SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, ATLANTIC
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511-2490, UNITED STATES

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
B-7010 SHAPE, BELGIUM

1706.1.2/SHOEC/004/00
October 03, 2000

HC-33/Ser:NU00805
03 October 2000

Bi-SC
EXERCISE PLANNING GUIDE
(EPG) (Change 2)

3500
HC-3305/Ser:

From: Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command Atlantic
To: Distribution List

Subj: CHANGE ONE TO THE EXERCISE PLANNING GUIDE

Ref: (a) MC 133/(series) - NATO's Operational Planning
            Architecture

1. This letter is issued to correct a typographical error
promulgated in the distribution of the Exercise Planning Guide
Change 1 and its associated Safety Supplement. The error occurs
at the end of paragraph three in the distribution letter.
Additionally, the distribution letter does not indicate that a new
safety supplement is issued with the EPG change 1. A copy of this
letter should be filed with the document, Bi-SC EXERCISE PLANNING
GUIDE (EPG) CHANGE 1 and its associated SAFETY SUPPLEMENT, HC-
33/Ser:NU 0829 and SHOEC 004/99 dated 20 December, 1999.

2. The Bi-Strategic Commander's (SCs') Exercise Planning Guide
(EPG) and its associated safety supplement is promulgated in
support of the SCs' Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP) in
accordance with reference (a).

3. The EPG and safety supplement is a complete revision
incorporating Change 1. The Introduction – Chapter 1 – explains
the status of this change in the context of evolving NATO exercise
policy.

4. The EPG, when read in conjunction with the GOP, provides
planning guidance designed to facilitate the development of NATO
exercises to support the full range of military capabilities
required to meet the wide range of security challenges facing NATO
today.

5. The rapidly evolving exercise programme with non-NATO nations
demand that exercise planners seek to ensure a commonality of
purpose across the spectrum of exercise in which NATO
participates. This is reflected in the EPG.

Subj: CHANGE ONE TO THE EXERCISE PLANNING GUIDE

6. This is a living document. Revisions and corrections to the EPG are expected as NATO evolves. Recommendations are to be forwarded to SACLANT (HC-33) or SHAPE (SHOEX).

        FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, ATLANTIC:

                              D. E. COLLINSON
                              Captain, Canadian Navy
                              Branch Head Exercises and Training

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CINCENT	1	RHQSOUTHLANT	1
RHQSOUTHLANT	1	COMSTRIKFLTLANT	1
COMPOAIR	1	COMSUBACLANT	1
COMNAEWF	1	COMSUBWESTLANT	1
COMARRC	1	COMOCEANSUBAREA	1
DIR RF (A) S	1	COMCANSUBLANT	1
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COMSTRIKFORSOUTH	1		
COMAIRSOUTH	1		
COMLANDSOUTH	1		
COMLANDSOUTHEAST	1		

EXERCISE PLANNING GUIDE - RECORD OF CHANGES

After a change has been incorporated, it is to be recorded below and the pages that have been replaced are to be destroyed in accordance with local security orders.

CHANGE #	SERIAL/DTG AND DATE	DATE ENTERED	SIGNATURE	RANK/RATE ORGANISATION
ONE	CHANGE ONE IS ISSUED BY THE SCs AS A REVISED DOCUMENT			

EXERCISE PLANNING GUIDE - TABLE OF CONTENTS

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO WEU

From: Supreme Allied Commanders, Atlantic and Europe
To: See Distribution

Subj: CHANGE ONE THE EXERCISE PLANNING GUIDE

Ref: (a) MC 133/(series) – NATO's Operational Planning
            Architecture

1. The Bi-Strategic Commander's (SCs') Exercise Planning Guide
(EPG) is promulgated in support of the SCs' Guidelines for
Operational Planning (GOP) in accordance with reference (a).

2. The enclosed copy of the EPG is a complete revision
incorporating Change 1. The Introduction – Chapter 1 – explains
the status of this change in the context of evolving NATO exercise
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EPG are expected as NATO evolves. Recommendations are to be
forwarded to SACLANT (HC-33) or SHAPE (SHOEX).

        FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDERS, ATLANTIC AND EUROPE:

K. J. SUMMERS   DIETER STÖCKMANN
Rear Admiral, Canadian Navy   General, GE Army
Chief of Staff ACLANT   Chief of Staff SHAPE

EXERCISE PLANNING GUIDE - RECORD OF CHANGES

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ONE	CHANGE ONE IS ISSUED BY THE SCs AS A REVISED DOCUMENT			

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2. For convenient reference, changes to these Guidelines are identified by a vertical line in the margin.

CHAPTER ONE

THE EXERCISE PLANNING GUIDE IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO EXERCISE POLICY AND MANAGEMENT

STATUS OF THE EXERCISE PLANNING GUIDE

1.   The Bi-Strategic Commander's (SC) Exercise Planning Guide (EPG) is a document designed to facilitate the planning and execution of NATO Exercises. Table 1.1 depicts the current position of the EPG in the hierarchy of NATO Exercise documents.

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+------------------------------------------------------------------+
|                  +-----------------------------+                 |
|                  |          MC 94/3            |                 |
|                  |   NATO EXERCISE POLICY      | .........       |
|                  |  AND THE BI-MNC OVERALL     |        :        |
|                  |    NATO/PFP EXERCISE        |        :        |
|                  |        CONCEPT              |        :        |
|                  +-----------------------------+        :        |
|                              |                          v        |
|          +--------------------------+   +-----------------------+|
|          |         Bi-SC            |   |       Bi-SC           ||
|          | NATO EXERCISE DIRECTIVE  |   | EXERCISE PLANNING     ||
|          | AND PROGRAMME (NEDP)     |   | GUIDE (EPG)           ||
|          |         AND              |   +-----------------------+|
|          |   NATO/PFP EXERCISE      |                            |
|          | DIRECTIVE AND PROGRAMME  |                            |
|          |        (NPEDP)           |+-------------------------+  |
|          +--------------------------+| REGIONAL EXERCISE       |  |
|                                     | DIRECTIVES AND          |  |
|                                     | PROGRAMMES              |  |
|                                     +-------------------------+  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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Table 1.1 – Current Hierarchy of NATO exercise documents

2.   However, in March 1999 the Military Committee (MC) directed the SCs to develop a proposal for the new over-arching NATO Policy document for all NATO Military Exercises – MC 94/4. At the time that the SCs approved Change 1 of the EPG, the MC had not approved MC 94/4. Nevertheless, the basic policy proposed in the draft MC 94/4 is not contentious and some new procedures introduced in the text of MC 94/4 are being implemented within the authority of the SCs. Therefore, where appropriate, this Change to the EPG incorporates some new policy, concepts and guidance that is in line with MC 94/4. When MC 94/4 is approved, the subsequent Change of the EPG will incorporate those elements of policy that cannot be assumed without MC approval.

3.   MC 94/4 will provide policy for all NATO Military Exercises and will subsume MC 94/3 and the Overall NATO/PfP Exercise Concept

document. In line with this, the SCs decided to amalgamate the NEDP and NPEDP into one document: the Military Exercise Directive and Programme (MEDP). The MEDP will first be published in mid-2000. Table 1.2 depicts the position of the EPG in the future hierarchy of NATO Exercise documents.

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                                                                   │
│          ┌──────────────────────────┐                             │
│          │        MC 94/4           │                             │
│          │  NATO MILITARY EXERCISE  │ ┄┄┄┄┄┐                       │
│          │        POLICY            │      ┆                       │
│          └──────────────────────────┘      ┆                       │
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│                      │        │         Bi-SC            │         │
│                      ▼        │   EXERCISE PLANNING       │         │
│          ┌──────────────────┐ │      GUIDE (EPG)          │         │
│          │      Bi-SC       │ └──────────────────────────┘         │
│          │ MILITARY EXERCISE│                                       │
│          │ DIRECTIVE AND    │                                       │
│          │ PROGRAMME (MEDP) │ ┌──────────────────────────┐         │
│          └──────────────────┘ │  REGIONAL EXERCISE       │         │
│                               │  DIRECTIVES AND          │         │
│                               │  PROGRAMMES              │         │
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Table 1.2 – Future Hierarchy of NATO exercise documents

NATO EXERCISE POLICY AND DIRECTION

4.   The principal contents of MC 94/4 that affect exercise planning are:

   a.   the key principles of NATO Military Exercise nomenclature and structure;

   b.   Political and Military (Pol-Mil) direction regarding the priorities for, and execution of, the exercise process;

   c.   the coordination required by the SCs, Subordinate Commanders, the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC), the nations and non-NATO authorities in the execution of the exercise process;

   d.   legal aspects, funding, Public Information and Visitors, Observers and Inspectors.

5.   MC 94/4 is a high-level policy document that must be understood by exercise planners but it is written to ensure a degree of longevity and thus does not dictate priorities in the

programming of exercises. It does indicate where military programmers should obtain guidance on priorities for programming exercises.

6.   The MEDP directs strategic exercise policy and priorities, and the details of the five-year exercise programme. By virtue of its annual publication cycle, the MEDP is able to reflect changes in emphasis and priority not provided by MC 94/4.

SCs' RESPONSIBILITIES

7.   The MC delegates to the SCs responsibility for managing the military exercise process.

8.   The Strategic Commanders (SCs) will ensure that the exercise programmes within their areas of responsibility support contingency plans and other operational requirements. Furthermore, the SCs have the responsibility to ensure the military exercise process will suitably exercise NATO Forces throughout the conflict and crisis management spectrum. Regional Commanders, (RCs) and Combatant Commanders (CCs) are required to incorporate training events and exercises within their individual regional programmes, in support of their specific area contingency plans.

THE NATO MILITARY EXERCISE PROCESS

9.   The NATO military exercise process is divided into five consecutive stages:

      a.   Programming,

      b.   Planning,

      c.   Conduct,

      d.   Analysis and

      e.   Reporting

10.   Both **MC 94/4** and the **MEDP** are focussed on the **policy** aspects and **programming** of exercises.

SCOPE AND AUTHORITY OF THE EPG

11.   The EPG provides strategic and operational guidance on exercise: **planning** – specifically the Exercise Planning Process (EPP) –, **direction**, **analysis** and **reporting**. The guidelines in the

EPG, in particular the EPP, are also to be used to the greatest extent possible when planning NATO-Plus exercises.

12. The original version of the EPG incorporated information relating to exercise programming. That information does not affect the Exercise Planning Process and thus it has been removed for inclusion in the NEDP/MEDP.

13. Because this document is required to guide exercise planning across the full NATO Command Structure, it is intentionally broad-based. Consequently, the EPG must, as the name indicates, be read as guidance that may require modification to meet the differing needs of the diverse range of NATO exercises. It should not be used simply as a check off list.

14. Nothing in this guide absolves exercise planners from their responsibility for applying more authoritative or recent NATO policy, nor from consulting subject matter experts across the spectrum of exercise issues.

RATIONALE AND AIM OF NATO MILITARY EXERCISES

15. The rationale for planning and executing military exercises is to prepare commands and forces for operations in peace, crisis and conflict. Therefore, the aims and objectives of military exercises must mirror current operational requirements and priorities.

16. The **aim of NATO Military Exercises** is to establish, enhance and display NATO's Military Capabilities across the Alliance's full mission spectrum.

17. In addition, NATO Military Exercises are to:

    a.   Integrate and improve the Military Capabilities of NATO Partners and other non-Allies to participate in NATO-led operations, and

    b.   Support the development and implementation of the military aspects of ESDI within NATO.

18. The implementation of this aim is expressed in the MEDP.

EXERCISE OBJECTIVES

19. NATO military exercises should be designed to achieve one or more of the following operational objectives:

1-4

a.   Promote and enhance Alliance cohesion, effectiveness and military capabilities under evolving strategy and command structures, including headquarters and agencies.

b.   Exercise, evaluate and improve the effectiveness of NATO Forces and integrated command structure in the full range of tasks in peace, crisis and war.

c.   Exercise, evaluate and improve NATO Operational and Contingency Plans.

d.   Exercise, evaluate and improve the ability of NATO Commanders and staffs to manage crises including co-ordinating with the United Nations (UN)and/or Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Peace Support Operations (PSO)using the full range of NATO crisis management and civil emergency procedures, including emerging concepts.

e.   Exercise Senior NATO Officers in the strategic and operational military levels of decision making in crisis and war in a joint and multinational environment.

f.   Demonstrate, evaluate and enhance NATO force build-up capabilities for intra-European and trans-Atlantic reinforcement with forces from different force categories, including co-operation with France through the execution of Force Identification System (FIDS).

g.   Exercise, evaluate and improve NATO's ability to rapidly deploy, employ and re-deploy Reaction Forces to different regions and integrate with regional forces under regional control.

h.   Develop and improve the inter-operability, flexibility and mobility of multinational formations and headquarters.

i.   Exercise, evaluate and improve procedures for exchange of intelligence/information between nations. Reporting, in accordance with Bi-SC Reporting Directives Volumes I-V.

j.   Practice, evaluate and refine joint military procedures required to maintain a credible and safe nuclear capability.

k.   Promote mutual understanding, confidence, co-operation and inter-operability among forces and personnel of NATO, Partnership for Peace and coalition nations.

l.   Exercise, evaluate and improve joint tactical operations at force, group, and unit levels, related to all warfare disciplines. It is critical that where appropriate/agreed NATO guidance exists (such as AXPs, ATPs, EXTACs, TACMEMOs, Etc.) that it is utilised.

m.   Exercise, evaluate and improve joint NATO C2 and intelligence systems and supporting CIS.

n.   Exercise NATO Rules of Engagement (NATO ROE - MC 362 Draft), the NATO Precautionary System and Manual (Draft) and other NATO Procedural publications.

o.   Improve inter-operability and standardisation of equipment, doctrine and procedures of NATO forces by:

   (1) Exercising Host Nation Support (HNS) Agreements and NATO Technical Arrangements.

   (2) Use of NATO infrastructure facilities.

p.   Exercise, evaluate and improve NATO multi-national logistics organisations to support multi-national forces.

q.   The testing, evaluation and improvement of CJTF Headquarters, when established.

r.   The implementation of NATO doctrine, with PFP Partners, with respect to:

   (1) PSO,

   (2) Humanitarian Aid operations,

   (3) SAR operations,

   (4) Others as may be agreed upon.

s.   Exercise and evaluate staff planning and co-ordination at all stages of the Operational Planning Process (OPP) for the Alliance's entire mission spectrum.

GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR EXERCISE PLANNERS

20. The following general guidelines are applicable to exercise planners:

a.   All operational planning conducted as part of an exercise is to be carried out in accordance with the SCs' Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP).

b.   The EPP should address the issues and co-ordination required establishing a suitable framework in which the training audience(s) can conduct operational planning.

c.   Simulation should be used to enhance and make the planning process more cost effective wherever practicable. In general, computers in a distributed or non-distributed form can be used to support or enhance LIVEXs, CPXs or Exercise Studies.

d.   Whenever appropriate, integrate into the planning process International Organisations (IOs), including relevant departments of the UN such as the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO), the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

e.   Initial exercise development should reflect output from the NATO Lessons Learned Database (NLLDB) in order to avoid duplication of previously learned lessons.

f.   Guidance on the collation of exercise records and reports (focusing on maritime exercises) has been provided by DIRPAT. Direction on the compilation and promulgation of exercise lessons learned is at ANNEX D. Bi-SC initiatives are in progress to expand this approach to include analysis of land and air exercises.

LEVELS OF EXERCISES AND TRAINING

21.   NATO training within exercises is categorised into three specific levels: basic, advanced, and operational. RCs and CCs should identify operational training requirements specific to their region and command responsibilities and establish exercises designed to meet these requirements. The commanders of forces allocated to or with specific roles in a region are to ensure that their forces have the required capabilities.

a.   Basic and Advanced Education and Training. Nations remain responsible for basic and advanced level education and training necessary to qualify their own forces to meet NATO readiness criteria, detailed in the BI-SC Maritime Standards (MARSTANS) and ACE Forces Standards (AFS).

b.   Operational Level Training. Responsibility for operational level training is shared between the providing nation and NATO. NATO carries out its responsibility principally through military exercises in the multi-national environment to achieve the necessary level of military co-operation and interoperability required of international forces.

c.   Exercises.

(1) NATO exercises are required in ACE/ACLANT to rehearse the deployment of the forces concerned, maintain the effectiveness of multinational formations and assess the capability of forces to execute their assigned missions.

(2) Exercise levels must be adequate to practice and evaluate required skills and abilities of the participating staffs and forces and to test and assess operational concepts, contingency and mobilisation plans, NATO standardisation, Communications/Information Systems and operational procedures including military response to crisis and nuclear operations.

CHAPTER TWO

EXERCISE PLANNING, DIRECTION AND EVALUATION

THE EXERCISE PLANNING PROCESS (EPP)

1.   Detailed exercise planning is conducted at several planning conferences involving representatives of all headquarters and nations participating in the respective exercise.

2.   The EPP should be a co-ordinated joint staff process to determine the best method of achieving Military Exercise objectives and desired training for future Military Tasks. Progressive consultation remains the cornerstone of the Exercise Planning Process.

