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FOREWORD

1. *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War* is written at the operational level and constitutes an amplifying doctrinal publication to Chapter 30 of *B-GG-005-004/AF-000, CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONS* Manual. This manual is *proactive* in its outlook and is primarily based on NATO CIMIC doctrine, but also relies on U.S. Civil Affairs doctrine and UK experiences, CF lessons learned and a wide source of reference material. The manual is written for the Canadian Forces and a wide civil audience of stakeholders and partners who will be asked to cooperate and coordinate their respective efforts and activities, including likely participation in the preparation phase with a military force. This collaborative effort will require a sense of cultural awareness from a military force to gain the trust and confidence of civilian agencies.

2. A *systemic* approach in dealing with civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) issues is adopted throughout this manual and applies to civil-military cooperation conducted in both domestic and international operations. The two aspects of civil-military cooperation which concern this manual are civil-military cooperation operations and support to civil administration. The manual further distinguishes article 5 operations, which are based on the NATO Charter and which require NATO leadership, from non-article 5 operations, such as a PSO, which are UN or OSCE led and which NATO could support with military forces.

3. CIMIC is a command function and responsibility. *Unity of command* for a military force is critical to achieve *unity of purpose* and *unity of effort* among all stakeholders and partners. The increasing number of non-military personnel, IOs, NGOs and UN agencies involved in UN or OSCE led operations, fuel the problem of integrating and coordinating civil and military activities and efforts to achieve unity of purpose and unity of effort in an area of operations. This reality is further complicated by divergent organizational cultures and fields of interest, competing with the military for scarce theatre resources which must be managed and attributed on a priority basis. Cooperation and coordination of CIMIC activities and operations are critical to achieving mission objectives to save lives, provide humanitarian assistance, stop the fighting and create the civil conditions for a sustainable peace. Notwithstanding, a TFC must recognize that the military force has no legal authority or command responsibility over civilian agencies, except when authorized by SOFAs, international or domestic laws.

4. It is important to have CIMIC planning coherence at the strategic, operational and tactical levels for both deliberate (campaign) and time-sensitive planning, such as for civil-military cooperation operations. This effort requires a detailed civil-military cooperation operations (CMO) estimate (also called CIMIC estimate) during the preparatory phase of an operation. The formulation of a coherent rehabilitation and reconstruction strategy among stakeholders and partners, particularly when faced with complex emergencies, is imperative *prior* to the deployment phase of a military operation. Military operations have two complementary phases: a military phase and a civil phase. The focus of this manual is on civil tasks conducted in both phases of military operations. There will always be a minimal level of civil tasks carried out in the *military phase* as well as a minimal level of military tasks in the *civil phase*. Military and civil phases are sequential but military and civil tasks are often carried out simultaneously in each phase.

5. The civil phase seeks to *minimize* military interference with the local population as well as *minimize* interference by the local population with the orderly conduct and completion of civil-military operations and support to civil administration. The civil phase also seeks to *maximize* the effects of humanitarian assistance and operations for the benefit of the local populace. Thus, the manual puts great emphasis on the synergy created by CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA as a *force multiplier* and on *Force protection* encompassing individual and material *security*, *safety* of personnel in their daily tasks (driving, weapons handling, general safety); and *health* matters essential to the well-being of civilian and military personnel. Force protection applies to military and civil tasks with an emphasis on deterring any radical element wishing to disrupt international efforts in peace building.

6. The manual covers all aspects of CIMIC issues such as refugees, internally displaced persons and human rights which involve political, military and civil elements characterized by divergent mandates and objectives. UN or OSCE peace-support operations are increasingly complex due to the difficulty of integrating military operations with humanitarian assistance programs (UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, UNESCO...), the protection of human rights, (UNHCHR) and economic rehabilitation (UNDP), in addition to managing the divergent interests of former warring factions. Furthermore, clear and concise policy guidelines will facilitate the issuing of clear military direction as well as adequate performance measurements of military operations. Two methods are proposed: *measures of*

effectiveness (MOE), which measure the success in executing military operations; and *normality indicators*, which measure improvements in the quality of life of the populace.

7. To carry out effective and efficient civil-military cooperation operations and support to civil administration, it is important to train realistically and deploy a military force with capabilities to deter radical elements and sustain military operations. A military force must also be capable of providing Force protection under worst-case scenarios to military personnel, as well as civilian agencies in an area of operations. In an unpredictable and unstable environment, a military force may have to launch combat operations to protect the civil phase. It is imperative that sea, land and air elements include in their annual training calendar, realistic programmes involving civilian agencies and civil police elements. Training for conventional operations remains an effective way of preparing for selected civil tasks, but the operational requirement for formalized training and CF civil-military cooperation structure to deal with complex emergencies, is increasing. Such activities and operations require a responsive, flexible, versatile and sustaining logistic system to achieve mission objectives, the TFC's end state and the civil-military end state.

8. CF civil-military cooperation doctrine is an evolutionary process and will improve as lessons are learned.

PREFACE

1. *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War* characterizes military operations in the domestic and international environments. The operational environment varies from peace support operations, military operations other than war to combat. Each military operation has a military phase and a civil phase during which civil-military activities will be carried out to varying degrees, as dictated by the tactical situation. Notwithstanding, civil-military cooperation will be most effective during the civil phase when civil conditions have been created to foster economic recovery and infrastructure rehabilitation. Force protection of military personnel and civil agencies will act as a deterrent against radical elements to facilitate the execution of civil tasks.
2. This manual seeks to formalize civil-military cooperation activities, operations and force structure by CF elements, moving away from strict reliance on *ad hoc* arrangements. This formalization is particularly important in *complex emergencies* which usually involve peace enforcement and warring factions, coupled with urgent humanitarian assistance and varying levels of threat involving a civilian police force and possible military operations. It has become necessary to *cooperate* with civil stakeholders in a given area of operations, namely international organizations, non-governmental organizations and UN agencies, and to *coordinate* civil-military activities and operations to achieve unity of purpose and unity of effort.
3. This manual is divided in 11 chapters focussed primarily on the operational level. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 provide an introduction to civil-military cooperation issues. *Chapter 1* introduces civil-military cooperation and discusses first principles, CIMIC campaign vision, design, CIMIC campaign joint planning concept and process. *Chapters 2 and 3* address the two aspects of civil-military cooperation: civil-military cooperation operations (CMO) and support to civil administration, respectively. These three chapters describe civil-military cooperation issues and the scope of CIMIC activities, and provide CIMIC planning guidelines for the civil phase of military operations.
4. Chapters 4 and 5 are pivotal chapters which discuss civil-military cooperation in domestic operations and international operations, respectively. At this stage, the manual is progressing from a general introduction to specific operational environments. *Chapter 4* recognizes and formalizes civil-military cooperation in *domestic operations*, and spells out the roles and functions of various organizations at the three levels of government. This chapter provides guidance to conduct civil-military cooperation operations and support to civil administration conducted or to be conducted under domestic laws. *Chapter 5* discusses among other relevant topics, CIMIC planning and operational considerations, a concept of operations; the requirement for a civil-military coordination centre (CMCC); cultural awareness; and, command and control in *international operations*. This chapter is based on NATO civil-military cooperation doctrine (MC 411) and the NATO Combined Joint Task Force civil-military structure.
5. Chapters 6 to 10 provide operational service support concepts and elements in domestic and international operations. *Chapter 6* discusses the role, functions, responsibilities, tasks, command and control of civilian and military police in military operations. *Chapter 7* raises an operational requirement for a synergy between civil-military cooperation, psychological operations and public affairs in which the management of information and synchronization of activities are key to success. A PSYOPS capability and force structure are required in Canada for education, training, exercises and operations. The synergy of CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA is critical to the success of international and specific domestic operations.
6. *Chapter 8* focuses on low level negotiation techniques and negotiation to achieve contractual agreements in civil-military support to a host nation. *Chapter 9* provides a methodology to commanders to measure the effectiveness of military operations and normality indicators to assess civil progress towards a desired quality of life. *Chapter 10* discusses financial considerations for civil-military activities conducted in domestic and international operations. *Chapter 11* enhances military training and exercises to further Canadian Forces civil-military education, training and exercises on civil-military matters.
7. The list of chapters apply to the full range of civil-military cooperation activities and operations, but their scope will need to be adapted to the type of operation, the nature and levels of threat and risk, as well as the scope of civil tasks in an area of operations. This manual provides fundamental principles, guidelines and direction to focus civil-military cooperative efforts. Commanders at all levels will need to exercise *judgement* in applying the guidance it provides to achieve the mission.

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CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

“Whatever we call these operations, peace enforcement or peacekeeping, they will require a civilian component and a civilian-military interface. That’s been the case of all these operations in the past and most certainly in Bosnia and it will be one of the key lessons learned for the future.” - Mr. Carl Bildt, The High Representative, May 1996

“What is the relationship between a just-arrived military force and the NGOs and PVOs that might have been working in a crisis-torn area all along? What we have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful, and, if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other.” - General J.M. Shalikashvili, USA, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

101. INTRODUCTION

1. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) has always been an integral part of the military profession, whether it be civilian assistance in preparation for war, or military assistance in a nation’s economic recovery and infrastructure rehabilitation, such as was the case in Europe after the Second World War under the Marshall Plan. CIMIC activities and operations have become an integral part of military operations and help to achieve politico-military objectives in domestic and international operations. In the past, the CF has conducted CIMIC activities and operations through ad hoc arrangements, relying primarily on its organic military capabilities to carry out minor and major civil-military projects. To exploit potential force multiplier effects, CIMIC must now be considered an essential element of Canadian military operations and must formally be considered in the TFC’s plans. The complexities and scope of CIMIC require commanders at all levels of command to understand that civil-military problems are best resolved through civil-military relationships focussed on a multidisciplinary approach to problem-solving. CIMIC encompasses the application of military capabilities to civilian concerns and civilian capabilities to support the military mission. Throughout all military operations, CIMIC activities and operations, involving political, military, civil and humanitarian elements will inevitably be focused on three central tasks: preventing further bloodshed, resolving an (armed) conflict and ensuring a lasting peace.

2. CIMIC, whether domestic or international, is a *command responsibility* and requires *leadership* from the highest military appointments in cooperation with the heads of civilian agencies. CIMIC will be conducted in or near populated areas where the threat varies from peaceful to armed conflict and in territories where domestic and international laws apply. In this context, CIMIC is essential to enhance operational effectiveness (leadership, training, equipment) and achieve the TFC’s military objectives. The operational environment, the relevant adequacy and stability of civil infrastructure as well as the level of support and cooperation from the HN and the local population, will determine the extent of the civil-military interface required to attain these objectives.

3. CIMIC requires that military commanders, all levels of government and the civilian population work together and mutually support one another in peace, emergencies, crisis and war. Responsive information and logistic systems regardless of time and space, terrain, weather and climate will greatly facilitate the interrelationship between civil and military authorities to conduct civil-military cooperation operations (CMO) and support civil administration. DND and CF relationships with OGDs, IOs, NGOs and the Canadian federal, provincial and municipal levels of government must become a SOP in order that CIMIC can benefit from specialists and civil resources available in the non-military environment. CIMIC is a *force multiplier* which will greatly contribute to the success of the mission. CIMIC encompasses two distinct aspects: CMO and support to civil administration.

4. Figure 1-1 illustrates the spectrum of conflict and continuum of operations in which CIMIC activities can be carried out. The nature of the security environment within which nations interact can be depicted as a spectrum of conflict which ranges from peace at one end to total war at the other. This figure is not designed to formulate specific actions or responses but to be seen as an analytical tool at the strategic level to help understand the relationship between peace, emergencies, crisis or war. It also illustrates the kinds of military operations which could involve maritime, land and air elements, that take place within different operational and security environments. A few explanations on figure 1-1 are necessary:

- a. **conflict escalation.** Nations can all be placed somewhere on the spectrum of conflict, a few enjoying relative peace, while many nations are either in a state of conflict or even war. When peace is threatened, disputes can lead to threats or coercion which in turn create a crisis or conflict. In the international environment, when preventive diplomacy, negotiations or mediation fail to resolve the conflict, the parties may evolve the conflict to war to achieve their national objectives.

- b. **military response.** Figure 1-1 is useful to identify and associate appropriate military responses with a particular security condition or conflict situation from a *generic* perspective. Thus, the strategic military response in conditions of peace and conflict are *operations other than war (OOTW)*; during actual war it is *warfighting*. OOTW are very broad in scope and for the CF may range from assistance to civil authorities at home to the evacuation of non-combatants or PSO abroad possibly involving belligerent forces/FWF. *Warfighting*, on the other hand, is the implementation of strategy aimed at imposing our will on an *enemy* to achieve national politico-military objectives through the application of decisive military means. The use of force in *warfighting* is required to defeat the enemy/adversary and is governed by the tactical situation. ROE apply to both domestic and international operations.

- c. **combat and non-combat operations.** The CF operating in an environment of conflict must be able to conduct both combat and non-combat operations, often simultaneously. The mix of *combat* (armed patrols, confiscation of weapons, demining...) and *non-combat* (distribution of relief supplies, re-building schools and clinics...) which characterize OOTW have required that they be clearly defined to ensure that the role and potential tasks of CF elements committed to an AO, including the risks, are clearly understood by civilian policy makers and military planners. Combat operations do not necessarily entail application of violence. Indeed, desired outcomes are often achieved, merely on the assumption that if it came to fighting, an adversary would be destroyed. Hence, whenever CF elements are deployed to an AO, they must be prepared, trained and equipped to undertake both kinds of operations. For a TFC, it is important to ensure that victims and vulnerable populations are able to clearly distinguish these two roles since experience has shown that incorrect perceptions and a lack of understanding of who is doing what often attracts misguided aggression. Every effort should be made by the TFC and TFHQ staff to separate combat from non-combat operations and to delineate them in a visible manner. The *transparency* of ongoing operations is crucial to attain mission objectives.




Figure 1-1 The Spectrum of Conflict and Continuum of Operations

102. AIM

1. The aim of this manual is to provide CF commanders and their staff with the appropriate guidance to plan, coordinate, conduct and control civil-military cooperation operations and support to civil administration, in cooperation with civil agencies, in times of peace, emergencies, crisis and war in all CF operations.

103. CANADIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY STATEMENT - CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

1. The Government of Canada has identified three key, interdependent and mutually-reinforcing objectives for its international actions:

- a. **The promotion of prosperity and employment.** Canada wishes to see other countries and regions prosper. Thus helping anchor international stability and make progress towards sustainable development.
- b. **The promotion of global peace as the key to protecting Canadian security.** Stability and security are prerequisites for economic growth and development. A whole range of issues that transcend borders, namely mass migration, crime, disease, environment, overpopulation and underdevelopment have peace and security implications at the local, regional and, in many cases, the global level.
- c. **The projection of Canadian values and culture is important to Canadian success in the world.** Application of values - respect for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the environment - is critical to the struggle for international security in the face of new threats to stability. Their adoption internationally is essential to ensuring they are viable within Canada.

2. The prevention of conflicts and peace building are essential goals to protect Canadian security within a stable global framework. *Preventive diplomacy* can be undertaken by multilateral institutions (UN, NATO...), regionally or bilaterally with regional security organizations (OSCE, OAS, OAU...) encouraged to foster confidence-building and security measures to prevent conflict. *Peace building*, the process of reinforcing efforts to build peace through economic and institutional rehabilitation is critical to sustaining the efforts of local populations and of the international community in resolving conflicts. Canada's international assistance program will foster peace building through technical assistance to strengthen the capacity of societies emerging from conflict to meet the needs and aspirations of their populace. In a post-conflict period, CIDA will channel funds for reconstruction and rehabilitation projects through Canadian embassies.

3. Canadian foreign policy is an external dimension of domestic policy, seen as a continuum, concerned with three dominant questions of high politics: international order, peace and war. Foreign policy decisions are the outcome of governmental politics influenced by international and domestic concerns as well as policy constraints. Civil-military cooperation reflects this dynamic and ideally seeks to create an environment conducive to stable and harmonious human relations where all levels of society can benefit from economic prosperity and development. The end state of civil -military cooperation is to achieve a sustainable peace and quality of life; a mirror image of Canadian beliefs, values and interests in the world.

4. **CF CIMIC Capability.** The CF has no CIMIC dedicated troops. The CF is primarily involved in CIMIC through *ad hoc arrangements* and specialist skills organic to formations and units, including limited resources in CIMIC and PSYOPS qualified personnel. The CF has no formalized CF CIMIC structure at the strategic, operational or tactical levels beyond a limited organizational capability known as J5 Branch, organic to the Joint Headquarters (JHQ) in Kingston. The JHQ is the national headquarter at the operational level. The J5 Branch is mandated for domestic and international operations as a permanent component of any commitment, but its final structure is mission and task dependent. It is structured to include a permanent cadre staff which would be expanded to integrate primary and secondary augmentees from the three environments and the Primary Reserve, once the mission and tasks are known. The DART is primarily an emergency humanitarian asset encompassing a CIMIC dimension.

104. MISSION OF DND AND THE CF

1. As an instrument of national policy, the CF protects and defends the national interest at home and abroad.

CF operations, are complemented by CIMIC activities and associated tasks which may be carried out simultaneously at varying degrees, as the tactical situation allows. CIMIC is an important aspect of the Defence Team mission statement reflected in Defence 2000 and DPG 99: "**The mission of DND and the CF is to defend Canada and Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace and security.**"

105. RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMMANDERS

1. CIMIC is the responsibility of all stakeholders and partners. The CF and the international bodies with which the CF conduct operations recognize the importance of CIMIC, particularly when dealing with complex emergencies comprising one or several of the following conditions: the collapse of political authority (fragile or failed state); widespread civil (armed) conflict which may involve ethnic cleansing; massive population displacement; human rights abuses on a nationwide scale; food shortages; public health emergencies; and economic collapse. Some complex emergencies are exacerbated by natural disasters and severely inadequate local transport networks, making it impossible for one actor to resolve these problems by himself. Commanders are to take the initiative in CIMIC activities and be aware of the political dimension of PSO, OOTW and combat in post-conflict peace building, such as HN policy impacts or attempts by belligerent forces/WWF to control the humanitarian distribution system for their own benefit. Commanders will:

- a. plan for national, military and civil support, and prepare appropriate CIMIC annexes to their OPLAN. It is crucial that joint civil-military strategic and operational planning be conducted and coordinated to ensure coherence at the tactical level (execution of tasks). These efforts translate into participation by available Canadian and international civilian agencies in the reconnaissance group and in-country joint planning, as well as pre-deployment planning, education, training and joint exercises. Commanders must liaise with the theatre humanitarian coordinator to confirm the politico-humanitarian objectives and obtain the UN or NATO led civil-military campaign plan to assist him in formulating the CIMIC annex to the OPLAN;
- b. be prepared to support, on request, civil authorities in the implementation of residence control and evacuation measures (collecting and maintaining information on population movement);
- c. give the national authorities such *assistance*, consistent with the military situation, as may be requested. This involvement requires clear guidelines from the Canadian Government and DND as to the areas of CIMIC commanders are authorized to get involved in and which correspond to national interests. The other aspect of this involvement is *financial* as spending of public funds is subject to strict guidelines and procedures, especially in the case of major and minor projects;
- d. be aware of NATO or UN policy and guidance on the planning, conduct and coordination of CIMIC activities. Developing civil-military relationships and cultural awareness among stakeholders is required;
- e. investigate the potential mutual support and assistance the military force and civilian agencies can provide each other to maximize the use of scarce resources in an AO. This must be achieved in the mission preparation phase by liaison with IOs and NGOs in domestic and international operations; and
- f. provide *Force protection*, within limitations, and formulate a *public security plan* (chapter 6) and *evacuation plan* for stakeholders and partners, consistent with the military force's exit strategy (chapter 5, article 517).

106. CANADIAN OBJECTIVES IN CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

1. The main objective of CIMIC is to achieve the necessary cooperation between civil authorities and the CF with a view to improving the probability of success of CF operations. CIMIC, when conducted in an impartial, neutral and independent manner in the eyes of national authorities and the local population, is a *force multiplier*. Notwithstanding, a TFC must be aware that some IOs and NGOs will conduct themselves in a manner which does not permit them to promote or associate with any political ideologies, such as national objectives or interests. The uniqueness of the ICRC, which stems from its mandate and role in the Geneva Conventions, separate it from typical IOs and NGOs, OGDs and agencies. In CF operations, CIMIC objectives are to:

- a. support Canadian national interests;

- b. fulfil obligations imposed by domestic law (eg. NDA and Criminal Code) and international law (eg. Law of Armed Conflict, International Human Rights Law), the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols of 1977, Treaties and such memoranda of understanding (MOU) and agreements, or technical arrangements reached between national authorities or parties;
- c. advise, assist or reinforce foreign governments IAW national policy and operational requirements;
- d. support the TFC's mission and COO;
- e. support specific Canadian politico-military objectives in the theatre or AO;
- f. assist TFCs, in support to civil administration, in achieving developmental goals by assisting or reinforcing the judicial, executive and legislative branches of government, as well as political and socio-economic infrastructure to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of public institutions and civil services;
- g. facilitate the TFC's mission by minimizing interference by the local population in the military phase of an operation while obtaining civil support for the civil phase and associated tasks;
- h. assist the TFC in meeting legal and moral obligations to the local population;
- i. assist all commander's by providing those resources necessary to meet essential civil requirements, avoiding damage to civil property and usable resources, and minimizing loss of life and human suffering, assuming a dedicated CIMIC organization is available;
- j. identify and coordinate the use of local resources, facilities and support such as civilian labour, transportation, communications, maintenance, medical facilities and supplies to restore local government;
- k. support, as required, IOs, NGOs, the UN and OSCE, as well as NATO or national civilian agencies, in all types of civil-military cooperation and PSO, to a level specified by the Government or NDHQ; and
- l. assist Canadian and foreign civil authorities in creating, restoring and maintaining public law and order.




Figure 1-2 The Operational Environment

22. In its operational task list, NATO recognizes the operational requirement to coordinate and provide CIMIC in an AO. Alliance Operational level task 4.5.1 reads: *to coordinate activities in support of military operations in an AO that foster the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population, and that develop favourable emotions, attitudes, or behaviour in neutral, friendly or hostile groups.* We must be very specific in our expectation of the functions to be performed. Figure 1-2 illustrates the spectrum of operations in which the CF can be expected to be involved, whether under the auspices of NATO, the UN or in domestic operations; all from a *specific* perspective. It depicts potential missions: *PSO* are those operations conducted in an attempt to prevent war or to assist in the transition from war to peace; *OOTW* are those military operations conducted during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily degenerate into armed conflict; and *combat* is the inevitable result of failed diplomatic efforts. OOTW will involve the efforts of OGDs, civilian agencies, the three levels of government as authorized by domestic laws and jurisdiction, IOs, NGOs and UN agencies. The operational environment will dictate the level of cooperation among stakeholders and partners.

107. GENERAL POLITICAL-HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVES

1. The political-humanitarian objectives sought through the cooperation of factional leaders, factional police and civil authorities, who will require education to overcome inherent resistance to change, can be summarized as follows:

- a. establish the primacy of the rule of law as the foundation of a civil society, including an impartial judicial system;
- b. integrate social justice and tolerance in daily lives, regardless of race, religion or creed;
- c. integrate as a social norm, the right to life and to a fair trial for all human beings;
- d. establish and maintain law and order to achieve a sustainable peace;
- e. instil respect of human rights by political, military/paramilitary and religious leaders, civil authorities, factional police and all segments of the population;
- f. introduce and/or reinforce basic human freedoms, to include: freedom of conscience, freedom of thought and beliefs, freedom of religion, freedom of speech/expression and freedom of movement; and
- g. establish basic human services: public health and medical care, public welfare, public safety, public utilities, public works and transportation, education and a sustainable economic infrastructure.

108. PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND RELEVANT TASKS

1. The planning and conduct of CIMIC will occur at varying degrees, in any UN or OSCE led PSO, which NATO supports with military forces (non-article 5 operations), or through multinational ad hoc arrangements. PSO is defined in Military Committee(MC) 327/1 as **those multi-functional operations conducted impartially in support of a UN or OSCE mandate involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies, designed to achieve a long term political settlement or other condition specified in the mandate in which multinational forces may be used for peacekeeping and/or peace enforcement. They include conflict prevention, peace building, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement and humanitarian operations.**

2. The overall success of a military operation is judged on more than purely military factors. Any assessment of the military stability must be blended with political, developmental, economic, social, cultural, environmental and humanitarian considerations to achieve the required end state. To understand the implications of CIMIC, PSO definitions and main activities defined in MC 327/1 are provided as follows:

- a. **Conflict Prevention.** Includes different activities, in particular, under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (settlement of disputes by a variety of peaceful measures, including negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement - Article 33) ranging from preventive diplomacy to preventive

deployment of troops. Conflict Prevention can include fact finding missions, consultation, warning, inspections and monitoring. Although CIMIC is an important command function throughout the spectrum of conflict, it is of great use to UN and NATO commanders in the prevention or resolution of conflict, as political pressures create a need to cooperate.

- b. **Peace Building.** Covers actions which support political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and military structures aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlements in order to redress the causes of a conflict. Peace building includes mechanisms to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic recovery, infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction. It will usually require military as well as civilian involvement. Tasks for the military component of peace building efforts could include:
- (1) supervising the withdrawal of forces from demarcation lines;
 - (2) ensuring the withdrawal of heavy weapons to interim or final locations;
 - (3) arms control and verification (ACV);
 - (4) monitoring external borders;
 - (5) supervising the exchange of prisoners and the movement of refugees and IDPs;
 - (6) assisting in the restoration of civil infrastructure which may require the planning and execution of major and minor engineering projects;
 - (7) assisting in de-mining and EOD operations;
 - (8) supporting the establishments of new political structures;
 - (9) assisting in the restoration or establishment of civil administration and law and order;
 - (10) supervising the relocation or demobilisation of warring factions, regular and paramilitary forces as well as the monitoring and enforcing of zones of separation and military barracks/cantonments;
 - (11) assisting in the training of hostile military officers in the principles and practices of the military in support of a democratically elected civilian government; and
 - (12) mediating or negotiating *intellectual property rights* or issues (licences, patents, trademarks, copyrights, know-how). Belligerent forces/FWF could have seized or occupied the territory of another faction or sovereign country and seized intellectual property (industrial designs, business, R&D, software, information technology...). Peace building and peacemaking in PSO, or following an armed conflict, could require mediation or negotiation for the return of such property to its rightful owner(s). At present, the UN through its specialized institution of the *World Organization for Intellectual Property*, promotes and protects intellectual property throughout the world by fostering cooperation between States and administrative cooperation among nations. Notwithstanding, the Geneva Conventions and the Additional 1977 Protocols do not raise or address the issue of intellectual property in PSO, OOTW or war.
- c. **Peacekeeping.** The containment, moderation and/or termination of hostilities between or within States, through the medium of an impartial third party intervention, organised and directed internationally with the *consent* of all Parties to a conflict to monitor and facilitate implementation of a peace agreement. The word *peacekeeping*, also known as classic or traditional PSO, is not specifically used in the UN Charter, but is generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Possible tasks include:
- (1) **Observation.** Observer missions may be assigned a wide range of tasks, any one of which could be the main purpose for the PSO. Probable tasks include:

- (a) observing cease-fire and demarcation lines as agreed by the parties;
 - (b) confirming the withdrawal of forces from the area;
 - (c) monitoring conditions in a potential conflict area for signs of increased tension or preparation for armed conflict;
 - (d) working in conjunction with or in support of NGOs, for such activities as monitoring human rights or electoral organisation and supervision; and
 - (e) inspecting areas and facilities for compliance with terms agreed between parties to the armed conflict.
- (2) **Interposition Force.** Tasks for an interposition force between belligerents, requiring their consent, include:
- (a) establishing interposition parties or posts;
 - (b) establishing control and supervision over the main routes and key terrain to prevent any side from gaining an advantage;
 - (c) marking and continually inspecting demarcation lines to lessen the chances of misunderstanding and violations;
 - (d) opening routes for humanitarian aid;
 - (e) escorting humanitarian aid convoys;
 - (f) establishing Joint Commissions with the legitimate authorities of the concerned parties to identify criteria for a return to normality, and to solve problems at the lowest possible level. A Joint Civilian Commission can also be established at the highest level of government, chaired by the UN SRSG or the HR of the NATO NAC;
 - (g) monitoring a cease fire; and
 - (h) establishing buffer zones and begin demilitarisation.

NOTE: A TFC must be aware that the ICRC does not generally accept armed escorts, and strongly reaffirms its conviction that *humanitarian work must be dissociated from military operations* aimed at ensuring security and restoring law and order in regions affected by conflict. *The ICRC thus rules out the use of armed escorts to protect humanitarian convoys or any other humanitarian activity*, although in extreme circumstances will accept minimal protection.

- (3) **Transition Assistance.** The types of tasks that a transition assistance mission might include are:
- (a) supervising the withdrawal, relocation, demobilisation, and disarming of the military and paramilitary forces of the parties;
 - (b) locating and confiscating weapons, munitions and supplies;
 - (c) supervising or assisting in locating and identifying minefields, and undertaking de-mining or EOD operations, as appropriate;
 - (d) helping provide or restore the civil administration throughout the mission area;
 - (e) providing a temporary law enforcement authority or supporting the civil police;

- (f) supervising cease-fire or demarcation lines;
- (g) coordinating and protecting humanitarian aid efforts, including providing or restoring critical infrastructure; and
- (h) assisting in the processing, relocation, movement, handling of refugees and IDPs.

NOTE: International actions define a *grey zone* between *chapter VI* (Peacekeeping) and *chapter VII* (Peace enforcement) interventions, known as chapter VI and a half. Examples are early stages in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, going back to the Congo in 1963. These interventions are characterized by unclear international crisis management and political decision making processes. Although not doctrine, this nuance is relevant.

d. **Peacemaking.** It covers the diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid peaceful settlement. Peacemaking efforts are conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, negotiations, conciliation and such actions as diplomatic pressure, isolation or sanctions.

e. **Peace Enforcement.** Involves operations undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (essentially coercive and designed to deal with threats to international peace and security, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression - Article 39) which may include using combat capabilities to restore peace in areas of international or internal conflict. This restoration could include dealing with an inter-state conflict or with internal conflict to meet a humanitarian need or where state institutions have largely collapsed. Peace enforcement operations are conducted when the consent of all the Parties to a conflict has not been achieved or might be uncertain. These operations are designed to maintain or re-establish peace, or enforce the terms specified in the mandate. Generally, peacekeeping and peace enforcement do not mix; as one may move from impartiality to partisanship, but returning to the previous state is all but impossible. Possible tasks for a peace enforcement mission can include:

- (1) enforcing sanctions and embargoes;
- (2) establishing and enforcing No-Fly-Zones;
- (3) force protection of humanitarian operations;
- (4) establishing and protecting "safe areas" or exclusion zones; and
- (5) combat operations at a level of intensity required to restore a sustainable peace.

f. **Humanitarian Operations.** These are operations conducted to relieve human suffering, often in circumstances where responsible civil authorities are unable, or possibly unwilling, to provide adequate logistic support to the population. Humanitarian operations may precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialist civilian organizations, such as UNHCR and the ICRC which deploy early in a crisis. The ICRC at article 108, paragraph 2c, interprets impartiality, neutrality and independence in its purest sense and will request Force protection in extreme cases, only. Possible tasks include:

- (1) supporting and protecting humanitarian aid convoys;
- (2) transporting humanitarian aid by road, air, sea, rail and waterways, plus air drops (helicopter, aircraft);
- (3) maintaining, repairing and even building routes and critical infrastructure;
- (4) providing health, medical and dental support; and
- (5) assisting in the relocation or return of refugees and IDPs to their former homes.

109. TYPES OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

1. There are two types of civil-military cooperation: civil-military cooperation operations and support to civil administration. The scope and level of inter-agency cooperation and coordination of activities and operations will be discussed in detail in chapter 2 - Civil-Military Cooperation Operations and chapter 3 - Support to Civil Administration.

2. Figure 1-3 illustrates the various CIMIC components and their interrelationships to support a military operation.




Figure 1-3 Types of Civil-Military Cooperation

110. SOFA AND FUNCTIONAL AREAS OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

1. **Negotiation of HNS.** The nature of the state, whether adequate, fragile or failed, will determine self-sufficiency/self-reliance of a military force or a certain level of dependency on HNS, either locally, regionally or both. A lead nation could be tasked to provide the bulk of the logistic support with other nations providing specialist logistics under the control of the lead nation, but most nations should be able to provide the required logistic support to their own contingents, particularly in communications, engineer resources which play a major role in peace building, medical and transport. Logistic planning and communications become the cornerstones of civil-military support requiring secure LOC from the COMM Z to the FCZ as well as a clear division of responsibilities between the HN and the TFC in rear area security tasks, which could involve paramilitary elements or insurgencies. Contractual negotiations would be required with the HN mandated ministry, department or agency responsible to provide assistance in HNS. The availability and accreditation of civilian contractors are also operational requirements in peace building efforts. A SOFA negotiated by the UN, NATO or a nation such as Canada did with Bahrain for OP FRICTION (1990-91 Gulf conflict), would deal with CMS matters, including the "Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the UN", which would have an impact on civil tasks to be performed in the theatre/area of operations, such as:

- a. importation of weapons, provisions and equipment;

- b. the use of airports, harbours and road networks in the HN;
- c. freedom of movement;
- d. exemption from taxation, customs and fiscal regulations;
- e. communications and postal services;
- f. use of water, electricity, roads, waterways, port facilities, airfields and other public utilities;
- g. local procurement of labour, goods and services;
- h. availability of local currency;
- i. licensing of drivers and vehicles;
- j. postal regulations;
- k. military police; and
- l. legal and financial considerations.

2. It is imperative that the Canadian Government clearly identify, in the warning phase of an operation, the CIMIC activities in CMO and support to civil administration, to which it is willing to allocate national resources. This effort will determine specialist requirements from OGDs and agencies, including national NGOs with specific qualifications or fields of expertise (education, economics, health, technical and technological assistance, logistics...) to achieve the mission. The nature, type, quality and quantity of materiel will be easier to assess and coordinate among the stakeholders. Specific guidelines will be made available by the UN or NATO commander, or commander Canadian contingent, IAW the type of operation, nature and levels of threat and the level of HNS.

3. The emphasis on the warning phase is important so the formation and selected units can use the preparation phase to plan and conduct individual and collective training with those stakeholders and national partners who will be part of the Canadian contingent. In this context, operational readiness and HNS negotiations, can be pursued concurrently. Once HNS has been negotiated and agreed upon, CMS will be the subject of MOU and formal agreements between the parties. Planning for worst case logistic scenarios is an operational requirement to sustain all operational scenarios which could arise in theatre. A responsive logistic support system, therefore, is essential as time may become a vital resource to the success of the mission.

4. CIMIC encompasses three functional areas:

- a. **Negotiation of Coordination and Support Arrangements and Agreements.** Coordination and support arrangements should be pre-planned and negotiated by a single in-theatre authority delegated by the national or TFC, as may be the case, during the early stages of campaign planning and cover all phases of the NATO (article 5), UN or OSCE (non-article 5) led operations. Coordination and support arrangements would normally consist of:
 - (1) General Agreements concerning the division of responsibilities and coordination of activities between the national or TFC, as may be the case, and national authorities;
 - (2) HNS, MOU, technical arrangements, CF support and implementation plans between the TFC and national authorities; and
 - (3) MOU, TOR and other agreements concerning areas of mutual concern between the TFC, non-governmental, national or international agencies, organizations and authorities.
- b. **Coordination of Civil-Military Support (CMS).** CMS is a command responsibility in UN, OSCE or NATO

led operations. CMS comprises all activities that entail civil-military interaction, coordination or cooperation and describes activities undertaken by allied forces and civil organizations in close cooperation in peace, emergencies, crisis and war to achieve common goals. The objectives of CMS are to assist civil authorities in restoring a peaceful infrastructure, to encourage CIMIC and to deter resistance to military operational activities. The TFC's staff should provide advice on maintenance of security for such people as relief workers, dislocated civilians, which should remain a UN responsibility, and civilian wounded. Under a UN mandate, the NATO commander would work with the support, advice and recommendations of UN representatives and relief organizations, but the decision authority in the AO remains with the NATO commander and the military chain of command. CMS excludes HNS and encompasses CEP at operational and tactical levels. CMS will be addressed in the CIMIC annex to an OPLAN and/or Op O.

(1) CMS includes:

- (a) facilitation of military assistance to civil authorities;
- (b) coordination with OGDs and agencies, as well as the three levels of Government;
- (c) facilitation of mediation and negotiation processes;
- (d) support of CF military information services (CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA); and
- (e) facilitation of support to, replacement of, or creation of civil infrastructure.

(2) CIMIC guidelines and coordination structures will also be included in the CIMIC annex to an OPLAN. The CIMIC annex will include:

- (a) the military unit and individual tasking authority and channels, normally using the military chain of command;
- (b) the focus of the military force relative to the operation of civilian organizations;
- (c) participation and constraints associated with the national reconstruction and rehabilitation or humanitarian assistance;
- (d) instructions regarding IDPs;
- (e) delineation of the military-civil coordination structure;
- (f) coordination with public information and PSYOPS and participation in Information Coordination Committees, as required;
- (g) authorized informal civil-military coordination;
- (h) participation and focus of Military Joint Commission program; and
- (i) financial and legal considerations.

c. **Coordination with Civil Emergency Planning (CEP).** CEP is a national responsibility. Emergency Preparedness Canada (EPC) operates as a Branch of DND and is headed by an Executive Director who reports to the DCDS. EPC is a civilian organization which supports the Minister of National Defence in carrying out his mandate to *advance civil preparedness in Canada for emergencies of all types*. This is accomplished by facilitating and coordinating among government institutions, and in cooperation with Provincial Governments, foreign governments and international organizations, the development of civil emergency plans. EPC delivers services in six key, inter-linked and mutually supportive service lines: coordination of plans; testing and evaluation; training and education; risk assessment and monitoring/warning/reporting of emergencies, and coordination of the federal response to emergencies;

public awareness and information through PA; international civil emergency preparedness; and financial assistance through Grants and Contributions. It must be remembered that EPC has no resources, beyond personnel and funds, allocated to its organization. CEP is addressed in the CIMIC annex to a plan. Considerations of each environment are as follows:

- (1) **Domestic Environment.** EPC's role is to advance civil preparedness in Canada for emergencies of all types, developing civil emergency plans and by managing two Federal Government programs: the Joint Emergency Preparedness Program (JEPP) and the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA), which covers cost-sharing arrangements between levels of Government. The legislative authority for the role of EPC and emergency preparedness at the federal level is found in the "Emergency Preparedness Act" and the "Emergencies Act". The federal emergency preparedness work program is overseen by the interdepartmental (OGDs) Emergency Preparedness Advisory Committee, chaired by the DCDS. There is a Regional Office in each Land Force Area across the country.
- (2) **International Environment.** The main CEP functions include civil support to the military and protection of civil populations against the effects of combat operations. J5 staff is responsible for making recommendations to, or advising the TFC on such matters as evacuation of the civil population, civilian collection points, check points and assembly areas. International Emergency Preparedness activities cover the following:
 - (a) **CANUS Agreement.** International emergency Preparedness conducted under the CANUS Agreement on Cooperation in Civil Emergency Planning and Management, as well as joint exercises and planning ventures ensure that emergency preparedness remains high on the agenda of both Canada and the United States.
 - (b) **NATO Civil Emergency Planning.** Civil Emergency Planning in NATO refers to the development of collective plans for the effective use of Alliance civil assets in support of Alliance strategy. Civil preparedness and the management of relevant resources are primarily national responsibilities. Coordination and participation in NATO Civil Emergency Planning activities through the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) and its nine Planning Boards and Committees, including the promotion of PfP objectives, ensure EPC's responsibilities to NATO are met. These responsibilities include closer ties with countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Russia, while assisting them in their efforts to institute democratic reform and in providing them assistance in the field of emergency preparedness. In principle, NATO disaster relief is a civil responsibility with emphasis on the coordination procedures required to mobilize national civil, civil defence and military assets to support individual governments' disaster relief efforts. While NATO assists (MC 343) with coordination, disaster response assets such as the DART remain under national command. OPLAN Griffon envisages the DART working under the operational control of the lead agency humanitarian assistance coordinator.
 - (c) **United Nations.** Canada has been a strong supporter of the "International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction", sponsored by the United Nations, on the need for global cooperation in emergency preparedness planning. NATO disaster relief also emphasizes the coordination procedures required to mobilize national civil, civil defence and military assets to support the United Nations' international disaster relief efforts. The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) in Geneva has developed the MCDA project to bridge the gap between the needs that the international community is being asked to satisfy, and the resources available to meet them. Refer to chapter 2, annex C, paragraph 5 for more on MCDA.

111. COMMAND AND STAFF FUNCTIONS IN CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

1. The level of cooperation and support provided to IOs, NGOs and UN agencies, and their willingness to accept military participation and coordination of civil-military tasks will be determined by each organizations' Charter, mandate, functions and responsibilities. The relevant functions of the J5 CIMIC and CIMIC staff at formation and unit levels, are to:

- a. **Prepare.** CIMIC assessments/formats (as per the Reporting System established for each operation), CMO estimates, OPLAN and/or Op O in coordination with J3 Plans and J3 Ops, as well as other documentation relevant to CIMIC support for military operations.
- b. **Advise.** Recommend appropriate actions to all levels of command to secure and maintain constructive civil-military relationships, essential for the success of the mission.
- c. **Assist.** Assist CF formations and units, HN civil and military authorities, OGDs and agencies, IOs and NGOs with developmental, political and defence issues as part of the mandate, or reached through national MOU or agreements.
- d. **Plan.** Coordinate plans to use CIMIC assets with formations and units, host nation civil and military authorities, OGDs and agencies, as well as IOs and NGOs, to determine the best method of supporting the assigned civil tasks. This function would be the responsibility of J5 Plans.
- e. **Coordinate.** Conduct periodic inter-agency meetings and keep channels of communication open, on behalf of the TFC, with host nation civil and military authorities, OGDs, non-governmental national or international organizations, agencies or authorities, including paramilitary leaders, to enhance mutual understanding of the peace building objectives sought and the concerted actions required to achieve these objectives.
- f. **Support.** Provide adequate support during PSO, particularly peace enforcement operations, in order to minimize noncombatants' interference with operations and to minimize the impact of operations on non combatants.
- g. **Train.** Provide instruction to HN civil and military authorities and its population by identifying, planning and implementing assistance programs to sustain peace building efforts in cooperation with OGDs and agencies, NGOs and other international agencies, organizations and authorities.
- h. **Supervise.** Perform monitoring function of civil-military cooperation operations and support to civil administration to ensure CIMIC objectives are being met. This is especially important when HNS varies from poor to non-existent and that functions of Government in a failed or fragile state are assumed by the international community.
- i. **Evaluate.** Perform review and analysis of CIMIC activities and operations to determine and enhance their *effectiveness* (measure of results versus objectives stated) and *efficiency* (measure of results versus resources expended) in supporting military operations to achieve the mission.
- j. **Facilitate.** A military force is incapable of solving all civil problems and satisfying all civil requests. It must use its CIMIC centres as information centres to ensure a request outside its mandate or capabilities is addressed to the proper civil agency capable of resolving the issue. As an example, tracing of missing family members is the responsibility of the ICRC (Refer to chapter 2, annex C, paragraph 4).
- k. **Control.** Control must be exercised diligently. It is necessary in the execution of civil projects in which local labour and/or civil contractors are employed. The organization of the execution of a project in phases will require contractual payment(s) and the issue of receipts following payment(s) to the party concerned. In addition, periodic on-site inspections by military specialists, such as electricians, engineers and NGO specialists are mandatory to exercise some form of quality control and compliance with contractual requirements. *Monitoring* of each project is also required, from conception to completion, "key in hands".

112. DEFINITIONS

1. The following definitions are provided to facilitate the formulation of a commander's intent and operational concepts to be discussed in chapters 4 and 5:
 - a. The definition of CIMIC for the domestic and international environments is aligned on NATO civil-military interface and cooperation in alliance operations. The definition replaces the terms "civil affairs" and "civil-

military relations". Because of legal considerations and complexities related to both operational environments, two definitions are required:

- (1) **CIMIC in a Domestic Environment.** In peace, emergencies or crisis, the resources and arrangements which support the relationship between CF commanders and Canadian federal, provincial and municipal levels of government, and civil populations in an area where CF elements are stationed, or plan to be deployed, employed and supported. Such measures could include cooperation and coordination of activities between CF commanders and non-governmental, national or international agencies, organizations and civil authorities.
 - (2) **CIMIC in an International Environment.** In peace, emergencies, crisis or war, the resources and arrangements which support the relationship between TFCs and foreign national authorities, military, paramilitary, as well as civil populations and foreign national governments in an area where TF elements are or plan to be deployed, employed and supported. Such measures would also include cooperation and coordination of activities and operations between TFCs and non-governmental and international agencies, organizations and civil authorities.
- b. **Public Affairs.** Military Public Affairs is the ongoing effort to establish a public understanding of CF policies and actions in support of the Government by providing timely and accurate information to HN and international media, and other target audiences. This effort is meant to promote public support for CF operations in the domestic and international environments.
 - c. **Psychological Operations.** CIMIC integrates PSYOPS in domestic and international operations. PSYOPS are planned psychological activities in peace, crisis and war directed to enemy, adversary(ies), friendly and neutral audiences, within the AO, in order to influence emotions, perceptions, opinions, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. PSYOPS activities are initially planned at the strategic level, controlled at the operational level and executed at the tactical level but ongoing operations will reflect concurrent activities at all levels of command. PSYOPS in domestic operations may be authorized against specific target audiences considered threats or risks to national security, as authorized by Canadian laws. The J3 staff would supervise PSYOPS directed at specific target audiences, in close coordination with PA and J5 CIMIC, through the IOCC. PSYOPS in CF operations would be conducted under CDS directives and the principle of transparency (see chapter 7).

113. PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION - GENERAL

1. The CF is an instrument of national policy. The general principles of civil-military cooperation are:
 - a. **Continuity and Consistency of Policy.** Unity of political guidance among NATO and internationally recognized political organizations (UN/OSCE) is crucial to unity of effort. It stems from an understanding that policy comes first and that the military is an instrument of national policy in PSO, OOTW and combat. This requirement underlines the inherent complexity and political sensitivity of CIMIC activities and operations, as well as the mutual support required between all civil and military participants. In light of the various players at the national level, namely DFAIT, DND, CIDA and NGOs, and the cooperation required with IOs and UN agencies or with the OSCE at the international level, it is imperative to have well coordinated, clear and comprehensive CIMIC policies issued to the TFC and his staff. This principle is paramount in light of modern-day conflict situations and fundamental questions raised about the connection between the *three elements of the peace process*: development, peacemaking and peacekeeping. These three elements would require greater attention from the development, diplomatic and defence communities.
 - b. **Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.** CIMIC is conducted in support of military operations to assist commanders at all levels to fulfill their obligations to civilians as required by international laws or by domestic policies, agreements and MOU, and to further Canadian national interests.
 - c. **Command Responsibility.** The responsibility for the conduct of CMO and support to civil administration is invested in the TFC and delegated as required. This responsibility is guided by national policies and directives, military strategy and international laws such as the Law of Land Warfare (Hague Conventions of

1907) the Law of Armed Conflict, International Law of Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, the Geneva Conventions and the Additional 1977 Protocols. In the end, *unity of command* in military operations must produce *unity of purpose* between the military force, civil authorities, IOs and NGOs, leading to *unity of effort* by all stakeholders and partners in achieving the mission.

- d. **Trust and Confidence.** Civil trust and confidence are vital to CIMIC activities and operations. Securing the trust and confidence of civilian authorities and the local population means achieving a common understanding of the mission and COO, which should result in their compliance with military directives and orders, while minimizing their interference in civil-military operations. Consequently, the inhabitants retain freedom from unnecessary interference with their property and individual liberties, and minimize the negative effects of military operations on their daily lives. *Transparency* at all levels of command means that information is communicated through open sources to facilitate the planning and coordination of activities and operations. Common goals leads to common understanding, to unity of purpose, and unity of effort based on a common civil plan to create, among all stakeholders and partners, an atmosphere of cooperation conducive to achieving the objectives set out in the civil phase.
- e. **Cooperation.** Usually, no legal military authority exists over civilian agencies in an AO. Coordination of efforts requires cooperation between political, military and civil elements to prevent duplication of efforts and wastage of scarce resources. Interdependence and interrelationships between these elements are cornerstones of civil-military efforts to rehabilitate and reconstruct in peace building efforts. Cooperation is also a principle of war.
- f. **Mutual Responsibilities and Support.** The relationships between a TF and civil authorities must establish clear and distinct division of responsibilities and levels of accountability between the military force and civil authorities. The more comprehensive the HNS, the lesser the requirement for external CIMIC resources, particularly IOR and UOR. In addition, if the mission is to be a success, military and civilian humanitarian organizations and agencies must also define their responsibilities and levels of accountability. The TFC must avoid, during the civil phase of a military operation, assuming unnecessary civil responsibilities and associated tasks, which will consume resources not originally allocated or planned for CIMIC activities. "Mission creep" must be minimized and controlled by the TFC and his staff. Further discussion on the various manifestations of "mission creep" is at chapter 2, article 212.
- g. **Impartiality.** CIMIC activities may be carried out in a multi-ethnic environment requiring that civil authorities and military personnel perform their duties without distinction of nationality, race, creed, religion, social class or political affiliation. Civil authorities and the population require early action to demonstrate competence, capability, resolve, fairness as well as transparency and consistency of action to restore a quality of life.
- h. **Foresight.** This principle must be high in the minds of those J5 officers (J5 CIMIC, J5 Ops, J5 Plans, J5 Projects) part of the reconnaissance group or part of a military force's advance party. Logistics as well as engineer planning for the military and civil phases require lead time. Logistics involves two aspects in arranging effective support for CIMIC activities. *First*, logistic planning requires lead time, requiring that logistic planners are made aware of the commander's CIMIC intent as early as possible. *Secondly*, logistic planners must be able to react quickly to successfully meet unforeseen changes in CIMIC plans as they arise. Foresight is necessary to ensure the existence of suitable specialists, equipment and materiel, and the flexibility to make reserves available when and where required. In CIMIC, a responsive logistic "push" system is mandatory, characterized by effective control measures and minimum *red tape*.
- i. **Economy of Resources and Effort.** CIMIC interface must seek to *minimize* military assets and *maximize* civil resources devoted to civil activities. A judicious allocation, management, expenditure and control of civil and military resources will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of military operations. Duplication of effort is to be avoided and requires detailed inter-agency coordination. *Centralized* control of CIMIC resources with *decentralized* execution offers a balance between responsiveness and economy of effort.
- j. **Humanitarian Considerations.** The CF Contingent must seek to *minimize* suffering for civilians and *maximize* humanitarian assistance that abide by domestic and international laws.

- k. **Force Protection.** For an operation to be successful in both its military and civil phases, a minimum force protection must be afforded to those who are to accomplish these respective tasks regardless of the threat, terrain, time and space, weather and climate. Force protection is a synergy of three domains: *security* against the effects of hostile intentions and actions on civilian and military personnel, and materiel; *general safety* concerned with the protection of individuals against injuries due to inattention (driving, weapons handling, hazardous materials...); and *health* for the protection of military and civilian personnel (hygiene, food, water, sexual behaviour, vaccinations...) as well as protection against the physical environment and diseases.

2. Figure 1-4 illustrates the inter-agency relationships and the stakeholders involved in CIMIC. It also illustrates the direct link between national strategy (Canadian Government) and the military strategy put forward by the TFC, to solidify the interrelationships between stakeholders and achieve common mission objectives.




Figure 1-4 Civil-Military Relationships

114. PEACE SUPPORT PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES

1. **Capabilities and Contributions.** Military PSYOPS elements bring unique capabilities to PSO, OOTW and combat. They are rapidly deployable, highly adaptable and can be task-organized to meet the specific requirements of a particular task. They can develop fully integrated campaign plans, if required, which fully support and complement the commander's intent and COO. PSYOPS elements can conceive, develop and produce a wide range of media products to include leaflets, posters, handbills, audio-visual products, videotapes, AM/FM broadcasts and tactical loudspeaker broadcast to large and small crowds to support the TFC. These media products can be disseminated via numerous means by sea, land and air components.

2. PSYOPS elements are trained in cross-cultural communication and can normally provide linguists with cultural expertise to assist and advise commanders at all levels of command. They can prepare basic and special assessments of the AO to promote understanding of the psychological dimension of the area and culture(s) within which they must operate. Often they will be the only source for information on ethnological aspects (science of human races, their relations to one another and their characteristics) and behaviour patterns of different groups in the AO. PSYOPS elements can provide the means (resources) for the TFC to effectively understand and

communicate with those who are directly influenced or are affected by the outcome of his mission.

3. PSYOPS capabilities can directly contribute to the mission objectives by relating to the principles of PSO:
 - a. **Impartiality.** It is critical that the military force be just and impartial and perceived in that manner. PSYOPS elements can provide a means of direct communication with civil authorities, factions, the local population, NGOs and others. They can advise the TFC on how planned activities may be perceived by different groups and they can use their media capability to ensure that activities and projects are understood in their proper context. When an incident occurs that might jeopardise the perception of impartiality, PSYOPS elements have the means to explain this incident to all groups.
 - b. **Credibility.** While the military force must demonstrate its credibility through its actions, third parties may not be in a position to directly observe it. Dissemination of information about PSO successes can broaden their impact beyond the audiences who observe them, helping them to build public support. PSYOPS elements can also assess, report and counter harmful propaganda directed against the military force.
 - c. **Limits on the Use of Force.** Increased communication, which may include the dissemination of authorized releasable ROE or use of force directives, reduces the chance of violent confrontations due to misunderstandings. As an example, loud speaker teams synchronizing their actions with ground forces provide a capability for non-violent resolution of a confrontation before force is used, but always as a last resort.
 - d. **Civil-Military Coordination.** PSYOPS capabilities can be used to enhance cooperation between military and civilian efforts, primarily through information sharing and distribution. For example, the TFC can target an audience and gain their support by disseminating information (white propaganda) about relief operations through the use of newspapers, leaflets and radio broadcasts, including such details as dates, times and locations for food distribution and medical assistance. Loudspeakers teams accompanied by interpreters can provide crowd control support at food and aid distribution centres.
4. **Authorized Activities.** The following types of activities can be conducted for PSO by PSYOPS elements on the approval of the TFC. All of these activities must be based on the dissemination of true and accurate information from well known sources and should be void of editorial opinion. This is not a complete list, but as a general rule if an activity cannot stand the test of *transparency* (i.e. if you would not want the media to find out), it should not be undertaken unless authorized by NDHQ:
 - a. provide an area assessment to include the identification of key leaders and local sensitivities, and assess the psychological impact of friendly operations;
 - b. provide information about the local population and culture to assigned forces to help prepare leaders and soldiers to accomplish their missions;
 - c. prepare the population for introduction of forces into the area;
 - d. develop and maintain the consent of the local population and parties for the presence of the military force. Project an image of the military force as an impartial, competent and capable body. Create a favourable image of friendly soldiers and leaders to the local populace;
 - e. assess, report, and counter propaganda directed against friendly forces within the AO;
 - f. assist in control of IDPs and refugees;
 - g. discourage interference with military and relief operations. Persuade paramilitary, criminals or other armed groups which are in conflict with friendly forces to surrender;
 - h. conduct a mine awareness campaign and support demining operations to reduce civilian and military mine casualties and encourage reporting of minefield locations by the local population;

- i. assist NGOs with crowd control at relief centres;
 - j. communicate statements of commanders and key governmental, and NGO officials to the local populace;
 - k. explain friendly force policies to target audiences within the AO; and
 - l. support health, sanitation and safety campaigns for the population.
5. **Unauthorized Activities.** The following types of PSYOPS activities **will not** be conducted for PSO:
- a. activities or dissemination of information which directly criticizes or is designed to reduce support for leaders of population groups in the AO (Divisive propaganda);
 - b. dissemination of any information for which the source is purposely hidden (Gray propaganda);
 - c. dissemination of any information for which the source is purposely misrepresented (Black propaganda);
 - d. activities or dissemination of information designed to mislead or deceive (Deception); and
 - e. dissemination of any information critical of population groups in the AO.
6. PSYOPS elements must be brought into the *early planning process* to provide maximum integration of their efforts. Through emphasis on transparency of operations, PSYOPS elements can make the employment of the military force easier, safer and more effective.

115. CIMIC RELATIONSHIPS - CANADIAN INDUSTRY AND THE CANADIAN FORCES

1. A national emergency requiring military and/or industrial support may come with little or no warning; nevertheless, the Canadian Government must be selective in its involvement in the civilian support phase of either domestic or international emergencies. In these situations, CF operational requirements involve industry (through the provision of storage sites, material, spare parts, UOR, IOR...) as the civilian phase is focussed on rehabilitation and reconstruction of communities as part of international peace-building and humanitarian efforts. Due to increasingly complex and unique emergency situations, ad hoc arrangements are no longer suitable to meet the demanding challenges of civilian emergencies in either domestic or international operations. Strategic and operational planning is required for CIMIC activities to be conducted in the domestic and international environments in collaboration with the appropriate agencies. Realistic scenarios and civilian tasks would first have to be approved by the Canadian Government as these tasks are resource-intensive.

2. A NIPP currently exists and was last updated 26 November 1992. This program outlines the responsibilities of OGD's ministers, the industry-crisis action network concept of operations and the duties of the IICC. Its concept of operations has the following as its general objectives:

- a. ensure critical crisis production is achieved;
- b. maintain equitable balance of military and civil, domestic and foreign needs; and
- c. stabilize disrupted markets and production.

3. The purpose of the IICC is to "provide its members with a consultative forum to coordinate development of national industrial preparedness plans, procedures, measures and arrangements, which shall be referred to collectively as the NIPP, and to manage their implementation, as required, in the event of an emergency". It was to also make recommendations to departments without limiting in any way their planning activities, except that the IICC be apprised of such activities. DND's commitment to NIPP consists of defence industrial preparedness measures, defence production capacity, requirements specifications, quality assurance, defence logistics cooperative agreements and defence industry base planning with the US DoD. If CIMIC planning is to be realized, then Departmental planning should start from its commitment to the NIPP planning document. Its first step should

be to first advise the IICC, as this planning document has already addressed many of the issues facing the CIMIC concept of operations, and can provide a very useful framework for any future emergency planning exercise.

4. With respect to civilian and military emergency preparedness, Industry Canada has the lead role in maintaining civilian and military emergency plans to ensure the availability of urgently required goods and services, and for the control and coordination of industrial production of goods and services not controlled by any other department. This effort involves the Departments of Public Works and Government Services, National Defence and Natural Resources, from the extraction of raw materials to the allocation and distribution of final output.

5. DND also has planning responsibilities concerning civil emergency preparedness. Under the Emergency Preparedness Act, DND has significant civil emergency planning and response functions. From this Act flow the individual departmental responsibilities and establish the authority for each department's (including DND's) involvement. These responsibilities, together with the guidelines of the Act were affirmed by the Government of Canada in conjunction with its approval of a Federal Policy for Emergencies in May, 1995. Under this Act, with respect to civil emergency preparedness, the Department is an important potential source of assistance in responding to a wide range of civil emergencies. The Department would support civil emergency preparedness plans of other federal government departments and those of requesting provincial and territorial authorities, providing such support does not jeopardize the Department's ability to carry out the national defence mandate.

6. Historically within DND, the DGIIIP was responsible for Defence Industrial Preparedness planning which is universally considered to be one of the foundations for any effective and efficient force expansion, which includes the civilian phase of military operations. Current preliminary efforts involve the utilization of research and training efforts using CFCSC facilities, along with any departmental resources devoted to Defence Industrial Preparedness planning, which are strained due to changing priorities and personnel reductions. It therefore becomes problematic for the CF to make any kind of sound planning for a civil phase when industry is not *systemically* involved in the planning. Nevertheless, the importance of emergency preparedness planning continues to be brought to the attention of departmental administration, and efforts to address the necessary resources committed to the planning efforts largely outlines the current measures that can be taken under the current budgetary constraints.

7. Similar comments have been made in the context of mobilization planning which also apply to any current CIMIC planning. A DGIIIP discussion paper, dated June 1992, on Defence Industrial Preparedness planning in DND, addressed the need for industrial support in the context of the significant political changes in the world. CIMIC planning, like mobilization planning, is not currently identified as part of ADM(Mat) planning tasks. Such planning tasks will require a significant level of staff effort, on an on-going basis, that is not currently accounted for in the ADM(Mat) organizational structure. It will also inevitably require the expenditure of a significant amount of funding for consultants to study various aspects of Canada's defence industry.

8. As in mobilization planning, while CIMIC planning could be addressed as a new funding requirement, there may be some difficulty substantiating the proposed expenditures based on the actual text of this CIMIC manual. As currently envisioned, the CIMIC manual could be viewed as simply one more academic exercise requiring a "checkmark" for completion, as opposed to a legitimate opportunity to develop a viable process to support future operational requirements. CIMIC planning, like mobilization planning, requires the operational and financial commitment of senior departmental management on an ongoing basis.

9. This exercise requires a significant level of effort to establish and maintain. It should not simply be considered an administrative exercise as it would be subjective in nature. It would also create expectations in the private sector that DND intends to support and maintain domestic industrial capabilities at a certain level, and it would inevitably be used to leverage political support for contractual decisions. As a consequence, DGIIIP would like to see a formal CIMIC planning process, adequately funded, established to deal with the issue on an ongoing basis. What is required is a proper assessment of the requirement for CIMIC planning and the necessary level of commitment of senior planners in ensuring its proper implementation and maintenance.

116. CIMIC COORDINATION MECHANISMS WITH CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS

1. The UNHCR *Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations* lists 10 coordination mechanisms to enhance civil-military coordination. These mechanisms are:

- a. **Pre-Mission Reconnaissance and Assessment.** This reconnaissance is important in establishing clear politico-military objectives. During early warning or preparation phase of an operation, J2 will produce a regional assessment focussing on the AO with the help of DFAIT and embassy staff, including military attachés. Pre-mission reconnaissance will be conducted by a reconnaissance party involving key players of which CIMIC personnel as well as representatives from OGDs and agencies (CIDA, DFAIT and the RCMP) whose mandate may require their active participation. This reconnaissance will allow early contact and coordination with in-theatre civil authorities and civil humanitarian organizations, especially in the AO. These pre-deployment contacts and familiarization meetings are useful coordination mechanisms to obtain real-time information from civil contacts (fax, E-mail, Internet) on the evolving civil situation, while training for the operation. In addition, legal considerations must be assessed by the TFC and TFHQ staff.
- b. **Early Agreement on Responsibilities and Objectives.** Agreement on responsibilities and politico-military objectives reduces coordination difficulties. Civil organizations have varied structural, operational, managerial and moral styles and culture which have a direct impact on the planning and conduct of an operation. Most UN organizations and agencies devolve authority to decision makers in the field, including field agencies such as NGOs, while the military operate in a hierarchial and more centralized system of command and control. The process of familiarization with each other's operational objectives and the formalization of mission responsibilities and will assist in ensuring mutual understanding. The changing situation may require agreements to be revisited during the military operation. Figure 1-5 illustrates the relationship between the military and civil phases of a military operation. *Civil tasks* will be executed in the *military phase* by organizations such as the ICRC and UNHCR, which deploy early and often well before a military force. Civil tasks will increase as the situation is contained and stabilized, and NGOs begin arriving in greater number. *Military tasks* will be executed in theatre during the *civil phase* in terms




Figure 1-5 Military and Civil Phases of a Military Operation

of Force protection, to force compliance with the terms of the agreement or deal with armed violence should it erupt. The *point of no return* serves to illustrate that once the civil phase is activated, there is no possible return to the military phase. As an example, the civil phase for IFOR, whose mandate covered 365 days, was officially declared at deployment plus 120 days (D+120). Military and civil phases are sequential but military and civil tasks are often carried out simultaneously in each phase at varying degrees of intensity.

