noted that, in implementing change at the institutional or systems level of leadership, there is a markedly increased requirement for a systems perspective and *systems thinking*.<sup>67</sup> Generally speaking, systems thinking is grounded in a recognition of the profound interconnectedness of things and the need to consider how the discrete parts of a system both interact with and affect the whole (Figure 1-1 is illustrative of this perspective at the organizational level). In analyzing problems and considering possible solutions, the careful consideration of system processes can help avoid at least two kinds of traps:

- treating symptoms, which may only temporarily mask a festering problem, and
- creating partial fixes, which may produce unintended adverse consequences elsewhere in the system or further downstream.

For these reasons, systems thinking is considered a core cognitive competency that underpins both planned-change and continuous-improvement efforts.

<sup>66</sup> This idea has been around for at least half a century. As developed by W. Edwards Deming, continuous quality improvement led directly to the introduction of Quality Circles in post-World War II Japanese industry.

<sup>67</sup> Systems thinking is a way of diagnosing systemic problems. It differs from the practice in traditional analysis of breaking problems down into their constituent elements in that it attempts to see the 'big picture,' understand process interactions (e.g., reinforcing feedback loops, balancing feedback loops) among the parts of the system, and identify both their intended and unintended effects. For an extended discussion of systems thinking, see Peter Senge, *The Fifth Discipline* (New York: Doubleday), 1990.

The degree of difficulty involved in actually implementing strategic change is generally acknowledged to be much greater than that of any other phase of the change process.<sup>68</sup> Because successful implementation relies on the efforts of so many more people than just the senior leadership, more things can go wrong. As noted earlier, awareness of the necessity or urgency for change occurs at different times for different people. Other factors can adversely affect people's readiness for change, and have been extensively documented in the management literature: misunderstanding or scepticism of the real purpose of a change, contrary opinions about the appropriateness or utility of the proposed change, a perceived or actual loss of something of value as the result of change, change fatigue – to name only the most commonly mentioned causes.

One of the conditions that can make the implementation of change easier is a widely perceived organizational crisis. The Somalia incident and its aftermath, for example, pointed up specific failures and systemic weaknesses in leadership from the bottom to the top of the CF. This created a reputational crisis that precipitated externally imposed rapid and sweeping changes in a number of areas with little or no opposition. Likewise, the risk of a total organizational collapse, such as an imminent threat of bankruptcy in private-sector companies, can stimulate the adapt-or-perish response. This was arguably the situation faced by the CF in the latter 1990s, as a combination of deep budget cuts, strength reductions, heightened operational tempo, equipment rust-out, and personnel burnout pushed the CF to the breaking point. The finding that most military members at the time lacked confidence in the senior leadership to extricate the CF from its predicament only aggravated the situation. The CF was ripe for major change.

**“Embarking on the process to develop Strategy 2020 was a recognition of the need for Defence to shape the future by building capabilities rather than face the challenges of the future with a force structure comprised solely from the residual of a decade of cuts.”**

*Defence Strategy 2020:  
Formulating the DND/CF Statement of Strategy*

Another condition that moderates the acceptance of change is an organization's *culture*. The military legal and professional norm of doing one's duty, for example, can facilitate change – even in sensitive social-policy areas – provided that the change is endorsed and reinforced by leaders at all levels. When the policy precluding the enrolment and service of homosexuals in the CF was cancelled in 1992, the CDS issued a CANFORGEN communicating the change and noting that the change brought the CF into alignment with core societal values, especially the value of equality as guaranteed under the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. He also appealed to members' professional sense of duty to comply with the letter and spirit of the policy change. Contrary to indications from prior opinion surveys of dire consequences if such a change went through, the transition was uneventful.

*Change-implementation methods* also have distinct utilities in achieving acceptance of, or commitment to, change. They draw on different sources of power and can, accordingly, be grouped under one of three approaches: empirical-rational, normative-re-educative, and authoritative-coercive. In practice, organizations tend to use more than one approach, or else some hybrid that combines elements of several methods.

*Empirical-rational* approaches to the implementation of change are primarily based on expert and information power and are a common element across many change methods. While they can be time consuming, their purpose is to persuade or convince others of the necessity of change. Hence, closing information gaps, logical argument, demonstration projects, expert testimonials, and other means of building understanding or securing credence are the principal tactics:

- *Demonstration projects* – Small experiments or trial programs are conducted to test or validate the utility of a technology, policy, or practice (e.g., the CF Experimentation Centre, which was established to identify and consider ideas and future technologies for military application). A successful trial is expected to facilitate diffusion throughout the organization, but if adoption is voluntary, the willingness to try the new approach will depend on the existence of some pressing motive or need.

<sup>68</sup> See, for example, Jeffrey Pfeffer, *Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press), 1992, who argues that visioning and planning are comparatively easy, whereas weaknesses and difficulties in decision implementation trip up many organizations.

- *Performance measurement and feedback* – These methods rely on comparisons of results against internal standards and expectations and/or external benchmarks. Comparisons may be longitudinal or cross-sectional and internal or external (e.g., analyses of CF attrition rates typically make use of historical, cross-sectional, internal, and external comparisons). Objective performance-measurement and feedback data indicating significant performance shortfalls are intended to generate dissatisfaction with the status quo and thus energize action. They are also useful in highlighting specific problem areas otherwise masked by aggregate data, and may be helpful in suggesting potential solutions when used with an appropriate cause-effect or systems model.
- *Survey feedback* – Survey feedback methods work much like objective performance measurement and feedback, the major difference being that they collect information on soft attributes, such as opinions (e.g., 1998 Philips Group survey on CF leadership), attitudes (e.g., surveys on Quality of Life policies and programs), values (e.g., survey of ethical values), experiences (e.g., surveys on operational stress and casualty support), and behavioural intentions (e.g., intentions to stay in or leave the CF).
- *Organizational learning* – All efforts in organizational learning have in common: continual intelligence gathering from relevant sectors of the environment, the review of results and analysis of trends, and the appropriate use of such knowledge in strategy development or modification. Applicable to both operational and non-operational responsibility areas, the U.S. Army's After Action Review process is often cited as an exemplar of organizational learning in operational garb.<sup>69</sup> The DND/CF *continuous improvement* program operates on very similar principles: commitment to performance measurement, quality awareness, continuous learning, and pro-active advancements across the whole of DND and the CF.

**"The After Action Review has democratized the army. It has instilled a discipline of relentlessly questioning everything we do. Above all, it has resocialized three generations of officers to move away from a command-and-control style of leadership to one that takes advantage of distributed intelligence. It has taught us never to become too wedded to our script for combat and to remain versatile enough to exploit the broken plays that inevitably develop in the confusion of battle."**

Brigadier General William S. Wallace, U.S. Army  
Quoted in Richard Pascale, et al.,  
"Changing the Way We Change"

*Normative-re-educative* methods are based on referent and connection power. They tend to be even more demanding of time and resources than rational-empirical approaches, but are held out to be especially useful in building attitudinal commitment, facilitating psychological adjustment to change, and overcoming attitudinal resistance. Inspirational appeals, participation, power sharing, and coalition formation and consensus building via brokerage politics are the most common techniques employed:

- *Inspirational leadership* – Inspirational leadership is a variant of transformational leadership, employing many of the same behavioural elements (vision, appeals to values, slogans, encouragement) but more pragmatic in its orientation. A compelling vision of the future or a clear long-term strategic objective is the centrepiece, the function of which is to focus attention and manage meaning. Effective and repeated communication of the change theme and the reasons for change is often a feature of successful inspirational efforts.
- *Participation* – The hallmark of participation is giving the people involved in implementing a change or those who will otherwise be affected by the change a role in decision-making. Victor Vroom and his colleagues differentiate among three kinds of participative processes: obtaining ideas and suggestions from participants (*consultation*); facilitating group or collective decision making (*consensus building*); and assigning others decision authority

<sup>69</sup> See, for instance, Gordon R. Sullivan & Michael V. Harper, *Hope is Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America's Army* (New York: Times Books), 1996; and Peter Kasurak, "Is the Mouse Dead? Thoughts on Reforming the Department of National Defence," paper presented at the Air Force's Advisory Group, NDHQ Ottawa, 12 April 1999.

(*delegation*).<sup>70</sup> Theory and research indicate that participation in change decisions results in increased satisfaction, better quality decisions when creative ideas are being sought, greater support for decisions, and the professional development of those involved.

- *Brokerage politics* – Politics is unavoidable in organizations because power is distributed unevenly and sometimes people in positions of power use it to advance or protect what they perceive as the best interests of a particular group or constituency. Change agents confronted with resisters may have to engage in negotiation and bargaining to achieve the desired outcomes. Tactics for dealing with powerful resisters tend to follow the following kind of script: conduct a preliminary “power audit” to identify supporters and resisters; build a coalition of supporters; consult extensively with resisters to clarify their objections; make personal and indirect appeals through coalition allies to resisters; and negotiate from strength but be prepared to make acceptable compromises.

*Authoritative-coercive* change tactics are based on legitimate, ecological, reward, and punishment power. Although often quick, inexpensive, and effective in the short-term, they also create resentment and may result in ‘counter-revolutionary’ activities later on. Typical authoritative-coercive measures include directed change, and contingent reward and punishment.

- *Directed change* – In a strong ‘command culture’ such as the CF’s, saying it or writing it is often sufficient to make ‘it’ happen. While compliance may occur at the level of behaviour, change cannot be assured at the level of attitudes. The irksome aspects of directed change can sometimes be offset by making appeals to important social values (e.g., fairness) or professional values (e.g., duty, loyalty). Nevertheless, without at least some attitudinal acceptance of change by subordinates, change efforts are vulnerable to the subtle sabotage of withheld enthusiasm and not-so-subtle attempts to reverse changes when senior leaders move on to new responsibilities.

- *Contingent reward and punishment* – Simply stated, contingent reward and punishment involve rewarding those who “get with the program” and punishing those who do not. There is a ‘tough love’ variation on contingent reward and punishment that Edgar Schein likens to the kind of cultural reprogramming and re-education practiced in some totalitarian regimes. Here, the key to change “is first to prevent exit and then to escalate the disconfirming forces while providing psychological safety” through recognizing and rewarding new behaviours.<sup>71</sup> As a last resort, the intransigent can be transferred or let go.

By way of summary, the process of change, as originally described by the social psychologist, Kurt Lewin, involves an initial phase of unfreezing beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, or behaviours, followed by a change state, and, finally, a refreezing, or locking in, of the new beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, or behaviours.

**Table 7-1. The eight most common reasons why organizational change efforts fail.**

1	Allowing too much complacency – people have to appreciate the need or urgency for change but may lack the information necessary for either.
2	Failing to create a sufficiently powerful guiding coalition – change leaders have to be committed, project power, and have the necessary resources and authority.
3	Under-estimating the power of vision – firm and clear direction is essential.
4	Under-communicating the change vision.
5	Permitting obstacles to block change -systemic and human barriers must be addressed.
6	Failing to create short-term wins – complex change takes time but momentum can be lost without intermediate milestones.
7	Declaring victory too soon.
8	Neglecting to anchor changes in the culture.

<sup>70</sup> These ideas are summarized in Victor H. Vroom & Arthur G. Jago. *The New Leadership: Managing Participation in Organizations*. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall), 1988.

<sup>71</sup> *Organizational Culture and Leadership* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1992, p. 328.



One contemporary scholar of organizational change, John Kotter, has identified eight common reasons why change efforts fail (summarized in Table 7-1), and has recommended corresponding practices for counter-acting them.<sup>72</sup> These eight practices reinforce the validity of many of the change-implementation methods outlined above and are presented below as they might fit into Lewin's stages of change:

### **Unfreezing**

- Establish a sense of urgency by identifying problems, crises, and opportunities.
- Create a guiding coalition with sufficient power and a strong team sense.
- Develop a vision/objective and strategy to guide the change.
- Communicate the change vision/objective constantly using all means available.

### **Changing**

- Enable broad based action, eliminating obstacles, changing structures, encouraging risk-taking and non-traditional ideas.
- Generate short-term successes, recognizing intermediate-goal attainment.
- Consolidate gains and inject more change, modifying related structures and policies, selecting supporters and sidelining opponents, and introducing more ideas.

### **Refreezing**

- Embed changes in the culture, by reinforcing desired practices and developing appropriate leader-succession plans.

## **INFLUENCING THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT**

Just as CF leaders at tactical and operational levels of activity try to improve situational favourability for the purpose of facilitating task performance, senior leaders attempt to influence the external environment in order to achieve the military strategy and requisite capability dictated by national policy and national interests. For senior CF leaders, influence attempts may be directed at Government officials, other Government departments, national security agencies, other militaries, non-governmental organizations, private-sector industries, the media, or the general public.