3.   The ultimate purpose of the EPP is to produce working documentation that dovetails the input of the Exercise Core Planning Team (CPT) with the operational planning through the EXSPEC and EXPI, which will enable the aims and objectives of the exercise to be met. Exercise planners, at each command level, should consider the EPP as a guide when planning their exercise, adapting each step of the process as appropriate.

STAGES OF THE EXERCISE PLANNING PROCESS

4.   The EPP is illustrated in Table (2.1). This process illustrates the planning required for a major exercise and should be adapted to meet the requirements for other forms of exercises.

   a.   Once an exercise has been scheduled for execution by a higher NATO Authority, the OCE will form a Core Planning Team (CPT), with representation from the OSE HQ. The CPT will be the focal point for planning, conducting, evaluating and reporting the exercise. The CPT will consist of planners from all Headquarters participating in the exercise, primarily from the OCE HQ, and representatives from the Host Nation. In addition, functional area expertise is required to produce the exercise documentation. The composition of the CPT will vary depending on the design of the exercise and may include external agencies and organisations. Additional CPTs may be established by the OCE as appropriate.

   b.   An Officer of Primary Responsibility, (OPR) will be appointed by both the OSE and OCE. His tasks will include the co-ordination of the work of the CPT and the

Table 2.1 – The Exercise Planning Process

CONFERENCES

5.   The following conferences are considered to be the minimum required by the EPP. Depending on the complexity of the exercise there may have to be separate Exercise and Operational planning conferences and for less complex exercises the MPC and FPC may be combined. The following sequence highlights Exercise Planning Conference issues and output.

- Pre-Initial Planning Conference

- Initial Planning Conference

- Main Planning Conference

- Final Planning Conference

a. The Pre-Initial Planning Conference (Pre-IPC) is convened by the OSE. The aim of the PRE-IPC is to develop the initial draft of the Exercise Specification (EXSPEC) in accordance with Annex B. Participants in the Pre-IPC are the Core Planning Team (CPT), and representatives of the OCE, Primary Training Audience (PTA), and Host Nation(s).

b. The Initial Planning Conference(IPC) is convened by the OSE. The aims of the IPC are to: Develop the final EXSPEC and forward it for approval, develop the first draft of the Exercise Planning Instruction (EXPI) in accordance with Annex C, and additional documents necessary to commence the Operational Planning Process by the OCE. Participation in the IPC is the same as the Pre-IPC plus representatives of all Nations and commands participating in the exercise. Between the IPC and MPC, the OCE will convene an Initial Operational Planning Conference to develop the first draft of the Exercise Operation Plan in response to the exercise documentation provided by the IPC and in accordance with the Operational Planning Process as defined in the GOP.

c. The Main Planning Conference (MPC) is convened by the OCE as appropriate. The aims of the MPC are to further develop the EXPI and foster the development of the exercise, including:

    (1) Approval of the DISTAFF structure.

    (2) Approval of live support including set-up of exercise location, Host Nation Support, and C4 architecture.

    (3) Determination of augmentation requirements by Headquarters and Nations.

    (4) Presentation and review of the operational plans, as developed by operational planners.

    (5) Assignment of responsibility for exercise analysis, including collection of data and any augmentation required.

d. Participants in the MPC will be the same as for the IPC plus representatives of the participating National Headquarters/Units as appropriate.

e.   The Final Planning Conference (FPC) is convened by the OCE as appropriate. The aim of the FPC is the approval of:

(1) The entire exercise planning instruction including start-ex definition and the conduct of the exercise based on the EXOPLANs developed for the exercise; and

(2) The exercise evaluation and reporting requirements.

f.   Participants in the FPC will be similar to the MPC.

MEETINGS

6.   Several meetings will be required to produce documentation for the conferences described above. Composition of the meetings should be flexible, subject to the requirements of the documentation to be developed. During the meetings, the exercise planners from participating headquarters will establish a co-ordination syndicate that guides functional area syndicates as required. At least two CPTMs will be required:

a.   CPTM1 should be scheduled prior to the IPC. The aim of CPTM1 is to develop the first elements of the EXPI, in particular the Scenario, the Country Studies, and the Initiating Directive/OPLAN of the Higher Headquarters as required. Close co-operation with the operational planners of the OCE is required to ensure commencement of the operational planning process.

b.   CPTM2 should be scheduled prior to the MPC. The aim of CPTM2 is to develop the DICON Organisation, the first draft of the Main Event List, and an outline of the starting scenario.

WORKSHOPS

7.   Workshops should be scheduled for the Exercise Planning Process (EPP) and the Operational Planning Process (OPP). Close co-operation between the EPP and the OPP is fundamental and workshops may be conducted in conjunction with the Conferences defined above.

a.   A STARTEX Development Workshop is to be convened by the OCE. This workshop should define the starting situation and conditions for all participants as required for D-Day. STARTEX must be based on all OPLANS developed for the exercise. Participants in the workshop should comprise

representatives from all participating
Headquarters/Formations/Units.

b.   The MEL/MIL (Main Events List/Main Incidents List)
Workshop is to produce pre-planned exercise play. The
MEL/MIL is the main tool for the DICONSTAFF to direct and
control the exercise and should be included in the EXPI
(Part 4). A MEL/MIL Workshop should be scheduled for each
level of Command involved in the exercise plus a final
workshop to ensure co-ordination of events and incidents.

c.   Computer-Assisted Exercises (CAX) require specific
workshops to develop and validate databases for the exercise
scenario and simulated forces. The minimum requirement may
be one workshop each for Friendly Forces and for Opposing
Forces and a workshop to convert the Start-ex situation to
the computer model and conduct a test run of the scenario.

d.   Real-life support workshops may be conducted as site-
surveys to decide on the set-up at exercise locations and
the C4 infrastructure. These workshops have to be conducted
in close co-operation with support groups and the CIS
community. The support of the Host Nations will be
determined in these workshops; therefore their participation
is crucial. The result of the workshops will be
incorporated into the EXPI.

e.   At least one workshop should be convened to review the
analysis, evaluation and reporting requirements of the
exercise as detailed in Annex D. Members of the analysis
and evaluation team established for the exercise should
participate in this workshop.

EXERCISE SPECIFICATION (EXSPEC)

8.   The EXSPEC should state the fundamental requirements for,
and the scope of, the exercise and will serve as a basis for
subsequent exercise development. It should provide all concerned
with early information as to the aim, exercise objectives,
concept, setting, force participation requirements, political
implications and estimated costs to NATO of the exercise. The
EXSPEC should also include:

a.   Information on forces and force structure, area and
dates relevant to annual calendars, notifications and
invitations for observers under the Vienna Document 1994.

b.   Recommendations:

(1) Which nation(s) should give advance forecast (for exercises involving 40,000 troops or more.

(2) Which nation(s) should include the exercise in the annual calendar.

(3) Which nation(s) should give notification.

(4) Which nation(s) should host observer activities, if any.

c.   Outline the C2 structure for the exercise (OSE Co-ordination with other OSE(s)/OCE co-ordination etc.) and endeavour to outline the exercise C2 structure (theatre commander, CJTF, CC etc.)

(1) The EXSPEC for a SC-led CJTF or Bi-SC NATO-wide military exercise requires the approval of the Military Committee. EXSPECs for other military exercises will normally be approved by the appropriate Strategic Commander(s). However, they may delegate approval authority to a Regional Commander. Once the EXSPEC is approved, it will be forwarded to all NATO and national authorities concerned with the exercise for information and planning action as necessary. The EXSPEC format can be found at Annex B.

EXERCISE PLANNING INSTRUCTION (EXPI)

9.   The EXPI will take the form of a rolling document which comes into being once the EXSPEC has been approved. The production of the EXPI is the responsibility of the OCE and is accomplished by the CPT. Initially, the EXPI will focus on the initiating directive, setting and information necessary to facilitate the OSE's concept of the strategic appreciation and production of the resulting EXCONOP. Additional exercise planning requirements, identified within the operational planning process, which would not constrain real world operational planning, but are necessary to facilitate exercise execution will be incorporated in the EXPI and promulgated on a rolling basis throughout exercise development. The organisation and execution of these additional requirements is the responsibility of the Exercise Core Planning Team (CPT). Thus, as exercise plans are progressed co-ordination between the exercise planners and the operational planners is paramount. The final EXPI will form a supporting document to the EXOPLAN. The EXPI format can be found at Annex C.

EXERCISE OPERATIONAL PLAN (EXOPLAN)

10. Based on the EXPI, the operational planners will develop an
EXOPLAN in accordance with the guidance provided in the GOP for
developing an Operational Plan.

EXERCISE PLANNING DOCUMENTS APPROVAL PROCESS

11. Table 2.2 illustrates the exercise planning document
approval process, using the in-place command structure at the SC
and RC level.

DOCUMENT	AUTHOR	APPROVAL
EXSPEC	OSE	SC
EXPI	OCE	OSE
EXOPLAN	OCE	OSE
FER	OCE	OSE

Table 2.2 – Document Approval Process

EXERCISE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

12. The following considerations and constraints are pertinent:

    a. Safety Exercise Planning Considerations. The safety
rules set out in this guide's safety supplement are to be
complied with in the planning and execution of all NATO
LIVEXs. Planning teams are to plan exercises with the
maximum safety commensurate with realism for participating
forces. Nothing in these rules supersedes or amends the
International Regulations for the Prevention of Collision at
Sea or the International Civil Aviation Organisation Rules
of the Air.

    b. CIS Exercise Planning Considerations. Communication
and Information Systems (CIS) assets will probably consist
of a mix of NATO and national resources and detailed
planning will be required for the integration of all forces
into the regional command and control structure. HQ and
Reaction Forces staffs at all levels will need to co-
ordinate detailed requirements such as inter-operability,
frequency co-ordination and communication security.
Detailed CIS planning to integrate formations from various
force categories into the regional command and control
structure will be key to efficient employment of these
forces.

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(1)   Where regional CIS resources are insufficient to meet the immediate needs of reaction forces, call can be made on the NATO Contingency CIS Assets Pool, national assets or by recourse to emergency procurement. For Peace Support Operations out of area, CIS planning should take into account that no great reliance can be placed on existing civil networks within the theatre during early phases of the operation, therefore all contributing forces must have their own organic communications.

(2)   The CIS architecture at the start of the exercise should be based on in-place real world CIS capabilities. Additional capabilities should be added as the exercise play unfolds by deployment of supporting force assets, use of the contingency assets pool, loan or lease of national resources or through emergency provision procedures. Exercises should be used to evaluate existing systems and procedures to identify shortfalls. Exercises can also be instrumental in testing and evaluating systems or procedures under development. Evaluation and revision of the existing CIS architecture is an important and on-going part of the operational planning process. Exercise play has an important role in this process.

(3)   Exercises involving NATO PfP and/or coalition nations present special considerations with regards to CIS (e.g., interoperability, connectivity and provisions for secure communications). Guidelines on CIS policies are contained in GOP.

DIRECTION OF EXERCISES

13.   The direction of a NATO military exercise includes the direction and control of all participating Headquarters, Forces, and Agencies in operations (live or simulated) to achieve the exercise aims and objectives set out in the EXSPEC/EXPI.

a.   Responsibilities. The OCE is responsible for the conduct of the exercise. When one or more OCEs has been nominated for an exercise, one of them will be appointed as OCE Co-ordinator who will be responsible for the overall conduct of the exercise. The OCE conducts the exercise through some or all of the following agencies:

(1)   Exercise Co-directors;

(2)   Directing Staff (DISTAFF) including response cells, role player organisations, host nation support or other support liaison cells;

(3)   Umpire/Exercise Control organisation;

(4)   Real life support including Host Nation support or other support and liaison cells;

(5)   Commanders of participating units, headquarters or agencies;

(6)   Visitors and Observers Bureau (VOB) as well as Press Information Centre (PIC).

b.   The exercise will be conducted by the OCE following the EXOPLAN/EXPI and in accordance with procedures, publications, and other documents established for the exercise in order to meet the aims and objectives. Where deviations from procedures or established documents are necessary, the OCE will ensure that detailed instructions for the conduct of the exercise are included in the EXOPLAN/EXPI.

c.   The OCE may suspend or modify all or part of the exercise keeping the OSE informed. If particular occurrences impinge on the conduct of the exercise or have the potential to stimulate extensive negative media interest, they are to be reported in a timely manner to the OSE who will inform higher authorities immediately.

d.   The OSE and/or OCE may terminate, suspend, or modify an exercise or parts thereof if in his view the safety of participants or the political situation make such action necessary. The MC and nations concerned should be advised as soon as possible on the decision taken and the reason that required it.

DIRECTING STAFF FUNCTION AND ORGANISATION

FUNCTION

14.   DISTAFFS may be used in LIVEXs, CPXs, or Exercise Studies etc. Each DISTAFF will differ depending on the size of the HQs to which it is attached, its level in the command chain and the system of operation. The functions of a DISTAFF are to direct and control exercise play in order to enable the aim and

objectives of the exercise to be achieved. A DISTAFF may also be required to:

    a.   Inject events or Incidents

    b.   Simulate a non-participating HQ, unit or agency.

    c.   Act as opposing force (OPFOR).

15. In addition to simulating non-participating combatant units, the DISTAFF must also simulate any authority who is not taking part in the exercise but from whom reactions are necessary to give realism to the exercise. For some CPXs nations should provide a DISTAFF and/or a response organisation for their non-participating units whose inputs are considered by the OSE/OCE to be essential for the conduct of the exercise. DISTAFF orders should lay down, for each exercise, the responsibilities of each DISTAFF for simulating such authorities. In addition, the EXPI should list the authorities, agencies and other players to be simulated by DISTAFFs and include signal routing instructions for the simulated authorities.

16. In LIVEXs, the function of the DISTAFF is to maintain supervision of the movement and action of opposing forces and, by acting as a liaison link between opposing commanders, to ensure that maximum exercise play is achieved.

17. The DISTAFF in a LIVEX is not required to judge the results of individual tactical situations. When so directed, this is the responsibility of the umpire organisation. Because the DISTAFF is entrusted with the control of exercise play, it must be fully independent, separated from the players and have complete freedom of action towards them and free access to all information. Instructions issued by the DISTAFF are binding on the players. Any conflict between the DISTAFF and the players should be submitted to the Exercise Director for resolution. The DISTAFF must interface appropriately with agencies such as the Press Information Centre (PIC) and the Visitors and Observers Bureau (VOB) in order to allow them the development and co-ordination within their respective responsibilities.

ORGANISATION

18. The DISTAFF of the Co-ordinating OCE is the Controlling DISTAFF (DICONSTAFF). The Chief of the DICONSTAFF is responsible to the OSE/OCE or to the Exercise Director for the overall direction and control of the exercise.

19. The DISTAFF chain of command normally parallels that of the existing NATO and national command structures. The DISTAFF structure will be laid down in the DISTAFF instructions. DISTAFFs should be organised so as to be able to direct and control all aspects of the exercise relevant to their specific area of responsibility.

PERSONNEL

20. The DISTAFF should be augmented to the maximum extent possible with officers from participating headquarters and nations. DISTAFFS, in a CPX, might comprise the following:

    a.   Chief of the DISTAFF.

    b.   Operations Staff.

    c.   Military Intelligence/Information Staff.

    d.   Logistics staff.

    e.   CIS Staff.

    f.   Administration Staff.

    g.   Response Cells representing non-participation authorities such as higher/lower HQs/units or (non-) government organisations.

    h.   Public Information Officer as an interface with the Press Information Centre (PIC) and as an advisor/co-ordinator with the DISTAFF for public information matters.

    i.   Civil-Military-Liaison Cell (possibly legal officers) if required.

21. When there is a requirement for expertise in excess of that available amongst its members, the DISTAFF may require the advice of specialists from non-military and/or non-government agencies, such as the UN or the OSCE.

22. The Chief of a DISTAFF should preferably be a senior officer from the permanent staff of the HQs which has been engaged in planning the exercise, but may be on a co-ordinated basis with a senior officer of the Host Nation. He must be fully conversant with all aspects of the exercise and relevant plans and procedures.

23. Ideally, DISTAFF officers should belong to the HQs at which they are operating. However, this may dilute the playing staff to an unacceptable level in which case augmentation from higher, lower or adjacent HQs or national sources should be sought. It is recommended that Exercise Planning Staffs/CPT should form the nucleus of DISTAFF. Officers selected for DISTAFF duties should be relieved of their regular duties and allowed adequate time for briefings and studying of Exercise Orders, DISTAFF Instructions and applicable plans, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), etc. Early selection of such officers is recommended. DISTAFF should not be dual-hatted as primary exercise participants.

24. DISTAFFS may be located at various HQs. The OPR for an exercise will have been involved in the planning of the exercise and will normally be a member of the directing staff HQ. He is the key man for exercise control purposes, advising the Exercise Director or Chief of the DISTAFF as appropriate and is available to give advice and guidance to both the DISTAFF and the players.

DISTAFF FACILITIES

25. The DISTAFF should be located as near as practicable to primary participants' HQs so they can apprise themselves of players' appreciation of the situation and monitor, direct and control the exercise play.