- c. **Central Coordination.** In UN and OSCE (non-article 5) or NATO (article 5) led operations, numerous politico-military and civil-military contacts occur between civil organizations, commanders and staff elements. The TFC may wish to effect civil-military coordination from a central headquarters and delegate authority for civil-military coordination to the J5 CIMIC assisted by the J5 staff cell. Central coordination allows for a proper military CIMIC or CMO estimate, prevents redundant civil-military activity and enhances the conditions for civil-military coordination of effort. Central coordination assumes a clear understanding between the various command levels (strategic, operational and tactical) of respective authorities on civil-military matters. In this context, a common civil-military doctrine, SOPs, communications, training and compatible structures among the military and key civilian agencies should lead to increase interoperability in CMO. This objective must be measured against the desire of some civilian agencies, which want to protect and maintain their neutrality, independence and impartiality. In addition, humanitarian operations require a humanitarian coordinator, either UNDP or UN DHA, to bring together humanitarian agencies and NGOs deployed in an AO, so coordination of their activities can occur.
- d. **Common Territorial Areas of Operations.** Consistent with military operational requirements, key civil organizations and the military force's areas of operations should coincide, if possible. Common boundaries will facilitate the planning, conduct, coordination control and monitoring of CIMIC activities. This issue is of paramount importance during the initial reconnaissance as it entails force protection, alert readiness levels and evacuation considerations.
- e. **Compatible or Shared Communications Equipment.** If as the saying goes "units that fight together must be able to communicate with each other", than CIMIC activities require standardized and compatible communication equipment and information systems between key players. CIMIC activities usually occur in areas where telephones and other public means of communication are unusable. Compatible or shared communications, some adapted with secure means of transmission between the military force and key civil authorities, are critical to coordination and to communications (common understanding of definitions, language proficiency and standardized equipment and frequency bandwidth). The establishment of a single POC for in theatre coordination of frequency allocation, which will involve the HN communication ministry, will ensure that all players are able to communicate with each other in times of emergency. This will require the efficient management of radio nets. Operational readiness, effectiveness and efficiency in the AO require contingency planning on this issue, which must be raised during the initial reconnaissance. On occasion, UNHCR will provide military units/sub-units with appropriate radios to ensure communications in case of emergencies.
- f. **Civilian-Military Coordination Centre (CMCC)/Civil-Military Cooperation Centres (CIMIC Centres).** To be effective and functional, CMCC (inside the military base/compound) and CIMIC centres (outside the military base/compound) require interpreters as well as LOs. Although CMCC and CIMIC centres have no tasking authority over civilian organizations, they provide a passive coordination and information-sharing focal point to all stakeholders in an AO. In exceptional circumstances, CMCC and CIMIC centres could be deployed in the domestic environment during major natural disasters when municipal and provincial government agencies are paralysed and unable to function. CMCC and CIMIC centres would then operate until municipal and provincial agencies are able to fulfil their mandate and responsibilities. An outline on their respective roles and functions is provided:
- (1) **CMCC.** The CMCC would be established at formation or unit level by the Canadian Forces Civil-Military Cooperation Group (CFCMCG) located in Canada, such as a Land Force Area HQ, and headed by the J5 CIMIC acting as an advisor to the TFC on civil-military matters. The CMCC (HQ CIMIC) is located *inside* the compound of a TFHQ for planning, coordination and conduct of CMO and support to civil administration, requiring close consultation and coordination between all staff officers and civil agencies. CMCC involve formation staff, augmented accordingly, and organized as a responsive force structure commensurate with the nature and levels of threat, the type of operation and the scope of civil tasks to be performed. In principle, the CMCC would only be accessible to designated key representatives of the civil authorities and the heads of civilian agencies such as UNHCR, UNHCHR, IOM, UNDP, ICRC and Red Crescent, involved in the planning, conduct and coordination of a CMO or CMA. This measure has the effect of minimizing the number of individuals a TFC has to deal with at any given time. The CMCC would rely on a minimal number of regular cadre and on the Primary

Reserve to man, augment and sustain its operational readiness. The structure of the CMCC is mission and task dependent. The general functions and tasks of a CMCC are found at annex A.

- (2) **CIMIC centre.** A CIMIC centre (US CMOC equivalent) is established at unit level and is located *outside* the military compound. It is essentially a humanitarian assistance coordination centre, providing information and coordination of J5 plans and J5 joint projects with civilian agencies, civil authorities, contractors and the local population. A CIMIC centre will usually provide civilian authorities, IOs, NGOs, UN agencies and the civilian population with information on the prevailing operational situation, on plans and minor/major projects either planned or ongoing. At least one CIMIC centre in the AO should be co-located, when possible, with the lead humanitarian agency to facilitate consultation, planning, and coordination. CIMIC centres located at the operational and tactical levels would compensate for a lack of structural alignment between military and civil organizations, and facilitate interrelationships. The tasks of a CIMIC centre are stated at annex B.
- (3) **Functional Support.** CIMIC activities conducted by the CF will generally fall into a specific type of civil-military cooperation and require specific fields of expertise. Commanders requesting such assistance must bear in mind that CMO will involve specialists trained primarily to provide a rapid contingency response and staff augmentation. Most of these specialists could be organic to a formation or unit, such as legal, engineers, socio-economic and operational analysts communication, transport, veterinarian, dental and medical staff, computer programmers/experts, MIST/PSYOPS and interpreters, which could be used as elements of rapid response teams. Augmentation and additional specialist support would be provided by functional elements:
 - (a) **Tactical Support Team (TST).** It would provide support to field units (units such as battalion groups or environment-specific equivalent), or could augment a TFHQ. A TST would involve up to eight officers/NCM per team. It would be preferable to have two TST for each operational formation to provide flexibility to the TFC in training and exercises for UN, OSCE or NATO led operations, as well as domestic operations. A TST Duty and Job Description is at annex B; and
 - (b) **Specialist Support.** Other support may be required for plans, programs and policy, operational and tactical planning, the civil police and combat service support. Some resources would come from the formation or unit, or may be required from other OGDs and agencies such as DFAIT, CIDA and the RCMP, including UN agencies. This arrangement would provide the TFC with more flexibility in the Defence Team/Total Force employment.
- g. **Co-location.** Where and when feasible, a TFC's headquarters or command elements should be co-located with or near key civil authorities or headquarters to enhance consultation, decision making, coordination, control of resources, cooperation and economy of effort. Location in close proximity of civil organization headquarters should reduce the strain on military resources and provide an opportunity for a clear understanding of each others mandate, responsibilities and SOPs in the absence of a common doctrine. Notwithstanding, UNHCR will deploy based on the location of civil authorities; existing municipal, provincial and national boundaries; and, the integrity of civil tasks to be performed in a territory by a UNHCR field office. Co-location issues must be addressed by UNHCR and the TFC, preferably in the preparation phase involving the TFC's reconnaissance group.
- h. **Inter-Agency Meetings.** Weekly or as required inter-agency meetings, either formal or informal, provide the opportunity to improve communication and coordination. These meetings enhance civil and military efforts, prevent duplication of effort and maximize the allocation and management of resources in an AO.
- i. **Liaison.** The exchange of liaison officers between military and key civil organizations is a means of establishing and preserving continuing communication and coordination. It serves in fostering a clear understanding of missions, concepts, doctrine and procedures, and provides for the accurate and timely transfer of vital information among stakeholders. This offers the advantages of rapid dissemination of information, a focal point for enquiries and better coordination of efforts. In addition, there is a bridging of cultural differences and a fostering of mutual understanding, trust, respect and confidence among the stakeholders. Each stakeholder becomes aware of the other participant's capabilities, skills, knowledge

and competence. Such exchanges will occur at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

- j. **Routine Contact between Staff to Desk Officers.** To ensure that communications between civil and military organizations and key players take place, civil-military counterparts must be identified within functional areas and at each command level. POC must be established in each functional area or command level to update the master list and ensure periodic dissemination. Regular contacts must be maintained among players.

117. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION PLANNING PRINCIPLES

1. **CIMIC Planning.** It is defined as **a cooperative civil-military venture aimed at selecting and implementing a coherent course of action which will achieve mission objectives and the desired end state.** Canadian CIMIC doctrine establishes 10 guiding principles which constitute a coherent framework in CIMIC campaign planning and time-sensitive operations, particularly in planning for complex emergencies:

- a. **Mission Primacy.** All stakeholders and partners involved in a military operation seek to attain mission objectives. The mission directive must generate complementary civil and military mission statements in campaign design, regardless of stakeholders' respective Charter, mandate, structure and capabilities. Common goals must be established to focus common understanding, unity of purpose and unity of effort on mission objectives and the civil-military end state. A civil-military partnership is the cornerstone of success in military and civil phases, to optimize the investment of scarce resources. These efforts require common centres of gravity, decisive points and lines of operations to be identified. Consequently, the synergy of integrated efforts must generate one civil plan for a theatre of operations to reach a common civil-military end state.
- b. **Command Responsibility.** CIMIC is a command responsibility but although unity of command is essential in military operations, commanders at all levels have no legal authority or command responsibility over civilian agencies in the AO. Civilian and military personnel must understand the scope of their mandate, know the resources available to them, identify the constraints of the environment and their own limitations. Commanders must understand the existing agreements (SOFA, MOU, HN and international agreements and technical arrangements) which will support the mission and its objectives. To increase operational effectiveness, education of all personnel, joint training and joint exercises with IOs/NGOs must be organized and specialist functions and requirements identified. Unity of command is a fundamental command and control principle in CIMIC which must lead to unity of purpose based on common goals, and unity of effort among all stakeholders and partners
- c. **Political Influence.** It is crucial for commanders at all levels to understand the political dynamic in the AO, particularly the political parties represented, their political views and agenda. Political parties may be represented at the municipal level and will certainly influence if not determine the level of compliance or non-compliance by the population, police forces and military or paramilitary forces, with existing agreements. Strategies must be developed in cooperation with IOs/NGOs to foster compliance towards the desired civil-military end state. Political pressures may have to be exercised by the UN SRSG or OHR to ensure compliance.
- d. **Freedom of Movement.** To achieve the desired civil-military end state, there must be no restrictions to the movement of civilian agencies and military elements within a defined AO. If military commanders and civilian agencies are to have the freedom of action to take initiatives and apply their skills, knowledge, and expertise, they must be able to operate freely without geographic restrictions, as well as have unhindered access to buildings, or commercial and industrial installations. HN civil or military interference with mission objectives is unacceptable.
- e. **Cooperation.** As no legal authority or command responsibility exist over civilian agencies, commanders at all levels must seek their cooperation. A unit commander must know the civilian agencies operating in his AO, their respective Charter, mandate, capabilities, range of civil tasks and funding. Cooperative teamwork is essential to gain the trust, confidence and support of IOs and NGOs as joint projects will be required for reasons of scale, skills, knowledge and funding levels. Cooperative attitudes and behaviour

toward civilian agencies, as well as civil authorities and the population, will improve relations and mutual understanding. Civil-military priorities will be discussed and common goals established accordingly. Notwithstanding, civil tasks will always be subordinate to military tasks when using military resources. Furthermore, cooperation and coordination of effort among stakeholder and partners will ensure that local political leaders do not play stakeholders and partners against one another for their own political gain.

- f. **Coordination.** To maintain unity of purpose, unity of effort must be sought from all stakeholders and partners in an AO. The J5 CIMIC has no dedicated resources and will submit requests for CMO and CMA to the J3 Ops who controls unit resources on behalf of the TFC. In addition, the coordination of CIMIC activities with PSYOPS and PA is a 'force multiplier' in gaining the support of the local populace and civil authorities for peace efforts, and to further isolate extremist elements, as well as minimizing reliance on military forces to impose the TFC's will. In the end, active participation in periodic IO/NGO/military meetings and in unit sponsored meetings with civil authorities (subordinate Joint Civil Commission) and armed forces representatives (subordinate Joint Military Commission), will foster a constructive dialogue conducive to the effective coordination of civil-military efforts and the efficient management of scarce resources. Liaison is critical to strengthen coordination efforts and meet mission objectives.
 - g. **Flexibility.** Unforeseen tasks, sometimes referred to as *mission creep*, require flexibility from a TFC, including a reassessment of the tasking priority list. Consultation with partners may be required for additional tasks affecting joint projects. Usually, delays encountered can be managed without negative results but in time-constrained situations, additional resources can be requested from formation J5 Operations. Resources (means) and methods (ways) will vary depending on the extent of the civil request. Lastly, a TFC can temporarily withdraw his support to civil authorities to foster compliance with a peace agreement.
 - h. **Security.** Operational security and Force protection measures are required to ensure a secure environment for the conduct of civil-military operations and in support of campaign pillars such as: economic recovery; demining; UN police; international war crime tribunal and judicial reforms; the return of displaced persons and refugees to their former residence; elections; arms control and monitoring; and the reestablishment of common institutions, such as regulating air traffic, passports, licence plates, bus lines, etc. Civilian agencies are preoccupied with their own security and the evacuation plan out of theatre. The TFC must address the legitimate concerns of both civilian and military personnel. Impartiality towards all parties to a conflict and transparency in civil-military relationships will increase security but the operational requirements of Force protection versus mission objectives will generate levels of risk which must be managed by all stakeholders.
 - i. **Information Sharing.** Area and economic assessments as well as unclassified formation and unit assessments provide useful information which can be shared with IOs/NGOs to facilitate their work and improve 'team' cohesion. Similarly, NGOs gather, process and disseminate their own information which may be useful to commanders for information operations, particularly in the planning of civil-military cooperation operations and joint projects, and in fostering a secure environment. Consent from civilian agencies to share their information must be encouraged. Information will be shared only if civilian agencies have trust in the military.
 - j. **Communications.** The conduct of CIMIC activities requires an effective communication and information system (CIS), as well as compatible and interoperable radio equipment and information technology (IT) in the AO among all stakeholders and partners. All means of communication (E-mail, Internet, fac-simile, satcom...) must be exploited in the AO. In addition, information is available through CIMIC Centres located in the community and accessible to civil authorities, the local populace as well as IO and NGO representatives. Internal and external communications operational requirements must be assessed.
2. At the operational level, CIMIC seeks to achieve strategic objectives, but always within military capabilities. CIMIC planning principles provide guidance to the TFC's staff whose efforts must be integrated in the unit and formation command and control warfare (C2W) structure, which includes PSYOPS and OPSEC considerations. These principles apply to CIMIC campaign planning or CIMIC planning for time-sensitive activities or CMO in domestic and international operations.

118. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION STAGES, TASKS AND FUNCTIONS

1. Figure 1-6 illustrates the CIMIC stages, tasks and functions which will, in practice, overlap and intertwine in the course of a military operation.




Figure 1-6 CIMIC Stages, Tasks and Functions

2. A brief explanation for each stage is required:

a. **Pre-Operational.** Before a military operation begins, the CIMIC task is to prepare the TF to deal with the civilian conditions it will meet in the area of operations. This process will involve four functions:

- (1) **Planning.** CIMIC staff write the TFC's CIMIC OPLAN, an annex to the TF OPLAN. To arrive at this OPLAN, it will be necessary to carry out an area assessment based where possible on detailed reconnaissance. Because many of the civilian agencies with which the TF will have to cooperate are likely to be on the ground already, particularly UNHCR, ICRC, UNHCHR, the host nation Red Cross/Red Crescent and local NGOs. These organizations must be approached to contribute to the area assessment to assist operational planning and division of responsibilities between the TFC and civilian agencies in the area of operations. CIMIC representation on the TFC's Reconnaissance Group is an operational necessity.
- (2) **Advice.** CIMIC staff will be responsible for briefing the TF's subordinate commanders on civilian conditions in the area of operations. It is important at this stage that commanders are given clear advice on interrelationships between military operations, civilian agencies, civil authorities and the civilian population. Specialist functions such as J5 Policy, J5 Legal, J5 CIMIC, J5 PA, J5 Engineer, CIVPOL and PSYOPS officer will provide the TFC's operational planning requirements, complementing the advice of the organic functions to the TF (J1 to J7 functions).
- (3) **Education.** CIMIC staff will produce troop information to ensure the TF enters the area of operation knowledgeable about critical aspects of the geographical area which will help them understand, cope and resolve civil-military issues. Topics of interest in the pre-deployment phase must include: history of the region; history of the conflict; culture of the ethnic groups; political structure; economic capacity of the region; civilian agencies' culture, mandate, structure, capabilities; and cultural awareness of the troops in dealing with civilian and HN agencies. Well-informed and knowledgeable troops are a

measure of the operational readiness of the TF.

- (4) **Training and Exercises.** Pre-deployment training with IOs and NGOs must be pre-planned in training and exercises. Furthermore, continuous training on topics such as mine awareness, hostage survival, security issues and evacuation plan, including safety and health matters, are command responsibilities. Operational readiness requires constant training by the TF and sub-units to maintain the advantage, as the nature of employment in PSO tends to erode individual and collective skills in conventional warfare.
- b. **Operational.** The core CIMIC tasks is to secure effective civil-military cooperation from all stakeholders and partners in the execution phase of the TFC's CIMIC plan. A list of civilian agencies in the area of operations will have to be maintained and updated regularly in light of new organizations and the integrity of the evacuation plan. Some civilian agencies may require periodic military support to function effectively. There are eight CIMIC functions: effective internal and external communications to the TF; the sharing of relevant information with stakeholders and partners; the coordination of effort to prevent duplication of effort and manage scarce resources effectively and efficiently; knowledge of formal agreement and how they will impact on CIMIC activities and operations, to include liaison and projects, in the area of operations; continuous assessment of the civilian populations and civil authorities perceptions of the TF; and lastly, the CIMIC operational function in support of the TFCs plan must be closely coordinated by the J5 CIMIC with the J3 operational and planning staffs, which control the TF resources on behalf of the TFC.
- c. **Transitional.** Based on the relationships established in the operational phase, the CIMIC task is to ensure transfer to follow on forces, should the military mandate be renewed, or to civilian agencies and civil authorities should the TF exit the theatre of operations permanently. The military is normally responsible to ensure a secure environment to provide civilian agencies freedom of movement and freedom of action. Once this is achieved, the military will handover its responsibilities to civilian agencies. A smooth transition is the best guarantee to achieve the civil-military end state.

119. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION - A CAMPAIGN VISION

1. The TFC must have a vision of how he perceives civil-military cooperation in his AO. The basis of a such vision is a *systemic approach* coupled with proactive attitudes and behaviour by military leaders, civilian agencies and civil authorities. All stakeholders and partners are interdependent and interact with one another, supporting each other. Stakeholders and partners are operating to achieve their respective but complementary mission within their respective Charter, mandates, capabilities and resources. To reduce mission creep a TFC must harness these energies, skills and knowledge in fields of expertise, and coordinate civil-military activities to achieve economy of effort in terms of military resources and manpower expenditures. In return, a TFC provides Force protection, an evacuation plan, logistic support within military capabilities and periodic situational and intelligence briefings. To achieve this synergy, a TFC must gain the trust and confidence of stakeholders and partners and encourage the sharing of information to foster cooperation. The object is to establish a sense of teamwork and constructive interrelationships. Common goals lead to common understanding of a mission among stakeholders, which in turn lead to unity of purpose and unity of effort.

2. The systemic approach is the cornerstone of this vision. The definition of civil-military cooperation and operational considerations define the borders of the international community system, which could be visualized as a 'box'. *Inputs* are directed at the international system in the form of *demands* by civil authorities, HN armed forces, the population, etc., as well as *support* by the media, the local population, businesses, including the injection of new resources from the troop contributing nations (TCNs), to sustain international community efforts in support of mission objectives. The various functional organizations shaping the international community and the HN organizations constitute sub-systems which are the beneficiary of *outputs* in the form of *decisions* and *actions*, taken by the international community system (box), of which the military is but one functional sub-system. These *decisions* and *actions* are assessed by the beneficiaries in each municipality of an AO and a *feedback* is provided the international community by the beneficiaries, itself preceded by a new set of demands generated by previous *outputs* and directed at the international community system. The systemic approach focuses solely on dynamic interrelationships between the international community system and its environment.

3. The international community system has the capacity to accept some level of *stress*, such as indicated by the management of unforeseen tasks (quantitative stress), but resources are not unlimited. Some demands will be approved, some rejected, some will be under consideration and/or demands will be matched by a corresponding level of support. In addition, a drastic change in the mission or mission evolution provoked by the departure of a key IO or NGO (qualitative stress), will produce a level of stress which may incapacitate the international system or render it incapable of functioning effectively and efficiently. This international community system is seen a continuous dynamic exchange of resources between stakeholders and partners; exchanges which often occur between two parties, without the knowledge of the others. Therefore, it becomes critical to use periodic IO/NGO meetings, as well as those organized by the military and civil authorities, to discuss civil-military issues and elaborate methods to manage duplication of efforts and prevent the wastage of scarce HN and international resources. Exchanges of information through a viable and reliable unit internal and external communications system is key to success.

4. A vision of success must provide suitable guidance to unit staff and personnel to operate effectively in the AO, as well as benefit from the services offered by civilian agencies to achieve the TF mission. The J5 staff will most likely include military LOs with HN Armed Forces, with IOs/NGOs and civil authorities, in addition to a TST placed under OPCON of the unit, as well as military or HN interpreters and translators. The J5 CIMIC will be responsible to the TFC for civil tasks but will coordinate all his activities with the J3 Ops who controls the unit resources on behalf of the TFC. Based on the strategic directive or guidance, this vision for an AO could include:

- a. the mission;
- b. the command philosophy and interrelationships with the lead humanitarian agency and IOs/NGOs;
- c. the strategic objectives to be achieved at the operational level;
- d. consideration of decisive points and centres of gravity corresponding to our own forces and potential adversary(ies);
- e. basic strategies to achieve these objectives, including effective and efficient joint civil-military resource management;
- f. performance criteria used by stakeholders and partners to measure success and how they can be mutually supporting of each other. These performance criteria will tell a TFC what is expected of him;
- g. division of responsibilities and labour, including mutually agreed upon coordination mechanisms (refer to article 116) to foster trust and confidence, provide economy of effort and prevent wastage of resources. This effort will require consultation and joint planning among stakeholders and partners;
- h. confidence and security building measures to be adopted with the HN civil authorities, population, military, paramilitary forces and extremist elements; the latter contained through concerted efforts directed at their political and popular support base;
- i. decision making process(es) and accountability in collective and collaborative problem-solving; and
- j. ethical standards of attitudes and behaviour in a multicultural environment.

5. All civil-military cooperation activities and operations must be integrated in effective and efficient command and control arrangements to generate unity of purpose and unity of effort which enhance CIMIC aspects but deny an adversary(ies) the ability to interfere with CIMIC activities. Figure 1-7 illustrates, from a systemic perspective, the dynamic of exchange and interaction among stakeholders and partners occurring on a daily basis in an AO.




Figure 1-7 The Systemic Approach to Civil-Military Cooperation

120. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION CAMPAIGN - A STATEMENT OF INTENT

1. The vision of success will lead to the formulation of a TFC's intent. The TFC's intent describes the commander's end state, establishes the purpose of the OPLAN and communicates the commander's vision on how he sees the CIMIC campaign being conducted in the course of the military operation. Consistent with the command philosophy, the commander's intent provides subordinates with the freedom to adapt their actions to achieve success. The intent should be expressed in a few sentences that clearly state why an operation is being conducted, the desired end state and how elements of the TF will achieve that end state. This intent must recognize that unity of both military and civil efforts remains essential and that the ultimate success of a military campaign or operation is directly linked to its impact on the success of the international effort in a HN. Success in one and failure in the other amounts to mission failure.

2. To provide a concrete example from SFOR, the following is the statement of intent of Commander MND (SW) in his direction to Battle Group commanders: "My intent is to continue to enforce robustly the military tasks of the GFAP laid down in Annex 1A to the GFAP, and COMSFOR's Instructions to the Parties (ITP), as the necessary prerequisite for the provision of a secure environment, whilst, within resources and capabilities, supporting civil agencies in the implementation of the civil aspects of the GFAP, without which Bosnia and Herzegovina will not become a democratic state. In short, *I seek a unity of purpose and action.*"

121. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION - A CAMPAIGN DESIGN

1. A campaign plan is designed around a number of building blocks to help the TFC visualize how the campaign will unfold. CIMIC is one of those crucial building blocks to enable the TFC to achieve his mission. Campaign design has two aspects: mission analysis and defining complementary military and civil end states. The mission analysis is a logical process, achieved through a rigorous estimate process, used for extracting and

deducing from a superior's order the *military and civil tasks necessary to fulfil a mission*. At the operational level, it places in context what effect is to be achieved by the campaign. The mission analysis should consider what national support is required particularly in terms of diplomatic, political, legal, economic, health and social needs to support the commander in his mission. The TFC must consider the military and civil end states, and the operational objectives to achieve them. The TFC's mission analysis allows him to provide planning guidance to his staff and should clearly state the tasks to be accomplished, as well as the framework within which the estimate process is to be conducted.

2. *The military end state* is that state of military affairs and civil conditions which must be met to achieve an established objective. This means that a TFC must win the trust and confidence of military and paramilitary forces, and create in his AO a stable and durable peace making it possible for civilian agencies to operate effectively in a secure environment, without any fear of threats or reprisals,. This also means, in conjunction with international and HN police efforts, that extremist or terrorist elements must be won over to the peace process, isolated or neutralized to the point of becoming ineffective. The military end state will be reached or the mandate of a military force ended, well before a civil end state is achieved.

3. *The civil end state* is that state of affairs and civil conditions that need to be achieved for the international community and civilian agencies to end their mandates and exit the HN. The military has the lead in providing a secure environment in addition to having resources and skills, within existing capabilities, to support other lead agencies in the accomplishment of their respective mandates.

4. The absence of unified civil-military political guidance in complex emergencies impairs military operations and often results in disagreement between NATO forces and civilian agencies as to how best to proceed. NATO military forces exercise their mandate under the political authority of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or in the case of disaster relief, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and will provide forces in support of the UN or OSCE which have the political control of a PSO. The problem lies in that although the UN SRSG or High Representative may have responsibilities related to the coordination of civilian activities, they usually enjoy, in non-article 5 operations, no political authority delegated to them by an internationally recognized organization (UN or OSCE), over the civilian implementation of an Agreement. The definition of lead agency is a mirror-image of this problem as it authorizes a humanitarian agency, such as UNHCR, to initiate coordination between civilian agencies but implies no legal authority or command responsibility in regards to the volunteer agencies.

5. As civilian agencies are protective of their respective Charter, mandate and are reluctant to surrender any powers or autonomy to military forces, one course of action is through consultation and joint planning efforts from the onset of a military operation. The purpose is to reconcile cultural differences and the requirement to achieve a common civil-military end state. Integrated efforts must lead to unity of effort, requiring consenting IOs/NGOs to join the Reconnaissance Group of the military force to begin joint planning. Civilian agencies and military forces do have one thing in common: the public purse funds their activities. Therefore, every mechanisms must be put in place to prevent duplication of effort between military and civilian agencies, and minimize the waste of resources through an effective and efficient resource management body. Effective coordination of civilian and military tasks is paramount to the mission, particularly joint and long-term projects, to ensure the assessment of tasks is matched with adequate and proper resources.

6. Complex emergencies require complementary mission statements and joint planning efforts to begin early. Freedom of action is based on a sound and constructive division of responsibilities and labour focused on the attainment of the civil-military end state through economy of effort. This focus will help determine the military end state and the civil conditions which must exist for the TF to exit the theatre of operations and leave civilian agencies to achieve the desired civil-military end state. This achievement is only possible if lead agencies are more aggressive in coordinating civilian agencies' efforts in the area of operations. Freedom of action must be exercised at the right place, at the right time by the right civilian agency and specialist functions, requiring military and civilian organizations to continuously synchronize their efforts and assess their environment. An Inter-Agency Task Coordinating Body formed by the military, major IOs (UN, OSCE, UNHCR, ICRC...), major donor agencies (CIDA, EC, ECHO, USAID, World Bank...) and key NGOs involved in major projects would provide effective resource management. The coordinating body should be co-chaired by the military and the lead humanitarian agency to show transparency of the resource management and decision making process, and transparency of the joint planning effort. Figure 1-8 illustrates the consultation and joint planning efforts among key stakeholders.




Figure 1-8 Civil-Military Joint Planning Efforts in Campaign Design

7. A campaign design must determine the planning lead (the military to date); the planning support (UN, OSCE, NATO supporting agencies depending on the mission and scope of tasks, as well as donor agencies); the lead humanitarian agency (primarily UNHCR); CIMIC Centres (unit and higher formation including materiel and personnel support resources); the requirement for Tactical Support Teams; Joint or Military Observers; Monitoring Missions; divisions of responsibility, labour and resources between military (to include PfP as dictated by the situation) and civilian agencies relying on campaign pillars; a preliminary list of joint priority projects; and command and control arrangements in the course of civil-military operations and associated joint projects. This campaign design should be formally submitted for the approval of key stakeholders in an area of operations to ensure agreement and operational support for the campaign plan. As well, HN civil authorities, national Red Cross/Red Crescent and local NGOs should be involved or approached to determine their level of support for the campaign design and also to provide advice to the TFC and lead agencies.

8. A collaborative effort is vital to the success of the mission and its sustainment over an indefinite period of time to achieve the civil-military end state. Campaign design for the civil aspects will usually rely on campaign pillars established at the strategic level. As an example, campaign pillars and lead agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina are established along functional lines:

- | | |
|--|--------------------|
| a. secure environment | SFOR (all pillars) |
| b. economic recovery | OHR |
| c. demining | UNMAC |
| d. police | IPTF |
| e. displaced persons and refugees (DPRE) | UNHCR |
| f. elections | OSCE |

- g. arms control OSCE
- h. common institutions (car plates, passport, bus lines...) OHR

122. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION - A CAMPAIGN PLANNING CONCEPT AND PROCESS

1. In normal circumstances, CIMIC planners at the operational level will synchronize and harmonize their efforts through preparation of a CIMIC annex to the OPLAN. Dependent upon the complexity of the PSO, CIMIC planners will prepare a supporting CIMIC campaign plan. In practical terms, this means that a military campaign plan and a civil plan approved by the UN, OSCE and NATO, must merge and be harmonized to produce *one theatre civil plan*. In this way, all stakeholders will focus on unity of purpose, unity of effort and economy of effort to achieve the mission. The CIMIC campaign planning concept and process at figure 1-9 integrates campaign planning in *B-GG-005-004/AF-000, CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONS* and *B-GG-005-004/AF-004 FORCE EMPLOYMENT*.




Figure 1-9 The CIMIC Campaign Planning Concept and Process

2. The process begins with the definition of the desired civil-military end state and TFC's end state. The J5 staff then works its way back to determine the TFC's objectives and the civil-military objectives in order of priority. The combination of end states and objectives define the appropriate resources, methods and tasks to achieve the civil-military end state. The process is then reversed and decisive points leading to each centre of gravity are identified. Each decisive point is assigned specific tasks, matched with the adequate resources and methods to overcome the corresponding centre of gravity. The linking of each decisive point to its corresponding centre of gravity establishes the line of operation which leads to the TFC's end state (civil conditions which must exist to exit the theatre of operations) and the civil-military end state. This two way process requires a continuous assessment of the operational environment, synchronization and harmony between civil and military tasks, and balance between military and civil considerations of the campaign planning process.

3. UN and NATO operations have shown that the early integration of all political, civil, economic, development and humanitarian agencies in the area of operations is essential to unity of effort and to a unified campaign plan. To establish coherence between all levels of command, the operational campaign plan must achieve civil-military strategic objectives while civil-military tasking, at the tactical level, seek to achieve operational objectives. Joint

military and civilian planning, preparedness, training and execution must be emphasized to deal effectively and efficiently with mostly complex humanitarian emergencies. Unity of command for the TF ensures the mission will reach its coherent strategic and operational objectives. Figure 1-10 illustrates the second part of the campaign planning process and lines of operation leading to the centres of gravity (CIMIC objectives), as described at paragraph 2.

4. Theory, doctrine and experience suggest the key elements in campaigns against top-down violence, are: *firstly*, an effective separation of factions as part of the military phase; and *secondly*, a public information campaign (PSYOPS+PA) targeting the civilian population to modify attitudes and behaviours in support of the peace process and its objectives, can be useful *multipliers* of military efforts. Combining the assurances of effective patrolling and pervasive presence with routine meetings, such as Joint Commissions, can systematically reinforce the “live-and-let-live” system. Confidence and security building measures are also effective at the lowest levels. These key




Figure 1-10 Lines of Operation to the Centres of Gravity elements also confirm that military and civil phases of a military operation are complementary to achieve the mission.

5. In the military and civil phases of a military operation, the civil tasks have a direct impact on the mission, the re-establishment of the civil infrastructure and the return to a stable, secure and normal way of life in which basic humanitarian needs can be provided. In peace building efforts, the type of information traditionally collected by a military force does not provide sufficient data to evaluate and analyse the progress of recovery to a stable and progressive civil society. The collection of both military and non-military data is required to ensure that credible and reliable data is available to the TFC so he can make informed decisions in support of the civil-military campaign. Strategic and operational guidance are imperative to the success of the mission.

6. **Mission Success.** The success of a mission must be defined in terms of effectiveness (objectives stated versus results achieved) and efficiency (results achieved versus resources invested) and relevance (resources invested versus objectives stated) in executing multiple civil tasks, leading to the attainment of mission objectives, whether strategic, operational or tactical. The end result of civil-military cooperation operations, civil-military activities and support to civil administration seek to *maximize*, or at the very least *optimize* the investment of all stakeholders' resources in peace building; the collective resources of the military, IOs and NGOs. Measures of effectiveness (MOE) and normality indicators seek to achieve some performance measurement of civil tasks

executed in a theatre or area of operations. These efforts must lead to a rapid handover of civil responsibilities to civil authorities who must carry on civil infrastructure reforms. Consequently, success is measurable, qualitatively (quality of life) and quantitatively (amount of resources), well beyond the departure of a military force from a theatre of operations. Success must also be durable and self-sustaining in the long term to maintain a quality of life acceptable to civilian authorities and the civilian populace. Mission success is establishing the civil conditions conducive to a lasting peace.

7. Military planners seeking to achieve strategic objectives must consider the following civil-military factors:
 - a. the political and civil implications of the strategic end state;
 - b. the civil end state inherent in the strategic end state;
 - c. centres of gravity which derive from civil authorities, civil infrastructures, capabilities and locations (public opinion, political parties, alliances or coalitions, economic sector, financial backers, vital industries, balance of payments, political regime, HN military support for the policies of the government...);
 - d. the alliance or coalitions which provide logistic support. Viable administrative and logistic systems capable of rapid deployment are required to sustain a military force in PSO, OOTW and combat;
 - e. national civil objectives which support the operational objectives;
 - f. the civil end state inherent in the operational end state;
 - g. decisive points associated with centres of gravity;
 - h. the synchronization of civil-military activities with the campaign lines of operations, sequencing, manoeuvre, tempo, supporting operational plans and culminating point;
 - i. the required civil and military resources to achieve operational objectives, requiring HN and inter-agency cooperation and coordination within the area of operations; and
 - j. the methods (ways) involving structure, augmentation, policies, liaison, commissions, boards, committees and information programs, etc., to utilize resources in an effective and efficient manner.
8. A CIMIC campaign plan applies primarily to international operations. In domestic operations, OGDs and government agencies, as well as provincial and municipal levels of government, possess mandates, functions, responsibilities and resources to meet CIMIC requirements, aided by the Canadian Red Cross and local NGOs. Nonetheless, CIMIC planning notions (ways, means, decisive points, lines of operation, centres of gravity and the civil-military end state) are also applicable to domestic operations.
9. To enhance CIMIC planning, annex D introduces a format for a CIMIC annex to an Op O, while annex E provides a format for a periodic CIMIC report to be submitted to a higher headquarters, as per established SOPs.

123. THE FORCE EMPLOYMENT PROCESS

1. The fundamentals of the Force employment process are covered in *B-GG-005-004/AF-004 FORCE EMPLOYMENT* and apply to both domestic and international operations. It is important to understand the CIMIC planning process and how it provides input to the main TF operational planning process and related decision making. The six steps of the Force employment process from a CIMIC perspective are:
 - a. **Initiation.** While CIMIC has no direct input in the initiation stage, it is clearly important that the CIMIC staff have the basis for an area of operations assessment. Even a sketchy assessment of civil conditions at this early stage will help direct the CIMIC staff's attention towards relevant civil-military considerations. For this reason, appropriate OGD desk officers at CIDA, DFAIT and UNHCR Office in Ottawa can assist J5 CIMIC staffs in obtaining preliminary information, particularly when there is a requirement to involve Canadian

embassies/Consulates and embassy Military Attachés in collecting data for the initial area assessment. As well, every effort must be made to contact IOs and NGOs already in the area of operations, particularly UNHCR, ICRC, UNHCHR organizations or representatives, the national Red Cross/Red Crescent, as well as local NGOs. Canadian NGOs may already be in the area of operations and may provide relevant information through their Canadian NGO field or regional offices. The purpose is to obtain political, economic, social and humanitarian information to develop the area assessment and to provide a clear picture of the situation which will contribute to the analysis of operational factors and the formulation of courses of action (COAs). Collection of reliable statistical and technical data may only be possible during the reconnaissance.

- b. **Orientation.** The CIMIC mission analysis and estimate will be used to identify potential tasks, restraints and constraints, and probably key assumptions. Moreover, the civil-military analysis of the situation should facilitate early CIMIC planning by the TF.
- c. **COA Development.** In the COA development stage, the CIMIC staff analysis will inform the TFC's courses of action and provide some clear idea of potential CIMIC tasks. It is important at this step, that the CIMIC staff have a well developed concept of civil-military support, particularly in terms of civil-military cooperation operations and corresponding military civic actions. It will allow the TFC to double check that the general thrust of the civil-military effort in support of the military force and of the civil environment, is as he wishes. There may only be one civil-military cooperation COA.
- d. **Decision.** The TFC's selected course of action will be translated into a concise statement of the TFC's decision. This decision is reflected in the TFC's statement of intent depicting why an operation is being conducted, how it will unfold and what the military campaign should achieve. The CIMIC course of action will be developed into a concept of operations for approval by the TFC. Once approved, the CIMIC annex to the OPLAN or Op O can be developed.
- e. **Plan Development.** Once the decision is taken, the concept of civil-military support is fully integrated in the TFC's main concept of operations which ensures coherence of the civil-military plan. The final product of this step is a SUP or a CIMIC annex to the OPLAN or Op O.
- f. **Plan Review.** A plan is only as good as it is current and practical in coping with the existing situation on the ground. CIMIC priorities will change as well as matching resource allocation. Such changes will always be accompanied by a repeat of the preceding stages and should result in either a new plan, or branches and sequels to the existing OPLAN or Op O. The important planning aspect for CIMIC staff is always to remain focussed on the civil-military end state.

2. Figure 1-11 illustrates the Force employment process and the CIMIC input in the TF operational planning process. It is essential that the CIMIC operational planning process be synchronized and in harmony with the TF operational planning process throughout the six steps discussed above. This continuous effort will ensure that adequate resources are assigned CIMIC tasks and that effective coordination of efforts is taken.

STEPS	OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS	CIMIC OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS
STEP 1 INITIATION	GATHER PLANNING TOOLS INITIATING DIRECTIVE GET ORGANIZED	INITIAL AREA ASSESSMENT INITIAL OP ESTIMATE ESTABLISH CONTACTS (POCs)
STEP 2 ORIENTATION	MISSION ANALYSIS MISSION STATEMENT TFC's PLANNING GUIDANCE WARNING ORDER/RECCE OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE	MISSION ANALYSIS MISSION STATEMENT CIMIC PLANNING GUIDANCE RECCE/FULL AREA ASSESSMENT CIMIC ESTIMATE/CIMIC FACTORS
STEP 3 COA DEVELOPMENT	STAFF ANALYSIS DEVELOP and REFINE COAs ANALYSE FACTORS DECISION BRIEF	STAFF ANALYSIS CIMIC COURSE(S) OF ACTION
STEP 4 DECISION	TFC's DECISION ON COA STATEMENT OF INTENT DEVELOP COA into COO	CIMIC COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOP COA into COO for APPROVAL PROCEED w/PLAN DEVELOPMENT
STEP 5 PLAN DEVELOPMENT	SEEK COO APPROVAL PREPARE COP/Op O DEVELOP ANNEXES or SUP ISSUE OPLAN or Op O	CIMIC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS DEVELOP CIMIC SUP TO COP or CIMIC ANNEX to OPLAN or Op O
STEP 6 PLAN REVIEW	PLAN REVIEW REVISED DECISION BRIEFING PREPARE and ISSUE PLANS	REVIEW CIMIC PLAN (as required) UPDATE OPLAN/Op O (as required) COORDINATION w/STAKEHOLDERS

Figure 1-11 The Force Employment Process and CIMIC Planning

124. CIMIC PRINCIPLES OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. In PSO, OOTW and combat, several CIMIC command and control options exist, dependent upon the actual mission, operational concept, overall task organization and national concerns. These options include a single CIMIC functional command placed under the authority of a single commander, national control of CIMIC assets or the support by CIMIC elements of a specific operational or tactical unit reporting to the supported unit's commander. The CF have adopted principles of command control to plan, direct, conduct, control and monitor military operations, regardless of operational environments. More details on command and control are provided in *B-GG-005-004/AF-000 CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONS*. These principles are:

- a. **Unity of Command.** In a military unit or formation, a single commander will be authorized to plan and direct operations. The TFC will be held responsible for an operation's success or failure, and has the authority to direct and control the personnel and materiel committed to the task. This principle encompasses the three elements of command: decision making, leadership and control.
- b. **Span of Control.** There is a limit to how much one person can effectively direct. A formation or unit's number of subordinate and activities, and its AO, must be such that one person can command and control the formation or unit.
- c. **Chain of Command.** The structure of the command and control process is hierarchial. The commander at each level responds to orders and direction received from a higher authority and, in turn, issues orders and direction to subordinates. Bypassing levels of command in either direction is justified only in the most exceptional circumstances, such as the need for immediate action or the loss of communication with intermediate commanders. In such cases, the chain of command must be reestablished as quickly as possible and any intermediate commander advised of the action taken.
- d. **Delegation of Authority.** If the scope and complexity of operations are such as that one person alone cannot direct and supervise all tasks, command authority should be delegated. Commanders may delegate all or any part of this authority and will decide how much authority will be exercised on their behalf by the staff and how much by subordinate commanders. Delegation means:
 - (1) a commander must identify the essential aspects which will be handled personally, and then delegate authority to subordinates for those activities which are within their capability or do not require the

commander's personal involvement;

- (2) authority which has been delegated may be withdrawn or adjusted by a commander at any time; and
 - (3) the transfer of authority and assignment of responsibility for functions or tasks within the formation or unit in no way relieves commanders of their ultimate responsibilities.
- e. **Freedom of Action.** Once the task or mission has been established and the necessary orders have been given, subordinate commanders must be permitted maximum freedom to take initiative and exercise their skills and knowledge of the local situation in the planning and conduct of the operation.
- f. **Continuity of Command.** Command must be maintained at all times and the following conditions met:
- (1) commanders will establish a clear procedure for succession of command in the event that they become casualties or are unable, for any other reason, to exercise command themselves;
 - (2) plans, organizations and facilities will be put in place to provide for a capability to overcome physical fatigue, equipment failures and inevitable personnel and equipment casualties resulting from belligerent forces' attack(s), and interruptions during moves or transfers of the command authority from one location to another;
 - (3) an *alternate headquarters* should be available to replace the *main headquarters* when it is out of operation, either IAW planned procedures or as a result of belligerent forces/FWF attack; and
 - (4) subordinates must be fully aware of the commander's CIMIC intent and concept of operations so that, if there is a loss of communications, headquarters or commanders, subordinate commanders are capable of continuing without higher direction or consultation until the chain of command is restored.

125. LEGAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

1. The legal annex to an OPLAN will largely be based on SOFA and the nature of the military operation, whether authorized under article 5 of the NATO Charter or by a UNSC resolution for non-article 5 operations, led by the UN or OSCE. Legal considerations will include:

- a. references to the international legal instruments relevant to the PSO or OOTW;
- b. the legal basis for the implementation of the military operation, such as the relevant UNSC resolutions;
- c. a description of the TOR and support arrangements of the theatre and AO legal advisors and their staffs, including an ongoing duty to review the OPLAN;
- d. legal implications surrounding ROE (refer to chapter 2, article 208);
- e. the procedures for settling claims against the military force;
- f. any special legal considerations relevant to the mission, such as the legal aspects of some humanitarian operations and legal consequences for the TFC and his staff, particularly when providing Force protection;
- g. the procedures for obtaining legal assistance;
- h. the procedures dealing with disciplinary matters;
- i. the procedures for dealing with violations or suspected violations of the law of the HN and the Law of Armed Conflict;
- j. the procedures for dealing with captured weapons, documents, materiel and other items particular to the

type of military operation;

k. a description of the legal status of the military force;

l. the procedures for dealing with detainees, IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers;

m. the procedures for contracting for goods and services;

n. the procedures dealing with IOs having international legal authority to operate in the AO, such as the ICRC/Red Crescent, the OSCE and the IOM; and

o. any other residual legal matters relevant to the conduct of the military operation.

2. Based on operational requirements, national policies and other political efforts, the national commander or TFC has the delegated authority to negotiate CIMIC arrangements with a foreign government or other authority in the area of operations, including assistance by the military force to civil authorities.

CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION CENTRE GENERAL FUNCTIONS AND TASKS

INTRODUCTION

1. The primary task of the CMCC is to assist the TFC to implement the civil-military tasks. In doing so, there is the requirement to advise the TFC and other staffs on CIMIC activities and operations, provide a conduit across which the military can interface with external civilian agencies and coordinate CIMIC projects.

2. **Operating Environment.** In PSO, OOTW and combat it is vital to establish close working relationships at all levels quickly with governmental, IOs, NGOs and UN civilian agencies. In many cases, they have a wide range of contacts and a depth of experience in the operational area and are a source for the military of critical and timely information. This annex is applicable, in large part, to domestic operations.

J5 STAFF CIMIC RESPONSIBILITIES

3. CIMIC is the responsibility of all commanders and staff. J5 staff respective functions would include:

a. **Information.** Collecting, collating, maintaining and providing information on CIMIC and passing such information, insofar as it affects military operations, to the command and other staff elements within their headquarters and to higher, lower and adjacent headquarters as required. This information shall include:

- (1) status of agreements and arrangements;
- (2) status of national legislative situation;
- (3) state of Civilian Preparedness/Civil Emergency Planning;
- (4) civil alert measures effected;
- (5) the current CIMIC situation in their AO and adjacent sectors;
- (6) political, economic and psychological factors affecting the civilian population;
- (7) status of requests for aid from national authorities; and
- (8) disagreements not solved at lower levels.

b. **Residence Control/Evacuating Planning.** Collecting and maintaining information on population movement (evaluations/refugee movement).

c. **Assistance to Other Staff Elements.** Assisting other staff elements with their CIMIC problems, for example:

- (1) **Personnel**
 - (a) civilian labour employed in Allied Forces; and
 - (b) control of POWs.
- (2) **Military Information Services or Intelligence**
 - (a) exchange information of intelligence value;

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- (b) psychological operations;
- (c) sabotage, subversion and espionage;
- (d) maintenance of public order; and
- (e) security.

(3) **Operations**

- (a) residence control/evacuation planning and coordination with military interests;
- (b) rear area security;
- (c) movement control - operational aspects;
- (d) barrier and denial measures;
- (e) NBC reporting; and
- (f) alert system.

(4) **Logistics**

- (a) provision of local resources (accommodation, real estate, expendable supplies and material, services, transportation, civilian labour);
- (b) damage control;
- (c) infrastructure support;
- (d) logistic support to sustain engineer resources and meet immediate and/or urgent operational requirements;
- (e) mutual logistics assistance; and
- (f) movement control.

d. **Liaison/Cooperation**

- (1) establishing and maintaining liaison, and the exchange of information with higher, lower and adjacent headquarters and with allied and national agencies, as appropriate; and
- (2) establishing and maintaining liaison, and the exchange of information with the staff elements of other war Headquarters and with national liaison staffs to HQ, as appropriate.

J5 STAFF TASKS AT FORMATION LEVEL

4. J5 CIMIC general tasks are to:

- a. liaise and coordinate with the appropriate level of the HN National Territorial Command, and or local civic leaders, national and international agencies/organizations such as police, firefighters, ICRC, UNHCR, WFP, etc.;

- b. gather, analyse, assess and disseminate civil and political information within the military chain of command and, where appropriate with civil agencies;
- c. analyse and assess refugee and IDP movements and be prepared to deconflict situations in order to maintain military FOM;
- d. prepare to assist in the conduct of local negotiations with, or for the TFC or subordinate commanders, as ordered;
- e. prepare to deal with other civil or local political issues as directed by the TFC; and
- f. submit appropriate reports and returns accurately and timely.

J5 OPERATIONS

5. J5 Operations is the main focal point for the implementation of the formation or unit CIMIC plan. In doing so, J5 Operations will monitor the operation(s), assess the impact of military operations on civilian rehabilitation activities. The J5 Operations general tasks are to:

- a. prepare CMO estimates, as directed;
- b. monitor current CIMIC activities through the CMO and support to civil administration cells in the CMCC and be prepared to provide a quick response in close coordination with J3 Ops and other staff branches;
- c. be prepared to provide J5 staff and J3 Ops with CIMIC information;
- d. receive and analyse CIMICREP from subordinate units, as well as from civilian agencies;
- e. produce CIMICREP and input to the formation or unit civil-military assessments;
- f. produce the TFC's area assessment report (COMASSESSREP) or operational estimate;
- g. prepare TFC's direction on civil-military matters to be coherent with formation direction to commanders;
- h. coordinate CIMIC activities with J5 CIMIC at the CMCC and TST leaders of CIMIC centres; and
- i. conduct security and civil-military briefings at periodic inter-agency meetings or as required.

J5 PLANS

6. J5 Plans is a position best filled by a combat arms officer. J5 Plans works closely with the higher HQ plans officer and section; both focused on planning to reach the civil-military end state. J5 Plans is primarily responsible for normality indicators and measures of effectiveness, refugees and IDPs and the coordination of joint planning activities with IOs and NGOs, involving the return of dislocated civilians to their former home. J5 Plans has the responsibility to coordinate his planning efforts with the J5 CIMIC, J3 Engineer, J3 Ops and J3 Plans because of the resources involved which may be planned for or allocated to other tasking priorities. The division of responsibilities and coordination mechanisms with J3 Ops and J3 Plans must be well understood to prevent duplication of effort and misuse or wastage of resources.

J5 PROJECTS

7. J5 Projects would require a dedicated J5 Engineer position to evaluate projects, particularly joint projects. There is a requirement to coordinate with J5 Plans, tasks associated with the civil phase of the military operation,

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which can be completed from available resources. General tasks are to:

- a. collect data and maintain a database of minor/major projects from formations and units. This includes status updates on current projects, cancellations of projects and identification of new projects;
- b. coordinate with IOs, NGOs and UN organizations and agencies, the availability of resources to carry out joint projects, to prevent duplication of efforts and adherence to CIMIC priorities;
- c. coordinate with various funding agencies, the release of funds in joint projects;
- d. establish a schedule of visit for projects for which an application form has been received. Following the J5 Project visit, the project will be submitted to a formation HQ J5 Committee for discussion, usually a 'Project Management Team' (PMT), which would meet periodically;
- e. a J5 Project Officer will discuss specific projects for which he/her is responsible at the formation 'Project Management Team' periodic meetings;
- f. each formation J5 Project Officer will advise the unit TST or J5 CIMIC on whether their respective projects are approved, rejected or put on hold until more details are provided, following each PMT meetings; and
- g. prepare an audit schedule of selected projects and organize an audit team, within six months following the completion of projects.

THE PROJECT PROCESS GUIDELINES

8. In the civil phase, formations and units are responsible to identify and develop minor and major projects in coordination with higher headquarters. J5 staff at formation level revisit and review project lists, with new projects added regularly and priorities shifted to reflect these new projects. J5 Plans, J5 Projects and J5 Ops should always involve the media and PSYOPS in minor and major projects to emphasize the creation of civil conditions towards a desired end state. The project process is subject to the TF Engineer directives and to engineer guidelines specified in B-GG-005-004/AF-15, *Military Engineer Support to CF Operations*. The project process will follow these guidelines:

- a. contact local authorities to identify, scope and prioritize project requirements;
- b. provide assistance in screening proposals;
- c. obtain a feasibility study from local firms/experts, including a financial estimate to involve them in the project;
- d. translate the local documents through the interpreters and format the presentation to meet higher headquarters specifications/expectations, SOPs, rules and procedures;
- e. forward the planned projects to higher headquarters and the concerned UN, OSCE or NATO agencies, IOs and NGOs, through the appropriate CIMIC centre or established channels of communication;
- f. finance the projects from likely funding sources: higher headquarters, EU, WB, CIDA through Canadian embassies, IOs, NGOs private donors or UN agencies;
- g. monitor the projects from initiation until completion and handover to beneficiaries "keys in hand"; and
- h. participation of the TFC, J5 CIMIC and other dignitaries in the handover/inauguration ceremony of completed projects to the local municipalities, which involves a media coverage and the local, national and international

press corps. Visibility of completed projects in peace building is key to achieving the mission.

9. The three types of engineering projects or tasks that could be encountered during an operation are:
 - a. TF engineer close and general support projects/tasks, such as EOD/mine clearance, accommodation, water supply, power restoration, etc.;
 - b. humanitarian/military civic action projects, such as facilities and utilities repair, potable water, etc.; and
 - c. dual purpose projects which simultaneously benefit the deployed TF and humanitarian relief, such as repairs to bridges, routes, utilities, etc.
10. To optimize the use of resources during the civil phase, when military tasks are less stringent, military personnel should be involved in as many minor projects as possible, financed by the international community, including cost-sharing arrangements involving the military, IOs, NGOs and civilian authorities. The execution of minor projects provides a sense of progress in civil reconstruction and does not unduly tie-down a military force if unforeseen military tasks should arise.
11. The senior military engineer in the TF is appointed the TF engineer to which J5 Projects (if an engineer) is accountable.

NOTE: This annex contains information extracted from IFOR/ARRC SOP 900 and 901 dated 28 September 96.

TACTICAL SUPPORT TEAM DUTY AND JOB DESCRIPTION

GENERAL

1. A Tactical Support Team (TST) is defined as a mix of dedicated J5 generalists or specialists employed to carry out civil tasks in support of a CF element. A TST provides flexibility to a TFC and is generally placed under operational control (OPCON) of a Battle Group and augments the J5 staff cell. A TST composition is generally of a mix of eight officers/non-commissioned members of at least sergeant rank, issued from various military occupational codes and CF environments, grouped in four sub-teams of two members each. To ensure unity of command, the officer in charge of the TST (OIC TST), usually of the rank of Major, will be attached to and coordinate his planning efforts with the unit J5 CIMIC who runs the J5 cell on behalf of the TFC. It is important that these efforts support and are consistent with unit mission. Notwithstanding, the official channels of communication of the OIC TST would be through the established chain of command, such as the commander of a US CIMIC Battalion under which the TST could be OPCON, or other command and control arrangements specified in the posting message or deployment orders. Any conflict in tasking, or disagreements between the Battle Group J5 CIMIC and OIC TST, will be resolved through this chain of command.

2. Civil-military cooperation has two aspects: civil-military cooperation operations (Chapter 2) and support to civil administration (Chapter 3). Support to civil administration focuses on support to a foreign government and in a worst case scenario, direct military involvement in the executive, legislative and judicial systems of a civilian government. It is based on HN laws, SOFA, MOU, jurisdiction rights, international laws and the Law of Armed Conflict. Therefore, support to civil administration has legal foundations which are beyond the mandate and scope of activities of a TST. A TST is solely concerned with civil-military cooperation operations (CMO).

MISSION

3. The mission of a TST is to support the TFC in achieving the civil-military end state.

TACTICAL SUPPORT TEAM MISSION ESSENTIAL TASKS LIST

4. The TST Mission Essential Tasks List (METL) is as follows:

- a. assist in coordinating civil-military cooperation and host nation support (HNS);
- b. coordinate and assist in population and resources control operations;
- c. coordinate and assist in humanitarian operations;
- d. coordinate and assist in military civic action operations. These are projects useful to the local population in areas such as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communication, health, sanitation and others. Community Assistance Program (CAP) projects (road, schools, health clinic repairs...), fall in this category and contribute to social development to improve the standing of the military with the local populace;
- e. assess, coordinate and conduct limited humanitarian/civic assistance projects. Military necessity may

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require a TFC to provide life sustaining services, maintain order or control distribution of food, goods and services;

- f. coordinate and assist in civil defence operations; and
- g. maintain liaison with other regional civil-military cooperation elements, including those which may be located close to the boundary separating two areas of operations.

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION OPERATIONS

5. The conduct of Civil-Military Cooperation Operations (CMO) will cover the following:

- a. coordinate with civil authorities and civil agencies;
- b. coordinate with allied and national or host nation military forces;
- c. coordinate with international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or PVOs (US);
- d. minimize civil interference with military operations through Population and Resources Control;
- e. assist the Battle Group commander in meeting legal and moral obligations to the local population. This requires a good knowledge of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, SOFA, international laws as well as policy directives which define the commander's moral and legal obligations to civil populations;
- f. provide program planning and technical advice and assistance to civil authorities in fields of expertise commensurate with operational requirements in the area of operations. This requirement relies on university trained and qualified TST members;
- g. coordinate requirements for and assist in acquiring local resources and facilities; and
- h. research, prepare and update periodically area assessments (chapter 5, annex B) and economic assessments.

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION CENTRE

6. A civil-military cooperation centre (CIMIC Centre) is a coordination and information centre established and tailored to assist a unit or formation in anticipating, facilitating, coordinating and providing those military functions and activities pertaining to the civil population, local government, the economy and infrastructure of areas or regions in which armed forces, HN organizations, international organizations and non-governmental organizations are employed.

7. The CIMIC Centre is neither a unit nor an organization; it is a capability provided by the J5 CIMIC which facilitates access to the civil population, civil authorities, international and non-governmental organizations, and police in the area of operations. The CIMIC Centre may be composed of military and civilian representatives from different civil agencies and will usually be operated by a TST sub-team. The number and locations of CIMIC Centres will depend on the nature of the PSO and operational requirements. CIMIC centres are unit or formation assets.

8. **Logistic Support.** Adequate logistic support must be provided TST members if they are to be self-reliant and contribute effectively to the mission. Adequate working and living facilities, vehicles, radios, information technology such as lap tops, computer workstations and printers must be assessed, in addition to telephones (SATCOM), photocopiers and fax machines. Interpreters and translators for TST sub-teams must also be assessed as part of the unit or formation support requirements.

9. **Tasks.** The tasks of a CIMIC Centre are:

- a. point of contact, liaison and centre for requesting assistance and support;
- b. source of area and economic assessments, including CMO estimate;
- c. information source to civil authorities, the local population, IOs and NGOs or PVOs;
- d. source of local maps: route maps, minefield maps;
- e. assist local citizens in filing claims to the military; and
- f. micro-business J5 projects' initiation until completion as well as macro-projects (shelters, electricity, sewage, water, waste management...) in coordination with IOs and NGOs, through national funding (CIDA) and/or international funding (EC-DG1a, ECHO, DFID, USAID...).

(Classification)

Copy ____ of ____ copies

(Date)

(Alphanumeric Designation)

(Team Name)

CIMIC SUPPORTING PLAN to _____ CAMPAIGN PLAN: (Number and Code Name)

References: (Maps, charts and other relevant documents). Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: _____

1. Situation

a. General. (Description of the theatre and unit area of operations)

b. Belligerent Forces/FWF or Enemy (warfighting) Threat

- (1) Military
- (2) Political
- (3) Economic
- (4) Social and Cultural
- (5) Informational

c. Friendly Missions and Capabilities

- (1) Military, MILOBS, UNCIVPOL
- (2) Civilian agencies
- (3) Political
- (4) Economic
- (5) Social and Cultural
- (6) Informational

d. CIMIC Elements

2. Mission. (Restated CIMIC theatre or campaign mission)

3. Execution

a. Commander's Intent. This plan coordinates military involvement in Canadian political, economic, informational and sociological and cultural activities in the theatre/area of operations.

b. Concept of Operations. Strategic CIMIC objectives are listed in the appropriate paragraphs below.

- (1) HNS.
- (2) Humanitarian assistance.

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- (a) Humanitarian and civic assistance.
 - (b) Military civic action is usually coordinated at the operational level and executed at the tactical level. However, if strategic level civic actions are specified by the TFC, those actions are included in this paragraph.
 - (3) Civil defence.
 - (4) Populace and resources control.
 - (a) Dislocated civilian operations.
 - (b) Non-combatant evacuation operations.
 - (c) Other.
 - (5) Support to civil administration.
 - (6) Engineer resources. Combat engineers, construction engineers, geomatics support personnel, fire protection services personnel and equipment, including HN civil and military engineers and equipment. As well, some NGOs are mandated to improve housing and provide construction materials while others are able to provide general engineering services, such as the IRC. These resources must be considered in the TFC's planning and coordination efforts.
 - (7) Employment of CIMIC elements.
- c. Phases of Operations. The purpose of this paragraph is to relate the CIMIC concept of support to the military campaign phases. Campaign plans generally have four phases: preparation, deployment, employment and redeployment. A general outline of the phasing activities is depicted below. The phases of the specific plan support are identified in paragraph 3 of the campaign plan.
- (1) Phase I. (Preparation)
 - (a) Concept. Include specific CIMIC operational objectives and timing of this phase.
 - (b) Tasks of subordinate units.
 - (c) Supporting PSYOPS.
 - (d) Non-military support employed, i.e. HNS, OGDs and agencies, IOs and NGOs.
 - (2) Phase II. (Employment)
 - (a) Concept. Include specific CIMIC operational objectives and timing of this phase.
 - (b) Tasks of subordinate units.
 - (c) Supporting PSYOPS.
 - (d) Non-military support employed, i.e. HNS, OGDs and agencies, IOs and NGOs.
 - (3) Phase III. (Redeployment or exit if mandate is not renewed)

- (a) Concept. Include specific CIMIC operational objectives and timing of this phase.
 - (b) Tasks of subordinate units.
 - (c) Supporting PSYOPS.
 - (d) Non-military support employed i.e. HNS, OGDs and agencies, IOs and NGOs.
 - (e) Coordination and transfer of tasks and responsibilities to follow on forces, if required.
4. Sustainment. Specify assumptions, if any.
- a. Reception aspects.
 - b. Supply aspects (civilian supply and property control).
 - c. Maintenance and modification.
 - d. Medical/public health.
 - e. Transportation (public transportation).
 - f. Base development.
 - g. Personnel (civilian labour).
 - h. Host nation support (HNS).
 - i. Government.
 - j. Lines of communication.
 - k. CF responsibilities.
 - l. Sustainment priorities and resources.
 - m. Coordinate the supply, maintenance and repairing of military engineer materiel.
 - n. Inter-agency responsibilities.
 - o. Protection priorities.
5. Command and Signal
- a. Command. State the command relationship for CIMIC elements and the civil-military relationships with civilian agencies deployed in the area of operations, which will be employed in the campaign activities. Indicate any shifts of command or changes in operational control contemplated during the campaign. Indicate time of the expected shift. Give location of TFC and command posts.
 - b. Signal. (Include liaison instruction)

 (Classification)

NOTE: This annex is extracted from FM 41-10, Appendix E and the CF Operations Manual, chapter 23.

