Rethinking the Total Force

PART THREE - COMMITTING TO CHANGE

…reserve force planning is no longer a matter of meeting short-term operational commitments or suiting the political fashion of the day. The Canadian experience has not been to question the worth of the Reserves; the experience of utilising them on peacekeeping operations has militated against that. Instead, Canada has sought to gain value from the force-in-being, while preserving the longer-term capability of the militia to respond in an emergency.

The Goal

From the foregoing examination of the 'conceptual fabric' and the seven 'tests' derived therefrom, it is clear that the Reserve component needs to be aligned with the strategic aims and imperatives of the Defence Establishment. Structured to respond to outdated contingencies and operating in concert with strategic assumptions that are no longer relevant, the Reserves are not capable of the necessary contribution to an effective Total Force. The status quo is not an option; the Reserves must change to meet the requirements of the modern world. The only alternative, in the words of the UK Ministry of Defence, is to risk their slow, but inevitable, 'marginalization and decline'.

Given the critical role played by the Reserves in supporting current CF operations, expanding to meet mobilization objectives, and maintaining links between the CF and local communities, the Department cannot afford to allow the Reserves to become marginalized. It is therefore vital that the Reserve and Regular Force components be brought firmly and quickly into alignment with the conceptual fabric circumscribing the Defence Establishment. The Reserves must become an integral element of the Total Force, responsive to the same imperatives and benefiting from the same initiatives as the other components thereof. The aim of this section is to define the 'way ahead' for the alignment of the Reserves with the aims and means of Canada's Defence Team.

In order to bring the Reserves into alignment with the remainder of the Defence Establishment, they must first be responsive to the long-term objectives set forth by Strategy 2020. Their primary focus must be on the core business - operational capability - with all other considerations, however important and fundamental, relegated to secondary status. The force development process must completely integrate the Reserves, bringing the Reserve component into concert with the same forward-looking analysis and scenario-based planning as the Regular Force, and committing to enabling the Reserves to make an effective contribution to the Total Force package at each stage of mobilization as envisioned by the Mobilization Planning Framework. The Reserves must be oriented in part towards non-traditional functions more in demand in current operational planning. Doing so will increase their integration with the Defence Team, and enable them to contribute the skills and capabilities needed to complement and supplement the Regular Force in responding to contingencies.

Finally, the Reserve alignment must aim to build Reserve Force structures that are affordable, achievable, adaptable, and - most importantly - ready and able to provide multi-purpose, combat-capable soldiers, units, or both, to enable the Canadian Forces to meet present-day contingencies both at home and abroad.

The Alignment Commitment

Portions of the Reserve community, particularly the Militia, continue to view the Reserve restructure process with some scepticism. The Department, for its part, has as a whole been remiss in elucidating the strategic aims, objectives and means by which the process of Reserve restructure will proceed. The Reserve community should not be asked to make an enthusiastic and whole-hearted commitment to the process of change until the nature of and reasons for that change have been clearly spelled out. The foregoing analysis has established the reasons for change, and other processes (such as the Land Force Reserve Restructure) will determine the nature of change through the force development process. But all of this will be for naught unless the primary stakeholders are committed to the process.

What is required is a commitment for the alignment of the Reserve component as a full and integral partner within the Defence Establishment. The purpose of such a commitment would be to enhance confidence in the force development and restructure processes, and to demonstrate solid dedication to change. From the perspective of the Department, this must include a commitment that the end result of the alignment process will be a more vital and effective Reserve Force, supported both by policy and resources, more fully integrated into the Defence Establishment, benefiting from the quality of life initiatives and improvements to human resource management systems, and able to make a more effective contribution to the Total Force capability across the spectrum of conflict and in all stages of mobilization. The Reserve community, for its part, must commit to embrace the necessary structural change, to meet specified levels of recruiting, training and readiness, to actively facilitate better administrative and operational integration, and to serve as the Defence Establishment's fundamental link to the Canadian public.

This final section outlines the fundamental principles of an 'Alignment Commitment' designed to facilitate the revitalization of the Reserves as an integral and indispensable partner within the Defence Team.

First Principle - Give the Reserves a Mission

The Reserve Force as a whole requires an operational mission. As in all military matters, the mission is the start point for conceptual planning, and serves as a touchstone against which the outcome of the planning process may be measured. Although Strategy 2020 provides the Defence Establishment with a mission (cited earlier in this paper), and the Reserves are an integral part of that establishment, it must be recognized that that the Reserves may be expected to fulfil special roles not assigned the other parts of the Defence Team. Neither the White Paper nor the Report of the SCRR attempted to define the Reserve Mission. Doing so is the first and most fundamental step in the alignment process.

The example provided by the UK approach to restructure of the Territorial Army is instructive and serves as a useful model for such a mission. As outlined by the Territorial Army's own leadership, The future TA will have three roles. The role that first and foremost determines its structure will be to provide individuals and formed units as an integral part of the deployable army, with each unit having a clear mission to play an essential part alongside regular forces in operations in support of [national] interests abroad…secondly…to provide a framework upon which larger reserve forces can be built should the country need them. Third, it will contribute to promoting the link between the Army and the civilian community.