26. Full use should be made of players' plots. However, it will generally be necessary for DISTAFFs to keep their own plot in order to:

    a.   Establish relative positions of own and opposing forces as well as other agencies for the injections of incidents.

    b.   Ensure co-ordination and continuity between play of opposing forces and of other playing/simulated parties.

    c.   Brief the respective commanders and selected officers of their staffs on the situation and especially on the forthcoming actions/events.

27. The DISTAFF should have adequate means of communication at their disposal to facilitate co-ordination. This can be achieved by establishing dedicated (separate) DISTAFF communications or a DISTAFF priority system within existing communications. The DISTAFF must have all relevant pre-exercise messages at STARTEX. When a DISTAFF chain of command is established, dedicated DISTAFF communications should be provided.

<u>DISTAFF INSTRUCTIONS</u>

28. Separate and detailed DISTAFF Instructions may be issued by
the OCE. In such a case, only those particulars of the DISTAFF
organisation and information required by the participants need to
be included in the appropriate section of the EXPI.

<u>ANALYSIS AND REPORTING</u>

29. Analysing and reporting the final stages of the exercise
process are designed to gain full advantage from the effort and
expense of planning and conducting the exercise. Analysis and
post exercise reporting should emphasise lessons learned as a
basis for subsequent corrective action and should make particular
reference to matters that should be taken into consideration for
the improvement of future exercises as well as the improvement of
NATO's ability to perform its mission.

<u>DEFINITIONS</u>

30. A number of terms regularly used when discussing analysis
require specific definition, they are:

    a.   <u>Analysis</u>. Analysis is the generic term used to cover
    the whole field of analytical activity including:

        (1) Gathering, recording and collecting data.

        (2) Event reconstruction.

        (3) The presentation of results as an array of facts.

        (4) Evaluation or assessment.

        (5) Reasoned conclusion.

    b.   <u>Assessment</u>. Assessment is the process of estimating
    the performance of a system, sensor, procedure or tactic
    based on the raw data submitted by participants. Normally
    assessment would imply a subjective process.

    c.   <u>Evaluation</u>. Evaluation is an objective and, where
    possible, quantified deduction arrived at by examination of
    all relevant data.

    d.   <u>Analysis Objective</u>. An analysis objective is a broad
    statement of the intended outcome of an analysis. An

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objective can be sub-divided into a number of more specific elements.

ANALYSIS OF NATO MILITARY EXERCISES

31. Analysis can take many forms ranging from first impressions formed immediately after the end of an exercise to a detailed reconstruction and evaluation carried out by a special team and resulting in the production of a detailed Exercise Analysis Report. Reconstruction, assessment and evaluation are discussed in detail in the Maritime Analysis Handbook (MAH).

32. Data gained from an analysis can be used to support the following:

    a. Determining the achievement or non-achievement of exercise aims and objectives.

    b. Examining the effectiveness of plans, procedures, tactics, equipment, facilities and the training of personnel.

    c. Comparing the results with those of previous exercises.

    d. Identifying problems of standardisation and interoperability with equipment, procedures or services that may require staff investigation and remedial action, including, where appropriate, consequential changes to ATPs and STANAGs.

    e. Prevention of recurring problems in future exercises.

    f. Determining statistics and planning factors that might prove useful in future exercises and operational plans.

TYPES AND LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

33. The following explains the types and levels of analysis:

    a. Types of Analysis. There are three distinct types of systematic investigation normally used to analyse exercises:

        (1) Type A. A quick investigation intended for presentation at a Post Exercise Discussion (PXD).

(2)   Type B.   An investigation using full Exercise Analysis Techniques.

(3)   Type C.   A detailed special study by agencies such as operational research authorities, national analysis groups or specialised NATO agencies.   Studies of this type are not covered by the normal procedures for exercise analysis and special instructions for their conduct would have to be included in the EXPI.

b.   <u>Levels of Analysis</u>.   The level of analysis is prescribed according to the depth of examination desired. There are three levels of analysis:

(1)   Level 1.   A general qualitative examination in which there is only a limited requirement for the recording of numerical data.   Incident reconstruction is not carried out.

(2)   Level 2.   An intermediate level of investigation requiring a range of recorded numerical data.   Where the objective to be analysed necessitates incident reconstruction, the incidents should be selective and reconstruction limited to the specific areas, periods or situations sufficient only to obtain verification of the relevant facts.

(3)   Level 3.   The deepest and most thorough investigation requiring extensive data recording. Where the analysis objectives so require, reconstruction of the exercise play takes place to include all incidents and missed opportunities. Details of unit movements, weapon and sensor performance and environmental conditions will be required.

<u>PLANNING OF ANALYSIS</u>

34.   Planning of analysis is a specialised task and exercise planners are encouraged to co-opt a representative of one of the recognised analysis agencies as a member of the core-planning group at the start of exercise planning.   Currently, there are only two NATO analysis agencies both of whom are specialised in maritime analysis:

a.   The NATO PAT is a bi-SC agency based at Northwood, UK and is tasked by the NEPB.   Bids to employ the team should be made to the appropriate SC at least one year in advance

of the exercise. The PAT is not subject to any geographic
restrictions and is available to analyse maritime and joint
exercises through the NATO area.

b.   The Independent Maritime Analysis Team is located at HQ
NAVSOUTH in Naples, Italy and is tasked by COMNAVSOUTH to
meet his need for analysis of Southern Region exercises.

35. Planners should be quite clear about the distinction between
exercise and analysis objectives. Exercises should be designed
by the command to achieve specific operational objectives related
to the command mission (see Chapter 1). Analysis objectives are
chosen from a range of options, after the exercise objectives
have been set, to gain as much feedback as possible from the
exercise. Analysis should be planned in such a way that it does
not interfere with the achievement of exercise objectives.

36. Maritime analysis objectives are listed in the NATO Maritime
Analysis Plan (MAP). The MAP is a five-year rolling plan that
reflects the analysis requirements of Nations and NATO Commands;
it is updated annually by the NATO Maritime Analysis Planning
Panel (NMAPP). Exercise planners should use the MAP as a source
document and select suitable objectives in consultation with the
analysis agency. The wording of non-maritime objectives, when
analysis capability is made available, should model those in the
MAP. The agreed analysis objectives should be published in the
EXPI.

37. As planning progresses, the analysis objectives may need to
be refined and the analysis agency will develop an appropriate
analysis plan. This plan, which will include specific
instructions and record requirements for participants in order to
facilitate the analysis, should be published in the EXPI.

38.   Guidance on the conduct of an analysis after an exercise is
given in the MAP.

POST-EXERCISE DISCUSSION (PXD)

39. Hot Wash-up will be conducted after the end of the exercise.
It is a forum for an active discussion between participants and
will serve as preparation for the Post-Exercise Discussion. The
Hot Wash-up is usually chaired by the Exercise Director and
prepared either by analysis team responsible for evaluating the
exercise. The Post Exercise Discussion (PXD) is the forum for
active discussion between participants after the exercise, while
impressions are still fresh in mind. It should take place as

soon as practicable after the end of the exercise. Details of the PXD should be published in the EXPI. The aim of a PXD is to:

a.   Benefit from the exchange of viewpoints and ideas with other participants.

b.   Discuss the performance of forces and commands during the exercise, particularly in relation to the aim and objectives set in the EXPI.

c.   Take immediate advantage of the experience gained.

d.   Detailed guidance on the conduct of a PXD is given at Annex D.

POST EXERCISE REPORTING

40. Reporting provides the means for promulgating the significant results of exercises and reports provide a basis for initiating such action as may be required to improve force effectiveness. Reports on exercises may take the form of:

a.   <u>First Impression Report</u>. First Impression Report (FIR). This report is to be submitted to the OCE immediately after the exercise by participating commanders. If the exercise is divided into phases, a separate report may be required for each phase. The format, addressees and deadline for FIRs should be given in the EXPI. The OCE's FIR must be with the SC within 7 days of completion of the exercise.

b.   <u>Preliminary Exercise Report</u> (only if needed). Preliminary Exercise Report. When the initial impressions of NATO Crisis Management exercises, NATO-wide or Reaction Force exercises indicate lessons of major significance or an urgent need for corrective action, the co-ordinating SC may submit a Preliminary Exercise Report to the Military Committee and the appropriate Nations. There is no specific format for this report and it will normally be made by message

c.   <u>Post Exercise Discussion Report</u>. PXD Report. When directed in the EXPI, a PXD report summarising the main points discussed at the PXD will be distributed to participating commands and other interested authorities.

d.   <u>Exercise Analysis Report</u>. Exercise Analysis Report. This report, containing the results of the analysis of the

exercise in accordance with the analysis objectives, will be submitted to the co-ordinating OSE and copied to OCEs and other interested authorities. Guidance on the format for exercise analysis reports is given in the MAH. When practicable, draft copies of the analysis report will be passed to the OSE at an early stage so that the findings can be included in the Final Exercise Report. On receipt of each part of the analysis report, the OSE will validate the conclusions and recommendations and initiate the appropriate remedial action. The analysis agency is also responsible for ensuring that the conclusions and recommendations in the analysis report are forwarded for inclusion in the NATO Lessons Learned Data Base (NLLDB).

e. Final Exercise Report (FER). This is the authoritative report that concludes the exercise. It is normally produced by OCE and forwarded to the OSE for approval and additional comments. It contains all significant information about the exercise. When analysis is carried out as part of the exercise requirements, the OSE is to confirm or reject the major recommendations of the analysis report and of any specific reports in the FER. When the results of any exercise indicate a requirement for action by the Military Committee or higher authority, the co-ordinating SC will forward a final report to the Military Committee, after the analysis has been validated. The format for this report is given at Annex D. The OSE's FER must be submitted to the SC within 80 days after completion of the exercise.

LESSONS LEARNED

41. The Lessons Learned from military exercises are a valuable source of validated information and reference data for planners and operators. Accordingly, the Director, PAT has been charged with setting up and distributing a NATO Lessons Learned Data Base and a PfP Lessons Learned Data Base. OSEs for exercises of all types should ensure that the lessons learned are forwarded to the PAT for inclusion in the NLLDB. The format for submitting Lessons Learned is given at Annex D.

CHAPTER THREE

FINANCIAL AND BUDGETING GUIDANCE FOR NATO EXERCISES

1.   Annex E to NATO document C-M(53)72 lays down the policy for the financing of NATO exercises. This annex provides guidance covering all aspects of the Common Costs directly related to exercises.

2.   The Costs incurred by military forces and personnel in connection with military exercises and exercise conferences, conducted by a NATO commander duly appointed for the purpose by SACEUR, or SACLANT fall into three categories as follows:

   a.   National Costs - are those costs incurred by any particular nation for the sole support of its own forces or national command organisation. These costs are further subdivided into direct costs, expenses incurred by a nation in support of their own forces or those of another nation and, reimbursable costs, incurred by a nation on behalf of another nation which are reimbursed in accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding or other bilateral agreement.

   b.   Multinational/Shared Costs – are those costs that are affirmed in advance to be the responsibility of more than one nation and are to be borne in accordance with a pre-agreed cost sharing formula.

   c.   NATO Common Costs - are those costs to be borne by all nations, incurred because of the international implications of the integration of forces. They are, furthermore, costs that do not fall under the definition of National (direct) costs.

3.   Extreme care is to be taken to ensure that expenditures are limited to only those costs essential to the accomplishment of exercise objectives. Existing peacetime facilities must be used to the maximum extent.

4.   Detailed budgeting is provided at ANNEX E and Appendix 1 to ANNEX E.

CHAPTER FOUR

PUBLIC INFORMATION, VISITORS AND OBSERVERS

PUBLIC INFORMATION (PI)

GENERAL

1.   The mission of PI is to ensure complete, accurate and timely availability of information about the activities of forces participating in a NATO military exercise for reporting both external and internal news media. Public information is based on the policy developed by the Military Committee (MC) and has to be consistent with national policies, operational security, and the privacy of the personnel involved.

PRINCIPLES

2.   PI for NATO military exercises is a NATO command responsibility. Following the guidance given by the MC, the OSE will determine, normally in the EXSPEC, the appropriate level of PI responsibility. Commanders at all levels must ensure that PI planning parallels operational planning so that the following principles are achieved:

   a.   Timely and accurate information will be made available so that the public and governments of NATO nations, and the news media may understand the facts and issues.

   b.   Requests for information on topics within the purview of NATO will be answered in as timely a manner as possible, adhering to the following guidelines:

      (1) PI officers (PIOs) will limit their comments to information that is within their purview and headquarters responsibility. Requests for information that falls within the responsibility of the nations will be referred to the appropriate MOD Information Office.

      (2) Requests for information of a purely political nature will be referred, without comment, to the NATO Information and Press Office (NATIP).

      (3) Information should be provided unless its release is precluded by current security classification, policy or national restrictions.

(4)   Information should be provided without censorship or propaganda. All bon fide news media agencies should be provided equal access to information.

(5)   Information should not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect NATO from criticism or embarrassment.

(6)   The mission to provide complete and accurate information to the public may, at times, require detailed PI planning. This planning is to ensure a timely flow of information to the public.

PLANNING

3.   All Exercise Core Planning Team PI planning will be done in conjunction with operational exercise planners and the PIOs of the NATO headquarters and national headquarters involved.

a.   Pre-Exercise Planning Requirements. To fully exploit the opportunities created by NATO military exercises, PIOs must take the following minimum specific actions:

(1)   All PIOs should maintain a planning calendar that includes all planned exercises, to ensure proactive real world PIO support in the exercise planning process.

(2)   Ensure, when appropriate, that the EXSPEC contains a PI objective(s) in its list of exercise objectives. Obtaining necessary PI funding and resources for the exercise will be less difficult if the exercise has a PI objective or objectives.

(3)   Post agreement to an EXSPEC, the core-planning group should draw upon the PIO expertise available in all major headquarters (NATO, national, and military) participating in the exercise. With the aim of ensuring all over arching aspects of PI policy, peculiar to a particular exercise are addressed in the EXPI. Not withstanding this, participating commands will be expected to develop specific PI policy, with respect to the exercise scenario, as part of EXPI development.

(4)   Ensure that the PI instructions to DISTAFF contained in the EXPI are clear, comprehensive, and support the overall exercise objectives.

(5) Ensure that the EXPI for LIVEXs contains detailed statements of the resources; such as funds, facilities, personnel, communications, transportation, equipment, supplies, services, required for effective exercise PI operations, and that the EXPI establishes responsibilities for the provision of these resources.

4.   Establishing PI Policy for Exercises. Unless otherwise directed, the PI policy for NATO military exercises is "Active".

VISITOR AND OBSERVER (VOB)

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

5.   The agreed provisions of the Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Vienna Document 1994, are meant to build confidence and security in Europe. The commitments apply to all OSCE participating states.

6.   The implementation of the Vienna Document 1994 provisions is strictly a national responsibility. In the case of NATO military exercises, the planning staffs must ensure nations have all necessary information in good time.

OBSERVERS AND INSPECTORS

7.   An observer is a military or civilian official other than an exercise participant who has been invited to witness all, or part of a military activity.

8.   An inspector is a military or civilian official who has been sent by his nation to inspect military activities in a specified area of another OSCE State for compliance with the Vienna Document 1994.

CATEGORIES

9.   The following categories of visitors/observers exist:

a.   Category 1 (DISTINGUISHED VISITORS) such as:

(1) Heads of State or Government;

(2) Members of Royal Families;

(3) Senior Politicians (e.g., Prime Minister, Minister of Defence);

      (4)   Senior Representatives from International Non-governmental Organisations (e.g. UN, OSCE, WEU, ICRC);

      (5)   EAPC (Ambassadorial level);

      (6)   Military Committee (CHOD level); and

      (7)   NATO Commanders of SC, RC and JSRC level and their equivalents from EAPC nations.

    b.   <u>Category 2</u>. Senior civilians and senior military officers from NATO HQs, NATO and Partner nations, not covered under Category 1 who are directly concerned with PfP issues (e.g. PCC or PRC/MCWG representatives) connected with the exercises' participating forces or planning HQs including those from a superior HQ who are specifically tasked to observe and analyse defined aspects of exercise planning and conduct.

    c.   <u>Category 3</u>. Senior military officers of national participating forces or HQs not covered by Categories 1 or 2.

    d.   <u>Category 4</u>. Representatives and observers from International or Non-governmental Organisations, non-NATO/non-PfP nations (e.g. Mediterranean Dialogue Countries) not covered under Category 1.

    e.   <u>Category 5</u>. Observers and inspectors from OSCE member states invited in accordance with the Vienna Document 1994.

10. Invitations to visitors and observers must be in line with NATO policy. Detailed guidance on invitations to DVs at NATO/PfP exercises is given with the Overall NATO/PfP Exercise Concept (OPEC), ANNEX B. Unless final NATO policy on the subject is available, invitations to visitors and observers at NATO Military Exercises should be issued along the provisions as outlined in the OPEC.