### **CONNECTING WITH CANADIANS**

"Opinion polls show considerable public support for Army activities. There is, however, a continuing need to promote a more balanced and deeper public understanding of what the Army is doing and where it is going. The aim is to ensure a well-informed national discussion on Army activities and issues and to contribute to an understanding that the Army is part of the national fabric. Given the rapidly changing security environment, senior officers need to get involved in public discussions about security issues and other matters that affect the Army. Greater effort will be made to open a dialogue with Canadians, with opinion leaders and relevant organizations, as well as with communities everywhere the Army has a presence."

*Army Strategy: Advancing with Purpose*

7

The most obvious and critical area of external influence at the national-strategic level is in civil-military relations. Like other forms of upward and lateral influence, the senior military leadership's ability to influence the Government and other Government Departments will depend in part on the perceived utility of the CF to national and other objectives, the political awareness and military professionalism of senior CF leaders, and, ultimately, the ability of senior

<sup>72</sup> *Leading Change*. (Boston: Harvard Business School Press), 1996.

military leaders to communicate effectively at the national-strategic level. To position the CF to advantage and to benefit from inter-agency requirements and opportunities for collaboration, senior leaders need a fairly good working knowledge of the roles and functioning of cabinet committees, parliamentary committees, central agencies, and inter-departmental committees. They also have to be knowledgeable about the formal and informal processes of establishing government contacts and forming coalitions of mutual interest.

**“The job description for Canada’s senior commanders should provide for much more political skill and experience than it ever has. This will not be popular with military traditionalists nor with liberal democrats. The former scorn ‘politics’ as a complex and deceptive art – as though war was simple and straightforward. The latter also prefer their military subordinates to be predictable and, therefore, easily outmanoeuvred.”**

Desmond Morton  
In *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*

Another key area of external influence involves relationships with allies and military partners. Longstanding military alliances, as well as liaison, exchange, and co-operation programs with other military forces – involving the sharing of information, technology, expertise, and other resources – have done much to strengthen professional ties with traditional allies and coalition partners. These relationships secure significant benefits and influence for the CF.

With these considerations in mind, it should not be surprising that, in a down-sized CF, one of the strategic objectives in *Defence Strategy 2020* is to “Establish clear strategic, external partnerships to better position Defence to achieve national objectives.” More generally, *interoperability with the U.S. military and engagement with other government departments and Canadians in security and defence issues* are identified as critical attributes of the long-run defence strategy. In effect, the doctrinal principle of ‘enhanced interoperability’<sup>73</sup> underscores the importance of senior leaders being able to exercise influence outside the boundaries of the CF.

## ***INFLUENCING GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY TO REBUILD THE RCAF – THE 1950S***

“Until his retirement in early 1953, [Air Marshal Wilfred] Curtis was... directly involved in the rebuilding of the RCAF from its post-war nadir to a size and strength that have prompted some to describe the early 1950s as the beginning of the ‘golden years’ for the service....

Curtis’ controversial status as a reservist was seen as a positive attribute by his predecessor, Air Marshal Robert Leckie, who wanted a reserve officer if at all possible to serve as CAS of a post-war RCAF that was expected to be composed in considerable part of auxiliary squadrons....

Curtis was transferred to the RCAF (Regular) with the rank of Air Marshal and became Chief of the Air Staff on 1 September 1947. Once appointed, Curtis served for longer than the usual post-war term of a chief of staff.... Curtis’ prolonged period of service is another argument for his effectiveness as a commander and an indication that the diplomatic skills and restraint that proved valuable during his service as Deputy Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the RCAF Overseas were also of use to his Chief of the Air Staff.

His skills also prepared him for the post-war challenge. When Curtis took over as CAS in 1947, the country was still in the grip of post-war military retrenchment and contraction, and no serious consideration had been given to deployments outside of Canada, a state of affairs that persisted until the fall of 1948. By mid-1949, however,

<sup>73</sup> Enhanced interoperability encompasses activities in which elements of two or more CF Environments participate (Joint) and CF interactions with any partner organization (Inter-Agency and Multi-National) involved in security activities. Interoperability is achieved by sharing information, collaborating in problem definition and decision-making, and identifying mutually supportive courses of action.

perceptions of the international situation had changed. In conjunction with the creation of NATO, the RCAF now had to give consideration to overseas commitments. In late June 1950, the Korean War provoked an even stronger reaction. One of Canada's first moves was to commit 426 Squadron to provide trans-Pacific air transport for the UN in Korea – an operation that garnered favourable publicity for Curtis and the RCAF. Korea also brought more significant changes for the RCAF and Canada's military in general... Canada's defence budget increased from approximately 1.4 per cent of the GNP in 1947, to 8.8 per cent in 1952-53.

A considerable portion of these new expenditures went to the support of Canada's aircraft industry through the procurement of military aircraft, including the Canadian-designed and built CF-100 and the Canadian-built versions of the F-86. Curtis was a strong supporter of a domestic aircraft industry, a stance which he attributed to wartime experience in unsuccessfully attempting to get combat aircraft – including those built in Canada – allocated to Canada. In a 1958 speech... Curtis stated that this situation 'meant that if Canada wants its Air Force to be equipped with the most modern and most suitable aircraft for our special needs, then we must build them ourselves.' One of the consequences of strong RCAF support for the aircraft industry at a time of strong defence funding was the development of an insistence on only the best possible equipment for the service."

Jeff Noakes  
In *Warrior Chiefs*

## ACHIEVING INTERNAL ALIGNMENT

Much of the burden of vertical and horizontal integration in the CF and its subordinate systems is borne by an over-arching strategic vision and plan, supported by modern management/oversight practices, clear internal

accountabilities, and routine reporting requirements. Primary processes for achieving internal alignment are: communication of strategic intent, the formalization of policy and doctrine, resource allocation and control, and performance management.

**Communicating Strategic Intent.** What seems to be critically important in achieving internal alignment is relentless communication and explanation of the strategic intent as broadly and deeply in the organization as possible. To have motivating force, the vision of the desired end state must be widely shared and accepted. Gaining acceptance takes exemplary personal commitment by the leadership team, effective networking to obtain the support of other key people, and, above all, the persuasive use of words and images. The reality in many organizations, however, is usually quite different and often reflects the kind of pattern in which senior managers develop a vision or goal statement and then send out only a few symbolic communications to signal the associated change effort.

Communication is most influential when it is *two-way*. Thus, while formal publications, newsletters, Web sites, commanders' letters, and so on have a part to play in transmitting intent and achieving alignment, these are all essentially impersonal one-way media, which lack the immediacy and arousal properties of ideas delivered live and in person. As such, they may unintentionally convey something quite different from the verbal message.

It is a general norm of social behaviour that, when matters of importance are to be discussed, they are usually communicated in a face-to-face conversation – not only to confirm understanding and acceptance of the message, but, also, to accomplish other important social functions: to suggest a willingness to listen, to allow for mutual give and take, to provide psychological reassurance to the recipients of the message, to reaffirm collective values, or to strengthen the relationship between the leader and the led. In using a vision to promote change, some amount of face-to-face two-way communication between senior leaders and a critical mass of their subordinates can substantially increase the impact, clarity, and acceptance of the strategic intent. This can take the form of large-scale town-hall addresses followed by ques-

tion-and-answer sessions, a series of small-scale visits and briefings, closed-circuit broadcasts, high-quality recorded video presentations, and the informal exchanges that occur when leaders engage in ‘management by walking around.’

### **MOBILIZING COMMITMENT THROUGH TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION – QUEBEC AREA 2001**

“Face-to-face communication was the impetus behind a gigantic undertaking Land Forces Quebec Area designed to let more than 7,000 people ‘talk to the boss.’ In May 2001, some 6,000 people gathered at one large site at Laval University in Québec City, while more than a thousand watched and asked questions through the miracle of satellite communication and closed circuit television.

Brigadier-General Marc Caron says, ‘We were coming up to a time when the level of activity was about to pick up in the command for a variety of reasons. We were about to launch a rotation to Bosnia – and my first objective was to mobilize and motivate. I wanted to get the message across that everyone needed to mobilize for this level of activity. Based on observations of the workplace six months into my command, my second objective was to reinforce values, such as treating each other with respect and dignity, listening and empowering people at the lowest level. I also wanted to hear people’s concerns and interests.’ ”

Brenda Stewart

“Hanging from Rafters to Hear and Be Heard at Commander’s Hour in Quebec”

**Formalization of Policy and Doctrine.** Policy is generally considered to have binding force on those to whom it applies whereas doctrine is viewed as providing somewhat more flexible authoritative guidance. One of the practical functions served by both policy and doctrine, however, is the prevention of errors of omission, especially in regard to such things as shared or overlapping responsibilities, co-ordination and hand-off, information exchange, and reporting requirements. The vertical integration of activity is rarely a serious problem in hierarchically structured organizations. What is usually more problematic is horizontal connectivity, or its lack, commonly described in terms of ‘stovepipes,’ ‘silos,’ ‘mineshfts,’ and related terms. Policies and doctrine create a fairly durable common view of things, and thus should help ensure that systems and staffs do not work at cross-purposes, particularly if operating policies and doctrine are developed under a systems perspective and with the participation of all key stakeholders.

**Resource Allocation and Control.** For DND and the CF, capability requirements from the Sustaining and Change agendas are used to set near-term priorities. As the principal strategic management and reporting framework, the *Planning, Reporting and Accountability Structure* (PRAS) is then used to guide the annual allocation of funds through the *Defence Plan* (DP) and business plans. In-year monitoring of progress and the re-allocation of resources, as necessary, are intended to ensure critical new requirements are addressed, variances from the *Defence Plan* and business plans are dealt with, and the fiscal year is completed without lapsing funds. These resource-control processes do not influence the quality of activity or necessarily ensure sustainment or development of the desired capabilities. They simply enable and set limits on activity. However, the inherent logic of these processes tends to obscure the social dynamics of resource allocation, which can generate an intense round of influence and counter-influence efforts. It is probably fair to say that this aspect of the strategic-development process is most vulnerable to the tension and discord of competing values and priorities.

**“The efficient allocation of scarce defence resources among competing demands is a permanent issue for political leaders and defence planners. Governments and defence ministries have tried various methods and techniques to determine defence needs and to make rational allocations such that resource distribution just matches requirements. Most of these *rational systems* are of limited value and fail to explain adequately the workings of the *actual process* that allocates resources over time. That *actual process* is complicated by its high political content, the uncertainties in international relations and warfare, and by the inescapable struggle for resources between the interest groups that make up the armed forces.**

**Understanding the actual process is also complicated because arguably there are several allocation processes in play at any time in most defence bureaucracies. For instance, there is a continual competition between national policy components, between ‘guns and butter.’ There are competitions within the defence and security communities between foreign aid and development funding and military funding. Within the defence establishment there are struggles between the services and inside the services for particular programs, clashes between military officers and civil servants, and skirmishes between the guardians of the official process and bureaucratic opportunists. From a macroeconomic point of view, there are ongoing competitions between the main components of defence spending, personnel, operations and maintenance, and capital. Finally, perhaps, there is always a contest between the champions of force readiness and force development.”**

Douglas Bland  
*Issues in Defence Management*

**Performance Management.** In general, whether applied at an aggregate level or at the individual level, performance management involves the three basic processes of:

- clarifying individual responsibilities and performance expectations;
- measuring performance to determine whether or not expectations have been met; and
- as necessary, requiring individuals in positions of responsibility and authority to explain their actions and performance.

In DND and the CF, responsibilities and performance expectations at the institutional and systems level are conveyed in general terms through the *Organization and Accountability* document. This document also establishes the general responsibilities and authorities of the Deputy Minister, Chief of the Defence Staff, and Senior Advisors. More specific performance expectations are laid out in the *Planning, Reporting and Accountability Structure* and are expressed as Key Result Expectations.

**“Having a responsibility involves having the authority and the obligation to act, including the authority to direct or authorize others to act....**

**Accounting for the use of authority is the means by which all members, military or civilian, ‘tell their story’ up, as well as across, the organizational chain. That is, accounting is a matter of reporting both actions (what is being done to make things happen) and results (what is being achieved or not achieved)...”**

*Organization and Accountability*

The second element of performance management, performance measurement, involves: first, the identification of measures and indicators that reflect the most critical elements of system and institutional performance; and, second, routine application of the measures to determine results or performance trends. The requirement for routine performance measurement and management is equally necessary for change activities emanating from the strategic-development process and management activities intended to sustain existing capabilities. Where a

finer-grained analysis of performance is required, an audit or evaluation can be carried out. For the same reasons that tests, examinations, and report cards induce students to apply themselves to their studies, the activity of performance measurement and evaluation focuses the attention and effort of an organization's members.

The fundamental requirement of any performance measurement system is that it capture critical dimensions of organizational effectiveness. Figure 7-3 depicts a hypothetical high-level performance-measurement model<sup>74</sup> based on the CF effectiveness framework of Figure 2-1. It contains both direct and proxy indicators of performance.