(Classification)

CIMIC ANNEX
(Change from oral orders, if any)

(Date)

(Alphanumeric Designation)

(Plan Name)

ANNEX _____ (CIMIC) TO OPERATION ORDER NO. _____

References: Maps, charts and other relevant documents.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: _____

Task Organization: CIMIC unit task organization or elements thereof, should appear under this heading or as a Tab to the CIMIC annex, should such units be tasked.

1. Situation. Include any items of information which affect CIMIC not included in paragraph 1 of the operation order or which need to be expanded.

a. Enemy Forces (warfighting) or disputing/hostile forces. Refer to the Intelligence/Military Information annex. Any items regarding the composition, disposition, location, movement, estimated strengths, identification, tactics and operational methods and capabilities of such forces which are specifically relevant to CIMIC should be addressed under this heading.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) Military. Outline the higher headquarters CIMIC plan, the CIMIC plans of higher and adjacent units and note CIMIC assets supporting the unit. Cover the following categories of military units:

(a) NATO.

(b) United Nations or other non-disputing military forces.

(2) Civilian. Outline the mandate, tasks, relevant organization, capabilities (resources and funding sources), locations, current or planned activities and the leadership of the civilian agencies. Current cooperation and coordination systems (periodic meetings, planning sessions...) among these agencies should be highlighted. If needed, appendices to the CIMIC annex should be used. The civilian agencies could include:

(a) United Nations' civil agencies and organizations. Examples are UNHCR, WFP, WHO, UNICEF, UNCIVPOL, MILOBS, DHA...

(b) International Organizations. Examples are ICRC, EC, ECHO, IOM...

(c) Governmental Organizations. Examples are CIDA, USAID, British DFID...

(d) Non-Governmental Organizations. Examples are CARE, OXFAM, IRC, MSF...

c. Attachments and Detachments. CIMIC resources attached and detached to include effective times, if appropriate.

2. Mission. A clear, concise statement of the CIMIC task and purpose. If necessary, multiple CIMIC tasks must be prioritized.

Annex D
to Chapter 1

3. Execution

a. Concept of the Operation.

- (1) TFC's Intent. A brief statement of the TFC's intent for CIMIC. This statement should include the expected results or civil-military end state.
- (2) General Outline of the Concept of Operations. A statement of how CIMIC will occur to accomplish the CIMIC mission and the CIMIC priorities. If the operation includes phasing, this section will include the timings, aims, and how each phase will be accomplished. The general statement may include the establishment of military CIMIC structures, their relationships with existing civil structures, key CIMIC activities: DPRES, Joint Commissions, HNS, liaison with NGOs, civil interference with military operations, CIMIC coordination mechanisms and the role of various committees and boards.

b. CIMIC Tasks to Subordinate and Supporting Units. PSYOPS teams, Media Group/PA...

c. Coordinating Instructions. Coordinating Instructions include those coordinating items which pertain to two or more units or elements thereof, and are not specified in subordinate unit tasks. Additionally, in PSO, it is important to delineate the military and civil functions. Coordination items can include:

- (1) Military Functions.
- (2) Civilian Functions.
- (3) Command Relationships with Non-Military Organizations.
- (4) Committees, Boards and Commissions.
- (5) Liaison Requirements and Responsibilities.
- (6) Evacuation Policies for Civilians.
- (7) Integration of the international police force and civilian agencies in the overall security plan.
- (8) Displaced Persons and Refugees (DPRES) Coordination.
- (9) Procedures for Civil Control.
- (10) Procedures for Military Use of Civil Resources.
- (11) Reference to supporting appendices not referenced elsewhere in the CIMIC annex.
- (12) Note additional CIMIC resources available to support the unit.

4. Service Support.

5. Command and Signal.

Acknowledgement Instructions

Authentication.
Appendices:
Distribution:

Last name of commander
Rank

(Classification)

NOTE: This annex is extracted from "Functional Planning Guide for Peace Support Operations".

 (Classification)

PERIODIC CIMIC REPORT
(Omit paragraphs and sub-paragraphs not applicable)

 (Date)

 (Alphanumeric Designation)

 (Name)

PERIODIC CIMIC REPORT NO. _____

Period covered: Date and time to date and time.

References: Maps (series number, sheet(s), edition, scale) or charts.

1. General Statement on the Situation at the End of the Period. Location of CIMIC elements and major activities of each; any important changes in CIMIC operational zones or areas; principal incidents and events since last report. Indicate on map or overlay annex, where possible.

2. Government Functions. Use annexes as necessary.

a. Public Administration.

(1) Screening-removal, appointment of officials.

(2) Political intelligence activities.

b. Legal.

c. Public Safety.

d. Public Health.

e. Public Welfare.

f. Public Education.

g. Labour.

h. Public Finance.

i. Civil Defence.

3. Economic Functions. Use annexes as necessary; arrange in tabular form, when practicable.

a. Economics and Commerce.

b. Food and Agriculture.

Annex E
to Chapter 1

- c. Property Control.
- d. Civilian Supply.
- 4. Public Facilities
 - a. Public Works and Utilities.
 - b. Public Transportation.
 - c. Public Communications.
- 5. Special Functions
 - a. Freedom of Movement.
 - b. Civil Information.
 - c. Civil Compliance.
 - d. Dislocated Civilians. (Refugees, IDPs, evacuees, stateless persons.)
 - e. Cultural Affairs.
 - f. Humanitarian Aid.
 - g. Meetings.
 - h. Civic Action Projects.
 - i. Elections and Political Activity. Elections are usually conducted under OSCE auspices. Chapter 5, annex A refers.
 - j. Other Points of Interest. Indicate any special recommendations, requests or other points of interests, such as existing CIMIC personnel problems, requisitions for additional units, recommendations for lifting of controls and restrictions, recommendations for troop indoctrination, and other matters not properly covered in paragraphs above.
- 6. Theatre level CIMIC related Activities. Appointments, events, high level meetings...
- 7. Areas of Concern and Assessment.

Commander

Authentication.
Annexes.
Distribution:

(Classification)

NOTE: This annex is extracted from FM 41-10, Appendix C (Modified) with elements of the IFOR/ARRC MAIN and SFOR daily CJ9 CIMICREP formats. It should be updated, as required, with elements listed at chapter 5, annex B.

CHAPTER 2

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION OPERATIONS

“While more effective military-NGO coordination may be necessary under certain crisis condition, it should be bracketed within the larger development problématique and linked to peacebuilding.” - The Role of NGOs in the Peacebuilding Process, Canadian International Development Agency

“The notion of mission creep...Our mission has not changed from the beginning. What has happened is that we have changed our capabilities and adjusted our procedures slightly, consistent with the changed circumstances on the ground and I don't think you would want us to do any different.” - General John M. Shalikasvili, US Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

201. INTRODUCTION

1. Civil-military cooperation operations (CMO) are one aspect of CIMIC conducted to support a commander's mission and Canadian national policy and interests. In the course of military operations, CMO facilitate military assistance to civil authorities and organizations, and provide support to civil authorities and the civil population. As such, CMO are required to support the TFC and his staff in their mission and assigned civil tasks, and to assist in the restoration of a working civil infrastructure to provide emergency humanitarian assistance in areas of operations. Because of planning and coordination efforts, including the scope of military and civil tasks, it is crucial to the success of a mission that J3 Engineer and J5 Engineer functions and positions be separate. The effective and efficient planning and conduct of CMO require close contacts between corresponding levels of command and of government to enable a coordinated response from stakeholders and partners involved in CMO: the military force, non-governmental, national and international agencies, organizations and authorities. The military is also involved, to a lesser degree, in civil-military cooperation activities (CMA) in support of objectives which are the responsibility of stakeholders and partners, such as providing logistic support or Force protection.

2. The levels of threat, instability and HNS will determine the quantity and quality of military capabilities to be invested in the operational environment as well as the corresponding degree of civil-military interface in CMO. Liaison, cooperation and coordination are required among all stakeholders and partners to define roles, mission, assigned civil tasks, capabilities and resources, to produce unity of purpose and unity of effort in carrying out CMO and CMA. The formulation of coherent strategic and operational plans involving all stakeholders and partners are essential to achieve mission objectives as well as the TFC's end state.

3. Under the TFC's CIMIC intent and COO, the J5 CIMIC ensures the military information services generated by dedicated J5 Plans, J5 Projects, J5 Ops, PSYOPS and PA are mutually supportive in CMO. CMO are planned, coordinated, conducted, supported, monitored and controlled as any military operation in close cooperation and consultation with J1, J2, J3 Plans, J3 Ops, J3 Engineer, J4 and J6 staff officers at the TFHQ. The J5 CIMIC is responsible to organize and run the CMCC (*inside* the compound area) and set up and supervise CIMIC centres (*outside* the compound area) to implement economic recovery and infrastructure rehabilitation, provide support to civil reconstruction and inform local authorities, IOs, NGOs and the local population on the general situation and progress of projects. The responsibility to plan and organize the CMCC, CIMIC centres and TST to meet strategic, operational and tactical objectives, rests with the J5 CIMIC. Coordination with J3 Ops and J3 Plans is mandatory to synchronize civil efforts.

4. The lead department for peacekeeping, peace enforcement or armed conflict will be DND but this role could be relinquished to CIDA for humanitarian operations involving CF resources, or DFAIT for conflict prevention (preventive diplomacy), peacemaking and to a certain extent, peace building efforts which will require civil and military involvement.

202. DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF CMO

1. CMO is defined in MC 411 as **“a military operation, the primary intention and effect of which is to support a civilian authority, population, IO or NGO, the effect of which is to assist in the pursuit of a military objective.”**

2. There are four types of CMO: military-civil information campaign; HNS arrangements and agreements; population and resource control; and support to civil authorities and the civilian population. The purpose of CMO is to provide political, economic and social stability leading to long term peace and security. But before we discuss the components of CMO, we must look at the likely nation state scenarios for the planning, coordination and conduct of CMO as well as the stakeholders and partners involved in CMO.

203. THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND CIVIL-MILITARY INTERFACE

1. The CIMIC operational environments presented at figure 1-2 (PSO, OOTW which includes domestic operations, and combat) are a reflection of the complexities inherent to the security environment. Security notions are perceived in terms of military capabilities and force structure, connected to military strength, strategic alliances, technological progress and industrial performance.

2. The emerging notions of security are based on a recognition that states and their citizens are confronted with a much wider range of problems: environmental pollution, ethnic cleansing and religious strife, incapacity to ensure sustainable development, scarce or depleted natural resources, rapid demographic growth, the production and distribution of drugs on a global scale, the proliferation of organized crime in war-torn countries or those in transition to a new political regime, international terrorism, human rights violations, the proliferation of small arms, unemployment and economic deprivation as well as mass migration movements. These problems have a destabilizing effect on nation states and create a recipe for disputes, crises, conflicts, which may lead to armed conflicts, as governments are proving less capable of resolving these issues on a unilateral basis and are resorting to new forms of cooperation, particularly at the regional level.

3. More importantly, rival ethnic factions or paramilitary forces often hold their own civilians as hostages, repress or intimidate them into behaviour patterns and attitudes (violent demonstrations, blocking freedom of movement, terrorist acts, rigged elections) that meet factional leaders' political convictions, in blatant violation of international humanitarian laws, which are detrimental to a stable and harmonious society. A strategy could involve the identification of extremist elements' centres of gravity and the selection of decisive points and lines of operations, based on a dual approach applied simultaneously:

- a. to deploy with capabilities and force structure to deter large scale violence and demonstrate operational readiness to deal with worst case scenarios. This show of force seeks to deter and isolate extremist elements from any decisive hold or influence on the population and public opinion. This recourse signifies a greater physical presence and control of the communication assets exploited by extremist elements to spread their message of hate and division; and
- b. a synergy of CIMIC activities and operations, PSYOPS and PA (refer to chapter 7), involving all stakeholders in civil tasks, could be produced to gain the trust and confidence of the local population, and eventually civil authorities, since everyone understand that the threat of force or use of force by extremist elements is their only legitimacy of their hold on power. This synergy should be sustained until moderates are in seats of authority, requiring a common political, military and civil strategy by all stakeholders. If people are to support the military force, they must feel secure in their environment, with no threat of reprisals. The end state is to create a critical mass of supporters, estimated at two-thirds of the population, for the mission and well-publicized strategic and operational objectives. This message must be disseminated and reinforced by all commanders through, Joint Commissions (refer to chapter 5, article 504) regular meetings and negotiations. The rational decision making process is not effective against extremist elements, which interpret any willingness to compromise as weakness and lack of resolve, when it is not backed up by a *declared political will to use force*, if needed. This message must be conveyed to all parties to a conflict in a strong and unambiguous manner.

4. A TF will operate in diverse operational environments. Political, economic, social, cultural, military, informational, technological, geographic and demographic factors will produce disparate civil infrastructures. The adequacy and stability of civil infrastructures within the AO establishes a foundation for the TFC's civil-military interfaces. Three types of civil-military infrastructures may emerge:

- a. **Adequate and Stable Civil Infrastructure.** When the TF AO consists of developed, adequate and stable

national civil infrastructures, the TFC's relation with the national government is established on the principle of *national sovereignty*. The interface between the TF and the national civil authorities will be found in negotiated general Agreements or MOU which will detail the division of responsibilities between the civil authorities and the TFC as well as the methods and procedures for mutual coordination and support. The civil authorities will normally establish some kind of "national territorial HQ and structure to facilitate the national military and civil interface with the TFC as shown in figure 2-1. Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR - OP ALLIANCE and SFOR - OP PALLADIUM) is such an example.




Figure 2-1 Adequate and Stable Civil Infrastructure

- b. **A Fragile Civil Infrastructure.** In this environment, an adequate and stable civil infrastructure exists but is not sturdy enough to withstand abnormal stress, especially at a regional level. A nation whose government is unable to cope with large regional population movements (IDPs and refugees) typify this circumstance. TFs conducting operations in such regions base their civil-military interface upon the principle of *national sovereignty* while recognizing that methods and procedures for regional coordination, cooperation and support may parallel those found in a nation with inadequate, unstable or non-existent civil infrastructure, Rwanda (UNAMIR I and II - OP LANCE) and Haiti (UNMIH - OP STABLE and OP FORWARD ACTION -Naval blockade to enforce the embargo) are such examples.
- c. **Inadequate or Unstable Civil Infrastructure.** A TF may conduct operations in a failed or collapsed state, in areas where the national civil infrastructure is inadequate, unstable or non-existent. The presence of numerous and independent IOs, NGOs and UN organizations and agencies moving freely in the AO will be the norm to compensate for the inadequate governmental civil infrastructure, unable to provide HNS. As a result of civil or international armed conflict, various militaries and paramilitaries may exist in the TF AO. Under these conditions, civil-military interfaces and relationships are complex and civil agencies' reliance on the TF to facilitate and protect their respective civil tasks, will increase. The operational environment for both the military and civil components of the military operations is dynamic and the relationship and status of the local government and the communities within the state are constantly changing. In these circumstances, it is legitimate that military and civil components have a different long-term purpose. Notwithstanding, the principle of *national sovereignty* remains but the TFC's mandate, mission and required relationships with military and civil organizations will form the base of the: political-military, civil-military and military-military interfaces, coordination, cooperation and support methods and procedures at various levels

of command. Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR - OP HARMONY, OP CAVALIER and OP AIRBRIDGE) and Somalia (UNOSOM II - OP DELIVERANCE) are such an example. The following characteristics, illustrated at figure 2-2, distinguish operations from the UN's traditional interstate experiences when *consent* by the parties was essential:

- (1) operational zones are physically larger and ill-defined;
- (2) presence of sizable civilian communities;
- (3) greater number of parties involved that will not always be easy to identify;
- (4) civilians and civil amenities become targets for hostilities;
- (5) warring parties show lack of accountability to the conditions of the peace process;
- (6) armed factions show hostility to UN, OSCE, NATO as well as NGOs, international and UN authorities, organizations and agencies; and
- (7) there is widespread extortion of relief supplies by armed factions.




Figure 2-2 Inadequate or Unstable Civil Infrastructure

5. **Stakeholders and Partners in CMO and CMA.** There are many stakeholders and partners in CMO and civil-military cooperation activities (CMA): civil authorities, the local population, military force (including OGDs and agencies providing specialists), international (UN, OSCE, NATO) non-governmental organizations and agencies. Each of these stakeholders have a *mandate*, *capabilities* and *limitations* which must be discussed and understood by the TFC and his staff in the context of the planning, coordination, conduct, monitoring and control of the civil phase of a military operation. All stakeholders and partners must work in harmony to achieve the mission objectives through unity of purpose and unity of effort. The limitations or constraints to the success of an operation will usually involve insufficient security capabilities, reduced coordination of existing in-theatre resources which may be insufficient to meet operational requirements and domestic pressures, political or financial. CMO and CMA

stakeholders and partners are:

- a. **Civil Authorities and the Local Population.** The nature of the relationships between civil authorities and the civilian population, particularly with extremist elements, are directly related to the operational environment and the degree of authority and autonomy in decision making, shown by the civil authorities at the various levels of government. If the existing civil infrastructures are able to generate the quality of services and meet the expectations of the civil population then stability will result. However, a multitude of different or controversial agendas may disturb the good cooperation of all stakeholders. Civil organizations, entities or civilian organizations may have their own agenda and be willing to cope with others within limitations. It is important for a TFC and J5 CIMIC to define these agendas and the limits to cooperation so they can identify where their civil tasks and responsibilities begin. These will be harder to identify as we move from adequate and stable infrastructures, to fragile, or inadequate and unstable civil infrastructures. Civil authorities must be convinced of the benefits to their community of economic recovery and infrastructure rehabilitation projects. The support of civil authorities will make acceptance of peace efforts by the local population that much easier, where such civil authorities exist.
- b. **Politicians and Diplomats.** In general, the use of force must be an action of last resort. Diplomacy, the intervention of international bodies and sanctions (Chapter VII of the UN Charter), must be exhausted before using force. These stakeholders and partners have a mandate covering a range of activities: conflict prevention, peacemaking and peace building (post-conflict reconstruction) with the SOFA, MOU and Agreements which international involvement generates. Politicians and diplomats are also negotiators who must understand in conflict prevention, the finality of preventative diplomacy when negotiating with extremists elements. Diplomacy must also address human right issues which are often at the root of a conflict and which are linked to political causes. Therefore, preventive deployment should be considered when diplomatic efforts can no longer modify the violent behaviour and attitudes of parties to a crisis or armed conflict. Diplomacy is a means to an end, not an end in itself.
- c. **Military Force.** A military force will only be as effective as the clarity and precision of the stated politico-military objectives which guide its actions. The capabilities and force structure which result are defined by the level and nature of the threat(s), the mission and assigned tasks. The military logistic support in humanitarian or disaster relief operations is not inexhaustible nor is it at the automatic disposal of IOs, NGOs and UN agencies. Nonetheless, the military needs to work effectively with civil agencies as they possess contact skills and experience in dealing with the beneficiary population, which are not inherent to a military force. A military force will only be as effective as its capacity to deter the use of force by extremists or warring factions. This capacity to deter is essential as military elements must maintain a clear public position of impartiality whereas the UN's civil organizations and agencies may succeed in negotiating deals with factions on a unilateral basis. In civil violence, a military force becomes involved, willingly or not, in sustaining or negating one or more warring factions' objectives in the conflict. Loss of "impartiality" within the force or following the "use of force" to impose factional compliance, may compromise the mission in the eyes of the warring factions and ethnic supporters. This reality makes "Priority Intelligence Requirements" relevant to provide military information which could affect the conduct of CMO. The unpredictable environment, therefore, makes reliance on a "Rapid Reaction Force" a vital element of Force protection in the civil phase. Annex A provides the format for a CMO estimate.
- d. **Civilian Police.** The mandate of the civilian police is to maintain law and order in the absence of a recognized and authorized national police structure. They will usually be armed for this role. In international operations, a military force will normally be deployed and employed without waiting for the fielding of a civilian police contingent, which creates a "public security gap". The military force may have no other choice but to perform vital law enforcement tasks, for which they are not trained, or risk jeopardizing the credibility and effectiveness of the mission. Their employment is well documented as an element of UN operations (police trainers, patrolling, border monitors...) but some countries are also employing their national police in NATO led operations, in addition to UNCIVPOL elements. Nonetheless, the *force of choice* for a TFC in the performance of essential law enforcement tasks, should be the Military Police, as they are trained for this function and possess many of the skills, knowledge and capabilities which characterize their civilian counterpart. In the event military police resources are not available, the TFC may consider a civilian police component. Their powers will be limited by SOFA and the mission's mandate, such as no direct policing

or authoritative means to prevent abuses by factional police forces, including limitations on powers of arrest. In an AO where criminal activity is high, police forces should be well informed on criminal gangs/mafia groups. Police forces must be capable of accessing "Interpol" and "Internet" to inform on regional criminal activities and be informed on world-wide criminal activities which could impact on military operations.

- e. **International Humanitarian Organizations.** These include the IOM (refer to chapter 2, annex C, paragraph 6), ICRC and Red Crescent which are neutral, impartial and independent organizations whose mandate is to assist and protect the victims of conflict. These organizations are very protective of their neutrality and do not normally wish to be associated with or depend on any military force for their security or daily operations. Such organizations will negotiate deals with factions to facilitate their operations and may rely on the military force for situational briefings to facilitate the implementation of their mandate.
- f. **Human Rights and Democratization Agencies.** The best known are the UNHCHR and the OSCE. These agencies are particularly active in protecting human rights in fragile and collapsed states where abuses are rampant. The basic human right they protect remains the right to life. These agencies have no enforcing mechanisms but seek to instil democratic values, beliefs and the primacy of the rule of law at all levels of a national government. In this regard, the establishment of an International Tribunal is a measure authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Human rights are increasingly at the centre of ethnic conflicts and a major cause of complex emergencies. The promotion and protection of human rights is a critical factor in the avoidance or resolution of international emergencies. Commanders who ignore human rights, put at peril the success of a mission. Human rights have become an operational imperative in conflict resolution. If human right experts correctly identify the human right parameters of a conflict, they can significantly inform PSO strategic, operational and tactical decision making processes. Annex B covers *Human Rights Field Practices* and annex B, appendix 1 the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, part of the *International Bill of Human Rights*.
- g. **International Development Agencies.** Their mandate is to provide technical assistance to developing countries to accelerate their economic and social development through country programs designed jointly with HN governments. The UNDP administers and coordinates most of the technical assistance provided through the UN system. These agencies benefit from multilateral (EU to ECHO, UNHCR to select NGOs, OECD through its Development Assistance Committee...) and bilateral national donors which provide emergency funding (not including food aid) to finance minor and major reconstruction projects and other peace building efforts: Canada (IHAP of CIDA), EU (ECHO), US (OFDA of USAID), UK (EMAD of ODA), Germany (BMZ), Italy (MFA), Netherlands (Development Corporation), Sweden (SIDA). Donor organizations are essentially non operational but they may have a presence in the field to gather information on which to base their decisions, to manage the distribution of funds and to monitor the results achieved. These donors are increasingly accountable to show that public funds are properly used.
- h. **Media.** The media is a vital player and stakeholder in the peace process, especially following the end of the military phase. An active international and local media campaign must be launched to announce the civil phase of the military operation while intense civil-military relations are pursued to obtain the cooperation of all parties in peace building efforts. In the age of information, real-time information provided by private news networks (CNN...), immediately influences crisis management and decision making at the highest levels of government, and shapes public opinion which, in turn, influences decision making. The media focuses on world events, forcing leaders and member states within the UN or NATO to act decisively, often under the pressure of their constituents. The media is able to exploit its technological advantage and counter any propaganda by warring parties and extremist groups. The media also provide enough detailed military and civil information to provide "early warning" of an impending CMO and to assist international organizations in achieving their mandate. The synergy created by CIMIC, PSYOPS and the media, through PA briefings and information packages, must be utilized by a TFC to enhance the planning and conduct of CMO. The *media in-theatre* will tend to behave both as an asset and as a liability by focusing on every aspect of the military operation, including the promotion and protection of human rights through increased public awareness, while *global reporters* will tend to be focused on the crisis.
- i. **UN.** The key UN response agencies are UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, WHO and UNDP. These agencies all have emergency-related programs and small units specialized in emergency planning and response. UN

agencies have had to find additional financial, human and materiel resources or redeploy them from development programs, to respond to the growing number of complex emergencies. UN agencies are present or represented in most developing countries to help improve the social and economic well-being of the population. To become more effective and efficient, UN agencies have changed policies and procedures, developed alliances and relationships with NGOs and military forces, and strengthened inter-agency coordination mechanisms. The UN also has a UN Volunteers Programme, employing UN volunteers in civilian positions for HROs. Although the UN has much sectorial expertise and experience, it is incapable under its present mandate and resources, to afford adequate Force protection in peace enforcement operations to civil populations and those civilian agencies deployed in-theatre, as well as deter or prevent human rights abuses by belligerent forces. Integrated strategic policy guidance as well as strategic planning efforts should be pursued with NATO. This effort could culminate in the opening of a UN liaison office at NATO HQ, Brussels and a NATO liaison office at UNNY.

- j. **NGOs.** This term is officially used in article 71 of the UN Charter to describe a wide range of primarily nonprofit organizations motivated by humanitarian and religious values that are independent of government, UN, OSCE, NATO and commercial sectors. NGOs, also called PVOs (US), are legally different from UN agencies, the ICRC, the IOM and national Red Cross or Red Crescent societies as they write their own charter, mandate and mission. Changing political commitment in many western governments has minimized the role of the state and increased the role of the private sector and civil society in the privatization of development and humanitarian aid. NGOs tend to be specialists in one field or direct their attention to a particular beneficiary population. Many NGOs offer skilled staff, a rapid deployment capability through international emergency teams, operational flexibility and resources that might not otherwise be available in a complex emergency. MSF, for example, can deploy a standby international team consisting of 20 staff members and as many technical specialists as needed for a specific operation with materiel, within 24-48 hours. A TFC will see more and larger NGOs in his AO due to a decrease in the budgets of western public institutions, particularly in extreme and dramatic complex emergencies. NGOs frequently work in conditions of social tension and violence. Increasingly, NGOs are choosing to continue their activities through levels of violence which would have previously suspended operations until the situation stabilized. Under such conditions, NGOs have often been forced into a humanitarian and relief mode at the expense of longer-term development objectives. UNHCR, CIDA and NGOs, undertake cooperative operations in which NGOs manage a wide variety of field operations, including voluntary repatriation, emergency relief, transport and logistics, family tracing for separated children, special needs of women and children, agricultural rehabilitation, water wells and purification, infrastructure repair programs, technical support (emergency health, shelter, food aid and distribution, education). To manage these programs, NGOs will usually maintain offices and staff in the national capital close to their UN agency sponsor, at regional and/or field levels. Notwithstanding, criticisms have been levelled against some NGOs who deploy with lack of expertise and limited perspective on the geographic area of employment and technical sectors required to deal with humanitarian needs. Some NGOs offer unsuitable programs to meet fundamental needs and deploy with limited resources. The lack of qualifications in the fields of administration and financial management has also been raised. The standard and quality of NGOs working in any emergency is uneven and some will even compete with each other for visibility and public recognition; a precondition to generate public funding. Accreditation along common criteria and guidelines, adopted by the UN and the HN, would contribute towards the deployment of suitable NGOs for the mission and civil tasks at hand. Nonetheless, the operational environment has a direct impact on the level of interrelationships between stakeholders and partners deployed in an AO:

- (1) **Adequate or Fragile States.** In most emergencies where the HN government is still functioning, NGOs are required to enter into a legal agreement with the HN government before they operate in-country. Humanitarian agencies may have to negotiate with HN governments for rights of access, and for the accreditation of the entire relief effort. In return, they assist governments in the restoration of national infrastructure, and even reconstitute their ability to govern. This reality involves the supply of expertise and equipment that previously have not been associated with relief efforts. Such agreement usually takes the form of official registration with, and accountability to, a particular government ministry (health, agriculture...). Many NGOs operate in association with UN agencies; NGOs act on their behalf as field implementation agency such as "Save the Children" for UNICEF in Rwanda. In refugee emergencies, UNHCR tends to contract NGO partners to implement health, feeding or

transport programs and may operate the refugee camps with the help of international organizations, namely the ICRC and IOM. NGOs will operate in line with legal agreements involving them as partners in an emergency with the HN government and a UN agency (UNHCR...).

- (2) **Failed or Collapsed States.** NGO registration can be non-existent and will operate on the legal basis of their contracts and agreement with UN agencies, or independently as sole operators negotiating access to an AO and running programs, autonomously of UN auspices. This situation is of serious concern to a TFC as NGOs or international organizations with no official links to the main relief operation, may not abide by the established security agreements. This situation is exacerbated by the absence of SOFA and any type of HNS. Reliance by IOs, NGOs and UN agencies on military protection against paramilitaries and bandits may be critical to the effective execution of civil tasks.

6. **Organizational Cultures.** The participants in an international response to PSO, OOTW or combat have different values and belief systems and are characterized by their national, professional and institutional differences. The degree of involvement, location, liaison and influence of the responding organizations will vary greatly. Cooperation and consensus among the diversity of stakeholders at the operational level is hard to achieve because of the requirement to maintain relationships in at least three levels: with each other in field operations at the tactical level; with the national parties (host government, the local parties and civilian communities) at the operational level; and with the international community at large at the strategic level. The stakeholders can be grouped into three broad disciplines: political, civilian and military; each with different behaviour, attitudes and levels of concern dictated by their respective structure, mandate, mission and SOPs. Political, civilian and military leaders must be sensitive to these cultural differences which are compounded by the HN history, culture, customs, languages, ethnic and religious diversities. Figure 2-3 illustrates the various mandates and agendas of stakeholders in an AO which must converge towards the formulation of a coherent and unified strategy to achieve mission objectives and the TFC's end state in military operations.




Figure 2-3 Integrated Strategy versus Divergent Objectives

204. CIVIL-MILITARY INFORMATION CAMPAIGN

- 1. Following the formulation of the TFC's CIMIC intent and COO, whether part of a UN or NATO led operation,

the J5 CIMIC ensures that CMO, PSYOPS and the military-civil information campaign are mutually supportive and generate the support of civil authorities and the local population in peace building efforts. CMO serve to legitimize the deployment and employment of a military force in an AO. It is therefore important to the success of a mission that a TFC defines centres of gravity, decisive points and lines of operation, such as gaining public opinion and overcoming ethnic cultural differences, to create a "critical mass" for the civil support of peaceful endeavours and a return to a normal society. Extremist elements from all parties must be targeted from the outset and isolated both politically and socially. The synergy created between CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA, when applied within legal and operational parameters, constitute a force multiplier.

2. Regardless of the operational environment, the military-civil information campaign must rely and exploit the capabilities of the MIST to bridge the communication gap between a military force, civil authorities and the civilians population, to achieve CMO objectives. The operational role of the MIST is to conduct local information campaign throughout the AO ranging across the full spectrum of political, economic, social and cultural issues. The end result should lead to enhanced Force protection, security and mission accomplishment. The objectives of a MIST campaign are summed up as follows:

- a. provide the TFC with operational capabilities to inform and influence public opinion and civil authorities;
- b. foster and promote peace building efforts, interests and successes by the political, military and civilian partners involved in the military operation;
- c. undertake the development of radio messages, secure broadcast time as a contractual condition for financing municipal television and/or radio projects, and of communication techniques among the civilian communities to support strategic and operational objectives;
- d. provide operational assessments based on the information collected by MIST at the tactical level;
- e. provide and acquire information, through regular contacts with civil authorities and the local population, to plan and conduct effective CMO;
- f. counter propaganda efforts and disinformation by extremist elements and civil authorities;
- g. maintain public support throughout the civil phase of a military operation;
- h. provide support to the TFC's media programs (newspapers, magazines, radio, TV, film/video); and
- i. adopt proactive behaviour and attitudes in media campaigns by collecting, processing (collate, evaluate, analyse, integrate and interpret) and disseminating political, economic, social and cultural indicators.

205. HOST NATION SUPPORT

1. HNS is defined as **civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peace, emergencies, times of crisis or armed conflict based upon agreements mutually concluded between nations.** HNS supplements CSS operational requirements by acquiring goods and services from local, regional or other international sources which can be used to support exercises during peace and to prepare for and provide CSS in peace, emergencies, crisis and war or armed conflict. The provision of support and assistance between UN and/or NATO forces pre-arranged to the greatest extent possible.

2. Inadequate, stable and even fragile states, the provisions for HNS to TF elements deployed and employed in a HN territory, depend on the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements, arrangements and MOU between the host and supported nations. The HN provides the types and volumes of support in accordance with these proceedings and its national laws, and will rely on its national capabilities and civil infrastructures to provide such support.

3. The complex nature of military operations in PSO, OOTW and combat require firm commitments by troop contributing nations such as Canada, as to the amount and types of support and assistance in CMO they are

prepared to render. This effort may require the support of OGDs and agencies to provide specialists in fields of expertise not found in DND or the CF. This collective effort is particularly vital to the success of military operations planned and conducted in failed or collapsed states. In such operations where there are no HNS logistical plan or other formal agreements for the procurement of support, ad hoc arrangements for support are established. Such arrangements include identification, coordination and acquisition of resources such as services, materiel and labour to support CF operations. In failed or collapsed states the partnership between the network of participants must be fully exploited and the availability of resources coordinated at the operational level.

4. **Operational Factors.** Before HNS resources are used for a specific operation, whether by formal or ad hoc agreements, the following factors must be considered in the TFC's CMO estimate:

- a. the operational environment;
- b. the types and levels of threats and risks in the AO, including rear area security concerns;
- c. the existence of multilateral agreements, MOU or other arrangements to provide support;
- d. the HN capability and capacity to provide support;
- e. the national infrastructure in place to provide HNS;
- f. the degree of control of the HN government over civil infrastructures and the local population;
- g. the capacity of the HN to sustain CMO in all intensities of conflict at the strategic and operational levels;
- h. the financial costs to the supported HN;
- i. the CF's capability to accept, allocate and manage HNS resources;
- j. the level of Force protection to ensure FOM and delivery of HN resources to their final destination; and
- k. operations security (OPSEC) enhances the TFC's freedom of action (refer to chapter 1, article 124, paragraph 1e), by limiting vulnerability to hostile activities and threats. It is driven by the essential elements of friendly information which must be protected. Command and control (C³) protection is vital to Force protection and must incorporate an OPSEC policy that considers vulnerabilities (CIS...).

5. **Scope of HNS.** The scope of HNS encompasses the entire range of local support in all types of military and civil assistance, particularly logistics and communications. HNS tasks could include:

- a. rear area security, including vital points;
- b. NBC defence;
- c. HN civil and military engineer support;
- d. de-mining and EOD support;
- e. secure LOC;
- f. movement control (logistic, refugees, IDPs, evacuees...) based on central control of all in-theatre movement operations using national means of transport - inland waterways, seaways, roads, rail, airports, national air corridors and port facilities;
- g. area damage control;
- h. provision of living and working accommodations, and logistic facilities, outside the fighting/combat areas;

- i. telecommunication facilities and materiel such as communication centres, relay stations, etc.;
- j. medical;
- k. transport;
- l. cargo handling services;
- m. access to expandable (working and building materials...) and non-expandable (technological, technical stores and equipment...) supplies;
- n. provision of skilled and unskilled labour; and
- o. storage and security of pre-positioned emergency or relief supplies.

6. **Planning Guidance for HNS.** The following operational planning guidance is provided the TFC and his staff for UN, OSCE or NATO operations which, depending on the size and scope of the military operation, will require liaison and/or approval from the national commander:

- a. host and troop contributing nations, in coordination with the UN or NATO commander, are primarily responsible for HNS planning and execution;
- b. the UN or NATO commanders, or delegated authority, are responsible for coordination of HNS planning for the support of TF elements deployed and employed in a multinational force;
- c. HNS will be as specific as possible wherever feasible and appropriate, especially when directed towards the utilization of civil resources;
- d. the TFC is to identify HNS requirements for each type of unit in support of each operational/deployment option, and negotiate the provision of HNS with the HN, or where appropriate, with the responsible UN or NATO commanders;
- e. the TFC is to inform the HN and appropriate UN or NATO commanders of any changes to their HNS requirements, as they occur;
- f. the TFC has the responsibility for reporting the status of HNS negotiations to the appropriate UN or NATO commanders;
- g. the HN is to advise the TFC of its capability to provide HNS against specific and generic requirements and is to advise the TFC of significant changes in capability as they occur. The TFC is therefore encouraged to identify overall HNS capability in order to assess the additional support required;
- h. the HN should ensure the required cooperation and coordination between their civilian and military sectors in order to make best use of limited HNS resources;
- i. the HN retain control over their own HNS resources, unless control of such resources is released;
- j. the authority for UN or NATO commanders to negotiate and conclude HNS agreements on behalf of the TFC will require his prior authorization.

7. **Contractual Agreements.** In adequate or fragile states, it is possible to conclude agreements on the nature and scope of HNS which would involve the government and civil infrastructures, particularly those whose mandate concerns logistic, communication and HN engineer resources. In UN or OSCE led operations, a transnational firm may already be under civilian contract to supply the multinational military force. Legal contracts will also be required for projects involving HN civilian contractors. The TFC will receive additional guidelines to those listed at paragraph 6, to negotiate and conclude contractual agreements locally, in conformity with the rules of

international law and the law of armed conflict. Such agreements may be required for operational readiness, security, safety or quality of life issues. Chapter 8 addresses negotiations in CIMIC activities and operations.

206. POPULATION AND RESOURCES CONTROL

1. Population and resources control by the TF in an AO is necessary when civil authorities or agencies are either unable or unwilling to undertake that responsibility. In friendly territory, such operations are conducted with the consent of the local government but in hostile territory, they are conducted in accordance with international law and the LOAC. Successful population and resources control mobilizes the population and material resources; denies belligerent forces/WWF or enemy ready access to the population and to both internal and external sources of supply; and provides security for the population. Population and resources control measures seek to reduce, relocate or access civilians that may impede to otherwise threaten the success of ongoing and follow on military and supporting logistic operations. These control measures can be applied across the spectrum of conflict and operational environments.

2. *Population controls* include curfews, movement restrictions (e.g., the imposition of restricted and prohibited zones), travel permits, registration cards and resettlement of civilians. *Resource controls* include licensing, regulations, checkpoints (e.g. road blocks), ration controls and inspection of facilities. Peacekeeping, peace enforcement and combat operations, including complex emergencies, will require some type of population and resources control, especially in rear areas. There are also command responsibilities to a civilian populace and national resources prescribed in the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which include recommendations to protect places and objects, such as historic monuments, works of art, museums and places of worship, against attack or unwanted destruction. Principles of targeting include: military necessity; weapons used will cause no unnecessary suffering; and proportionality i.e. damage to property must not be out of proportion to the military advantage to be gained.

3. Operations involving dislocated civilians are a special category of population and resources control. Dislocated civilians is a generic term that include a refugee, an IDP, an evacuee or a stateless person. The movement and physical presence of dislocated civilians who most likely require some degree of humanitarian aid such as medicine, food, water, shelter, clothing and similar items, can hinder military operations. Dislocated civilians operations are conducted to:

- a. minimize local population interference with military operations, particularly along LOC, by coordinating with civil authorities or government ministries and agencies to implement population and resource controls;
- b. protect civilians from combat operations;
- c. prevent and control the outbreak of disease among dislocated civilians, as this could jeopardize the health of military forces (communicable diseases from humans and animals), as well as all other participants in the operation: police forces, IOs, NGOs, UN agencies' personnel and civilian contractors deployed and employed in the AO;
- d. alleviate human suffering by providing relief supplies to civilian communities to prevent disease, starvation, or such unrest as might interfere with the effectiveness and efficiency of military operations; and
- e. centralize the large populations of dislocated civilians into selected and controllable areas.

4. The employment and efficient management of police forces, IOs, NGOs and UN organizations and agencies in military operations involving dislocated civilians, decreases reliance on limited military resources. Non-military sources such as international aid organizations may therefore assist civil authorities in this type of operation, provided the aid organizations are accepted by civil authorities or local government ministries. Usually, international aid organizations must be explicitly recognized by the LOAC or international humanitarian law, and must be accredited by the HN and lead agency, as being impartial in the provision of humanitarian assistance.

5. The control of civilians is essential during military operations. In hostile or occupied territory, commanders must segregate civilians from belligerent forces/WWF or enemy POW, and civilian internees to protect them as

required by International Humanitarian Law. Under international humanitarian law, all commanders must provide a minimum standard of humane care and treatment for all civilians, establish law and order, and protect private property in their AO.

6. When the CF is part of a multinational force, commanders must recognize their obligations and duties to civilians in the hostile or occupied territory as specified under international humanitarian law and the LOAC. Civilians who are in an hostile or occupied territory must not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits to which they are entitled under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, more particularly Geneva IV relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, and the two 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.

207. SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES AND THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

1. Under international law, commanders have certain obligations to the government, civilians and economics of the country in which an operation is conducted, regardless of the circumstances under which the CF are employed. Commanders are expected to enforce the SOFA as well as meet HN Government expectations in rebuilding the civilian infrastructure and handover, as soon as possible, the responsibility for the administration of local communities to civil authorities. For this reason, commanders may be required to support the local government or the civilian population by assisting local civil authorities with:

- a. humanitarian assistance;
- b. military civic action; and
- c. civil defence.

2. **Humanitarian Assistance.** A crisis or armed conflict which threatens international peace and security almost inevitably endangers civilian populations, and therefore calls for humanitarian action. The purpose of humanitarian assistance, as stated by UNHCR, is to sustain dignified life, to strengthen local institutions' efforts to relieve suffering and build self-reliance, and to assure that steps are taken toward reconstruction, rehabilitation and development. All commanders must be aware of the implications of providing support to civil authorities and the civilian population. Despite the urgency of the situation, the need to manage scarce resources may limit the support that can be provided. Military logistic support in humanitarian or disaster relief operations is not inexhaustible nor is it at the automatic disposal of IOs, NGOs and UN agencies. Commanders understand that military resources for CMO have been allocated based on a specific mission and assigned civil tasks. Additional humanitarian civil tasks (mission creep) should not be assumed without an evaluation of the resources involved and the specific approval of the TFC as these resources may be required for priority military tasks. Once approved, humanitarian assistance must be coordinated with all organizations and agencies involved in the CMO.

3. The primary responsibility for the well-being of a population rests with the lawful Government or *de facto* authorities of the affected State. Where the Government or authorities are unable or unwilling to protect or support their populations appropriately (Failed state), an international humanitarian response may take place. This may take the form of consensual humanitarian assistance to a functioning civil infrastructure, usually with the concurrence of the Government (Adequate or Fragile states) or where consent to humanitarian operations is fluid or incomplete, as in a civil war or complex emergency situation, may take the form of humanitarian action. In friendly territory, humanitarian assistance encompasses short range programmes aimed at ending or alleviating suffering caused by natural or man made disasters, including peace enforcement and combat operations.

4. To assist the TFC in planning PSO involving humanitarian operations, the following annexes have been included: annex C lists some key humanitarian organizations; annex D specifies United Nations humanitarian organizations and annex D, appendix 1 lists UNHCR's major NGO partners and their respective mandates.

5. **Military Civic Action.** MCA involves activities intended to win support of the local population for the military and for the foreign nation civilian leadership. MCA may include hiring local labour or working with paramilitary forces and is planned as short term projects with the long term goal of fostering national development. Community Assistance Program (CAP) projects fall in this category, such as repair of roads, schools and health clinics. Properly planned, executed and advertised in close cooperation with local authorities, military and community

leaders, MCA projects result in popular support. MCA help eliminate some of the causes of civilian unrest by providing economic and social development services such as transportation, communications, construction or repair of schools, health clinics or community buildings, providing health care, by repairing and building roads, or by distributing agricultural implements/tools, seeds and providing access to a water source for cultivation and even demining or neutralizing booby traps to ensure the safety of the populace. MCA projects may exceed the organic capabilities of a formation or unit, thereby requiring inter-agency cooperation coordination, controlling and monitoring to succeed. The TFC and his staff must be aware of legal and financial considerations in authorizing such projects, using existing public funds and allocated resources to ensure the execution of such projects is conformed to rules and regulations. In some situations, the TF's participation in projects involving military civic action may be limited to a training and advisory role. The success of military civic actions is dependent on a close relationship between civil agencies, J2, J3 Ops, J3 Plans, J3 Engineer, J4, J5 Engineer and J5 staff, J6 and the synergy created by the CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA cells. Annex E provides a sample military civic action worksheet.

6. **Civil Defence.** Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions defines civil defence “**as the performance of some or all of the undermentioned humanitarian tasks intended to protect the civilian population against the dangers, and to help to recover from the immediate effects, of hostilities or disasters and also to provide the conditions necessary for its survival.**” Civil defence is primarily the responsibility of the civilian government and its agencies. It deals essentially with the immediate emergency conditions created by an attack. The effectiveness of civil defence plans and organization has a direct impact on ongoing CMO. Support by the military of humanitarian assistance planning and exercises in civil defence will result in public support for the military in disaster relief operations. These tasks apply to the domestic and international environments and cover:

- a. warning;
- b. evacuation;
- c. management of shelters;
- d. management of blackout measures;
- e. rescue;
- f. medical services, including first aid and religious services;
- g. firefighting;
- h. detection and marking of danger areas;
- i. decontamination and similar protective measures;
- j. provision of emergency accommodation and supplies;
- k. emergency assistance in the restoration and maintenance of order in distressed areas;
- l. emergency repair of indispensable public utilities; and
- m. emergency disposal of the dead.

7. TF involvement will depend on the status of local civil-defence planning and organization. Examples of civil defence include emergency repairs and restoration of destroyed or damaged vital utilities and facilities, which contribute to rebuild the civil infrastructure, accentuate peace building efforts and a return to a normal society. In accordance with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I of 1977, civil defence workers are granted protected status during armed conflict. In rendering civil defence assistance to foreign government agencies, TFCs must be cautious not to draw civil defence workers into military activities that would compromise their protected persons status as noncombatants. Military personnel serving with foreign civil defence organizations receive POW status if they fall in the hands of an hostile force.

208. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE USE OF FORCE IN CMO

1. ROE are orders issued by the CDS to commanders and govern the use of force. ROE and the use of force by the CF are dealt with in *"The Use of Force Manuals, Volumes I and II"* and *B-GG-005-004/AF-000 CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONS* Manual. There will be in any CF operation, the requirement to review the mission ROE and adapt them to changing circumstances as well as take into consideration Canadian amplifications and caveats to ROE issued under a UN or OSCE led operation which NATO supports with military forces (non-article 5 operations). The smooth running of CIMIC activities requires that the TFC discuss with the theatre Force commander, national caveats related to ROE before the military and civil phases are activated. The transition from a military intensive operation with civilian participation to one which is civilian intensive (or vice versa) is no different and the ROE will require a careful review to ensure that they still meet the requirements of the mission. The actual level of force used during combat operations is determined by environment-specific situations at the tactical level. In PSO and OOTW (refer to figure 1-2 - The Operational Environment), which includes domestic operations, ROE determine the force to be applied in tactical scenarios.

2. The guiding principles for the civil phase are the same as the military phase. The mission in CIMIC activities should be achieved with the minimum use of force, although circumstances, such as Force protection measures for CMO or support to civil administration, may necessitate the use of higher level of force to ensure the security of the civil-military force to fulfil its mission and civil tasks. Incidents should be prevented or stopped by negotiation, persuasion or show of force, rather than by its use. The use of force in international military operations is governed by domestic and international laws as expressed in the Law of Armed Conflict and ROE. In domestic military operations, the use of force is regulated by use of force directives, ROE and domestic laws, such as the *Criminal Code of Canada*.

3. The full ROE will not normally be for general release. However, depending on the circumstances, selected portions may be released by the CDS to the public if allowing the public to know acts as a deterrent to violence. The TFC must balance the potential deterrent effect versus the potential harm to the military force. Every member of a military force should carry a "Soldier's" card summarizing the ROE and the concept of self-defence. It is important that the TFC and his staff coordinate ROE with police forces under OPCON or in location (UNCIVPOL) in the AO. The right to self-defence remains a constant of any operational environment in which CMO or support to civil administration occur. In domestic operations, the use of force in self-defence is authorized only in certain situations, such as aid of the civil power (Part VI of the NDA) and CF support to Law Enforcement Agencies. The application of force and exercising the right to self-defence are always measures of last resort.

4. In the course of the civil phase of a military operation, the elements that form the basis of ROE (the intersection of law, policy and operations), will always come into play at various stages of the operation. ROE will impact on CMO and support to civil administration as Force protection will usually be required for CIMIC activities to be carried out effectively in the AO.

209. THE LEAD AGENCY CONCEPT IN CMO

1. The lead agency is defined as **"a humanitarian agency which has agreed because of its expertise and knowledge, to initiate coordination between agencies volunteering to participate and contribute to an emergency operation, but which implies no legal authority or command responsibility in regards to the volunteer agencies."** UNHCR is the lead humanitarian agency for the UN and endeavours to mobilize the resources and expertise of all agencies in a theatre or AO, to strengthen coordination between the humanitarian players and to conduct consolidated appeals for funds. These activities are carried out with the understanding that the mandates of various agencies may require each to take the "lead" in their own areas of specialization. Despite a lead humanitarian agency in an AO, the CF will never be placed under command and control of any civilian organizations, but will support and assist civil-military cooperation activities. The following operational coordination functions are appropriate to the designated "lead agency":

a. Operational level

- (1) take the lead in policy making, planning and information sharing;

- (2) act as the main POC for other UN agencies, the military, and political components of the UN effort, NGOs and for the parties to the conflict;
- (3) allocate tasks according to the sectoral interest or target population of each agency; and
- (4) coordinate funding efforts and consolidated appeals to donors.

b. Tactical Level

- (1) provide guidance, policy advice and information;
- (2) coordinate field activities to avoid duplication of efforts and wastage of resources;
- (3) provide administrative and logistic support to humanitarian agencies; and
- (4) act as an interface between the political and military components of the UN or OSCE led operation, which NATO supports, IOs, NGOs and UN agencies.

210. RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMMANDERS IN CMO

1. CMO are by definition, the execution of a cooperative effort among agencies to achieve a mission. The TFC and his subordinates have no legal authority or command responsibility over the cooperating civil agencies in an AO, except when operating in a failed or collapsed State and directed to fulfil this mandate by a UN Resolution. This fact makes coordination and the prevention of duplication of efforts an imperative to achieve the mission. Guidelines for CMO are to include:

- a. warning order;
 - b. inter-agency meeting to discuss CMO;
 - c. reconnaissance with dedicated J5 representation and consultation with key civil agency leaders;
 - d. produce CMO Estimate;
 - e. assessment of civil-military tasks and resources;
 - f. plan (annex to OPLAN), as required;
 - g. orders (annex to Op O), as required;
 - h. coordinate military resources with lead agency;
 - i. liaise and coordinate with local authorities local police and UNCIVPOL, and inform the local population as required;
 - j. liaise and coordinate with MILOBS in the AO;
 - k. control military activities;
 - l. monitor civil agency activities until completion;
 - m. ensure Force protection combined with OPSEC; and
 - n. optimize the combined effect of CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA on public opinion to achieve the end state.
2. Figure 2-4 provides a layout of a CMO section for a minor humanitarian or disaster relief operation. It may

only be necessary to deploy elements of the CMCC for a mission and tasks to be carried out over a specific duration. The definite structure and organization will be determined by the TFC in light of the type of operation, the scope of civil-military tasks and relevant operational requirements. The key is to identify the right structural elements for the mission and tasks assigned, communicating through effective command and control arrangements. *Current Ops* would be responsible for the CMO estimate and providing LOs. The CMO section would come under the J5 CIMIC.




Figure 2-4 Civil-Military Cooperation Operations Section

211. GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORIZATION OF CIVIL TASKS

1. Civil tasks in support of a military operation could include: major and minor engineering projects; mine clearance; transport; medical; supply; maintenance; telecommunications; and staff support/office space, to name a few. The following guidelines are provided to assist commanders in appreciating the request for civil tasks:
 - a. the performance of military tasks has absolute priority. Civil tasks are only to be undertaken within available resources or capabilities once the requirements of the military tasks have been met;
 - b. the first priority in civil tasks for international operations, should be given to those that will materially support the campaign plan, military objectives and the civil end state;
 - c. measures are to be taken to ensure that stakeholders in the mission, such as IOs, NGOs and UN organizations and agencies, do not become aid or assistance dependent upon the military force to an extent that makes disengagement from projects difficult;
 - d. a TFC should focus his efforts on minor projects which are not too labour intensive and time-consuming so as to be able to withdraw military resources at short notice if priority military tasks require him to do so. Joint ventures with civil agencies and the use of civilian contractors will reduce chances of paralysing minor or major projects;
 - e. access for transport and funding of urgent or worthwhile civil assistance projects must be forwarded to higher HQ, IAW civil tasks directives or SOPs; and

- f. a project proposal should always be submitted to or at least discussed with higher HQ for evaluation and approval, IAW SOPs and control measures.

212. MANIFESTATIONS OF MISSION CREEP IN CMO

1. *Mission creep* or *mission evolution* is a direct result of the divergent mandates and agendas of political, military, civilian and humanitarian elements deployed and employed in a theatre of operations. There are two broad sources of mission creep: *firstly*, a drastic change in a situation which invalidates the original basis for the operation. The TFC may require additional forces or resources, a new mission or a change in mission tasks or in command authority in order to continue the operation or ensure Force protection; *secondly*, political, military, civilian and humanitarian elements characterize CMO and CMA through a dynamic interplay which generates additional unforeseen civil tasks. These tasks require the assistance of collaborative elements, resulting in a new prioritization of civil tasks to meet mission objectives. The mission does not change but the circumstances surrounding the execution of prioritized civil tasks require flexibility, versatility and resources from the unified political, military, civilian and humanitarian elements deployed in theatre.

2. In the course of a complex emergency involving peace enforcement, combat operations and domestic operations, there will occur some disconnects among these elements (political, military, civilian and humanitarian) in courses of action and decision making due to divergent objectives. The CF are an instrument of national policy and therefore only political leaders have the authority and legitimacy to change the original mission statement. NATO and UN experiences reveal four manifestations of *mission creep* which have emerged:

- a. **Mission Accretion.** To the original tasks (x), there is the general accretion of new tasks (y) believed necessary to achieve the mission’s main objective. Mission accretion does not occur due to changes on the desired end state but due to changing perceptions of what is required to achieve the objectives of the mission. Policy and activities on the ground are focussed on achieving the main objective.




Figure 2-5 Mission Accretion

- b. **Mission Shift.** It occurs when forces adopt tasks not corresponding to the original mission and assigned tasks (x), thus expanding the mission. Key to this manifestation, is the disconnect between the on-scene tactical decision to employ forces in additional tasks (y) and political decision making about the mission’s objectives. Although the policy is aimed at the main objective or a new one to adapt to the changing political situation in-theatre, the additional tasks force the activities on the ground (z) to focus on a new emerging objective.




Figure 2-6 Mission Shift

- c. **Mission Transition.** It results from the reassessment of a mission by political and military leaders at higher HQ and involves the changing perception as to the objectives of a CMO. Mission transition occurs in an environment of gradual and, perhaps, unclear, unrecognized, or confused modification of objectives and priority civil tasks to be completed to achieve the mission. These changes, therefore, may not get stated explicitly nor lead to a reassessment of the force levels required or assigned tasks (x). In this concept, the additional tasks (y) impose a change of policy thereby creating a new objective and new tasks (z) while the activities on the ground remain focussed on the main objective.




Figure 2-7 Mission Transition

- d. **Mission Leap.** It results from a decision, whether driven by political motives or the situation on the ground, to radically change the mission and original tasks (x) and additional tasks which have been assigned (y). It is important to recognize that mission leap represents an explicit choice, whether or not the political or military leadership recognizes the full implications of the decision. In this concept both the policy and activities on the ground focus on a new objective generating new tasks (q).




Figure 2-8 Mission Leap

3. The various manifestations of “mission creep” are a reality of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and armed conflict, as well as domestic operations. The diversity of players, mandates and agendas influencing the consultative and decision making processes at the political (UN SRSG or NATO High Representative) and military (operational commander) levels. The diversity of interests can result in some lack of cohesiveness, coordination and clarity of purpose at the tactical level. The four-way concept illustrates the complexity and difficulties in providing a unanimous course of action. Mission accretion and mission leap are inevitable elements of military operations involving a military phase and a civil phase, mutually supportive to achieve the mission. *Mission accretion* and *mission leap* represent conscious decisions either taken at the tactical level, operational or strategic levels, to modify or drastically change the mission’s parameters.

4. The serious problems exist with *mission shift* and *mission transition*. In both, there are disconnects between political, military and civil elements which can lead to serious command and control complications which could jeopardize the mission. Clear statements of policy guidance and constant communication and coordination between the deployed forces and higher HQ can help avoid mission shift and mission transition.

5. All in all, mission creep can be managed effectively and efficiently with adequate advance warning. Civilian agencies are also flexible and can adjust or delay their requests if the military is unable to comply immediately to a request for support. Constant liaison and dialogue between civilian agencies and the military in an AO will minimize the element of surprise. Periodic inter-agency meetings will facilitate this dialogue.

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION OPERATIONS ESTIMATE

(Classification)

(Date)

(Alphanumeric Designation)

(Team Name)

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION OPERATIONS ESTIMATE NO. _____

References: Maps, charts or other documents.

1. **Mission.** The restated mission as determined by the commander.
2. **Situation and Considerations**
 - a. Intelligence Situation. Include information obtained from the intelligence officer. When the details make it appropriate and the CMO estimate is written, a brief summary and reference to the intelligence document or an annex of the estimate may be used.
 - (1) Characteristics of the Area of Operations. Physical features: climate; and basic political, economic and psychological factors.
 - (a) Attitudes of the population (cooperative or uncooperative).
 - (b) Availability of basic necessities (food, clothing, water, shelter and medical care). Include civilian capabilities of self-support.
 - (c) Availability of local material and personnel to support military operations.
 - (d) Number of dislocated civilians in the area.
 - (e) Amount and type of war damage suffered by the economy (particularly in the transportation, public utility and communication fields).
 - (f) Status and character of civil government.
 - (g) State of health of the civilian populace.
 - (h) Engineer capabilities available and required to carry out the full range of engineer tasks. This estimate must assess civil and military materiel, including problem areas.
 - (2) Belligerent Forces/FWF or Enemy (warfighting) strength and dispositions.
 - (3) Belligerent Forces/FWF or Enemy Capabilities. Consider sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism and movement of dislocated civilians.

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- (a) Affecting the mission.
- (b) Affecting CMO activities.
- b. Tactical Situation. Include information obtained from the commander's planning guidance and from the operations officer.
 - (1) Present dispositions of major tactical elements.
 - (2) Possible courses of action to accomplish the mission. These courses of action are carried forward through the remainder of the estimate.
 - (3) Projected operations and other planning factors required for coordination and integration of staff estimates.
- c. Personnel Situation. Include information obtained from the personnel officer.
 - (1) Present dispositions of personnel and administration units and installations that have an effect on the CMO situation.
 - (2) Projected developments within the personnel field likely to influence CMO.
- d. Logistic Situation. Include information obtained from the logistics officer.
 - (1) Present dispositions of logistic units and installations that have an effect on the CMO situation.
 - (2) Projected developments within the logistic field likely to influence CMO.
 - (3) Status of LOCs which may require construction and/or repair.
- e. Engineer Requirements - Civil and Military. Requires an assessment of engineer tasks versus resources, prioritization of tasks in consultation with civil authorities and agencies, and the efficient coordination and management of resources to prevent duplication of efforts and wastage among stakeholders. Further engineer considerations and guidelines can be found in *B-GG-005-004.AF-015, Military Engineer Support to CF Operations*, chapter 8.
- f. CMO Situation. In this sub-paragraph, the status is shown under appropriate sub-headings. In the case of detailed information at higher level of command, a summary may appear under the sub-heading with reference to an annex to the estimate.
 - (1) Disposition and status of CIMIC elements and related significant military and non-military elements, to include all stakeholders (IOs, NGOs, UN agencies, MILOBS, OGDs and agencies) mandates, functions, responsibilities and capabilities and resources, relevant to the CMO.
 - (2) Current Problems Faced by the Command. Estimate the impact of future plans of the supported unit operation pertinent to the CMO mission.
 - (3) Projected impact of civilian interference with military operations.
 - (4) Government Functions
 - (a) Public administration.

- (b) Public safety.
 - (c) Public health.
 - (d) Labour.
 - (e) Legal.
 - (f) Public welfare.
 - (g) Public finance.
 - (h) Public education.
 - (i) Civil defence.
- (5) Economic Functions
- (a) Economics and commerce.
 - (b) Food and agriculture.
 - (c) Civilian supply.
 - (d) Property control.
- (6) Public Facilities Functions
- (a) Public works and utilities.
 - (b) Public communications.
 - (c) Public transportation.
- (7) Special Functions
- (a) Dislocated civilians.
 - (b) Arts, monuments and archives.
 - (c) Cultural affairs.
 - (d) Civil information.
- g. Assumptions. Until specific planning guidance becomes available, assumptions may be required for initiating planning or preparing the estimate. These assumptions are then modified as factual data becomes available.
3. **Analysis of Courses of Action**. Under each sub-heading (para 2e) for each course of action, analyze all CMO factors indicating problems and deficiencies.

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to Chapter 2

4. Comparison of Courses of Action

- a. Evaluate CMO deficiencies and list the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed course of action.
- b. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each tactical course of action under consideration from the civil-military operations standpoint. Those that are common to all courses of action or are considered minor should be eliminated from the list. Include methods of overcoming deficiencies or modifications required in each course of action. Priority will be given to one major CIMIC activity that most directly relates to the mission, such as preventing civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations, providing and/or supporting the functions of civil government, community relations, military civic action, military participation in a populace and resources control programme, military support of civil defence, or consolidation of psychological operations.