These are precisely the same "Fundamental Roles of the Primary Reserve" identified by the Special Commission in its October 1995 Report. Furthermore, the ordering of the roles indicates the priority of each in the overall mission. It is therefore proposed that the Reserve component be assigned the following mission:

THE RESERVE MISSION

The Reserves will, as an essential part of the order of battle, provide individual and formed unit augmentation, at specified states of readiness, for operations across the spectrum of conflict in order to enable the Canadian Forces to mount and sustain operations; build and maintain links between the Canadian Forces and local communities; and expand as directed to achieve national mobilization objectives.

The Reserve Mission will provide the Reserves with a solid foundation upon which they may begin to build the future of the Reserve component as a vital, vibrant and indispensable member of the Defence Team.

Second Principle - Designate Operational Roles for the Reserves

Once the Reserve Mission has been established, it is necessary to assign operational roles before the force development process may proceed. In doing so, it is important to recall one of the policy principles underlying the Mobilization Planning Framework: that both the Vanguard in Stage One and the Main Contingency force in Stage Two are generated, and the former sustained, without alteration to the existing force structure. This means that all components of the Defence Establishment must be structured to fulfil the requirements of up to Stage Two of mobilization. The Reserves must therefore be tasked with, and structured to fulfil, the roles that they are expected to play in the deployment of the Vanguard and the Main Contingency Force.

The US Reserve Forces, particularly the Army Reserve, have been structured to provide the breadth and depth of operational capability required to sustain and augment the regular forces. The United Kingdom is well on the way to doing the same. Both countries have recognized, as Canada has, that high-readiness combat roles are best fulfilled by Regular Forces with Reserve augmentation, while lower-readiness, long-term augmentation and sustainment functions can best be met through use of reserves. The Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) study has identified numerous non-traditional areas where the Militia can make a more effective and necessary contribution to current operations:

Table 2: Traditional and Non-Traditional Militia Roles

MILITIA ROLES
TRADITIONAL	NON-TRADITIONAL
Armour Armoured reconnaissance Field artillery Air defence Artillery Combat engineers Supply Transport Maintenance Medical (field ambulance) Military Police Intelligence	National Level Unit transport NLU movement control NLU supply NLU maintenance NLU engineer Medical (field hospital) Decontamination Administration (including postal) Domestic NBC defence Civil-Military Cooperation Psychological Operations

While the MOS Review has identified a continuing need for a certain proportion of combat arms augmentation to enable the Main Contingency Force to deploy in Stage Two of mobilization, it has likewise identified nearly as great a need for more service support functions, particularly within the National Level Units (NLUs). In these areas, the Reserves can provide important supplementary skill sets, adding depth to those capabilities already existing in the Regular Force. In addition, and in some cases more importantly, the Reserves can be structured and called upon to provide vital complementary skills, furnishing capabilities not resident in the Regular Forces, but which are nonetheless required to enable the Defence Establishment to fulfil its mandate.

In short, the Alignment Commitment must establish clearly which operational roles the Reserves are expected to fulfil in the various stages of mobilization, in accordance with the results of the MOS Review.

Third Principle - Complete the Force Development process

Once the Reserve Mission has been defined and operational roles outlined, the force development process that has been under way for years in the rest of the Defence Establishment must be extended to the Reserves. The Land Force Reserve Restructure is the spearhead of this process, and must be brought to its logical conclusion as rapidly as is consistent with a thorough and exacting approach. The Reserve, particularly the Militia, force structure is antiquated and designed to respond to contingencies which, today, are at best remote. The new Reserve restructure must respond to the clear requirement to provide, in the words of the UK MOD, "highly trained and properly resourced forces to support the Regular Army."

The outcome of the force development process may lead to some Reserve units being assigned roles and tasks different from those they currently hold. It is important that the Reserve community recognize that such changes, where implemented, are necessary to provide the Defence Team as a whole with the balance of capabilities it needs to meet the commitments made in the White Paper. The corollary of this, of course, is that Reserve units that are restructured to provide vital breadth or depth of capability will be far more likely to be called upon to provide that capability for ongoing operations than they have been to date.

Fourth Principle - Guarantee the Provision of Resources

As the foregoing citation suggests, any new Reserve Force structure will be meaningless without proper resource levels. The Reserve Force must, as a pre-condition, be given a guarantee by the Defence Establishment that they will be provided with the necessary resources - personnel, equipment and funding - to carry out the alignment process, and develop and maintain the force structure necessary to meet Canada's defence aims. No less than the Defence Establishment as a whole, the Reserve component needs stable and predictable funding in order to be able to conduct strategic planning; Regular Force personnel credits to provide full-time support; and regular and unimpeded access to the equipment they need to carry out their assigned roles. This means that where the Reserve is assigned supplementary or "depth" roles, they must be provided with the same equipment as their Regular Force colleagues; and where they are assigned complementary or "breadth" roles, dedicated Reserve equipment must be purchased and provided.