**Figure 7-3 | Hypothetical values-based measurement model.**



<sup>74</sup> Although the model in Figure 7-3 is notional only, there is a high degree of correspondence with the current version of the DND/CF performance measurement (PM) framework. An adaptation of the Balanced Scorecard, the DND/CF PM framework consists of the following major dimensions: Deliver Defence Outputs (Mission Success value); Manage Program Resources (Internal Integration value); Professional, Effective and Sustainable Defence Team (Member Well-Being & Commitment value); and Shape Future Defence and Security Outcomes (External Adaptability value).

## STEWARDSHIP OF THE PROFESSION

All members of the profession of arms in Canada share in the responsibility for safeguarding the integrity, reputation, and image of the CF – at a minimum, by regulating their personal conduct and by influencing others to comply with professional norms. Senior leaders must not only epitomize professional qualities, but also assume, by virtue of their status, broad responsibilities to foster and maintain a culture based on military professionalism. As discussed in *Duty with Honour*, the attributes of the military profession include responsibility, expertise, identity, and ethos. Senior leaders have obligations in each of these areas.

In order to discharge the profession's responsibility to society, and consistent with the primacy of mission success in the CF effectiveness framework, senior leaders must ensure adequate operational capability and the professional conduct of operations. To do less would be unprofessional.

**“Strong and effective leaders are at the heart of military professionalism. Such leaders ensure that the profession is constantly evolving to higher planes of effectiveness and performance. They set and maintain the necessary standards, and they set an example that inspires and encourages all members to reflect these standards in their day-to-day conduct. Leaders at every level contribute to professionalism through their influence on education, training and self-development, always seeking to make every aspect of military experience professionally instructive and rewarding.... Above all, effective leaders exemplify the military ethos, and especially the core military values that are the essence of military professionalism.”**

*Duty with Honour:  
The Profession of Arms in Canada*

Similarly, to maintain military expertise, as a consequential obligation of the military's responsibility to society and jurisdictional privilege, senior leaders must constantly extend the boundaries of professional knowledge – by pursuing their own program of professional development, by encouraging others to do likewise, and by establishing educational and research programs in support of doctrine development and advanced practice. Failure to improve personal and collective expertise would be unprofessional.

Senior leader support for history and heritage programs, as well as participation in commemorative events and ceremonies, are part of the necessary work of strengthening institutional identity. Not to do so would be disrespectful as well as unprofessional.

And finally, to shape the culture, while preserving the legitimacy of the CF and trust in the military as a national institution, senior leaders have to ensure new members are appropriately and effectively socialized into the value systems of the CF ethos, confirm that legal and ethical regulatory systems operate as intended, and, more generally, align administrative policies and practices with the values of the ethos. Any demonstrated unwillingness or inability to uphold civic, legal, ethical, and military values would not only be unprofessional but would also jeopardize the authority of the CF to operate as a self-regulating institution.

Generally speaking, the salience or centrality of cultural assumptions, values, and behaviours can be altered by concerted efforts involving either or both primary and secondary culture-embedding mechanisms (summarized in Table 7-2). The distinction between the two is simply this. Primary mechanisms establish and embed culture. Secondary mechanisms can serve to reinforce the culture in being, but only if they are consistent with primary practices. If they are inconsistent, they will either be considered irrelevant and ignored, or else will be a recurring source of dissonance and frustration.

**Table 7-2. Culture-embedding mechanisms.<sup>75</sup>**

Primary Embedding Mechanisms	Secondary Articulation and Reinforcement Mechanisms
Deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching.	Formal statements of institutional philosophy, values, and creed.
How leaders react to critical incidents and organizational crises.	Institutional rites and rituals.
Observed criteria by which leaders allocate scarce resources.	Stories, legends, and myths about people and events.
What leaders pay attention to, measure, and control on a regular basis.	Organizational design and structure.
Observed criteria by which leaders allocate rewards and status.	Organizational systems and procedures.
Observed criteria by which leaders recruit, select, promote, retire, and excommunicate institutional members.	Maintaining a coherent body of knowledge and doctrine.

7

In a mature organization like the CF, which possesses a deeply ingrained culture or family of cultures, achieving significant cultural change is a difficult undertaking at any time. But, even though some substantive beliefs and patterns of behaviour might be highly resistant to change, cultural change is often triggered and facilitated by an organizational crisis. Ian Mitroff<sup>76</sup> identifies seven major types of crises that can serve as an impetus to action: *economic* (budget shortfalls, fiscal mismanagement), *informational* (loss of classified information, compromise of information systems), *physical* (destruction or damage to equipment and facilities, catastrophic equipment failure), *human* (loss of key personnel, high attrition, serious recruiting shortages, unexpected deaths or injuries), *reputational* (performance failure, criminal or scandalous conduct), *psychopathic acts* (terrorism, workplace violence), and *natural disaster* (fire, flood, earthquake, explosion, storm). How leaders react to significant organizational incidents and crises is a powerful test of organizational values, and serves either to strengthen or undermine their validity.

The allocation of financial and other resources across the various dimensions of organizational functioning and effectiveness is a tangible indicator of issue importance and leader commitment. This is why, for example, drastic personnel cuts and reductions to personnel-support programs invariably damage the credibility of assertions that people are the organization’s most valuable resource and, consequently, undermine members’ commitment to the organization.

What leaders pay attention to, measure, and control sends strong signals to others about what is important to them and what their priorities are. What they ignore or overlook sends equally strong signals about what is culturally unimportant, and may prompt questions about leaders’ priorities. Actions have intended and unintended consequences. In this latter vein, the intermittent attention of senior NDHQ leaders to conditions-of-service issues during the 1970s and 1980s and related conditions-of-service staff reductions contributed to the quality-of-life crisis that was brought to Government attention in the 1990s.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>75</sup> Adapted from Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1992.

<sup>76</sup> *Crisis Leadership: Planning for the Unthinkable* (New York: John Wiley & Sons), 2004.

<sup>77</sup> For a much earlier illustration of the dangers of paying insufficient attention to conditions of service, see the Mainguy Report: Rear-Admiral E.R. Mainguy, L.C. Audette & Leonard W. Brockington, *Report on Certain “Incidents” which Occurred on Board H.M.C. Ships Athabaskan, Crescent and Magnificent and on Other Matters Concerning the Royal Canadian Navy* (Ottawa: Minister of National Defence), 1949. A critical reassessment of the Mainguy Report, which relates the noted incidents to a navy tradition of collective protest, can be found in Richard Gimblett, “What *The Mainguy Report* Never Told Us: The Tradition of Mutiny in the Royal Canadian Navy Before 1949,” *Canadian Military Journal*, Summer 2000.



Likewise, what seniors say and, more importantly, what they do, including the basis on which they recognize and reward individual performance, clearly communicate the operative elements of CF culture. Whether or not it can be described as a professional culture depends on whether senior leaders exemplify professional traits themselves, and whether they acknowledge such attributes in others and act promptly to correct or punish those who demonstrate professional shortcomings. Professionalism, too, is a facet of requisite capability.

To maintain the health of the profession and its culture, *Duty with Honour* suggests four principles to guide development and change:

- *Relevance* – which simply means that, whatever changes are contemplated or introduced, the CF must continue to meet its responsibilities to society and satisfy the expectations of Canadians.
- *Openness* – which refers to the idea that individual and collective learning, and the consequential enhancement of professional expertise, can only occur in an environment which promotes the open exchange of ideas, mediated by reason and core values.
- *Consistency* – which requires the integration and alignment of the professional attributes of responsibility, expertise, identity, and ethos.
- *Reciprocity* – which refers to the balance of mutual obligations between the CF and society, and between the CF and its members.

Any change with the potential to affect the culture of the institution and the profession should be carefully weighed against these principles.

## **Culture and Leadership**

**“Culture and leadership are two sides of the same coin in that leaders first create cultures when they create groups and organizations. Once cultures exist, they determine the criteria for leadership and thus determine who will or will not be a leader. But if cultures become dysfunctional, it is the unique function of leadership to perceive the functional and dysfunctional elements of the existing culture and to manage cultural evolution and change in such a way that the group can survive in a changing environment.**

**The bottom line for leaders is that if they do not become conscious of the cultures in which they are embedded, those cultures will manage them. Cultural understanding is desirable for all of us, but it is essential to leaders if they are to lead.”**

Edgar H. Schein  
*Organizational Culture and Leadership*

## SUMMARY

Institutional leadership is like a double-headed coin, one face turned toward the functioning of the CF as a large national organization comparable to many others, the other toward the functioning of the CF as a distinctive profession, but both inseparable. Who leads the institution? First and foremost, the senior officers and chief warrant officers who serve in key appointments; by association, the subordinate staffs who work directly for senior officers; and finally, anyone with the ability and desire to influence the development of CF strategic or professional capabilities.

The unique aspect of strategic leadership is the requirement to sustain and develop the high-end systems and capabilities that the CF requires to meet its defence commitments, both now and into the future – that is, to deliver requisite capability. In addition to safeguarding professional capabilities relating to members' sense of social responsibility, expertise, identity, and the military ethos, this is largely accomplished by integrating and sustaining existing systems and by formulating and executing a capability-development strategy oriented to the future. The latter aspect of strategic leadership is a striking illustration of indirect influence; in building bridges to the future, strategic leaders shape and influence performance improvements which they may never see during their tenure.

Strategic leaders chart the CF's future direction through the strategic-development cycle, an expansive version of the task-performance cycle that engages similar and parallel processes: analysis, decision-making, the application of direct and indirect influence, active performance monitoring and management. Because of the broad scope of strategy development, senior leaders must, as a matter of course, establish numerous lateral, upward, and external influence relationships. A good part of their leadership job is to use these relationships to position the systems they are responsible for, and the CF, as favourably as possible in the operating environment. If done well, they will create the conditions for operational success and institutional effectiveness.

Overall, we can identify four general ways in which senior leaders shape requisite capability and contribute to performance and effectiveness:

- adapting systems and the CF to the external environment, through strategic planning and the initiation and implementation of strategic change;
- influencing the external environment, through direct advice and influence, public affairs activities, strategic partnerships, and professional networking;
- achieving alignment across organizational systems and sub-systems, through extensive personal communication, the formalization of policy and doctrine, control of activities and resources, and performance management; and
- exercising stewardship of the profession, through the strengthening of professional capabilities and culture.

# CF Leadership Model and Philosophy

## CHAPTER 8

Integrative CF Leadership Model .....	120
CF Philosophy of Leadership .....	122
Supporting Conditions .....	124
• Broadly based leader development .....	124
• Appropriate delegation of authority .....	125
• Professional cohesion .....	125
• An open culture .....	126
• A living ethos .....	126

# CF Leadership Model and Philosophy

The systems perspective of institutional performance and effectiveness introduced in Chapter 1 amply illustrates how performance and effectiveness are affected by a host of factors, which can be sorted according to the distinctive properties of individuals, groups, and the organization as a whole. This view also reveals the potentially pervasive influence of leaders on just about all aspects of institutional functioning, and much of this manual has been an elaboration of that theme. In particular, Chapter 6 addressed team and group levels of functioning (tactical and operational levels in military terms), demonstrating how leaders influence the behaviour and performance of individuals and teams through direct contact, and, indirectly, through alterations to group/unit characteristics and other situational variables. Chapter 7 provided a parallel discussion of strategic-capability development and the influence of senior leaders on institutional characteristics and systems, as well as on the external environment.

Along the way, we have examined the part played by leader competencies and leader power in shaping leader behaviour and establishing the capacity to influence. We have illustrated how situational or environmental factors may substitute for, reinforce, or counteract leader influence. Finally, we have related all of these characteristics and processes to the essential outcomes and behavioural norms that are of central importance to the CF and that orient, drive, and guide leader

behaviour, namely, the CF effectiveness framework. The conduct values expressed in the military ethos and the rule of law are particularly important parts of this framework.

In this concluding chapter, we present a comprehensive leadership model that recapitulates the prior material, integrates these elements, and rounds out the systems view of leadership. The model is explanatory only, yet is put forward in the hope that knowledge and understanding will translate into improved performance. To provide complementary guidance on the practice of leadership, the latter part of the chapter outlines the CF philosophy of leadership.

## INTEGRATIVE CF LEADERSHIP MODEL

One of the few leadership models that takes a systems approach to the subject and successfully demonstrates the inter-relationships, or linkages, among the various classes and sub-classes of variables routinely covered in leadership theory and research is Gary Yukl's Multiple-Linkage Model. The CF leadership model is a slightly modified version and includes four major classes of variables (previously identified in Figure 5-1): leader characteristics and behaviour, individual/group variables, situational variables, and outcomes. The purpose of the model is to illustrate how various leader variables interact with the other classes of variables and influence:


- the capabilities, behaviour, and performance of individuals and groups;
- the capabilities and performance of CF systems and the institution as a whole;
- key outcomes indicative of CF effectiveness (mission success, member well-being and commitment, internal integration, and external adaptability, and, secondarily, the CF's image and reputation, trust and confidence in the CF, and public support for the CF).