5. Conclusions/Recommendations

- a. Indicate whether the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from the CMO standpoint.
- b. Indicate which course(s) of action can best be supported from the CMO standpoint.
- c. List primary reasons why other courses of action are not favoured.
- d. List the major CMO problems that must be brought to the commander's attention. Include specific recommendations concerning the methods of eliminating or reducing the effect of these deficiencies.

NOTE: The CMO estimate is also known as the CIMIC estimate within NATO. Same format.

Designation of staff officer or Originator

Annexes: As required.

(Classification)

NOTE: This annex is extracted from 96th Civil Affairs Battalion - Leader's Reference Book.

HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD PRACTICE

ROLES OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS OPERATIONS

1. Complex emergencies require a human rights response. The phrase “Human Rights Operation (HRO)” is used for any large or functionally substantial UN human rights field operation. A UN HRO has roughly two primary roles:

- a. **Operational Role.** It consists of HRO staff themselves carrying out human rights promotion and protection tasks that require particular human rights expertise. This would include technical knowledge of international human rights standards and procedures, operational skills on how to monitor and implement such standards and a political strategy in light of the political/cultural context. A key operational role would include investigations, possibly ranging from interviewing alleged victims or witnesses to forensic investigations of massacres; and
- b. **Cooperation/Coordination Role.** It fulfils such a role where an HRO works with and through its field partners. Because of limitations in resources and often limited political will, there is a requirement to optimize the use of UN field capacity to maximize human rights. UN HROs must understand both the role and the potential of UN and other field partners such as the military, CIVPOL, or local government and NGOs.

CORE FEATURES OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS OPERATIONS

2. Recent experience has shown that there are four core features which appear in every situation in which a HRO has been deployed to date. They require approaches based on international human rights law which do not vary in nature with the particular situation:

- a. a need for timely and accurate reports, beyond rumours and disinformation, regarding the human rights situation;
- b. a need to facilitate the combatting of impunity such as the need for truth-telling and justice as elements of reconciliation and to deter future human rights violators;
- c. a need for sustainable improvement in the human rights situation; and
- d. a need to emphasize domestic remedies. or solutions.

CHARACTERISTICS OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS OPERATIONS

3. HROs are characterized by the following features:

- a. organized by an intergovernmental organization (IGO) such as the UN, OSCE, EU and OAS;
- b. based in a country for at least several months, as opposed to visiting it for shorter periods;
- c. its central functions at the very least include observing, and more typically include investigating, documenting and/or reporting on, human rights violations and situations likely to give rise to such violations; and
- d. staffed by at least a dozen human rights monitors and more when feasible.

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UNIVERSAL UN HUMAN RIGHTS TASKS

4. The human rights tasks to be performed by human rights officers as well as field personnel such as MILOBS, UNCIVPOL, IOs (Red Cross, Red Crescent...), NGOs or a military force may include some or all of the following tasks:

- a. monitoring the current human rights situation and publishing reports;
- b. monitoring national and local election campaigns or processes;
- c. monitoring re-insertion of ex-combatants into civil society;
- d. investigation past violations to help combat impunity towards human rights abuses;
- e. developing human rights promotion, education and public information campaign;
- f. deterrence of violations by an active human rights, protection tasks and military presence;
- g. facilitating reconciliation and confidence-building;
- h. confidence-building and local level conflict resolution; an example being the safe and voluntary return of refugees and IDPs; and
- i. contributing to civil institutions and peace building through technical assistance programmes, such as reform of the police or judiciary system.

FIELD UN HUMAN RIGHTS OPERATIONS

5. It is commonly agreed that the following were/are HROs:

- a. the human rights division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL);
- b. the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), a joint operation of the UN and OAS;
- c. the Human Rights component of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC);
- d. The United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (UNHRFOR) carried out by the centre for Human Rights (CHR) under the authority of the UNHCHR;
- e. the United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA); and
- f. the OSCE mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the Dayton Agreement.

NOTE: This annex is extracted from “UN Human Rights Operations” by Paul Larose Edwards and “Effective Training for Field Human Right Tasks” by Karen Kenny.

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(Extracted from *United Nations Military Observers Handbook*)

Article 1

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2

1. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

2. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

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Article 11

1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed.
3. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14

1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16

1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17

1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression: this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21

1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine *elections* which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23

1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family and existence worthy of human dignity, and supplement, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join free trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24

Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25

1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widow-hood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
2. Motherhood or childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in and out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

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Article 26

1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
3. Parents have prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27

1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29

1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone, the free and full development of his personality is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of other and of meeting the just requirements of morality and the general welfare in a democratic society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

MANDATES OF KEY HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS

This annex is extracted from CIDA; from *A UNHCR Handbook for the Military and Humanitarian Operations*; *UN Human Rights Operations* by Paul Larose-Edwards; *The ICRC in Rwanda* document and a *Guide to PSO*.

1. **Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).** CIDA is an agency of the Government of Canada responsible for carrying out most of Canada's official development assistance program. The mandate of CIDA is to support sustainable development in developing countries in order to reduce poverty and to contribute to a more secure, equitable and prosperous world. CIDA's priorities are:

- a. basic human rights: to support primary health care, basic education, family planning, nutrition, water and sanitation, shelter and to continue providing emergency and humanitarian assistance;
- b. women in development: to support the full participation of women as equal partners in the sustainable development of their societies;
- c. infrastructure services: to help developing countries deliver environmentally sound infrastructure services which include clean water and sanitation, good roads, reliable electricity, telephone and information services;
- d. human rights, democracy, good governance: to increase respect for human rights, including children's rights, to promote democracy and good governance and to strengthen both civil society and the security of the individual;
- e. private sector development: to promote sustained and equitable economic growth by supporting private sector development in developing countries; and
- f. the environment: to help developing countries protect their environment and to contribute to addressing global and regional environmental issues.

2. **United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).** UNHCR mandate is to assist Government's to meet the obligations which they have assumed under various international instruments concerning refugees and human rights and to provide protection and assistance to groups of refugees fleeing combinations of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, conflict and widespread violations of human rights. UNHCR's functions are to:

- a. provide international protection to refugees by promoting the adoption of international standards for the treatment of refugees;
- b. promoting the adoption of international standards for the treatment of refugees in national law and procedures, and supervising their implementation;
- c. seek permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by facilitating the voluntary repatriation of refugees (principle of non-refoulement) and reintegration into their country of origin or, where this is not feasible, facilitating integration into a country of asylum or a third country; and
- d. provide protection, emergency relief and other form of humanitarian assistance, counselling, education and legal assistance to populations within their own countries (IDPs, returnees, detainees). NOTE: This is a role not contemplated in the UNHCR founding Statute of 1951.

3. **United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR).** The promotion and protection of all human rights is a legitimate concern of the international community. The mandate of the UNHCHR is to promote the universal respect for and observance of all human rights. The UNHCHR has two functions:

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- a. the independent monitoring of UN field operations: human rights operation (HRO), peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. To fulfil this function, the UNHCHR must be vigorous and fearless in his investigations and genuinely independent from the institutions of government he is investigating. The UNHCHR must maintain judicial independence; and
- b. senior advisor to, and facilitator of UN HROs.

4. **International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).** The ICRC is a private Swiss organization and as such is an independent international non-governmental humanitarian organization (refer to chapter 5, annex C for more details). The mandate of ICRC is to ensure that victims of international and internal armed conflict and disturbances, receive appropriate protection and assistance and to serve as a neutral intermediary between parties in conflicts. UNHCR and ICRC both deal with the human consequences of conflict and their mandates overlap (a refugee camp would normally be run as a partnership). The ICRC fulfils the following functions:

- a. protect and help POW and wounded soldiers, civilian internees, the inhabitants of occupied territories, political detainees and their families;
- b. verify the conditions of detention: visit detainees and record their identity, conduct private interviews;
- c. operate a tracing programme to restore contact between families separated during a conflict to ensure children are reunited with their parents;
- d. provide food and relief supplies and embark as required, on an agricultural rehabilitation programme aimed at restoring a country's self-sufficiency in food production (sustainable development is assured through self-sufficiency);
- e. provide reconstruction of health centres and the medical needs in places of detention;
- f. rehabilitate water supplies/water treatment plants and sanitation for the communities, and prison population; and
- g. promote and develop International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and disseminate IHL worldwide.

5. **United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN DHA).** The leadership and coordination role of the UN is ensuring the success of international efforts to provide prompt delivery of relief assistance to areas in need. The mandate of the UN DHA is to coordinate the UN response to natural disaster and other emergencies that are beyond the mandate or capacity of any single UN agency (complex emergencies). DHA works alongside the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The main functions are:

- a. assist agencies to reach agreements on the allocation of responsibilities;
- b. conducting consolidated donor appeals; and
- c. collecting and disseminating relevant information, including appeals for assistance by member States.
- d. **Military and Civil defence Assets (MCDA).** DHA, in consultation with an International Standing Coordination Group has arranged for the employment of military and civil defence assets on international humanitarian missions. Procedures for these were agreed to as the *Oslo Guidelines* at an international meeting in Norway in 1994. The type of activities envisioned for MCDA include sea, land and air assessments. Specialized staff could be seconded for communications and logistics support and EOD. This responsibility falls to the Military Civil Defence Unit located in Geneva.

6. **International Organization for Migration (IOM).** IOM is an intergovernmental organization with 59 member states and 41 observer states. Although formally established outside the UN system, IOM holds observer status in the UN General Assembly and actively participates in coordination mechanisms established within the UN. IOM works closely with UNHCR, UNDP, UNDHA, UNFPA and the International Labour Organisation. IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. In the context of its constitution, individuals of concern to IOM include economic migrants, IDPs, refugees, nationals returning to their home country, and other individuals in need of international migration assistance. IOM will usually deploy with UNHCR when a third party country is involved, such as in the Rwandan conflict. In Rwanda, the IOM deployed with UNHCR to manage the refugee population located in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi. The role of IOM is to:

- a. assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration;
- b. encourage social and economic development through migration; and
- c. work toward effective respect of the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

7. IOM is interested not only in providing assistance to migrants resettling permanently in another country but in the link between migration and development. This has taken the form of programs to return and reintegrate qualified national to participate in the civil reconstruction and development of their native countries, and programs to return home irregular migrants such as rejected asylum-seekers and migrants smuggled into a country. The organisation also undertakes large programs to assist IDPs as well as demobilized combatants whose transport home and reintegration are essential to the transition from (armed) conflict to peaceful civil society. IOM increasingly focuses on the migration aspects of complex emergencies. Generally, IOM activities include registration and documentation, emergency transportation (overland, by sea/waterways, or airlift), escorting, providing temporary shelter and camp management. In post-emergency situations, IOM may provide assistance in the following areas:

- a. return and reintegration of IDPs;
- b. civilian reintegration of demobilized combatants in cooperation with UN military;
- c. return of qualified nationals;
- d. repatriation of refugees in cooperation with UNHCR;
- e. tracing and family reunification in cooperation with ICRC;
- f. capacity building in migration related areas;
- g. migration information and job referral services;
- h. micro projects to facilitate reintegration of returnees; and
- i. local communal governance to alleviate migratory pressures.

8. The migration assistance IOM provides to IDPs can cover a wide range of interrelated activities, such as transport, evacuations, returns, health care, temporary shelter and other material relief. IOM also provides rapid analysis of migratory flows and early warning, technical cooperation to governments, national population information systems and census taking.

UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS

This annex describes three United Nations humanitarian organizations and is designed to assist the military to work with UNHCR, and not United Nations organizations in general. This annex and appendix 1 are extracted from *A UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations*.

UNICEF

1. UNICEF was established as the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund in 1946 by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Its initial, time-limited mandate was to provide emergency relief aid for children in Europe following the devastation of World War II. In 1950 the General Assembly, satisfied that UNICEF's original task had successfully been carried out, extended the mandate for a further three years. UNICEF was directed to shift its attention from emergency aid to longer term programmes for the improvement of the health and nutrition of children in developing countries. In 1953, the General Assembly made this UNICEF's permanent mandate, changing the name of the agency to the United Nations Children's Fund.

2. UNICEF operates more than 200 offices in 117 countries, assisting Governments to implement programmes concerned with children's health, nutrition, education, training and social services. UNICEF is also an international advocate of children's rights and is, for example, responsible for publicizing and implementing the General Assembly's 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child. The Nobel Peace prize was awarded to UNICEF in 1965.

WFP

1. The World Food Programme, the food aid organization of the United Nations, was established in 1963. WFP helps poor people by combatting hunger and poverty. WFP provides relief assistance to victims of natural and man-made disasters, and supplies food aid to poor people in developing countries aimed at building self-reliant families.

2. WFP operates in more than 90 countries worldwide. The largest multilateral food aid organization in the world, WFP provides twenty-five percent of global food aid, reaching more than 47 million people. The hungry poor who receive WFP assistance include landless agricultural workers, small-scale farmers, the urban poor and others lacking food resources. Among these, some sixty percent obtain family rations by lacking food resources. Among these, some sixty percent obtain family rations by participating in labour-intensive programmes to construct infrastructure and create assets essential for their longer-term advancement. Most of the remaining beneficiaries receive WFP assistance through human resource development projects.

3. WFP is the largest source of grant assistance to developing countries within the United Nations system; the largest supporter of development projects involving and benefitting poor women; the largest provider of grant assistance for environmental protection and improvement; and the largest purchaser of food and services in developing countries. WFP conducts peace building programmes such as "Work for Food" in which locals are fed for rebuilding work (roads, housing...).

WHO

1. The World Health Organization was established in 1948. The first Article of its constitution states its purpose to be "the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health." In pursuit of this goal, WHO cooperates with national health authorities, other specialized agencies, professional groups, and other organizations concerned with health. It may also respond to government requests for assistance in the technical, emergency relief and national health service sectors. WHO functions as the international health coordination authority.

2. Within the United Nations system, WHO's Division of Emergency and Humanitarian Action (EHA) coordinates the international response to emergencies and natural disasters in the health field, in close partnership with other member agencies of the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), and within the framework set out by the department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). In this context, WHO's vast technical network

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is utilized to provide expert advice to Member States on, among other things, epidemiological surveillance, control of communicable diseases, public health information and health emergency training.

3. The WHO's Division's emergency relief activities include the provision of emergency drugs and supplies, fielding of technical emergency assessment missions and technical support. Its emergency preparedness activities include coordination, policy-making and planning, awareness-building, technical advice, training, publication of standards and guidelines, and research on emergency preparedness issues. EHA's main objective is to strengthen national capacity of Member States to reduce the adverse health consequences of emergencies and disasters.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

The following is a list of some of UNHCR's major NGO partners and a key word description of their areas of specialization. Mention or omission does not imply any form of endorsement by UNHCR. Target sector descriptions are not comprehensive.¹

	ORGANIZATION	TARGET SECTOR
ACORD	(Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development)	Emergency Assistance, Development (Consortium of Agencies)
ADRA	(Adventist Development and Relief Agency)	Transport/Logistics, Health/ Nutrition, Shelter, Community Services, Education, Food Production, Legal Assistance
AICF	(Action Internationale Contre la Faim)	Food, Water, Health/Nutrition, Shelter
AI	(Amnesty International)	Human Rights, Legal Assistance
ARC	(American Refugee Committee)	Sanitation, Health/Nutrition
CARE	(Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere)	Food, Transport/Logistics, Health/Nutrition, Shelter, Community Services, Legal Assistance
LIRS	(Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service)	Advocacy, Migration
LWF	(Lutheran World Federation)	Food, Transport/Logistics, Domestic Needs, Water, Sanitation, Shelter, Health/ Nutrition, Community Services, Education, Food Production, Income Generation, Legal Assistance
MDM	(Médecins du Monde)	Health
MSF	(Médecins sans Frontières)	Food, Transport/Logistics, Domestic Needs, Water, Sanitation, Health/Nutrition, Shelter, Community Services, Food Production
NRC	(Norwegian Refugee Council)	Transport/Logistics, Shelter, Community Services
OXFAM		Food, Transport/Logistics, Water, Sanitation, Community Services, Income Generation
PSF	(Pharmaciens sans Frontières)	Health
Radda Barnen		Domestic Needs, Community Services, Education
Refugees International		Advocacy, Migration
SCF	(Save the Children Fund)	Transport/Logistics, Domestic Needs, Water, Sanitation, Health/Nutrition, Shelter, Community Services, Education, Food Production, Income Generation

¹ More comprehensive NGO information may be obtained from the NGO Coordinator's Office at UNHCR Headquarters in Geneva (telephone (41 22) 739 87 81 or fax (41 22) 739 87 89).

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ORGANIZATION		TARGET SECTOR
WUS	(World University Service)	Education
World Vision		Water, Food Production, Health Care, Economic Development, Water Resource Programmes, Agricultural Assistance, Promotion of Social Justice
CARITAS		Food, Transport/Logistics, Domestic Needs, Water, Sanitation, Health/Nutrition, Shelter, Community Services, Education, Food Production, Income Generation, Legal Assistance
CONCERN WORLDWIDE		Water, Shelter
CRS	(Catholic Relief Services)	Food, Domestic Needs, Housing, Health/ Nutrition, Sanitation, Education, Income Generation
CWS	(Church World Service)	Transport/Logistics, Domestic Needs, Health/Nutrition, Shelter, Community Services, Education, Income Generation
DRC	(Danish Refugee Council)	Transport/Logistics, Shelter, Community Services
Equilibre		Food, Transport/Logistics, Shelter
HI	(Handicap International)	Food, Transport/Logistics, Health/Nutrition, Shelter, Community Services, Legal Assistance
ICMC	(International Catholic Migration Commission)	Transport/Logistics, Domestic Needs, Health/Nutrition, Community Services, Education, Legal Assistance
IFRC	(International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies)	Food, Transport/Logistics, Health/Nutrition, Shelter, Community Services
IIRO	(International Islamic Relief Organizations)	Emergency Assistance, Logistics/Transport
IRC	(International Rescue Committee)	Food, Transport/Logistics, Domestic Needs, Water, Sanitation, Health/Nutrition, Shelter, Community Services, Education, Food Production, Income Generation, Legal Assistance
LCHR	(Lawyers Committee for Human Rights)	Advocacy, Human Rights

PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION							B-GG-005-004/AF-023
Other functional Areas As Required	Agriculture	Public Health	Education	Transportation			Annex E To Chapter 2
Build farm to market road	Improve farming methods	Build irrigation system	Establish dispensaries	Train village medics	Begin immunization program	Provide texts	
						Train teachers	
						Build schools	
						Improve railway equipment	
						Repairs airfields	
						Repair/improve harbors	
							CRITERIA
							Desirability
							Will the population support it?
							Will the military support it?
							Will other agencies support it?
							Will the government support it?
							Can it be started immediately?
							Will it have immediate impact?
							Will it benefit a majority of the people?
							Will it have a favorable psychological effect?
							Is it amenable to public exploitation?
							Will it improve the government image?
							Will it improve civil-military relations?
							Will it lend itself to self help?
							Will it contribute to the stabilization of society?
							Does it jeopardize primary mission accomplishment?
							Does it have full approval and support of the civilian leadership in the community?
							Will the civilians in the community work along with the military?
							Does it infringe upon private enterprise?
							Will it require future Army maintenance?
							Will it benefit a wide spectrum of the community?
							Is it discriminatory?
							Will it be fully coordinated with all appropriate levels of authority?
							Is it in consonance with the country's national objectives and interests?
							Is it in support of the commander's politico-military mission?
							Does it compromise civilian authority and responsibility?
							Is it an important need, locally wanted, and beyond unaided local capabilities?
							Can military participation be so managed that it does not compromise civilian authority and responsibility?
							Will the project stimulate the flow of needed information from the people of the area?
							Will the project serve to gain civilian cooperation with populace and resources control and tactical operations?
							Will participation by the military avoid wasteful or needless duplication of functions and services of other agencies?
							Feasibility
							Does it conform to local customs?
							Are all necessary skills available?
							Are labour materials and equipment available?
							Justification
							Will it provide maximum return on investment and effort?
							Does it avoid duplication with efforts of other agencies?
							Will the operation raise the expectations of the populace and then result in disappointment when Canadian assistance is withdrawn?

CHAPTER 3

SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

“The key to this business (peacekeeping operations) is absolute impartiality. Favouritism will get you in trouble if you show the slightest hint of it”. - Colonel H.C. Ross, J3 Operations, Canadian Forces, NDHQ, Ottawa

301. INTRODUCTION

1. Support to civil administration is the second aspect of CIMIC, conducted in times of peace, emergencies, crisis and war, and is subject to the same parameters and operational considerations as for CMO. Support to civil administration has domestic and international considerations. Support to civil administration fulfils obligations arising from domestic laws and jurisdiction rights as well as HN laws, international treaties, agreements, MOU and concerns of the International Humanitarian Law, the International Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict covering conflicts of an international (Article 2) or internal character (Article 3). Both of these common articles are provisions in the four Geneva Conventions.

2. It is important for the Canadian Government to clearly state in the early planning process, the categories of involvement in support to civil administration. In extreme international situations, support to civil administration results from the direct military involvement in executive, legislative or judicial areas of civilian government. The military role and involvement in civil administration varies with the spectrum of conflict, the operational environment, the continuum of operations or the level of support required from the local civilian government. There are four forms of civil administration support: civil assistance, civil administration in friendly territory, civil administration in hostile or occupied territory and civil administration in Canadian territory.

302. CIVIL ASSISTANCE

1. CIMIC elements support civil assistance in the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters. Based on military necessity, a TFC may begin civil assistance in friendly territory to maintain law and order, provide potential life sustaining services, and control distribution of goods and services. The TFC will therefore determine the capabilities of the HN civil administration, develop plans to assist or support the civil administration and coordinate civil assistance plans with the HN.

2. Civil assistance differs from the other three forms of civil administration because it is based on the TFC's decision. It provides short term military support to an established government or population and does not incur a long-term commitment.

303. CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN FRIENDLY TERRITORY

1. Governments of friendly territories may request military forces to perform basic government functions during PSO, international emergencies, OOTW or war emergency. As situations stabilize, the functions performed by the armed forces return to civilian agencies. Generally, the transition is gradual and requires detailed long-range planning.

2. The TFC, assisted by a legal advisor, negotiates a support arrangement for civil administration with a foreign nation's government when authorized by and in accordance with the political and strategic military policy and direction of higher authority. In a Canadian context, higher authority is the strategic level of command, with the CDS acting on direction of the Canadian Government. The arrangement to provide civil administration support outlines: the expected nature, extent and duration of the support; defines the limits of authority and the liability of military personnel, and defines the civil-military relationships that will exist. Guidelines for the allocation of resources are:

- a. the support requirements identified;
- b. the damage and disruption suffered by the national economy and civil infrastructures and institutions;
- c. the general welfare of the populace; and

d. the CIMIC resources available in theatre or which can be obtained externally.

3. In exceptional cases, and on direction of higher authority, support to civil administration may begin before a formal agreement is negotiated. However, there must be some form of agreement between the HN and Canada or a multinational force, whether an alliance or coalition, representing the military forces providing the support. The level of support rendered is tailored to meet the needs of the existing situation, but in no case should it exceed the foreign nation's request for assistance, the limitations imposed by applicable international treaties, agreements or MOU, and the limitations imposed by the law of armed conflict or other international law. Civil administration support in friendly territory is temporary. It ends as soon as the foreign government can assume its national responsibilities and resume its normal activities.

4. In friendly territory, the following tasks could be assigned a TFC in support of a civil administration:

- a. assist foreign or HN in rehabilitating and building socio-economic infrastructure as specified by the Canadian Government or the CDS;
- b. coordinate and supervise provision of Canadian resources to meet essential civil requirements;
- c. assist HN ministry or agencies, Canadian OGDs and agencies in providing and allocating Canadian resources to meet essential civil requirements;
- d. monitor contacts between military forces, civil authorities and the civil population within limits specified by the mission and assigned tasks;
- e. coordinate essential funding of minor and major activities/projects, or funding programs, in cooperation with designated Canadian OGDs or agencies, including NGOs; and
- f. coordinate and assist in the return of government controls or indigenous authority as soon as feasible.

5. The TFC cannot compromise the sovereignty of a HN. If disputes arise between civil authorities and CIMIC personnel, the TFC will submit the problems or issues through the military chain of command for resolution. In this context, the TFC and his staff must maintain close working relationships with Canadian embassy staff and military attaché for consultation purposes and to receive proper policy guidance on courses of action.

6. Civilian unrest associated with PSO, international and domestic emergencies, and war can hinder effective and efficient employment of scarce and limited civil-military resources. Under such operational scenarios, priorities in functional tasks will have to be established based on an assessment of civil-military tasks and resources available to the TFC. The establishment of such priorities requires a politico-military effort to achieve the mission.

304. CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN HOSTILE OR OCCUPIED TERRITORY

1. Alliances, coalition forces or a nation, may be required to conduct civil administration activities during PSO, international emergencies or war. This form of support to civil administration differs from the other two activities described above, in that it is imposed force on a HN population by a military force acting on the authority of a nation, alliance or coalition of nations. The administered territory is effectively under military control. The occupying force has an obligation under the 1949 Geneva Convention IV on the Treatment of Civilians and the 1977 Additional Protocol I to ensure a just and effective administration of and support to an hostile or occupied territory. Specific obligations are laid out in these conventions and must be complied with by the occupying force.

2. Within its capabilities, the occupying force must maintain an orderly government in the occupied territory and must have as its ultimate goal the creation of an effective civilian government. The commander of an occupying force has the right, within the limits set by international law, national laws of the occupying power, and any applicable treaties or agreements, to demand and enforce law and order in the occupied area so as to accomplish the mission and properly manage the area. In return for cooperation, the inhabitants have a right to freedom from unnecessary interference with their individual liberty and property rights.

3. Subject to the requirements of the military situation, the TFC must analyse the military activities which will increase tensions in the occupied territory as well as those which will facilitate and accelerate a return a civil administration. This is especially important in a multi-ethnic environment where a chosen course of action will rarely meet unanimity among the ethnic groups or armed factions. The TFC must observe the principles of governing for the benefit of the governed.
4. Support to civil administration in an hostile or occupied territory should emphasize that:
- a. the system of control furthers the political and military objectives of the occupying power, alliance or coalition of nations;
 - b. the population receives responsive and effective government services;
 - c. the population is able to receive essential goods and services;
 - d. the measures taken enhance the social and economic well-being of the occupied territory;
 - e. law and order prevails;
 - f. the obligations of international law, treaties, agreements (SOFA...) or MOU are met;
 - g. restoration, rehabilitation and development take place in the occupied territory's social institutions and economic system;
 - h. human rights abuses against collaborators, minority groups and discriminated social classes or individuals are prevented;
 - i. an orderly and efficient transition occurs from civil administration to civilian government; and
 - j. the population and the country are better off at the end of civil administration as at the onset of occupation to ease the return to civil authorities.
5. Once a territory has been occupied, hostilities could resurface again. This likely operational scenario requires the TFC and his staff to assess the force level, capabilities and the level of sustainment required under specific planning criteria. These criteria include the degree of resistance to the occupation, the size of the area and the nature of the ground, the population density and distribution, and the level of development in the AO.
6. The head of an established civil administration system in occupied territory, the civil administrator, is a military commander or other designated person who exercises authority over the occupied territory. Under the civil administrator's control and supervision, the existing government structure may continue or the government may be replaced and a new structure built.
7. The occupying power must obey domestic laws but if some of these laws need to be changed, the occupying power must meet the requirements of international law when changing civil law in an occupied territory.
8. The level and nature of Canadian support to civil administration in hostile or occupied territory is on authority of the Canadian Government.

305. HUMANITARIAN IMPLICATIONS IN SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

1. The continuity of consent for humanitarian activities conducted during PSO, OOTW and combat is inextricably intertwined with the trust which derives from a perception of impartiality and neutrality. Confidence-building measures reinforce consent. One means of garnering trust and confidence is by lending support to local authorities and institutions through visible humanitarian activities, especially at the unit level. Notwithstanding, support to civil administration in humanitarian activities which does not follow the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality, and which is not coordinated with the appropriate humanitarian institutions, can have a detrimental effect on the program

of humanitarian activities conducted during the civil phase.

2. Figure 3-1 shows the UNHCR concept linking humanitarian action to the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality which are considered essential in maintaining consent in support to civil administration.




Figure 3-1 UNHCR Humanitarian Principles

3. The UNHCR guiding humanitarian principles are:

- a. **Humanity.** Human suffering should be relieved wherever it is found. The inherent dignity and other human rights of individual and groups must be respected and protected.
- b. **Impartiality.** Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discrimination. Relief must address the needs of all individuals and groups who are suffering, regardless of nationality, political or ideological beliefs, race, religion, sex, or ethnicity. Requirements and relief activities must address the most urgent cases.
- c. **Neutrality.** Humanitarian relief should be provided without bias toward or against one or more of the parties to the political, military, religious, ideological or ethnic controversy which has given rise to the suffering. Humanitarian actors must not allow themselves to become allied with a party to the conflict.
- d. **Consent.** The participation of humanitarian agencies and the military in joint operations is dependent upon the consent of the HN government, military and paramilitary forces, civil authorities and the local populace. Consent is sought by all stakeholders and partners at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to achieve mission objectives. Notwithstanding, consent is not absolute across the spectrum of conflict and will vary greatly with the situation prevailing at each level of command, particularly in complex emergencies.

4. **Humanitarian Activities in Support of Civil Administration.** The timing of support to civil authorities is important. Where a viable cease fire has emerged, the opportunity is ripe to turn public support in favour of a lasting peace. This can effectively be achieved without compromising the neutrality or impartiality of military forces. Activities designed to assist civil authorities must focus on the restoration of law and order and civilian administration. Such activities could include:

- a. the collection of weapons/disarmament;

- b. EOD and mine disposal;
- c. repair of essential civil infrastructure;
- d. leading belligerent forces/FWF involved in a conflict, in accepting the international supervision of a cease fire formerly agreed between the parties to the conflict, and in implementing disarmament agreements;
- e. monitoring zones of separation (ZOS); and
- f. establishing mechanisms for resolution of disputes and conflict.

5. The *UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations* states at chapter 4: "In addition to the general principles which prohibit extraneous agenda on humanitarian action, UNHCR is bound by Article 2 of the UNHCR Statute, which requires the work of the High Commissioner to be of an entirely non-political character. The handbook further states that the UN SRSG will provide guidance in an effort to harmonise the operational objectives of the political, military and humanitarian components of the mission but that *humanitarian principles are absolutes*, in the sense that they should not be subordinated to political considerations." Notwithstanding, the prevailing situation in the operational environment dictates that humanitarian principles be measured and balanced against mission objectives, Force protection requirements, a manageable level of risks to military and civilian members participating jointly in activities of support to civil administration, and operations security. Humanitarian principles must be applied within a secure environment to protect and preserve scarce resources, which may involve the military and/or international and HN police, or Canadian police forces under domestic laws and jurisdiction.

6. **Negotiations.** Military and humanitarian actors should work with the lawful or *de facto* civil, military or paramilitary authorities under the guiding humanitarian principles listed above, to encourage such authorities to resume full responsibility for their populations, at the earliest as well as to reinforce the consensual basis upon which activities are founded. Considerable time and effort will be spent on negotiation and mediation at every level by the political, military and humanitarian components of a UN or OSCE led mission which NATO will support with military forces. Each component must limit his negotiations within the scope of his mandate, without interfering with other components' objectives. Linking activities of one component with another, as negotiating parties to a conflict may well try to compromise or discredit the mission to achieve their specific objectives. The parties to a conflict must not be allowed to condition humanitarian activities upon other humanitarian actions or the progress of political or military issues. It is imperative that political, military and humanitarian components coordinate their efforts and share information on the status of their respective negotiations. This coordination and sharing of information is therefore an essential part of success in negotiations.

306. SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN CANADIAN TERRITORY

1. Details on the legal framework and the nature of domestic operations are given in *B-GG-005-004/AF-000 CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONS* Manual. In the domestic environment, the focus of military activities will primarily be on emergencies and assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies. As time allows, support to civil administration will be subject to five operational phases: warning, preparation, force deployment, employment and redeployment. The scope of emergencies and assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies, including the Arctic region, is on short periods of conflict, armed assistance and unarmed assistance to include:

- a. aid of the civil power;
- b. terrorism;
- c. counter-drug operations;
- d. arms smuggling;
- e. illegal immigrants;
- f. humanitarian assistance to needy communities involving food, medical, shelter, clothing, basic services and

facilities;

- g. emergency disaster relief caused by oil spills, floods, forest fires, earthquakes, accidental NBC release and other such disasters under a declaration of a public welfare emergency;
- h. search and rescue; and
- i. fisheries.

2. In the domestic environment, these scenarios are governed by Part VI of the NDA (pursuant to Bill C-25 of 1 September 1999), the Emergencies Act, Orders in Councils such as CFAADs and CFAPPDs, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Canadian Human Rights Act and other agreements and MOU concluded between the three levels of government.

3. Further to chapter 1, the legislative authority for the role of EPC and for emergency preparedness at the federal level is found in the Emergency Preparedness Act and the Emergencies Act. EPC's role is to advance civil preparedness in Canada for emergencies of all types.

4. All emergencies will require at some level or another, the intervention of OGDs and agencies, NGOs, the Canadian Red Cross and possibly other IOs and UN agencies, as dictated by the gravity of the situation and the extent of damages. Cooperation and coordination of efforts will be paramount to achieve mission objectives in support to civil administration in international and domestic operations.

CHAPTER 4

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

“The JTFC identified the achievement of effective and comprehensive civil-military cooperation as the centre of gravity for OP ASSISTANCE (Red River floods).”-OP ASSISTANCE Lessons Learned Staff Directive, 19 Nov 97

401. INTRODUCTION

1. Domestic operations covers the whole spectrum of CF activity within Canada other than the internal organization, training and administration of the CF for its defence mandate. A key difficulty in considering CIMIC in domestic operation is the common misconception that domestic operations are CIMIC. It is vital to understand that, as in other military operations, the mission is the focus of operations and in domestic operations the mission is support to the civil authority. There will be a vital CIMIC component to this mission but the CIMIC component is a separate, supporting and complementary phase to the military operation.

2. Domestic operations cover a range of activities from local assistance to charitable organizations through large scale military deployments. The use of force, during domestic operations is governed by the Criminal Code of Canada, amplified and/or limited by use of force directions issued by the CDS. Any ROE required to support a domestic operation will be drafted IAW principles, concepts and direction contained in *B-GG-005-004/AF-005 - The Use of Force in CF Operations* and the authorized level of force found in the Criminal Code of Canada.

3. At the lower end of the domestic operations spectrum, the mission of the military force is often an activity that might be seen as a pure CIMIC role in an expeditionary setting, i.e., supporting humanitarian disaster relief assistance. In a domestic operation setting, however, this would be the commander's military objective, as described in article 101, paragraph 2, and his supporting CIMIC annex to the OPLAN and/or Op O would be calculated to enhance the accomplishment of this mission.

4. Generally, domestic operations in response to natural disaster or in support of civil law enforcement occur with little or no warning. The challenge to national and operational level HQs is to anticipate, plan and warn to a level of command and detail which ensures stakeholders are informed and able to react responsively.

402. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

1. In domestic operations, the CF will always operate in a supporting role acting under the direction and authority of the civil authority. As the legal link to the civil authority, the CDS commands domestic operations where there is any potential for a disturbance of the peace, operational (i.e. war fighting) equipments are to be used, or critical public attention is likely. In other cases, the CDS has delegated command authority to the operational level commanders.

2. Operational level commanders are the commanders MARLANT and MARPAC, Land Force Area (LFA) commanders, commander 1 Cdn Air Div and commander CFNAHQ. LFA commanders and commander CFNAHQ have specific responsibilities as the CDS's personal representative to provincial and territorial authorities for Aid of the Civil Power operations and assistance to provincial policing. All operational-level commanders are responsible to maintain liaison with the civil authorities with whom they routinely interact, deal with requests that are within their delegated authority, and providing advice to the civil authorities in situations where military assistance may be requested, at all times keeping the CDS informed.

3. The CDS commands all domestic operations, but has delegated authority for routine provision of services situations and other specified circumstance to operational level commanders. The CDS shall command all other domestic operations. The CDS will direct which forces will be provided, the type and scope of CF support, limits on the use of force, command and control (C²) arrangements, and designate the TFC. Depending on the situation, the TFC may be at the operational or tactical level, and will report directly to the CDS, through DCDS/NDCC. Members of the CF shall always remain responsible to the CDS through the designated chain of command.

403. TYPES OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

1. All domestic operations are constrained by precise legal interpretations concerning mandate, jurisdiction, and responsibility. Government and departmental regulations and policies, in particular those relating to financial accountability, limit the flexibility and scope of commanders assigned domestic operations missions. Table 1 illustrates the potential domestic operations by category:

Table 1 - Examples of Potential Domestic Operations by Category

Type of Operation	Civil Agency or Authority Supported	Legal Authority	Requesting/ Approval Level
Civil unrest or natural disaster that falls within the definitions described in the Emergencies Act	Federal Govt and affected provinces/territories	Emergencies Act	Governor in Council in consultation with the affected provinces/territories
Aid of the Civil Power	Provincial or Territorial Govt	NDA, Part VI	Provincial or Territorial Attorney General/CDS
Federal Armed Assistance to the RCMP (Counter-Terrorism)	SolGen	CFAAD	SolGen/MND
Assistance to Provincial Police Forces (Class 1 - potential disturbance of the peace)	Provincial, Territorial or Municipal Police Forces	CFAPPFD	SolGen/MND
Assistance to Provincial Police Forces (Class 2 and 3)	Provincial, Territorial or Municipal Police Forces	CFAPPFD	Provincial or Territorial Attorney General/Operational Level Commander
Assistance to Provincial Police Forces (Class 4)	Provincial, Territorial or Municipal Police Forces	CFAPPFD	Provincial or Territorial Police Forces/IAW Provision of Services Policy (DAOD 1019-0)
Perimeter Security at Federal Penitentiaries	Correctional Service Canada (CSC)	OIC	Commissioner or Correctional Service Canada/CDS
Support for the Federal Counter Drug Plan	SolGen RCMP	MOU Narcotic Control Act	SolGen/MND
Fisheries Protection	Dept of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO)	MOU/Coastal Fisheries Protection Act	Minister of Fisheries/MND
Hazardous materials (NBC) advice and assistance	Dept of Natural Resources	MOU	Minister of National Resources/MND
Humanitarian Disaster Relief	Provinces and Territories		Province to LFA Comd or Federal Government Direction
Air and Maritime SAR	Dept of Transport	DPG	Established interdepartmental framework
Provision of Goods and Services to other than Defence Agencies	OGDs, Provincial, Territorial and Municipal Govts, Non Govt Agencies, commercial organizations, private citizens		

Environmental Protection	Dept of the Environment (DOE)	MOU	Minister DOE/MND IAW with Provision of Services Policy
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2. While most domestic operations situations will develop with sufficient time for advice and direction from the appropriate authorities, in an emergency, commanders at all levels have a responsibility to respond to requests for assistance, subject to any specific overriding military direction they have been issued. It is vital that the strategic and operational Wng O and Op O clearly delineate the types of CF assistance authorized in support of civil authorities as well as related limitations, constraints and restraints to the mission and relevant tasks. In this regard, the value of a crisis management and decision making structure at the operational level, complemented by a joint civil-military coordination centre (CMCC) structure at the tactical level, are relevant and should be encouraged to facilitate planning and coordination of efforts between the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Figure 4-1 illustrates the interrelationships between stakeholders in domestic operations.




Figure 4-1 Examples of Interrelationships among Stakeholders in Domestic Operations

3. **Assistance to Civil Authorities.** The CF are organized, equipped and trained for their military role in defence of Canada and, in cooperation with Canada's allies, protecting and advancing Canada's interests in the world community. Although the CF are focused on their defence mandate, the inherent flexibility of military units, many with unique capabilities, makes the CF a potential source of assistance which may be called to support Canadian civil authorities.

4. **Requests for Assistance from Non-Defence Agencies.** On a continuing basis, units of the CF support community based activities with short term loans of such things as tents or mobile cooking facilities for events ranging from town and village festivals to Boy Scout Jamborees. This assistance must not adversely affect CF training or readiness, compete with commercial alternatives or create a charge against the public. It provides CF units an opportunity to participate in the communities in which they live and work, and, at a very personal level, show the public the human face of the CF.

5. **Humanitarian Assistance.** As recent events such as the 1997 Red River flood and the 1998 ice storms have shown, the CF are a source of highly trained, skilled and disciplined expertise which can readily react to the unforeseen demands of a natural disaster, when called upon by the responsible provincial authority or directed by the Federal Government. CF operations and support will supplement, not supplant, the responsible civil agencies. CF assistance will often focus on command and control, information gathering, reconnaissance, tactical communications and general support tasks. Specialized capabilities, such as engineer resources, may be used to augment civil resources, but such assistance will generally not extend beyond emergency assistance. In this regard, a division of labour to include EPC, OGDs and agencies, the Canadian Red Cross, NGOs, in addition to delineation of responsibilities and authorities among stakeholders, early in the operation, are vital to economy of effort.

6. **Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies (ALEA).** Currently, the CF does not have a mandate to conduct direct law enforcement operations in Canada. However, there are instances where the Municipal, Provincial or Territorial LEA may seek CF assistance in discharging their duties. Usually, the assistance is for a special skill or equipment that is only practically available from the CF. Under the *CF Assistance to Provincial Police Forces Directions* (CFAPPF), Provincial and Territorial LEA must first address requests for assistance to the SolGen, who will either satisfy these from the Federal RCMP, or may request CF assistance. CF assistance, when provided, is always in a supporting role to the police force of jurisdiction, which retains full responsibility for enforcing the law.

7. The CF, as part of the federal counter drug strategy, cooperate with LEA in both Canada and the United States in the use of military surveillance capabilities to assist in the detection and apprehension of persons attempting to import illegal drugs into Canada, under the jurisdiction and control of the LEA of each country.

8. The CF is also prepared to provide, under standing arrangements with other Federal Government departments such as Correctional Service Canada and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, resources to facilitate the enforcement of Federal laws or the maintenance of public safety in the event of labour disputes or other disruptions.

9. **Aid of the Civil Power.** In Canada, responsibility to uphold the law and enforce the Criminal Code is primarily vested in provincial authorities, however, Canadian Provinces and Territories may not maintain para-military forces and have no internal recourse for situations beyond the control of their law enforcement agencies. Therefore, each province and territory has the power, under Part VI of *The National Defence Act*, to requisition the CDS to take action to restore the authority of the civil power, if the Attorney General of that province or territory declares in writing that a disturbance of the peace is beyond the capability of its police forces. The CDS has sole discretion in determining the response necessary, but must act to restore the situation to a level that is within the capability of the civil power to discharge its responsibilities.

10. Members of the CF, when employed in aid of the civil power, will only act as members of military units under military command and are individually liable to follow the orders of their superior officers. The CF does not replace the responsible LEA. The CF will address the situation that is beyond the capacity of the police using military organization, equipment and methods while the police continue to discharge all duties that are within their mandate and powers. In responding to an aid of the civil power requisition, the CF will act to restore the situation to the control of the civil authorities as quickly as possible, and the CDS will be notified by the provincial or territorial Attorney General when this has been accomplished.

11. The introduction of the CFAPPF, covered in DCDS 2/98, provides a more flexible and less draconian procedure for provinces and territories to access assistance from the CF, and will greatly reduce the potential for provinces/territories to have to consider use of Part VI of the NDA in situations where it has hitherto been employed.

12. **Counter-Terrorism.** The SolGen is the lead department responsible for counter-terrorism in Canada. Under the CFAAD, the CF may provide forces capable of assisting in the resolution of an issue that is, or has the potential of, affecting the national interest. The general management of the police response at the site of a disturbance remains under the command and control of the police. CF elements deployed in this role act as a military force under the command and control of their military commanders.

13. **Emergencies Act.** The Act can be proclaimed in the event of an urgent and critical situation of a temporary nature that seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such proportions or nature as to

exceed the capacity or authority of a province/territory to deal with it, or seriously threatens the ability of the government to preserve the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the country, and cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law. Under such circumstances, the federal government may, in consultation with the provinces/territories concerned, assume special powers under the terms of the *Emergencies Act*.

14. *The Emergencies Act* permits the federal government to take on, for a limited period, the powers deemed necessary to deal with the emergency. These are intentionally not specified, and in practical terms would be primarily focused on assuming jurisdiction and directing the allocation of resources, such as transportation and communications. These would likely include special powers for the CF. A proclamation under *The Emergencies Act* is an extreme action which would only be taken in very exceptional circumstances.

15. **Environmental Protection.** In the 1994 Defence White Paper, the Government of Canada identified environmental protection as a major priority and emphasized the prevention of pollution and the promotion of “green” practices in day-to-day operations. In March 1994, DND and the Department of the Environment concluded a MOU with respect to the use of the CF in environmental surveillance and clean-up. The agreement sets out the role of DND and the CF in assisting the Department of the Environment in the event of a serious incident. In addition, the CF will identify and report potential and actual environmental problems as they carry out routine surveillance missions.

404. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

1. The aim of CIMIC support of a domestic operation is to contribute to the accomplishment of the mission. In the majority of situations, the paramount requirement will be to establish effective liaison with civil agencies including government and private organizations, and important public figures to communicate the scope and limitations of the military support that will or may be provided. The other component is harnessing civil plans and resources to military intentions and capabilities to accomplish secondary objectives which contribute to the military commanders primary mission. Other components may include joint arrangements to provide for military discipline, enhance military security and provide for mitigation or handling of damage claims from military operations.

2. The primacy of the civil authority and legalistic nature of domestic operations often produces limitations which will be overriding factors. These may well be the focus of CIMIC planning for domestic operations. Commanders and staffs will require immediate access and continuous reference to legal advice from attached JAG staff. Similarly, the public relations plan will be a vital component of both the commanders plan and the supporting CIMIC annex to the OPLAN and/or Op O. Indeed, the CIMIC annex to the OPLAN and/or Op O will usually be a function of the public relations plan. The relevant CIMIC annexes at chapter 5 are easily adaptable for domestic operations.

3. Domestic operations are usually economy of force missions where, for political or financial reasons, the military force deployed must be kept to a minimum. The impact on overall defence readiness and other ongoing CF operations or programmes will also often be a significant factor. CIMIC planning must consider these factors and ensure that CIMIC initiatives do not affect military readiness or unnecessarily commit other CF resources.

4. The requirement for interface with civil police agencies under CIMIC planning must be clearly differentiated from assistance to LEA as a domestic operation. Assistance to LEA must be approved and directed by the CDS as detailed in NDHQ Instruction DCDS 2/98. Interface with local LEA to facilitate military movement, to provide for police liaison in the maintenance of military discipline as well as ensure the safety and security of deployed forces, is an essential part of CIMIC planning. The interface with civilian police authorities in the domestic environment, remains a military police function.

5. Where the Task Force may be required to use force, the CIMIC plan may be useful in underlining the scope of force that might be employed to produce and emphasise its deterrent effect, or alternatively to underline the limitations that might be imposed to calm undue public fears and promote public confidence. Instruction for the use of force for each domestic operation will be determined and directed by the CDS.

6. It is important to delineate the type(s) or levels of assistance required from the CF in support of civil authorities, to achieve trust and confidence among stakeholders. The key to building a viable and workable civil-military relationship is to establish early in the warning or preparation phases, that responsibilities and authorities

are clearly understood by each stakeholder. This will usually be a prime objective of the CIMIC plan.

405. LIAISON

1. LFA commanders are responsible, within their areas, for domestic operations and for maintaining liaison with provincial authorities, to facilitate the sharing of information among all stakeholders; a procedure which may not be familiar to all civil agencies. LFAs maintain appropriate liaison with each provincial/territorial capital, to provide liaison, to develop personal working relationships and to build mutual understanding and confidence. Liaison between stakeholders, crisis managers and decision makers will be required in case of major disasters disabling utilities and essential communication services. The essential POC to be maintained are with:

- a. provincial emergency measures organizations and provincial Attorney Generals' staffs;
- b. emergency planning staffs in major urban centres;
- c. provincial law enforcement agencies; and
- d. the Canadian Red Cross, if it becomes the lead humanitarian agency.

406. LEGAL AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON CIMIC IN DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

1. The CF has no mandate to conduct domestic intelligence operations that target Canadian citizens or their activities. CIMIC activities in domestic operations must be open and avoid any activity that might be construed as directed at obtaining intelligence.

2. As a force of last resort and a Canadian government agency operating IAW TB Directive, the CF must not become engaged in activities that are properly the mandate of other government agencies or compete with commercially available services.

3. The legal framework in which any domestic operation is conducted will be overshadowed by federal, provincial and municipal laws, and any restrictions that the Canadian Government and the CDS may impose. JAG/AJAG advice is vital before any plan or initiative is put in motion for execution. Some legal considerations involve:

- a. rules of engagement requests (ROEREQ) and authorizations (ROEAUTH);
- b. the interpretation of ROE and use of force training by CF personnel;
- c. the application of the Criminal Code of Canada in regards to the use of force by CF personnel;
- d. legal implications of Peace Officer powers in regards to federal and provincial laws;
- e. the provision of supplies and services during the operation, including IOR or UOR;
- f. the identification of CF and personal liability exposure, such as liability under federal and provincial environmental protection laws, and advising on risk management; and
- g. procedures for settlement of claims against the Crown and costs recovery by the Crown.

407. THE REDEPLOYMENT PHASE

1. Domestic operations are extraordinary events carried out by the CF outside its normal mandate. CF engagement will be short term and effectively cease when the situation can be handled by the responsible civil authority. It is therefore important that CIMIC activities, in particular community relations activities are focused on similarly short term objectives which can easily and effectively be completed, and which do not imply any continuing military commitment.

CHAPTER 5

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

“Forget logistics and you lose.” - General F.M. Franks, Jr., USA (Ret)

“These small (foot) patrols, generally four or five-men strong, accompanied by an interpreter, provide very important local intelligence and enable us to gain the confidence of the local population. In addition, the patrols identify infrastructure reconstruction projects that would assist the local community in returning to a more normal life. As an example, they find a school that needs some work and, in close cooperation with ODA, a decision is made about the go-ahead in five days. Projects like these employ local labour, must cost less than \$30,000.00 and must be completed in 10 weeks.” - Major General John Kiszely, commander MND (SW), Bosnia, Dec 1996.

501. INTRODUCTION

1. International operations have stressed the requirement for closer cooperation and coordination of CIMIC activities in areas of operation. The increasing complexity of international emergencies added to the number of stakeholders in a given AO, require the CF to synchronize military and civil phases of a military operation and to consider associated strategic and operational factors which have a direct impact on command, control, communications and information system arrangements linking stakeholders in PSO, OOTW and combat. The TFC and his staff, subordinate commanders as well as members of a CF contingent, must operate in a multidisciplinary environment to achieve the mission. International operations cover the two aspects of CIMIC: CMO and support to civil administration. The role of CIMIC is to maintain the support and cooperation of the civilian population and civil authorities towards achieving stated political and military objectives, while denying such cooperation to actual or potential belligerents/FWF, who do not support these objectives. In this context, coordination and synchronization of activities, involving CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA to create a force multiplier aimed at isolating and deterring “extremist” elements, are paramount to achieving the objectives of the mission.

2. The lead department for peacekeeping, peace enforcement or armed conflict will be DND but this role could be relinquished to CIDA for humanitarian operations involving CF resources, or DFAIT for conflict prevention (preventive diplomacy), peacemaking and to a certain extent, peace building efforts which will require civil and military involvement. The warning and preparation phases of a military operation will require focus on CIMIC training and activities to develop mutual understanding, coordination and SOPs for international operations. Strategic and operational factors must also be synchronized to ensure sustainment of the operations throughout the five operational phases: warning, preparation, deployment, employment and redeployment. Effective command and control (C2) requires the establishment of a CMCC, operated by the J5 CIMIC, and CIMIC centres in the AO with appropriate rapid response TST to conduct CIMIC activities. Clear division of responsibilities are also required between the J1, J2, J3 Ops, J3 Plans, J3 Engr, J4 Log, J4 Mov, J6 and the J5 staff (to include a J5 CIMIC, J5 Ops, dedicated J5 Engineer, J5 Policy, J5 Legal, J5 PA) to analyse, plan, conduct, coordinate, control and monitor the military and civil phases of a military operation, including associated tasks.

3. CIMIC activities in international operations are a *command responsibility* requiring leadership by all commanders. Prioritization of military and civil tasks will be based on mission objectives and the TFC's end-state, coupled with an effective and efficient civil-military resource allocation and management system which should contribute to the elimination of duplication of effort among all stakeholders involved in the mission. The end result will be a reduction in the waste of civil-military resources earmarked for civil tasks. Cooperation and coordination of effort among all stakeholders are key to success in CIMIC activities and often, the mission cannot be achieved without significant progress in the civil phase of a military operation. The planning process for the civil phase is the same as the military phase with the focus on the execution of civil tasks. *B-GG-005-004/AF-004 Force Employment* provides the necessary guidance.

502. CANADIAN INVOLVEMENT IN UN OPERATIONS - THE APPROVAL PROCESS

1. **The Staff Levels.** To understand the scope of civil-military cooperation activities Canada may become

involved in, it is necessary to understand the Canadian approval process for an international operation. There are five staff-levels involved in the Canadian approval system:

- a. UNNY with the key being the UNSC;
- b. The Canadian Permanent Mission in New York (PRMNY), with our ambassador and the military advisor playing the key roles;
- c. DFAIT as the lead department in the Government of Canada for peacekeeping, including an internal section which provides a link to DND;
- d. NDHQ/ADM Pol/DGIS Pol, responsible for handling the staffing to the point of Government approval; and
- e. NDHQ/COS J3 staff translate strategic policy and planning guidance, and operational requirements into OPLAN and/or Op O for the CDS appointed TFC. The purpose is to achieve at the operational level, stated strategic objectives. Therefore, there must be coherence between the strategic and operational levels of command as well as coordination and synchronization of CIMIC activities involving all stakeholders, between the military phase and the civil phase of a military operation.

2. **The Approval Process.** This is a strategic level process which overlaps with the operational level. For UN operations, the process by which the Canadian Government arrives at a decision is generally as follows:

- a. **UN Requirement.** The UN requirement is identified and the Government of Canada initiates staff level discussions with UN counterparts. These discussions must cover the scope of civil-military activities to be performed in the theatre of operations or AO so the Canadian Government can begin identifying the CIMIC activities (CMO+support to civil administration) it is willing to pursue in theatre and the national resources required. Definitive CIMIC strategic and operational requirements will be borne out by the UN Technical Report/Strategic estimate. It is essential to assess potential CIMIC requirements, involving all stakeholders, early in the warning phase. The theatre campaign plan will reflect a systemic approach, particularly when facing complex emergencies.
- b. **UN SRSG.** The UN appoints a UN SRSG and the PRMNY, advises the Canadian Government of an impending UN request. DND preliminary planning begins when the Military Advisor has knowledge that an informal request is forthcoming.
- c. **UN Technical Reconnaissance.** The Canadian planning process begins in earnest when the UNNY requests through PRMNY, to DFAIT and NDHQ/DPK Pol, that Canada participate in a UN technical reconnaissance (recce). Canada would provide a member to assist in producing the UN Technical Report/Strategic estimate to include CIMIC factors and issues. If there is a large military engineer involvement, or a lack of civilian infrastructure, a J3 and J5 Engineer representation will be required, to be coordinated with NDHQ/J3 Engineer. This recce is separate from the national recce party which would also include military engineer representation.
- d. **Consultation Phase.** On completion of the initial recce and during the UN consultation phase, PRMNY seeks direction from DFAIT and keeps both DND and DFAIT abreast of activities related to the potential operation. Canadian staffing begins and DFAIT, CIDA, DND, appropriate NGOs, OGDs and agencies, should assemble to discuss the scope of CIMIC activities and a division of responsibilities among stakeholders to achieve the mission and serve Canadian national interests. We stress that the ICRC and some NGOs, which are by definition private and autonomous, have charters and mandates that preclude them from cooperating with the TFC. Their support must not be taken for granted and will have to be negotiated and/or coordinated, through liaison, in the preparation or employment phases. The same philosophy applies for NATO operations.
- e. **UN Informal Request.** After the UNSRSG Technical Report is presented to the UNSC, the UN makes an informal request to member states asking them to identify what they would be willing to contribute. The informal request is staffed from PRMNY to DFAIT, which coordinates a national response with appropriate

OGDs and agencies (DND, CIDA, Solicitor General for RCMP/Canadian police requests...). NDHQ/COS J3 staff begin an operational estimate, including an assessment of tasks, to determine courses of action (COAs) for CF participation. Efforts are made to complete the *formal planning* based on the *informal request* from the UN. The *formal request* will be for those national capabilities Canada is able to provide.

- f. **Informal Advice to the UN.** Canada participates in the bilateral and multilateral discussions at the UN to determine possible UN COAs and makes recommendations on the content of the UNSC resolution.
- g. **UN Formal Request.** The UNSC adopts a UN resolution to establish a UN force. The UN issues a *formal request* to those countries who respond favourably to the informal request for assistance. In Canada, this request is staffed from the UN through PRMNY to DFAIT. Approval from the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence is sought for small operations. In complex emergencies, Cabinet approval will usually be sought, particularly if OGDs and agencies are involved. This process would involve the Solicitor General for the RCMP, CIDA as the lead Canadian agency for development or humanitarian assistance, as well as NGOs. Individual and collective training for a military operation begins when the formal request is received, and should include CIMIC training at formation and unit levels.
- h. **Formal Acceptance.** Following formal acceptance by the Canadian Government, CF deployment is authorized.

3. The approval process demands continued interaction between key players: the Military Advisor in New York, DFAIT peacekeeping staff, NDHQ/DGIS Pol staff, COS J3 Plans and Ops, J2/DG Int, J4 Log and J5 Fin. For humanitarian assistance, DFAIT/Regional Security and Peacekeeping Division acts as liaison with DND in respect of requests for humanitarian assistance from developed countries. Within CIDA, the International Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Program Branch is the POC for humanitarian issues in *developing countries* while the Southern Europe and Multilateral Division of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) Branch is the POC for humanitarian issues in CEE/Russia. In humanitarian operations, CIMIC may be a central part of the mission as in the case of disaster and/or humanitarian relief which could involve the deployment of the DART.

503. CANADIAN INVOLVEMENT IN NATO OPERATIONS - THE APPROVAL PROCESS

1. Canada will be asked to participate as a coalition partner in international operations, rather than as a unilateral player. Much of the approval process for UN operations, described above, will be the same and involve the same stakeholders within the Canadian Government who are asked to authorize national resources for NATO operations. The purpose is to identify, through a strategic estimate as well as policy and planning guidelines, the national resources, force levels and CF capabilities to carry out effectively and efficiently the full scope of military and civil tasks, involving all stakeholders. The mission statement for the Force commander will be formulated by either SACEUR or SACLANT, based on political direction.

2. Much of the process followed by the Government of Canada involves consultation with NATO members, involving the NATO Military Committee, the DPC, the NAC (ambassadorial level) and the MNCs (SACEUR and ACLANT primarily) to determine NATO's best COA, force levels and capabilities required to achieve the mission. The Canadian ambassador to NATO as well as CAMILREP NATO and NMR at SHAPE and ACLANT, will be largely involved in the development of the Canadian position based on the recommended size, composition, operational concept, command structure as well as anticipated time lines for the execution of the mission.

3. **NATO Messages to Nations.** At the same time that NATO plans are being prepared and finalized, SHAPE or SACLANT will issue a number of messages to TCNs as part of the NATO approval process. It is essential to mission success that CIMIC considerations be covered in the Activation Warning and following messages, so that national CIMIC preliminary planning can begin:

- a. **Activation Warning (ACTWARN).** The ACTWARN is issued to NDHQ/COS J3, which notifies DFAIT through DGIS Pol. The ACTWARN does three things:
 - (1) informs nations and NATO agencies of the possibility to implement an OPLAN, as the situation requires;

- (2) requests providing nations to increase readiness of selected forces in the plan; and
 - (3) requests additional forces and capabilities depending on the specific situation.
- b. **Force Preparation (FORCEPREP).** Nations respond to an ACTWARN with a FORCEPREP which states a nation's intent to provide forces and associated details.
 - c. **Activation Request (ACTREQ).** The ACTREQ by MNCs is the *formal request* to the NAC/DPC to activate an OPLAN, specifying forces required to carry out the mission based upon national FORCEPREP and the specific OPLAN.
 - d. **Activation Order (ACTORD).** When final approval and authority to deploy forces and implement the OPLAN is received from the NAC, an ACTORD is issued to NDHQ/COS J3. The actual deployment of forces becomes a national responsibility. Once CF elements are operationally ready in theatre, Canada will give TOA of its forces to the MNC, normally OPCOM, who will in turn delegate authority to the NATO TFC, normally OPCON. This is achieved via an ORBATTOA at a pre-arranged time and/or location.

504. JOINT COMMISSIONS

1. **Joint Military Commissions.** The framework and scope of Joint Military Commissions (JMC) will be covered in any General Framework Peace Agreement (GFPA). The purpose of the JMC is to bring to the theatre Force Commander or his representative any complaints, questions and problems related to the military aspects of a peace settlement that require resolution. The scope of issues would involve separation of belligerent forces/FWF, enforcing compliance with the Peace Agreement, collection and destruction of types of weapons, clearing of obstacles, de-mining activities and factional training and movement. The main Commission will usually be chaired by the theatre Force Commander with appropriate representation from stakeholders, as specified in the GFPA. The JMC will normally establish subordinate military commissions at the formation and unit levels to decentralize, facilitate and accelerate the resolution of issues raised by the members. The TFC may have to chair a subordinate JMC in his AO, which will convene as required. The composition of the JMC would include, among others, the local military commanders of the FWF, military advisors and a representative of the HR.

2. **Joint Civil Commissions.** The establishment of Joint Civil Commissions (JCC) is similar to JMC. The purpose of JCC is to bring to the attention of the HR, any complaints, questions and problems related to the civilian implementation of a peace settlement that require resolution. The range of issues would cover the continuation of humanitarian aid effort, freedom of movement mainly linked to the resettlement of refugees and IDPs, economic recovery, infrastructure rehabilitation or reconstruction and human rights abuses/mass graves. The main Commission will be chaired by the HR and comprise a membership spelled out in the Peace Agreement. The HR will, as necessary, establish subordinate JCC at the local levels, which will convene as required. The composition of the JCC would include, among others, local political representatives of the FWF, the J5 CIMIC as the TFC's representative on subordinate JCC and representatives of those civilian organisations and agencies deemed necessary to resolve civil issues.