In aligning its own reserves, the UK Ministry of defence has committed itself to training the Territorial Army to operate "modern battle-winning equipments", including but not limited to the CHALLENGER 2 main battle tank, the AS 90 self-propelled howitzer, and the RAPIER air defence system. The Territorial Army will therefore be required to operate the most modern equipment in the British Army inventory. If the Alignment Commitment is to be credible to the Reserve community, the Canadian Defence Establishment can do no less. The Reserves, for their part, must commit to good stewardship of their assigned resources, and to proper conduct of business in accordance with the standards set for the Defence Team as a whole.

Fifth Principle - Set and Meet Enhanced Readiness Levels

If the Reserves are to be expected to participate in current operations as an integral element of the Total Force, then the readiness levels of units - particularly those providing complementary or "breadth" skill sets - must be significantly enhanced. Units must be recruited, trained - both individually and collectively - and equipped to meet their operational tasks. Again, this will require assigning the Reserves the resources necessary to the task. Readiness levels must be specified, and the Reserves held to them.

An important consequence of this review is that more [reserve] units will be placed at significantly higher states of readiness to reflect the increased likelihood that they will be…called out. This means that we plan for all units in the new structure to be fully recruited, manned and resourced to meet these new readiness requirements.

This area will be the most demanding for the Reserves under the new force structure; once recruiting levels, training standards and states of readiness have been assigned, it will be up to individual Reserve units to meet the requirements imposed by the Department. This will be a challenge, but doubtless one that will be welcomed by the Reserves.

Sixth Principle - Make the Best Use of Our People

Finally, if the Reserves are to be considered an integral part of the Defence Team, then they must be treated as such. The Reserve senior leadership must be welcomed and encouraged to participate in strategic planning and force development processes. The Defence Team stands to derive considerable benefit from the contributions that can be made to the force development process by highly-skilled Reserve Force personnel, many of whom possess valuable leadership and management skills developed and enhanced in the course of their civilian careers.

On an individual level, this means that, within the scope of policy, they must enjoy the same access to, and receive the same benefits from, ongoing quality of life and human resource management initiatives as their Regular Force brethren. Existing programs and systems must be homogenized to eliminate, as far as possible, the artificial administrative barriers between Regular and Reserve Force personnel.

The SCRR Report criticized the amount of "red tape" extant in the Reserve personnel administrative system. Although some of these problems have since been eliminated or resolved, much more remains to be done. Programs and services that require review and alignment include but are not limited to recruiting, pay and benefits, career mobility, recognition of service, professional development, training and education, medical care and easy transfer between components. Easing the Byzantine labyrinth of regulations and administrative procedures that currently exist will go a long way towards making the Reserves, to paraphrase Strategy 2020, a "part-time career of choice" for all Canadians. As Ryan has noted in his criticism of Australia's reserve restructure process,

…no action plan for employing reservists can afford to ignore the reality that they represent a different form of human resource…Pretending that reservists are only 'part-time regulars' ignores the fact that their work patterns, professional and family obligations, and career structures are generally very different from those of full-time soldiers.

The differences in availability, career paths and obligations of Reservists, properly managed, are assets to be exploited rather than liabilities to be feared. If this principle is adhered to the Department and the Reserves alike, then the Defence Team will be able to capitalize upon those differences, and leverage them to the benefit of all.

Conclusion

The autumn 1999 Chief of the Defence Staff Issue Seminar included an exercise in which syndicates, consisting of most of Canada's General and Flag officers, were required to design a military response to an operational contingency. Three scenarios were discussed, ranging from a terrorist incident on Canadian soil to a medium-intensity conventional conflict in an overseas theatre. While syndicate solutions differed, all participants reached the same fundamental conclusion: that in order for the Canadian Forces to be able to provide a multi-purpose, combat-capable response to the threat, full integration of the Reserve Force from the outset was indispensable.

There is no going back; the Canadian Forces cannot meet its commitments without the Reserves, and the Reserves cannot make the necessary contribution to the total operational capability without alignment. It is time for the process to proceed, and the Alignment Commitment will provide a solid foundation upon which to build the future of the Total Force.

Aligning the Reserves to make them a full and integral part of the conceptual fabric circumscribing the Defence Establishment will entail a fundamental cultural shift. As the administrative and operational differences between Regular and Reserve Force personnel gradually dissolve, the Defence Establishment will slowly evolve from a component-based to an employment-based organization. Eventually, differences will either have been eliminated or will have degenerated to the point where the only visible means of distinguishing between two soldiers will be that one works full-time, and the other part-time. Fundamental differences will not be erased, but their collective impact on the operational capability of the Total Force can be greatly reduced.

Finally, there must be a firm and sustained commitment to change - by Government, by the leadership of the Department and the Forces, by the Regular Forces, by the Reserve community and by all other stakeholders. Only through solid dedication to change can the Alignment Commitment be brought to fruition. The outcome of the process must be a viable, effective and affordable Total Force structure; one that is wholly integrated into the Defence Establishment and able to make a meaningful and cost-effective contribution to the core business. The Alignment Commitment will give the Reserve Force vital and clearly-defined functions within the Total Force - functions upon which Canada will be able to rely to enable the Canadian Forces to fulfil their mandate as effectively in the years to come as they have in the past.