A schematic of the model is shown in Figure 8-1. Partitioning the figure according to the four major classes of variables, *leader characteristics and behaviour* occupy the top-left and centre-left areas, several sub-groupings of *situational variables* are located in the bottom area of the figure, *individual and group variables* are in the centre of the schematic, and *outcomes* are shown on the far right of the model.

We can work through the model beginning with leader characteristics. Technical, cognitive, social, and other competencies are the basis of a leader's personal power and affect the quality of a leader's analytical, decision-making, and planning behaviours, regardless of whether they are employed in solving a tactical-level problem or a strategic one. Analysis and intent formation are also influenced by various situational factors. A leader's consciousness of his or her responsibilities, which ultimately derive from the purpose of the profession and the CF's defence tasks, channels attention, thinking, imagination, and decision making. Constraints and opportunities also guide and mould behaviour. Constraints operate at all levels and may apply to time, resources, or behaviour. For example, constraints on behaviour can take the form of the rules of engagement applicable to a specific mission, or Government policies that pertain to the CF as a whole. Similarly, for the prepared and situationally aware leader, opportunities that get noticed can result in dramatic changes in plans or direction at the tactical, operational, or strategic level.

The influence processes depicted in the central portion of Figure 8-1 are, of course, where the action is. The exercise of leader influence is an expression of leader intent and is moderated by the leader's personal power and position power. Consistent with the conventional view, influence may be applied in a face-to-face way to modify the capabilities, behaviour, or performance of individuals and groups (this is typical of *leading people* at tactical and operational levels). But unlike the downward exercise of position power that is typical of command, for example, leadership is multi-directional, and leaders may purposefully and directly influence peers and colleagues, superiors, and people external to the organization, in addition to influencing subordinates. Moreover, any of these people may equally attempt to pro-actively influence or reactively counter-influence whoever is doing the leading. These observations thus sharpen our understanding of leadership as a dynamic social process involving both hierarchical and mutual influence.

Figure 8-1 | Integrative CF leadership model.



One of the key unconventional themes of this manual is that leader influence is also exercised indirectly, to shape task, group, system, institutional, or environmental characteristics (this kind of influence is highly typical of but not unique to *leading the institution* at the strategic level of activity). In this fashion, leaders attempt to improve situational favourability and create the conditions necessary for effective performance and mission success. According to their level of responsibility and authority, CF leaders may change or influence an operational procedure (e.g., a tactical innovation), group structure (e.g., to process-based rather than functional), system capabilities (e.g., new technology or doctrine), institutional characteristics (e.g., unit climate, organizational norms and culture), or conditions in the external environment (e.g., through CIMIC activities, advice on national security policy). When particular group or organizational improvements become stabilized (e.g., task understanding and proficiency, professionalism, drills and SOPs, teamwork and cohesion, cultural norms), they make the process of leading easier, and, at an advanced stage of group or organizational development may substitute for weak leadership or make detailed leader direction unnecessary. Much like the reaction between direct influence and counter-influence, though, attempts to introduce systemic change are also subject to blowback effects that range from passive resistance to active subversion. Whatever the reasons behind these reactions – erroneous perceptions and beliefs, regressive ideas, entrenched cultural norms, ideology, or indignation – leaders who pursue systemic change must eventually focus their efforts on the acceptance of change if there is to be any hope of a durable effect.

We conclude this discussion of the CF leadership model by emphasizing that the key determinants of CF effectiveness are its people and its systems. The performance of CF members and the performance of various CF systems contribute jointly and independently to the essential outcomes of mission success, member well-being and commitment, internal integration, and external adaptability. However, events are not entirely subject to human control, and hence outcomes are not predetermined even in the best-equipped, best-trained, and best-led military forces. As a quick survey of military disasters will confirm, desired outcomes may be thwarted by human error, natural phenomena, the behaviour of independent actors, equipment failure, chance, and other uncontrollable factors. Consequently, leaders must constantly be alert to the possibility of plans and actions miscarrying and strive to contain or offset identifiable risks. While leaders must be held accountable for results, as well as

actions taken or not taken, no blame can be attached for failure if they act conscientiously and give the mission or task their best effort. Results, of course, do reflect back on leaders, affecting their subsequent behaviour and their perceived power; results also have carryover effects on the institution's image, reputation, and related public attitudes. Success almost always has a positive effect on these secondary outcomes, but even a failed mission can bring credit to the CF and its leaders if carried out with intelligence, courage, and discipline.

## CF PHILOSOPHY OF LEADERSHIP

Any organizational philosophy of leadership involves calculated choices about who should lead and how they should lead. For the CF, such choices have to be compatible with the CF's operating conditions and requirements first and foremost, but also with members' expectations, the norms of the profession, and Canadian social and cultural values. These conditions are best satisfied by a philosophy that incorporates the principles of *distributed leadership* and *values-based leadership*. The principle of distributed leadership addresses the question of who should lead, while the principle of values-based leadership addresses the question of how CF Officers and NCMs should lead.

Distributed leadership means three things: that the essential functions of leadership should be shared with peer and subordinate leaders; that the leadership potential of Officers, Warrant Officers, and NCOs down to the lowest level of formal authority should be fully developed and exploited; and that the latent leadership potential of all CF members should also be given an opportunity for development and expression. Granted, individuals differ in their technical skills and other abilities. They also differ in their motivation to assume the responsibilities of leadership and in their self-confidence as leaders. Nevertheless, the importance of operational mission success requires all CF members to understand that they have a personal and professional responsibility to support and assist appointed leaders. They also have a responsibility to assume a leadership role when there is no superior present to provide direction and the threat of failure looms or an opportunity presents itself to gain a tactical, operational, or strategic advantage. Such occasions could arise in peace or war or any circumstance in between. This is when their sense of responsibility for the group, the unit, the mission, or the profession should most obviously oblige them to take charge of the situation and others and get the job done.

## *BUILDING DISTRIBUTED LEADERSHIP CAPABILITY – VIMY RIDGE, MARCH 1917*

"In one of his handwritten memos to himself entitled 'Things Worth Remembering' the methodical Arthur Currie [a Major-General at the time and commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division] had included as Item 3: 'Thorough preparations must lead to success. Neglect nothing' and as Item 19: 'Training, Discipline, Preparation and Determination to conquer is everything.'

He could not accept the excuse given at the Somme, where entire brigades had advanced blindly in neat waves to vague spots on the map with no clear idea of the tactics or strategy of battle: the men, it was said, were not sufficiently trained for anything more sophisticated. To this alibi Currie had a blunt response: 'Take time to train them.'

As a result, the thoroughness and scope of the training that took place on the broad slopes in the back areas of Vimy that March were entirely new to the Western Front and, indeed, to the British Army. Troops had rehearsed battles before, using tapes to represent enemy trenches, but never with such detailed, split-second timing....

By the end of March entire divisions were going through manoeuvres. The advance behind the creeping barrage had to be choreographed to the split second; men's lives depended on it....

Officers were under orders to grill their men to be sure they knew exactly what to do and where they were at every stage of the advance. Duncan Macintyre, during his brigade's turn at the tapes, picked one man at random during the practice advance and asked him where he was supposed to be. 'On the Red Line, sir,' came the reply, indicating the second objective of the division.

'Right,' said Macintyre. 'And what are you going to do?'

'Stay right here and hang on like hell.'

The troops grew weary of the repetition.... Nonetheless, as the training progressed, the men began to gain a sense of confidence.

One reason for their high morale was Currie's insistence on a return to the pre-war tactics of fire and movement at the platoon level. . . . In the stationary war of 1914, these tactics had been discarded or forgotten, but Currie saw how useful they could be in dealing with isolated machine-gun nests or other pockets of resistance that might hold out during the advance. An old maxim was dusted off: reinforce success, not failure....

For the first time, junior officers, NCOs, and ordinary soldiers would all be given specific responsibilities. On Currie's advice each platoon was reorganized into a self-contained unit made up of a lieutenant, three sergeants, fifteen riflemen, eleven bombers, eleven rifle grenadiers, six Lewis machine gunners, two scouts, and a stretcher-bearer, all of whom would be interchangeable in the event of casualties. By the end of March, every platoon and every section had developed into a tightly knit group of cronies who knew each other well and knew exactly what their job was to be in the battle that followed....

The platoon system adopted at Vimy had broader implications. Claude Williams, writing home as early as January, had quoted Byng [Lieutenant-General Julian Byng, commander of the Canadian Corps] as saying that 'war in the future more than ever will be won or lost by platoon commanders.' It was a prescient remark. In the peacetime army, the veterans who stayed in uniform taught the platoon tactics adopted at Vimy. In the next war they were the basis for what came to be known as 'battle drill.'

The Canadians had an advantage over their Allies. The social gap in the British army had led to a communication problem that affected the course of battle. On the first brutal day at the Somme, when officer after officer was mowed down, few rankers knew enough to assume leadership. At Vimy, Currie and Byng were determined that no one would be kept in the dark."

Pierre Berton  
*Vimy*

As discussed in Chapter 2, values-based leadership means that leaders are to be guided in their decisions and actions by the institutional values that define CF effectiveness: accomplishing the mission; acting as part of a cohesive team; developing and looking after their people; anticipating and adapting to the unexpected; and exemplifying and upholding the civic, legal, ethical, and military norms inherent in the military ethos. This principle speaks to *how* CF leaders should lead. Leadership practice, like service in the CF, should be governed by the ideal of duty with honour. In accordance with these institutional values, leaders also ought to ensure that they exercise their position and personal power in ways that are most likely to earn respect, trust, and commitment. This norm applies equally to interactions with subordinates, peers, superiors, and anyone else they seek to influence. Hence influence behaviours that reflect a disdain for others (authoritarian behaviour) or a lack of accountability (*laissez-faire* leadership) are not acceptable. On the other hand, influence behaviours associated with superior, or transformational, leadership (exemplary personal commitment to the mission, motivating others through ideas and ideals, individualized consideration of others) are highly congruent with CF institutional values and ought to be cultivated in training and reinforced in line units and staff organizations.

## SUPPORTING CONDITIONS

For the CF philosophy of leadership to thrive, it must be supported by the right conditions. These include: broadly based leader development, the appropriate delegation of authority, professional cohesion, an open culture, and a living ethos.

**Broadly Based Leader Development.** This condition is considered to provide the best fit with the demands of contemporary and future operations. As noted earlier, a number of technical and military developments have made accelerated decision-making, initiative, and co-ordinated independent action highly valued capabilities across the spectrum of operations and at increasingly lower levels of responsibility and authority. This is why the CF philosophy of mission command explicitly recognizes the necessity of allowing subordinates maximum freedom of action consistent with commander intent.

**“[C]ombat arms NCOs no longer are simply practitioners of minor tactics or logisticians dealing with ‘beans and bullets.’ An infantry sergeant going to Kosovo, for example, must be versed in those arts, plus have knowledge of civil-military co-operation, media relationships, propaganda and counter-propaganda, local history, culture, and negotiation techniques. The search for war criminals and war crimes evidence also requires the skills of a police officer. The sergeant will require expanded military knowledge to deal with unconventional threats such as mines, booby traps or suicide bombers, guerilla activity, or infiltration tactics, such as might be practised by clandestine military and para-military forces attempting to neutralize NATO’s conventional power.**

**Although a platoon will always be part of a larger force, the traditional force-to-space ratio is changing and the nature of the mission will cause platoons to operate in a dispersed fashion. The section commander, a master corporal, may be the person making critical decisions, based on his or her own knowledge and abilities, without the time or ability to refer to higher authorities.”**

Sergeant Arthur Majoor  
*In Backbone of the Army: Non-Commissioned  
 Officers in the Future Army*

Operating requirements call for a similar approach to leadership. What this means is that leading should not be viewed solely as the responsibility of the people wearing the highest rank. Everyone has to accept some responsibility for the mission and the effectiveness of the team, the unit, and ultimately the CF. Everyone, regardless of rank, should be considered as part of a system of interlocking relationships based on both position and personality. Therefore, with respect to the question ‘Who should lead?’ the CF answer is: in principle, everyone – in particular Officers and NCMs assigned to positions of responsibility, but, also, anyone else presented with the opportunity or called upon by circumstances to lead. Given this requirement, leadership training and development should start relatively early in every CF member’s career and, based on demonstrated



potential and increased responsibility, should be continual and progressive thereafter. The objective of the CF's leadership-development program should be to create a broadly distributed capability for both position-based leadership and emergent leadership.