<u>NON-NATO/NON-PARTNER OBSERVERS AT NATO MILITARY EXERCISES</u>

11. Requirements may arise whereby a non-NATO/non-Partner nation (e.g. Mediterranean Dialogue Countries) will be invited or wishes to send observers to a NATO or NATO-Plus Military Exercise. In such cases, the SCs must forward the NATO Commander's proposal or the nation's application to the MC for endorsement and NAC approval. In the case of a NATO Subordinate Commander receiving such a request, the application has to be forwarded through his

SC. Only upon approval by the NAC, are NATO Commanders authorised
to discuss with non-NATO/non-Partner nations the possible
participation in a NATO or NATO-Plus Military Exercise.

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SURFACE SHIP SAFETY

Reference: (a) International Regulations for the Prevention of
                Collision at Sea (1972)
           (b) ATP 1(A)

1. <u>Safety</u>. Commanding Officers are responsible for the
navigation and safety of their ships at all time. While the OTC
will normally maneuver the formation so as to keep it clear of
shipping, on occasion it may be necessary to take positive,
individual evasive action to permit shipping to clear through the
formation. Commanding Officers will maneuver their ships
independently in compliance with reference (a) at any time they
deem it necessary to avoid risk of collision. This action will be
done without waiting for a signal to maneuver independently or
waiting until an emergency develops. The "maneuver independently
to avoid shipping" signal is considered to be in the air at all
times. Particular attention is directed to reference (a) which
defines the terms and responsibilities of the "stand on" vessel
and the "give way" vessel.

2. Commanding Officers may switch on any radar or navigation
lights as necessary, regardless of the EMCON or lighting plan in
force, if any doubt as to the safety of a ship, submarine or
aircraft exists.

3. <u>Flag November Procedures</u>. When any ship maneuvering in
company, or in close formation with other ships considers a
dangerous situation is developing or feels concern regarding the
movement of another ship/ships in the formation, the ship or ships
concerned are to be challenged by the signal "FLAG NOVEMBER"
(should not be used in any circuit other than the tactical
net(s)). This challenge is to use call signs currently in use on
that circuit. In other circuits, plain and direct language must
be used in order to clearly, and quickly, pass the message across,
because some operators on those circuits could be unfamiliar with
the meaning of Flag November (tactical signal). When using these
procedures in the safety lines (e.g. bridge to bridge) calling
other units by their names must be considered, this will call
attention in an easier and faster way.

4. The ship or ships addressed are to reply immediately, in
proper sequence, in the clear giving present heading, speed,
current movement if altering course and their intentions. Ships
not addressed are to maintain silence until the originating ship
transmits "Cancel FLAG NOVEMBER".

5. At night all units in company with the units involved are to
switch navigation lights to full brilliance when FLAG NOVEMBER
procedures are instituted.

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6. <u>Bridge to Bridge Safety Circuit</u>. In all cases where doubt exists, the bridge to bridge VHF safety circuit shall be the primary means of resolving safety issues. A continuous listening circuit. Units fitted with multi-channel listening capability VHF sets should consider simultaneous listening of channel 16.

7. Nothing in this Exercise Safety Supplement or any other relevant guidance takes precedence over Commanding Officer responsibilities to protect the safety of lives and equipment during NATO training exercises.

<u>GENERAL</u>

8. Surface ship safety rules are contained in the Allied Tactical Publications and documents.

9. Surface units taking part in exercises are, as far as practicable, to keep clear of non-exercise shipping.

10. Night is defined as extending from sunset to sunrise. The times of sunset and sunrise being obtained from the NAUTICAL ALMANAC for the geographical position of the forces concerned.

<u>NAVAL GUNFIRE</u>

11. Appropriate warnings through NOTAMs, NAVAREAWARNS and other adequate means are to be issued to inform all concerned of the area (sea, land, air) where gunfire is to be carried out.

12. All firing is to be discontinued when ships and aircraft entering the area will be in danger.

13. Safety rules for naval gunfire are contained in AXP-2 (series).

FPB ACTIONS

14. When FPBs are beyond a range of 2000 yards, target ships are free to counter-maneuver. Under 2000 yards, target ships are not to counter-maneuver and will maintain a steady course, unless required to maneuver to comply with the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collision at Sea; they will burn navigation lights at full brilliance to facilitate disengagement by FPBs.

SIMULATED ATTACKS

15. Surface ships conducting simulated attacks are not to close within 1000 yards of the units being attacked and 4000 yards in the case of aircraft carriers and other large, difficult to maneuver units.

HARASSMENT ACTIONS

16. When simulated harassment will take place during the exercise, ranges close enough to recognize that simulated harassment is being carried out will be specified in the EXOPORD.

17. High intensity lights will not be used by surface units to illuminate aircraft, including helicopters. They may be used to illuminate the bow pennant numbers or stern of other surface units, but must avoid illumination of ship's bridges and superstructure.

ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTION SAFETY RULES FOR SURFACE SHIPS

18. For the initiation of explosive signal charges in accordance with AXP-1 (series) surface units should carry on board and have a ready supply of at least twenty-four explosive charges.

ASW AND SUBMARINE SAFETY RULES

References:

A. ATP 1(C)
B. ATP 10
C. ATP 18
D. ATP 28
E. AHP 6 VOL 1
F. AXP 5(B)
G. AXP 1(C)
H. ACP 176(E)
I. ACP 176 NATO SUPP 1
J. ATP 57
K. APP 4A VOL 1
L. EXTAC 855

GENERAL

1. The state of training of submarines taking part in NATO exercises is presumed to be such that anti-submarine operations may be undertaken. Submarines must be cleared for advanced anti-submarine exercises by their National Commanders.

2. The safety rules for submerged submarines rely on the submarines depth-keeping ability and on use of main passive sonar and underwater telephone (UWT). It is therefore of paramount importance that the submarine is capable of maintaining desired depth accurately and that the main passive sonar and UWT are in working order and are used correctly. Submarines that experience deficiencies with ship control equipment, with main passive sonar or UWT which make them unable to comply with the safety rules are to surface and report to the Submarine Operating Authority (SUBOPAUTH).

3. Safety rules for depth separation of submarines and for employment of towed sonar systems or towed decoys will be enacted for each separate exercise. These rules will vary with type of exercise, depth of water in the exercise area, types of ships and submarines participating and, on the level of safety relaxations that national authorities are prepared to approve.

SUBOPAUTH

4. The OSE will appoint one or more submarine commanders as the SUBOPAUTH for each exercise.

5. The OCE is to issue instructions regarding submarine diving and surfacing signals and check reports. Such instructions will be in accordance with ATP 10 and other national requirements. Although check reports may not be required by NATO submarine commanders, the

SUBOPAUTH must be prepared to accept and co-ordinate such reports from participating submarines when required by National Authorities.

6. Exchange of information. All SUBOPAUTHs will communicate when and to what extent deployment of forces has been implemented. The following types of information should be exchanged in a timely manner between the Maritime Commander (or his designated Submarine Operation Control Authority (SOCA))and the NATO SUBOPAUTH for the exercise:

  a. Name, mission, target priorities, reporting policy and ROEs of submarines operating in or adjacent to the assigned operating area.
  b. Waterspace Management allocations and intended changes.
  c. Contact and attack reports from submarines.
  d. Information on mine warfare activities subject to WSM procedures.
  e. Information on minefield planning and execution.
  f. Command and control arrangements related to submarines deviating from standard arrangements.
  g. Key operational defects affecting submarine operations.
  h. Logistic requests where co-ordination is necessary.
  i. Surface ship (equipped with variable depth and/or towed array sonar) operations which might affect submarine operations.
  j. Other relevant information that might effect submarine operations in adjacent areas.
  k. ASSESSREP or equivalent exercise operations planning messages.

SUBLOOK/SUBMISS/SUBSUNK RESPONSIBILITIES

7. SUBLOOK/SUBMISS/SUBSUNK responsibilities will be in accordance with reference (B), (F), (G) and (I). The SUBOPAUTH is responsible for initiating SUBLOOK/SUBMISS/SUBSUNK and for informing appropriate National Authorities. Subsequent actions will be the responsibility of the appropriate NATO area or NATO Sub-area commander until relieved by the appropriate National Authority.

ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTION SAFETY RULES

8. Existence of submarine danger areas inside the Notice of Intent (NOI) areas must be highlighted in EXOPLAN.

9. Local rules and regulations aiming to prevent submarines interfering with fishing activities are to be included in the EXOPLAN.

10. Exercise submarines should not approach boundaries of patrol areas or moving havens closer than 1 NM unless otherwise directed.

11. Splash/Spar targets are likely to be towed by surface ships up to 600 YDS astern of the ship. Inert rockets and inert bombs may be used by aircraft against these targets. Submarines at periscope depth are not to approach these targets within 1000 YDS. Submarines which are deep are not to come to periscope depth within 1600 YDS astern of the ships.

DECONFLICTION OF SUBMARINES AND MCM OPERATIONS

12. Deconfliction of submarine and Mine Warfare Operations will be in accordance with EXTAC 855.

NON-EXERCISE OPERATIONS

13. Non-exercise submarine operations may be taking place in areas adjacent to exercise areas and NOIs. Units will not conduct aggressive ASW exercises operations outside of exercise areas and NOIs. No operations potentially hazardous to submarines (e.g. Towed Sonar Systems, Towed Decoys or Explosive Signal Charges, etc.) are allowed outside the assigned exercise areas and NOIs.

MARITIME AIR SAFETY

References:

A. ATP-1(C) Vol I
B. ATP-34(B)
C. AXP-2(B)
D. Exercise Planning Guide (EPG)
E. CEAC Exercise Airspace Planning Guide

PLANNING AND CO-ORDINATION

1. The Officer conducting the exercise (OCE) is responsible for overall planning and co-ordination of air safety requirements. Officers in Operational Control/Tactical Command of maritime forces are responsible for air co-ordination of supporting forces within their areas of interest as designated in warfare OPGENS or OPTASKS. Similarly, for a specific serial within an exercise scenario or for a stand-alone training event the Officer Conducting the Serial (OCS) is responsible for exercising TACON over assigned forces, which may include certain delegated air co-ordination responsibilities.

2. Nothing in these rules supersedes or amends ICAO or national air traffic procedures. Civil and National regulations are to take precedence over NATO regulations whenever these are more restrictive. National regulations may only be relaxed by the nation concerned.

3. Reference C - The Allied Maritime Above Water Warfare Exercise Manual - is a major complementary NATO exercise publication to this document and Ref D. It should be referred to when planning detailed aspects of NATO exercises or training serials involving maritime and air assets. In particular, it contains instructions and associated procedures for weapon direction, live firing, EW and miscellaneous aviation exercises as well as details of NATO targets, missile/gun safety traces, tables of aircraft suitable for simulation purposes and weapon firing ranges.

4. Reference E lays down the (NATO HQ, SC, Nations) agreed procedures and timelines for planning and appropriating civil airspace for air & maritime exercises in Europe. Its contents can serve as guidance for exercising in airspace outside Europe.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

5.   The following factors should be taken into account when ordering the relevant air safety rules detailed in the following appendix:

   a.   Type of air operations. The types of exercise operations can be pre-planned or free-play.

   b.   Force Aircraft Co-ordination Area (FACA) Requirements.
   The FACA will be determined by the OTC. The dimensions and shape of the FACA are likely to be determined by operational considerations, such as the area surveillance capability of a force or matching the FACA with the limits of a Maritime Air Defence Zone. It can no longer be assumed that a unique maritime exercise FACA be based exclusively on a circular boundary determined by the attack profiles of attacking aircraft. It is therefore essential that all maritime and land-based air authorities be made aware of the FACA dimensions, and any subsequent alterations to them.

   c.   Degree of control within FACA. The air co-ordination measures laid down by the OTC/AC must be co-ordinated with exercise/opposing air safety requirements. In particular, NO PLAY rules, callsigns, frequencies and associated TACAN channels for use by Air Safety Cells must be clearly laid down in the EXOPORD/ Order message. Furthermore, close liaison must be established between the Air Safety Cell/Contact Cell and the AC/AAWC regarding the use of radios and radars in restricted or silent EMCON. In general, the decision of the Air Safety Cell as to whether radar should be switched on is to be overriding.

   d.   Relationship between Air Exercise Area (AEA) and FACA. The AEA defines the airspace which is notified or NOTAMed for a particular exercise; all or selected parts of it may be subject to NOTAM or ACN notification. The FACA is that area within which certain air coordination measures are imposed to prevent mutual interference between friendly surface and air units and their weapon

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systems. More than one FACA may exist within an AEA, which itself may overlap an adjoining Air Defence Region/Airspace Control Area. An EXOPORD should therefore contain explicit instructions to ensure that deconfliction measures, such as VMC minima and IMC separation rules are co-ordinated throughout the AEA for friendly and opposing aircraft.

e. <u>Air Co-ordination in an Amphibious Objective Area (AOA)</u> - The control of operations in the AOA is to be in accordance with the procedures laid down in ATP-8. An Air Co-ordination Cell is to be established and manned by representatives of the following agencies:

(1) Commander Combined Amphibious Task Force (CCATF).

(2) Commander Combined Landing Force (CCLF).

(3) Shore-based Military Air Control Authority.

<u>AIR CO-ORDINATION DUTIES</u>

6. In accordance with References A and B the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) of a maritime force may designate an Air Co-ordinator (AC), whose responsibilities in peacetime exercises and conflict include prevention of interference between friendly surface and air units and their weapon systems. However, to enhance peacetime training opportunities an additional authority with neutral status (NO PLAY) is needed to ensure safe separation of opposing air units. This authority, the Air Safety Cell /Air Safety Contact Cell is to be formally established, in the EXOPORD or other serial order, in order to liaise directly with the Air operating authorities, the AC and with other Air Safety Cells/Contact Cells, to ensure that all aircraft can carry out their assigned tasks in safety. Co-location of the AC with the Air Safety Cell is an ideal option. In a force of ships where more than one Air Safety Cell is operating, the AC will nominate one Air Safety Cell to be responsible for co-ordination between cells. This will normally be the cell embarked in the ship with the best facilities.

<u>AIR SAFETY CELL/CONTACT CELL</u>

7. Detailed Terms of Reference are laid out in Appendix 3. The requirements for Air Safety Cells and Contact Cells are as follows:

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a. Air Safety Cell. An Air Safety Cell, with mandatory callsign EAGLE, is to be established in ships with a full control capability , as detailed below.

b. Air Safety Contact Cell.   An Air Safety Contact Cell, with mandatory callsign FALCON, is to be established in ships that do not have such a full control capability. Ships which possess only a helicopter control capability (IAW STANAG 1154) are not considered able to assume positive control of tactical fixed-wing aircraft, therefore regardless of their radar/SSR and communications fit they should not be allocated Air Safety Cell duties.

c. FULL CONTROL CAPABILITY . The full control capability of ships should consist as a minimum of:

(1) Two-way communications on UHF and HF Jamming/Attack safety nets, and UHF Military distress frequency.

(2) Suitable Air/Search radar.

(3) Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR)

(4) Suitably-qualified Air Traffic Controllers, or controllers qualified in accordance with STANAG 1183 (NATO Qualifications for Fixed-wing Above Water Warfare Aircraft Controllers).

d. Period of Activation. When ordered in an EXOPORD, or other serial order, Air Safety Cells/ Contact Cells will be activated from 30 minutes prior to the start of the raid/ first aircraft of raid on station, until the last raid aircraft departs. During 'Free Play' style exercises, when no raid plan is pre-issued, Safety Cells will have to be prepared to man continuously; unless set periods of operation are identified in the EXOPORD. Air tasking authorities should ensure expeditious transmission of aircraft tasking messages.

RAID PLANS

8.   Air DISTAFFs, Air Safety Cells/Contact Cells and relevant aviation capable units are to hold a copy of air raid plans. In addition, Air Safety Cells/Contact Cells are to be action addressees on ALL FORMs GREEN/TURQUOISE. During periods of unscripted air raid activity Air Safety Cells/Contact Cells are to be in receipt of the ATO or ATO Extract detailing air raid activity targeted against maritime units. Different tasking agencies may issue FORMs GREEN/TURQUOISE and the ATO, therefore it is essential that OSEs/OCEs and OTCs ensure the correct distribution is achieved.

LIVE (AIR) FIRING

9.   The general rules for live/practice weapon firing or ordnance delivery against towed targets is laid out at Appendix 2. Weapons delivery on geographically fixed or designated weapons ranges should be in accordance with published rules, which should be promulgated in the EXOPORD, unless already laid and distributed to aircrews, range safety officers, and air tasking authorities. Clear range procedures can be utilised using national criteria. Routing and use of live armed aircraft in practice attacks is forbidden unless specific orders relating to that serial have been agreed, coordinated with OTC and issued by the aircraft OPCON.

ANNEX:
A. Maritime Air Safety Rules
B. General rules for live attacks on maritime targets
C. TORs for Air Safety Cells/Contact Cells

ANNEX A

MARITIME AIR SAFETY RULES

1. The following Air Safety Rules form the basis upon which all
maritime exercises, from unit-level to major NATO LIVEX can be
planned. Where necessary, these rules can be expanded in the
EXOPORD, to cover specific safety aspects which may be relevant to
particular types of exercises.