505. OPERATIONAL FACTORS IN CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

1. This article must be read concurrently with the fundamentals of campaigning covered in *B-GG-005-004/AF-004 Force Employment*. Overall mission objectives and the TFC's command philosophy are two of the most important factors in determining command focus on CIMIC activities, as means of achieving the military end state and the civil-military end state. The following operational factors pertaining to the scope of CIMIC activities should be considered in the estimate process and deliberate planning for a military operation in PSO, OOTW and combat:

- a. threats and risks;
- b. intelligence or military information;
- c. operational objectives in harmony with strategic objectives;

- d. civil-military end state in harmony with the military end state (military success will usually constitute the creation of a stable and secure environment for civil tasks to be carried out without the presence of military forces, thereby achieving strategic goals);
- e. common CIMIC doctrine among all stakeholders;
- f. time, space and volume (3 dimensions);
- g. civil-military coordination centre (CMCC);
- h. CIMIC centres, TST and liaison officers;
- i. state of civil infrastructures/support required;
- j. command, control, communications and information systems (C³S);
- k. information technology to maintain operational effectiveness and efficiency in the GIE through the overall strategy of information operations, contributing to Mission protection and Force protection;
- l. standardization of equipment and interoperability;
- m. decisive points and corresponding lines of operations leading to friendly and adversaries' centres of gravity;
- n. PSYOPS activities based on the transparency of operations;
- o. media/PA to publicize success in civil tasks and enhance human rights awareness and abuses;
- p. stakeholders and partners in the AO;
- q. cross-cultural dimension;
- r. civil and military engineer resources;
- s. Force protection in the AO balanced against mission objectives and acceptable risks;
- t. logistics (supply, transport, maintenance, medical...) and movement control;
- u. LOC from the rear COMM Z to the FCZ;
- v. host nation support (HNS);
- w. sustainment;
- x. minor and major economic recovery and infrastructure rehabilitation or reconstruction projects;
- y. legal considerations, including HN laws; and
- z. national and international funding sources.

2. **The Commander's Intent.** The analysis of the estimate factors will generate deductions and likely COAs that a TFC may take. After evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each, the TFC then selects from the COAs open to him, the one which he considers the most likely to achieve the strategic objective(s). The selected COA is translated into a concise statement of the TFC's decision. It is important to stress that the military operation is not civil-military cooperation but that the operation will include a civil -military cooperation dimension, which is translated as an annex to a Task Force OPLAN and/or Op O.

506. TASK FORCE COMMANDER'S STATEMENT OF INTENT

1. **Commander's Intent.** The vision of success will be reflected in the formulation of a TFC's intent. The TFC's intent statement is the TFC's personal expression of why an operation is being conducted and what must be achieved. Consistent with the command philosophy, the commander's intent provides subordinates with the freedom to adapt their actions to achieve success. The intent should clearly state why an operation is being conducted, the desired end state and how elements of the TF will achieve that end state, establishes the purpose of the OPLAN or Op O and communicates the commander's vision on how he sees the CIMIC campaign or the military operation being conducted. This intent must recognize that unity of both military and civil effort remains essential and that the ultimate success of a military campaign or operation is directly linked to its impact on the success of the international effort in a HN. Success in one and failure in the other amounts to mission failure.

2. The CIMIC intent is personally written by a commander and begins at the strategic level of command so subordinate commanders can develop their own plans which encompass CIMIC activities within the AO. The TFC's CIMIC intent will require adjustments on whether he is supporting military objectives (contain and disarm factions...) or civil objectives (support elections...). Further to chapter 1, article 119, other examples of IFOR operational-level CIMIC intent are as follows:

- a. minimize civilian interference with military operations;
- b. minimize military operations' interference with the civilian populace;
- c. plan and conduct CMO to facilitate IFOR's military operations;
- d. promote the reconstruction of civil infrastructure in the AO and conduct minor and major projects promoting long term peace;
- e. align CIMIC centres to command structure for both security and logistical support;
- f. identify risk assessment for small CIMIC centres and maintain a vital sites list;
- g. support the OSCE (refer to annex A) in its activities such as elections; and
- h. support the UNHCR in target areas for the return/resettlement/repatriation of IDPs and refugees (assuming their security can be guaranteed), through demining and reconstruction projects.

3. **Concept of Operations.** The TFC's decision on a selected COA is the logical result of the estimate process. This decision represents the TFC's outline concept of operations and must include the commander's intent, usually expressed in terms of phases, in the 'General Outline' of an Op O. The intent statement expresses the TFC's intentions on the use of the military force, time and space to achieve his CIMIC objectives (centres of gravity) and how the available resources are to be utilized following assigned tasks. Within a given operational plan or order, there is only one commander's intent - that stated by the issuing TFC. Supporting commanders, to include the CIMIC annex, may provide concepts for support of the plan or order, but they will not devise separate intent statements. This fact makes it imperative that dedicated J5 personnel be part of the TFC's recce group (R-Group) so that CIMIC is an integral part of the estimate process in the warning and preparation phases.

507. CF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

1. **General.** The CIMIC structure provides the conduit to the civil organisations, agencies and population, and provides functions, discussed in chapter 1, which include CIMIC support, assistance, advice, coordination, analysis, information, planning, preparation, training, supervision and evaluation to the TFC and his staff. CIMIC requires close cooperation and interrelationship among the elements of the peace process: sustainable development, diplomacy and defence. In PSO, OOTW and combat, military tasks and civilian tasks have become interdependent and complementary to achieve the mission. Once the Government has taken the political decision to participate in an operation, the level of support to civil administration by the Government must be specified and lead time must be exploited by the appointed TFC to plan, organize and consult with internal and external organizations (DFAIT,

embassies, attachés, CIDA, EPC, RCMP, UN DPKO, UNDHA, UNHCR, UNHCHR...). The lead time should also be used to conduct multidisciplinary education, training and exercises of the military force and other players (CMX, CPX, field exercises, CAX). Unity of command at the military and political levels must reinforce unity of purpose and unity of effort at the operational and tactical levels.

2. **Organization Elements.** The J5 CIMIC is the qualified authority and advisor to the TFC on CIMIC activities within an AO. A TFC staff should include, a J5 Policy, J5 Legal and J5 PA whose primary functions would be as advisors. In addition, the TFC requires a tailor-made *CMCC*, at the formation level, to plan and coordinate CMO as well as support to civil administration. The *CMCC* composition and structure would vary with the nature and levels of threats and risks, the type of operation and the scope of civil tasks to be performed by the military. The Area Assessment at Annex B will help define operational and organizational requirements. The *CMCC* would be manned, augmented and sustained by Primary Reserve elements from the maritime, land, air components. This effort would require a minimal number of Regular Force personnel to provide some training as well as operational and administrative support. These realities require a modular approach to the organization of a *CMCC*, similar to the method used to man the CIMIC (CJ-9) section of the CJTF HQ. CIMIC centres would complement the *CMCC* at the unit level. The elements of formation and unit *CMCC* organizations are summarized at annex B, appendix 1 and would involve:

- a. *organic civil-military nucleus* which is a permanent, minimum staff formed from personnel of formation or unit HQ who may be dual-hatted;
- b. a *key nucleus* from within the nucleus, composed of double-hatted personnel on the personnel establishment of the parent HQ, identified within each functional staff element (J1 through J7 or CJ1 through CJ-9) to ensure the cohesion of the nucleus and organize respective functional elements;
- c. *civil-military augmentation planning elements* for CMO and support to civil administration, to augment the organic civil-military nucleus and to provide depth of civil-military planning and expertise (CIMIC area assessment, CIMIC estimate (CMO+support to civil administration), CIMIC annex to a plan or Op O, CIMIC supporting plans);
- d. *CMCC* at the formation level and CIMIC centre(s) and TST at the unit level which would require additional personnel in complex emergencies, although the existing *CMCC* and CMO cell, the latter operating under the J5 Ops, would be adequate to provide civil-military coordination capabilities in non-complex emergencies; and
- e. use of *specialist augmentation of military and civilian experts* to compensate the absence of military qualifications, knowledge and expertise in non-military fields related to CIMIC activities.

3. **Warning and Preparation.** The R-Group must involve a dedicated J5 CIMIC officer, J5 Ops and J5 Engineer to generate a CIMIC area assessment and CMO estimate of activities in theatre. The mandates of civil organizations in the TFC's AO must be known so planning and coordination for the civil phase of the operation can begin early. CIMIC capabilities and resources must be identified and could include communications, engineer, logistics (medical, transport, finance, supply, maintenance...), PA, aviation, civilian police, J5 staff, military and civilian specialists (DND, OGDs and agencies, NGOs...) and materiel. These CIMIC capabilities must be identified and coordinated with the lead agency, humanitarian or military, in theatre to prevent mission creep prior to and during the civil phase. Once the conditions for peace building have been created, civil tasks must be sustained to completion requiring a responsive logistic support system, adapted to theatre requirements.

4. **Cultural Awareness and Integration.** The TFC in an AO must focus on a bottom up process to coordinate and integrate IOs and NGOs' activities and provide them with the necessary Force protection (security, alert status, evacuation plan which may require aviation and naval support) so civil tasks can be carried out safely in the AO. The civilian organizations are an excellent source of military information to plan CMO and support to civil administration, but this information will only be forthcoming if organizational cultural differences are overcome and trust and confidence are fostered among all the stakeholders. The TFC must seek to build a "team spirit" within his AO and translate CIMIC doctrine and capabilities into a force multiplier. Annex C states the Code of Conduct of the ICRC in international operations.

5. **Force Protection.** The TFC would be required to maintain rapid reaction forces, with the appropriate notice of degree to move, to deter, protect and defend civilian and military personnel in an AO. Escort of specific IOs, NGOs and UN agencies may be required to protect humanitarian convoys, carry out de-mining tasks or provide protection for urgent civil tasks in contested populated areas, involving belligerent forces or extremist elements. The unlimited operational scenarios require the TFC to acquire some flexibility and versatility in terms of Force protection. In the absence of adequate military police (MP) resources, the TFC may consider that his contingent include a CIVPOL component which would advise and liaise with the TFC and military units and elements to plan, conduct and coordinate operations in urban areas. If there is a TF MP detachment, the civilian police component, preferably under OPCON, will report through the MP commander to the TFC.

6. **Division of Responsibilities.** The J3 cell is the focal point through which the TFC directs the conduct of operations, including CIMIC activities. The J5 cell would carry out its own detailed planning, coordination and conduct of CIMIC activities in coordination with J2, J3 Ops, J3 Plans, J3 Engr and J4 Log cells, as well as external civilian agencies through their CMCC field representatives. J3 Ops will always supervise the conduct of CMO as he controls military resources on behalf of the TFC. It is accepted that the J5 cell will always be subordinate to the J3 cell since the execution of military tasks has absolute priority over civil tasks. In effect, military personnel can be withdrawn temporarily from civil tasks to complete priority military tasks. Once military tasks are completed, the military can be reassigned to civil tasks. It is therefore preferable to assign minor projects to the military so as not to disrupt the timetable for the civil phase.

7. **UN MILOBS.** MILOBS or UNMOs deployed in an AO will be of great assistance to a TFC in terms of liaison with IOs, NGOs and UN agencies as they can carry out duties and tasks normally assigned to a formed troop CIMIC centres. There is usually no C2 relationship between a TFC and MILOBS deployed in an AO. MILOBS fall under a MILOBS Group, composed of Sector HQs, which reports to the theatre Force Commander. Notwithstanding, close ties and timely exchanges of information (daily sitreps) between formed troops and MILOBS are required and must be encouraged to meet mission objectives. A typical MILOBS Sector HQ has a Sector commander, a Deputy who also acts as the Ops O, a Log O and a Hum O. MILOBS can increase Force visibility and deal in a timely and effective manner with local civil authorities and belligerent forces. MILOBS are in daily contact with civilian agencies and belligerent forces/FWF. MILOBS likely tasks are listed at annex D.

8. **Primary Reserve.** The Primary Reserve would be used extensively in CMCC and CIMIC centres as well as TST. CMCC and CIMIC centres complement each other and would employ Primary Reserve from all capability components to man, augment and sustain the CMCC with staff positions mostly filled by university trained personnel to include legal, communications, engineers, logistics, PSYOPS, media and interpreters. Liaison officers at formation and unit levels would liaise with military and civilian organizations to coordinate J5 plans and J5 projects in CMO.

9. **Force Multiplier.** The TFC must exploit at every turn the synergy of CIMIC, PSYOPS (J3 Ops supervises, at the strategic level, for all CF operations) and PA, especially in the development, execution and completion of minor and major civil-military projects, to reinforce peace building efforts, create confidence and security building measures, and give hope to the people. More importantly, the media "blitz" would counter belligerents' propaganda while building up local and international public opinion for the civil phase. This in turn will facilitate the political decision making in TCNs to support the civil phase until completion. Funds will be channelled to civilian agencies, thereby facilitating the attainment of the TFC's mission and objectives. The synergy created by CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA constitutes a force multiplier as it reduces the dependence on military force to achieve mission objectives, while minimizing interference by the local population with military operations.

508. CMCC AND CIMIC CENTRES IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

1. **CMCC.** The primary purpose of the CMCC (see Annex E) is to provide the TFC a secure area to conduct formal or informal meetings, to consult or discuss classified matters and issues with heads of IOs, NGOs and UN agencies, occasionally with local community or military leaders, as well as plan, coordinate and conduct CIMIC activities in the AO. The CMCC serves as a focal point for policy, military, civil agencies' matters in the AO, all related to CIMIC activities. There is no command relationship between civilian and military leaders at any level, requiring a cooperative spirit from all stakeholders. A CMCC would be required in complex emergencies and large scale PSO, OOTW and combat to analyse, plan, consult, decide, conduct, coordinate, control and monitor CMO

and support to civil administration. In an AO in which CIMIC activities are high or on the increase, a TFC could split the CMCC into two levels: a "Current Operations Group", which could be chaired by the J5 CIMIC, focussed on short-to-medium term planning and a "Steering Group", which could be chaired by the Deputy or COS, to provide policy guidance with its focus on the long term perspective. A CMCC has the following characteristics:

- a. it would be located *inside* a military compound and composed of the normal HQ staff focussed on the civil phase and civil tasks of a military operation. The J5 CIMIC advises the TFC on civil-military matters;
 - b. the J3 is responsible for supervising the CMCC. The CMCC would be headed by a J5 CIMIC, with CIMIC experience and training, assisted by a J5 staff which could be composed of a J5 Ops, J5 Plans/Projects, J5 Health Services Support (HSS), J5 Veterinarian, J5 Admin/Fin (minor and major projects) and a PSYOPS cell, in addition to the heads of key humanitarian organizations in the AO. Logistics and movement coordination remain with the J4 staff at the Area Logistic and Mobility Coordination Centres depending on theatre logistics arrangements. The logistics cell would provide the input for, and coordination of logistic and HSS, including HN support. In large scale combat operations, the Main and Rear Headquarters (HQ) of a formation could include a CMCC Main and a CMCC Rear;
 - c. the CMCC would be manned, augmented and sustained by the Primary Reserve with the required military and civilian specialists and fields of expertise, including interpreters, to conduct effective and efficient CMO and support to civil administration. The composition of a CMCC will vary with the type of operation, the nature and levels of threat and the scope of civil tasks to be performed. Some officers/NCO's may be double-hatted when formation and unit organic resources are used for CIMIC activities; and
 - d. the CMCC must strive for unity of purpose and unity of effort in the absence of unity of command to coordinate military efforts with civilian agencies. Organization and operation of a CMCC could include:
 - (1) **Reception.** All visitors report to the CMCC Visitors Bureau.
 - (2) **Staff.** All military staff and specialist functions such as legal, policy, PA, CIMIC and PSYOPS, including heads/representatives of civil agencies in the AO, should be represented in the CMCC. It is recognized that some agencies such as the ICRC may not wish to be represented or associated too closely with a military force so as to maintain its independence, impartiality and neutrality. As a general guide, nonetheless, it would be useful for the CMCC to develop a *coordination matrix* to identify who within the TF and/or CMCC was responsible for dealing with which outside civil agencies. This effort is particularly important for plans/projects, to prevent duplication of effort and to ensure no civil agency is forgotten as part of the TF security and evacuation plans.
 - (3) **Operation.** Operate on a 24/7 basis.
 - (4) **Flexibility.** Flexible in size and composition to effectively coordinate military support to a crisis response such as a preventive deployment in a particular AO, or in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, OOTW and combat as well as complex humanitarian emergencies.
 - (5) **Coordination.** The CMCC will be the primary civil-military coordinating agency for the heads of key IOs, NGOs, OGDs and agencies deployed as part of or independent of the Canadian contingent, including UN, OSCE or NATO agencies. Inter-agency weekly briefings and meetings will be required, chaired by the TFC or his representative.
 - (6) **Versatility.** A CMCC will comprise the Primary Reserve and a minimal number of Regular Force officers and civilian personnel with fields of expertise that meet operational requirements and who are capable of effectively coordinating CMO and support to civil administration. In CIMIC activities, employment of formations or units' organic resources will be the norm in which the military is the lead agency or is in support of a lead humanitarian agency.
2. **CIMIC Centres.** CIMIC centres are subordinate to the CMCC and would be deployed *outside* the military compound within the communities. At least one CIMIC centre, should be co-located with the lead agency to provide

information on the tactical situation in the AO and coordinate plans and projects with IOs, NGOs and UN agencies as well as brief local authorities and the population at large. The CIMIC centre is composed of a commander, operations, admin/log and representatives from military, civilian agencies and specialist fields.

3. CIMIC centres seek to decentralize the information and coordination processes from the CMCC. CIMIC centres are focal points for civilian agencies where problems associated with a lack of familiarity in military comportment, rules and procedures may be overcome. CIMIC centres also provide ready access by members of IOs, NGOs, UN or NATO agencies, civil authorities, military or paramilitary personnel and the local population. When feasible, at least one CIMIC centre should be co-located with the lead humanitarian agency in the AO to analyse, plan and coordinate activities. CIMIC centres can be established at unit level, and ideally should be located away from military establishments to encourage participation and visits by personnel from civil agencies, civil authorities and the local populace. Figure 5-1 illustrates the validation and decision process for CIMIC requests. CIMIC centres would operate along the same guidelines as a CMCC and could perform tasks such as:

- a. provide liaison to harmonize political, military, civil, and humanitarian agencies' activities;
- b. facilitate the transparency of CMO and support to civil administration in the AO among all stakeholders through media and PA efforts, briefings, backgrounders and meetings;
- c. provide up-to-date route and minefield maps, mine awareness training as well as useful information on issues such as freedom of movement, minor and major plans/projects, the general situation in the AO, the general activities of the formation and units in the AO, security issues and the evacuation plan;
- d. brief policies and procedures to all concerned and coordinate IOs, NGOs and UN/NATO agencies' activities;
- e. keep abreast of IOs, NGOs, UN, OSCE and NATO agencies' activities and the donors who finance them, through ICVA or a similar agency in theatre;
- f. conduct daily operational/situational briefings, as required; and
- g. provide information to J5 Ops for inclusion in the daily CIMICREP and the periodic commander's assessment report (COMASSESSREP), also called the estimate process.

4. **TST.** CMO specialists would deploy with the R-Group, under the J5 CIMIC, to assess the situation and begin initial coordination of CIMIC activities in the HN (population and resources control, humanitarian assistance, civil defence and military civic action) or provide temporary augmentation to deployed units, as decided by the TFC. A TST at unit level would provide contingency response and would be deployed to carry out specific civil tasks. A TST would operate at the unit level based on the TFC's intent and COO. TST provide a TFC with a rapid response capability and specialist skills to support civil-military cooperation activities in an AO, such as to:

- a. provide staff augmentation and CIMIC planning or assessment support to deployed units;
- b. provide interpreters and cultural training/briefings to supported units;
- c. augment the CMO staff as required;
- d. provide basic CIMIC training in collecting data for MOE and normality indicators;
- e. maintain liaison with other CIMIC elements deployed in the AO;
- f. execute rapid deployment in the most remote areas; and
- g. provide general CIMIC support to formations and units, as directed by the TFC.

NOTE: Refer to chapter 1, annex B for a Tactical Support Team Duty and Job Description.




Figure 5-1 The Validation and Decision Process for Requests

5. **Interpreters.** Interpreters are invaluable in multinational operations in daily contacts, negotiations and patrols. In practice, both interpreters and users must become accustomed to one another, particularly the user's dialect and manner of speech. Training of interpreters should be conducted along the techniques described in this paragraph. In general, the interpreter should always stand slightly to the side of and behind a speaker. The interpreter should mimic the speaker's body language and voice inflection as much as possible. The speaker should keep sentences short and speak in *sound bytes* to ensure accurate translations. The speaker always faces the individual with whom he is having the conversation. This includes the periods after he has finished speaking and is awaiting translation. Under no circumstances should the speaker turn to face the interpreter unless he is speaking personally to the interpreter. Obtaining an interpreter's point of view following a meeting is a good practice as he/she is well aware of local customs and culture. Experience has shown that the best interpreters are female as they show little emotion and are more accurate than men in their translation. Also, HN authorities *may* make the regular reporting of information by local interpreters, a prerequisite for permission to work for an international organization.

6. **Translators.** Interpreters may occasionally be used as document translators but because of the need for accuracy of thought in translation, particularly when the text is of a technical nature, the functions of interpreter and translator should be separate and filled by qualified personnel. Usually a unit and formation will be able to find such individuals with the assistance of the unit or formation's personnel hiring office. Such help will usually come from HN universities, locals or by ensuring permanent positions on the formation or unit personnel establishment. Interpreters and translators may be civilians or military.

7. **Liaison Officers.** The use of LO will enhance interoperability and unity of effort in a coalition or multinational operations. Their cultural awareness and language skills can be beneficial to a TFC, especially with formations and units whose communication equipment may not be compatible with the lead nation. Interoperability will make it imperative that LO be equipped with compatible communications for effective liaison with military and civil agencies involved in CIMIC activities. LO can assist in planning and coordination with civil agencies and should be located at the lead humanitarian agency HQ for planning and coordination purposes. LO will also be in daily contact with civilian agencies and local authorities, civil contractors and civil labour for the planning, execution, coordination and control of minor or major rehabilitation and reconstruction projects.

509. CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONAL LEVEL TASKS

1. In PSO, OOTW and combat, the following operational tasks, although not exhaustive, may be assigned:

a. Land Forces

- (1) observation and monitoring;
- (2) supervision of truces and cease-fires;
- (3) interposition conducted as peace enforcement without necessarily the consent of the belligerent parties;
- (4) demobilization operations of irregular forces and militias involving: the securing of agreements; withdrawal and assembly of belligerent forces; disarming belligerent forces; and the dispersal and rehabilitation of such forces;
- (5) conflict prevention to include early warning, surveillance, the introduction of stabilizing measures as well as intervention activities such as preventive deployment and forcible separation of belligerents;
- (6) military assistance to assist civil authorities within a state or region where effective government has ceased to exist or to provide support to civilian elements in the election process;
- (7) humanitarian relief and the protection of personnel and physical property;
- (8) the establishment and supervision of Protected Areas;
- (9) mine awareness and mine clearance operations;
- (10) guarantee and denial of movement and the enforcement of sanctions;
- (11) non combatant evacuation operations by sea, land and air in cooperation with HN, OGDs and agencies to facilitate the proper receiving, screening and relocating of threatened civilians;
- (12) nation security assistance operations involving: security assistance to provide economic advice; to support Canadian cooperative efforts in areas of public health, communications, utilities, safety, administration controls, civil information and military civic action;
- (13) counter insurgency operations, mainly as part of rear area security tasks in an AO; and
- (14) rear area security tasks.

b. Naval Forces

- (1) naval diplomacy or show of force;
- (2) evacuation operations;
- (3) sealift;
- (4) offshore support to include air support, naval gunfire support; surveillance, C¹, search and rescue, medical support, accommodation facilities and logistic support;
- (5) mine countermeasures;
- (6) naval sea and air patrols;

- (7) enforce an embargo;
- (8) board and search civilian shipping; and
- (9) convoy escort.

c. Air Forces

- (1) provide air support and air strikes, as required by the operational situation;
- (2) monitoring of an AO, through MPA;
- (3) combat search and rescue;
- (4) evacuation operations;
- (5) strategic and tactical transport;
- (6) disaster relief and humanitarian assistance;
- (7) provide air-to-air refuelling; and
- (8) provide sustainment.

510. MAIN CIMIC ACTIVITIES - OPERATIONAL PHASES

1. Guidance on specific CIMIC policies, including the formation commander's direction to commanders, may not be available to the TFC until the deployment is initiated. The following CIMIC activities for four of the operational phases are not exhaustive, but critical to the success of the mission:

a. Warning and Preparation Phases

- (1) obtain from the TFC, the list of *Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)* as part of the mission CIMIC collection plan: EEI, elements or agencies gathering information, fluctuation in attitudes and behaviour of the populace, status of PIR to include when, where and how to report;
- (2) obtain from NDHQ/J2/DG Int, an area study and assessment of the theatre or AO, which constitutes the basic intelligence document for military operations in the civil phase. An area assessment format is at annex B, with appendix 1 listing the positions to be considered when designing the CMCC. Assessments (area and economic) must be conducted early and updated periodically. The ongoing area assessment is used to update the J2 Int area study;
- (3) obtain from NDHQ/J2 Geomatics the series of maps to conduct the initial recce and operations. An adequate set of maps is required especially in humanitarian operations involving refugees and cross-border activities, in which military forces may be involved in to support the lead humanitarian agency in theatre. Required map updates could be performed by a Terrain Analysis Team in theatre;
- (4) NDHQ must identify and exploit all information sources, particularly HUMINT, early in the initial planning process of humanitarian assistance such as alliance or coalition members, embassies, military attachés, IOs, NGOs, OSCE and UN agencies;
- (5) establish a R-Group to include a dedicated J5 staff to conduct a CMO/CIMIC estimate and liaise with IOs/NGOs in the AO. Essential elements of the area assessment covered in MC 411 (NATO CIMIC Policy) are: the geography; the political and cultural history of the area; the state of the government; public administration and public services; the media; the industrial, economic, commerce and agricultural capacity of the region; and the involvement, capability and structure of IOs and NGOs;

- (6) planning staff should liaise early in the warning phase with J2/DG Int through J2 Plans and Policy 2 and the Director of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence (NDHQ/DNBCD) to determine additional operational requirements;
- (7) establish a *Vital Points List* which should be categorized with a brief statement of significance and actions. The NDHQ/J2/DG Int area study/assessment is a good starting point. A valid mission statement in support of this list could read: "*Secure facilities critical to immediate relief of life-threatening conditions and required for restoration of social, economic and government functions in the AO*". This list would include: medical and utilities facilities, cultural or religious institutions, communication centres, broadcasting facilities/relay stations, banks, embassies, judicial institutions, storage sites, port facilities, airfield and airstrip facilities;
- (8) J5 Engineer planning and coordination considerations, as well as policy guidelines must be defined in relation to the mission, the scope of civil tasks, the nature and levels of threat as well as expected HN, IOs and NGOs, UN, OSCE or NATO support in the AO;
- (9) conduct legal training on the Law of Armed Conflict and rules of engagement (ROE);
- (10) establish the range of civil-military tasks, specialist requirements, capabilities, projects and funding sources;
- (11) conduct education, sending the commander and key J3 and J5 staff on a CIMIC course in anticipation of, or once the warning phase is activated, as well as planning a series of lectures and briefings for unit personnel. Training and exercises must be conducted with IOs, NGOs and national Red Cross/Red Crescent in a PSO scenario, including hostage taking situations/survival skills (refer to annex F for more details) and mine awareness training; and
- (12) logistic support.

b. Employment Phase

- (1) review agreements, liaison matrix, internal and external communications, and information exchange procedures with civil authorities, IOs, NGOs, HN police;
- (2) review SOPs, operational requirements and CIMIC capabilities, if not previously completed;
- (3) develop strategies for integrating CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA as a 'force multiplier';
- (4) Force protection issues for military and civilian personnel: security, safety and health;
- (5) review security and evacuation matters;
- (6) attend IO/NGO meetings and organize IO/NGO meetings at the unit location;
- (7) review the legal implications on ROE and other legal matters;
- (8) review the evacuation register/matrix (refer to annex G) and conduct rehearsals;
- (9) organize a subordinate Joint Civil Commission and a subordinate Joint Military Commission, as directed;
- (10) reinforce campaign pillars and create incentives and rewards for compliance by civil authorities, the local populace and HN armed forces;
- (11) conduct a revision of mine awareness and hostage survival skills for military and civilian agencies. This is a good occasion to introduce your unit and to gain the trust and confidence of IOs/NGOs; and

(12) mid-tour report, as directed.

c. Redeployment Phase

- (1) handover and briefings;
- (2) transfer of responsibilities to follow on forces and to civilian agencies; and
- (3) end of tour report, lessons learned, feedback into SOPs, CIMIC doctrine and first principles.

511. NDHQ ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

1. The CDS, assisted by the NDHQ J5 staff (J5 CIMIC, J5 PA, J5 Policy, J5 Legal, J5 Ops, J5 Engineer) and J3 staff to include J3 Plans & Ops and J3 Engineer, is responsible for establishing broad CIMIC policies based on national strategic objectives. For a particular operation, the CDS will:

- a. designate the commander for specific humanitarian operations which, in complex emergencies, may require deployment of the DART for domestic or international operations;
- b. task the appropriate ECS to provide identified units, specialists and support personnel;
- c. designate a formation to create the CFFET and TO&E, and provide the equipment and materiel, within limitations imposed by the CDS;
- d. establish specific CIMIC policies in accordance with international and domestic laws, and based on broad policies, to meet the requirements of the military situation;
- e. ensure that the operation plan adequately addresses CIMIC aspects; and
- f. ensure that CIMIC support is commensurate with the aim of the operation.

2. Based on the specific CIMIC policies established by the CDS, the TFC must:

- a. determine the level of staff support needed to plan and conduct CIMIC activities; and
- b. plan for the conduct of such CIMIC activities as may be appropriate in the AO.

3. CIMIC aspects of an operation will affect several divisions of NDHQ, particularly the J1, J3, J4 and J5 divisions. The detailed cooperative arrangements for CIMIC are the responsibility of the J5 division. This responsibility involves:

- a. preparing the estimate of CIMIC involvement in CMO, support to civil administration and SUP;
- b. advising the TFC on military requirements for CIMIC activities and recommending policies and procedures for such activities;
- c. collecting, interpreting, collating and disseminating information on civil-military matters;
- d. advising the TFC on matters concerning the civilian population, local government, institutions, the economy, and resources available for military use;
- e. recommending to the TFC policies concerning obligations to the population in the AO and obligations relative to treaties, agreements and international and domestic laws;
- f. establishing policy and procedures for coordinating military support to the population and for resources control programmes;

- g. establishing policy and procedures for the supervision of community relations by the TFC in the AO;
- h. establishing or coordinating policy and procedures for standing Joint Military Commissions in the AO;
- i. assisting SAMP and J1 staffs in processing and reorienting POW and detained persons, and in relocating and settling dislocated civilians (DPREs). The J1 is responsible for administering policies and procedures for dealing with POW, civilian internees and other detained persons; and
- j. in conjunction with the J4 staff, coordinating the procurement of local resources and HNS for operations.

4. Depending on the extent of CIMIC activities for a given operation, a CMCC may be established within the HQ. Under supervision of the J5 CIMIC and with representation from other divisions of the HQ, as required, this centre would coordinate all CIMIC activities on behalf of the TFC, without intruding on the security or operation of the TFHQ operations centre.

5. To obtain the cooperation of the civilian population, CIMIC integrates PSYOPS. PSYOPS support CIMIC through political, military and economic actions planned and conducted to mould the opinions, attitudes and behaviours of foreign groups to support Canadian national objectives. The J3 staff would supervise PSYOPS directed at specific target audiences, in close coordination with PA and J5 CIMIC, through the IOCC.

6. J4 Log and J4 Fin, assisted by the J5 cell are responsible for logistic HNS arrangements. J4 Log staff identify projected shortfalls, determine available goods and services within the AO and, in cooperation with the J5 cell, negotiate for such support.

512. MILITARY INFORMATION IN CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

1. In international operations not involving a "war emergency", the standard military function of "intelligence" may be called "military information" or simply "information". The aim is to prevent doubt and suspicion relative to the future intentions of the occupying force. The traditional intelligence cyclical process (direction, collection, processing and dissemination) will apply for PSO, OOTW and combat although methods and procedures to implement the process may vary with those developed for conventional warfare and operations.

2. Easy access to CIMIC centres fosters trust and confidence among stakeholders resulting in an exchange of information about the situation, events or incidents occurring in the AO and which are known only to IOs, NGOs, UN, OSCE or NATO agency personnel. Civilian agencies cover geographic areas not accessible to military personnel, by the nature of their mandate, nurture daily contacts with the local population and civil authorities, and therefore have access to information not readily available to military personnel. TFC's must be aware of this source of information and reinforce cultural awareness and good relations between the military force and civilian agencies in an AO. In return, civilian agencies may raise issues with the TFC, such as their inclusion in the AO security and evacuation plans.

3. Military information is important for Force protection and Mission protection during the civil phase of a military operation. It can be acquired through such means as active and passive surveillance and is essential to early warning of factional intentions which will determine the alert status in an AO. Military information will benefit all stakeholders and partners and requires close monitoring of indicators. To protect the civil phase, J2 "Priority Intelligence Requirements" must clearly reflect the TFC's intent towards CIMIC activities. The following is an example taken from the IFOR/ARRC commander on Mission protection:

- a. identify the impact of the FOM issue on the peace process;
- b. posture of the FWF indicating an intention to return to conflict; and
- c. report on the impact of the overall civilian-military campaign on the military and civilian community and identify areas where the IFOR/ARRC should focus its effort.

4. Successful CIMIC activities and operations depend upon complete and accurate intelligence on a variety of factors which exist in the AO. Examples include: demographics (e.g. ethnic distribution and influences), as well as information on military, paramilitary and terrorist elements which have the potential to threaten friendly forces, exploit unrest, incite violence, or otherwise destabilize the peace process. This will require the fusion of national, coalition and locally acquired intelligence. Intelligence databases, both in-theatre and at supporting command echelons, should be specifically tailored to support these requirements. The purpose of military information is not to gain a military advantage but to protect the military force and civil agencies deployed in an AO from threats and risks to their security. Great care must be taken not to compromise the security of individuals providing information. Sites where the populace congregates or assembles as part of its daily life should be identified as a source of military information. Information will normally be gained from the following sources:

- a. imagery from a variety of sensors such as hand-held photographs, videography, air recce (including drones), remote sensor data, as well as other tactical and national-level sources;
- b. patrols by infantry (foot, air recce, air patrols), transport drivers (road conditions, attitudes of the local populations, INCSPTREP, location of check points and the ability to pass), civilian police component, CF maritime, CF maritime, land and air recce units, and UN MILOBS (Annex D refers to tasks by MILOBS);
- c. inspection results/reports by UN, OSCE or NATO;
- d. factional commanders, HN military personnel and/or local civil police on the status of their own forces;
- e. civil organizations and agencies' personnel who by their mandate and functions entertain regular contacts with local nationals and civil authorities in the AO;
- f. contributing nations' CIVPOL or UNCIVPOL;
- g. local population, assisted by an interpreter;
- h. IDPs and refugees;
- i. television news channel (CNN...), local and international newspapers or magazines;
- j. school principals, teachers and administrators;
- k. hospital and health centres' administrators and staff;
- l. religious congregations, clergy or priests;
- m. local civil authorities/administrators at the municipal and provincial levels; and
- n. visitors from a neighbouring state to the crisis or conflict, or from an international body close to the crisis or conflict.

513. CROSS-CULTURAL ASPECT OF MULTINATIONAL AND MULTIDISCIPLINARY OPERATIONS

1. It is imperative to the success of the mission that the TFC and the civil phase NAC HR or UN SRSG reinforce cultural awareness to all stakeholders of a multinational and multicultural military operation. A team approach will enhance unity of purpose and help achieve unity of effort. Table 1 is a generic comparison of the cultural differences in behaviour and attitudes between NGOs (refer to chapter 2, article 203, paragraph 5j for more details on NGOs) and a military force deployed in an AO. Its purpose is to illustrate some makable cultural and operational differences between the two organizations:

Table 1 - Cultural Awareness

NON -GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS	MILITARY FORCE
Private, voluntary, independent (non governmental), with own Charter	Cohesive and trained disciplined body of troops subject to NDA
Decentralized, young with significant independent authority	Hierarchical, chain of command, decisions made at the top. The military is results-oriented and less flexible
Cooperation, coordination, consensus and assessment (C ³ A)	Command, control, communications and intelligence (C ³ I)
Formal training and On-the-Job Training (OJT)	Individual and collective training with formal career paths
Field manuals and informal transmission of methods and procedures gained through experience	Doctrinal and field training manuals at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command
Long-haul commitment and mandate focussed on an end state: reconstruction, rehabilitation and humanitarian assistance	Ad hoc arrangements to meet the situation and formal structure such as the DART, to meet humanitarian assistance requirements
Vast field experience focused largely on humanitarian and development assistance, including complex emergencies	PSO, OOTW and combat operations with limited experience in humanitarian missions and complex emergencies

2. The spirit of International Humanitarian Law contributes to core values and beliefs which can be summarized as follows: "The idea of respect for the individual and his dignity affecting persons not directly involved in the hostilities and those put out of action through sickness, injury, captivity or any other cause, must be respected and protected against the effects of armed conflict or war. Those who suffer must be aided or cared for without discrimination."




Figure 5-2 Multinational and Multidisciplinary Cross-Cultural Partnership

3. Figure 5-2 illustrates the concept of core beliefs and values shared by the stakeholders employed in an operation. To achieve unity of effort, core values and beliefs must be strengthened among stakeholders to include political freedom, social justice, social tolerance, the primacy of the rule of law, law and order, the right to life, the right to a fair trial, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, democratic values and sustainable development.

514. SECURITY OF CIVILIAN AGENCIES

1. A TFC and his J5 staff must attempt to collect the following information on civilian agencies in an AO, as this information will be required for security, changes in alert status and the evacuation plan (exercise or real):

- a. name of the civilian organization/agency;
- b. location: address, grid reference, description of habitat;
- c. phone number, as applicable;
- d. call sign on administrative or operational radio nets, frequency and bandwidth. Are radios standardized? interoperable? CIS compatibility/connectivity?;
- e. number, trademark and type of vehicles (4x4, cruiser, minibus...) licence plate numbers;
- f. information on their ability to comply with the evacuation plan;
- g. collection/RV point, assembly area(s), final concentration area; and
- h. name and nationality of individuals and a codeword for each organization, as some may require assistance due to lack of resources. Secure communications should be provided at all times.

2. Annex G illustrates this information in table format for use by a TFC and his staff. Periodic exercises of the civilian agencies' evacuation mechanisms need to be conducted to:

- a. verify necessary lead times and establish SOPs;
- b. verify the accuracy of personnel listings and locations;
- c. familiarize both civilian and military players with the problems likely to be encountered; and
- d. produce, in a cooperative spirit, workable solutions to those problems.

515. LOGISTIC SUPPORT

1. CIMIC activities and operations in foreign countries are conducted IAW the requirements of applicable international and domestic law and are influenced by such variables as:

- a. Canadian foreign policy;
- b. the requirements of the military situation;
- c. Canada's relationship and any special agreements with the HN government in question; and
- d. the participation of allies in an alliance or coalition force.

2. For operations in countries where the procurement of support is through ad hoc arrangements, of J4 and J5 representatives should be among the first to arrive in the AO to identify locally available support and to coordinate and integrate the support into the logistic plan. Once support agreements are concluded, logistics staff continue to serve as the link between local activity and the supported units of the force.

3. The main CIMIC areas of logistic interest are:
 - a. the existence of HNS agreements and arrangements;
 - b. the appropriate level of support and self-sufficiency;
 - c. sources of procurement and resupply of equipment and materiel;
 - d. timely availability of resources and CSS facilities and infrastructure, particularly for IOR and UOR;
 - e. availability and suitability of specific civilian services related to maintenance and logistics;
 - f. use of civil airfields and seaports;
 - g. medical cooperation;
 - h. movement control;
 - i. damage control;
 - j. logistics support to military engineer operations;
 - k. logistics support and assistance for the civilian population;
 - l. mobilization and provision of civilian labour;
 - m. transportability of equipment and supplies, and use of civil transport asset; and
 - n. financial controls of the military operation, including audit procedures based on existing directives/SOPs.




Figure 5-3 CF Support Options

4. Figure 5-3 illustrates the scale of CF operational support which can be expected based on the operational environment, terrain, weather, climate, type of operation, threats and risks, time and space, duration of the mission, assigned tasks, LOC, size of the AO, logistical requirements and the tempo of operations across the spectrum of conflict and continuum of operations. NSE is a UN and NATO definition of the support unit to national contingents. CF Doctrine defines NSE as a **role** that is conducted by an organisation tailored to the operation.

5. Logistics should be able to support both military and non-military humanitarian operations. Coordination with NGOs and PVOs will facilitate support to humanitarian operations. The TFC's operation plan must include planning for handling DPRES. The DPRES plan must allow for accomplishment of the military mission to be within restrictions imposed by the strategic level of command, and guide subordinate commanders in the handling and routing of DPRES. The DPRES plan must also address the:

- a. status and disposition of all DPRES;
- b. allowed extent of migration and evacuation;
- c. minimum standards of care;
- d. designation of routes and control measures for movement control;
- e. cultural and dietary considerations; and
- f. designation and delegation of responsibilities.

516. COMMAND AND CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

1. CIMIC operations are directed from the strategic level, coordinated and managed at the operational level, and conducted at the tactical level. Assuming a single authority is designated at theatre level to synchronize or coordinate political, military and civilian efforts, CF C2 arrangements for CIMIC activities would include:

- a. a humanitarian force to assist the lead Canadian humanitarian agency in theatre (OGDs or agencies, primarily CIDA) or the lead UN humanitarian agency in humanitarian operations (UNHCR);
- b. TOCA of CF elements to the UN, OSCE or a NATO commander during the *deployment phase*, normally OPCON, will occur at the APOE/SPOE. TOCA of CF elements to national control during the *redeployment phase*, normally OPCOM, will occur at the APOE/SPOE;
- c. establishment of a CMCC for the TF/JTFHQ, to coordinate activities and establish priorities in cooperation with in theatre NGOs. In addition, CIMIC centres are also required in communities to facilitate the exchange of information as well as the coordination of J5 plans and J5 projects with civilian agencies and civil authorities concerned (refer to chapter 1, annex A);
- d. no command relationship with civilian agencies, in location, in an AO. Coordination of activities relies on cooperation among stakeholders. Inter-agency meetings, whether formal or informal, become conduits through which the TFC can plan and coordinate CMO and support to civil administration;
- e. establishment of an integrated intelligence data base to include ethnic, paramilitary and terrorist groups as well as criminal/mafia groups, which have the potential to incite or exploit unrest to their benefit. This should be coordinated with the CIVPOL detachment in the AO by accessing reliable data sources through means such as *Internet* and *Interpol*. Such information must be managed efficiently and disseminated quickly; and
- f. creation of an integrated data base of minor and major projects showing a description of military and civilian economic recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction projects, agencies involved, funding amount and financial source, beginning and date of completion of projects, as well as the hiring of civil contractors and/or local skilled and unskilled labour. This integrated data base must be maintained by the TFC for control and monitoring functions.

2. Based on operational requirements, national policies and other political efforts, the national commander or TFC has the authority to negotiate CIMIC arrangements with a foreign government or other authority in the AO, including assistance by the military force to the civil authority.

517. TOWARDS A COHERENT EXIT STRATEGY - THE REDEPLOYMENT PHASE

1. The warning and preparation phases must serve to formulate clear politico-military and politico-humanitarian objectives at the strategic and operational levels. The degree to which these objectives and mission commander's end state are met will serve to measure success of a military operation, involving political, civil and military elements. At present, the decision to redeploy military forces is primarily based on political considerations which do not always measure up to humanitarian considerations, particularly when dealing in complex emergencies. The time frame and agenda are defined by politicians, in part, to obtain the support of public opinion, satisfy domestic and international political/policy requirements, and make the intervention manageable. Notwithstanding, the realities of the operational environment, which surface in the course of a military operation, are often impediments to a predetermined timetable.

2. As mentioned at chapter 2, article 203, paragraph 6, if the formulation of a coherent and integrated strategy is required to achieve mission objectives and the theatre commander/TFC's civil-military end state, the same must be said for an exit strategy involving all stakeholders and partners. The following guidelines for the formulation of an exit strategy must be defined in the warning or preparation phases:

- a. the military must establish a stable, secure environment in which civilian agencies can carry out remaining mission objectives, without Force protection or a military presence in the AO;
- b. unity of thought and purpose are required from the UN, OSCE and NATO to convey a strong well-mediatize political message to all extremist elements;
- c. democratic principles, such as freedom of expression, freedom of movement and respect for human rights, must permeate the civil society;
- d. democratic elections must be planned for in the near to medium term, within 12 months *preceding* the disengagement of the military force, with executive, legislative, and judiciary bodies in place at each level of government i.e. municipal, provincial and federal;
- e. local civil authorities must be in positions of authority, espousing moderate views towards reconciliation and a sustainable peace;
- f. the disarmament of ethnic factions must at least include medium and heavy weapons, as it is unrealistic to expect seizing all light weapons or discover every arms cache;
- g. municipal, provincial and national police forces must be jointly organized and trained with complementary mandates, functions, responsibilities and powers. Unauthorized police forces *must* be disarmed, particularly those in DMZ or those supporting known extremist elements;
- h. funding sources must be available to complete the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the civil infrastructure;
- i. a strong diplomatic presence to sustain peace building efforts must be available to immediately contain disputes should disagreements arise between factions or entities;
- j. military and civilian specialists and experts, part of the military force or international community, may have to remain until all mission objectives are reached;
- k. a degree of economic well-being, self-sufficiency and self-reliance must be achieved in the civil society;
- l. transfer military responsibilities for the civil phase, including assigned civil tasks, to follow on forces and/or civil agencies if the military forces' mandate is being terminated (exit from theatre). A smooth, well planned transition pays dividends; and

m. a rapid reaction force, whose staging area would be outside the AO, should be on a degree of notice to move. Its main purpose would be to deter violence but if the situation should deteriorate, this force would be in position to react immediately and extricate civilian agencies if the situation so warrants. This force should be on alert status for no more than 90 days, following the redeployment of the last military elements. By this time, decision makers should know if a military intervention is required or not.

3. Democratic reforms must be introduced slowly and carefully so as not to destabilize the political regime which may have difficulty coping with abrupt changes while maintaining political and public support which may be eroded by extremist elements. Incentives for democratic reforms should focus on the *global village* and the mobility of the work force, including capital, goods and services which will benefit the country. Furthermore, structural and sustainable peace are directly linked to sustainable development, which translate in hope for the future. The selling of reforms must emphasize more political stability and economic well-being, instead of oppression and repression, abuse of powers and of human rights, usually associated with non-democratic countries.

4. The way ahead towards a structural and sustainable peace will require total long term commitment of regional organizations, such as the OSCE, OAU, OAS and the UN. NATO could provide inputs for selected missions in a close partnership with the UN.

THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

1. The Final Act of the *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe* (CSCE) was concluded in Helsinki, Finland on 1 August 1975. It changed its name to the *Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe* (OSCE) in January 1996. The OSCE was motivated by the political will, in the interest of peoples, to improve and intensify their relations and to contribute in Europe to peace, security, justice and cooperation as well as to rapprochement between themselves and with the other States of the world.

2. The members of the OSCE have demonstrated their commitment to security, stability and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The OSCE has developed procedures and institutions to promote peaceful settlements under the UN Charter. As a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII, Article 52 of the UN Charter, the OSCE has made clear its willingness to participate in, conduct or lead PSOs under Chapter VI in appropriate situations. NATO action will be in response to OSCE mandates and will be conducted in accordance with NATO policies.

3. The OSCE comprises 55 nations, both NATO, former Warsaw Pact and neutral, non-aligned countries. Its members adopted a number of politically binding agreements on security which include confidence-building measures, as well as co-operation in the field of economics, of science and technology and the environment, and cooperation in the humanitarian and other fields. There are 10 OSCE principles guiding relations between participating States:

- I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty.
- II. Refraining from the threat or use of force.
- III. Inviolability of frontiers.
- IV. Territorial integrity of States.
- V. Peaceful settlement of disputes.
- VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs.
- VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.
- VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
- IX. Co-operation among States.
- X. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

4. The *Vienna Document 94* emerged as one of the foundations of security in Europe. In practical terms, the main aim of this document was to promote military transparency, openness and confidence-building. As such, it specified a number of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) that are designed to reduce the risk of a confrontation, which the signatories agreed to implement, and which included:

- a. an annual exchange of military information covering command organization, numbers of weapons and equipment systems, personnel strengths for land and air forces;
 - b. defence planning information, including policy and doctrine, force planning and military budgets;
 - c. measures to promote risk reduction through consultation and co-operation, including the requirement to notify and invite observers to military exercises;
 - d. improved military contacts through visits to air bases, military formations and facilities at least once every five (5) years as well as the promotion of military exchanges and visits;
 - e. unit evaluation visits and area inspections to verify both annual information exchanges and compliance; and
 - f. establish and use OSCE network of direct communications among the participants.
5. The Dayton Peace Accords charged the OSCE to conduct and supervise free and fair elections, to monitor

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human rights issues and to assist in the implementation of regional stabilization measures that include an arms control verification regime. As a result, an OSCE mission was established in Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 1996.

6. Canada participates in the arms control and verification process and agreements reached between the parties to the conflict, by providing arms control inspectors or assistants as requested by the signatories for inspection or escort teams. Canada has a permanent delegation with an ambassador to the OSCE in Vienna. A military advisor reports to DND through NDHQ/DAPC Pol.

CIMIC AREA STUDY AND ASSESSMENT FORMAT

1. The following format is extracted and updated from the US manual, *FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations*. It provides a guide to preparing an area assessment, but is subject to modifications based on the mission and assigned tasks. In failed States, the majority of the functions listed will be non-existent. Reliance will be on the military force to contain and stabilize the country as well as cooperate and coordinate their efforts with IOs, NGOs and UN agencies to provide essential services and begin the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country. Area study files may already exist and contain information on a designated area. The area study is updated, as required, through the area assessment.

 (Classification)
CIMIC AREA ASSESSMENT FORMAT

 (Date)

 (Alphanumeric Designation)

 (Team/Officer's Name)

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION AREA ASSESSMENT NO. _____

References: Maps, charts or other documents.

1. General

- a. geography;
- b. history;
- c. people;
- d. cultural and ethnic differences;
- e. Canadian national interests.

2. Civil Defence

- a. organization, plans and equipment;
- b. HN, OGDs and civil agencies.

3. Labour

- a. organization;
- b. labour force i.e. skilled, unskilled;
- c. agencies, institutions and programmes;
- d. wages and working standards.

4. Legal

- a. system of law;
- b. the administration of justice i.e. the judicial system in place or lack thereof (failed States).

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5. Public Administration

- a. general system of public administration;
- b. structure of the national Government and political parties;
- c. structure of other levels of Government;
- d. armed forces, militias, paramilitaries;
- e. international affairs involvement;
- f. support to ministries/departments and agencies;
- g. elections' planning and monitoring.

6. Public Education

- a. organization, general conditions and problems;
- b. agencies, institutions and programmes i.e. schools and universities;
- c. influence of politics on education.

7. Public Finance

- a. organization, general conditions and problems;
- b. monetary system, applicable laws and regulations.;
- c. budgetary system and current budget;
- d. sources of Government income;
- e. financial institutions;
- f. foreign exchange, balance of trade, balance of payments, controls and restrictions;

8. Public Health

- a. organization, general conditions and problems;
- b. agencies and institutions i.e. hospitals, health clinics and morgues;
- c. medical personnel, equipment and supplies;
- d. diseases, communicable or not, carried by humans and/or animals;
- e. environmental sanitation i.e. animal and agricultural inspections;
- f. sewage treatment systems and garbage disposal;
- g. access to clean water.

9. Public Safety

- a. general conditions and problems i.e. type of crimes, crime rate;
- b. mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) resources;
- c. police system, secure prisons and reliable penal institutions and system;
- d. organized crime, criminal gangs;
- e. fire fighting and fire protection;
- f. obstacles to demobilization and social reintegration of local armed forces;
- g. extremist elements i.e, acts of intimidation, violent demonstrations or terrorist acts.

10. Public Welfare

- a. organization, general conditions and problems;
- b. agencies, institutions and programmes;
- c. relief to displaced persons and returnees i.e. food, shelter;
- d. secure food distribution system - food insecurity is a source of social disorder.

11. Civilian Supply

- a. general conditions and problems;
- b. storage, refrigeration, processing facilities and distribution channels;
- c. dietary and clothing requirements and customs;
- d. production excesses and shortages.

12. Economics and Commerce

- a. general conditions, problems and statistics;
- b. description of economic system;
- c. structure, key officials and business leaders;
- d. resources and rationing;
- e. opening markets;
- f. goals and programs;
- g. exports/imports and internal movement of goods;
- h. industries, commerce and foreign trade;
- i. agencies, institutions and programmes;
- j. wages and price controls;

13. Food and Agriculture

- a. general conditions and problems;
- b. agricultural geography;
- c. agricultural products, practices and processing;
- d. fisheries;
- e. forestry;
- f. agencies, institutions and programmes;
- g. applicable laws and regulations governing food and agriculture.

14. Property Control

- a. general conditions and problems;
- b. agricultural and industrial property;
- c. property laws, land holding system and reform programs;
- d. domestic and foreign ownership.

15. Public Communications

- a. general conditions and problems
- b. postal system;
- c. telecommunications (telephone, telegraph and broadcasting (radio and television));
- d. applicable laws governing communications systems.

16. Public Transportation

- a. general conditions and problems;
- b. functioning roads, streets, bridges, seaports, airports, railroads;
- c. vehicular transportation;
- d. water transportation i.e. waterways;
- e. air transportation;

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17. Public Works and Utilities

- a. general conditions;
- b. public works and utilities i.e. power, water, sewage, dams and pipelines;

18. Engineer

- a. UN Technical Report/NATO strategic estimate;
- b. SOFA and scope of civil tasks;
- c. HN, allies and regional infrastructure to support engineer tasks;
- d. range of engineer resources required (materiel, augmentees...);
- e. the "mission creep" factor;
- f. inter-agency cooperation and coordination in areas of operations;
- g. sustainment.

19. Arts Monuments and Archives

- a. general conditions and problems;
- b. arts, monuments and archives.

20. Civil Information

- a. general conditions, problems and stage of development;
- b. newspapers, periodicals and publishing firms;
- c. other means of communications i.e. Internet, satellite.

21. Cultural Affairs

- a. religions and religious beliefs in the area of operations;
- b. clergy;
- c. places of worship;
- d. relationship between religion and motivation of indigenous people;
- e. relationship between religion and cross-cultural communication;
- f. socio-economic influence of religion;
- g. interrelation with Government (church and state);
- h. religious schools.

22. Dislocated Civilians

- a. existing dislocated civilian population, if any;
- b. potential population dislocation;
- c. care and control of dislocated civilians.

23. Disaster Preparedness and Relief

- a. disaster preparedness;
- b. organization, emergency procedures and relief facilities;
- c. toxic waste/toxic material sites or dangerous materials considered health hazards;
- d. disaster relief;
- e. HN point of contact (POC) by position and telephone numbers.

24. Host Nation Support

- a. command and control;
- b. combat service support;
- c. mobility and survivability;
- d. medical;
- e. impact of Canadian presence on the HN economy.

SUMMARY OF CMCC PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

Functional Areas	Rank	Total	Nucleus (Note 1)	Key Nucleus (Note 2)	Remainder (Note 3)
J5: CIMIC Organization					
Specialist Augmentation Modules, as required					
HN Government Module					
Civil Protection					
Labour					
Legal					
Public Administration					
Public Education					
Public Finance					
Public Health					
Public Safety					
Public Welfare					
Economics Module					
Civilian Supply					
Economics & Commerce					
Food & Agriculture					
Property Control					
Public Facilities Module					
Public Communications					
Public Transportation					
Public Works & Utilities					
Engineers - Civil and Military					
Special Functions Module					
Arts, Monuments & Archives					
Cultural Affairs					
Civil Information					

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Dislocated Civilians & Refugees					
Other Modules					
Translation/Interpretation					
Area Experts					
Investigative Experts					
Agreement Experts					
Liaison Officers					

NOTES:

1. **Nucleus Staff.** Each parent HQ has a *nucleus staff* of Regular Force personnel embedded in its structure. The nucleus is defined as those personnel with a standing UN or NATO HQ who may be dual-tasked or dedicated as potential members of a CMCC. These cadres would rely on the Primary Reserve to man, augment and sustain the Civil-Military Coordination Centre (CMCC).
2. **Key Nucleus Staff.** Nucleus staff will be dual-hatted personnel on the personnel establishment of the parent HQ. Additionally, within the nucleus staff, key staff personnel within each functional staff element (J1 to J7 or CJ1 to CJ9 for the NATO CJTF) will be identified as *Key Nucleus Staff*. Their role is to ensure the cohesion of the nucleus and enhance the ability of the entire nucleus to form rapidly, accept and integrate augmentation and undertake assigned missions.
3. **Remainder.** This column refers to the *remainder* of the CMCC augmentation staff. The CMCC personnel augmentation requirements must be balanced with those of additional specialist requirements, CIMIC centres and TSTs, as dictated by the operational situation.

NOTE: This appendix is extracted from the CJTF HQ Doctrine, chapter 12 entitled: *Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)*.

THE MISSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) AND THE CODE OF CONDUCT

The ICRC acts to help all victims of war and internal violence, attempting to ensure implementation of humanitarian rules restricting armed violence. Its mission arises from the basic human desire, common to all civilizations, to lay down rules governing the use of force in war and to safeguard the dignity of the weak. The ICRC has received a mandate from the international community to help victims of war and internal violence and to promote compliance with international humanitarian law.

The ICRC's activities are aimed at protecting and assisting the victims of armed conflict and internal violence so as to preserve their physical integrity and their dignity and to enable them to regain their autonomy as quickly as possible. It is independent of all governments and international organizations. Its work is prompted by the desire to promote humane conduct and is guided by empathy for the victims. The ICRC is impartial: its only criterion for action is the victims' needs. It is neutral and remains detached from all political issues related to conflict.

By applying these principles strictly, the ICRC is able to act as an intermediary between the parties to armed conflict and to promote dialogue in situations of internal violence, with a view to finding solutions for matters of humanitarian concern.

Through its work, the ICRC helps to prevent the worsening of crises and even at times, to resolve them.

The ICRC systematically reminds all military and civilian authorities directly involved in armed conflict or internal violence of their obligations under international humanitarian law and the other humanitarian rules by which they are bound. Similarly, the ICRC has the duty to remind all States of their collective obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law.

In all societies and cultures, the ICRC endeavours to promote international humanitarian law and the fundamental human values underlying that law.

As the founding member of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the ICRC directs and coordinates the international work of the Movement's components in connection with armed conflict and internal violence.

The ICRC, by nature of its mandate, works closely with various agents of the United Nations, and is particularly interested in the strengthening and coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance. In the opinion of the ICRC, the main issues at stake with regard to humanitarian coordination are how best to serve the interests of victims in an effective and coherent way and how to make the best use of donor funding. Accordingly, the ICRC's practical approach to humanitarian coordination is primarily guided by its focus on victims and by its own accountability to donors.

The ICRC feels that field coordination works best when humanitarian organizations accept a common set of ethical and operational standards, such as those laid down in the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and when they aim at achieving true complementarity with due respect for each other's mandates and roles. A good example of effective field coordination has been set in Angola, where humanitarian organizations have established sound coordination mechanisms and mutually complement their respective activities. Such efforts, aimed at pragmatic cooperation in the field and founded on a common humanitarian approach, deserve to be pursued and developed in all emergency or post-conflict situations where a multitude of humanitarian agencies are responding to the needs of victims.

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Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross, Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief

Background

This Code of Conduct results from a 1993 Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, Geneva. An alliance was forged for *voluntary action* involving Caritas Internationalis, Catholic Relief Services, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Save the Children Alliance, Lutheran World Federation, OXFAM and the World Council of Churches.

Purpose

This Code of Conduct seeks to guard our standards of behaviour. It is not about operational details, such as how one should calculate food rations or set up a refugee camp. Rather, it seeks to maintain the high standards of independence, effectiveness and impact to which disaster response NGOs and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement aspire. It is a *voluntary code*, enforced by the will of the organization accepting it to maintain the standards laid down in the Code.

In the event of armed conflict the present Code of Conduct will be interpreted and applied in conformity with international humanitarian law.

The Code of Conduct is presented first. Attached to it are three annexes, describing the working environment that we would like to see created by Host Governments, Donor Governments and Intergovernmental Organizations in order to facilitate the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Definitions

The relevant terminology found in this code is defined in the “Glossary” at the end of this manual.

THE CODE OF CONDUCT

Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross, Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes

1. **The Humanitarian imperative comes first.**

The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. As members of the international community, we recognise our obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. Hence the need for unimpeded access to affected populations, is of fundamental importance in exercising that responsibility.

The prime motivation of our response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering amongst those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster.

When we give humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such.

2. **Aid is given regardless of race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone.**

Wherever possible, we will base the provision of relief aid upon a thorough assessment of the needs of the disaster victims and the local capacities already in place to meet those needs.

Within the entirety of our programmes, we will reflect considerations of proportionality. Human suffering must be alleviated whenever it is found; life is as precious in one part of a country as another. Thus, our provision of aid will reflect the degree of suffering it seeks to alleviate.

In implementing this approach, we recognise the crucial role played by women in disaster prone communities and will ensure that this role is supported, not diminished, by our aid programmes.

The implementation of such a universal, impartial and independent policy, can only be effective if we and our partners have access to the necessary resources to provide for such equitable relief, and have equal access to all disaster victims.

3. **Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.**

Humanitarian aid will be given according to the need of individuals, families and communities. Notwithstanding the right of NGOs to espouse particular political or religious opinions, we affirm that assistance will not be dependent on the adherence of the recipients to those opinions.

We will not tie the promise, delivery or distribution of assistance to the embracing or acceptance of a particular political or religious creed.

4. **We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.**

NGOs are agencies which act independently from governments. We therefore formulate our own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to implement the policy of any government, except in so far as it coincides with our own independent policy.

We will never knowingly____or through negligence____allow ourselves, or our employees, to be used to gather information of a political, military or economically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian, nor will we act as instruments of foreign policy of donor governments.

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We will use the assistance we receive to respond to needs and this assistance should not be driven by the need to dispose of donor commodity surpluses, nor by the political interest of any particular donor.

We value and promote the voluntary giving of labour and finances by concerned individuals to support our work and recognise the independence of action promoted by such voluntary motivation. In order to protect our independence we will seek to avoid dependence upon a single funding source.

5. We shall respect culture and custom.

We will endeavour to respect the culture, structures and customs of the communities and countries we are working in.

6. We will attempt to build disaster response on local capacities

All people and communities even in disaster possess capacities as well as vulnerabilities. Where possible, we will strengthen these capacities by employing local staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local companies. Where possible, we will work through local NGHAs as partners in planning and implementation, and cooperate with local government structures where appropriate.

We will place a high priority on the proper coordination of our emergency responses. This is best done within the countries concerned by those most directly involved in the relief operations, and should include representatives of the relevant UN bodies.

7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.

Disaster response assistance should never be imposed upon the beneficiaries. Effective relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved where the intended beneficiaries are involved in the design, management and implementation of the assistance programme. We will strive to achieve full community participation in our relief and rehabilitation programmes.