**Appropriate Delegation of Authority.** No reasonable person in the CF today would seriously entertain the idea that the one best way to exercise authority and influence is autocratically, nor would any one suggest that everyone should be taught to lead this way. While there are situations that require highly directive and controlling forms of influence, there are also many situations in which rigid adherence to autocratic practices will be counter-productive. By way of contrast, the philosophy of distributed leadership, like the doctrine of mission command, encourages the practice of delegating authority to create subordinate leaders and capabilities for independent action. Admittedly, not everyone develops at the same rate. Therefore, not everyone is capable of handling the same amount of authority. As observed by Hersey and Blanchard in their theory of Situational Leadership,<sup>78</sup> and Pigeau and McCann in their discussion of the Balanced Command Envelope, people possess different amounts of ability, different levels of motivation, and different degrees of willingness to accept responsibility. Not everyone is at the same level of readiness to operate independently or to lead or command others, so that to delegate authority indiscriminately would do some people a disservice and possibly jeopardize mission accomplishment. As a general rule, the delegation of authority must be balanced against the readiness of the person to whom authority is delegated. Subordinates should be given as much authority as they can competently and responsibly handle; beyond that, to satisfy developmental objectives, it may sometimes be desirable to give them very challenging duties and correspondingly greater authority (so-called 'stretch' assignments). The corollary to this rule is that, whenever authority is delegated to subordinates, the canons of accountability require that their performance be monitored, and energized, re-directed, facilitated, or corrected as necessary.

**"In a hierarchy, delegation is the primary tool for creating opportunity for more leaders.... If delegation is the norm, each leader can create subordinate leaders."**

Gifford Pinchot  
In *The Leader of the Future*

**Professional Cohesion.** *Duty with Honour* defines a profession essentially as an exclusive group of people voluntarily performing a service to society and unified by a common body of expertise and code of conduct. Consistent with these ideas, the condition of professional cohesion promotes distributed leadership through the equal professional status accorded all Officers and NCMs of the Regular Force and Primary Reserve. There is an important but subtle distinction that applies here. While CF members have different competencies, perform different roles, and are assigned different levels of authority commensurate with their roles and responsibilities, each member of the profession of arms in Canada is considered on some level as an equal member of a distinctive community. Consequently, all have a shared responsibility and right to contribute to the health and functioning of the profession, principally through the process of mutual influence. By building a strong sense of, and attachment to, the professional community, it is reasonable to expect that each member will be motivated to answer the call of duty when required and use whatever influence he or she has to serve the profession's purpose in society.

**"There is no substitute for the fundamental mind-set that members of the profession, regardless of rank, are colleagues, engaged in a common enterprise that matters deeply to them. If that mind-set is present, then each member feels a loyalty to the other, grounded in his or her common professional identity. If each thinks of professional identity in this way, each takes pride and responsibility in preserving, developing and transmitting the body of knowledge that resides at the core of the profession."**

Martin Cook  
In *The Future of the Army Profession*

<sup>78</sup> Situational Leadership theory uses Subordinate Readiness (indexed by ability and motivation) as the key contingency variable in determining appropriate influence behaviour. For subordinates with high levels of both ability and motivation to perform a given task, delegation is the recommended leader behaviour. Paul Hersey, Kenneth H. Blanchard, & Dewey Johnson, *Management of Organizational Behavior: Leading Human Resources* 8<sup>th</sup> ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall), 2000.

**An Open Culture.** An open culture means that people are encouraged to engage in broad inquiry, to think critically, and to venture and debate new ideas in the interests of contributing to collective effectiveness. These are the means by which an organization or a society is able to manage change and evolve. In short, they are the characteristics of a learning and adaptive culture and what CF leaders must foster if they are to take full advantage of the organization's intellectual and social capital. This condition reflects the belief that knowledge grows and society thrives most advantageously in an environment that encourages the free exchange of reasoned ideas reasonably presented and reasonably evaluated. Hence, in an open culture, the taken-for-granted assumption about leadership is that people in positions of authority are receptive to upward influence and that no one needs permission to lead.

**“If we expect our subordinates to furnish us with unvarnished information, unbiased advice, and unswerving support at the times when it really counts, we need to have cultivated a culture that encourages and rewards them for doing so.”**

Michael Useem  
*Leading Up*

**A Living Ethos.** As discussed in Chapter 2, values are real and have meaning only to the extent that we live by them. Hence, the civic, legal, ethical, and military values at the heart of the military ethos must be reflected in day-to-day decisions and actions. They cannot be just words on paper or empty commitments. They must be publicly visible consistent patterns of behaviour. Leaders make the difference. By internalizing the values of the military ethos and living by them, by instilling the ethos in others, by establishing and maintaining a professional culture, by protecting the professional reputation of the CF, by facing and resolving problems lawfully and ethically, leaders make values real.

These are the elements of values-based and distributed leadership. It is a basic duty of leaders at all levels to instill and uphold the CF's professional values and to make distributed leadership a reality in their team, unit, or organization. What this philosophy should ultimately provide, if applied correctly, is the confidence that CF Officers, Warrant Officers, and NCOs can and will develop the capabilities necessary to ensure mission success, and that they can also direct, motivate, and enable others to accomplish the mission ethically and professionally.

## DISTRIBUTED LEADERSHIP IN ACTION – AFGHANISTAN 2003

“It is only 7:30 a.m. here, but the sun is already beating down on the small patrol of 3rd Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment (3 RCR) soldiers preparing for the day's mission. Troops are scurrying around their Iltis vehicles, some conducting radio checks, others filling water bottles – all while the drivers perform their last checks under the hood.

‘Today we're going to link up with the police in this district,’ says Master Corporal Jeff Donaldson, patrol commander, jabbing at a map of West Kabul with his finger. ‘We've got reports that small groups of Taliban or Al-Qaeda may be moving towards Kabul along several routes in the area.’

He goes on to give precise instructions on the route, along with actions the patrol will take in the event of an ambush.... The troops scramble into their vehicles and head toward the main gate of Camp Julien. MCpl Donaldson signs out the patrol and picks up the interpreter while the remainder load their weapons. After a few minutes, the patrol is leaving the sanctity of their fortress-like camp for the wild streets of Kabul....

The need for vigilance while outside the main gate has been drilled into every member of the contingent. ‘We watch the high ground, windows, roofs, and check alley ways,’ explains Private Bradley Carson. ‘Anything that seems out of the ordinary.’

Soon the sights, sounds and smells of Kabul are left behind and the patrol is headed west towards their intended destination.... Landmines in the area are well hidden, but the soldiers know they are present due to the inordinate number of wandering goats and children that are missing limbs. The Iltis drivers are very careful to keep their vehicles moving along the same tracks that have been made by others in the recent past....

The patrol stops at a group of buildings about a kilometre outside of town. A group of armed men quickly appear from a small cluster of buildings. 'This is the sub-unit police headquarters,' explains MCpl Donaldson. 'Three of us will go in and talk to them, the rest of you keep your eyes open out here.'

MCpl Donaldson grabs his patrol second-in-command and interpreter and follows the police down a stinking alley and into a small courtyard.... The group is ushered into a lavish office that looks as if it is only used for important guests....

Tea and fruit are ordered, and the meeting begins with 15 minutes of small talk, smoking, and frequent cell-phone interruptions. MCpl Donaldson keeps his cool through the delays, and ever so slowly begins to probe for information. Using the interpreter, but never taking his eyes off the chief, he asks several casual yet pointed questions. After another 10 minutes, he drops the one big question on his mind.

'Have you seen any unusual activity in your district lately?' asks the patrol commander, his voice calm and collected. 'Anything at all that concerns you?'

The chief takes a long drag on this cigarette... 'Taliban are moving in from the West,' he says after a long pause. 'They organize small gatherings – only a few people are involved. We don't know who they are – we can't punish everyone,' he says, his tone somewhat resigned and embarrassed.

MCpl Donaldson quickly reassures the men that they have handled the situation well and that ISAF is here to assist them. Tea arrives on a tarnished silver tray, and large bowls filled with a strange white melon are quietly brought into the room.

The discussion continues, and the Canadians compliment their hosts on the sweet taste of the fruit.... More details are gleaned regarding the suspected Taliban incursions, and the police agree to accompany the Canadians on a patrol of the nearby town....

Soon the patrol is mounted up and following the police vehicle into Tusken-Raider-ville.... The patrol pulls into the center of town and parks in a loose box formation.

MCpl Donaldson selects a team of soldiers to patrol the western outskirts of the town on foot. The remainder secure the vehicles and maintain radio connections with the main camp. The patrol commander allows the local police to lead the way up the dusty track leading out of town, a prudent thing to do in one of the most heavily mined countries in the world.

The soldiers march in the 45°C heat carrying weapons, ammunition, and flack vests fitted with heavy ballistic plates. Despite the temperature and the 30-kg load, the patrol members remain sharp, scanning their arcs of fire as they plod steadily uphill. After a few kilometres the patrol reaches a vantage point that offers a fantastic view westward, right up to the mountains.

The patrol members and police converse and quickly conclude that the spot would make an excellent observation post from which to observe infiltrators attempting to move into town. The position is marked using a GPS, and the patrol starts back towards their comrades in town.

Before returning to Camp Julien, the section will conduct a further two hours of operations. They will patrol through another nearby suburb of Kabul, visit a school, and link up with additional police officials.

After a day in the searing Kabul sun, the troops finally head for home. They have missed lunch, but have gained valuable information that will contribute to the 3 RCR Battle Group's mission: to assist in maintaining security and stability in the Afghan capital."

Captain Jay Janzen

"Making a Difference One Patrol at a Time"



# Glossary

accountability	A person's obligation to take responsibility for and explain performance in relation to commitments made and results achieved. (See <i>responsibility</i> )
authority	The legal right to make decisions, to direct the activities of subordinates with the expectation of being obeyed, and to hold subordinates accountable for their actions and performance.
capability	The state of having sufficient power, skills, and ability to carry out a military activity or operation successfully.
cascading of objectives	As a technique for achieving co-ordination and unity of effort in organizations, the use of high-level objectives to shape or determine objectives through successive lower levels of an organization. In the CF for example, national strategic objectives shape military strategic objectives, which, in turn, shape operational and tactical objectives.
charismatic leadership	A general pattern of influence based on followers' emotional commitment and enthusiastic loyalty and devotion to a leader or the leader's cause. Charismatic leaders typically have idealized goals, make personal sacrifices for their principles, and may engage in unconventional behaviour to achieve their goals.
cohesion	The degree to which group members feel a sense of attachment and loyalty to their group. Peer cohesion, or mutual loyalty among peers, is sometimes distinguished from hierarchical cohesion, mutual loyalty between superiors and subordinates.
command	The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, co-ordination, and control of military forces. Also, the authority-based process of planning, organizing, leading, and controlling the efforts of subordinates and the use of other military resources to achieve military goals. (See <i>management</i> )
commitment	The degree to which an individual identifies with a particular organization and its goals and wishes to maintain membership in the organization in order to contribute to those goals.
compliance	Behaviour that conforms to the wishes of another. Where the relationship is based on authority, compliance is equivalent to obedience.
conduct values	Norms or standards of desirable behaviour that give direction to and set limits on individual and collective behaviour. For Canadian military professionals, conduct values include the civic, legal, ethical, and military values embodied in the military ethos. (See <i>values</i> and <i>essential outcomes</i> )
contingency theory	In the behavioural sciences, any model of behaviour that emphasizes the role of unpredictable events in influencing or determining human actions.
culture	A shared and relatively stable pattern of behaviours, values, and assumptions that a group has learned over time as an effective means of maintaining internal social stability and adapting to its environment, and that are transmitted to new members as the correct ways to perceive, think, and act in relation to these issues.
direct influence	Face-to-face influence over others which has an immediate effect on their ability, motivation, behaviour, performance, attitudes, or other psychological states, or which progressively modifies such slow-growth attributes as intellectual ability and professional values. (See <i>indirect influence</i> )

discipline	In general, the armed forces' exercise of legal and coercive powers to control the behaviour of members. More particularly, a superior's control of subordinates' conduct to ensure they carry out assigned duties and conform to legal and other professional military norms (e.g., <i>Code of Service Discipline</i> ). Discipline may be exercised through training, authoritative direction and guidance, supervision, corrective feedback, and punishment if necessary. (See <i>self-discipline</i> )
distributed leadership	The idea, first, that the capacity for leadership is not limited to people selected for and assigned to senior positions of responsibility and authority but, in varying degrees, is broadly distributed throughout the CF population, and, second, that the function of leadership should be shared. Bringing out this potential requires a combination of broadly based leader-skill development, opportunities for junior leaders to lead and emergent leaders to step forward, professional cohesion across the leadership team, and a culture that supports and rewards initiative and sensible risk-taking. (See <i>emergent leadership</i> )
effective CF leadership	The process of directing, motivating, and enabling others to accomplish the mission professionally and ethically, while developing or improving capabilities that contribute to mission success. This definition reflects the idea that leadership roles in the CF exist to serve CF effectiveness.
effectiveness	The extent to which stated objectives are achieved. In any definition of effectiveness, the achievement of objectives may be qualified by other criteria, such as efficiency or lawfulness. The CF effectiveness framework adopted for this manual identifies mission success as the primary objective, with member well-being and commitment, internal integration, and external adaptability as enabling or supporting objectives. As to qualifying conditions, the CF concept of effectiveness requires that objectives be achieved in ways that are consistent with the civic, legal, ethical, and military values embraced by the military ethos.
emergent leadership	The voluntary assumption of a leadership role by someone who lacks formal responsibility and authority; it is most apparent when a formal authority structure is either lacking or inactive in a group.
essential outcomes	General outcomes, goals, results, or end-states that are considered highly important and desirable. In broad terms, essential outcomes for the CF are: mission success; member well-being and commitment; internal integration; and external adaptability. (See <i>values</i> and <i>conduct values</i> )
functional imperative	With respect to the defence function of the CF, the obligation to be operationally proficient and effective. (See <i>societal imperative</i> )
heuristic	An open-ended method of discovery or creative problem-solving involving rules of thumb and trial-and-error methods.
hierarchical dominance	Influence over others based on deference to superior rank or status, as for example in a pecking order. Characteristics which serve as the basis for social ranking and ascribed leadership (alpha status) vary across species, societies, and groups, and may include such attributes as strength and aggressiveness, practical intelligence, prowess, wealth, or social class. (See <i>mutual influence</i> )
high-reliability organization	A term used to describe any organization in which failure to meet high standards of performance proficiency and consistency could lead to loss of life or serious injury, operational mission failure, loss of or damage to high-value materiel and equipment, environmental degradation, significant collateral damage to civilian communities and populations, or negative political repercussions.
indirect influence	Influence over others that is mediated by purposeful alterations in the task, group, system, institutional, or environmental conditions that affect behaviour and performance. (See <i>direct influence</i> )
integrity	Moral uprightness, wholeness, consistency between behaviour and moral principles and values. Professional integrity takes into account the obligations and responsibilities of the profession and, hence, for military professionals ensures that what is valued in terms of military outcomes is achieved in ways that are consistent with the values of the military ethos.
intent	A mental formulation involving foresight of some possible end and the desire to seek or attain it.
interoperability	The ability of alliance forces and, when appropriate, forces of partner and other nations to train, exercise, and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks.