AIRSPACE AND AIR CO-ORDINATION

2. Local Target Zone (LTZ)/Local Target Area (LTA). An LTZ/LTA,
of which there may be a number within an Air Exercise Area (AEA),
is defined as an area of temporary restricted air space, within
which attacking aircraft have complete tactical freedom.
LTZs/LTAs are normally established for aircraft attacks employing
Straight in Silent and low (SISAL) and Anti-ship missile Defence
(ASMD) procedures. The dimensions of an LTZ/LTA shall be a circle
of 30NM radius based on the target datum (ZZ), from sea level to
2500 ft AMSL based on the force QNH. The LTZ/LTA is active from
10 minutes before until 10 minutes after TOT. The following
procedures and restrictions for LTZs/LTAs apply.

>   a. The center of the LTZ/LTA will be given as either a
>   position in Latitude and Longitude and, where
>   available, as a TACAN-equipped ship. These
>   details, together with TACAN channels will be
>   promulgated in the EXOPORD or serial setting
>   message. It is the responsibility of the OTC/OCS,
>   advised by the Air Safety Cell, to ensure that the
>   ship is radiating on the specified TACAN channel,
>   regardless of EMCON, and to ensure it is on
>   station at the center of the LTZ/LTA from one hour
>   before TOT until raids are complete. Radiation of
>   this TACAN channel positively establishes the LTZ/LTA
>   center for preplanned air operations. Should
>   TACAN be unavailable, or should the position of
>   the center of the LTZ/LTA change for any reason, the
>   OTC/OCS is to ensure that this fact is promulgated
>   to all agencies concerned. Maritime commanders
>   are to make every attempt to ensure that their
>   units operate within the LTZ/LTA during pre-planned
>   opposition air operations, and that any units
>   operating in any way (e.g. HDS, Amphib Cross-
>   Decking) that could affect the attack serial
>   should be clear of the LTZ/LTA or be suitably
>   coordinated.
>
>   b. All aircraft, within the LTZ/LTA, must monitor the air
>   safety frequency, passing their position, height
>   and intentions to the Air Safety Cell on first

contact. Any subsequent change in altitude must be approved by the Air Safety Cell.

c.   With the exception of Air Defence (AD) aircraft and, on occasions, AEW helicopters only attack/EW aircraft forming the attack *or* ASMD package are permitted to operate within the LTZ/LTA.

d.   AD aircraft may penetrate the LTZ/LTA provided they are:

   (1) In visual or radar contact with the attacking aircraft or when receiving an appropriate radar service from a military Aircraft Control Unit (ACU).

   (2) Conducting interceptions in accordance with exercise or national engagement rules whichever are the more restrictive. The EXOPORD should quote any particular set of interception rules (e.g. FIGHTING EDGE) which have been pre-agreed. Any particular restrictions on interception of certain types of aircraft (e.g. AAR, AWACS, TACAMO, etc) should be listed in the EXOPORD; attention should be drawn to the hazards posed such as stores release, EMI, trailing aerials and the like.

e.   <u>AEW Helicopter/Attack Aircraft Within the LTZ/LTA</u>.

   (1) AEW helicopters are to adhere to the following restrictions prior to entry, and during operations in the LTZ/LTA:

      (a) AEW helicopters are to operate NOT below 500 FT AMSL.

      (b) Remain in VMC throughout.

      (c) Establish 2-way comms with the Air Safety Cell prior to launch or before entering the LTZ/LTA.

      (d) Confirm that the AEW helicopter is identified on SSR or primary radar by the Air Safety Cell.

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   (e) Leave the LTZ/LTA if advised that the
       SSR/primary contact has been lost and
       remain clear until SSR/primary contact
       has been re-established.

   (f) Leave the LTZ/LTA in event of radio failure.

   (g) Monitor UHF Guard throughout.

   (h) Transmit safety of flight information on
       UHF Guard to attack aircraft if a
       potential collision exists and when
       acting in accordance with (e) and (f)
       above.

(2) <u>Attack Aircraft Limitations</u>. If the position
    of the AEW helicopter is known by the attack
    aircraft, (having been updated by the
    ASC/MPA/E3) they may maintain full freedom of
    movement within the LTZ/LTA, provided it is
    positively identified on PWHR equipment and a
    minimum of 10 NM lateral separation from the
    helicopter is maintained. If these criteria
    cannot be met, attack aircraft are restricted
    to 200 FT AMSL and below. If attack aircraft
    are not able to maintain VMC as laid down in para
    12 (A) at 200 FT and below, a climb to IMC
    sanctuary level, above the LTZ/LTA, is to be made
    transmitting intentions on the Air Safety Frequency
    and UHF Guard simultaneously.

f. <u>MPA and non-AEW helicopter operations</u>. MPA and
   helicopter crews are to be aware of attack
   headings and LTZ/LTA activation times. Except in
   emergencies, ships are not authorized to launch or
   recover aircraft within an LTZ/LTA. In such
   circumstances, prior permission of the Air Safety
   Cell must be obtained, and heading and height
   restrictions may be imposed.

g. Where two LTZs/LTAs overlap, the Air Safety Cell with
   the best facilities is to assume responsibility
   for issuing low-level on top clearances to all
   opposing aircraft.

<u>COMMUNICATIONS AND RADAR REQUIREMENTS</u>

3. The following communications and radar requirements are to be
met:

a. <u>Communications.</u> Callsigns, frequencies and
    associated TACAN channels of Air Safety Cells and
    Air Safety Contact Cells are to be specified in the Air
    Safety Annex of the EXOPORD or serial order message. All
    aircraft operating within the Air Exercise Area (AEA)
    should, where possible, monitor the UHF safety frequency.
    NAEW/AWACS aircraft should be used for airborne relay.

b. <u>Acknowledgment of calls.</u> Air Safety Cells/Contact
    Cells are responsible for acknowledgment of
    approach calls from opposing attack, recce and ECM
    aircraft. Unless specifically excluded in the
    EXOPORD, the acknowledgment of calls from such
    aircraft is to be NO PLAY and is MANDATORY
    regardless of the exercise EMCON policy in force.

c. <u>Target information</u>. Air Safety Cells/Contact
    Cells are to acknowledge and provide all possible
    assistance to any aircraft which states a NO PLAY
    safety-of-flight situation. However, to maintain
    the balance between tactical realism and the
    requirements of aircraft safety, the Air Safety
    Cell should not provide positional information to
    opposing recce/surveillance aircraft unless
    specifically requested for aircraft safety
    reasons. The Air Safety Cell/Contact Cell is not
    to be used as a means of obtaining tactical
    information that would not otherwise be available.

d. <u>Use of radar</u>. Frequently, the requirements of
    the Air Safety Cell to use shipborne radars for
    aircraft co-ordination may conflict with the
    requirements of the OTC of a force maintaining
    EMCON silence. In such cases, the Air Safety Cell
    is to liaise with the AC to establish the radar
    requirements. Where a safety-of-flight situation
    exists the decision of the Air Safety Cell as to
    whether radar should be switched on is to be
    overriding. If it is agreed that the radar should
    be switched off, and the controller is unable or
    unhappy to provide a procedural service, then
    the Air Safety Cell is to revert to Air Safety
    Contact Cell status.

<u>RAID PLANS</u>

4. Raid Plans for all pre-planned opposition flights are to be
promulgated to Air Safety Cells, Air Safety Contact Cells, MPA and
all shipborne aviation units. As a minimum, Raid Plans are to
contain the following:

(a) Aircraft mission number/callsign and type.

(b) Known IFF Modes

(c) Target group (target if known) and TOT.

(d) Attack and escape headings.

(e) Ingress/Egress waypoints and ETA.

(f) Lower and upper altitude limits.

(g) Period of activation of LTZ/LTA, if applicable.

Air Safety Cells/Contact Cells and MPA operating authorities are also to be action addressees (IMMEDIATE) on all signals concerning Planned and Free-play flights (e.g. ATO, FORMs TURQUOISE etc.).

ATTACK PROCEDURES

5.   Control facilities available to the Air Safety Cell, the attack tactics of the opposing aircraft and traffic density in the vicinity of the target ships are all factors that must be considered when determining attack aircraft approach procedures. The attacks will be "Pre-planned" or "Free play".

   a.   "Pre-planned" missions are those that are planned as part of a published Raid Plan, and are either:

      (1) "Fully scripted": Flown to known or planned target positions, or

      (2) "Partly scripted": Target position is unknown, and subject to exercise development.

   b.   "Free play" missions are those planned and executed as a result of exercise developments and tactical play.

Note: Combat Enhancement Training and Work-up Phases, where target positions are usually planned prior to the exercise, are best suited to fully scripted raid plans, utilising LTZs/LTAs. Tactical phase operations can be fully scripted, but are usually best suited to partially scripted or free play operations.

ATTACK CLEARANCES

6.   Clearance for opposition aircraft to enter the FACA is not required , however specific instructions may be laid down in an EXOPORD requiring attack packages to call the relevant Air Safety Cell at a given distance from ZZ, in certain tactical situations.

Communications limitations may require such calls to be made by means of an airborne relay. For fully scripted raids the requirement for aircraft to obtain attack clearance into the LTZ/LTA will be determined by the procedures employed during the exercise.

    a. LTZ/LTA Procedures. Within the LTZ/LTA, attack aircraft have freedom to conduct simulated attacks (see para 2 above), within their TOT bracket, without establishing communications. The following constraints are to be met:

        (1) Attack aircraft are to monitor EAGLE SAFETY on UHF prior to entry and while operating within the LTZ/LTA.

        (2) Aircraft simulating missiles will not evade interception of defending aircraft.

        (3) Aircraft IFF will be on standby unless directed otherwise by the Air Safety Cell/Contact Cell.

        (4) Attack aircraft are to establish comms with the Safety Cell upon completion of the attack profile or on overflying the target.

    b. Non-LTZ/LTA Procedures. Attack clearances must be obtained in accordance with the procedures detailed at para 7 below.

7. Partly scripted and Free play Raids. Generally, LTZs/LTAs will not be used during these periods. Ship Safety Zones (SSZs) will be established to provide additional protection to organic aircraft conducting ship borne air operations, during maritime attack procedures.

    (a)   Unless otherwise stated, in the EXOPORD, SSZs have the following dimensions:

        (1) Aircraft Carrier (CV/CVSA). Radius 10NM(VMC)/
                           30NM(1MC)
                       MSL-2500FT AMSL

        (2) Helo Equipped Ships. Radius 5NM
                         (VMC/1MC)
                     MSL-700FT AMSL

        (3) Other Ships.   Radius 5NM
                      (VMC/IMC)
                 MSL-500FT AMSL

(4) Submarines. Overflight not below:
100FT AMSL by
day or 300FT AMSL
by night.

(b) Attacking aircraft are prohibited from entering a
SSZ without first obtaining positive clearance
from the Air Safety Cell/Contact Cell (ASC/ASCC).
Such clearance may be obtained from an airborne
relay. Aircraft unable to establish radio contact
with the ASC/ASCC may proceed towards the target
providing the SSZ is not infringed. If clearance
is not obtained attack aircraft may overfly the
target however, not below the upper limit of the
SSZ, as detailed above. If attack aircraft do not know
the type of ship they are approaching, the limits for
helo equipped ships apply. The avoidance of Carrier
Tactical Control Zones, as specified in the EXOPORD, is
mandatory. Attack aircraft are to monitor the Air
Safety frequency to enable the ASC/ASCC to update or
amend the given clearance. Even for unscripted attacks
it may be prudent to lay down escape headings or egress
sectors.

8.   Time on Target (TOT). TOT is defined as that time when the
aircraft or simulated weapon is overhead the declared target.
Attack aircraft unable to meet their TOT bracket (+ or - 2.5 mins)
are to break off the attack, unless positive clearance has been
obtained from the appropriate Air Safety Cell (NOT Air Safety
Contact Cell) to continue the attack.

9.   Jamming. When any ACU providing positive control to an
aircraft operating in IMC is jammed on radar, IFF or voice
circuits, it can call the jamming units on the safety frequency to
"CEASE JAMMING on band..........providing safety-of-flight
service". The jamming unit is to cease jamming. Pre-agreed
frequencies can be declared 'taboo' and should be published in the
EXOPORD, and will not be subject to interference (or tactical
use).

10. Post attack procedures. Contact must be established with the
Air Safety Cell/Contact Cell on completion of the attack profile
or on overflying the target. Attacking aircraft are to climb out
on their specified escape headings or as directed by the Air
Safety Cell.

ORGANIC HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

11. With the exception of AEW aircraft, as detailed above, organic helicopter operations are not permitted within an LTZ/LTA. Ships controlling helicopters, either independently or within a force,

 are to man their air safety circuit during flight operations whenever equipment fit permits.

   a. Launch/Recovery. Shipborne helicopter aircrew should be aware that there may not be an Air Safety Cell/Contact Cell in the vicinity of their ships and that fixed-wing aircraft may still be transiting the area at low level. When launching from a ship aircrew are to make a blind call prior to launch on the air safety frequency stating their intentions and position from ZZ. The air safety frequency should, where possible, be monitored throughout the sortie by all aircraft and a blind call made when the aircraft commences recovery.

   b. IMC Operations. In IMC, outside the SSZ, helicopters are not to deviate from the assigned altitude block. In case of aircraft emergency, crews forced to change altitude must inform EAGLE Safety and broadcast their intentions , by all means available, to other units. AEW helicopters may deviate from block altitudes when on task providing that they are able to monitor their own safety clearances and EAGLE Safety is informed.

   c. SSZ Operations. Within the SSZ helicopter operations are to be conducted at or below 400ft AMSL unless otherwise cleared by EAGLE Safety. Attack aircraft will initially be cleared to a minimum of 700ft AMSL when helicopters are operating within the SSZ, however they may be cleared to attack minimum if the pilot can maintain good situational awareness and is in receipt of traffic information from the Air Safety Cell. The Air Safety cell may instruct helicopters to climb out above the level of attack aircraft or to depart the SSZ laterally to avoid potential confliction.

   d. Engagements. Helicopter versus helicopter engagements are prohibited.

   e. Vertical Onboard Delivery (VOD). VOD flights are to be coordinated by the Logistics Cell, in close liaison with Air DISTAFFs. Scheduling of VOD flights to Task Groups restricted by LTZ/LTA windows

is prohibited and should also be avoided during
ADEX windows. If owing to operational constraints
VOD flights are scheduled during an ADEX then they
are to check in with the appropriate ASC/ASCC

before closing within 30NM. VOD flights
proceeding from ashore are to check in with the
appropriate Force Marshaller at the earliest
opportunity (40NM/coasting out) to ensure
deconfliction with organic air assets and MPAs.
If unable to contact the relevant force
Marshaller, VOD flights are to contact their
destination Aircraft Control Unit (ACU) on the
designated ICF/Land Launch frequency.

WEATHER MINIMA AND IMC SEPARATION

12. IMC separation.   Within an AEA the preferred method of
deconfliction in IMC is by a system of height banding. IMC
separation altitudes are provided for aircraft in transit from one
area to another, and for those who inadvertently encounter weather
conditions below the VMC minima. IMC safety altitudes will be
implemented when weather conditions fall below VMC.

    a. VMC. VMC minima for maritime operations are
       defined as follows:

	Visibility	Clearance from cloud
Fixed wing	8km	1500m/1000ft (Horiz/vert)
Rotary wing	5km	Clear of cloud

Note: Below 2000ft AMSL the vertical distance from cloud is 500ft.

    b. IMC. A table should be published allocating
       altitude bands which segregate aircraft by type,
       role and mission whilst, wherever possible,
       enabling them to operate in accordance with
       quadrantal or semi-circular rules. An example is
       detailed at Fig 1. The structure required for
       individual exercises will depend on the exercise
       objectives, participants etc, and should be
       decided during exercise planning. The Transition
       Level (TL) should be defined; attention should be
       drawn to the situation in very low atmospheric
       pressure which may reduce actual vertical
       separation directly above TL.

c. Any unit in IMC not receiving a radar safety
    service and forced in an emergency to ascend or
    descend through other height bands is to:

    (1) Transmit the intention to do so on 243.0
        Hhz, before and during climbing or descending,
        giving position and track.

    (2) Switch on navigation and anti-collision
        lights at full brilliance.

    (3) Call clear when the transit is complete.

d. All other aircrafts receiving a relevant transit
    call are to:

    (1) Attempt 2-way communications.

    (2) Switch on navigation and anti-collision
        lights at full brilliance.

    (3) Switch on IFF Mode 1 and radar transponder
        for 10 minutes or until the transitting
        aircraft has called clear, whichever is
        sooner.

Fig 1 - <u>EXAMPLE OF IMC ALTITUDE BANDS</u>

FL230 – FL240	BLUE	ATTACK/ EW
FL210 – FL220	WHITE	ATTACK/ EW
FL190 – FL220	BLUE/ WHITE	AAR
FL160 – FL180	BLUE	ATTACK/ AD
FL130 – FL150	WHITE	ATTACK/ AD
FL120	BLUE	EW
FL110	WHITE	EW
FL100	BLUE	MPA
FL90	WHITE	MPA
FL65 – FL80	BLUE	ATTACK/ AD
2000 – 5000'	WHITE	ATTACK/ AD
1500'	BLUE/ WHITE	MPA
700 – 1000'	BLUE/ WHITE	ASUW/ AEW HELOS
SFC – 400'	BLUE/ WHITE	ASW HELOS

Note: If pressure falls below 996 Mb (29.42 inches) attack and AD
aircraft should note the reduction in vertical separation between
the FL65 – 80 block and the 2000-5000' block.