8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs.

All relief actions affect the prospects for long term development, either in a positive or a negative fashion. Recognising this, we will strive to implement relief programmes which actively reduce the beneficiaries' vulnerability to future disasters and help create sustainable lifestyles. We will pay particular attention to environmental concerns in the design and management of relief programmes. We will also endeavour to minimise the negative impact of humanitarian assistance, seeking to avoid long term beneficiary dependence upon external aid.

9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources

We often act as an institutional link in the partnership between those who wish to assist and those who need assistance during disasters. We therefore hold ourselves accountable to both constituencies.

All our dealings with donors and beneficiaries shall reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.

We recognise the need to report on our activities, both from a financial perspective and the perspective of effectiveness.

We recognise the obligation to ensure appropriate monitoring of aid distributions and to carry out regular assessments of the impact of disaster assistance.

We will also seek to report, in an open fashion, upon the impact of our work, and the factors limiting or enhancing

that impact.

Our programmes will be based upon high standards of professionalism and expertise in order to minimise the wasting of valuable resource.

10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects.

Respect for the disaster victim as an equal partner in action should never be lost. In our public information we shall portray an objective image of the disaster situation where the capacities and aspirations of disaster victims are highlighted, and not just their vulnerabilities and fears.

While we will cooperate with the media in order to enhance public response, we will not allow external or internal demands for publicity to take precedence over the principle of maximising overall relief assistance.

We will avoid competing with other disaster response agencies for media coverage in situations where such coverage may be to the detriment of the service provided to the beneficiaries or to the security of our staff or the beneficiaries.

THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT

Having agreed unilaterally to strive to abide by the Code laid out above, we present below some indicative guidelines which describe the working environment we would like to see created by donor governments, host governments and the inter-governmental organizations___principally the agencies of the United Nations___in order to facilitate the effective participation of NGHAs in disaster response.

These guidelines are presented for guidance. They are not legally binding, nor do we expect governments and IGOs to indicate their acceptance of the guidelines through the signature of any document, although this may be a goal to work to in the future. They are presented in a spirit of openness and cooperation so that our partners will become aware of the ideal relationship we would seek with them.

ANNEX I

Recommendations to the Governments of disaster affected countries

1. Governments should recognise and respect the independent, humanitarian and impartial actions of NGHAs.

NGHAs are independent, non-political bodies. This independence and impartiality should be respected by host governments.

2. Host Governments should facilitate rapid access to disaster victims for NGHAs.

If NGHAs are to act in full compliance with their humanitarian principles, they should be granted rapid and impartial access to disaster victims, for the purpose of delivering humanitarian assistance. It is the duty of the host government, as part of the exercising of sovereign responsibility, not to block such assistance, and to accept the impartial and apolitical action of NGHAs.

Host Governments should facilitate the rapid entry of relief staff, particularly by the rapid granting and delivery of visas where necessary.

3. Governments should facilitate the timely flow of relief goods and information during disasters.

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Relief supplies and equipment are brought into a country solely for the purpose of alleviating human suffering, not for commercial benefit or gain. Such supplies should normally be allowed free and unrestricted passage and should not be subject to importation taxation, landing fees or port charges.

The temporary importation of necessary relief equipment, including vehicles, light aircraft and telecommunications equipment, should be facilitated by the receiving host government through the temporary waving (sic) of license or registration restrictions.

Equally, governments should not restrict the re-exportation of relief equipment at the end of a relief operation.

To facilitate disaster communications, host governments are encouraged to designate certain radio frequencies, which relief organizations may use in-country and for international communications for the purpose of disaster communications, and to make such frequencies known to the disaster response community prior to the disaster.

4. Governments should seek to provide a coordinated disaster information and planning service.

The overall planning and coordination of relief efforts is ultimately the responsibility of the host government. Planning and coordination can be greatly enhanced if NGHAs are provided with information on relief needs, and government systems for planning and implementing relief efforts as well as information on potential security risks they may encounter. Governments are urged to provide such information to NGHAs.

To facilitate effective coordination and efficient utilization of relief efforts, host governments are urged to designate, prior to disaster, a single point-of-contact for incoming NGHAs to liaise with the national authorities.

5. Disaster relief in the event of armed conflict.

In the event of armed conflict, relief actions are governed by the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law.

ANNEX II

Recommendations to donor Governments

1. Donor Governments should recognize and respect the independent, humanitarian and impartial actions of NGHAs.

NGHAs are independent non-political bodies whose independence and impartiality should be respected by donor governments. Donor governments should not use NGHAs to further any political or ideological aim.

2. Donor Governments should provide funding with a guarantee of operational independence.

NGHAs accept funding and material assistance from donor governments in the same spirit as they render it to disaster victims; one of humanity and independence of action. The implementation of relief actions is ultimately the responsibility of the NGHAs and will be carried out according to the policies of that NGHAs.

3. Donor Governments should use their good offices to assist NGHAs in obtaining access to disaster victims.

Donor governments should recognise the importance of accepting a level of responsibility for the security and freedom of access of NGHAs staff to disaster sites. They should be prepared to exercise diplomacy with host governments on such issues if necessary.

ANNEX III

Recommendations to international organizations

1. IGOs should recognise NGHAs, local and foreign, as valuable partners.

NGHAs are willing to work with UN and other intergovernmental agencies to effect better disaster response. They do so in a spirit of partnership which respects the integrity and independence of all partners. Intergovernmental agencies must respect the independence and impartiality of the NGHAs. NGHAs should be consulted by UN agencies in the preparation of relief plans.

2. IGOs should assist host governments in providing an overall coordinating framework for international and local disaster relief.

NGHAs do not usually have the mandate to provide the overall coordinating framework for disasters which require an international response. This responsibility falls to the host government and the relevant United Nations authorities. They are urged to provide this service in a timely and effective manner to serve the affected state and the national and international disaster response community. In any case, NGHAs should make all efforts to ensure the effective coordination of their own services.

In the event of armed conflict, relief actions are governed by the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law.

3. IGOs should extend security protection provided for UN organizations, to NGHAs.

Where security services are provided for intergovernmental organizations, this service should be extended to their operational NGHAs partners where it is so requested.

4. IGOs should provide NGHAs with the same access to relevant information as is granted to UN organizations.

IGOs are urged to share all information, pertinent to the implementation of effective disaster response, with their operation NGHAs partners.

NOTE: This annex is extracted from "A Guide to Peace Support Operations", Annex 6.

**TASKS PERFORMED
BY
UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVERS**

GENERAL

1. MILOBS or UNMOs are the eyes and ears of the UN SRSG, the TFC, CMO and DCMO. MILOBS are reasonably senior, mature and experienced military officers who are carefully selected for an objective and unbiased reporting in war-torn countries. MILOBS duties encompass a variety of tasks within a designated AO.
2. A variety of tasks in peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations could include:
 - a. observation and reporting of cease-fire violations and the investigation of alleged violations of the cease-fire agreement;
 - b. supervision of the disarmament of regular, militia and paramilitary elements;
 - c. monitoring the separation and withdrawal of troops;
 - d. supervision of the destruction of armaments and weapons;
 - e. provision of liaison services to local governments, opposing military forces and international agencies;
 - f. monitoring of conditions in potential conflict areas for signs of increased tension or conflict escalation;
 - g. observation and reporting on alleged abuses of human rights;
 - h. assistance with referendum or election validation in support of the OSCE;
 - i. the conduct of emergency air evacuation for seriously injured civilian and military personnel, as ordered by the MILOBS Group HQ or higher authority; and
 - j. conducting and coordinating liaison between UN mixed military working groups and components, NGOs and UN and civilian humanitarian agencies.
3. Additional tasks which could be performed by MILOBS are given in succeeding paragraphs.

PATROLLING AND RECONNAISSANCE

4. Ground and air patrolling/reconnaissance is an essential activity for observing, dominating, enquiring and assessing the prevailing situation in the area of responsibility. The main aims of patrolling are:
 - a. to confirm/verify/supervise an incident, agreement or any violation;
 - b. to obtain information about terrain and topography;
 - c. to assess the general situation in a given area;
 - d. to show the presence of UN, OSCE or NATO; and
 - e. to interact with local people and other agencies to obtain any information which could be useful to operational tasks.

NOTE: *Air patrols* involves landing at designated landing sites for a specified duration. *Air reconnaissance* does not involve any landing in the course of a pre-planned flight.

VISITS TO COMMUNITIES

5. Visit various communities in the area of operations to enquire about the following normality indicators and to take necessary action:

- a. **Community.** Meet the mayor and enquire about community problems.
- b. **Population.** Obtain population details, ethnic groups and their interrelationships.
- c. **Living Conditions.** Assess living conditions of local population: housing policy, utilities, water, sewage and garbage disposal i.e. waste management.
- d. **Food and Water.** Check the availability of food and potable water in the commune. Distribution of food, if any, and by what agency? Is it getting to the people who need it most? In sufficient quality and quantity?
- e. **Orphans.** The number of orphans, physical and mental conditions, and problems.
- f. **Education.** The state of education, number of children attending, availability of teachers and problems, if any.
- g. **Prisons.** Check conditions of prison and detention centres. Check condition of prisoners, human rights violations and the judicial system in place.
- h. **Agriculture.** Check availability of agricultural implements, seeds and water for cultivation.
- i. **Health.** Check for prevalent communicable and non communicable diseases, hospitals and health centres, the availability of doctors and nurses as well as adequate supplies of drugs and medicine.
- j. **Security.** Assess the security situation, cases of banditry arrests, killings and others.
- k. **National Military Forces.** Deployment, strength, commanders and their attitudes towards the local population.
- l. **Administrative Setup.** The setup, their attitude, efforts towards reconciliations and inclinations.
- m. **Returnees.** Their numbers, integration in mainstream, problems, assistance provided by local administration, security, harassment, housing, food and attitudes of locals and national forces.

ESCORT DUTIES

6. MILOBS provide unarmed escorts to:

- a. VIPs and other visiting persons;
- b. IOs, NGOs and UN agencies;
- c. in the case of IDPs returning to their former homes, MILOBS could be tasked to:
 - (1) monitor target municipalities/communes;

- (2) liaise and coordinate between relief centres, local authorities and IDPs;
- (3) provide liaison between national or local authorities and UN, OSCE or NATO personnel; and
- (4) escort IDP convoys from Displaced Persons Camp (DPC) to relief centres, municipalities or communes in coordination with local forces and UN, OSCE or NATO personnel.

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

7. MILOBS are monitoring the humanitarian situation in their respective sectors. Each sector has a Humanitarian Officer who works in close coordination with local humanitarian, human rights and other NGOs. Some of the important tasks are:

- a. close contact with local authorities and representative of the Ministry of Rehabilitation;
- b. work in close cooperation with UNHCR and render necessary assistance to them in execution of their tasks in rehabilitation of IDPs and returnees;
- c. assist World Food Programme (WFP) in coordination of food and aid delivery to medical centres and orphanages; and
- d. work in close coordination with HR and ICRC to assess the situation in municipal cachots, detention centres and prisons.

HUMAN RIGHTS OPERATIONS - POSSIBLE TASKS

8. HRO-type tasks which could be performed by military and police personnel including MILOBS, even if they are not human rights officers, may include some or all of the following:

- a. monitoring the current human rights situation and publishing reports;
- b. monitoring national and local election campaign or processes;
- c. monitoring re-insertion of ex-combatants into civil society;
- d. investigating past violations for truth-telling and justice, to help combat impunity for human rights violations;
- e. developing human rights promotion, education and public information campaigns;
- f. deterrence of violations by an active presence;
- g. facilitating reconciliation and confidence-building;
- h. confidence building and local level conflict resolution e.g. for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and those internally displaced; or
- i. contributing to institution and capacity-building through technical assistance programmes, such as reform of police or judiciary.

ADVANTAGES OF MILOBS

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9. MILOBS have tremendous advantage over other agencies in carrying out accurate observation, evaluation and assessment since they are all experienced officers with sound military backgrounds. Some of the advantages of MILOBS are:

- a. even in absence of comprehensive guidelines, they can carry out their tasks effectively. They do not need supervision;
- b. because of their military background, they can carry out an accurate assessment of the prevailing security situation;
- c. it is much easier for an officer to interact with the local population (keeping in mind the language problem);
- d. correct assessment is very essential for optimum utilization of meagre UN resources. MILOBS can make an accurate assessment of existing situation as also to what is likely to happen in the near future due to their constant interaction with local population and NGOs; and
- e. it has been experienced that representatives of the HR and other NGOs often insist on MILOBS accompanying them.


SECURITY MEASURES FOR MILOBS

10. The following measures are to be enforced:

- a. sensitive and classified material should be hand delivered or sent through secure means. MILOBS will not compromise the impartiality of the military force with any FWF or belligerent;
- b. information transmitted by unsecured radio or fac simile could be intercepted by FWF or belligerent and used against an adversary. This applies to reports and returns such as SITREP, INCSPOTREP, INTSUM, PSYREP...;
- c. land lines, telephones, telegraphs, including VSAT (via satellite) means are manned and maintained by local employees. OPSEC and the protection of the information is vital to the mission;
- d. MILOBS will protect the information and data on their computer and will not leave any classified information on their hard disk. They will make certain that the back-up file is not on their hard disk. The C:\ drive or hard drive will not be used for computer data work;
- e. sources of information will not be revealed to anyone. Indirect source identifiers will be used, such as a UN source, an international source mentioned. FWF or belligerent sources will not be mentioned by name as well as an official or unofficial local civilian source (ethnic group or by name); and
- f. MILOBS will be careful of what is said before an interpreter as he or she may be required to provide information on MILOBS duties/tasks, or pressured to do so against their will.

NOTE: This annex is extracted from *UN Military Observer Handbook*, duties of *UN Military Observers in UNAMIR* and *Towards Effective training for Field Human Right Tasks* by Karen Kenny.

NOTIONAL FORCE LEVEL CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION CENTRE



Annex E
to Chapter 5

- NOTES:
1. The TFC has three specialists on his staff with primary functions as advisors: J5 Policy, J5 Legal and J5 PA. The J5 CIMIC is an advisor to the TFC and commands the Force-Level Civil-Military Coordination Centre (CMCC) on his behalf.
 2. The CIVPOL detachment provides advise to the TFC and liaison with the military elements but reports to the CIVPOL Contingent Commander. The CIVPOL meet national training standards and can provide valuable services and expertise to a TFC in: crowd control, crowd psychology, riot situations, searches and operations in urban areas, criminal investigations, planning of CMO, liaison with the local police, as trainers, ballistic, as well as in forensic. The number of CIVPOL officers will depend on the operational environment, the type of operation, the mission and tasks as well as an MOU among interested parties.
 3. The J5 CIMIC exercises command and control of the MIST/PSYOPS cell. The MIST would conduct the PSYOPS campaign. The J5 CIMIC would be assisted by a J5 Admin/Finance cell to control minor and major projects, stores and equipment, separate from the formation J4 Fin.
 4. The MIST would carry out PSYOPS activities and could be divided into six three-man Tactical Dissemination Teams, each composed of at least a detachment commander (combat arms officer), one interpreter/linguist and one driver. At formation level, a platoon size MIST, manned, augmented and sustained by the Primary reserve would be required, based on lessons learned from OP STABLE (Haiti).
 5. J5 civil tasks are always subordinate to military tasks. The J3 Ops monitors and supervises the CMCC. The J5 CIMIC plans, conducts and coordinates all CIMIC activities in close cooperation with J3 Ops and appropriate formation staff officers. J3 Ops and the J5 CIMIC continuously exchange military information and J3 Ops provides resources and Force protection for CMO and support to civil administration. The duties of the J5 staff officers are enunciated at chapter 1, annex A.
 6. The notional CMCC could be configured as follows:
 - a. A *Territorial Section* which could be composed of:
 - (1) CIMIC centres each composed of at least a situation cell, a PA cell, a plan/projects cell and one interpreter. One CIMIC centre should be co-located with the lead humanitarian agency in the area of operations;
 - (2) TST could be deployed at the unit level and employed as rapid response teams to urgent civilian tasks at the request of units or civil agencies;
 - (3) a J5 Ops who plans and conducts CMO in coordination with J3 Ops and other staff officers, through the J5 CIMIC. The CMO cell would come under the J5 Ops for command and control;
 - (4) a J5 Engineer cell under a, a Construction Procedures Technician, and a Construction Maintenance Technician. Three LOs, one per battalion, are required to coordinate plans and projects with the battalion J5 and local civil agencies and contractors. Dispersion between units will also determine their operational requirement. The exchange of information must flow in both directions;
 - (5) a medical/health cell which must include a female doctor and at least two female nurses for women patients. This cell would include a J5 Veterinarian, particularly in areas of operations known for communicable diseases; and
 - (6) a Territorial Analysis (two officers, two NCOs and four other ranks) cell to collect, process and disseminate civil data and to built and maintain an adequate data base on the population in

the area of operations. This cell would produce CIMICREPs, area assessment and other operational assessments, MOE, normality indicators as well as keep data on refugees and IDPs.

b. A *Public Affairs Section* which could be composed of:

- (1) a J5 PA who runs the section in addition to his primary role as advisor to the TFC on PA; and
- (2) a PAO, an LO detachment with IOs and NGOs for elections and the inauguration of minor and major projects, a transport cell with vehicles and drivers, and an interpreter/translator cell (locals, regular or the Primary Reserve). PA would coordinate its activities with J5 staff and the MIST/PSYOPS cell.

7. Many of these positions such as the medical staff and engineer resources could come from organic resources to the formation or unit.

HOSTAGE SURVIVAL SKILLS

"If you can last a month, you can last forever. The only danger is illness." - David Jacobsen, former hostage.

1. **General.** None of us expects to be taken hostage but the possibility exists. Being part of a peace support operation will increase the chance of being exposed to, or involved in, a hostage situation. Many UN personnel have been taken hostage in recent years for periods of hours to weeks. This is an age of terrorism and criminal activities. For these reasons, it is important for both civilian and military personnel to be acquainted with the *main aspects* of hostage taking.
2. **Types of Hostage Takers.** There are several main types of hostage takers:
 - a. military and paramilitary personnel (for example, to prevent being targeted);
 - b. terrorists (for example, to right a perceived wrong or for political motives);
 - c. criminals (usually for a ransom);
 - d. the mentally ill (no clear objective(s) or purpose but *may* include the above types); and
 - e. the emotionally distraught (for example, in response to a personal or domestic crisis).
3. **Types of Hostage Situations.** There are four types of hostage situations:
 - a. **Barricade.** People are held with the hostage-takers in a building, plane, train or other clearly identified location. The lives of the hostages are bartered for demands. This is the favoured action for terrorists seeking publicity.
 - b. **Containment.** This is an increasingly common experience for peacekeepers. It refers to situations where a group, such as a convoy of military or humanitarian vehicles, is surrounded and restrained by a larger force that has control of a local area or by a small but better equipped force. Violence is averted as long as the group held hostage remains stationary and none threatening. There is no direct control over the hostages but rather a zone of containment.
 - c. **Human Shields.** This is often used by ruthless or desperate military and paramilitary forces and involves the deliberate placement of captured people, military and/or civilians, at vital military points or equipment sites in order to deter targeting or attack.
 - d. **Kidnapping.** This is where people are captured, taken to a secret location and kept for ransom or political leverage. The motive for terrorists to use this method of hostage-taking is usually for the release of political prisoners or imprisoned terrorists.
4. **Stages of Hostage Situations.** The following are the typical stages associated with a hostage-taking incident:
 - a. planning and surveillance by the perpetrators;
 - b. attack (the taking or restraining of hostages);
 - c. movement to a safe location (normally only in a kidnapping situation);
 - d. captivity; and

Annex F
to Chapter 5

e. release.

5. **Behaviour of Captors Toward Their Hostages.** Although there is a great variability in the experience of hostages, the following behaviours and attitudes should be expected from captors:

- a. physical restraint and sensory deprivation (chains, blindfolds...);
- b. mental cruelty;
- c. interrogations which may involve physical violence;
- d. indoctrination/brainwashing often associated with sleep deprivation to weaken hostage resistance;
- e. verbal abuse and humiliation such as being stripped naked;
- f. threats of injury or death; and
- g. physical or sexual abuse, or both.

6. **Stages of Adaptation to Captivity.** Six broad stages of reaction and adaptation to being held hostage have been identified:

- a. **Startle/Panic.** First seconds to minutes. Hostage situations are an abrupt transition that is difficult to assimilate. Typical initial reactions are a desire to flee, uncontrollable trembling and thinking.
- b. **Disbelief.** First minutes to hours. Common thoughts are: *“This can’t be happening to me”* and *“We’ll be rescued shortly”*.
- c. **Hyper Vigilance and Anxiety.** First hours to days. This refers to the state of being extremely wary and alert to minute details. It is often accompanied by startled reactions to noise or sudden movement, and a tendency to think the worst - to see the situation in a catastrophic light.
- d. **Resistance/Compliance.** First days to weeks. Some captives resist all coercive attempts while others cannot cope with relatively minor pressure.
- e. **Depression and Despair.** First weeks to months. Loss of freedom, isolation, boredom, cruel treatment usually combine to cause depression and passivity.
- f. **Gradual Acceptance.** First months to years. The final stage of adaptation where a decision is made by captives to gain control of their lives and make constructive use of their time and limited resources available.

7. **Surviving a Hostage Situation.** Hostages can maximize their chances of survival and minimize their suffering by managing themselves, their time and their environment in certain ways. The following general guidelines are provided:

- a. **Regain and maintain composure.** Try to be calm and clear-headed at all times.
- b. **Maintain a low-key unprovocative posture.** It is safest to control impulsive behaviour, remain calm and follow instructions.
- c. **Get captors to recognize you as a human being.** Show your humanity to captors so they begin to see you as a person. Foster communication on non threatening topics. Avoid political and sensitive issues.
- d. **Follow the rules given by the captors.** It is wise to consent to the demands made by your captors.

- e. **Say as little as possible if questioned.** Always give short answers and avoid making suggestions.
- f. **Win your captors respect.** Learn what behaviours your captors value and regard as honorable.
- g. **Set goals.** Be determined to survive until a certain date (anniversary) and reset these dates. Plan on a long captivity as this helps stave off disappointments and depression.
- h. **Maintain some form of control of your environment.** It reduces stress by enhancing self-esteem and reducing feelings of hopelessness and helplessness. As an example, some hostages saved and shared food with fellow hostages.
- i. **Keep your mind active.** Take in as much detail as possible about your captors' habits and characteristics and your surrounding. Develop mind games to stimulate your thinking based on the plots of movies and books.
- j. **Attempt to understand your captors.** Be sensitive to and learn about the cultural norms of your captors. Do not make assumptions about their general knowledge.
- k. **Look for, or inject humour into your situation.** Once the captivity has settled into a predictable routine, humour can be a very strong antidote to hopelessness.
- l. **Eat and exercise as much as possible.** Keep mentally and physically healthy. Adapt to imposed restrictions such as exercising despite being bound or blindfolded.
- m. **Maintain hope.** Believe in something meaningful to you, whether it be family, God, country or an ideal.
- n. **Actively use stress management techniques.** Put them into practice such as relaxation techniques.
- o. **Accept your failings.** Avoid dwelling on feelings of weakness or guilt about your behaviour during captivity. You will likely face extreme stress. The world accepts statements made under coercion and stress as simply that.
- p. **Be tolerant of fellow hostages.** Be tolerant. Each individual will have different methods of coping with stress. There will be a tendency to vent frustrations on fellow hostages as it is too risky to do so against the captors.

NOTE: Extracted from "Hostage Survival Skills for CF Personnel", Operational Effectiveness Guide 97-1.

CHAPTER 6

THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY POLICE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS

“A tailored, carefully analysed public security plan should be developed for each combined military and civilian mission.” - Lessons Learned, The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre

“CIVPOL or other international police assistance forces must be under the same command structure and closely coordinated with military forces, including coordinated ROE, and closely coordinated in their activities.” - Lessons Learned, The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre

601. INTRODUCTION

1. CIVPOL can be deployed as part of a UN or NATO led operation in PSO, OOTW and combat. In most NATO operations, a division of responsibilities occurs between the UN, which channels its resources to specialist fields and civilian police efforts, to complement those of the NATO military force. In addition, some NATO nations have deployed with their military contingent, national police contingents to bolster their military as well as their civil-military tasks, particularly in urban and rural areas. The purpose of having the civilian police accompany a CF contingent is to provide flexibility to the TFC when adequate MP resources cannot be generated in sufficient numbers and in fields of expertise required, particularly in complex emergencies. This operational requirement would be supported by the MP commander's estimate. It is understood that any CIVPOL detachment assigned to a military force would be deployed *as persons accompanying the CF and subject to the NDA* and would report through the military police to the TFC (OPCON relationship). CIVPOL personnel would be armed and SOFA and/or MOU would reflect this reality.

2. In the context of international and war emergencies under the Emergencies Act, military forces must be versatile and may require a multi functional response where national and local governments structures have broken down and the population itself is involved in the crisis or conflict. Notwithstanding, but to a lesser degree of integration, domestic operations also involve the civilian police in Public Welfare Emergencies and Public Order Emergencies, under the Emergencies Act. The involvement of civilian police in domestic military operations in Canada is covered by domestic laws. If there is an armed conflict in Canada then the Law of Armed Conflict, particularly the Geneva Conventions, determines the role of civilian police in military operations.

3. In UN or OSCE led operations which NATO supports with military forces, the presence of UNCIVPOL and NATO national civilian police is less confrontational than UN or NATO military forces. In this regard, MP and CIVPOL functions are complementary in CMO planning and execution of civil tasks. It is worth noting that the CIVPOL and MP use the same laboratories and receive training from the same training establishments in ballistic and forensics, as well as other police functions. This chapter will focus primarily on international operations, as the role and functions of police in domestic operations are legislated under Canadian law.

602. ROLES OF CIVILIAN POLICE AND MILITARY POLICE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. **Civilian Police.** A police officer will always operate, regardless of the mission, tasks and environment, under the principles of credibility, of fairness, social and criminal justice. The role of civilian police in *international or war emergencies* is to monitor the performance and conduct of the local police, and to assist them in the performance of their duties. In humanitarian tasks, the police officer is bound by the same principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality applicable to humanitarian operations, as discussed in chapter 5. In humanitarian operations, civilian police duty is primarily to the war-affected population and not in support of the civil administration. The broad objectives of military and police operations are to:

- a. help prevent the escalation of violence in regional conflicts;
- b. help reduce the socio-economic effects and human suffering engendered by war, such as assist in the resettlement of refugees in their former communities, under UNHCR auspices; and

- c. support the UN as a multilateral institution for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, including civilian police monitors and trainers, human rights supervisors and humanitarian and refugee workers.
2. The deployment of civilian police in UN, OSCE or NATO led operations should be determined by operational requirements in the area of operations:
 - a. when national police services and civilian authorities are still operating effectively such as in adequate and some fragile states, the civilian police role when no MP are available to the TFC, will be to liaise between a UN or OSCE led operation, supported by NATO. Liaison will also be required with the local police or between local police belonging to different groups in the conflict, and to observe and report on local police activities; and
 - b. in more complex emergencies, where local police and civilian authorities are not operating effectively, such as a failed or collapsed state, civilian police may be required to monitor human rights and provide independent policing services. In this case, its foremost role is usually to monitor, train and develop the national, provincial/préfectoral and local police as sustainable national institutions acceptable to a society built on or aspiring to democratic values and beliefs. This endeavour requires clear mandates, functions and division of responsibilities, supported by national legislation/NDA or equivalent, between armed forces, national, provincial/préfectoral and municipal/communal police elements.
3. **Mandate of the International Police Task Force - Bosnia-Herzegovina.** The purpose of this paragraph is to provide a concrete example and compare the mandates of UNCIVPOL with the functions and responsibilities of the CIVPOL and MP, discussed in this chapter. The UNSC articulates the UN Civilian Police mandate: On 21 December 1995, the Security Council decided to establish a UNCIVPOL component whose role is to establish a programme of assistance with the specific tasks being essentially those set out in Annex 11 of the Dayton Agreement. The IPTF also has an important referral role if they learn of “credible information” concerning human rights violations. Under the Dayton Agreement, they are obliged to provide this information to the Human Rights Commission, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or to other appropriate organization or agencies. Under the authority of the UN Secretary General and “subject to coordination and guidance as appropriate by the NATO High Representative”, these tasks are:
 - a. monitoring, observing and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities, included associated judicial organizations, structures and proceedings, when MP services are unavailable;
 - b. advising law enforcement personnel and forces;
 - c. training law enforcement personnel;
 - d. facilitating, within the IPTF's mission of assistance, the parties' law enforcement activities;
 - e. assessing threats to public order and advising on the capability of law enforcement agencies to deal with such threats;
 - f. advising governmental authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the organization of effective civilian law enforcement agencies; and
 - g. assisting the parties' law enforcement personnel to carry out their responsibilities.
4. **Military Police.** All incidents involving the military are handled and investigated by the MP, not the civilian police. The MP shall have powers of arrest over the military members of a military force. The focus of MP tasks will vary with the scope of the military operation. MP can perform security tasks such as Force protection, implement control measures and undertake general police duties. MP may work in close cooperation with HN civilian police and assist in the maintenance of law and order. They may be required to detect and curtail possible illegal activities, including black market activities, within the military force.

603. FUNCTIONS OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY POLICE

1. CIVPOL deployed in international operations report directly to the appointed Police Commissioner in a theatre of operations. The functions of civilian police in military operations, spelled out in SOFA, agreements and MOU will include:

- a. advise the TFC on the planning and conduct of CMO in adequate, fragile and collapsed states, particularly for CMO conducted in urban and rural areas; when MP services are not available;
- b. liaise with military forces, particularly the MP;
- c. collect information/intelligence which may prove useful in the planning and conduct of CMO;
- d. plan police operations, particularly for cordon and search operations conducted in urban and rural areas;
- e. coordinate police operations with local ethnic/factional police, as required;
- f. conduct armed patrols in civilian areas to reassure the local population and deter extremist groups by day and night, when assigned to the maintenance of law and order (usually armed for this task). If unarmed, military elements will usually be deployed with the civilian police elements;
- g. investigate shootings, killings and robberies concerning civilian personnel, where the municipal /communal police is ineffective or inexistent, IAW agreements;
- h. liaise with civil authorities and local police to inform and enforce clauses of domestic or international agreements;
- i. arrest or detain individuals separate from the local police or exert pressures to induce local police to take action;
- j. searches for illegal weapons or illegal goods which may have been stolen from UN or NATO warehouses or IOs, NGOs and UN agencies. These searches will be conducted in conjunction with the MP if the weapons or materiel stolen come from military sources;
- k. protect individuals placed under their jurisdiction;
- l. enforce freedom of movement within the AO and accompany relief convoys and resettlement buses (usually unarmed), as ordered;
- m. monitor the protection of human rights to prevent abuses;
- n. assist in the maintenance of law and order in close cooperation with the national justice system;
- o. escort and protect individuals, such as civil authorities whose life may be threatened or VIPs. Such a task would require to be armed;
- p. mediate and negotiate in confrontational situations between belligerents or ethnic groups;
- q. train police at all levels of government to support civil administration;
- r. monitor border areas to enforce agreements and curtail smuggling activities, usually in low risk threat areas;
- s. control prisons, IAW existing agreements; and
- t. report and returns on civilian police activities.

2. In international operations, UN, OSCE or NATO mandates will determine the legal status and powers of civilian police as well as the tasks it can perform. In most operations, including complex emergencies, the civilian police will not require status and powers over and above those conferred on personnel operating under a UN, OSCE or NATO mandate, nor do they require the same policing powers that they possess in their respective domestic environment. If civilian police are required to monitor or protect human rights, they will require powers to:

- a. have unrestricted access on demand to all places of investigation and detention;
- b. remove, as ordered, persons at risk from local jurisdiction to UN or NATO protection; and
- c. investigate complaints.

3. **Public Security Gaps.** In all circumstances, civilian police can operate effectively and efficiently only with the cooperation of the HN, belligerent forces/FWF and civil authorities, if all parties to the conflict recognize the letter and spirit of agreements and civil tasks assigned to civilian police forces. Public security gaps could exist with the national civil infrastructures articulated at chapter 2, article 203. A tailored, carefully analysed TF public security plan should be developed for each mission:

- a. **Stable or Fragile States.** An adequate or stable civil infrastructure would most likely be in place. Two scenarios are possible: a military operation may be launched without waiting for the CIVPOL contingent which may not have yet deployed in theatre, so as not to compromise the mission. This situation creates a public security gap, perceived or real, and forces the military to perform vital law enforcement tasks or risk jeopardizing the mission. These police functions would be carried out until relieved by the local police or CIVPOL. *Secondly*, a military force could provide area security or reinforce patrolling to deter lawlessness but would refuse to carry out policing activities outside its mandate. If in this context factional police forces refuse to take on policing duties and cooperate with CIVPOL or the military, a public security gap arises. CIVPOL and the UN or NATO led military force must enforce local police or belligerent forces/FWF compliance with the signed and ratified Peace Agreement, supported by civil authorities. Public security gaps must be satisfactorily bridged or anticipated to prevent social upheavals, in the course of a mission.
- b. **Failed or Collapsed States.** If no peace agreement can be negotiated to cease hostilities, this will most likely be the type of civil infrastructure in place. The military force would most likely be responsible for a secure environment, assisted by an international civilian police force responsible for law and order. This arrangement would have to be mandated by the international community until HN civil authorities can form a government or a national representative body which has the support of the people, and which can assert its authority over the land.

4. **Military Police.** The MP will work closely with UNCIVPOL and/or any civilian police component deployed as part of the TF. Their efforts must be coordinated to prevent duplication and wastage of resources, while their employment will depend on the TFC's direction. As the primary advisor to the TFC on MP and security issues, the function of the MP in the civil phase will include:

- a. civil law enforcement/restoration operations for handover to civil authorities;
- b. oversight, training and coordination for the restoration of police, penitentiary and custom services;
- c. coordination with police, security, custom and penitentiary services to support military operations;
- d. advice and support to J5 staff regarding routes, population control, law enforcement and security matters;
- e. joint police and security patrols involving UN, NATO and HN civilian police, and police services to enhance trust, confidence and cooperation;
- f. CMO planning;
- g. control check points;

- h. control of stragglers, IDPs and refugees and other noncombatants;
- i. searches of military vehicles/facilities;
- j. searches of civil vehicles/facilities, in the absence of UNCIVPOL or local factional police, particularly in a failed or collapsed state;
- k. assist, as ordered by the TFC, in disarming armed civilian groups, special police forces and other such groups, bearing weapons in unauthorized or demilitarized zones defined under the Peace Agreement..
- l. escort duties;
- m. patrolling;
- n. investigations of military personnel and incidents;
- o. powers of arrest related to military suspects;
- p. Force protection; and
- q. liaison with CIVPOL and local factional police.

604. RESPONSIBILITIES AND TASKS OF CIVILIAN POLICE

1. The responsibilities and assigned tasks to any international police body or troop contributing nation civilian police elements are reflected in SOFA, MOU and other such agreements reached between the parties operating in an adequate, fragile or failed state. As well, the levels of threat and risk to social stability, law and order will define the extent of police activities and resources required across the spectrum of conflict.
2. In light of police functions, the range of tasks in CMO and support to civil administration will include:
 - a. acting as a neutral channel of communication, on request, if police from different parties in a conflict need to contact each other about crime problems. An example is Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina where three mafia groups operate on each side of the Neretva river which divides the city in two (three on the Muslim side to the East and three on the Croat side to the West);
 - b. advising the TFC, through the MP commander, on civil policing matters;
 - c. providing information on how opposed parties, such as the local police and criminal justice system, are carrying out police tasks;
 - d. monitoring the work of all police forces to ensure effective, impartial and fair maintenance of law and order;
 - e. training and supervising HN police forces with the HN providing facilities, material and training areas and classrooms;
 - f. exercising supervision of the civil administration to ensure their compliance with the letter of agreements reached and mediating or negotiating to defuze tensions between different parties of the community;
 - g. monitoring election campaigns and processes; and
 - h. observe the voluntary return of refugees (policy of non-refoulement) and IDPs.
3. In conjunction with the above civil reconstruction activities and support to civil administration, elements of a criminal justice system may need to be constituted, incorporating:

- a. prosecution and defence legal services;
- b. procedures for processing offenders;
- c. a judicial service for the disposal of offenders; and
- d. appropriate custodial services.

4. Particularly in a failed or collapsed state in which a state of anarchy reigns, civilian police and MP may assume some additional police duties to fill the void in law and order, such as extra powers to arrest and detain suspects. In these circumstances, an independent international sanctioned body for prosecution will need to be established while civil reconstruction and rehabilitation of the police and judicial system is ongoing.

5. In UN or OSCE led operations, police elements of UNCIVPOL live in communities to facilitate a closer working relationship with the population and local police. They are also responsible for finding their own accommodation and covering their own expenses. Exceptions could be made but would have to be negotiated and formalized through an MOU (DAOD 7014-0 and DAOD 7014-1) or some form of agreement.

6. UNCIVPOL and MILOBS often work closely together and patrol the same area of operations. In such circumstances, MILOBS occasionally provide logistic support but both require formed troops to provide security and Force protection for ongoing CMO. Formed troops in an area of operations would benefit from the synergy created by the interrelationships of these organizations through daily contacts, exchange of information, daily situation reports and inter-agency meetings.

605. INTERRELATIONSHIP OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY POLICE

1. The mandate of UN and NATO civilian police will be specified in the *General Framework Agreement for Peace* negotiated between the parties to a conflict. The jurisdiction of civilian and MP forces versus the HN national police forces would be spelled out in SOFA. In principle, when the international police force is not required to enforce local laws or law and order, it is unarmed and thus specified in SOFA. Therefore, any international police tasks which could endanger the lives of civil policemen will require Force protection. Any available information on CIVPOL mandate, functions and responsibilities must be obtained by the reconnaissance group in the preparatory phase. If the TFC decides to add a CIVPOL detachment to the TF, in addition to the organic MP Unit (MPU), then respective mandates, responsibilities and tasking will have to be closely coordinated and monitored by the J3 and J5 staff to prevent jurisdictional problems, duplication of effort and redundancy of resources between police elements.

2. The TFC must also understand the mandate, complementary functions and division of responsibilities of an international police force in regard to the TF organic MPU. The MPU must be sensitive to the security environment and the division of responsibilities and jurisdiction of UNCIVPOL and factional police forces. As an example, the *International Police Task Force Assistance Program*, specified in Annex 11 of the Dayton Agreement, consists of the following:

- a. to monitor and inspect judicial and law enforcement activities, including conducting joint patrols with local police forces;
- b. to advise and train law enforcement personnel;
- c. to analyse the public security threat and offer advice to government authorities on how to organize their police forces most effectively; and
- d. to facilitate law enforcement improvement and respond to the requests of the parties, to the extent possible.

606. COMMAND AND CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

1. In peacekeeping operations when consent is given by the parties to a conflict, UNCIVPOL may be sufficient

to carry out police tasks if civil authorities possess the police and military infrastructures to stop or deter the escalation of violence by extremist groups. In complex emergencies, on the other hand, peace enforcement requires military and police forces to be deployed when consent by all the parties to a conflict is not given and when the situation is largely unstable or unpredictable, and which could degenerate quickly to armed conflict. This type of operation will require early warning to provide adequate Force protection in assigned civil tasks and the capacity to deter any form of violence through diplomatic efforts and if this should fail through a show of force.

2. In complex emergencies, such as peace enforcement with IFOR/SFOR being such examples, a TFC requires police assistance to carry out civil tasks to their completion. Numerous factors will come into play to determine if a UN or NATO police force will deploy detachments in an area of operations or remain an integral force. Such factors include threats and risks, time and space, numbers and qualification of policemen, resources available, transport, logistic support and sustainment.

Civilian Police Contingent

3. If adequate MP resources cannot be generated to fulfill the TFC's requirements, he may consider in his estimate the employment of a CIVPOL detachment to be attached to his military force. This arrangement would provide the TFC flexibility in the planning and coordination of CMO and support to civil administration, particularly in complex emergencies. CIVPOL personnel would have to be deployed as *persons accompanying the Canadian Forces, subject to the NDA*. In principle, this detachment would be under OPCON of the TFC but remain under OPCOM of the CIVPOL Contingent commander in theatre. Notwithstanding, any command and control arrangements would have to be negotiated with the CIVPOL, prior to any deployment. Any agreement between the parties would also have to be formalized in an MOU (DAOD 7014-0). In non complex emergencies, the employment of a CIVPOL detachment need not be considered, as adequate MP resources would be available.

4. The composition of the CIVPOL detachment would be dictated by the tactical situation, the type of operation, the scope of police activities, the presence of extensive urban areas and the estimate of threats and risks, such as criminal activities. CIVPOL volunteers would accept prior to deployment, the conditions of employment dealing with issues such as foreign service pay, overtime and annual leave, to conform as much as possible with those of their military counterpart. The purpose is to establish one standard for all Canadians and maintain morale within deployed Canadian elements in an area of operations. Notwithstanding, prior to the implementation of such a process, issues such as authorization to perform these duties overseas and funding arrangements would have to be finalized.

607. TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT

1. **Selection of Officers.** UN police officers and national police detachments must be competent to carry out most of the routine tasks usually performed by the national police of a UN or NATO member state. Police officers must be experienced in crime investigation and case preparation, and capable of making full use of supporting services, including forensic, scenes of crimes, fingerprint and photo-fit facilities. The UN Secretariat to the Permanent Missions of the contributing Member States produces guidelines for member states on selection, testing and early repatriation of CIVPOL officers in UN operations as well as desirable mission specific knowledge: police mandate, UNCIVPOL responsibilities and how to monitor local police, history of the country and of the conflict, HN culture and religion, and knowledge on the Constitution of the HN. Police officers provided by nations should have the following capabilities:

- a. familiarity with an international recognized criminal justice system and domestic laws;
- b. national compliance with the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials at annex A. This Code is provided for information only since it has not been approved for application by CF members;
- c. prior experience of working with other law enforcement agencies at national, regional and/or international level;
- d. capable of operating effectively in geographically isolated locations, as part of various multinational and multidisciplinary organizations; and

- e. experience or skills relevant to UN, OSCE or NATO led operations such as anti-terrorist, special operations (disarming illegal security groups...), search and rescue, first aid, communications, hostage negotiation, four-wheel driving, navigation, mines and booby trap awareness, including competence in languages, with or without interpreters.

2. **Training Standards.** Training must include:

- a. UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials to the extent the Code does not conflict with Canadian law and policy;
- b. awareness of the history, powers and limitations of UN, OSCE or NATO led operations;
- c. case studies of UN, OSCE or NATO operations and lessons learned from civilian police involvement;
- d. education about the religion, culture of the region and ethnic groups, traditions and customs of the people and organizational cultures of the various elements forming a multinational force, including IOs, NGOs and UN or NATO agencies, especially in the AO where policemen will be deployed; and
- e. additional language training.

3. **Equipment and Resources.** Civilian police involved in operational law enforcement, law enforcement supervision or the maintenance of order among the civilian population, will require:

- a. transport;
- b. compatible communication systems with MILOBS and formed troops in the AO, on board vehicles and at police headquarters, including access to "Internet" and "Interpol" to monitor criminal activities in the AO;
- c. protective, self-defence and law enforcement equipment, including a police camera cell to record police operations, which would be covered by SOFA or other forms of agreements;
- d. weapons, as dictated by SOFA; and
- e. sites for police stations.

UNITED NATIONS CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS

Article 1

1. Law enforcement officials shall at all times fulfil the duty imposed upon them by law, by serving the community and by protecting all persons against illegal acts consistent with the high degree of responsibility required by their profession.

2. **Commentary**

- a. The "law enforcement officials" includes all officers of the law, whether appointed or elected, who exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detection.
- b. In countries where police powers are exercised by military authorities, whether uniformed or not, or by states security forces, the definition of law enforcement officials shall be regarded as including officers of such services.
- c. Service to the community is intended to include particularly the rendition of services of assistance to those members of the community who by reason of personal, economic, social or other emergencies are in need of immediate aid.
- d. This provision is intended to cover not only all violent, predatory and harmful acts, but extends to the full range of prohibitions under penal statutes. It extends to conduct by persons not capable of incurring criminal liability.

Article 2

1. In the performance of their duty, law enforcement officials shall respond and protect human dignity and maintain and uphold the human rights of all persons.

2. **Commentary**

- a. The human rights in question are identified and protected by national and international law. Among the relevant international instruments are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
- b. National commentaries to those provision should indicate regional or national provisions identifying and protecting these rights.

Article 3

1. Law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty.

2. **Commentary**

- a. This provision emphasizes that the use of force by enforcement officials should be exceptional, while it

Annex A
to Chapter 6

implies that law enforcement officials may be authorized to use force as is reasonably necessary under the circumstances for the prevention of crime or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders, no force going beyond that may be used.

- b. National law ordinarily restricts the use of force by law enforcement officials in accordance with a principle of proportionality. It is to be understood that such national principles of proportionality are to be respected in the interpretation of this provision. In no case should this provision be interpreted to authorize the use of force which is disproportionate to the legitimate objective to be achieved.
- c. The use of firearms is considered an extreme measure. Every effort should be made to exclude the use of firearms, especially against children. In general, firearms should not be used except when a suspected offender offers armed resistance or otherwise jeopardizes the lives of others and less extreme measures are not sufficient to restrain or apprehend the suspected offender. In every instance in which a firearm is discharged, a report should be made promptly to the competent authorities.

Article 4

1. Matters of a confidential nature in the possession of law enforcement officials shall be kept confidential, unless the performance of duty or the needs of justice strictly require otherwise.
2. **Commentary.** By the nature of their duties, law enforcement officials obtain information which may relate to private lives or be potentially harmful to the interests, and especially the reputation, or others. Great care should be exercised in safeguarding and using such information, which should be disclosed only in the performance of duty or to serve the needs of justice. Any disclosure of such information for other purposes is wholly improper.

Article 5¹

1. No law enforcement may inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, nor may any law enforcement official invoke superior orders or exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a threat of war, a threat to national security, international political instability or any other public emergency as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
2. **Commentary**
 - a. This prohibition derives from the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly, according to which:

“Such an act is an offence to human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (and other international human rights instruments).”²

- b. The Declaration defines torture as follows:

“... torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally

¹ From Human Rights and the Police by J. Alderson, Appendix VII, Pages 181-195 - Council of Europe Publication, Strasbourg 1984

² First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders: Report by the Secretariat (United Nations Publication, Sales No. 1956.IV.4), Annex 1.A.

inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or other persons. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions to the extent consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.”³

- c. The term “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” has not been defined by the General Assembly but should be interpreted so as to extend the widest possible protection against abuses, whether physical or mental.

Article 6

1. Law enforcement officials ensure the full protection of the health of persons in their custody and, in particular, shall take immediate action to secure medical attention whenever required.

2. **Commentary**

- a. “Medical attention”, which refers to services rendered by medical personnel, including certified medical practitioners and paramedics, shall be secured when needed or requested.
- b. While the medical personnel are likely to be attached to the law enforcement operation, law enforcement officials must take into account the judgement of such personnel when they recommend providing the person in custody with appropriate treatment through, or in consultation with, medical personnel from outside the law enforcement operation.
- c. It is understood that law enforcement officials shall also secure medical attention for victims of violations of law or of accidents occurring in the course of violation of law.

Article 7

1. Law enforcement officials shall not commit any act of corruption. They shall also rigorously oppose and combat all such acts.

2. **Commentary**

- a. Any act of corruption, in the same way as any other abuse of authority, is incompatible with the profession of law enforcement officials. The law must be enforced fully with respect to any law enforcement official who commits an act of corruption, as Governments cannot expect to enforce the law among their citizens if they cannot, or will not, enforce the law against their own agents and within their own agencies.
- b. While the definition of corruption must be subject to national law, it should be understood to encompass the commission or omission of an act in the performance of or in connection with one's duties, in response to gifts, promises or incentives demanded or accepted, or the wrongful receipt of these once the act has been committed or omitted.
- c. The above expression “act of corruption” should be understood to encompass attempted corruption.

Article 8

³ Ibid.

Annex A
to Chapter 6

1. Law enforcement officials shall respect the law and the present Code. They shall also, to the best of their capability, prevent and rigorously oppose any violations of them.
2. Law enforcement officials who have reason to believe that violation of the present Code has occurred or is about to occur shall report the matter to their superior authorities and, where necessary, to other appropriate authorities or organs vested with reviewing or remedial power.
3. **Commentary**
 - a. This Code shall be observed whenever it has been incorporated into national legislation or practice. If legislation or practice contains stricter provisions than those of the present Code, those stricter provisions shall be observed.
 - b. The article seeks to preserve the balance between the need for international discipline of the agency on which public safety is largely dependent, on the one hand, and the need for dealing with violations of basic human rights, on the other. Law enforcement officials shall report violations within the chain of command and take over lawful action outside the chain of command only when non-other remedies are available or effective. It is understood that law enforcement officials shall not suffer administrative or other penalties because they have reported that a violation of this Code has occurred or is about to occur.
 - c. The term “appropriate authorities or organs vested with reviewing or remedial power” refers to any authority or organ existing under national law, whether internal to the law enforcement agency or independent thereof, with statutory, customary or other power to review grievances and complaints arising out of violations within the purview of this Code.
 - d. In some countries, the mass media may be regarded as performing complaint review functions similar to those described in sub-paragraph c above. Law enforcement officials may, therefore, be justified if, as a last resort and in accordance with the laws and customs of their own countries and with the provisions of Article 4 of the present Code, they bring violations to the attention of public opinion through the mass media.
 - e. Law enforcement officials who comply with the provisions of this Code deserve the respect, the full support and the cooperation of the community and of the law enforcement agency in which they serve, as well as the law enforcement profession.

NOTE: This annex is extracted from “A Guide to Peace Support Operations”, Annex 7.

CHAPTER 7

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION INTERRELATIONSHIP WITH PSYOPS AND PA

“The major assets for this (civil) phase...are my division’s media, psyops (psychological operations) and civilian affairs units and, at this time, these three groups are as powerful as the big guns, complementary and with an entirely different emphasis. Media, PSYOPS and civilian affairs are involved at every stage of each (local community) project, ensuring that our message to the local population gets across.” - Major General John Kiszely, commander MND (SW), Bosnia, December 1996

“A proactive media programme was adopted. This proved to be a key factor. Spokespersons were designated, media lines were prepared, media scrums were organized and a spokesperson was available to respond to media queries, regardless of whether the news was good or bad. The military side was reported and the respect for, and confidence in the military continued because of this.” - OP SALON (1990 Oka Crisis), POR Comment, Dispatches, September 1990

“Proactive and active public affairs activities would also be valuable in theatre in counterbalancing typical belligerent misinformation and in low level ‘hearts and minds’ psychological operations.” - OP HARMONY, UNPROFOR, Bosnia, POR Comment, Dispatches, October 1994

701. INTRODUCTION

1. CIMIC, whether domestic or international, deals with assistance to governments and civil populations in a geographic area where logistics and social services have been destroyed or rendered ineffective as a result of a crisis or conflict. This assistance may take the form of economic recovery, rebuilding civil infrastructure or passing information to a local population on the purpose and objectives of the programed assistance programs.
2. Canada and NATO (MC 402) define PSYOPS as planned psychological activities in peace, crisis and war directed to enemy, friendly and neutral audiences to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. The purpose of PSYOPS is to analyse, and when required, influence the perceptions, emotions, opinions, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of selected individuals or groups while preventing the effective use of these activities by an enemy or adversary. Some knowledge in the fundamentals of human psychology is helpful in the effective planning and conduct of PSYOPS.
3. PSYOPS are an important component of the political, military and ideological actions that support the attainment of both immediate and long term objectives. PSYOPS tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for understanding and changing the perceptions, emotions, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of selected individuals or specific target groups, provide TFCs with their primary means of communication with opposing military forces, potential adversary’s and civilian groups. The classifications of PSYOPS include strategic psychological activities (SPA), psychological consolidation activities (PCA), battlefield psychological activities (BPA) and peace support psychological activities (PSPA).
4. C2W encompasses deception, OPSEC, physical destruction, PSYOPS and EW, integrated within the information operations structure. CIMIC is an enabling operation in PSO, OOTW and combat, which relies heavily on an effective C2W structure and PSYOPS to minimize interference by the population with military operations. This aspect is relevant to PSO considering the unconventional disposition of forces throughout the AO, which makes the identification of the TF centres of gravity and decisive points critical to protect the TF. Within the C2W structure, a TFC and his subordinates must appreciate that when physical force is applied, it should be combined with psychological action to produce the psychological effect on an hostile or potentially hostile adversary, that will ultimately lead to a desired response.
5. PAPAOs are terms used by CA, the US and the UK with the UN and NATO both using PI/PIO. Regardless of the terminology, both PAOs and PIOs fulfil the same role and functions. PA is a distinctive management function which, through the media, helps establish and maintain mutual LOC, understanding, acceptance and cooperation

between an organization and its public, which includes the domestic audience whose support is critical to sustain military operations to their end state. PA also involves the management of issues that confront the organization and helps commanders at all levels and their staff keep informed on and responsive to public opinion.

6. The common ground between CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA is *information*. This synergy is required to establish and maintain the cooperation of the civilian population and civil authorities with the goal of achieving political and military objectives, while denying such support and cooperation to actual or potential belligerent forces, which do not support these objectives. Where CIMIC uses information to inform the in-theatre public on assistance programs and reconstruction or rehabilitation projects in their locality/area, PA uses information to manage issues and inform the Canadian as well as the in-theatre public, of its activities in their AO. PSYOPS uses information to attempt a change in a population's perceptions, opinions, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour to gain its support for civil tasks and programs.

702. PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. The following principles apply to the conduct of a PSYOPS campaign to support the civil phase:
 - a. PSYOPS must support strategic objectives and be conducted IAW government policy;
 - b. overall planning and control of PSYOPS must be exercised at the strategic level;
 - c. the purpose of PSYOPS should be understood and supported by commanders at all levels;
 - d. there must be close coordination among all stakeholders and partners, particularly the military and authorized civilian agencies, involved in the planning and conduct of PSYOPS;
 - e. the planning and conduct of PSYOPS must be based on thorough research and target analysis, and on accurate and timely intelligence or military information;
 - f. the PSYOPS plan must be developed in conjunction with the IO strategy and complement the overall operation plan;
 - g. PSYOPS should be initiated at the earliest possible time, once resources and an opportunity exist and closely monitored and amended throughout to ensure the intended effects are achieved; and
 - h. in military operations where the level of threats and risks is low, PSYOPS will be conducted under the principles of truth, verifiability, credibility and unity of effort.

703. FACTORS AFFECTING A PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CAMPAIGN

1. A crucial element of a PSYOPS campaign is to synchronize all PSYOPS activities with any military or non-military activities within the AO. The following factors affect a PSYOPS campaign planned at the strategic level, controlled at the operational level and executed at the tactical level:

- a. **Selection of Suitable Target Audiences.** Targeting is defined as the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities. The goal is to obtain from selected target audiences a desired response in support of the TFC's mission. The three types of target audience are groups (collections of people bound together by common activities and goals); categories (collections of people who share specific demographics such as race, religion, sex or age); and aggregates (collections of people identified by a common geographic area). A target audience analysis is necessary to plan and conduct PSYOPS. Such an analysis requires the designated target audience's identity, location, conditions, vulnerabilities, susceptibilities and effectiveness. Therefore, PSYOPS will always rely heavily on specialized areas of study, such as social and behavioural intelligence for careful planning. Nonetheless, the scarcity of PSYOPS resources will require careful prioritization of selected target audiences. The following should be considered:

- (1) policy and legal framework of the intended action against the selected target audience;
 - (2) the vulnerability of a particular audience to a psychological approach. The potential targets of PSYOPS remain various adversarial military groups and factions. Can they be persuaded or influenced?;
 - (3) the ability of that audience to produce a desired response, either by themselves or in other groups; and
 - (4) the accessibility of that audience to various forms of the media available (Internet, TV, radio, films/video, newspapers, leaflets...). A thorough knowledge of the local culture (values, beliefs, customs and traditions) is required so the message is delivered, by appropriate means, to a selected target audience so as to achieve a desired response.
- b. **Selection and Development of Credible Themes.** A theme is an idea or topic on which a psychological operation is based. Once a target audience is selected, care must be taken to select corresponding themes which will produce the desired response. Themes must be believable and support the mission, and PSYOPS objectives. Themes (e.g. 'mine awareness saves lives within a community'; 'freedom of movement, of goods and services improve the quality of life of citizens'...) must urge the target audience to adopt attitudes and behaviour which are realistic and acceptable to this target audience. Themes can be disseminated through leaflets, with each leaflet focusing ideally on one theme so as not to confuse the target audience. If more than one theme is used, they should be closely related to a single task. The examples provided are true and credible themes which can be disseminated by PA, without any chance of compromise.
- c. **Coordination of Operations.** PSYOPS themes will be perceived by target audiences as expressions of national policy or that of the organization leading the operation. Any inconsistency between themes used by political authorities, military forces at various levels of command or civilian agencies, may discredit the mission. Careful coordination of PSYOPS among all organizations and agencies, authorized to conduct such operations, is paramount.
- d. **Timeliness.** Psychological activities conducted at the correct moment will significantly enhance or, if required, minimize the impact of operations on the day-to-day activities of the population. The PSYOPS staff must be able to analyse the enemy or adversary's psychological situation, identify suitable target audiences, select themes, plan, coordinate and execute operations as the situation develops. This said, PSYOPS, unlike other forms of operations, seldom produce immediate results. Time is required for ideas to mature, or to erode an enemy's or adversary's morale, or foster cooperation among former warring factions and hence increase the combat effectiveness of the TF. To be effective, PSYOPS must be initiated at the earliest possible time.
- e. **Results.** Given the delay in achieving results and the dynamic nature of individual or group attitudes and behaviours, PSYOPS activities must be closely monitored throughout and activities modified to ensure selected target audiences and themes remain relevant. PSYOPS activities must include measurements of actual outcomes to determine whether PSYOPS objectives and intended effects are achieved.
2. When conducting PSYOPS, PA must not be compromised and must maintain its credibility and reliability in the eyes of the national and international media, as well as the national and international public. Therefore, PSYOPS messages should be formulated in close cooperation with PA. As specified in the IO doctrine, PA activities allow a TFC to influence an adversary's or a potential adversary's perception about the friendly force's intent, capability and vulnerability. At the same time, PA activities will not be used as a military deception capability or to provide disinformation to either internal or external audiences. PA activities will be consistent with ongoing OPSEC efforts, another pillar of C2W.

704. CLASSIFICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. In addition to its use in information operations, PSYOPS are employed in an AO and involve propaganda. PSYOPS can also be directed at local populations in an attempt to sway perceptions, opinions, beliefs, attitudes

and behaviour either towards one another, towards a third party or towards an occupying force, as part of PCA. Such activities are directed at the civilian population in areas under friendly control and are employed to gain the support and cooperation of the local inhabitants. The definitions of apparent sources of propaganda which apply to military operations conducted in peace, crisis and war are as follows:

- a. **White Propaganda.** Propaganda disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency of the sponsor;
- b. **Grey Propaganda.** Propaganda which does not specifically identify any source; and
- c. **Black Propaganda.** Propaganda which purports to emanate from a source other than the true one.

2. This effort generates two types of PSYOPS: *offensive PSYOPS* which is aimed at weakening the will of belligerent forces and/or civilian population; and, *defensive PSYOPS* in which assets are used to analyse the belligerents' propaganda and its effect on the friendly population and friendly forces.

3. PSYOPS fall into four classifications which, in the context of combined warfare, facilitate the division of responsibility among national authorities, host nations and operational commanders. To prevent loss of credibility, coherent planning among all levels of command, including civilian agencies, must permeate PSYOPS. These classifications are known as:

- a. Strategic Psychological Activities (**SPA**);
- b. Psychological Consolidation Activities (**PCA**);
- c. Battlefield Psychological Activities (**BPA**); and
- d. Peace Support Psychological Activities (**PSPA**).

4. **SPA** are Canadian Government planned psychological activities in peace, crisis and war and directed towards friendly, hostile, potentially hostile or neutral audiences. SPA pursue objectives to gain the support and cooperation of friendly and neutral countries, and to reduce the will and the capacity of hostile or potentially hostile countries to wage war. SPA aim to undermine the adversary's or a potential adversary's readiness for conflict, and will to fight, and to reduce his war-making capability while gaining the support and cooperation of neutral and friendly populations. SPA are generally planned at the highest level of government and may be implemented exclusively by civilian agencies. The objectives of SPA are generally long term and political in nature.

5. **PCA** are planned psychological activities in peace, crisis and war directed at the civilian population located in areas under friendly control to achieve a desired behaviour which supports the military objectives and the operational freedom of the supported commanders. The aim of PCA is to win the cooperation and support of the local population. PCA are normally a national responsibility when military forces are operating in their own country, and are the responsibility of a host nation and the TFC when operating in a theatre of operations within the national boundaries of the host nation. PCA must be in consonance with SPA and conducted in coordination with the TFC.

6. **BPA** are planned psychological activities conducted at the operational and tactical levels as an integral part of combat operations. BPA aim to reduce an enemy or adversary's combat power by eroding the morale of his leadership and troops, or the willingness of civilians to support his operations. BPA are designed to bring psychological pressure to bear on opposing military forces and civilians under enemy control in the battle area, to assist in the achievement of operational and tactical objectives. BPA, which must be consistent with SPA and PCA, are the responsibility of the TFC and are conducted as a coordinated part of combat operations. BPA are planned initially in peacetime and executed as a component of operations after the commencement of hostilities.

7. **PSPA** are planned psychological activities conducted as an integral part of PSO. They are designed to create a supportive atmosphere and a willingness to cooperate among the adversaries and the local population in an AO, to assist in the achievement of Peace Support mission objectives and to protect the TF. PSPA are the responsibility of the TFC and are planned and conducted to ensure that perceptions are accurate and to promote

positive perceptions, emotions, opinions, attitudes and behaviour towards the TF and its mission. PSPA specifically address the problems of rumours, misinformation and disinformation by providing information and messages directly to key communicators and local audiences, without the filter of any local leadership or local media. PSPA are conducted as part of an overarching PSYOPS campaign and are closely coordinated with the activities of CIMIC, PA and all of the aspects of PSO. PSPA objectives could be to:

- a. enhance security and safety;
- b. facilitate orderly peace implementation;
- c. gain civilian adherence to implementation measures;
- d. establish the force as a credible information source;
- e. dissuade interference with operations;
- f. alleviate local population anxieties about operations and expected civil-military end state;
- g. limit the effectiveness of hostile propaganda, disinformation or the impact of other forms of negative information on the achievement of the mission;
- h. curb the development of unreasonable expectations of all ethnic groups in areas of operations;
- i. magnify the positive effect of CIMIC activities; and
- j. reduce accidental injury and death from unexploded munitions/ordnance (UXO).