leadership	The process of directly or indirectly influencing others, by means of formal authority or personal attributes, to act in accordance with one's intent or a shared purpose.
leading people	One of two major leadership functions in the CF, primarily concerned with developing individual, team, and unit capabilities and using those capabilities to execute tasks and missions.
leading the institution	One of two major leadership functions in the CF, primarily concerned with developing and maintaining the CF's strategic and professional capabilities and creating the conditions for operational success.
learning organization	An organization that is able, on an ongoing basis, to critically examine its performance, assimilate information from the environment, and transform itself, with a view to adapting to challenges and positioning itself to exploit opportunities or to establish a dominant capability.
legitimacy	On the basis of law, ethics, or principles of justice, having the right to act, or being justified in actions taken; also, being publicly perceived as such.
levels of conflict	A general framework for the command and control of operations and the analysis of civil and military functions that distinguishes among activities at the national-strategic level (concerned with broad national interests), the military-strategic level (concerned with the allocation of military capabilities in support of the national strategy), the operational level (concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns to achieve military-strategic objectives), and the tactical level (concerned with the conduct of battles and engagements to achieve operational objectives).
linking pin	The interconnecting function of commanders, managers, or leaders between levels of an organization. The linking-pin idea refers to the fact that commanders, managers, and leaders function as superiors in relation to a lower-level part of the organization but as subordinates in relation to a higher-level part of the organization and thereby link one level to the other.
management	The authority-based process of planning, organizing, leading, and controlling the efforts of organizational members and the use of other organizational resources to achieve organizational goals. (See <i>command</i> )
mission command	The CF philosophy of command, which basically relies on a clear understanding of the commander's intent to co-ordinate the actions of subordinate commanders and which thereby allows them maximum of freedom of action in how they accomplish their missions. Mission command has its origins in the German Army concept of <i>Auftragstaktik</i> , and is often contrasted with a command style which relies more on procedural direction and control.
motivation	An internal energizing state that may be triggered by physiological or psychological needs, the creation or failure of expectations, or emotional arousal. Motivation cannot be observed directly but is usually inferred from one or more behaviours: the choices an individual makes when presented with alternatives, the level of effort expended in performing a task, or the persistence of effort over time or in the face of difficulties.
mutual influence	The ability of individuals to influence each other as equals on the strength of reason, emotional appeals, evidence, example, or other persuasive methods which allow the element of choice to operate. (See <i>hierarchical dominance</i> )
norms	Shared beliefs and expectations about what behaviours are appropriate for members of a group.
personal power	The capacity or potential to influence others on the basis of personal characteristics and attributes. These include expert power, referent power, and connection power.
position power	The capacity or potential to influence others on the basis of authorities conferred by organizational position or rank. These include legitimate power, reward power, coercive power, information power, and ecological power.
professionalism	In general, displaying the qualities or features of a profession. With respect to the CF, professionalism means that CF members apply their unique body of military expertise in accordance with the civic, legal, ethical, and military values of the military ethos, pursuant to the profession's responsibility to society and a strong personal identification with military activities and the military way of life.

requisite capability	The ability or means required by the CF to achieve the Government's defence objectives across a range of changing circumstances.
resilience	The individual and collective ability to recover from surprise, setbacks, miscarried plans, and other threats to mission accomplishment.
resistance	Behaviour that passively or actively opposes the wishes of another.
responsibility	Something that one is required to do as part of a job, role, or legal obligation; having the authority and obligation to act. (See <i>accountability</i> )
risk	Any circumstance which exposes a decision maker or course of action to some hazard which may either produce a negative effect or else prevent or impede the attainment of one or more objectives.
risk management	A systematic approach for determining the best course of action and mitigating risk when risks are present. Risk management involves identifying, understanding, assessing, and acting on risk according to its likelihood and potential impact.
rule of law	A basis for social governance, entrenched as a fundamental principle in Canada's Constitution, which affirms that positive law, rather than any other authority, is the supreme authority in society, and that all persons, including government officials, are subject to the law and may expect their legal rights to be determined in a fair and non-arbitrary manner.
self-discipline	The ability of a military member, independently of external supervision and control, to direct and regulate his or her behaviour and perform his or her duties in accordance with internalized professional values and norms. (See <i>discipline</i> )
social capital	Social relationships, based on personal contacts and networks, that have the potential to provide individual or collective benefits and advantages.
social contract	Originally, a term used in political theory to describe an actual or implied agreement between a state's ruler and its people that defined the rights and obligations of each; now, used more broadly to describe the give-and-get expectations that workers, employers, and societies have for work and employment relationships. In the CF, the social contract refers to both the reciprocal obligations between the Government and CF members and reciprocal obligations between the CF and members. The basic idea is, that, in exchange for the service members voluntarily provide and the unlimited liability they assume, they may reasonably expect to be fairly compensated, supported, and treated in terms of their needs and well-being and their family's needs and well-being. Related terms include <i>psychological contract</i> and <i>implied contract</i> .
socialization	The formal and informal processes of teaching and persuading others to accept the core beliefs, values, behavioural norms, and roles of a particular culture.
societal imperative	With respect to the CF's legal and professional responsibilities to society, the general obligation to serve Canada's interests and satisfy Canadians' expectations of the armed forces, including specific obligations to remain subordinate to civil authority and to reflect core Canadian values. (See <i>functional imperative</i> )
stratified systems theory	A set of ideas about formal organizations which basically propose: that organizations are systems of sub-systems that interact with and are variably dependent on their environment; that organizational, and hence leadership, functions differ and become increasingly complex from lower to higher levels or strata of an organization; and that leader/organizational effectiveness may be gauged by the extent to which leaders/organizations achieve environmental adaptation and ensure system or sub-system growth and survival.



systems thinking	A way of thinking about and diagnosing problems that intentionally avoids compartmentalized analysis in favour of considering problem symptoms in relation to broad process interactions and system-wide effects.
transactional leadership	A general pattern of influence based on the provision of various rewards or benefits in exchange for extra effort or improved performance; sometimes discussed with reference to principles of economic exchange.
transformational leadership	A general pattern of influence based on shared core values and mutual commitment and trust between the leader and led, and intended to effect significant or radical improvement in individual, group, or system capabilities and performance; sometimes discussed in the context of social-exchange theory.
trust	The willingness to accept the decisions or influence of another person based on a belief in that person's reliability. Any of several characteristics may be important to establishing reliability, including technical competence, loyalty, integrity, courage, and similar qualities.
unit climate	In a unit, members' perceptions of their work environment. Major climate dimensions include: role stress and clarity, job challenge and autonomy, supportive and facilitative leader behaviour, and work-group co-operation and friendliness.
values	Beliefs concerning what is centrally important in life and what should, therefore, guide decisions and actions; properties or qualities that make something useful, desired, or esteemed. (See <i>conduct values</i> and <i>essential outcomes</i> )



# References and Additional Reading

## PREFACE

*Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada.* (Kingston, ON: CF Leadership Institute), 2003.

Last, Major David. "Educating Officers: Post-modern Professionals to Control and Prevent Violence." In Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn (ed.) *Contemporary Issues in Officership: A Canadian Perspective.* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies), 2000.

Ulmer Jr., Lieutenant General Walter F., U.S. Army (ret'd). "Military Leadership into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century." In Robert L. Taylor & William E. Rosenbach (eds.), *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence* 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), 2000.

## INTRODUCTION – THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF CF LEADERSHIP

Adams, Michael. *Better Happy than Rich? Canadians, Money, and the Meaning of Life.* (Toronto: Penguin Books), 2002.

Adams, Thomas. "The Real Military Revolution." *Parameters*, Autumn 2000.

Belknap, Margaret. "The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?" *Parameters*, Autumn 2002.

Bricker, Darrell & Edward Greenspon. *Searching for Certainty: Inside the New Canadian Mindset.* (Toronto: Anchor Canada), 2002.

Boyer, Colonel Alain. "Leadership and the Kosovo Air Campaign." *Canadian Military Journal*, Autumn 2002.

Capstick, Colonel M.D. "Command and Leadership in Other People's Wars." In Carol McCann & Ross Pigeau (eds.) *The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience.* (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers), 2000.

Dallaire, Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Roméo. "Foreword." In Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn (ed.) *Contemporary Issues in Officership: A Canadian Perspective.* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies), 2000.

Friedman, Thomas L. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization.* (New York: Anchor Books), 2000.

Ignatieff, Michael. *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism.* (Toronto: Penguin Books), 1993.

Ignatieff, Michael. *The Needs of Strangers.* (New York: Viking Press), 1985.

Ignatieff, Michael. *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond.* (New York: Henry Holt and Company), 2000.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. *The Responsibility to Protect.* (Ottawa, ON: International Development Research Centre), 2001.

Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War.* (New York: Random House), 2000.

Kaplan, Robert D. *Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Requires a Pagan Ethos.* (New York: Vintage), 2003.

- Labbé, Colonel J. Serge. "Time, Tempo, and Command." In Carol McCann & Ross Pigeau (eds.) *The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience*. (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers), 2000.
- Morgan, Matthew J. "The Origins of the New Terrorism." *Parameters*, Spring 2004.
- Moskos, Charles, John Allen Williams & David Segal (eds.) *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. (New York: Oxford University Press), 2000.
- Shamir, Boas & Eyal Ben-Ari. "Leadership in an Open Army?" In James G. Hunt, George E. Dodge & Leonard Wong (eds.) *Out-of-the-Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-first Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations*. (Stamford, CT: JAI Press), 1999.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. *Globalization and its Discontents* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: W.W. Norton), 2003.
- van Creveld, Martin. *The Transformation of War*. (New York: The Free Press), 1991.
- Wait, Tracey. *Youth in Canada: Population Projection to 2026*. (Ottawa, ON: NDHQ/DSHRC Research Note 2/01), January 2001.
- Wait, Tracey. *Canadian Demographics and Social Values at a Glance: Impact on Strategic HR Planning*. (Ottawa, ON: NDHQ/DSHRC Research Note 2/02), January 2002.
- Wait, Tracey. *Organizational, Social and Demographic Change in the Canadian Forces: 1976-2001*. (Ottawa, ON: NDHQ/DSHRC Research Note 3/02), February 2002.

## CHAPTER 1 – LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS

- Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do* FM 22-100. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army), 1999.
- Bass, Bernard M. *Bass and Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications* 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (New York: Free Press), 1990.
- Chemers, Martin. *An Integrative Theory of Leadership*. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum), 1997.
- Garnett, Vice-Admiral Gary L. "The Flag and General Officer as a Resource Manager." In Bernd Horn & Stephen Harris (eds.) *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*. (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing), 2001.
- Hollander, Edwin P. "Leadership and Power." In Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson (eds.) *Handbook of Social Psychology: Volume II* 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (New York: Random House), 1985.
- Howell, J.P., D.E. Bowen, P.W. Dorfman, S. Kerr, & P.M. Podsakoff. "Substitutes for Leadership: Effective Alternatives to Ineffective Leadership." *Organizational Dynamics*, 19, 1990.
- Hughes, Richard L., Robert L. Ginnett, & Gordon J. Curphy. *Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience* 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill), 2001.
- Kerr, Steven. "Substitutes for Leadership: Some Implications for Organizational Design." *Organization and Administrative Sciences*, 8(1), 1977.
- Kolenda, Christopher (ed.) *Leadership: The Warrior's Art*. (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Foundation Press), 2001.
- Lord, Robert T. & Karen J. Maher. *Leadership and Information Processing: Linking Perceptions and Performance*. (Boston: Unwin Hyman), 1991.
- Lund, Captain(N) (ret'd) Wilfred. "Vice-Admiral Harold Grant: Father of the Post-War Royal Canadian Navy." In Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn & Stephen Harris (eds.) *Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders*. (Toronto: Dundurn Press), 2001.
- Meindl, James R., Stanford B. Ehrlich, & Janet Dukerich. "The Romance of Leadership." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 30, 1985.
- Mintzberg, Henry. "Managing Quietly." *Leader to Leader*, No. 12, Spring 1999.