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ANNEX B

GENERAL RULES FOR WEAPON DELIVERIES ON MARITIME TOWED TARGETS

Reference:

A.   AXP-2(B) Chap 7

1. The following rules amplify the instructions laid down at Reference A for the delivery of live and practice ammunition by aircraft against towed surface targets. The rules for firing practices against land ranges or static/floating targets are not covered here.

RANGE SAFETY

2. The responsibility for the safe conduct of these exercises lies with the ship providing the target. All live/practice weapon deliveries against a towed target are to be carried out under the control of a Range Safety Cell, callsign PENTHOUSE, which is to be established in the towing ship for this purpose. The towing ship is to fly FLAG BRAVO for the duration of the attack exercise.

3. The Air Safety Cell is to pass control of the attacking aircraft over to the Range Safety Cell, who is to inform attacking aircraft of the position, course and speed of the target and any attack restrictions (min altitude, direction of attack etc).

CONDUCT OF ATTACKS

4. Weapon deliveries may only be conducted in VMC conditions.

5. In accordance with Ref A attacks may involve practice gun ammunition, practice bombs, rocket projectiles with inert heads or illuminants, however high live explosives may be used when previous agreement has been reached between the nation supplying the towed target and the attacking aircraft. Such agreement must also cover the length of tow to be used. Ref A provides details for certain types of basic attack exercise, however specific details for more advanced firing exercises must be included in the EXOPORD or promulgated separately.

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR AIR SAFETY CELL/ CONTACT CELL

Reference:
A.   STANAGS 3993, 1154, & 1183

<u>AIR SAFETY CELL</u>

1. The References lay down definitions and standards of control and controllers.

2. <u>General</u>. Air Safety Cells (ASC) are activated on suitable ships to implement the air safety orders during a maritime exercise. To enable the ASC to operate with autonomy it may only be manned by a suitably qualified Air Traffic Control officer or Fighter Controller. An ASC is to use the callsign EAGLE plus a suffix (eg EAGLE ONE). Where an exercise involves only one ASC, EAGLE CONTROL may be used.

3. <u>Purpose.</u> The primary purpose of an ASC is to provide a safety service which will ensure as far as practicable the safe operation and separation of exercise aircraft, whilst allowing such aircraft and participating ships to operate with the greatest degree of tactical freedom.

4. <u>Accountability.</u> The ASC is accountable to the Officer Scheduling the Exercise (OSE) and/or Exercise DICONSTAFF; it is under the functional authority of the ship's Commanding Officer when embarked.

5. <u>Authority.</u>   The ASC is authorised to:

   a. Operate as an autonomous unit which has neutral status and a 'no play' role reacting only to ship's "Safeguard" (No Play) pipes.

   b. Issue control instructions to all opposing aircraft operating within a defined area and to impose flying restrictions when deemed necessary to avoid safety problems.

   c. Order, where any doubt exists as to the safety of any aircraft, the operation of ship's radars and other associated equipment regardless of the exercise EMCON policy in force, to ensure the safe control or coordination of such aircraft.

   d. On the grounds of air safety, cancel air raids or re-negotiate TOTs, in liaison with the appropriate air tasking authorities or DICONSTAFF.

e. Where necessary to avoid a safety incident, call a "Cease Jamming" order to EW/ Jamming aircraft, or pass message through (J)EWCC or DICONSTAFF.

f. Deactivate LTZs.

6. <u>Tasks.</u> The ASC principal tasks are:

a. Monitor the air safety frequency from 30 minutes prior to the time on station/ TOT of the first opposing aircraft until the last raid aircraft has departed. During Freeplay style exercises, where raid times may be unknown or at short notice, the air safety frequency should be manned throughout, or as detailed in the EXOPORD.

b. Within the above timescale provide a Procedural or Flight Information Service to opposing aircraft, or a Radar Service when specifically requested.

c. Pass relevant traffic information on all unknown traffic, including non-exercise aircraft.

d. Be responsible for the coordination and safe separation of opposing raid aircraft and any other known aircraft.

e. Provide, when requested, or whenever doubt exists as to the safety of an aircraft, a radar service to aircraft with an emergency.

f. Liaise with the embarked Air Coordinator to provide opposing aircraft with the necessary clearances to accomplish their mission.

g. Transmit target information and when necessary provide navigational assistance, as instructed in the EXOPORD.

h. Coordinate any SAR actions until the incident is handed over to the OTC or shore authority.

i. Assist the embarked Air Coordinator to deconflict organic aircraft making emergency recoveries from opposing raids.

j. Acknowledge all calls made on the air safety frequency regardless of exercise EMCON in force.

k. Monitor air safety within the exercise area and report any breaches of safety rules.

l. Transmit Force QNH, current weather and diversion airfield details to participating aircraft.

m. Transfer control of opposing aircraft to Range Safety (callsign PENTHOUSE) when splash weaponry is required. (Note: Callsign depends on the particular range).

n. Liaise with other Air Safety Cells/ Contact Cells.

o. Maintain a narrative of events and exercise recommendations.

p. Retain Executive Control of land based target towing aircraft whilst delegating Operational Control to the firing unit. This may entail:

   (1) Informing the target towing aircraft of required tow length and target height, and providing assistance to enable the target to be streamed at the earliest opportunity.

   (2) Controlling the target-towing aircraft during approaches as required by the CTG/CTU.

   (3) Ensuring the aircraft and target remains within the airspace allocated in the Airspace coordination Notice.

   (4) Informing the CTG/CTU when ready to commence firings.

   (5) Ensuring all other opposing aircraft are clear of the firing area.

AIR SAFETY CONTACT CELL

7. <u>General.</u> Where a requirement exists for aircraft to communicate with surface units during an exercise, and an ASC is not appropriate or not available, then an Air Safety Contact Cell (ASCC) will be established. An ASCC is to be manned by an operator who is authorised to provide the services listed below. An ASCC is to use the callsign FALCON plus a suitable suffix

8. <u>Purpose.</u> The primary purpose of an ASCC is to monitor the air safety frequency and provide low level clearances to opposing aircraft ensuring deconfliction from own ship's aircraft

9. <u>Accountability.</u>   The ASCC is accountable to the OSE and/or DICONSTAFF; it is under the functional authority of the ship's CO when embarked.

10. <u>Authority</u>. The ASCC is authorised to:

   a. Operate as an autonomous unit which has neutral status and a 'No Play' role reacting only to ship's "SAFEGUARD" (No Play) pipes.

   b. Provide low level clearances into ship's safety zones (SSZ) for which he is authorised.

   c. Order "Cease Jamming" to EW/ Jamming aircraft.

   d. Cancel air raids when the safety of inbound raids is in doubt, and amend TOTs as instructed by DICONSTAFF or opposing aircraft operating authority.

11. <u>Tasks.</u> The ASCC is to:

   a. Monitor the air safety frequency from 30 minutes prior to the on station/ TOT of the first opposing aircraft until the last raid aircraft has departed. In the event of Freeplay, the ASCC should be manned continuously, or as instructed in the EXOPORD.

   b. Pass information to opposing aircraft about other known traffic.

   c. Liaise with the AC to provide opposing aircraft with the necessary clearances to accomplish their mission.

   d. Transmit target information to opposing aircraft as necessary and authorised.

   e. Acknowledge all calls on air safety frequency if addressed to the ASCC, or not answered by the ASC, regardless of the exercise EMCON in force.

   f. Coordinate any SAR action until the incident is handed over to the OTC or shore authority.

   g. Transmit Force QNH, weather and diversion airfield details to participating aircraft.

   h. Liaise with other ASC or ASCC.

   i. Maintain a narrative of events and exercise recommendations.

3-C-4

AIR TO AIR INTERCEPTION SAFETY RULES

1. <u>Introduction</u>. To maintain operational capability, NATO units must practice in peace the tactics that they would employ in war. Training must be as realistic as possible within the standards and constraints of flight safety. Personnel involved must know precisely the aims of and the engagement rules for the exercise and the limitations imposed on aircraft maneuvers. This chapter details the rules to be observed when planning and conducting air to air interceptions in NATO exercises.

2. <u>Definitions</u>. For the purpose of this document the definitions contained in AAP-6 will apply. Additional definitions are as follows:

   a. <u>Air to air interception</u>. An air to air interception is that part of an air defense mission during which the intention is to interrogate, identify, intervene with or engage other aircraft.

   b. <u>Interrogation</u>. Is that part of an interception during which an attempt is made to identify an airborne object by visual or electronic means.

   C. <u>Intervention</u>. Is that part of an interception during which an attempt is made to divert another aircraft from its intended flight path or mission.

   d. <u>Engagement</u>. Is that part of an interception during which an attempt is made to place the interceptor in a firing position with intent to destroy.

   e. <u>Unarmed aircraft</u>. Is an aircraft without armament. An aircraft is also considered unarmed if:

      (1) It is carrying inert missiles without propellants.

      (2) It is carrying live gun ammunition and the gun(s) have been made safe from outside the cockpit.

<u>GENERAL RULES</u>

3. Unit commanders are to ensure that personnel involved in air-to-air interceptions during a NATO exercise are competent to do so. Trainee personnel may participate under supervision.

4. <u>General Interception Restrictions</u>.

   a. Interception is not to take place:

      (1) When the target aircraft is refueling in flight.

      (2) Inside a permanent air weapons range unless the EXOPORD so specifies.

      (3) When the target aircraft is involved in take-off, approach or landing.

   b. Armed fighters are not to carry out simulated engagements. Interrogation may be practiced by armed aircraft only, if weapons carried have external safety devices and these are kept on at any stage of the fight.

   c. All aircraft may be interrogated. Only exercise aircraft may be intervened with or engaged.

   d. Interceptions against helicopters may take place only in specific areas and only if specifically scheduled. The rules for such interceptions are to be formulated by the OCE and the helicopter operating authority(ies) and included in the EXOPORD. The following rules must be included:

      (1) Attacks are to be initiated only from above the helicopter.

      (2) Attacks are to be carried out in the VMC only.

      (3) Attacking aircraft are to remain subsonic.

      (4) Minimum separation distance is to be 1500 ft horizontally and vertically.

   e. Interceptions against SAC aircraft are permitted only when fighters are under close control. The minimum break-off ranges will comply with the current SAC-Regulations. Lead collision course interceptions are forbidden.

   f. Interceptions against jamming targets are to be carried out only in VMC.

   g. Interceptions of USAF tanker a/c is not permitted.

   h.   Interceptions of AEW aircraft are not permitted
        within 2000 ft vertically and 2NM laterally.

5.   <u>Interception Restrictions During the Free-play Phase</u>.   The
above interception restrictions for use during the pre-planned of
the exercise are amplified by the following exceptions and
amendments for use during the Free Play period and in the
designated Free Play Area.

   a.   Interception of helicopters is not permitted.

   b.   Air combat maneuvers are not permitted. When a
        fighter aircraft appreciates that he is
        intercepting another Air Defense fighter aircraft,
        front hemisphere attacks are permitted, but the
        engagement must be terminated at a distance of
        1NM.

   c.   Evasion by intercepted aircraft over the sea is
        limited to a maximum of two 360 degree turns with
        one reversal. Interceptions carried out by AD
        aircraft over land are to be limited to front
        hemisphere attacks only; no tail chasing. Fighter
        escorts are to adhere to the same evasion criteria
        applicable to the attack aircraft they are
        escorting.

6.   <u>In-Flight Procedures</u>.

   a.   <u>Lights</u>. At night and/or under IMC, navigation and
        anti-collision lights are to be displayed.

   b.   <u>Evasive Action</u>. Evasive action may be conducted
        during interceptions when the limits are clearly
        defined in the EXOPORD. Air combat maneuvers may
        take place only when specifically authorized and
        pre-briefed between participants or their
        respective operating authorities.

   c.   <u>Avoidance Criteria</u>. Pilots of attacking aircraft
        are to comply with their national avoidance
        criteria unless other participating nations or the
        OCE impose more restrictive criteria which are to
        be specified in the EXOPORD.

   d.   <u>Break-Off</u>. the order to break-off an interception
        is to be indicated by one of the following
        methods:

   (1) By radio.

  (2) By visual signals from the target aircraft:

    (a) During the day by rocking the wings.

    (b) During the night by flashing navigation
      lights at irregular intervals.

    (c) By firing a pyrotechnic signal.

7. <u>Electronic Warfare</u>. Forces participating in exercises which include air to air interceptions under EW jamming conditions are to comply with the following rules:

  a. The international distress radio frequencies are not to be jammed.

  b. Where communications jamming is a part of the exercise a safety radio frequency is to be specified in the EXOPORD.

  c. In the case of interception in air space where control is mandatory and where the interceptor radar and the GCI radar controlling that interceptor are jammed simultaneously, there is to be a safety controller using an unjammed radar.

NATO NAVAL SAFETY RULES FOR DIVERS

GENERAL

1. Safety rules for diving operations are laid down nationally and in A DIV P1 (Allied Diving Publication No 1). The EXOPORD will lay down the specific procedures which are to be followed in case of a diving accident, and will contain all pertinent information such as:

  a. Location of facilities where diving accidents can be handled.

  b. Their signal address and/or telephone number.

  c. Means of transportation of compression chambers to the facility.

  d. Number and size of available compression chambers in the facility.

  e. Medical personnel available.

  f. Any special administrative instructions.

NATO LAND SAFETY REGULATIONS

<u>GENERAL</u>

1. NATO safety regulations pertaining to land forces exercises have not been written. Specific safety rules for all land forces participating in NATO LIVEXs are to be promulgated in appropriate EXOPORD.

2. In the absence of NATO Land Safety Regulations, national rules will be complied with in the conduct of NATO exercises.

ANNEX A

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GENERAL

1.   The principle terms used in this document are listed and defined below. Other terms are contained in the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (AAP-6 current edition).

NATO MILITARY EXERCISE

2.   An exercise of any form or type scheduled by a NATO authority in which NATO forces and/or personnel perform military functions with the object of improving the capability of NATO forces, headquarters or agencies.

EXERCISE AUTHORITIES

3.   The Officer Scheduling the Exercise (OSE). The officer who originates the exercise and orders it to take place. When two or more NATO commanders schedule an exercise, a co-ordinating OSE will be designated. The OSE, or co-ordinating OSE, will issue basic instructions that will include the designation of exercise areas, the allocation of forces, and the necessary co-ordinating instructions. He will also designate the officer/s conducting the exercise.

4.   The Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE). The officer responsible for the conduct of an exercise or an allocated part of an exercise. When there is more than one OCE, a co-ordinating OCE will be designated. He will issue necessary supplementary instructions. In addition he may be an exercise commander.

5.   Exercise Commander. A commander taking part in the exercise who will issue appropriate operation orders to forces placed under his control. He may be allocated responsibilities regarding controlling, conducting, and/or directing the exercise in addition to that of command. The OCE or co-ordinating OCE will be the overall Exercise Commander.

6.   Exercise Director. The exercise director is appointed by the OSE and is the Chief of the DICONSTAFF organisation. He is responsible to the OSE and responsive to the OCE/Exercise Commander.

EXERCISE CHARACTERISATION

7.   An exercise can be best characterised using a variety of criteria such as:

- Form

- Type

- Extent

- Purpose of conduct

- Control

   a.   **Form**. The form of a NATO Military Exercise indicates the method, selected by the OSE, to achieve most effectively the aim and objectives. There are three forms of exercises:

      (1) Command Post Exercise (CPX). A HQ exercise involving commanders and their staffs, and communications within and among participating headquarters, in which friendly and opposing forces are simulated, by whatever means (e.g., by Response Cells (RC)).

      (2) Live Exercises (LIVEX). An exercise in which actual forces participate.

      (3) Exercise Study. Various activities which include map exercise, wargames, a series of lectures discussion groups, a seminar or an operational analysis which involve a limited number of participants with a specific functional focus.

   b.   **Type**. CPX and LIVEX may be further designated by abbreviations indicating the type; e.g. AIREX (Air Exercise), FTX (Field Training Exercise) or MAREX (Maritime Exercise). A list of types of exercises is included at Appendix 1 to Annex A. Examples of form/type of exercises are:

      (1) Form/Type: CPX/Synthetic Exercise (SYNEX)- an exercise in which forces are generated, displayed and moved by electronic or other means on computers, simulators, or other training devices. Contained within this grouping is the Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX). This is a CPX where computers simulate the operational

environment and provide event resolution which may be used in a distributed or non-distributed form or a combination of both:

(a) A distributed CAX is one in which the participants remain at home stations and computer resolution is provided by special communication means from a central location; and

(b) A non-distributed CAX requires all participants to exercise at a central location.

(2) Form/Type: LIVEX/Command Field Exercise (CFX)- a combination of CPX and FTX in which command, control and communications elements deploy, but only selected units of troops deploy in an FTX mode. Although it is left to the OSE to define in what phase of the exercise, to what extent and for what purposes should fully equipped units participate, it is considered that when applied to land, full deployment should not exceed Brigade level.

c. **Extent**. The extent of NATO Military Exercises indicates the degree of participation at a given NATO Command Level.