8. BPA and PSPA conducted by a TFC will not target the international media, friendly nations or forces, or civilian audiences outside the AO. In peace, crisis and war, PSYOPS activities will be conducted in the TFC's AO, which will include its area of influence and occasionally, portions of the TFC's area of interest. The latter could infringe on an adjacent unit's AO. For instance, PSYOPS activities in an area of interest could apply to a municipality or community straddling the boundary separating two units or formations. Therefore, the coordination of PSYOPS activities among adjacent units becomes crucial to unity of purpose and unity of effort at all levels of command.

705. SCOPE OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

1. At the strategic, operational and tactical levels, commanders carry out information operations which integrate all aspects of information: intelligence and military information; communications and information systems (CIS); C2W; and information operations support environment which provides the necessary policies and plans to mould all systems together. Information operations also include interacting with the GIE through PA and other means. Information operations are conducted IAW B-GG-005-004/AF-010 'CF Information Operations' Manual.

2. The GIE encompasses such influences as political decisions, governments, global/national/defence information infrastructures, the international and national media (CNN, Internet...), NGOs, IOs, UN agencies, OGDs and agencies, academic institutions, religious and ethnic movements. To effectively conduct information operations in the civil phase, the TFC must deal effectively with that portion of the GIE relevant to the military operation i.e. the military information environment which is linked directly to the GIE. In fact, all military operations take place within the GIE, as current and emerging technologies permit any aspect of a military operation to be made known to a global audience in near-real time and without the benefit of filters.

3. Since CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA deal with information, the TFC responsible for these functions is directly concerned with the effective and efficient management of the military information environment. Within the military information environment, the CF will conduct information operations at all levels of command.

4. The three functions of CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA operate as complementary means within a commander's

COO and therefore must use consistent messages. When the three functions operate within the same AO, they must cooperate fully during the planning, execution, control, monitoring and evaluation of programs and activities. The coordination of messages and means is critical and is best handled by the information policy staff at the operational level.

5. PA, and to a lesser extent CIMIC, will use the media as a method of getting information to the population, including the domestic audience, while PSYOPS will, in the great majority of cases, have its own information generating facilities, including television and radio stations as well as presses for leaflets and newspapers, to pass information to the local population and other target audiences. The scope of PSYOPS for domestic and international operations needs to be specified.

Domestic Operations

6. The conduct of PSYOPS in domestic operations could include aid of the civil power, counter-terrorist activities or CF assistance in support of provincial or territorial law enforcement agencies, as authorized by Canadian laws. In domestic operations, a primary target audience would be identified with the intent of saving lives and preventing or minimizing injuries, and damage to public and private property. PSYOPS would be subject to strict CDS directives and conducted under the principle of transparency. As an example, in the early stages of the 1990 Oka crisis, the CDS sent a 'Master message' approved by the Government: "*The CF will not be the first to open fire*". This master message could be interpreted as a PSYOPS message which, in the end, had very positive effects on all parties to defuse and resolve the crisis peacefully. This message would constitute an example of strategic level white propaganda.

International Operations

7. In international operations, the CF would plan and conduct strategic, consolidated, battlefield and peace support psychological activities IAW Government policy in support of Canadian as well as theatre of operations' strategic objectives. There must be close coordination among all military and civilian agencies involved in the planning and conduct of PSYOPS. The PSYOPS plan must be developed in conjunction with the overall information operations strategy and complement the theatre operational plan. Accordingly, the CDS will issue the guidance and directives on the use of PSYOPS by the TFC.

8. The integrated planning and execution of military and civilian activities need to improve unity of purpose and unity of effort to bring about the commitment of political and military leaders to create political, social, economic and environmental conditions and change for a structural, durable and sustainable peace. The synergy of CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA can be used to educate and modify the culture, behaviour and attitudes of leaders towards a democratic system, values and beliefs. The same approach can be used to educate the population which, in time, will counter extremist views and request democratic reforms from its leaders. Exploitation of the written and electronic media must be used to this end, to include public lectures and documentaries using television, radio, Internet and the written press to foster democratic reforms in public institutions. This strategy is important in light of recorded factional efforts used to impede the implementation of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina:

- a. HN factional commanders establish policies and behaviours detrimental to and sometimes targeting the civilian population which may not support them;
- b. the lack of commitment on the part of nationalistic leaders to the implementation of the Dayton Accords has been clearly evident in policies issued to their military, police and civil authorities. Resettlement attempts have resulted in houses being occupied or blown up to prevent occupation by its former owner of different ethnic origin. In addition, when former owners tried to visit their former homes in a different ethnic enclave, their progress was impeded by violent demonstrations, with the local police passively looking on; and
- c. local *police* have harassed rather than facilitated recovery activities; *mayors* have prohibited refugee return; and *religious* leaders have been discouraged from providing moral guidance to their adherents.

706. COUNTER PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. The aim of counter PSYOPS is to shield an audience from hostile messages and lessen their impact. In this context, PSYOPS aim to counter information, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour detrimental to the objectives of a CF operation. Any misinformation or disinformation propagated will be exploited by extremist political, paramilitary and military groups to gain public support in support of their own objectives.

2. Counter PSYOPS uses capabilities to analyse an enemy or adversary's propaganda and its effect on friendly populations and friendly forces. Analysis of propaganda sources (white, grey and black), content, intended audience, media selection and effectiveness are done using subjective and/or objective methods:

- a. **Subjective Methods.** These methods are based on the background, experience and judgement of the analyst or specialist; and
- b. **Objective Methods.** These methods employ classification systems and statistical databases over a period of time. Staffs must therefore streamline and coordinate their data collection and data processing activities to prevent duplication of effort and wastage of resources. Network connectivity of information systems at the strategic level is the responsibility of the NDHQ/J6. CIS support and connectivity at the TFHQ is planned and coordinated by the TF/J6.

3. Counter PSYOPS methods in peace, crisis and war rely on the critical collection of information pertaining to an enemy or adversary's intentions. These intentions are the focus of the TFC's 'Priority Intelligence Requirements'. Themes are identified and techniques are employed to counter the effect of propaganda. Themes selected for this purpose aim to reduce the enemy's or adversary's real or potential prestige and status, counter the effects of his propaganda and inform audiences about the TF's intentions and measures, so as to prevent or minimize civilian interference with the orderly conduct of military operations. The TFC's direction and close coordination of PSYOPS, PA and information passed on to the TF remain critical to the employment of effective counter PSYOPS techniques. In the course of their daily activities, CF members and liaison officers should expect questions by civil authorities and the populace on the TF mission and mission objectives.

707. CANADIAN FORCES CAPABILITIES

1. The NDHQ CF Public Affairs division is organized along national and command lines. PAOs are deployed on domestic and international mission to implement the communications aspects of the TFC's plan for the mission. PA personnel at national, formation or unit levels are members of the TFC's personal staff and are directly involved in the planning of the operation. They provide strategic and operational advice and guidance to the TFC and his staff on the unfolding of the communications plan for the mission, whether conducted in the domestic or international environment. It is important to provide effective management of media issues from the outset of a military operation, requiring the TFC to be proactive in the planning and management of media issues.

2. CIMIC is an activity which the CF has conducted, by other names, in domestic operations, but principally through an ad hoc fashion in international operations. No formal organization or TOR have been written for international operations and ad hoc CIMIC activities in these areas have not been part of the TFC's integral plan to achieve the mission. It is a function, however, that has gained credibility and momentum over time among NATO allies and PfP, and has contributed to the success of military operations in which military tasks and civil tasks are complementary.

3. The CIMIC function should be instituted as part of a formation and unit staff, separate from PA, that would have the responsibility to plan, execute, control, monitor and evaluate domestic, as well as international CIMIC programs. Domestic desks already exist within environment-specific areas and these could become the elements responsible for general support to local governments and the public at home, as well as being on call as deployable elements for overseas missions, as the core CIMIC component of a mission. These elements could also be augmented as necessary by specialists, such as civil engineers and civil transit experts.

4. The CF has not been involved in PSYOPS since World War II. Only recently have CF elements been conducting similar function using small groups called Military Information Support Teams (MIST). MIST has been used successfully in Haiti where, as a force asset reporting to the TFC, it is an important part of the TFC's operational plan. IFOR and SFOR have successfully conducted PSYOPS, however this function is resource

intensive and the CF has few resources to conduct such activities even on a low to moderate scale.

5. The MIST employed as part of Canada's contribution to the UN Mission in Haiti (OP STANDARD/STABLE) was composed of a 24-men team, 14 of which spoke fluent Creole. PSYOPS operations were conducted by the MIST which planned, developed and executed the information campaign, assisted by PA, on behalf of the TFC. The MIST provided a significant force multiplier especially in a crowd situation where MIST Tactical Dissemination Teams of three-men each often used PSYOPS techniques to calm or restore order in tense situations. The MIST was assigned the following mandate:

- a. provide commanders with an additional tool for dealing with the local population, particularly crowds, without resorting to force;
- b. provide feedback and information to commanders, of use to both operations and intelligence/military information;
- c. inform the local population and correct misleading information (disinformation)/perceptions to counter disruptive rumours; and
- d. at the operational level, undertake development of radio messages to obtain the support of the population and minimize interference with UN operations.

6. A PSYOPS cell at the formation and unit levels could be instituted as part of the J3 Ops cell, to support CMO and other CIMIC activities. This PSYOPS cell would be responsible for the planning, execution, control, monitoring and evaluation of PSYOPS activities in a theatre or AO. The PSYOPS cell would be deployable to a mission and come under OPCON of the TFC and be responsive to both the CIMIC and PA cells for the coordination and synchronization of activities, and the consistent use of messages. CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA must be well coordinated and are in fact elements of the TFC's overall information operations plan. The PSYOPS campaign can rely on PA, as well as the local and international media to disseminate a true and credible PSYOPS message. In this entire process, it is important for the TFC and his staff, to maintain and protect the integrity, credibility and reliability of the PA campaign, and foster media trust and confidence in the military operation and the civil phase.

708. COORDINATION OF INFORMATION AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES

1. The most important factor associated with the use of information in any situation is the coordination of this information and associated activities. Meetings are on a required basis, defined by the operational situation. In IFOR, for example, COMIFOR met daily with PA staff while the public information planning schedule showed regular weekly meetings of a JICC headed by the Senior Public Affairs Officer composed of the senior PIOs from IFOR and ARCC, the Director of the CPIC, J3 Plans, J2 Int, J5 CIMIC, PSYOPS, J5 Legal and the main combat camera cell. The CF model should also include a JICC when two or more information teams are operating in the same AO.

2. The coordination of information and associated activities within military operations, also involve the activities of IOs, NGOs and UN agencies in a theatre or areas of operation. Because military tasks and civil tasks are complementary, their inclusion in the communications plan, combined to the synergy of CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA, are an operational requirement to achieve mission objectives.

3. Commanders at all levels must be aware of the lesson learned in PSO, as in other charged crises or conflicts, that *perception* is the *reality*. An act of deliberate or accidental *misinformation* or *disinformation* could take a life of its own through a tightly wired global information grid (GIE), as represented by the Internet. This fact makes the management of *perceptions* and *emotions*, to minimize civilian interference with military operations, an important and continuing aspect of leadership and command. Strategic and operational communication plans must be aware of this PA issue and focus on countering its negative impact on unity of purpose and unity of effort at the political, military, humanitarian and civilian levels.

4. Inter-agency meetings, held on a required basis by the TFC and subordinate commanders, must coordinate information and activities involving all stakeholders and partners in an AO. The end state is to maximize results, economy of effort and resources by winning the trust and confidence of civil authorities, local populations and

belligerent forces. As an example, IFOR found it beneficial to coordinate its media campaign at all command levels with IOs, NGOs and UN agencies in theatre or located in areas of operations. The early deployment of information campaign resources are beneficial to commanders at all levels.

709. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA operate under different concepts because of the activities undertaken by each function. CIMIC provides support to civil administration in friendly and hostile or occupied territories, to ensure that the social structure is able to continue to support its citizens which could include assistance or support to the civil infrastructure for mail delivering. CIMIC also supports CMO concerned with the control of resources and humanitarian assistance which could include the provision of engineers to rebuild bridges, rail lines, telephone or electrical systems. CIMIC may also be involved in civil protection by training local police forces (support to civil administration).

2. PSYOPS provide the TFC with means by which he can affect a change in the attitudes, behaviour and beliefs of the population and may involve countering disinformation attempts or propaganda efforts by extremist groups. *Offensive PSYOPS* would include speeches and the production of poster campaigns, leaflets, pamphlets, magazines, radio broadcasts or television images with specific messages aimed at certain segments of the population and belligerent forces to create doubt on the righteousness of their cause, the reliability and credibility of their leaders, the dependability of allies, the outcome of the conflict and their own survival. *Defensive PSYOPS* would require a TFC to reduce the belligerents' prestige, counter the effects of his propaganda and provide information about the intentions and measures to be taken by the military force to protect civil tasks and the mission.

3. PSYOPS shall not be conducted in peace, crisis or war unless approved by the CDS. PSYOPS shall be authorized within the approved AO, to include the area of interest to a TFC. Once a military operation is launched, concurrent PSYOPS can be planned, conducted, executed and coordinated at all three levels simultaneously, within directives and limitations issued by the CDS. Coherence between the political and military messages is paramount to achieving the mission

4. In certain circumstances, PSYOPS could include the insertion of information teams into areas of operations with the specific task of transmitting messages to the local population via the most effective and efficient communications tool available in the AO. All messages can be tailored to specific target groups. In essence, PSYOPS support CIMIC through political, military and economic actions planned and conducted to mould the perceptions, opinions, attitudes, behaviours and beliefs of foreign groups to support the objectives of the mission.

5. PA provides information on the activities of the military force to both internal and external target audiences via the media. PA uses news releases, back grounders, interviews and news conferences to pass information to these publics, including electronic means such as the Internet. Several aspects should be considered when planning an organizational structure for the employment of combined CIMIC/PSYOPS/PA for a task:

- a. there are two environments in which the three functions could be employed: domestic and international;
- b. CIMIC, as described and defined earlier, can be employed in both the domestic and international environments. In the domestic role, CIMIC can also provide support tasks associated with CEP;
- c. PA already provides support in both domestic and international environments by informing the public on civil and military tasks performed by military personnel. PAO will be used at formation and unit levels to release information for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding and support;
- d. PSYOPS would be used for domestic and international operations under specific guidelines aimed at influencing and shaping public opinion to support military activities and relying on the transparency of authorized sources of activities. Knowledge of local culture, values and beliefs as well as social structure, including centres of authority and decisions which may be likely centres of gravity, are essential elements which contribute to the success of PSYOPS; and

- e. in rehabilitation and reconstruction projects CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA are involved at every stage of each project, ensuring that the message is well understood by the local population and belligerent forces/FWF. This synergy acts as a *force multiplier*, enhancing the effectiveness and impact of the military force on the civil society, while contributing to the attainment of mission objectives.

6. PSYOPS activities would depend on the prevailing operational situation. In PSO, OOTW and combat, the CF would conduct white, grey and black propaganda, and other PSYOPS actions (political, diplomatic, economic, military), in conformity with Canadian Government policy and as authorized by strict CDS guidance and directives. Such actions must be coordinated with those PSYOPS activities of agents or units supporting the TFC.

710. UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES

1. CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA functions must be carefully managed so as not to overstep the scope of their activities, otherwise they may compromise themselves, particularly PA, in the eyes of the public and the media. PSYOPS, for example, should not be authorized to undertake the reconstruction of a school, to deliver humanitarian supplies or manage issues on behalf of the formation or unit commander. CIMIC should not conduct covert information gathering activities or organize and conduct press conferences. PA must not engage in PSYOPS activities so it is able to maintain its transparency and credibility at all times.

2. In essence, neither one of the three organizations (CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA) should conduct a campaign that would impair each other's operations. For example, press releases should not be used in deception plans because this would damage the credibility of the PA organization. Therefore, coordination and synchronization of activities between these organizations, such as in the formulation of PSYOPS messages, is paramount to the attainment of strategic and operational objectives.

711. ORGANIZATION

1. The CDS will authorize the guidance for use of CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA functions by the operational-level commander, for domestic and international operations. CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA could be most efficiently organized in the following manner:

a. Domestic Operations

- (1) The CF are an instrument of national policy. The CDS assisted by the NDHQ/J5 staff (J5 Policy, J5 Legal and J5 PA) and J3 Plans and Operations would be responsible for establishing broad CIMIC guidance based on national strategic objectives. The NDHQ/JSAT would be responsible for implementing policy as well as conduct detailed strategic planning and integration of CIMIC activities in the domestic environment. The environmental commands would be responsible for the planning of CIMIC activities by appointing an operational level coordinator and using environment-specific area domestic desks, at formation and unit levels to plan, conduct, control, monitor and evaluate CIMIC activities.
- (2) PA would continue its present activities in support of domestic tasks through national, command and other formation PA structures.
- (3) The mass media and means of coverage (print, newspapers, face-to-face interviews/debates, radio, films/video, TV, Internet, satellite communications) offer to all parties, capabilities to inform, influence and shape public opinion, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour in support of their respective objectives. A force structure at formation and unit levels is required in Canada to educate, train, exercise, plan and conduct domestic and international operations. In the context of preparing for international operations, the NDHQ/JSAT should assign a desk officer responsible for policy overview. The commands should also assign desk officers for strategic planning of PSYOPS contingency activities.

b. International Operations

- (1) The CDS assisted by the NDHQ/J5 staff (J5 Policy, J5 Legal and J5 PA) and J3 Plans and Operations

would be responsible for establishing broad CIMIC policies based on national strategic objectives. The NDHQ/JSAT would be responsible for implementing policy as well as conduct detailed strategic planning and integration of CIMIC activities in the international environment. The commands, at the operational level, would be responsible for the planning of CIMIC activities by using command coordinators for the planning phase and deploying area CIMIC desk officers to areas of operations, in the execution phase of these activities.

- (2) PAO are assigned to all international missions where Canada deploys in force. PAO are employed at formation and unit levels, and are responsible to the TFC for the management of issues and execution of communication plans.
- (3) Personnel assigned to PSYOPS are a mission asset and because their activities involve objectives to attain the mission, they should be accountable only to the TFC. PSYOPS are particularly useful as force multipliers. PSYOPS could be employed to great effect as it will gain the cooperation of the neutral and win the support of the undecided. The J3 cell would be accountable to the TFC for the integration of PSYOPS into military operations, including the selection of target audiences, supported by the J2 cell and specialist officers. Notwithstanding, a public information campaign must exploit all media available in theatre to disseminate credible information to the national and international public.

712. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. When the CF must conduct PSYOPS to support a military operation, the CDS will authorise the policy and guidance for use by the TFC through the national Information Operations Coordination Cell (IOCC) within the J staff. The CDS may also assign specialist staff officers to the TFC as required.
2. At the operational level, the TFHQ staff is responsible to the TFC for integrating PSYOPS into the IO activities of their operations. The implementation of PCA, BPA and PSPA are the responsibility of the TFC. The TFC may also be involved in the implementation of SPA. J3 Ops would supervise PSYOPS, in close coordination with PA and J5 CIMIC, through the TFHQ IOCC. The TFHQ IOCC should include as a minimum, members from the J3 Division, J2 Division and specialist staff including PA, PSYOPS and J5 CIMIC officers.
3. At the tactical level, PSYOPS units or teams will conduct PSYOPS activities as authorized by the chain of command, within CDS guidelines.

713. CANADIAN FORCES PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES

1. The activation of PSYOPS elements within a reliable information operations structure, has specific materiel and organisational capability requirements for target audiences. For education, training, exercises and operations a Task Force TO&E would detail the personnel and equipment required to provide all or several of the following capabilities:
 - a. command, control, communications and information systems (C³S);
 - b. research and analysis, and propaganda production;
 - c. intelligence/military information and military police resources with access to "Internet" and "Interpol" in light of criminal activities prevalent in an AO;
 - d. access to radio, television and film/video productions, including a broadcast capability;
 - e. graphic production;
 - f. newspaper/leaflet publication;
 - g. printing capability;

- h. loudspeaker teams;
- i. man-portable loudspeaker systems to address large crowds or groups spread over large areas;
- j. combat camera cell, both for CIVPOL and the military, in domestic and international operations;
- k. audio-visual teams;
- l. language proficiency/ethnic background among PSYOPS teams deployed in the AO;
- m. interpreters and translators, as required; and
- n. transport and drivers, supply and maintenance.

2. Effective MIST teams employing PSYOPS TTPs would enhance Force protection and the security of individuals and material in an AO. These TTPs will help modify attitudes and behaviours in support of the TF political and military objectives. PSYOPS will be most effective, as a force multiplier, when employed with PA, whose function it is to help bridge cultural differences, and CIMIC. The use of all available means of disseminating credible and factual information, including the troops in direct contact with the local population, such as in the case of foot patrols, must be exploited by the TFC to enhance the combat effectiveness of the TF.

3. Coordinated Force protection measures at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, remain the most potent weapon available to commanders to deter potential violence that would disrupt the civil phase, as long as these measures are backed up by the political will to act when violence erupts.

CHAPTER 8

NEGOTIATIONS IN CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

SECTION I

**NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE
CONTEXT OF LOW LEVEL CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

“Deployment and negotiation are to peacekeeping as fire and movement are to war...In peacekeeping operations, forces deploy to support negotiations and negotiate to enhance and facilitate their deployment. Just as fire and movement must be tied to a larger concept of operations, so deployment and negotiation must support the overall plan of de-escalation.” - Major David M. Last, Canadian Forces, Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-escalation in Peacekeeping Operations

*“There are many times when platoon commanders and platoon sergeants at roadblocks, and company and battalion commanders working in cordon and search operations, must negotiate and communicate with potential belligerents. **Leaders** need to know that they may be placed in a position that requires them to mediate or negotiate on the battlefield.”* - BG L. Magruder, USA, CG, Joint Readiness Training Center

801. INTRODUCTION

1. Negotiations take place when two parties with opposing views meet to resolve their differences. When a third party assists by acting between the opposed parties in an effort to bring them together, it is referred to as mediation. In practice, most mediation takes the form of negotiations between a mediator and one of the parties at a time, trying to find common ground. This section describes the characteristics of these activities and the techniques needed to succeed. It must be adapted to the particular context of domestic operations, domestic laws and jurisdictional rights.

2. In the context of a complex emergency, negotiations will be conducted at many levels and between many parties, and issues will range from strategic level discussions in the UN Security Council to tactical level negotiations between UN officials and military commanders and local militia leaders. Negotiations may concern political, humanitarian, and military activity. The parties in a complex emergency will want to discuss these questions with anyone representing the different elements of the international community. It is essential that those people working to resolve the conflict understand the scope of the negotiations that may be taking place and how their functions relate to wider efforts to achieve a negotiated solution.

3. It is imperative that the aims of higher level negotiators be made known to all levels in order that the credibility of lower level negotiators is not compromised.

802. CHARACTERISTICS

1. In the intercommunal violence associated with a complex emergency, most negotiations will be between members of the international community and each of the parties separately. These meetings will concern relations between elements of the international response group and one of the parties, for example in the interpretation of their mandate and to gain access to recent incidents, rather than mediation between the parties. Three broad types of negotiations may be taking place at every level, of which only one is actually between the parties:

- a. negotiations between elements of the international community on external or internal theater related problems; for example between troop-contributing nations, between the civilian and military elements of a UN mission, and at local level between NGO convoys and their UN military escort;
- b. negotiations between elements of the international community and one or more of the parties; for example, on the scope and nature of the international community’s intervention or assistance in the crisis, or with a host government concerning which military contingents are acceptable, and at a lower level between NGO officials and the local authorities on the implementation of a program; and

- c. negotiations between the parties, assisted by members of the international community; these also take place at every level and are the most important type for members of the international community to promote. It is possible that the parties also will meet and negotiate without outside assistance.

803. NEGOTIATING ISSUES

1. Within each type of negotiation in the context of a complex emergency, there are three broad areas that may be the subject of negotiations. Although these tend to follow the division of responsibility adopted by elements of an international response group, these divisions may not be recognized by the parties to the conflict.

a. Political Issues

- (1) In a crisis that results from a conflict between two or more parties, the immediate priority may be to provide humanitarian assistance or achieve a cease-fire, but the most important negotiations will be aimed at achieving an overall political agreement between the parties. Successful negotiations provide the framework and direction within which humanitarian and military activities take place. Once agreement has been reached, the countries or organizations involved have to negotiate with the host government and other parties to agree to the terms of deployment and create a viable situation on the ground, for example by reaching a political accord that could lead to a cease-fire.
- (2) As international agencies (military units, humanitarian agencies, or NGOs) arrive in the conflict area, they will need to negotiate with the parties for access to their territory and for accommodation and support. Deployment of UN agencies should be covered by a SOFA with the host government. However, it may prove difficult or impossible to reach formal agreement if government has broken down or in territory where the defacto government is not recognized by the international community.

b. Humanitarian Issues

- (1) Representatives of humanitarian agencies may need to negotiate for access to assess humanitarian needs with a host government, or with local military or police units. Having made a "needs assessment," the humanitarian agency may need to agree with the host government or the local commanders on the assessment (if the humanitarian aid is going to a minority, for example) and methods of supply and distribution. The humanitarian agency will negotiate with donors to provide the types and quantities of relief that are required. Once the humanitarian agency has the supplies, it may have to negotiate with the parties on a case-by-case basis for access to supply relief to the target population. No matter what agreement may have been reached before-hand, actual distribution can take a great deal of negotiation as convoys can be halted locally on the whim of a local militia commander.
- (2) In addition to supplying humanitarian aid, humanitarian agencies may need to negotiate with the parties for freedom of movement to monitor the conditions of a minority at risk. This may be done by human rights monitors, or almost any other agency operating in the area. Release of detainees and prisoners of war is another crucial area of humanitarian negotiations because detainees are often held under poor conditions and their captivity is a highly emotive subject between parties. These negotiations are normally conducted by the ICRC, on the basis that all prisoners should be unilaterally released. Members of other agencies, humanitarian or military, should allow the ICRC to take the lead in these negotiations, and should be very careful if they become involved in them by the parties. There is a great risk that the parties may seize personnel in order to exchange them for their own detainees if uncontrolled prisoner exchanges take place.

c. Military Issues

- (1) Although the decision to become involved may be political, military commanders may have to negotiate the terms on which they will deploy in support of political or humanitarian agreements. It is important for the military to ensure that they are not committed to an operation that is militarily untenable. Military representatives may be involved in negotiating cease-fires that can take three stages: first

getting the parties to reach an internal political agreement that they want a cease-fire, then achieving a military agreement on how to conduct the cease-fire, and finally negotiating a workable implementation of the agreement on the ground. Having deployed, military units will negotiate with the parties for FOM to monitor and enforce political or military agreements, such as cease-fires or demilitarization.

- (2) Agreements made at a higher level may need to be renegotiated on a case-by-case basis at a lower level: for example, to move up to confrontation lines to monitor activity or establish observation posts; to cross confrontation lines in order to hold meetings or resupply units; or to monitor troop deployments once a separation of forces from a confrontation line has been agreed, following a cease-fire or demilitarization of a zone. Military units deployed to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance will have to negotiate on a case-by-case basis for freedom of movement to escort convoys. This may lead to "linkage" negotiations on other humanitarian issues and political problems that may be used as bargaining devices by local warlords or paramilitary forces.

804. APPOINTING NEGOTIATORS

1. **Command Involvement.** Command and negotiating are both full time functions. Although commanders will want to be fully involved in all negotiations that are central to the success of their mission, there may be scope for establishing a negotiating team to deal with routine matters and allow the commander to step in, either to add weight when negotiations are in danger of failing, or to finalize agreements. However, negotiators should have rank, status, and credibility; for example, a senior military officer should engage the commanders of the parties about a cease-fire, and a doctor should discuss medical questions with local health authorities.

2. **Impartiality.** There may be occasions when it is useful to have senior negotiators who are not commanders, so that if a commander has had to take punitive action against one of the parties, and as a result, they refuse to talk to the commander (suspension of relief supplies or use of air power, for example), a mediator or an impartial negotiator can reopen dialogue.

3. **Negotiating Teams.** Because negotiating can be very time-consuming and operational areas are spread out, dedicated negotiating teams should cover specific areas; negotiators who are divided between several different locations while dealing with different problems may be less successful. Negotiating teams may include several people with different expertise, but large delegations should be avoided, and a lead negotiator is best joined by other experts as necessary. In large delegations, decision makers will be constrained by the presence of an audience, and without constructive dialogue, negotiations may break down. Progress will improve once the negotiators and decision makers, or their direct representatives, work alone or in very small groups.

4. **Coordinated Objectives.** Political, humanitarian, and military negotiators from different organizations or elements of a UN mission may talk to the same leaders of the parties. If they are going to have any success in their negotiations, individually or collectively, they need to be coordinated. This can be achieved by providing clear direction from the highest level on what objectives should be sought from negotiations and where it is possible to compromise. In addition, there needs to be regular liaison between the agencies and individuals engaged in negotiations at each level so that they are aware of progress or problems. The most efficient solution may be to create a separate negotiating organization that is responsible for generating negotiating strategy, following the directions of the commander, and for conducting the majority of negotiations at the theatre level.

805. TASKS

1. Negotiating objectives should be set at the highest level and implemented by everyone involved. Although the UN SRSG may give clear direction about what can be negotiated - with whom and by whom, to the heads of the military, civilian, and humanitarian elements working for the UN - it is important to note that many organizations operating in-theatre will not be under UN control, and will conduct their own negotiations independently. The following negotiating tasks may be carried out at all levels:

- a. **Mediate.** Negotiators identify common ground on which the parties can discuss and agree on.

- b. **Facilitate.** Negotiators provide practical assistance to their opposite numbers in the parties, for example, by passing messages, providing a hot line, or securing a venue for a meeting.
- c. **Communicate.** Because negotiations can be affected directly by outside events, negotiators must stay in touch while negotiating and also pass on the results swiftly. If related military activity occurs while the negotiations are in progress or an agreement on a cease-fire is successful, it has to be communicated as rapidly as possible to all forces on the confrontation line.
- d. **Educate.** Negotiators may have to teach parties how to negotiate and to make genuine concessions. The parties may be unable to see that there are alternatives open to them. Negotiators also will have to ensure that the parties understand the meaning of agreements that they reach, and the resulting obligations of the international community and the parties in implementing the agreements.
- e. **Information Policy Development.** Manipulation of information can have a serious impact on negotiations. This may be countered by actively seeking international support for negotiations and by presenting the facts as seen by the negotiators to diplomatic contacts, who will report to their capitals, and the local and international media. The local media may be influenced by the parties and need to hear the negotiators' points of view. The international media will influence both international decision makers and those elements of the local population who have access to it.
- f. **Identify Incentives and Disincentives.** Mediation and negotiation should be supported by a comprehensive range of incentives and disincentives to the parties, so that they can be encouraged to take positive steps and dissuaded from taking action that will be detrimental to the peace effort. These incentives and disincentives will vary according to circumstances. Identification of effective incentives and disincentives is vital in the preparatory stage of the negotiating strategy.

806. NEGOTIATING VENUES

1. The venue for negotiations is usually dictated by the parties, particularly if negotiators have taken the initiative to go to the parties. In face-to-face negotiations, venue selection may be very difficult, with each party perceiving advantages or disadvantages to each proposal and refusing to agree. Common locations are:
 - a. **In-Theatre.** UNNY have the advantages of being neutral territory if the parties are to meet with some security and good communications. However, space is often at a premium, making protracted negotiations difficult. The headquarters of the parties are where most bilateral negotiations between parties will take place, with the negotiator visiting their opposite side's office. Embassies, where parties can meet for negotiations hosted by a nation acceptable to all concerned, have the advantages of neutrality and providing status to the negotiations. However, security of the visiting delegations may be a problem, as can the availability of space at the embassy. When the parties refuse to meet anywhere else, crossing points in no-man's land on confrontation lines or a porta cabin at a UN checkpoint in no-man's land can be useful.
 - b. **Out-of-Theatre.** UNNY has been used as a neutral venue for parties. However, it is probably a long way from the theatre and secrecy is hard to maintain. Regional UN headquarters also have been used as neutral locations, and may be considerably closer to the theatre of operations, making it easier to bring the parties together, but secrecy is also very difficult. Other neutral locations can be found in external, neighbouring, or neutral third countries, if this is acceptable to the parties. This may be the preferred solution if negotiations are to be kept secret.
 - c. **Factors.** The following factors should be considered when selecting a venue:
 - (1) **security.** The venue should be physically secure, with protection provided by the host authorities or the UN if it is on UN controlled territory;
 - (2) **accessibility.** Time should not be wasted getting to remote venues unless this promotes either secrecy or a positive approach to the negotiations;

- (3) **communications.** As already mentioned, communications are vital. If necessary, the negotiating team should provide communications facilities that also can be used by the parties to liaise with their authorities; and
- (4) **comfort.** During protracted negotiations, a basic level of comfort may be useful to facilitate a successful outcome. There should be rooms for each delegation, large and small meeting rooms, facilities for providing food and drinks, and overnight accommodations if required.

807. OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES

1. **Identification of Decision makers.** Time and effort can be wasted negotiating with officials without the influence or authority to reach agreements. It is important to identify who the real decision makers are, as they are not always the people who have the appropriate titles and offices, and to attempt to deal with them directly.
2. **Media.** All parties will try to exploit the media for their own aims. Negotiators should not become victims of this manipulation. Many incidents are “staged” with a view that they will be almost instantly broadcast as satellite television news. These incidents often are used to communicate a political position or to elicit the sympathy and support of the international community to take action on behalf of the manipulator. Failure to understand the underlying motives for staged media incidents can endanger the success of negotiations.
3. **Security of Delegates.** Negotiators must be aware of security at all levels. Individually, negotiators may be at risk if extremists believe that they support an opposing side’s position or fail to support their own position sufficiently. Delegations from the parties may visit or travel through hostile territory controlled by or accessible to other parties for negotiations.
4. **Two-Track Negotiations.** As much work as possible should be done at the local level, as this creates a more favourable climate in which negotiations of all types can take place. Progress made on small issues at the local level can create a degree of trust and confidence that allows negotiations on more serious issues to make progress at the top level. Conversely, progress in the top level negotiations will provide impetus to the local level. Parties at the local level may say that they are unable to reach an agreement because they are waiting for instructions from a higher authority.
5. **Communications and Mobility.** During crises, negotiators must be able to contact their interlocutors and superiors at any time, rapidly, and under all conditions. They need to have voice and data communications that are portable and function reliably, as well as flexible transport that is appropriate to the local conditions.
6. **Maintaining Secrecy.** In public, parties may take extreme negotiating positions to try and influence their domestic audience, the international community, and the opposition. If progress is to be made, it is probable that one or more of the parties may have to discuss matters and reach agreements at odds with their public position. It may be very difficult for the parties to do this publicly and survive politically. For this reason, negotiations are best conducted in secret. Successful secret negotiations require careful and imaginative planning and implementation and strict adherence to the “need to know” principle. This is best achieved by involving only one or two people from each delegation. They are not popular with those who are excluded, both within the international community and the parties. In addition, information must be protected so that parties are sure that they can discuss their negotiating positions in confidence with the negotiators, and that there is no risk that the press will exploit information about the content of negotiations for their own benefit, either as a news story or to gain intelligence, which would damage the negotiators’ credibility.
7. **Political Recognition.** The parties may seek international recognition for a region or state, which may be politically impossible for the international community to confer. Everyone dealing with the parties must be aware of this, and beware of the informal use of titles or terms of reference that might appear to give credibility where none is implied.
8. **Joint Commissions.** Convening a joint commission can bring parties together at the local level, chaired by relevant representatives from the international community and attended by representatives of the parties. Delegations can be political (mayors or politicians, for example), military (commanders at various levels, for

example) or humanitarian (the local Red Cross or Red Crescent). Problems can be raised and, if possible, the entire joint commission can travel to examine the facts on the ground, rapidly correcting false allegations and building confidence. Chapter 5, article 504 discusses Joint Military Commissions and Joint Civil Commissions.

9. **Using Interpreters.** First class interpreters are vital. They should not be natives of the conflict area, as locals are vulnerable to coercion or attack by the parties and may not be accepted by both sides. Unless they can be trusted for their impartiality and be protected, interpreters from one party should not be taken onto territory controlled by another party. It is likely that the parties will bring their own interpreters.

808. PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS

1. **Impartiality.** If parties believe a negotiator is no longer impartial, their trust, cooperation, and openhearted relationship will be lost and negotiations probably will be unsuccessful.

2. **Long-Term View.** Negotiators should recognize that it takes time to change from opposing positions to common ground and to establish a culture of negotiations in which the parties become used to meeting and solving small problems together in preparation for handling crises and tackling larger problems. A short-term negotiating success, won by conceding an apparently small point, may be damaging and set a long-term precedent; for example, paying tolls to get emergency aid through a hostile checkpoint may solve an immediate crisis, but also could set a precedent that results in all convoys having to pay increasingly extortionate tolls in future. Negotiators should plan ahead to exploit the impact of seasonal changes; for example, seeds and fertilizer for spring planting and fuel in winter as a source of incentives. They also should anticipate future crises and be prepared to react when they occur, but also remain aware that long negotiations may be overtaken by events.

3. **Imagination.** Imagination and lateral approaches are vital for the identification of common ground between the parties, development of incentives and disincentives, and finding ways to overcome the many barriers in conducting successful negotiations.

4. **Acting with Determination.** The parties will have more at stake and may have fewer constraints on their actions than negotiators from the international community; for example a militia gunman at a checkpoint may have no rules of engagement, unlike a convoy commander. Faced with parties under emotional pressure, the negotiator or representative must also be prepared to act with determination.

5. **Cultural Awareness.** Negotiations are often conducted in unfamiliar languages between parties that follow idiosyncratic customs for greeting and meeting, and hold values that are peculiar to their culture. When negotiators themselves also have different cultural backgrounds, the possibilities for misunderstanding are great. It is above all the responsibility of the negotiators to understand the culture of the people they are talking to, so that they better understand the messages that they receive.

809. CONTACT SKILLS

1. **Reality.** An effective peacekeeping mission requires close coordination within the military chain and between the military and civilian elements of a force. All entities within a peacekeeping force may have the opportunity to act as third parties to a conflict where they may be called upon to segregate opposing forces to reduce violence and restore trust, confidence and normal relations. One approach to the overall concept is to perceive that, as the neutral party, you are working with the belligerents against the conflict and you have at your disposal numerous tools including:

- a. **Constabulary Intervention.** This occurs when soldiers of a peacekeeping force act as police to halt or deter the actions of opposing forces. This action may consist simply of soldiers standing in full view and dissuading belligerent acts by their presence alone.
- b. **Arbitration.** Arbitration is used to control situations that could turn violent. In arbitration, an authoritative third party provides a binding judgement by considering the opposing positions and imposing a settlement. A binding judgement means that the freedom of the opposing forces is reduced and therefore, the freedom of the peacekeepers is enhanced.

- c. **Mediation.** A third party mediator in a conflict normally acts as in the presence of both sides at the same time, holding third party meetings. This rarely happens at the tactical or operational level in peacekeeping missions because the focus is on separation of opposing forces. Segregation allows mistrust and lack of communication to turn small acts on either side into threatening gestures. Acting as mediators, the peacekeeper can minimize misinterpretation of opposing force intentions and reduce tension and hostility.
 - d. **Conciliation.** Conciliation by peacekeeping forces consists of actions and discussions that reduces hostility between opposing forces. In the process, conciliation erodes the negative stereotypes that characterize conflict. It occurs at every level and can be particularly effective at the tactical level, where platoon commanders may meet with comparatively inexperienced opposing force company commanders who are prepared to believe the worst of their opponents.
 - e. **Negotiation.** This is a powerful technique for handling incidents throughout the conflict resolution process, but it is a two sided sword in that like any technique relying on local initiative, the strategic and operational goals must be clearly spelled out so that negotiators at all levels are working towards a common goal. There are four basic tenets of negotiation that should be considered:
 - (1) separate people from the problem(don't make it a conflict of personalities);
 - (2) focus on interests, not positions;
 - (3) invent options for mutual gain; and
 - (4) insist on using objective criterion for evaluation.
2. Three potential criteria offered to measure the success of the negotiations are:
- a. they should produce agreements that serve the legitimate interests of both parties;
 - b. they should be efficient; and
 - c. they should improve or at least not damage the relationship between the parties.

810. LOW LEVEL NEGOTIATION TECHNIQUES

- 1. These negotiations are usually time-sensitive. The following approach is proposed:
 - a. identify the IOs/NGOs in your AO, the likely situations which may arise and require negotiation. Be proactive and ready;
 - b. know your international law, SOFA, MOU as most breaches will revolve around issues spelled out in these documents i.e. freedom of movement...;
 - c. have a portrait of key figures and appointments of HN civil and military authorities in your AO. Know whom you most likely will be dealing with in a particular situation i.e. HN security officer, liaison officer...;
 - d. find out as much about the situation as you can before going on-the-scene. Be aware that radio communications are most likely monitored by the HN. Always have someone with you to operate the radio as your superior(s) and higher headquarters will most likely want to be informed as the situation evolves;
 - e. once on-the-scene, find out the exact situation from the international community organizations and from the HN members. Never get into a discussion or argue about who is right and who is wrong with those who simply apply orders as this is counter-productive. Negotiate only with those in position of power and able to make decisions. If they are not present, ask to speak to a representative immediately. If in doubt on the course of action to take, contact your immediate superior;

- f. be assertive but always calm, polite and patient. Project an image of confidence and discuss the situation with team member(s) and your interpreter should the situation so dictate. Let the other side know you are representing an international body or a very important person, and that you are speaking in the name of that organization e.g. the UN or NATO or that person. Exert pressure on decision makers to make a quick decision;
 - g. once the situation is resolved, take steps with those involved to ensure the situation does not repeat itself. This may mean briefing IO/NGO representatives in your AO. Re-establish a collaborative effort with HN representatives at the various levels of government, as applicable. Be pro-active and keep all parties informed of actions taken to correct a real or perceived problem. Always keep your communication channels open with all parties. All must save face and arrive at a fair and just compromise;
 - h. keep your sense of humour at all times and never show your frustration; and
 - i. report to your immediate superior, the chain of events and action(s) taken. The chain of events may be serious enough to be addressed by HN higher level authorities in Joint Commissions.
2. Annex A sets out ways and means of planning your negotiation. It is a useful checklist in low level conflict resolution (Section I) and negotiations for support services with a HN or in the context of domestic operations (Section II).

SECTION II

CONTRACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS FOR SUPPORT SERVICES

811. INTRODUCTION

1. Negotiation for support services is covered extremely well in documents listed at article 812, therefore, only a general overview will be given here. Negotiations will occur both domestically (with industry assisting the CF in mobilizing for war as well as in day to day activities) and internationally. Within the realm of CIMIC, these negotiations are the same as those undertaken in all aspects of logistics during operations, training and exercises.

2. Prior to entering into negotiations for support, authority from the host government must be in place. In the context of NATO countries, this is usually in place through SOFAs. Support may be obtained in four ways:

- a. integral support from ones own country;
- b. support from allied powers;
- c. support from the Host Nation; and
- d. support obtained direct from the local economy.

812. HOST NATION SUPPORT

1. The requirement for HNS arises on operations where the CF is deployed as part of an alliance such as NATO or under UN auspices. Under these conditions a NDHQ representative, usually from J4 Logistics, or a representative with delegated authority, will represent Canada in any negotiations for HNS. Negotiating for HNS is covered under NATO document ALP-12, Procedures for NATO HNS Agreements/Arrangements (HNSA) dated June 1993. Canada, as a sending nation is responsible for coordinating the HNS required to mount and deploy her forces into the theatre of operations, while MNCs, or their designated subordinates, are responsible for coordination of HNS planning for the support of multinational forces within the AO.

2. CF policies and procedures for procurement of goods and services are listed below:

- a. instructions and procedures governing the commitment of DND resources to non defence agencies are found in DAOD 1019-0, Provision of Services;
- b. the introduction to an MOU and policy direction are covered in DAOD 7014-0. Procedures for the preparation of an MOU are covered in DAOD 7014-1 and A-AD-005-0011/AG-000, Memoranda of Understanding Guidelines and index. NATO procedures are described in NATO publication AACP-1, Guidance for the drafting of MOU and International Cooperative Arrangements. Advice and assistance in drafting and negotiating MOU may be sought from the National Defence MOU Coordinator (NDMOUC). NDMOUC will be consulted and kept advised of activities on MOU from inception to termination;
- c. policy and procedures for the provision of training to foreign military forces are found in CFAO 9-68;
- d. instructions / regulations governing real estate and utility agreements are in DAOD 4001, 4006 and 4008;
- e. policy and instructions for negotiating for HNS are covered under NATO document ALP-12, Procedures for NATO HNSA dated June 1993;
- f. information on SOFA may be found in QR&O Appendix XIV; and
- g. the DND Contracting Manual, A-LM-102-000/AG-001, details the Policies and Procedures for obtaining goods and services.

CHAPTER 9

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND NORMALITY INDICATORS

“One major challenge is that this mission is a non-conventional military campaign. Hence, the military information traditionally collected by the HQ is unlikely to provide a wide enough view of the progress of the mission and all the ‘knock-on’ effects in the community.” - HQ ARRC, Normality Indicators Briefing, Bosnia, October 1996

“Our mission was to support the ground force commander, in particular, to give independent analytical advice to the Commanderto aid his decision-making over the spectrum of ARRC activities.” - Dr George Rose, Head Operational Analysis Branch, HQ ARRC, Oxford, 13-15 April 1997

901. INTRODUCTION

1. In the military and civil phases of an operation, the civil tasks have a direct impact on the mission, the re-establishment of the civil infrastructure and the return to a stable, secure and normal way of life. In peace building efforts, the type of information traditionally collected by a military force does not provide sufficient data to evaluate and analyse the progress of recovery to a stable and progressive civil society. The collection of both military and non-military data is required to ensure that credible and reliable data is available to the TFC to make informed decisions in support of the civil-military campaign. The synergy of CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA will be particularly effective in the application of selected performance measurements. The local population can be predisposed to assist and support the collection of data, and informed of results once the data has been adequately processed. Positive results will certainly be a boost to the morale of civil authorities and the population.

2. Two methods are available to a TFC: *measures of effectiveness* (MOE) and *normality indicators*. MOE provide tools to measure the level of success of the mission, thereby assessing operational effectiveness in carrying out the mission and civil tasks. MOE do not measure the end result of a humanitarian operation i.e. the condition and quality of life of refugees following humanitarian aid but the success of the civil tasks associated with the mission. More particularly, MOE focus on the correlation between results achieved in the overall mission and the execution of assigned civil tasks. *Normality indicators*, on the other hand, serve to measure trends and progress in the recovery of a civil society to a realistic quality of life. Normality indicators measure the level of improvement of the civilian condition to reduce the level of dependency on the military force. Either methodology can be adapted to domestic or international environment.

3. While humanitarian operations must be subject to performance measurements, they are not a substitute for longer term extensive socio-economic surveys sponsored by UN agencies, IOs or NGOs. A TFC must therefore exploit all sources of data measuring the recovery and quality of life of the local population in his AO, as well as the effectiveness of military operations that assist in this recovery. MOE and normality indicators should be *jointly* developed with civil agencies to reinforce unity of purpose and effort in civil-military activities.

902. TASK FORCE COMMANDER’S STATEMENT OF INTENT

1. The TFC must state his intent to collect and analyse information that measures the trends in the recovery of a society, particularly political, social and economic progress, as well as the effectiveness of military operations launched in the civil phase. This data is available, in part, through civilian sources which collect both long term and short term data. All data, once systematically processed, will allow the TFC to evaluate and demonstrate the success and reliability of the security framework in an AO and, in so doing, win over public support for peace building efforts in the civil phase of a military operation.

2. Good news must be disseminated by the most effective mass communication means to counter extremist propaganda which would turn public opinion against the military force. The synergy of CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA is important to the successful application and dissemination of the data collected to measure success.

3. The requirement for a wider data set than normal was at the root of the IFOR mission, as stated by the

COMARRC intent: *"I intend to employ the full spectrum of Joint Military Commissions (refer to chapter 5, article 504) and liaison arrangements and military forces to establish the security framework within which humanitarian aid and military civic action projects can be carried out to allow peace to take root and to achieve the conditions that will allow a transition to peacekeeping operations and a reduction in IFOR force levels...We must examine our image with the local population. We must lead the way in demonstrating normality".*

903. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

1. MOE in military operations are defined as tools used to measure results achieved in the overall mission and execution of assigned civil tasks, compared to stated strategic and operational objectives. Notwithstanding, efficiency which measures the results achieved compared to resources invested must also be assessed in the course of military operations. Military involvement in PSO and humanitarian operations are increasing. Measuring progress is important to military operations for the same reasons it is in combat. Measures are tools providing a better picture of the situation, the level of effort being applied against specific problems, the effectiveness of these efforts and, ultimately, an assessment of progress toward the desired end state.

2. It is essential for the TFC, to develop MOE to assess operational and tactical military effectiveness in PSO, OOTW and combat. In this particular instance, we will look at MOE applicable to a PSO, namely humanitarian operations. The necessary criteria to develop analytical measures to assess military effectiveness in humanitarian operations is shown at table 1.

Table 1 - Criteria for Selecting Measures of Effectiveness

Criteria	Definition
Mission-Related	Mission-level MOE at the operational level should relate to the strategic objectives for the mission. The other MOE and measures will be more specifically focussed but must be related to the strategic objectives.
Comprehensive	The full list of task-performance MOE should cover all tasks in support of the mission and should expand if the mission expands. A military force should not focus solely on the security aspect of the mission nor should it fail to include measures that cover extra tasks (see Chapter 2 - "mission creep"). Different types of measures should be complementary.
Meaningful	<i>Mission-level</i> MOE should focus on the effectiveness of the mission, <i>task-performance</i> . MOE should focus on the effectiveness of tasks, not on their accomplishment, and transition MOE should focus on the degree the tasks are <i>transitioning</i> to the follow-on organization. They should all be evaluated together.
Measurable	Those managing the analytical measure effort must give clear guidelines so that information can be collected and measured consistently over time and across areas.
Sensitive	The level of MOE measurement should provide enough detail to ascertain whether the situation is changing. MOE should support trend analysis.
Timely	Mission-level MOE used to assess effectiveness, should be responsive to the changes they are trying to measure, so the military force can detect the changes and act on them.
Cost-effective	The number and type of analytical tools should be sufficiently reasonable not to levy too high a burden on those tasked with the effort.

3. **Types of MOE.** As a result of the application of the above criteria to humanitarian operations, five types of MOE have been identified as part of a framework to develop a comprehensive set of MOE for humanitarian operations, involving all stakeholders. These same measures could be applied to other PSO, OOTW and combat:

- a. **Mission-Level MOE.** They provide insight into progress toward the larger political and humanitarian objectives. These objectives include providing a secure environment that allows the delivery of humanitarian

assistance, promotes the redevelopment of key institutions, and supports democratic elections. Because the objectives they address are encompassing, mission-level MOE must be broad.

- b. **Task-Performance MOE.** They provide additional insight into how well military and humanitarian tasks are proceeding. MOE will support an evaluation of task-performance. They will address specific actions taken to address specific military and humanitarian tasks. Many of the measures compare the actions undertaken to address a specific situation with the total requirements.
- c. **Level of Effort MOE.** They provide insight into the magnitude of military support to a humanitarian operations, more particularly, individual actions taken by the military force. Examples include metric tons of food delivered or number of convoys escorted. Such measures are not MOE because they do not measure effectiveness, but they often support the measurement of broader-level task-performance or mission-level measures.
- d. **Transition MOE.** They provide insight into progress toward the transition of responsibilities to another follow-on military force or civil agency. Transition measures can be useful in helping to assess the particular responsibilities assumed by follow-on organizations. An effective transition is important to sustain the military's accomplishment and prevent a relapse to earlier crisis conditions.
- e. **General Indicators.** They provide insight into progress on improving the situation. Operational indicators are a non-quantitative tool, a supplement to MOE, that can indicate progress. Examples of general indicators include food riots (indicating food shortages) or crowds returning to markets (indicating the public's perception of a reduced threat of violence).

4. These various MOE build upon each other and should be used together to get a more comprehensive view of the situation a military force is trying to measure. The first three types of MOE (key elements of mission analysis) produce political and policy level objectives addressed through mission-level MOE. From these objectives, tasks are derived, and are addressed through task-performance MOE. From the tasks, required civil-military capabilities and force structure are derived, and their actions are addressed by level of effort measures.

5. Historically, the analysis of humanitarian operations generate some or all of the following characteristics: diplomacy, security, infrastructure and institutions, public health, and the agriculture and economic situation. Using these characteristics, along with the different types of MOE identified at paragraph 4, provides a framework for developing MOE applicable to humanitarian operations, as illustrated by table 2.

Table 2 - Types of MOE and Characteristics of Humanitarian Operations

Characteristics/ Types of MOE	Security	Institution/Infrastructure	Public Health	Agriculture/Economic
Mission-level MOE				
Tasks-performance MOE				
Level of effort measures				
Transition measures				
General indicators				

6. **Security.** Because the military is the primary force to provide security and Force protection it would be responsible to collect the data for developing the MOE. In some cases, relief organizations may have some information to contribute such as stolen inventory. An example of security MOE is at table 3.

Table 3 - Security MOE

Type	Examples of Specific Security MOE
Mission-level MOE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Number of threats to the lives of civil and military personnel. 2. Number of OPSEC breaches and types i.e. verbal, electronic... 3. Number of political incidents/corruption at each level of government. 4. Number and level of changes to the military alert status.
Task-performance MOE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Area patrolled divided by total area requiring patrolling in AO. 2. Numbers of convoys escorted divided by convoy escort requirement in terms of troops, UN police, weapons and vehicles. 3. Number of criminal-related incidents i.e. mafia groups. 4. Number of facilities/warehouses targeted by belligerent groups.
Level of effort measures	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Number, size and types of patrols by road, sea and air. 2. Number of convoys escorted and size of forces assigned to convoy escort.
Transition measures	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Percentage of security requirements assumed by HN or follow-on forces.
General Indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cost of material damage sustained in confrontations with belligerents. 2. Number of police in communities deployed to maintain law and order. 3. Number of incidents involving the military or the local police, or both.

7. **Infrastructure and Institutions.** The military may need to collect the data for developing measures, particularly at the task-performance level. Some mission-level data needed for measure development may be available through relief organizations or in other assessments that are conducted for humanitarian operations. An example of infrastructure and institutions MOE are at table 4.

Table 4 - Infrastructure and Institutions MOE

Type	Examples of Specific Infrastructure and Institutions MOE
Mission-level MOE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Fraction of local institutions functioning to meet local needs. 2. Percentage of areas where required basic services can be provided. 3. Percentage of IDPs and refugees repatriated to their homes.
Task-performance MOE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Number of police per 1000 persons population. 2. Number of courts functioning divided by number required for an effective and efficient HN judicial system. 3. Percentage of airfields, ports, and major supply routes opened to traffic. 4. Percentage of food, potable water, sanitation being provided <i>versus</i> the total demand to meet the <i>basic</i> needs of the population.
Level of effort measures	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Number of trained police. 2. Number of visual flight rules-capable airfields being operated compared to close idle or instrumented-operated airfields. 3. Number of miles of roads improved to specific HN standards.
Transition measures	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Percentage of required responsibilities (running ports, ports or airfields, maintaining roads, providing lift...) turned over to the HN, contractors, follow-on forces.
General indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Incidents of harassment of returnees. 2. Civilians injured or killed, which may involve local police civil authorities, military or paramilitary forces. 3. Increase/decrease in human rights violations (Unwarranted arrests...).

8. **Public health.** Most mission-level measures are collected by relief organizations in the HN or by an established *Disease Control Centre*. The data to calculate the other measures would need to be collected by the

military in conjunction with relief organizations and the HN. An example of public health MOE is at table 5.

Table 5 - Public Health MOE

Type	Examples of Specific Public Health MOE
Mission-level MOE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Crude mortality rate by political area or regional towns. 2. Starvation rate by local area. 3. Cause-specific death rates by local area.
Task-performance MOE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Percentage of supplies delivered versus defined basic needs. 2. Percentage of sanitation services provided versus defined basic needs. 3. Percentage of adult and children population vaccinated.
Level of effort measures	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Number of supplies/metric tons of food delivered. 2. Litres of water provided. 3. Number and types of vaccinations against diseases. 4. Food stocks in markets and stores. 5. Relative affordable prices of staple foods.
Transition measures	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Percentage of operational requirements being met by the follow-on organization.
General indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No walking skeletons or visible corpses. 2. No communicable disease(s) in the AO.

9. **Agriculture and Economic Situation** (Table 6). The military may not be tasked to intervene in the area of agriculture as the relief community usually addresses those requirements. The economic situation can be influenced by the military when it employs locals in humanitarian tasks: rebuilding institutions or when launching minor or major projects in cooperation with local authorities, using local contractors or skilled/unskilled labour.

Table 6 - Agriculture and Economic MOE

Type	Examples of Specific Agriculture and Economic MOE
Mission-level MOE (trends in changes to the percentages must be managed closely)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Percentage of land cultivated versus total arable land (satellite imagery). 2. Percentage of the population owning land versus the population that does not, such as returnees (refugees, IDPs). 3. Employment versus unemployment percentages of the total work force.
Task-performance MOE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Percentage of seeds (kilograms) or tool kits/farm implements (numbers) provided for the planting season versus the total demand by the HN. 2. Percentage of the population employed in food for work programs.
Level of effort measures	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Number of seed or tool kits/farm implements provided. 2. Number of people employed by the WFO in food for work programs.
Transition measures	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Percentage of the population transitioning from food for work to full-time employment IAW HN standards i.e. number hrs worked over seven days.
General indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Market price of food. 2. Types of food available at markets, especially on market days. 3. Estimated crowds in markets, especially on market days. 4. Incidents of food riots (indicator of a socio-economic breakdown which could lead to political instability, making it a potential security concern).

10. Some data required for specific MOE may be difficult to obtain or compile. Much depends on the state (stable, fragile or failed/collapsed), the capability of state institutions to provide reliable and credible data, HN statistical/historical records, UN agencies' statistical records, IOs and NGOs and even religious or humanitarian

institutions which may have been in the country before the crisis or armed conflict. Data collection is particularly true in the case of “percentages” which makes access to a vast network of sources and a reliable data base, imperative to satisfactorily measure civil progress. Data collection must be complemented by an effective validation process. Experience has shown that UN agencies and NGOs do not necessarily operate a central data base or collect data which feeds the data base. Therefore, it is important during the preparation phase and the mission to ensure mechanisms are put in place to collect, process and disseminate vital data not only to operational users but follow-on-forces, as the case may be. The success of the mission depends on it.

11. **Problem Areas Related to MOE.** Potential problems with MOE are:

- a. if not carefully chosen, the cost in time and effort for collection and analysis of MOE data may outweigh the benefit;
- b. one pitfall is that a single MOE may come to be viewed as the key to success, rather than as a possible indicator of it;
- c. factors outside the military’s control, such as the weather or the effectiveness of other militaries, the HN and relief organizations influence overall effectiveness in a humanitarian operation, and this will be reflected by the MOE;
- d. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, under IFOR, most NGOs and UN agencies did not have a standard methodology to collect, evaluate and analyse data. There was no consistent nation-wide data collection program and assessments provided were subjective. The absence of credible and reliable data hampered the TFC’s decision making process; and
- e. where there are areas controlled by factions, there may be significant differences in standards for collecting information, or in the availability of information.

904. NORMALITY INDICATORS

1. Normality indicators are defined as “*relative measures of the state of normalcy characterizing an element of the civil environment, through data collected on a regular basis and assessed to have the frequency, quantity, consistency and coverage required to make a useful objective assessment of the changes occurring in the civilian populace.*” The data collected must be objective, quantifiable and collected regularly from the same place at the same time over a specific period of time. Normality indicators can be grouped in categories and adapted to meet the changing requirements: political, socio-economic levels of development, cultural and technological.

2. **Using Normality Indicators.** Normality indicators can be used in the following manners:

- a. to focus civic action progress;
- b. to focus IOs, NGOs, UN agencies’ as well as OSCE activities;
- c. to rank towns with slower recovery;
- d. to brief VIPs, other military HQ and other organizations;
- e. to inform the local and international media and gain national and international public support;
- f. as a teaching tool in the form of an instructional video to prepare operational analysts and troops in the collection, processing and dissemination of data; and
- g. to train military and civil personnel by generating a synergy of CIMIC activities, PSYOPS and PA in such a way as to produce a force multiplier.

3. **Information on a Broader Set of Categories.** The following information elements should be included to

enrich the normality indicators data collection process. The effective management of these elements require more training for inexperienced personnel and access to regional data, within limitations, that has the same standards and reliability:

- a. **Social Statistics.** Polling data on attitudes toward peace and the future, number of students in schools, ethnic makeup in communities compared to pre-war ethnic groupings, number of refugees and IDPs...;
 - b. **Economics.** Unemployment data, interest and inflation rates, ability to use national currency throughout an AO, availability of credit, income rates, credit card usage, local investments in the economy...;
 - c. **Infrastructure.** The percentage of roads open to traffic, utilities such as electrical power and 24-hour potable water supply...; and
 - d. **International Aid Requirements.** Estimates by the international aid organizations as to the requirements for emergency international assistance.
4. **Recording and Reporting.** When using normality indicators collection sheet, it is important that completion be IAW established SOPs. The timing of each visit is critical (~every two weeks). Visits to each locality should be on a market day when trading activity is at its peak.
5. The following factors must be considered in selecting normality indicators:
- a. the data must be quantifiable;
 - b. the period of the mandate;
 - c. the likelihood of follow on forces able to implement the selected methodology;
 - d. the means and level of training available to a TFC on collecting, evaluating and analysing the data i.e. soldiers on patrol, IOs, NGOs, UN or OSCE agencies and representatives;
 - e. areas or items expected to show change will be measured so as to measure objectively the recovery in a civil society in areas such as politics, social, economic, culture, technology and natural resources; and
 - f. the collection of data based on the collection plan, must establish the presence of the military force in all areas of the AO.
6. **Limitations of Normality Indicators.** These factors lead to the following limitations:
- a. the collection plan in a theatre of operations will involve inexperienced civil and military personnel which must be trained so reliable and credible data is available for operational analysis;
 - b. in light of the TFC's intent, normality indicators produce a "snapshot" of socio-economic recovery in time and space in a specific locale. It is difficult and dangerous to extrapolate civil progress to an entire region;
 - c. the interpretation of the data collected is only effective when a composite picture of civil progress or trends emerge over a period of time;
 - d. the collation and interpretation of the data require a concerted effort at higher level HQ as well as experienced operational analysts so that timely dissemination of credible data is possible to civil agencies and military formations and units;
 - e. the acquisition of good and meaningful data is very difficult requiring simple operational analysis models to be built and calibrated against operational data;
 - f. if soldiers are tasked, information must be easily available and visible, this eliminates such factors as

interest rates, unemployment and household income, unless provided through external sources; and

- g. the limited resources and constraints of a particular mission may preclude a TFC from resorting to this methodology, which requires much human resources.