- Pfeffer, Jeffrey. "The Ambiguity of Leadership." *Academy of Management Review*, 2, 1977.
- Pigeau, Ross & Carol McCann. "Redefining Command and Control." In Carol McCann & Ross Pigeau (eds.) *The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience*. (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers), 2000.
- Pigeau, Ross & Carol McCann. "What is a Commander?" In Bernd Horn & Stephen Harris (eds.), *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*. (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing), 2001.
- Pigeau, Ross & Carol McCann. "Re-conceptualizing Command and Control." *Canadian Military Journal*, Spring 2002.
- Rost, Joseph. *Leadership for the Twenty-first Century*. (Westport, CT: Praeger), 1991.
- Useem, Michael. *The Leadership Moment: Nine True Stories of Triumph and Disaster and Their Lessons for Us All*. (New York: Three Rivers Press), 1998.
- Walker, David M. *The Oxford Companion to Law*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1980.
- Yukl, Gary. *Leadership in Organizations* 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall), 2002.
- Zaccaro, Stephen J. & R.J. Klimoski (eds.). *The Nature of Organizational Leadership: Understanding the Performance Imperatives Confronting Today's Leaders*. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 2001.

## CHAPTER 2 – VALUES-BASED LEADERSHIP

- Barnes, Rudolph C., Jr. *Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium*. (Portland, OR: Frank Cass), 1996.
- Blackburn, George G. *The Guns of Normandy: A Soldier's Eye View, France 1944*. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart), 1995.
- Dallaire, Lieutenant-General R.A. "Command Experiences in Rwanda." In Carol McCann & Ross Pigeau (eds.) *The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience*. (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers), 2000.
- Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. (Kingston, ON: CF Leadership Institute), 2003.
- Forsy, Eugene A. *How Canadians Govern Themselves* 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (Ottawa: Library of Parliament), 2003.
- Fundamentals of Canadian Defence Ethics*. (Ottawa, ON: National Defence Headquarters/Chief of Review Services), January 2002.
- Hackett, General Sir John W. *The Profession of Arms*. (London: The Times Publishing Company), 1963.
- Heathcote, Blake. *Testaments of Honour: Personal Histories of Canada's War Veterans*. (Toronto: Doubleday Canada), 2002.
- Hodgkinson, Christopher, Donald Lang, & James Cutt. "A Mirror for Leaders." Paper prepared for the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, March 2002.
- Ignatieff, Michael. *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*. (New York: Viking), 1998.
- Ignatieff, Michael. *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*. (New York: Henry Holt and Company), 2000.
- Ignatieff, Michael. "Ethics and the New War." Young Memorial Lecture at the Royal Military College of Canada, 25 October 2001.
- Janowitz, Morris. *The Professional Soldier*. (New York: The Free Press), 1971
- Kanungo, Rabindra & Manuel Mendonca. *Ethical Dimensions of Leadership*. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications), 1996.
- Kaplan, Robert S. & David P. Norton. *The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action*. (Boston: Harvard Business School), 1996.
- Kasurak, Peter. "Is the Mouse Dead? Thoughts on Reforming the Department of National Defence." Paper presented at the Air Force's Advisory Group, NDHQ Ottawa, 12 April 1999.

- Kelman, Herbert C. & V. Lee Hamilton. *Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 1989.
- Kolenda, Christopher. "Discipline: Creating the Foundation for an Initiative-Based Organization." In Christopher Kolenda (ed.) *Leadership: The Warrior's Art*. (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Foundation Press), 2001.
- Legault, Albert & Joel Sokolsky (eds.). *The Soldier and the State in the Post Cold War Era*. Special issue of Queen's Quarterly, 2002.
- Off, Carol. "Do the Right Thing! Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire in the 1990s." In Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn & Stephen Harris (eds.) *Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders*. (Toronto: Dundurn Press), 2001.
- Quinn, Robert E. *Beyond Rational Management: Mastering the Paradoxes and Competing Demands of High Performance*. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1988.
- Quinn, Robert E. "Mastering Competing Values: An Integrated Approach to Management." In D.A. Kolb, I.M. Rubin & J.S. Osland (eds.) *The Organizational Behavior Reader* 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall), 1991.
- Reber, Arthur S. *The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology*. (Markham, ON: Penguin Books Canada), 1985.
- Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*. (Ottawa, ON: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada), 1997.
- Rescher, Nicholas. *In the Line of Duty: The Complexity of Military Obligation*. U.S. Air Force Academy Lecture on War Morality and the Military Profession (Colorado: U.S. Air Force Academy), 1990.
- Simons, Anna. "Backbone vs. Box: The Choice between Principled and Prescriptive Leadership." In Lloyd J. Matthews (ed.) *The Future of the Army Profession*. (Boston: McGraw-Hill), 2002.
- Statement of Defence Ethics*. (Ottawa, ON: National Defence Headquarters/Chief of Review Services), 1997.
- Sullivan, Gordon R. & Michael V. Harper. *Hope is Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America's Army*. (New York: Times Books), 1996.
- Varljen, Colonel Peter J., U.S. Army. "Leadership: More than Mission Accomplishment." *Military Review*, March-April 2003.
- Wakin, Brigadier General (ret'd), U.S. Air Force. "Professional Integrity." *Airpower Journal*, Summer 1996.
- Withers, General (ret'd) Ramsey. "Public Expectations of the General Officer Corps." In Bernd Horn & Stephen Harris (eds.), *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*. (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing), 2001.

## CHAPTER 3 – LEADERSHIP AND THE LAW

- Brand, C.E. *Roman Military Law*. (Austin: University of Texas Press), 1968.
- Clavell, James (ed.) *The Art of War*. (New York: Delacorte Press), 1983.
- Collins, Joseph J. & T. Owen Jacobs. "Trust in the Military Profession." In Lloyd J. Matthews (ed.) *The Future of the Army Profession*. (Boston: McGraw-Hill), 2002.
- de Mulinen, Frederic. *Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces*. (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross), 1987.
- Dicey, Albert V. *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution*. (London: Macmillan and Co.), 1939.
- Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. (Kingston, ON: CF Leadership Institute), 2003.
- Fay, J.B. "Canadian Military Criminal Law: An Examination of Military Justice", *Chitty's Law Journal*, Vol 23, No 4, 1975.
- Granatstein, Jack. *Canada's Army – Waging War and Keeping the Peace*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 2002.

- Green, Leslie C. *Essays on the Modern Law of War*. (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers), 1985.
- Green, Leslie C. *The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press), 2000.
- Kaplan, Robert D. *Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Requires a Pagan Ethos*. (New York: Vintage), 2003.
- Keegan, John. *A History of Warfare*. (Toronto: Random House), 1993.
- Watkin, Colonel Ken. "Warriors, Obedience, and the Rule of Law," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, 3(4), 2000/2001.

## CHAPTER 4 – RESPONSIBILITIES OF CF LEADERS

- Bashow, Lieutenant-Colonel David L., Colonel Dwight Davies, Colonel André Viens, Lieutenant-Colonel John Rotteau, Major Norman Balfe, Major Ray Stouffer, Captain James Pickett, & Dr. Steve Harris. "Mission Ready: Canada's Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign." *Canadian Military Journal*, Spring 2000.
- Kouzes, J.M. & B.Z. Pozner. *The Leadership Challenge: How to Get Extraordinary Things Done in Organizations*. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1987.
- Miller, Rear-Admiral D.E. "The Naval Commander in Joint Operations in the Gulf War." In Bernd Horn & Stephen Harris (eds.), *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*. (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing), 2001.
- Yukl, Gary & David Van Fleet. "Theory and Research on Leadership in Organizations." In Marvin D. Dunnette & Leetta M. Hough (eds.) *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Volume 3* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press), 1992.
- Yukl, Gary. "Leadership Competencies Required for the New Army and Approaches for Developing Them." In James G. Hunt, George E. Dodge, & Leonard Wong (eds.) *Out-of-the-Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations*. (Stamford, CT: JAI Press), 1999.
- Zaccaro, Stephen J. *Models and Theories of Executive Leadership: A Conceptual/Empirical Review and Integration*. (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences), 1996.

## CHAPTER 5 – LEADER POWER, LEADER CHARACTERISTICS, AND INFLUENCE BEHAVIOURS

- Adams, Barbara D., David J. Bryant, & Robert D.G. Webb. *Trust in Teams Literature Review*. Report (DCIEM No. CR-2001-42) prepared under contract to the Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine, Toronto, by Humansystems Incorporated, Guelph, ON, March, 2001.
- Bass, Bernard M. *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations*. (New York: The Free Press), 1985.
- Bass, Bernard M. *Bass and Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications* 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (New York: Free Press), 1990.
- Bass, Bernard M. "From Transactional to Transformational Leadership: Learning to Share the Vision." *Organizational Dynamics*, Winter 1990.
- Bass, Bernard M. *Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impact*. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum), 1998.
- Beaumont, Roger A. & William P. Snyder. "Combat Effectiveness: Paradigms and Paradoxes." In Sam C. Sarkesian (ed.) *Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military*. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications), 1980.
- Burns, James MacGregor. *Leadership*. (New York: Harper & Row), 1978.
- Campbell, John P. "The Cutting Edge of Leadership: An Overview." In James G. Hunt & Lars L. Larson (eds.) *Leadership: The Cutting Edge*. (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press), 1977.
- Conger, Jay & Rabindra N. Kanungo. *Charismatic Leadership in Organizations*. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications), 1998.

- Dirks, Kurt T. & Donald L. Ferrin. "Trust in Leadership: Meta-Analytic Findings and Implications for Research and Practice." *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87(4), 2002.
- Dixon, Norman. *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*. (London: Jonathan Cape), 1976.
- English, Allan D. *The Cream of the Crop: Canadian Aircrew 1939-1945*. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens's University Press), 1996.
- Hogan, Robert, Robert Raskin & Dan Fazzini. "The Dark Side of Charisma." In Kenneth Clark & Miriam Clark (eds.) *Measures of Leadership*. (Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership), 1990.
- Hollander, Edwin P. "Leadership and Power." In Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson (eds.) *Handbook of Social Psychology, Volume II* 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (New York: Random House), 1985.
- House, Robert J. "A 1976 Theory of Charismatic Leadership." In James G. Hunt & Lars L. Larson (eds.) *Leadership: The Cutting Edge*. (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press), 1977.
- Jansen, E. & Von Glinow. "Ethical Ambivalence and Organizational Reward Systems." *Academy of Management Review*, 10(4), 1985.
- Keegan, John. *The Mask of Command*. (Toronto: Penguin Books), 1988.
- Kerr, Steven. "On the Folly of Rewarding A, while Hoping for B." *Academy of Management Journal*, 18, 1975.
- Kipnis, David, Stuart M. Schmidt, & Ian Wilkinson. "Intraorganizational Influence Tactics: Explorations in Getting One's Way." *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 65, 1980.
- Kotter, John P. *Power and Influence: Beyond Formal Authority*. (New York: The Free Press), 1985.
- Kouzes, J.M. & B.Z. Posner. *The Leadership Challenge: How to Get Extraordinary Things Done in Organizations*. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1987.
- Maddi, Salvatore. "The Search for Meaning." In William J. Arnold & Monte M. Page (eds.) *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 1970.
- Mowday, Richard T., Richard M. Steers, & Lyman W. Porter. "The Measurement of Organizational Commitment." *Journal of Vocational Behaviour*, 14, 1979.
- O'Toole, James. *Leading Change: The Argument for Values-Based Leadership*. (New York: Ballantine Books), 1995.
- Pfeffer, Jeffrey. *Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations*. (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press), 1992.
- Reed, Colonel George E. "Toxic Leadership." *Military Review*, July-August 2004.
- Salancik, Gerald R. & Jeffrey Pfeffer. "Who Gets Power – and How They Hold on to It: A Strategic-Contingency Model of Power." *Organizational Dynamics*, Winter 1977.
- Vroom, Victor H. & Arthur G. Jago. *The New Leadership: Managing Participation in Organizations*. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall), 1988.
- Yukl, Gary & Cecilia M. Falbe. "Influence Tactics and Objectives in Upward, Downward, and Lateral Influence Attempts." *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 75(2), 1990.
- Yukl, Gary. *Leadership in Organizations* 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall), 2002.
- Zaccaro, Stephen J. *Models and Theories of Executive Leadership: A Conceptual/Empirical Review and Integration*. (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences), 1996.
- Zand, Dale E. *The Leadership Triad: Knowledge, Trust, and Power*. (New York: Oxford University Press), 1997.