(1) NATO-wide exercises involve both Major NATO Commanders with a majority of subordinate commanders and MODs concerned.

(2) Inter-command exercises involve one or both Major NATO Commanders and/or their subordinates.

(3) Intra-command exercises involve an identified part of a Major NATO Command or of a subordinate element. Such exercises may also be described by the name of the command; e.g. ACE Exercise or ACLANT Exercise.

(4) Operational Inter-operability exercises describe the ability of different nations' forces and headquarters, trained to NATO standard, to operate within NATO's command and control structure in such a way as to make an effective, homogeneous and cohesive force.

d. **Purpose.** The purpose for which exercises are conducted are as follows:

(1) <u>Procedural Exercises</u>. An exercise to practice and validate specific plans and procedures. The ENDEX situation is pre-determined and exercise events are controlled to ensure required plans and procedures are practised/validated.

(2) <u>Decision-Making Exercises</u>. An exercise to allow Commanders and their staffs to participate in the decision-making process supported by plans and procedures. The ENDEX situation is determined by player action. Exercise events are controlled only to the extent of providing players the opportunity to make strategic, operational and tactical decisions.

e. **<u>Methods of Control</u>**. NATO Military Exercises are, generally either Controlled or Free-Play.

(1) <u>Controlled Exercises</u>. Controlled Exercises are characterised by the imposition of constraints on some or all of the participants with the principal intention of provoking interaction. Variation in control can be achieved by:

(a) Pre-Scripting the Events - DISTAFF/Control predetermine all events and activity in an attempt to guarantee achievement of the exercise objectives, irrespective of player action.

(b) Dynamic scripting of the Events DISTAFF/Control allows a degree of free play to develop events as play unfolds.

(2) <u>Free Play Exercises</u> test the capabilities of participants under contingency and/or wartime conditions, limited only by the need to achieve the overall exercise aim and objectives and by those artificiality's or restrictions required by peacetime safety regulations.

<u>EXERCISE TERMINOLOGY</u>

8. To avoid confusion in exercise terminology the following definitions are implemented:

a. <u>Scenario</u>. Scenario is the lead-in background story of a crisis or conflict.

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b.   Setting. A setting describes a pre-STARTEX series of events, without political rationale, which terminates upon commencement of the active phase of an exercise with a pre-STARTEX situation.

c.   Framework. A framework provides the skeleton around which an exercise is constructed.

d.   Snapshot. A snapshot is a selected situation. It can be used to exercise staff in a particular spectrum or, as a series of snapshots conducted at intervals in one real time frame, to exercise staff progressively through different spectra.

EXERCISE ACTIVITY LEVELS/PARTICIPATION

9.   Exercise activity levels/participation are as follows:

a.   Primary Training Activities (PTA) – Military roles/functions/responsibilities that are executed in pursuance of the exercise objectives.

b.   Secondary Training Activities (STA) – Military roles/functions/responsibilities executed within the scope of the exercise but not linked to the exercise objectives.

c.   Primary Participants (PP) - Personnel required to execute PTA.

d.   Secondary Participants (SP) - Personnel receiving training as a result of participation.

e.   Core Planning Team - Consists of OSE/OCE exercise planning staffs and is responsible for Overall Exercise Design; others with specialist areas of expertise may be assigned to this group at the discretion of the OSE/OCE.

f.   Control Group - Allied and opponent response cells and directing staff (DISTAFF).

g.   Response Cells - Represent superior, equivalent and subordinate level of command. For CAX these cells provide the interface between the PP and the computer.

h.   DISTAFF - Directs all elements and participants in the exercise through the execution of the Master Events List (MEL).

i.   <u>DICONSTAFF</u> – The staff established by the co-ordinating OSE to provide oversight and direction of the DISTAFF to ensure that the exercise aim and objectives are met. In some exercises this function is delegated to the DISTAFF.

EXERCISE TYPES

1.   <u>Military Exercise Types</u>. Within the 3 Military Exercise
Forms (CPX, LIVEX and Exercise Study), exercises can be of many
types. The following list contains a number of examples and is
not intended to be exhaustive. Other abbreviations may be
employed to designate special types of military exercises provided
they are defined the first time they are used in the document.

ADEX	-	An exercise in air defence that may include operations by air units, surface units, and submarines
AIREX	-	Air Exercise
AIROFEX	-	Air Offensive Exercise
ALEX	-	Alert Exercise
ARTEX	-	Artillery Exercise
ASUWEX	-	Anti-Surface Warfare Exercise
CASEX	-	Combined Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise
CAX	-	Computer Assisted Exercise
CFX	-	Command Field Exercise: A combination of CPX and FTX, in which C2 elements and supporting CIS deploy, but only selected units of troops deploy.
CIRADEX	-	Combined Interregional Air Defence Exercise
CMX	-	Crisis Management Exercise
DEPEX	-	Deployment Exercise
EWX	-	Electronic Warfare Exercise
FLEX	-	A Fleet Exercise that may embrace all of carrier, mine warfare, amphibious, maritime interdiction, submarine, mobile logistic support and maritime and/or patrol air operations.
FTX	-	Field Training Exercise

INVITEX	-	National exercise to which forces of other nations may be invited to participate
JOINTEX	-	Joint Exercise involving forces of more than one service of the same nation
LOGEX	-	Logistic Exercise
MAPEX	-	Map Exercise
MCMEX	-	Mine Counter Measure Exercise
MINEX	-	Mine Laying Exercise
MOBEX	-	Mobility Exercise
MOVEX	-	Movement Exercise
NCSEX	-	Naval Control of Shipping Exercise
PASSEX	-	Exercise arranged with forces on passage
PREREADEX	-	Pre-Readiness Exercise
RECONEX	-	Reconnaissance Exercise
SACEX	-	Supporting Arms Co-ordination Exercise
SAREX	-	An exercise which involves the use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialised rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea.
SEARCHEX	-	Sea/Air Search Exercise
SIGEX	-	Signal Exercise
SMASHEX	-	Submarine-Search Escape and Rescue Exercise
SUBEX	-	Submarine Exercise
SWITCHEX	-	Circuit Switching Exercise
SYNADEX	-	Synthetic Air Defence Exercise

APPENDIX 2
TO ANNEX A

<u>EXERCISE NICKNAMES</u>

1.   SC's and RC's, including their subordinate commands, are to use the following initial letters for the <u>first</u> word of their exercises' nicknames.

SHAPE, ACE/SCE REACTION FORCES, NAEWF:	A
b.	AFNORTHWEST:	B
c.	AFCENT/RC NORTH:	C
d.	AFSOUTH/RC SOUTH:	D
e.	SACLANT, SUBACTLANT, STRIKFLTLANT:	S N O
f.	EASTLANT/RC EAST:	R W Y
g.	WESTLANT/RC WEST:	T Z
h.	IBERLANT/RC SOUTHEAST:	P U V

2. The above does not apply to NATO/PfP exercises. For those exercises guidance on the use of exercise nicknames is provided with the Overall NATO/PfP Exercise Concept (OPEC), ANNEX I.

3. Nicknames should have a robust connotation. Nicknames of an undignified or a frivolous nature are to be avoided. Special attention is also to be given to misinterpretation if it is translated into a language of a NATO or non-NATO nation.

ANNEX B

FORMAT FOR THE EXERCISE SPECIFICATION (EXSPEC)

1.   <u>References</u>. To include all higher HQs' as well as own directive for the planning and conduct of the exercise; a list of supporting documents should be attached as a separate ANNEX to allow for detailed preparation of all participating HQs and nations in order to achieve the exercise objectives.

2.   <u>General Data</u>.

   a.   NICKNAME:
   b.   SERIAL NUMBER:
   c.   FORM/TYPE:
   d.   EXTENT:
   e.   DATES:
   f.   AREA:
   g.   OSE(S):
   h.   OCE(S):
   i.   EXDIR(S):

3.   <u>Overall Requirements</u>. Outline the requirements for the exercise, its purpose and relationship to other exercise.

4.   <u>Exercise Aim and Objectives</u>. Aim, overarching objectives and, supporting objectives to be specified. For NATO/PfP Exercises also to include the PARP Interoperability Objectives (IOs) to be achieved.

5.   <u>Concept Of The Exercise.</u> Set out the concept of operations designed to achieve the aim and objectives. Outline the setting including, where required, the political, economic, military, climatic scenario situation etc., which provides the background for the exercise play.

6.   <u>Participation Requirements</u>. Divide into NATO and national (NATO, Partner and other non-Allies) as appropriate and where required into different parties indicating likely employment and/or roles. When considered necessary, the intended employment of forces nominated to simulate certain events or military situations is to be stated. Participation requirements should show (to be confirmed in the EXPI/EXOPLAN):

   a.   Parties involved.
   b.   Envisaged kind and size of headquarters.
   c.   Envisaged number of troops.
   d.   Types of armed forces involved.

    e.   Envisaged level of command.
    f.   Any other information important for NATO Commands and
    g.   Nations

7.   In the case of a computer assisted exercise (CAX), the extent of simulation should be indicated.

8.   <u>External Support.</u> This paragraph should consider external support requirements to be requested from other NATO HQs and/or agencies (e.g. CIS support, staff augmentation, special analysis/evaluation teams)and international/non-governmental organisations.

9.   <u>Political Implications.</u> This paragraph should address political implications of the exercise in order to identify areas of possible difficulty and the recommendation on the CFE Treaty and Vienna Document 1994 provisions.

10. <u>Planning Schedule.</u> (This paragraph may include the proposed planning schedule. It is necessary in any case to include the dates by which firm allocations and nominations of forces are required.)

11. <u>Public Information Policy.</u> Unless indicated otherwise by the OSE, the PI policy for NATO Military Exercises is "Active".

12. <u>Administration and Logistic Requirements</u>. To include estimated costs to NATO.

13. <u>Reporting Requirements</u>. To include necessary guidance on form and timelines for reporting on the exercise.

14. <u>Other Special Instructions.</u> As required

15. <u>Annexes</u>. As required (see also remark on 'references' above). For NATO/PfP exercises it is mandatory to include an Annex listing the appropriate MIRs/MTIs.

16. <u>Signature</u>. The EXSPEC should be signed by the OSE or, if applicable, the OSE (COORD).

<u>NOTES</u>:

1. When completed, classify at lowest level, as appropriate.
2. Where there is more than one OSE/OCE, indicate the co-ordinating OSE/OCE.

EXERCISE PLANNING INSTRUCTION (EXPI)

1. The following list of subject headings are topics that should be considered in the production of the supporting EXPI, a sample is at Appendix 1 to this ANNEX. However, it should be appreciated that the list is not exhaustive and that individual exercises will each have their own idiosyncrasies to be catered for:

2. Topics for consideration in EXPI development:

- ❖ EXSPEC

- ❖ Exercise Initiating Directive

- ❖ Setting

- ❖ Political Guidance/Directive

- ❖ Agreed C2 Architecture

- ❖ Force Identification

- ❖ Real World Geographical Areas Allocated for Exercise Play (including allocated CET areas/responsibilities)

- ❖ Navigation Area Warning, Notices to Airmen, and Submarine Notices of Intention

- ❖ Environmental Considerations

- ❖ Agreed Recce. Requirements

- ❖ Host Nation Support Requirements

- ❖ MOU's and NATO Technical Agreements

- ❖ Legal Provisions

- ❖ Medical Provisions

- ❖ Visitors and Observers Bureau Arrangements

- ❖ Press Information Centre Arrangements

- ❖ DISTAFF Instructions

❖   Events List

❖   Supporting Activities (CPX etc)

❖   Analysis Objectives and Requirements

❖   PXD Arrangements

❖   Lessons Learned

3.   The document is developed in up to five parts, all of which may not be required for every exercise.

EXERCISE PLANNING INSTRUCTION (SAMPLE)

PART ONE

Approved EXSPEC

PART TWO

Preliminary Pages
Table of Contents and Effective Pages
Record of Changes
List of Abbreviations
Distribution List

Main Body
Letter of Promulgation
Situation
Mission (Exercise Aim and Objectives)
Execution (Milestones)
Service Support
Command and Signal

Annexes
A. Task Organisation and Participation
B. Exercise Setting and Scenario
C. STARTEX Situation
D. Real Life Support
E. Real Life Communications and ADP
F. Public Information Policy
G. Visitors and Observers

PART THREE

EXERCISE CONTROL

Preliminary Pages
Table of contents
Record of Changes

Main Body
DICON Mission
Execution
Service Support
Command and Signal

Annexes

A. DICON Structure
B. Terms of Reference
C. Manning List
D. Location Plan
E. Organisation Timelines
F. Working Schedule
G. Coordination Meetings
H. Real Life Support
I. Communications
J. ADP Support
K. Administration
L. After Action Review
M. First Impression Report

PART 4

MEL/MIL

PART 5

Evaluation Analysis and Reporting

Preliminary Pages
Table of Contents and Effective Pages
Record of Changes
List of Abbreviations
Distribution List

Main Body
As Above

Annexes
A. Evaluation Team
B. Exercise Evaluation
C. Exercise Analysis
D. Real Life Support

ANNEX D

EXERCISE REPORTING AND EVALUATION

POST-EXERCISE DISCUSSION

1.   The aim of a PXD can be achieved through:

    a.   Comments and points of view of the participating
    commanders on the entire exercise or on particular events
    which they took part.

    b.   Discussion of relevant encounters between opposing
    forces and initial assessment of the outcome.

    c.   Discussion of tactics, procedures, use of detection
    and weapon systems and any innovations.

2.   In order to provide a basis for the discussion it will be
necessary for a PXD preparation team to assemble and:

    a.   Determine the topics to be presented on the agenda of
    the PXD. This may include the presentation of a Type A
    analysis, if ordered.

    b.   Collect all relevant data in order to prepare
    presentation material.

    c.   Prepare a broad description of the exercise including
    actions, interactions and other significant events.

    d.   Prepare an introductory briefing for each agenda item.

    e.   Guidelines for the planning, preparation, conduct and
    reporting of a PXD are contained in the following
    paragraphs.

PLANNING

3.   The requirements for a PXD vary considerably with the
nature and scale of an exercise. Instructions should be
promulgated in the EXPI and contain the following:

    a.   Date, time and location of the PXD.

    b.   Level of attendance.

D-1

  c. Administrative arrangements including funding.

  d. Composition and functions of the PXD Preparation Team.

  e. Data requirements and the means of collection. Timetable for the PXD preparation and the facilities required.

  f. Method of presentation.

  g. The PXD Report.

DATA COLLECTION

4. The main source of data for PXD preparation will be message files compiled during the exercise, including First Impression Reports (FIR) from participants. It will be necessary to designate an agency to collect this data and correlate it prior to the assembly of the PXD preparation team.

5. It may be advantageous to specify particular data requirements in the EXPI. In particular, units can be instructed to compile a daily report of location, employment and incidents of note; this is known as a 'Special Daily Message' and the precise format required should be given in the EXPI.

6. Advice on the data required for PXD preparation can be obtained from the Director, PAT whose tasks include a remit to assist OSEs in PXD preparation, if required.

PXD PREPARATION TEAM

7. The Command responsible for the PXD should appoint a senior officer to chair the team. He will have sole authority over the team and responsibility for the content and conduct of the presentation and adherence to the outline described in the EXPI. He will normally observe the exercise as a member of the DICONSTAFF or DISTAFF.

8. At an early stage of planning, the OSE should appoint a PXD Project Officer (PO). He will establish liaison with the Command or Nation hosting the PXD and be responsible for ensuring that the OSE's and Host's requirements are harmonized. The PXD (PO) will be responsible to the Chairman of the PXD Preparation Team.

9.   The size and composition of the team required to prepare
and present a PXD depends on the scope of the exercise. Due to
the short time normally allocated for the preparation, the
number of personnel required should not be underestimated. The
staff requirement should be stated in the EXPI, listing the
qualifications of officers and other ranks to be provided by
each participating command. Names and particulars of the team
members should be ascertained before the start of the exercise.

10.   Particular attention should be paid to the need to provide
a strong element of illustrators in the team for the preparation
of presentation graphics. Presentations, using either view
graphs or PowerPoint, provide the backbone for the PXD and their
preparation is usually a critical factor. PXD Preparation Teams
have, in the past, suffered from inadequate numbers of
illustrators and graphics systems with the consequence that the
personnel involved have worked excessive hours in order to meet
the demands placed upon them. This has inevitably led to errors
and inaccurate presentations.

11.   The preparation of a PXD should begin with a short plenary
session of the Team, conducted by the Chairman. The aim of this
meeting will be to review the data available, debrief those who
are joining the team from dispersed locations and to establish a
selection of items to be presented at the PXD.

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

12.   Administrative arrangements for the PXD Preparation Team
will be the responsibility of the PXD Officer(PO) working in
liaison with the Host Command or Nation.