## CHAPTER 6 – LEADING PEOPLE: AN OVERVIEW

- Avolio, Bruce J. & Bernard M. Bass. *Developing Potential Across a Full Range of Leadership™: Cases on Transactional and Transformational Leadership*. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum), 2002.
- Bartone, Paul T. & Faris R. Kirkland. "Optimal Leadership in Small Army Units." In Reuven Gal & A. David Mangelsdorff (eds.) *Handbook of Military Psychology*. (New York: John Wiley & Sons), 1991.
- Bass, Bernard M. & Bruce J. Avolio (eds.). *Improving Organizational Effectiveness Through Transformational Leadership*. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications), 1994.
- Bennis, Warren. *On Becoming a Leader*. (Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley Publishing), 1994.
- Chemers, Martin. *An Integrative Theory of Leadership*. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum), 1997.
- Copp, Terry. "Stress Casualties and the Role of the Commander." In Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn & Stephen J. Harris (eds). *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*. (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing), 2001.
- Delaney, Major Douglas E. "CIMIC Operations during Operation 'KINETIC'." *Canadian Military Journal*, Winter 2000-2001.
- Dyer, Gwynne. *War*. (New York: Crown Publishers Inc.), 1985.
- English, Allan D. "Leadership and Operational Stress in the Canadian Forces." *Canadian Military Journal*, Autumn 2000.
- English, Allan. "The Masks of Command: Leadership Differences in the Canadian Army, Navy, and Air Force." Paper prepared for the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Conference, 25-27 October 2002, Kingston, ON
- Feldman, Daniel. "The Development and Enforcement of Group Norms." *Academy of Management Review*, 9, 1984.
- Giuliani, Rudolph W. (with Ken Kurson). *Leadership*. (New York: Hyperion/Miramax Books), 2002.
- Goette, Richard. "Squadron Leader N.E. Small: A Study of Leadership in the RCAF's Eastern Air Command, 1942." *Canadian Military Journal*, Spring 2004.
- Hatton, Colonel Richard A. "Stressors and Stresses on Peacekeeping Operations: Implications for Operational Level Commanders." In Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn & Stephen J. Harris (eds). *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*. (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing), 2001.
- Heathcote, Blake. *Testaments of Honour: Personal Histories of Canada's War Veterans*. (Toronto: Doubleday Canada), 2002.
- James, Lawrence R., Lois A. James, & Donna K. Ashe. "The Meaning of Organizations: The Role of Cognition and Values." In Benjamin Schneider (ed.) *Organizational Climate and Culture* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1990.
- Kellett, Anthony. *Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Men in Battle*. (New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers), 1982.
- Kirkland, Faris R., Ronald R. Halverson, & Paul D. Bliese. "Stress and Psychological Readiness in Post-Cold War Operations." *Parameters*, Summer 1996.
- Lane, Commander (ret'd) Richard A. "The Fog of War: A Personal Experience of Leadership." In Carol McCann & Ross Pigeau (eds.) *The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience*. (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers), 2000.
- MacKenzie, Major-General (ret'd) Lewis W. "The Media as a Tool of the Military Commander." In Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn & Stephen J. Harris (eds). *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*. (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing), 2001.
- Madden, Robert W. "Living on the Edge: Building Cohesion and the Will to Win." In Christopher Kolenda (ed.) *Leadership: The Warrior's Art*. (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Foundation Press), 2001.

- Malone, Colonel Dandridge M., U.S. Army (ret'd). *Small Unit Leadership: A Commonsense Approach*. (Novato, CA: Presidio Press), 1983.
- Marshall, S.L.A. "Leaders and Leadership." In R.L. Taylor and W.E. Rosenbach (eds.) *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), 1984.
- Marshall, S.L.A. "Mainsprings of Leadership." In R.L. Taylor & W.E. Rosenbach (eds.) *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), 1984.
- Meloy, Major General Guy S. (U.S. Army ret'd). "Reflections of a Former Troop Leader." *Army*, August 2003.
- Murphy, Major Peter J. & Major Kelly M.J. Farley. "Morale, Cohesion, and Confidence in Leadership: Unit Climate Dimensions for Canadian Soldiers on Operations." In Carol McCann & Ross Pigeau (eds.) *The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience*. (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers), 2000.
- Nelsen, John T. II. "Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Combat Leadership." In Lloyd J. Matthews & Dale E. Brown (eds.), *The Challenge of Military Leadership* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey), 1989.
- Off, Carol. "MacKenzie in Sarajevo." In Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn & Stephen Harris (eds.) *Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders*. (Toronto: Dundurn Press), 2001.
- Perkins, Dennis N.T. *Leading at the Edge: Leadership Lessons from the Extraordinary Saga of Shackleton's Antarctic Expedition*. (New York: AMACOM), 2000.
- Shalit, Ben. *The Psychology of Conflict and Combat*. (New York: Praeger Publishers), 1988.
- Sharpe, Brigadier-General (ret'd) G.E. *Croatia Board of Inquiry: Leadership (and Other) Lessons Learned*. (Kingston, ON: CF Leadership Insitute), 2002.
- Sternberg, Robert J. (ed.). *Handbook of Creativity*. (New York: Cambridge University Press), 1999.
- Useem, Michael. *The Leadership Moment: Nine True Stories of Triumph and Disaster and Their Lessons for Us All*. (New York: Three Rivers Press), 1998.
- Useem, Michael. *Leading Up: How to Lead Your Boss So You Both Win*. (New York: Random House), 2001.
- van Creveld, Martin. *Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945*. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press), 1982.
- Weick, Karl W. "A Stress Analysis of Future Battlefields." In James G. Hunt & John D. Blair (eds.) *Leadership on the Future Battlefield*. (New York: Pergamon Press), 1985.
- Weick, Karl W. & Kathleen M. Sutcliffe. *Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High Performance in an Age of Complexity*. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 2001.
- Wilson, Clark L., Donald O'Hare, & Frank Shipper. "Task Cycle Theory: The Processes of Influence." In K.E. Clark & M.B. Clark (eds.) *Measures of Leadership*. (Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership), 1990.
- Wong, Leonard, Thomas Kolditz, Raymond A. Millen, & Terrence M. Potter. *Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War*. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College), 2003.
- Yukl, Gary. *Leadership in Organizations* 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall), 2002.

## CHAPTER 7 – LEADING THE INSTITUTION: AN OVERVIEW

- Bland, Douglas L. (ed.). *Issues in Defence Management*. (Kingston, ON: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University), 1998.
- Conger, Jay, Gretchen Spreitzer, & Edward Lawler III (eds.). *The Leader's Change Handbook: An Essential Guide to Setting Direction and Taking Action*. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1999.
- Conner, Daryl R. *Leading at the Edge of Chaos: How to Create the Nimble Organization*. (New York: John Wiley & Sons), 1998.
- de Chastelain, General (ret'd) John. "A Personal Perspective on Command." In Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn & Stephen Harris (eds.) *Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders*. (Toronto: Dundurn Press), 2001.
- Gimblett, Richard. "What *The Mainguy Report* Never Told Us: The Tradition of Mutiny in the Royal Canadian Navy Before 1949," *Canadian Military Journal*, Summer 2000.
- Jacobs, T. Owen & Elliott Jaques. "Executive Leadership." In Reuven Gal & A. David Mangelsdorff (eds.) *Handbook of Military Psychology*. (New York: John Wiley & Sons), 1991.
- Kasurak, Peter. "Is the Mouse Dead? Thoughts on Reforming the Department of National Defence." Paper presented at the Air Force's Advisory Group, NDHQ Ottawa, 12 April 1999.
- Kotter, John P. & Leonard A. Schlesinger. "Choosing Strategies for Change." *Harvard Business Review*, 57(2), March-April 1979.
- Kotter, John P. *Leading Change*. (Boston: Harvard Business School Press), 1996.
- Liddell Hart, Sir Basil H. *Strategy* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger), 1967.
- Magee II, Roderick R. (ed.). *Strategic Leadership Primer*. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, U.S. Army War College), 1998.
- Mainguy, Rear-Admiral E.R., L.C. Audette, & Leonard W. Brockington. *Report on Certain "Incidents" which Occurred on Board H.M.C. Ships Athabaskan, Crescent and Magnificent and on Other Matters Concerning the Royal Canadian Navy*. (Ottawa: Minister of National Defence), 1949.
- Milne, Greg. *Making Policy: A Guide to the Federal Government's Policy Process*. (Ottawa, ON: Greg Milne), 2004.
- Mintzberg, Henry. *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, Planners*. (Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan), 1994.
- Mitchell, Paul T. "A Transformation Agenda for the Canadian Forces: Full Spectrum Influence." *Canadian Military Journal*, Winter 2003-2004.
- Mitroff, Ian. *Crisis Leadership: Planning for the Unthinkable*. (New York: John Wiley & Sons), 2004.
- Morton, Desmond. "The Political Skills of a Canadian General Officer Corps." In Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn & Stephen J. Harris (eds.) *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*. (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing), 2001.
- Nanus, Burt. *Visionary Leadership: Creating a Compelling Sense of Direction for Your Organization*. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1992.
- Noakes, Jeff. "Air Force Architect: Air Marshal Wilfred Curtis, Chief of the Air Staff, 1947-1953." In Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn & Stephen Harris (eds.) *Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders*. (Toronto: Dundurn Press), 2001.
- Pascale, Richard, Mark Milleman, & Linda Gioja. "Changing the Way We Change." *Harvard Business Review*, November-December 1997.
- Pfeffer, Jeffrey. *Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations*. (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press), 1992.
- Schein, Edgar H. *Organizational Culture and Leadership* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1992.
- Senge, Peter. *The Fifth Discipline*. (New York: Doubleday), 1990.

- Stewart, Brenda. "Hanging from Rafters to Hear and Be Heard at Commander's Hour in Quebec." *Bravo Defence*, Spring 2003.
- Stumpf, Stephen A. & Thomas P. Mullen. *Taking Charge: Strategic Leadership in the Middle Game*. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall), 1992.
- Sullivan, Gordon R. & Michael V. Harper. *Hope is Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America's Army*. (New York: Times Books), 1996.
- Vroom, Victor H. & Arthur G. Jago. *The New Leadership: Managing Participation in Organizations*. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall), 1988.
- Zaccaro, Stephen J. *Models and Theories of Executive Leadership: A Conceptual/Empirical Review and Integration*. (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences), 1996.
- Zaccaro, Stephen J. & R.J. Klimoski (eds.). *The Nature of Organizational Leadership: Understanding the Performance Imperatives Confronting Today's Leaders*. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 2001.

## CHAPTER 8 – CF LEADERSHIP MODEL AND PHILOSOPHY

- Beer, Michael. "Leading Learning and Learning to Lead." In Jay Conger, Gretchen Spreitzer, & Edward Lawler III (eds.) *The Leader's Change Handbook: An Essential Guide to Setting Direction and Taking Action*. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1999.
- Berton, Pierre. *Vimy*. (Toronto: Anchor Canada), 2001.
- Cook, Martin L. "Army Professionalism: Service to What Ends?" In Lloyd J. Matthews (ed.) *The Future of the Army Profession*. (Boston: McGraw-Hill), 2002.
- Gronn, Peter. "Distributed Leadership as a Unit of Analysis." *The Leadership Quarterly*, 13, 2002.
- Hersey, Paul, Kenneth H. Blanchard, & Dewey Johnson. *Management of Organizational Behavior: Leading Human Resources* 8<sup>th</sup> ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall), 2000.
- Janzen, Captain Jay. "Making a Difference One Patrol at a Time." *The Maple Leaf*, 6(35), 24 September 2003.
- Majoor, Sergeant Arthur. "The End of the Non-Commissioned Officer Corps?" In Douglas L. Bland (ed.) *Backbone of the Army: Non-Commissioned Officers in the Future Army*. (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press), 2000.
- Pearce, Craig L. & Jay A. Conger. *Shared Leadership: Reframing the Hows and Whys of Leadership*. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications), 2002.
- Pigeau, Ross & Carol McCann. "What is a Commander?" In Bernd Horn & Stephen Harris (eds.), *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*. (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing), 2001.
- Pinchot, Gifford. "Creating Organizations with Many Leaders." In Frances Hesselbein, Marshall Goldsmith, & Richard Beckhard (eds.) *The Leader of the Future: New Visions, Strategies, and Practices for the Next Era*. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1996.
- Useem, Michael. *Leading Up: How to Lead Your Boss So You Both Win*. (New York: Random House), 2001.
- Yukl, Gary. *Leadership in Organizations* 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall), 2002.