13.   Administrative arrangements for the PXD properly include,
but are not limited to the following:

    a.   Seating Plan.

    b.   Transportation and accommodation.

    c.   Directions and access to the PXD location.

    d.   Security - including safekeeping of classified
    material.

    e.   Protocol.

    f.   Catering.

    g.   Lighting, ventilation and noise suppression.

    h.   Recording and translation facilities and public address system.

    i.   Provision, operation and maintenance of visual aids.

    j.   Display of NATO and appropriate National flags.

PXD SCRIPT

14. All narratives and summaries should be prepared in the knowledge that they form part of a verbal presentation. The final task of the PXD Preparation Team is to assemble and coordinate all subjects to produce a coherent commentary of the exercise, the PXD script.

15. The aim of the script is to bring out salient points arising from the exercise, not to present statistics. Any data that is considered essential is best presented in the form of simple tables or graphs.

PXD CONDUCT

16. The PXD may take the following general form:

    a.   Opening remarks by the Chairman.

    b.   Summary of events (the PXD script or Type A analysis).

    c.   Short presentations of the individual topics identified by the Preparation Team. Each presentation to be followed by discussion from the floor of the PXD. Widespread participation should be encouraged by the Chairman.

    d.   Final remarks by the major commanders involved in the exercise.

    e.   Concluding remarks by the OCE.

f.   Closing address by the OSE.

17. As discussion is an essential part of the proceedings, sufficient time must be allowed for participants to express their views. Where there is disagreement, discussion should not be prolonged, but the problem noted down for later analysis. Comments should be recorded.

PXD RECORDS

18. 18. If a subsequent analysis is to take place, arrangements should be made to ensure that all records are forwarded to the analysis site.

FINAL EXERCISE REPORT

19. The Final Exercise Report (FER) is the authoritative summary that concludes the exercise reporting process. Actions to correct the deficiencies identified in the FER will continue after the reporting process is complete.

PREPARATION AND CONTENT

20. First Impression Reports, the PXD Report and the exercise analysis report(s), if any, form the basis for the FER. The major recommendations of these supporting reports, confirmed by the OSE, are the focus of the FER. In particular, the OSE should record his validation of any exercise analysis recommendations in the FER.

21. The FER should comprise a brief description of the exercise, major conclusions and recommendations and actions taken or proposed by the reporting command. The report may include direction to subordinates to take specific actions as well as actions proposed to superior commands and external agencies. Recommendations may also be further categorized as follows:

    a.   Those that record errors of judgement or mistakes that are unlikely to recur and which it would be fruitless to pursue further are noted as "Exercise Experiences".

    b.   Those that involve an improvement to exercise planning are noted as "Exercise Planners Recommendations".

c.   Those that involve shortcomings, deficiencies or changes to plans, publications, procedures or other matters that require remedial action by NATO or National authorities are annotated "Remedial Action".

FORMAT FOR A FER

22.   The format for a FER is to be as follows:

a.   Letter of Promulgation. This letter should address any anomalies within the report and give general comments on the exercise.

b.   Exercise Abstract. The details of this section are outlined below.

c.   Exercise Description. This enclosure should provide sufficient information for the unfamiliar reader to gain an appreciation of the concept of operations and objectives of the exercise.

d.   Subject Enclosures. Subject enclosures group together the comments and recommendations addressed in the report by subject area. Subject areas may be warfare areas such as ASW and AAW or other areas such as Exercise Planning, Logistics or Communications that support either the warfare areas or the conduct of the exercise.

e.   Summary of Action Items. This enclosure provides a summary of action items identified by the OSE in the Subject Enclosures.

SECTION 1 EXERCISE ABSTRACT AND EXERCISE DESCRIPTION

23.   This section contains all information on the exercise in a condensed form:

a.   Exercise abstract:

(1) Identification of Exercise (name, form, type, area, date).

(2) OSEs/OCEs.

     (3) Participating commands and forces (in summary tables).

     (4) Exercise aim and objectives.

  b. <u>Exercise Description</u>. Summary account of the exercise (description of the setting, scenario and conduct).

SECTION 2 SUBJECT AREA ENCLOSURES

24. These enclosures should include the following as appropriate:

  a. Issues raised that are peculiar to that particular subject area.

  b. General Comments by the OSE.

  c. Major conclusions and recommendations of the OSE that require action with a clear and concise identification of the action to be taken and the action authority.

  d. The results of trials of tactical doctrine such as EXTACs that were exercised as well as recommendations as to whether the doctrine should be incorporated into tactical publications.

LESSONS LEARNED

25. Lessons Learned are maintained in an electronic database by the NATO PAT. Inputs should be made by use of the Navy Instructional Input Program (NIIP or WinNIIP), if available. Copies of this program can be obtained from the PAT.

26. In the absence of the NIIP or WinNIIP, commands wishing to forward Lessons learned may do so, by message or letter, as described below.

LESSONS LEARNED FORMAT

    a. <u>Title</u>. The title for each specific lesson learned should reflect both the subject area and the nature of the problem. The title should be UNCLASSIFIED and less than 75 characters long.

    b. <u>Observation</u>. A short statement of the problem or action. Try to limit each lesson learned to a single problem or action. If a problem is identified, this paragraph should identify the full problem, not just a symptom. Details are presented in the "discussion" paragraph. An example observation is "Unable to communicate with Air Force aircraft during 'Distant Hammer' because their fighter squadrons are not normally issued with the WXYZ-1234 keylist."

    c. <u>Discussion</u>. Amplifies the observation statement and answers the "who, what, where, when, why and how" questions about the observation. As applicable, the following information should be included:

        (1) <u>Who</u>. Other units involved or in the vicinity that may have had an impact on the observation.

        (2) <u>What</u>. Type of operation; systems/sensors used; equipment settings; tactical situation/constraint; environment.

        (3) <u>Where</u>. Geographic location (LAT/LONG) or general location (e.g. East Med).

        (4) <u>When</u>. Date of observation or period of exercise/ operation/deployment (start date/end date).

d.   Lesson Learned. This paragraph describes the positive action that was taken, or the local/temporary solution to the problem identified; it suggests a new way for doing something, or a way for doing something in spite of the problem (e.g. new tactic utilized; new procedure; new equipment settings. If there was no local or temporary solution to work around the problem, enter "NO SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM WAS FOUND". Avoid restating or rephrasing the problem and concentrate on positive actions take.

e.   Recommended Action. Statement on how to correct the problem permanently and who should make the correction. The lesson learned could require new or modified publications, procurement of new equipment, changing force structure, revising command relationships, improved training, etc. If no corrective action is necessary, enter "NONE" in this paragraph.

f.   Comments. Other information the submitting command wishes to add. Include any reference information here (letters, messages, publications, etc). If the originator is a task force/ group/unit/element commander, then their administrative title should be provided here (e.g. CTG 60.1 was COMCARGRU 4). Validation site comments may be added here if appropriate. Start the comment with "VALIDATION SITE COMMENT" followed by the command name and then the comment (e.g. VALIDATION SITE COMMENT/ COMSECONDFLT).

SUBMISSION OF LESSONS LEARNED

27. Lessons Learned should be compiled using all of the paragraph headings given above and submitted to the PAT, marked "for the attention of SORA". The address is: NATO PAT, NATO HQ, Eastbury Park, Northwood, Middlesex, HA6 3HP, UK. Messages should be addressed to DIRPAT NORTHWOOD.

EXERCISE FUNDING

1.   The requirements for NATO Common Funds are first identified
in the five year Medium Term Financial Plan (MTFP) in which the
individual requirements are presented in order of priority, each
with a brief description, funding, justification, mission input
statement and an estimated cost. The SC's/IMS MTFPs are compiled
from requirements and priorities presented by the individual
headquarters and agencies.

2.   NATO nations will determine a draft Resource Allocation
Figure, an overall funding limit, based on the MTFP and their
ability or preparedness to provide funds.

3.   Each NATO HQ, agencies and programme is thereafter assigned a
Budget Submission Figure equal to the estimated cost of the MTFP
projects which could be accommodated within the Resource
Allocation Figure together with their recurring costs. Within
this Budget Submission Figure the NATO HQs will present their
annual budget with detailed cost figures, operational
justification and impact statement using the format as provided
within the NEDP and NPEDP, or as modified by the Military Budget
Committee (MBC).

EXECUTION CYCLE

4.   Upon approval of the annual budgets, the Fund Managers may
incur expenses as follows:

>   a.   Each request must receive advance financial approval by
>   the Financial Controller and be entered in the accounts as a
>   numbered commitment, or an outstanding obligation, justified
>   by an opened purchase order, contract, or travel order.
>
>   b.   Each invoice received from a supplier must be certified
>   proper for payment (the goods or services have been properly
>   and completely delivered) by the proper authority and be
>   submitted by the relevant Fund Manager to the Financial
>   Controller for payment with reference to the commitment
>   number.
>
>   c.   If during the year of budget execution the actual costs
>   of activities turn out to be different from the budgeted
>   costs the Financial Controllers have the authority within
>   certain limits to transfer funds between separate accounts
>   within the exercise budget. Any substantial changes may also

be addressed in the Mid Year Review in which the MBC will consider justified requests for revision of the budgets.

BUDGETING AND EXECUTION STRATEGY

5.   At the end of a year budget funds are frequently returned unused to the nations. Such funds could have paid for valid projects that were left unfunded at the MTFP stage. Whereas the level of resources allocated made available by nations is beyond control of the staff, leaving funds unused is unnecessary and should be avoided.

6.   The NATO Commanders should continuously re-assess their requirements and inform each other and BUDFIN on any significant changes. Immediately after an exercise the appropriate NATO Commanders should, e.g. compare the number of communication circuits actually activated and transportation actually performed etc. with the planned quantities and advise the respective Fund Manager and BUDFIN of any significant changes.

COMMON COSTS

7.   The following four categories and sub-categories list the types of costs, for which NATO Common Funds may be used within the Exercise Process. The categories and sub-categories are numbered to correspond to the NATO Budget codes.

3210 Administrative Costs

01   Hire of personnel or consultants. Hire of additional temporary personnel or consultants, and overtime payment of civilian personnel in established NATO international and LWR positions.

02   Honorariums. Honorariums are authorised and may be paid for guest speakers when the SC commander believes that the presentation by the speaker warrants the expense and contributes to the training being conducted. Honorariums will not be paid to serving military speakers.

03   Maintenance of Premises and Equipment. Maintenance of internationally owned premises and equipment are to be charged to Headquarters' budget.

04   Utilities. Costs of utilities during the period of the exercise for international headquarters at another place than an already established NATO installation.

05   Stationery and Printing.   Expenditures for stationery
supplies (bulk paper, toner cartridges, etc.) and printing
necessary to conduct an exercise.   Additionally, the cost
for printing press handouts and information packets for DVs,
the media and in the case of NATO-Plus Exercises information
packets or leaflets for civilians in and near the exercise
areas.

06   Maps and Charts.   Expenditures for maps and charts,
along with the cost for developing synthetic exercise maps
and charts.

07   Photographs.   Cost for film, developing, and printing
of photos directly related to the employment of troops
during LIVEXs.

08   Non-ADP Administrative Equipment.   The cost to acquire
and maintain shredders, field deployable copiers, or other
administrative office equipment to be used solely for the
support of exercises (or their development) may be charged
to the exercise programme.   It should be the responsibility
of each RC (OSE) to determine the cost effectiveness of
either leasing or procuring equipment needed to support
exercises.   It is not the intent that exercise funds
be used to circumvent the NATO rules governing the
acquisition of capital equipment within NATO.   Where
purchase is clearly more economical than leasing, budget
submissions should include specific plans for future
utilisation of the equipment and a detailed cost/benefit
analysis.

09   MEWSG Costs.

    a. EW support by MEWSG
    b. Transport of MEWSG assets for EW exercises.

10   Postal Services.   Cost of postage, packaging, and
crating directly related to an exercise.

11   Temporary Facility Rentals.   Costs should primarily be
for the rental of field portable toilets during LIVEXs.
The rental of office accommodations in appropriately
justified cases can be made, but should occur only in
exceptional cases.   Primary efforts should be at
establishing temporary offices, command posts, etc. at NATO
facilities, or at Host Nation military facilities.   NATO

shall not pay "rent" to nations for use of existing national facilities (these are to be considered a national contribution supporting the exercise), however incremental operating costs specifically attributable to NATO HQ support during the exercise may be recovered by the nation on a reimbursable basis. In such cases, the categories and amounts of such costs must be agreed in advance by the NATO HQ in the context of an MOU, MOA, TA, or JIP, and the host nation must provide detailed invoices documenting the extraordinary nature of costs.

12   Temporary Alterations/Construction.   Costs associated with setting up and later removing temporary exercise areas within larger structures (intelligence cells, watch cells, and departments) should be charged here. Construction of facilities that will endure and potentially be used for other than exercises should not be charged to exercise funds, these should be charged to the Headquarters' Budget. It is not the intent to provide an alternate source of construction or maintenance money for real property from the exercise programme.

13   Other Equipment.   The costs to acquire or maintain equipment other than that described per code 3210-08 (administrative) and 3230 (CIS) required by internationally funded organisations for the exercise and not available from NATO inventory. It should be the responsibility of each RC (OSE) to determine the cost effectiveness of either leasing or procuring equipment needed to support exercises. It is not the intent that exercise funds be used to circumvent the NATO rules governing the acquisition of capital equipment within NATO. Where purchase is clearly more economical than leasing, budget submissions should include specific plans for future utilisation of the equipment and a detailed cost/benefit analysis.

14   Miscellaneous administration costs.

15   Contingent liability for target damage (not normally budgeted)

16   Public Relations Costs.   These funds are provided to facilitate presentation of a positive image of the Alliance to DVs and the general public. Exercise public relations funding is not intended to support entertainment of, or post-exercise celebrations for NATO HQ personnel. However, it is recognised that NATO HQ personnel play an important

role in hosting such events, and may be included as participants in strict accordance with SC directives. In view of the sensitivity of this issue, SC may impose additional, detailed constraints on local authority regarding execution of such funding allocations.

3220 Travel Costs.   NATO common funding for exercise transportation is limited to the eligible personnel as detailed per Chapter 7 paragraph 10, and includes the following categories of activity:

a.   Transportation of NATO military members for attendance at planning meetings, exercise site reconnaissance trips, to get to and return from the exercise site, and for post exercise discussion meetings.   NATO common funding may be used to pay the transportation and per diem of NATO civilians who are needed to attend exercises or exercise related meetings. Transportation of visitors is the responsibility of the nations and not reimbursable via common funding.

b.   Vehicle transportation required by internationally common funded organisations at exercise location(s), pre-exercise conferences or post-exercise discussion if not available free of charge (provided by one of the participating nations).

c.   POL for the NATO-owned vehicles for that portion of use directly attributable to an exercise

Travel costs are budgeted as either Vehicle transportation (budget element 21) or Staff Travel (budget element 22). Transportation of forces to the exercise location and the costs of their activities in the field is a national expense to be borne by the participating nations. The only exceptions to this rule are transportation of forces to the exercise area in support of specific AMF(L) exercises in accordance with MC-137, and transport of forces in support of NCF exercises in accordance with MC decisions.

3230 Communication Costs.   Expenditures for communication services and facilities provided solely to fulfil a requirement of the exercise on behalf of the NATO HQ, and downward connectivity to the national force structure in accordance with STANAG 5048. Funding may be used to support provision of theatre-wide infrastructure capabilities that are not attributable to a single nation and collectively benefit both the

NATO HQ and all participating nations. Exercise funding is only authorised to cover the incremental costs, which can be demonstrated to accrue due to NATO exercise activity; the pro-rating of costs of existing NATO or national circuits is not authorised. Following is a list of specific items that are funded via common funding.

    a. Cost for circuits brought in solely to support an exercise at locations other than normal peace or wartime locations.

    b. Circuits, cell-phones, or mobile radios for DISTAFF and umpires, if essential for the control of the exercise and not normally available by the participating nations or NATO organisations.

    c. Separate communication's services (circuits, cell-phones, or mobile radios) for opposing forces. If existing national military or NATO equipment is available it should be used rather than acquiring separate equipment for the exercise.

    d. Charges to set up telephone services for an Allied Press Information Centre (APIC).

    e. Cost to acquire and maintain computers and other CIS equipment to be used exclusively for CAX or other exercise events. Where purchase may be demonstrated to be clearly more economical than lease arrangements, purchase of assets may be requested. In such cases, all normal approvals via ADP/CIS working groups and funding committees will be required. Requests should include a detailed cost/benefits analysis, and should provide detailed plans for the subsequent utilisation of the equipment (all equipment must eventually be rolled into CIS contingency pools or official HQ inventories).

Communications costs are budgeted as:

    31   Reserve Circuits

    32   Added Circuits

    33   Telephone/Telegraph

    34   Miscellaneous Communications/CIS

3240 Hire of Assets.   This category includes the cost of acquiring assets or services not available directly from the member nations needed to support NATO Military Exercises.

41   Merchant ships for use as EW platforms. Use of non-combatant merchant ships for use in maritime boarding and search training.

42   Non-combatant aircraft for use as EW platforms, or for use as target tow aircraft

43   Targets and target services costs

44   Acquisition of CAX support from allied nations via government approved and controlled military sales agreements.