905. CASE STUDY OF NORMALITY INDICATORS - BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

1. During the IFOR deployment, an assessment of the “return to normality” within Bosnia proved essential to improve the commanders perception of mission progress. More particularly, a requirement arose for an analytical method to assess the broad changes which were occurring throughout the country, especially with respect to the civil population. The normality assessment became a primary tool to measure strategic and regional changes objectively and indicate which “Opština” (main regional towns surrounded by satellite villages) were exhibiting slow recovery. The following objectives were at the heart of the project:

- a. provide a strategic measure of success of the security framework and to aid the media campaign spread the “good news”;
- b. indicate potential difficulties before they become problems, by highlighting regions with consistently low scores in several categories and the ability to monitor change across the whole of Bosnia;
- c. provide local IFOR commanders with objective information on their area, enabling them to support ventures in a specific area;
- d. assist commanders in the local “Hearts and Minds” endeavour by making troops conduct non-military tasks that will be notice by the community and ,therefore, helping to make IFOR less threatening to the local populace. In addition to the collection of valuable data, experience has shown that troops are kept more alert on a routine patrol if they are given a secondary task; and
- e. place troops into every “Opština” (there are 109 Opštinas in Bosnia and Herzegovina) every two weeks would maintain an IFOR presence across the whole of Bosnia, rather than just the areas with a perceived or real security problem.

2. To avoid placing western judgements on the values used to define “Normal”, a town from Bosnia-Herzegovina i.e. Tomislavgrad, was chosen as a baseline. This town had experienced little or no problem and damage during the war, had an acceptable standard of living and was far enough from the border not to be influenced directly by the economy in neighbouring Croatia. The town was used in three different ways:

- a. to define the boundaries between the scores of a category;
- b. to produce relative values for the scoring method; and
- c. to remove seasonal adjustments from the assessment.

3. Annexes A, B and C are *example templates* used by ARRC/IFOR as normality indicators to measure the recovery of the main market towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Annex A is an example of a normality indicators collection sheet used by ARRC/IFOR to facilitate the collection of available and visible data by its soldiers during regular vehicle or foot patrols. The collection sheet focuses mainly on economic factors and ignores by design, other progress factors indicating a return to normality.

4. Seven categories were used by IFOR/ARRC soldiers to rate principal towns in an AO, using a four-colour coding for each category: *level 4* - red, *level 3* - amber, *level 2* - yellow and *level 1* - green. Red represents the worst conditions and green and yellow (some towns will always be in yellow as they will never achieve the economic development or status of the baseline) indicate “normality”. Because the IFOR mandate was for one year, it was decided that data describing the basic needs of the individual should form the bulk of the indicators, with a few data describing the needs of the community. This rating provides a quick way to judge towns and to judge relative change through a quick viewing of the data collected:

- a. urban staple goods/food outlets;
- b. availability of key groceries;
- c. food price stability;
- d. availability of other staple goods;
- e. urban traffic levels on a market day;
- f. occupancy/use of farm buildings; and
- g. use/conditions of public/community and private housing/buildings.

5. Annex B reflects “Civil Issues Output Data” covering 19 major categories and sub-categories to measure civil issues output as part of a collection of CIMIC campaign data to monitor the return to normality (green). The colour coding scheme for each category is as described at paragraph 4.

6. Annex C provides a comparison of colour codings for each of the seven selected categories of normality indicators. These categories average out to produce an overall colour coding applicable to each town selected for the measurement of normality indicators. This information provides a TFC with information identifying weak indicators, the corrective measures required and where to channel civil resources. These corrective measures require the coordination of resources with civil agencies in the AO.

7. **Lessons Learned.** The following lessons were learned from the normality indicator project:

- a. PSO or OOTW require wider data sources: military and non-military;
- b. J2 Priority Intelligence Requirements must include civilian indicator data;
- c. most civil information is to be collected in an objective and civil manner, amenable to statistical analysis;
- d. simple data can be found that is easy to collect and analyse. However, data processing is the time critical task;
- e. large projects need the highest level backing. If commanders are seen to be using the results, staffs become more interested in the studies;
- f. results must be timely to allow informed decision making. Often, the “80% solution” is all there is time for;
- g. civil and military organisations must be encouraged to use analysis results, even if not produced by them;
- h. a central higher formation data base is critical to store and access vital data required for analysis;
- i. multi-media presentations are needed to communicate results effectively, especially in multinational operations. This is critical for successful analysis;
- j. data collection must not unduly burden formations or units due to priority military and civil tasks, thereby restricting the number of sites for data collection, the frequency of data collection and the number of items which could be collected; and
- k. the selection of items to be measured must be done objectively and reflect true change, positive or negative, during the period of the mandate. The dissemination of data to the civil authorities, the public and the media, requires a synergy of CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA.

906. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND NORMALITY INDICATORS

1. MOE measure the level of success of a military operation while normality indicators measure the level of improvement in the quality of life of the populace. MOE and normality indicators complement each other and can apply to the domestic and international environments. This expertise must be available in theatre through specialized UN agencies IOs or NGOs. Human resources to collect the data may be in short supply and reliance on military personnel and MILOBS may be necessary. MILOBS have, by their mandate, daily contacts with local authorities IOs, NGOs and UN agencies and can be of assistance to a TFC to achieve his mission. The end result will be well thought out civil-military resource allocation and resource management in the AO. Minimizing the wastage of resources is critical, time and funding being the most precious resources.

2. The TFC needs to measure the recovery of a society and its quality of life as well as the effectiveness of military operations using MOE appropriate to the characteristics of a given mission. A TFC would be well-advised to include on his staff, specialists capable of developing such methodology as well as planning, collecting, evaluating and analysing such measurements, to assist the TFC in making informed decisions on his next course of action. The data collected must be processed, particularly collation and interpretation, and disseminated quickly by the higher level HQ to be of any value to the operational users, both military and civilian. Dissemination of such information to selected targets such as VIPs, PA, as well as local and international journalists, must also be assessed as part of the TFC's information plan.

3. Databases must be maintained at each level of command. A prioritized data collection plan and the type of data to be retained for processing (collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation) must be determined in the planning or early employment phases. It is particularly important for higher formation HQ to maintain, for the full duration of a military operation, a *central database* accessible at any given time by operational analysis experts or the commander's staff for crisis management or decision making purposes. SOPs should also reflect that data collection is a HQ responsibility.

4. As a general statement, more work will need to be done on MOE and normality indicators. This effort serves to underline the operational requirement for performance measurement of military and civil tasks. Conceptual discussions are now evolving towards *structural stability* and *sustainable peace*. To achieve this, every effort must be made to convince those moderate elements in position of power, and more so extremist elements that possess the means to destabilize allied rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, that peace and stability are the pillars of economic prosperity and, therefore, increased political power. This power base would rely on strong public support instead of acts of intimidation and violence which appeal to a minority of the population. The synergy of CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA could be used to great effect in attempts to modify the culture, behaviour and attitudes of belligerent forces/WWF which resist the introduction of democratic values and beliefs in a civil society, as well as focussing on gaining the trust and confidence of the population.

5. The periodic CIMIC Report at chapter 1, annex E should be read by analysts and personnel involved in MOE and Normality Indicators, as it provides a snapshot measuring *progress*, *problem areas* and/or *failures* in the theatre and areas of operation.

NORMALITY INDICATORS COLLECTION SHEET

Date Time Group: _____

Location Grid: _____

Location Name: _____

BACKGROUND. This Proforma plays a major part in providing the information needed to feed the database which will provide Normality Indicators. It has been amended as a result of the second collection of information. Please fill in the form carefully, do not guess the answer to the questions, if the item is not available or cannot be priced then say so. Nil or 0 is just as useful as the figures you are collecting. These figures, costs and consistency are the keys to the database effectiveness. The timing of each visit will probably be critical. You should therefore try to visit each location on a market day when trading activity will peak. The date and time of the visit must be entered on the collection sheet.

FOOD AND OTHER STAPLE GOODS. Upon entering the new area, look at the whole town and locate the main shopping area. Use this and the roads leading into it for the collection of food and other staple data. Note the number of outlets by type as indicated on the form. Note also the names of the streets and shops involved for reference for future visits. In the case of market/roadside outlets, count the stalls/stands falling into the food and other staple categories. You must show the difference between normal markets and people are selling on the roadside or from their house. In addition to noting those shops in business also note the number of vacant shops. On all subsequent visits, return to the same area to make the assessment.

<p>1. Food Outlets - Show number. Also show Poorly (P) or well Stocked (W). Roadside Group ____ () Markets ____ () Shops Vacant ____ (P) Occupied ____ ()</p>
<p>2. Other Staple Goods Outlets - Show number. Also show Poorly (P) or well Stocked (W). Roadside Group ____ () Markets ____ () Shops Vacant ____ (P) Occupied ____ ()</p>

Use the same outlet to price the items and once a brand has been chosen for a locality, monitor the same branch on each occasion. Price in Deutchmarks.

<p>3. Food Goods</p> <p>Cost</p> <p>- Bread standard weight each DM__</p> <p>- Cabbage each DM__</p> <p>- Lamb/mutton/pork b Kg DM__</p> <p>- Ground coffee Kg DM__</p> <p>- Beer by 1/2 Ltr DM__</p> <p>- Wine by bottle DM__</p> <p>- Eggs each DM__</p> <p>- Carrots by Kg DM__</p> <p>- Apples by Kg DM__</p> <p>- Tomatoes by Kg DM__</p>
--

<p>4. Other Staple Goods</p> <p>Cost</p> <p>- Men's Underwear Pants DM__</p> <p>- Razor Blades DM__</p> <p>- Men's Socks DM__</p> <p>- Women's Underwear Pants DM__</p> <p>- Woman's Tights DM__</p> <p>- Lipstick DM__</p> <p>Diesel by Ltr DM__</p> <p>Petrol by Ltr DM__</p>

Annex A
to Chapter 9

Whilst in the locality, and enroute to the areas of data collection, note any outlets for selling fuel as indicated.

<p>5. Identify Outlets Selling Fuel By Number. Show Poorly (P) or well Stocked (W). Roadside Group ____ () Markets ____ () Shops Vacant ____ (P) Occupied ____ ())</p>
--

Upon entering the area for the first time locate the main road/street. Over a period of half an hour note the number of used cars, "new" cars, all private coaches, all taxis and all local non-military vans/orlorries that pass the location. Whether the team park or patrol on foot is left to you to decide, whatever method is adopted, use it again on all subsequent visits.

<p>6. Count private coaches, taxis, cars, vans/trucks - show new (N) or Used (U) that pass by in 30 mins. Coaches(N) __ (U) __ Taxis(N) __ (U) __ Cars(N) __ (U) __ Vans/Trucks(N) __ (U) __</p>

SHELTER/HOUSING. Look at the whole town and choose an area or areas that are representative of the locality. These areas should contain 50-100 houses or apartments still habitable. Some of the houses in the sample will be vacant because of damage, include them in the House vacant slot. Note the names/numbers of the streets and houses that re to be used in the sample. On all subsequent visits, return to the same area to make the assessment.

Note the number of occupied houses and the total number of houses, flats and temporary dwellings.

<p>7. Type of the shelter/housing available in the area, show Number. Temporary Shelters ____ House Vacant ____ Occupied ____ Apartment Vacant ____ Occupied ____</p>
--

Note if any repairs are underway as indicated.

<p>8. Identify any repairs - Show Number of repairs. House _____ Apartment _____</p> <p>Are any boarded windows being replaced with glass - Show Number of Houses or Apartments involved. House _____ Apartment _____</p> <p>Are roof tiles being repaired Show if yes show the Number of Houses or Apartments involved. House _____ Apartment _____</p>
--

If there are Gardens show Total Number. If they are growing flowers show Number.

<p>9. Gardens Gardens Total _____ Gardens Growing Flowers _____</p>

SOCIAL. Note the location of schools, churches/mosques, and sporting/entertainment centres. Identify any regular worship re-established and or the rebuilding of damaged local religious structures. On the initial visit, the state of each building is to be noted, as well as any events scheduled.

10. Show those Occupied/Used by (O) Number. Show those Vacant/Unused by (V) Number.
 Schools(O)__(V)__Churches/Mosques(O)__(V)__Sporting/Entertainment Centres(O)__(V)__
 Show any rebuilding of damaged schools, local religious structures or sporting/entertainment centres by Number
 Schools _____ Churches/Mosques _____ Sporting/Entertainment Centres _____

CONDITION OF FARMING. Choose an area or route through a representative area of countryside in the Opština. The initial state of the local agricultural industry is to be noted (ie, within the sample, how many farms are abandoned or back to normal farming). Indicators such as those listed on the collection sheet should be noted. Changes are to be noted on all subsequent visits.

11. Total the Number of Farms - Show by Number which are Abandoned (A), or Normal (N).
 Total Number of Farms _____ Number (A) _____ Number (N) _____

12. Using the same farms - Show by Number those farms that:

Are cultivating, ie, ploughing, seeding or planting	Number (A) _____
	Number (N) _____
Any livestock in the fields	Number (A) _____
	Number (N) _____
Any repairs to fences/hedges	Number (A) _____
	Number (N) _____
Any selling of produce on site or locally	Number (A) _____
	Number (N) _____

Unit _____ Rank _____ Name _____ Signature _____

CIVIL ISSUES OUTPUT DATA

CATEGORY	LEVEL 4 (RED)	LEVEL 3 (AMBER)	LEVEL 2 (YELLOW)	LEVEL 1 (GREEN)	DATA SOURCES
Staple availability	Reliant on food/fuel aid	Some self-sufficiency, aid required to top up	Markets poorly stocked	Markets well stocked	J5 / JMC / Div LO / HR?
Shelter	Homeless roaming. Homes and accommodation destroyed.	Temporary camps. No active destruction of accommodation.	Shared permanent accommodation. Repair of damaged housing stock.	Individual family accommodation. Revival of building trade - houses.	UN / Div LO/ J5 / HR?
Water	Untreated water. Foraging only.	Water points	Supplied to essential points only	Normal distribution to households	Engr / Div LO / JMC / HR?
Power	No power. Foraging for wood.	Intermittent limited power	Essential services only	Distributed normally	Engr / Div LO / JMC / HR?
Medical (Civilian)	Minimum care. Restricted supplies. Basic operations only.	Essential lifesaving. Operations in hospitals only.	Full hospital care	Full medical support including local clinics	HR?
Law and Order	Unrestrained bandity. No police operations.	Police require mil escort, crimes of violence	Limited police ops. No escort. Normal crime levels.	Normal crime levels and retribution	MP / JMC / Div LO
Infrastructure	Combat engineering only	IFOR/Factional assistance in rebuilding local infrastructure	Non-essential hearts and minds only. Considerable contractor activity evident.	No military involvement	Engr / Div LO / JMC /HR?
Civil Communications Freedom of Speech	No telephones. Restricted radio/TV. International Press excluded. Local press tightly controlled.	Telephone hotlines only. Restricted radio/TV. Restricted access to international press, local press censorship.	Local telephones. Regular radio/TV and papers. International Press formal statements only. Some local press control.	Post, trunk telephones, radio/TV and papers. Total freedom of the press.	J6 / J5 / Div LO Media / J2 (truth picture) perceptions
Education	No formal education available	Primary, some secondary. Restricted external.	Primary and secondary, some support to external Tertiary	Full national system	JMC / J5 / HR?

Annex B
to Chapter 9

CATEGORY	LEVEL 4 (RED)	LEVEL 3 (AMBER)	LEVEL 2 (YELLOW)	LEVEL 1 (GREEN)	DATA SOURCES
Non-Staple Consumer Goods availability	Primary black market	Irregular availability, some rationing	Intermittent availability	Normal outlets	Div LO / Perceptions
Inflation	Hyper inflation	High inflation	Unstable prices	Stable prices	Local Economists
Investment	No international investment, national dedication to war effort	Limited	Restricted	Free international investment	HR? / Media / Local Economist
Sport and Social Activity	Totally confined between faction	Officially sponsored international activity only	Limited voluntary interfactional activity	High levels of activity, no factional limitation	Media / Local Contacts / J2
Unemployment	Total population committed to war fighting	High	Medium	Employment in all sectors	Local Economists / J2
Religious	Destruction of religious infrastructure and desecration of religious sites	No active desecration, congregations can gather without penalty, hatch match and despatch re-established	Regular worship/religious activities re-established	Rebuilding/building of local religious structures	Media / J2
Civil -Military Cooperation	No local government, local "warlords" in control	Town/parish councils established along factional lines	Free and open local elections	Council services resumed. No factional/military involvement.	J5 / JMC
Infant Mortality	Unacceptably high	High	High for Europe	Low	Med? / J5?
Agriculture	Dependency on aid or no farming	Subsistence farming	Limited professional farming	All local farms re-established. Local self-sufficiency/local exports of products.	Local Economists / J2 (satellite imagery)

COLOUR CODING OF NORMALITY INDICATORS

COLOUR	URBAN STAPLE GOODS/FOOD OUTLETS	AVAILABILITY OF KEY GROCERIES	FOOD PRICE STABILITY	AVAILABILITY OF OTHER STAPLE GOODS	URBAN TRAFFIC LEVELS ON A MARKET DAY	OCCUPANCY/ USE OF FARM BUILDINGS	COMMUNITY BUILDINGS/ PRIVATE HOUSING IN USE
RED	No open shops, reliance on only a market or roadside sales	Three key indicators missing	“Unstable” prices	Five key indicators missing	Traffic levels equal to or less than the ghost town Bosanko Grahavo	More than 90% of sample unused	More than 90% of sample unoccupied/ uninhabitable
AMBER	A few shops, or a market or roadside sales	Two key indicators missing	↓	Three key indicators missing	↓	More than 50% of sample unused	More than 50% of sample unused/ uninhabitable
YELLOW	Market, shops and perhaps roadside sales	One key indicator missing	↑	One key indicator missing	↑	Less than 50% of sample unused	Less than 50% of sample unused/uninhabitable
GREEN	Normal high street activity, with more open than closed shops, regular markets with shops and no roadside sales	All four key indicators (Eggs, Bread, Cabbage, Carrots) available	“Stable” prices	All six key indicators (Socks, Tights, Razor Blades, Lipstick, Men’s and Ladies’ Underwear) available	Traffic levels equal to or above Tomislavgrad in Apr 96	5% or less of sample unused	5% or less of sample unused/uninhabitable

CHAPTER 10

FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

IN

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

“Approximately forty projects were undertaken by the contingent. These CIMIC projects went a long way to win the “hearts and mind” of the local population and were also a morale booster for contingent members...and included activities such as delivery of humanitarian aid, repairs to and construction of infrastructure at schools and orphanages. Funding was provided by CIDA through the Canadian Embassy in Haiti.” - OP STANDARD/STABLE Lessons Learned Report, May 1997

1001. INTRODUCTION

1. CF operations may entail military assistance to civilian organizations at home and abroad. As well, from time to time military training and exercises will receive support from civilian organizations. Formed CF units, or specially created military TFs may deploy into locations and situations that will require the military unit to work closely with, and perhaps provide direct support to civilian personnel, civilian agencies, or governmental organizations. CF Task Forces are not initially funded to conduct CIMIC operations. Funding will have to come from other federal government sources; however, more frequently, expenses are recovered from the organization being supported or that requested the assistance. Military support to CIMIC is usually conducted IAW a written agreement of some form. On special occasions, CF units may be directed to assist with the provision of humanitarian assistance. This may involve the management and expenditure of funds provided by humanitarian or relief agencies. It is imperative that such funds be carefully managed and effectively controlled IAW Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.

2. Most financial liaison with civilian organizations in the field deal either with cost recovery, accounts receivable, accounts payable, or with the management of humanitarian monies. Regulations governing DND funded support to other government departments, provincial and municipal authorities, as well as to the private sector are covered in CFAOs and manuals, as well as Government of Canada publications, with the primary reference being DND publication DAOD 1019-0, *Provision of Services*, which has replaced the former “DNDP 55”. Essentially, one will find within these publications:

- a. regulations which specify the requirements for financial recovery for material and services provided;
- b. the extent of such recovery;
- c. expenditure authorities and ceilings; and
- d. procurement authorities and regulations.

3. In times of peace, emergencies, crisis and war, financial regulations will remain consistent. DAOD 1019-0 specifies the level and nature of cost recovery, including full recovery, recovery of only incremental costs, and the authority to waive cost recovery. Calculations of recoverable costs will be determined by the provisions set forth in the CF Cost Factors Manual. Costing Services (DMAC 2) in NDHQ can be requested to provide cost estimates applicable to the operation at hand. An agreement to provide DND services to a civilian agency must meet the normal requirements of Canadian and Provincial contract law and therefore, it may be prudent to obtain the assistance of JAG lawyers prior to finalizing such agreements.

4. Financial guidelines and regulations governing civilian support to DND operations, exercises and training are set forth in CFAOs, Government Contracting Regulations and the DND Contracting Manual (A-LM-102-000/AG-001). As well, additional information on the topic of negotiating for support services for a NATO operation may be found at chapter 8 to this manual.

5. Chapter 5, article 511 to this manual notes that NDHQ J3 and J5 staff have a primary responsibility for the establishment of CIMIC policies. It also goes on to note that the TFC must determine levels of staff support needed

to conduct CIMIC activities. In this regard, the NDHQ J4 Financial Coordination Centre (J4/FCC) is available to assist with the financial aspects of CIMIC planning.

6. When an operation deploys, an officer trained in finance will normally be in place to provide second line financial support. If an operation is large enough, personnel may be available for first line support. In addition, the CF Contingent HQ may be staffed with a finance officer in the position of J4/Fin.

7. The main CIMIC areas of logistic support are discussed at chapter 5, article 515. For each area, sources of O&M funding will have to be addressed.

1002. DEFINITIONS

1. **Full Cost.** The sum of all costs, variable and fixed, direct and indirect, cash and non-cash, incurred for the provision of a service to a non-defence agency.

2. **Incremental Cost.** Additional costs incurred as a direct result of supplying a service. These costs result in additional resources or a reallocation of existing resources. For short term decisions, incremental costs are normally the same as direct or operating costs. For long term decisions, some indirect or other costs become incremental costs.

3. **Recoverable Cost.** The amount chargeable for supplying a service calculated in accordance with DAOD 1019-0 for the Provision of Services.

4. **Total Operating Costs.** Full costs less Departmental "Other Costs" that are incurred in supplying a service, as identified in the DND Cost Factor's Manual.

5. **Other Government Department (OGD) Recoverable Costs.** Total operating costs incurred by the Department in supplying a service.

1003. FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR CIMIC IN DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

1. Concept of Operations

a. CIMIC financial coordination, agreements and arrangements may take place within Canada during:

- (1) peacetime;
- (2) emergency or crisis; and
- (3) wartime.

2. Peacetime

a. During peacetime operations the CF will be involved with:

- (1) civilian support to military training;
- (2) civilian support to pre-deployment of the CF to an international theatre; and
- (3) military support to municipal authorities and local non-governmental agencies.

b. interested parties include: CF commanders, unit comptrollers, civilian contractors, and civilian consultants.

c. chapter 4, article 403, table 1, *Examples of Potential Domestic Operations by Category* specifies the type of support by category that the CF may be called to provide during domestic operations. Generally, financial recovery will be in accordance with DAOD 1019-0; however, financial considerations may be specifically set

forth in applicable MOU with the civil agency or authority being supported, or as specified in other Acts and directives.

- d. when obtaining assistance from civilian consultants, both DND and Treasury Board regulations must be consulted. In particular Government Contracting Regulations, and the DND Contracting Manual Policy and Procedures (A-LM-102-000/AG-001) must be referred to, to ensure that a proper bidding process takes place or to verify the financial limits for sole-sourcing of a personal services contract.
- e. even under new initiatives such as budget devolution and operating budgets, budgetary ceilings must be respected and legal financial commitments must not be made unless funds are available. As a precautionary measure, the assumption that a significant volume of funds can be transferred between fund centres (O&M, Capital, and SWE) should not be made without prior liaison with senior budgetary managers to ensure that adequate funds exist to facilitate such transfers.
- f. during peacetime operations, normal procurement policies contained in the A-LM-180 series of DND publications apply and unit supply officers should be consulted to ascertain applicable procurement-from-trade policies and regulations. In addition, commanders should consult CFAO 36-19 *Local Procurement of Material and Services*. CFAO 36-19 prescribes the policy and financial limitations applicable to the local procurement of materiel and services, whether through Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), or directly from civilian suppliers.
- g. during peacetime, local commanders may, from time to time, be requested to provide materials and services to local non-defence agencies. Commanders must be aware that under normal circumstances, Defence personnel do not have authority to use resources for a purpose not directly in support of the Defence Program; however, there are occasions when it is consistent with the purpose of government policy to provide a service in response to a request from a non-defence agency. DAOD 1019-0 will be a primary source document as this manual describes the policy and procedures for provision of services by DND and the CF to non-defence agencies. These policies and procedures apply to any request from a non-defence agency for the use of Defence resources. This publication specifies the methods used to calculate recoverable costs. The Cost Factors Manual must also be consulted to tabulate all costs that comprise full or incremental cost.
- h. DAOD 1019-0 must be consulted to determine the conditions under which services can be provided, and to determine delegated authorities, material limits and cost recovery procedures. Unless specified in a Federal Government act, regulation or agreement, in a federal - provincial government MOU or in a Federal Government - Corporate agreement, the recoverable cost for the provision of such peacetime services will be defined by the policies and procedures set forth in DAOD 1019-0. It is important to note that all services to non-defence agencies will be provided under written agreement. DAOD 7014-0 (Memoranda of Understanding) should also be consulted prior to developing a written arrangement or agreement. The development of an MOU is covered in DAOD 7014-1.
- i. often full costs will be recovered; however, situations may arise when, in the opinion of the approving authority, it is consistent with the purpose of government policy to charge less than the recoverable cost for a service provided. Authority to charge less than recoverable cost is specified in the B-GS-055 table *Authority to Charge Less than Recoverable Cost*. Units must, in all instances, certify in writing to the Deputy Minister their reasons for reducing recoverable costs. As set forth below, there are four types of services outlined in DAOD 1019-0 and cost recovery is different for each one:
 - (1) the recoverable cost for a requested one time service provided to another OGD is the incremental cost of the service plus the administrative charge specified in the Cost Factors Manual. Where services to an OGD are provided pursuant to specific legislation or other Treasury Board direction, the recoverable cost will be calculated IAW the legislation or direction.
 - (2) a service may be provided IAW an **Act, Regulation or agreement** to an external user whereby this document gives specific direction regarding the conditions for providing the service or provides a formula for recovering these costs. The specific terms which apply to the conditions for providing the service

or the calculation of recoverable costs must be honoured by the approving authority. If the Act, Regulation or agreement is silent regarding either of these, then the service will be treated as an external Other Request, as discussed below.

- (3) should a **surplus capacity** be formally identified and should DND be required to maintain this surplus capacity to fulfil its mandate, then this surplus capacity may be used to provide services to an external non-defence agency. Such services can be provided with cost recovery being variable cost plus the applicable administrative charge, plus a portion of the fixed costs, up to what the market will bear.
- (4) lastly, if a service is provided to meet any **other request** by an external civilian agency and this service does not meet the criteria for one of the other types identified above, then this civilian organization must reimburse DND for the full cost plus the administrative charge.

j. commanders must ensure that services are not provided when similar services are available from local commercial enterprises. A service to a civilian organization should not normally be provided if that service will be provided on a continual basis where other government departments or the private sector are capable of providing these services. Generally, except as discussed above at paragraph 2i(3) if DND capacity is available for the continual provision of a service to a non-defence agency, commanders should consider eliminating this excess capacity to permanently save valuable resources.

3. **Emergency or Crisis**

- a. during a domestic emergency or crisis, a provincial government may request that the Federal Government provide military assistance. The CF may become involved during a civil disturbance or a natural disaster.
- b. interested Parties include CF commanders, unit comptrollers, Emergency Measures Organizations, Provincial Governments, and Municipal Governments. Chapter 1, article 115 discusses the relationship between industry and the CF during national emergencies.
- c. DAOD 1019-0 will be a primary source document for the provision of defence services to non-defence agencies during times of emergency or crisis. The discussion in the above section concerning the applicability of DAOD 1019-0 to *Peacetime* support to civil agencies also applies here to support during times of emergency and crisis. As with peacetime operations, normally full costs will be recovered; however, situations may arise when it is appropriate to charge less than the recoverable cost for a service provided.
- d. in 1996, new federal policies and arrangements were enabled regarding the provision of CF assistance to civilian law enforcement operations carried out under provincial authority. The two documents which set out the new policies are ***Principles for Federal (Military) Assistance to Provincial Policing*** and an Order in Council entitled ***Canadian Forces Assistance to Provincial Police Forces Directions***. The ***Principles*** stipulate that CF assistance would be provided on a cost-recovery basis and the requesting provincial government must accept liability regarding the use of the CF in support of a police operation carried out under its authority. Operational guidance regarding the Order in Council is contained in 3120-DCDS(J3 Plans 2-5) 28 Aug 96. This letter sets forth the various classes of CF support to law enforcement agencies. Paragraph 16 to this letter states that "*CF support to provincial policing will be provided on a full recovery basis, in accordance with QR&O 36.40(3)*".
- e. sufficient time may not be available to complete all procedures required in DAOD 1019-0 when a service is provided to meet an urgent request. In this event, the approving authority will take all reasonable action to satisfy the spirit and intent of omitted steps, and ensure, whenever possible, that the non-defence agency is aware of the terms under which service is provided. A written agreement to formalize the provision of the service will be completed as soon as time permits.

4. **Wartime**

- a. during wartime, it is anticipated that the level of domestic civil support to DND will increase in specific industrial sectors. In particular, the volume of capital procurement may escalate. Generally, the financial procedures applicable to procurement during peacetime and during times of domestic emergency will apply during wartime. During wartime, there may be an increase in the number of unforecasted requirements; when this happens, the Unforecasted Operational Requirement (UOR) process specified DCDS Instructions to commanders of deployed operations.
- b. UOR submissions will be staffed to J4 Log Ops who will forward these to J3 Ops for approval by a written declaration of operational necessity. Where a UOR submission does not indicate that requisite funds are available, J4 Fin Coord will determine the funding availability from the DCDS Operational Reserve funds. All UORs requiring current-year capital funds must receive the appropriate operational OPI approval set out in DCDS Instructions to commanders of deployed operations.

1004. FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR CIMIC IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

1. **Concept of Operations.** CIMIC financial coordination, agreements and arrangements may take place outside of Canada during peacetime, emergency or crisis, and wartime.

2. **Peacetime.** During peacetime, the CF may be deployed out-of-country as part of a multinational training exercise. When support to the CF is received from civilian organizations, normal Canadian contracting regulations should be applied. However, consideration will also have to be given to the laws, regulations and cultural traditions of the host country.

3. **International Emergency or Crisis**

a. during an international emergency or time of crisis, CF may be deployed out-of-country to assist with the provision of humanitarian aid during times of natural disaster and to provide support to civil administration. The management of scarce resources during support to civil administration in friendly territory is discussed in chapter 3, article 303, paragraph 3. Chapter 5, article 507, paragraph 3 notes the CIMIC capabilities and resources that the CF may be called upon to provide. It is important that the points set forth in these two articles be noted because of the need to manage associated funding and expenditures. In addition the CF may be called upon to provide troops for peacekeeping or for peacemaking. The CF could be required to enter a foreign country during troubled times under the following conditions:

- (1) as a member of a UN sponsored force under the UN banner;
- (2) as part of a NATO force, perhaps sanctioned by the UN; and
- (3) as part of a multi-national force not directly associated with the UN or NATO.

b. it will not be normal for the CF to receive any form of financial compensation from the host country when providing CF support during a significant breakdown of law and order within that country. However, when providing support during an emergency brought about by a natural disaster, DND may invoice the host country and might receive some financial compensation, although this may not necessarily be considered a major factor in the decision to deploy our forces.

c. when tasked to provide humanitarian assistance as per Canadian objectives in civil-military cooperation enunciated at chapter 1, article 106 or to assist in *Military Civic Action* as noted in chapter 2, article 207, paragraph 5, commanders must seek guidance from NDHQ regarding the Canadian Government's intention to recover the cost of such services from the nation being supported. NDHQ/D Fin Ops can assist in this process. The management of resources, as discussed under the topic of *Humanitarian Assistance* in chapter 2, article 207, paragraph 2 is of particular financial significance. It is worth repeating here that commanders must understand that military resources for CMO have been allocated based on specific mission and formally assigned civil tasks. Additional humanitarian civil tasks (mission creep) should not be assumed without an evaluation of the resources involved, including financial resources.

- d. if Host Nation providers of supplies and utilities are contracted to provide support to the CF, then normal payments will be made IAW the contract from contingent O&M funds. As well, it will be normal to engage local indigenous labour to assist with clerical functions and custodian type duties. Such individuals must be hired under contract, respecting local wage and hiring practices. Host Nation Support is discussed in detail in chapter 2, article 205 and should be studied with a view to coordinating and finalizing financial arrangements. The need for preplanning support requirements is emphasized in this article. The provision of HNS depends on the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements, arrangements and MOU between the host and support nations. Where there is no HNS logistic plan, ad hoc arrangements for support are required. Support may come from OGD or other nations if local infrastructure is non-existent.
- e. commanders must be aware that if the primary purpose of the mission is peacekeeping or peacemaking, then scarce CF in theatre resources can not be arbitrarily assigned to humanitarian assistance without receiving such direction from the Minister. As noted in chapter 2, article 207, paragraph 5, *Military Civic Action* (MCA), projects may exceed the unit capabilities thereby requiring inter-agency cooperation, controlling and monitoring to succeed. The TFC and his Comptroller must be aware of legal and financial considerations in authorizing such projects, using existing public funds and allocated resources, to ensure the execution of such projects is conformed to rules and regulations. Of particular financial importance are the financial implications discussed in chapter 2, article 211, *Guidelines for Authorization of Civil Tasks*, especially paragraphs 1a, 1e, and 1f. However, the lack of special authority to spend CF funds does not preclude the CF from administering funds provided by relief agencies like CIDA if sanctioned by NDHQ and the Minister. Normal rules governing the use of *Public Funds* will apply. Control of these funds is critical. Whether funds can be directly made available locally by CIDA or must be transferred from CIDA to DND and reallocated will depend on the circumstances at the time. Not only is it essential to comply with Canadian legislation and negotiated arrangements, but care must be taken to ensure assets are safe guarded and that visibility and accountability are maintained. D Fin Ops must be consulted to determine the appropriate accounting measures to be implemented.
- f. while humanitarian assistance may not be part of a commander's deployed operations mandate, commanders may authorize troops to voluntarily provide humanitarian assistance in the form of manual labour by CF members during their off-hours on a non-recovery basis.

4. **During a UN Mission**

- a. CIMIC is a common UN, OSCE and NATO activity, as discussed in chapter 1, article 105.
- b. financial support to the CF by the UN will be IAW a Canadian-UN agreement. Such agreements may or may not be in place prior to the commencement of a particular Canadian force deployment. Traditionally, while operating as part of a UN mission, the UN provides for a significant part of the mission funding. Generally, specific costs are not shared; they are either UN funded or Canadian funded. If formal agreements are not in place, then prior to conducting any activity undertaken on behalf of the UN, Commanders must have written agreement from the local UN staff stating that the UN will reimburse Canada for all expenses incurred.
- c. while on deployed operations, the CF may be required to provide support to other Canadian Federal Government organizations such as the RCMP, as was the case in Haiti during 1996 and 1997. An MOU between the CF and the other Canadian organization must be created prior to providing support services. Normal recovery procedures associated with support to an OGD will apply. It is anticipated that OGDs will make their own financial arrangements with the UN, including creating their own Letters of Assist (LOAs).
- d. all required operating costs not provided by the formal UN agreement will have to be covered from DND sources as part of the mission O&M budget. Commanders must note that, as of the date of writing, DND capital procurement budgets have not been delegated to mission commanders. Some capital resources may be assigned for the procurement of capital item from civilian sources or from other nations must be obtained by submitting an UOR to the DCDS through NDHQ/J3 Ops & Plans.

5. **During a NATO Mission**

- a. depending on the geographical location of the mission, funding for in theatre mission costs may be provided to commanders from a combination of the following sources:
 - (1) from the Western European Union (WEU);
 - (2) from NATO Common Funds; and
 - (3) lastly, from CF resources.
- b. commanders must ensure that invoices are submitted promptly to the WEU and NATO HQ staffs, as applicable, so that bills may be paid in a timely manner. It may be possible to obtain incremental funding by staffing requests through NDHQ/J3 Plans & Operations.
- c. the CF mission comptroller may be able to draw upon NATO STANAGs, MOU, or Mutual Support Agreements for assistance in financial support that may already be in place prior to deployment or during the mission. Of importance to finance and supply officers is chapter 8, *Contractual Negotiations for Support Services*, articles 811 and 812, which should be read in conjunction with this section on NATO.
- d. during a NATO mission, there will be an exchange of services between the CF and other participating nations. The TFC and his J4/Fin, or the national commander who has national responsibilities, must ensure that Mutual Support Arrangements (MSAs) are created immediately upon their arrival in theatre. D Fin Ops can provide unit comptrollers with sample MSAs. It will be imperative that the mission Comptroller track all such transactions with other nations through signatures and paperwork. In particular, the location of the paying office of other nations must be obtained and recoverable invoices submitted promptly and hastened regularly.
- e. procedures noted above, in the sections *International Emergency or Crisis* and *During a UN Mission*, regarding billing of Host Nations, provision of Humanitarian Assistance, support to CIDA, and support to OGDs are also applicable during NATO missions.

6. **Multinational Force - Non-UN and Non-NATO Mission**

- a. every effort must be made to ensure that participating nations agree in writing on the cost sharing arrangement prior to deployment. An MOU and Mutual Support Arrangements are to be developed in conjunction with NDHQ/J4 Log, D Fin Ops, and JAG prior to deployment. If formalized agreements are not in place, D Fin Ops is to be contacted and ad-hoc arrangements will have to be created. There are no guidelines currently in place for the CF to bankroll other nations for CIMIC.
- b. depending on the nature of the mission and the location, the provisions of DAOD 1019-0 may or may not apply when dealing with local civilian organizations. Clarification from NDHQ/D Fin Ops will have to be obtained for each case.
- c. revenue collection requirements for services provided to other foreign services or during CIMIC operations will be determined during the initial negotiations. D Fin Ops is to be contacted prior to deployment to create all required financial accounts to ensure all revenue is accounted for correctly and IAW Treasury Board regulations.

CHAPTER 11

MILITARY TRAINING AND EXERCISES IN CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

“A well trained and disciplined military unit is the best foundation upon which to build a peacekeeping force.” - LTG T. Montgomery, USA, Sr MILREP to NATO

“Throughout the theatre, a lack of exposure to CIMIC capability and doctrine at all levels resulted in problems of understanding the nature of CIMIC and what benefits it can bring to an operation. This problem was so pervasive that CJ-CIMIC created a “CIMIC Roadshow” to inform decision makers and alleviate this problem.” - NATO Report on IFOR Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina

“Law of Armed Conflict training must not only be a part of a unit’s routine military training but it must also be reinforced during the pre-deployment phase.” - PXR, Ex Venom Strike, Dispatches, March 1997

1101. INTRODUCTION

1. The increasing complexity of PSO, OOTW and combat makes it important to concentrate on CIMIC training by simulating CIMIC scenarios that would be encountered in operations. The operational effectiveness and efficiency with which the CF conducts CIMIC activities is directly related to the effectiveness and efficiency of its training. Combat forces as well as other elements of the CF (communications, medical, logistics...) must introduce CIMIC in their operational level training.

2. CIMIC will continue to increase in importance in joint and combined operations, to include possible training of and participation of PfP in NATO operations. Quality CIMIC training would provide trained personnel to contribute effectively to the civil phase of joint and combined operations. Training with stakeholders and partners must emphasize the joint perspective, enhance connectivity and interoperability of equipment, emphasize efforts toward the development of a common civil-military doctrine, as well as a common understanding of the operational language. These principles will achieve economy of effort, minimize confusion, increase trust and confidence, and contribute to the accomplishment of the mission and its objectives.

3. The guidance presented in this chapter concentrates on individual and collective training of CF personnel. More precisely education, training and exercises are focussed on the maritime, land and air environments. Formations and units will be employed in CIMIC activities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels for domestic and international operations where *complex emergencies* are becoming the norm.

1102. EDUCATION AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

1. CIMIC education and individual training are carried out at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Cornwallis and are included in the curriculum of national training establishments such as the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College in Toronto and the Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston. NATO also offers twice a year, a one week *Civil Emergency Planning/CIMIC* course and a *CIMIC Planning* course conducted at the NATO School (SHAPE) in Oberammergau, Germany. Courses of instruction conducted at these establishments are designed to impart both general and specialist knowledge and skills related to CIMIC activities. Single-environment schools and colleges, while focussing on environmental studies, devote a portion of their curriculum to CMO-related instruction, such as negotiation and mediation techniques prevalent in PSO.

2. Foreign training military and civilian establishments to which the CF has access offer training aimed at all levels of command and staff (Oberammergau, Fort Bragg...). Furthermore, operational training and experience will enhance CIMIC activities which are becoming increasingly complex in nature, requiring a multidisciplinary approach to resolve civil issues. The legal framework of the UN Charter, Law of Armed Conflict, International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law must be well understood by leaders at all levels of command. The legal annex to an OPLAN will largely be based on the SOFA. Refer to chapter 1, article 123 for the range of legal tasks

pertaining to the planning and conduct of CIMIC activities. Commanders and their legal advisors must understand their limitations and the impact of existing agreements and international laws on the range of CIMIC tasks to be performed in their AO.

3. Training in *hostage situations* and *mine awareness* has become a civil-military operational requirement. All civil and military personnel in an AO must follow this kind training during the preparation phase or on arrival in theatre. All should be aware that the UN Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel states: "The conduct of combatants in armed conflicts is regulated by International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, but there is *no international instrument which prohibits or provides a legal remedy for attacks on UN personnel involved in peacekeeping or other humanitarian missions*". In this case, *UN personnel* refers to members of the military, police or civilian components and other UN officials and experts on mission in the area where a UN operation is being conducted, while *associated personnel* are those assigned or engaged in support of the fulfilment of UN operations by or with the agreement of the UN. To ensure standardization of training, HQ training cadres or a designated unit in theatre should oversee the planning and conduct of training for civil and military personnel who could be taken hostage/captive in the course of CIMIC activities.

4. Seminars, lectures, round table discussions, video tele-conferences (VTC) or other types of conferences on CIMIC issues (returnees, human rights...) and lessons learned, involving representation from the CF, OGDs and agencies, IOs, NGOs and academic institutions, provide a further means of broadening and updating officers' knowledge on CIMIC matters. The bottom line is to provide, in UN or OSCE led operations, supported by NATO forces, CIMIC trained personnel with the required skills and knowledge to carry out their assigned tasks with minimum or no supervision.

1103. COLLECTIVE TRAINING

1. Exercises are the best method of achieving and evaluating the planning and execution skills required by CIMIC staff and subordinate commanders. They serve to train assigned forces, validate contingency and capability-based plans, test concepts and doctrine, and exercise command, control and coordination systems. In this regard, tools such as CMX, CAX to include simulation, CPX and field exercises should be utilized to develop SOPs, TOR for CIMIC personnel unfamiliar with their new responsibilities, as well as certification standards for formation and units employed in domestic and international operations. This entails that minimal CIMIC capabilities in areas such as communications, engineer, logistics, medical/health, PSYOPS and PA be developed and sustained in joint or combined operations. In this regard, the synergy created by CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA, as a force multiplier must be formalized in CF education, training, exercises and program activities. Consequently, CIMIC and PSYOPS doctrinal principles must be supported by enhanced CF PSYOPS capabilities to sustain CF operations. Refer to chapter 7, article 713 for a list of proposed PSYOPS materiel.

2. Since military operations involve complementary military and civil phases, it is imperative that formal training and exercises on CIMIC be included in annual formation and unit training programs, including possible training with NATO and PfP. Exercise participation is critical to the training of CIMIC personnel. Officers conducting exercises should seek out every opportunity to incorporate fully a broad array of CMO activities into all types of exercises. They should also emphasize the requirement to identify the goals and objectives of CIMIC training and to evaluate success in achieving those goals. Exercise realism is enhanced by involving OGDs and agencies, IOs and NGOs in the planning, conduct of exercises and post-exercise review processes.

3. Higher-level CPX should deal with integrated strategic policy guidance and strategic planning, crisis management and decision making processes. For HQ that could be employed for C2 of operations involving CMO, exercises should address the planning, deployment and execution aspects of such operations. Education in an interdepartmental strategic assessment methodology is required and could be injected in CMX, CPX and CAX. Units likely to be employed in operations with a CMO aspect should orient their field training exercises and CPX at the operational and tactical levels.

4. CIMIC training is most effective when conducted in conjunction with operational- or strategic-level exercises conducted in foreign countries. Overseas training participation increases proficiency in regional, economic, cultural, and political programs and forms the basis of experience needed for CIMIC regional capabilities and planning. CIMIC personnel become culturally aware and are put in a unique position to interface with prospective HN leaders and civil authorities.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used in this publication:

ACLANT	Allied Command Atlantic	CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
ADM (Mat)	Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel)	CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
ADM (Pol)	Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy)	CIMICREP	Civil-Military Cooperation Report
AJOD WP	Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Party	CIVPOL	Civilian Police
ALEA	Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies	CMA	Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Activity
AO	Area of operations	CMCC	Civil-Military Coordination Centre
AOR	Area of Responsibility	CMG	Canadian Medical Group
APOE/APOD	Airport of Embarkation/Debarkation	CMO	Civil-Military Operations
ARRC	ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (NATO)	CMO	Chief Military Observer
ASSESSREP	Assessment Report	CMS	Civil-Military Support
CAMILREP	Canadian Military Representative	CMX	Crisis Management Exercise
CAX	Computer Assisted Exercise	C2W	Command and Control Warfare
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff	COMIFOR	Commander Implementation Force
CEP	Civil Emergency Planning	COMM Z	Communications Zone
CF	Canadian Forces	COO	Concept of Operations
CFAAD	Canadian Forces Armed Assistance Directives	COS J3	Chief of Staff Operations (NDHQ)
CFAPPF	Canadian Forces Assistance to Provincial Police Forces Directions	CPIC	Combined Press Information Centre
CFAO	Canadian Forces Administrative Order	CPX	Command Post Exercise
CFFET	Canadian Forces Field Equipment Table	CSG	Canadian Support Group
CFNA	Canadian Forces Northern Area	CSS	Combat Service Support
CFP	Canadian Forces Publication	DAOD	Defence Administrative Orders and Directives
		DAPC Pol	Director Arms and Proliferation Control Policy
		DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
		DCDS	Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (Cont)

DCMO	Deputy Chief Military Observer	FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
DFAA	Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements	FCZ	Forward Combat Zone
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade	FOM	Freedom of Movement
DFID	Department For International Development (UK) - Formerly the Overseas Development Agency	Frag O	Fragmentary Order
D Fin Ops	Director Financial Operations	FWF	Former Warring Factions
DGIIP	Director General International and Industry Programs	GIE	Global Information Environment
DGIS Pol	Director General International Security Policy	HN	Host Nation
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs	HNS	Host Nation Support
DND	Department of National Defence	HQ	Headquarters
DoD	Department of Defence (U.S.)	HQDP	Headquarters Defence Plan
DPC	Defence Planning Committee	HRO	Human Rights Operations
DPG	Defence Planning Guidance	HUMINT	Human Intelligence
DPKO	Director of Peacekeeping Operations	Hum O	Humanitarian Officer
DPK Pol	Director Peacekeeping Policy	IAW	In Accordance With
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office	ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ECMM	European Community Monitoring Mission	ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
ECS	Environmental Chief of Staff	IDP	Internally Displaced Person
EEI	Essential Elements of Information	IHAP	International Humanitarian Assistance Program (CIDA)
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal	IICC	International Industrial Coordination Committee
EPC	Emergency Preparedness Canada	IMG	International Management Group
ESU	Engineer Support Unit	INCSPOTREP	Incident Spot Report
EU	European Union	INTSUM	Intelligence Summary
EW	Electronic Warfare	IO	International Organization
		IOCC	Information Operation Coordination Cell

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

IOM	International Organization for Migration	MIST	Military Information Support Team
IOR	Immediate Operational Requirement	MNC	Major NATO Commander
IRC	International Rescue Committee	MND	Minister of National Defence
J1	Joint Personnel Staff	MND (SE)	Multinational Division (South East)
J2	Joint Intelligence/Military Information Staff	MND (SW)	Multinational Division (South West)
J3	Joint Operations Staff	MOC	Military Occupational Code
J4	Joint Logistics Staff	MOE	Measures of Effectiveness
J5	Joint Civil-Military Cooperation Staff	MOU	Memorandum (a) of Understanding
J6	Joint Command, Control and Information Systems Staff	MPA	Maritime Patrol Aircraft
J7	Joint Doctrine Staff	MSF	Médecins sans Frontières
JAG	Judge Advocate General	NAC HR	North Atlantic Council High Representative
JEPP	Joint Emergency Preparedness Program	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
JICC	Joint Information Coordination Committee	NBC	Nuclear Biological and Chemical
JTF	Joint Task Force	NDA	National Defence Act
JTFHQ	Joint Task Force Headquarters	NDCC	National Defence Command Centre
LEA	Law Enforcement Agencies	NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
LFA	Land Force Area	NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
LO	Liaison Officer	NIPP	National Industrial Preparedness Programme
LOC	Lines of Communications	NMR	National Military Representative (SHAPE)
Log O	Logistics Officer	NSE	National Support Element
MARLANT	Maritime Atlantic Region	O&M	Operations and Maintenance
MARPAC	Maritime Pacific Region	OAS	Organization of American States
MCA	Military Civic Action	OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
MILOBS	Military Observers	OHR	Office of the High Representative
		OOTW	Operations Other Than War

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (Cont)

OPCOM	Operational Command	SAMPU	Security and Military Police Unit
OPCON	Operational Control	SAR	Search and Rescue
OPI	Office of Primary Interest	SFOR	Stabilization Force
OPLAN	Operations Plan	SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
Op O	Operations Order	SITREP	Situation Report
OPSEC	Operations Security	Sol Gen	Solicitor General Canada
Ops O	Operations Officer	SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
ORBATTOA	Order of Battle Transfer of Authority	SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	SPOE/SPOD	Sea Port of Embarkation/Debarcation
PA	Public Affairs	STANAG	Standardization Agreement (NATO)
PAO	Public Affairs Officer	SUP	Supporting Plan
PfP	Partnership for Peace	SWE	Salary Wage Envelope
PIO	Public Information Officer	TB	Treasury Board
POC	Point of Contact	TCN	Troop Contributing Nations
POR	Post Operation Report	TF	Task Force
POW	Prisoner of War	TFHQ	Task Force Headquarters
PSO	Peace Support Operations	TOCA	Transfer of Command Authority
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations	TO&E	Table of Organization and Equipment
PSYREP	Psychological Operations Report	TOR	Terms of Reference
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization (US)	TST	Tactical Support Team
PXR	Post Exercise Report	UNCIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
PY	Person Years	UNDHA	United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
QR&O	Queen's Regulations and Orders	UNDP	United Nations Development Program
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police	UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
ROE	Rules of Engagement		
SAMP	Security and Military Police		

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNMAC	United Nations Mine Action Centre
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
UNNY	United Nations New York
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UN SRSG	United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General
UNV	United Nations Volunteer
UOR	Unforecasted Operational Requirement
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VIP	Very Important Person
Wng O	Warning Order
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization

GLOSSARY

Adaptive Command and Control (CIDA/NGO)

Field operations in complex emergencies frequently change as objectives evolve and new conditions arise. Adaptive control includes foreseeing the set of possible futures and taking steps to influence the course of events so that unacceptable futures are prevented and desirable ones encouraged.

Area of Operations (NATO AJOD WP Proposal)

A geographical area defined by the Commander Allied Joint Forces within his area of responsibility in which a component or subordinate commander, designated by him (usually a component commander), is delegated authority to conduct operations.

Area of Influence (AAP-6)

A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations, by manoeuvre or fire support systems normally under his command and control.

Area of Interest (NATO AJOD WP Proposal)

That area of concern to the commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including assigned areas of influence and/or responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto.

Area of Responsibility (NATO AJOD WP Proposal)

In allied joint operations, the geographical area within which the Commander Allied Joint Forces has authority to plan, conduct and coordinate operations, and develop and maintain infrastructure, as delegated.

Assessment (CIDA/NGO)

Assessments are required for humanitarian relief, reconstruction and conflict resolution activities. Rapid assessments at the beginning of operations, particularly relief operations, are critical to providing the correct relief in a timely manner to prevent further loss of life.

Assigned Force Structure (DPG 99)

The force structure is as follows: Canada's maritime forces (CMS); Canada's land forces (CLS); Canada's air forces (CAS); Joint Operations, Intelligence, Geomatics, Operational Research and Civil Emergency Preparedness (DCDS); operational coordination and support for personnel and elements of the CF assigned to the collective defence of North America and stationed outside Canada (NORAD OUTCAN); Canadian Forces Northern Area - CF presence in the Northwest and Yukon Territories (CFNA); Defence Information Service Organization (DISO); Personnel Group (PER); Materiel Group (MAT); Infrastructure and Environment Group (IE); Finance and Corporate Services Group (FIN CS); Policy Group (POL); Vice-Chief of Defence Staff Group (VCDS); Chief of Review Services (CRS); Office of the Judge Advocate General (JAG); Office of the DND/CF Legal Advisor (DND/CF LA); Directorate of Public Affairs (PA).

Asylum Seeker (UNHCR)

A person whose application for refugee status is being considered.

Campaign (CF Ops Manual)

A series of military operations in one theatre of operations designed to achieve a specific strategic objective.

GLOSSARY (Cont)

Campaign Plan (CFP 300-1)

A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common strategic objective, normally within a given time and space.

Canadian Forces Operation (CF Ops Manual)

The deployment of an element or elements of the CF to accomplish a specific mission.

Capability (DPG 99)

The ability to deal with the risks identified in the scenario associated with a Defence Mission Objective or the risks associated with actual operations. Includes the availability of personnel and materiel as well as a quantitative and qualitative assessment.

Centre of Gravity (AJP-01(A))

The characteristics, capability(ies), or locality(ies) from which a nation, an alliance, a military force, or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. It exists at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations. More than one centre of gravity may exist and must be identified for both opposing and friendly forces.

Chain of Command (AAP-6)

The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised.

CIMIC Activity or CMA(MC 411)

Military activity intended to support the achievement of a military mission by pursuing an objective which is the responsibility of a military authority, IO or NGO or *civilian activity* intended to support the achievement of a civilian aim by assisting in the pursuit of a military objective.

CIMIC Centre (Functional Planning Guide for PSO)

A civil-military cooperation centre (CIMIC Centre) is a coordination and information centre established and tailored to assist a Battle Group and/or formation in anticipating, facilitating, coordinating and providing those military functions and activities pertaining to the civil population, local government, the economy and infrastructure of areas or regions in which armed forces, HN organizations, international organizations and non-governmental organizations or PVO are employed.

Civil-Military Cooperation (AJP-01(A) - Adapted)

In peace, emergencies, crisis or war, the resources and arrangements which support the relationship between commanders and national authorities, civil, military and paramilitary as well as civil populations in an area where Canadian Forces elements are or plan to be deployed, employed and supported. Such measures would also include cooperation and coordination of activities between commanders and non-governmental or international agencies, organizations and civil authorities.

Civil-Military Cooperation (Domestic)

In peace, emergencies or crisis, the resources and arrangements which support the relationship between CF commanders and Canadian federal, provincial and municipal levels of government, and civil populations in an area where CF elements are stationed, or plan to be deployed, employed and supported. Such measures could include cooperation and coordination of activities between CF commanders and non-governmental, national or

GLOSSARY

international agencies, organizations and civil authorities.

CIMIC House

A CIMIC Centre becomes a CIMIC House with it is used both as an office and living area.

Civil-Military Cooperation Operations (MC 411)

A military operation the primacy intention and effect of which is to support a civilian authority, population, IO or NGO, the effect of which is to assist in the pursuit of a military objective.

CIMIC Planning

A cooperative civil-military venture aimed at selecting and implementing a coherent course of action which will achieve mission objectives and the civil end state.

Civil Society (CIDA/NGO)

Civil society generally refers to the civilian population disempowered by the conflict and unable to express itself freely for the purpose of regaining its rights. A measure of effectiveness of an intervention is the degree to which the civilian population is able to exert its influence in political, social and economic matters with respect to its welfare.

Combat Operation (CFP 300-Canada's Army)

Military operations where the use or threatened use of force, including lethal force, is essential to impose our will on an opponent or to accomplish a mission. The actual level of force will be IAW specified ROE.

Command (CF Ops Manual)

The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination and control of military forces. There are three elements of command: decision making, leadership and control.

Command and Control (CF Ops Manual)

The process by which commanders plan, direct, control and monitor any operation for which they are responsible.

Complex Emergencies (A Guide to PSO/UNHCR Definition/NGOs and military peacekeepers article of July 97)

A humanitarian disaster that occurs in a theatre or areas of operation and is complicated by, or results from, the conflicting interests of warring parties. It will most likely involve a national crises which has evolved into an internal armed conflict or a situation where the HN has lost control of a considerable part of its own territory so that, beyond its capital city, warring factions supplant its authority. The magnitude of the emergency makes it difficult, if not impossible, for any single agency to handle the emergency on its own and the need arises to mobilize a range of actors/UN agencies.

NOTE: Complex emergencies comprise one or several of the following conditions: the collapse of political authority (fragile or failed state); widespread civil conflict; massive population displacement; human rights abuses on a nationwide scale; food shortages; public health emergencies; and economic collapse. Some complex emergencies are exacerbated by natural disasters, environmental problems and severely inadequate local transport networks.

Concept of Operations (AAP-6)

GLOSSARY (Cont)

A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish the mission.

Conflict (CF Ops Manual)

A struggle or clash between alliances, individual states or factions within a state to achieve political objectives. When military force is used, the conflict becomes armed conflict.

Conflict Resolution (CIDA/NGO)

Hostile parties are often slow to implement peace agreements. Efforts in support of resolving the conflict at both macro-and micro-levels to gain their commitment to a sustainable peace are often necessary.

Control (AJP-01(A) and AAP-6)

That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

Counter Psychological Operations (MC 402)

Actions designed to detect and counteract hostile psychological activities.

Crisis (CF Ops Manual)

An incident or situation involving a threat to Canada, its territories, citizens, military forces and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political or military importance that commitment of Canadian military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.

Decisive Point (AJP-01(A))

A point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or in the information environment.

Disaster (A Guide to PSO)

A calamitous event resulting in loss of life, great human suffering and distress, and large scale material damage.

Displaced Person (UNHCR)

(For all practical purpose) a person who is in a "refugee like situation" but has not crossed an international border.

Doctrine (CF Ops Manual)

Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.

Durable Solution (UNHCR)

The three possible "end states" to a UNHCR operation are, in order of preference:

GLOSSARY

- a. repatriation to country of origin or area of origin in the case of IDPs;
- b. local integration in a neighbouring country with similar culture; and
- c. resettlement in a third country, usually with the intention of acquiring citizenship of the adoptive country.

Effectiveness (DPG 99)

The degree to which the activity/process and resultant output delivered/met the desired expectation (target/goal/standard, etc.).

Efficiency (DPG 99)

The measure of the relationship of outputs to inputs (resources), and is usually expressed in terms of a ratio.

Emergency (Government Emergency Book)

An abnormal situation which, to limit damages to persons, property or the environment, requires prompt action beyond normal procedures.

End State (AJP-01(A))

The political and/or military situation which needs to exist when an operation has been terminated on favourable terms. **NOTE:** The end state *must* be established prior to *deployment* as political considerations, CIMIC capabilities and other resources required to achieve mission objectives will necessitate national and international politico-military consultation and agreement. In conflict prevention involving a preventive deployment, there *may* not be enough time to agree on an end state.

Enemy; Factions; Political Parties (CIDA/NGO)

In most operations, there is no “enemy”, only factions and political parties. Maintaining the neutrality of the intervenor in enforcing the peace accords or negotiating new implementation agreements is essential.

Force Structure (DPG 99)

The composition of the forces in terms of types of major units and their relationship to one another.

Geomatics (DPG 99)

The ensemble of earth measurement sciences. Those scientific and engineering activities involved in the capture, storage, analysis, processing, presentation, dissemination and management of geospatial information.

Global Information Environment (CFP 300-1)

Information operations take place within the Global Information Environment (GIE). The GIE contains those processes and systems that are beyond the influence of the military or government, but nevertheless may directly impact on the success or failure of military operations. Although a primary player in the GIE is the national and international media, others include: non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), other government departments (OGDs) and agencies, as well as international agencies, academic institutions, religious movements, international corporations, and individuals with access to modern communication tools, such as the Internet.

Host Nation (NATO Terminology Proposal)

GLOSSARY (Cont)

A nation receiving the forces and/or supplies of NATO nations, other nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, or to operate in, or to transit through its territory.

Host Nation Support (AJP-01(A) Adapted)

Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis and in war by a host nation to UN, OSCE, other forces and NATO organizations which are located on or in transit through the host nation's territory. The basis of such assistance is commitments arising from the NATO Alliance, UN agreements or from separate bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded with the host nation.

Humanitarian Operations (AJP-01(A))

Operations conducted to alleviate human suffering. Humanitarian operations may precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialised civilian organizations, such as UNHCR and the ICRC.

Human Rights (CIDA/NGO)

Several international conventions and national constitutions exist which define the rights of the civilian population in both normal and conflict situations. Conflicts almost always result in the abuse of the rights of civilians, which peace operations attempt to mitigate or bring to an end.

Implementing Partner (UNHCR)

An organization which has signed a sub-agreement. UNHCR employs major NGO partners to provide humanitarian aid or participate in humanitarian operations.

Information Operations (CFP 300-1)

Continuous military operations within the Military Information Environment that enable, enhance and protect the commander's decision cycle of mission execution to achieve an information advantage across the full range of military operations. Information operations (IO) include interacting with the Global Information Environment (GIE) and exploiting or denying an adversary's or belligerent forces' information and decision systems. The combat function of IO takes place within three interrelated components of IO: operations, intelligence and information, and information systems.

Information Operations (CFP 300-1)

Continuous military operations with the Military Information Environment that enable, enhance and protect the commander's decision cycle and mission execution to achieve an information advantage across the full range of military operations. Information operations include interacting with the Global Information environment and exploiting and denying an adversary's information and decision systems.

Information Warfare (CFP 300-1)

Actions taken, at the strategic level, to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processes and information systems, while defending one's own information, information-based processes and information systems.

Infrastructure (AAP-6 and DPG 99)

A term generally applicable for all fixed and permanent installations, fabrications or facilities for the support and control of military forces.

Internal Resettlement (UNHCR)

GLOSSARY

The integration of displaced persons into another community (i.e. not their original home area) within the same country.

International Committee of the Red Cross (Canadian Red Cross)

A private Swiss, independent humanitarian organization based in Geneva. It works to protect and assist victims of armed conflict or disturbances, either on its own or on the basis of the Geneva Convention.

International Financial Institutions (CIDA/NGO)

The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the regional development banks (European, African, Inter-American and Asian) all provide significant financial support to development activities. This support is largely in the *form of loans, not grants*. A reasonable stability is required for these institutions to consider qualified to receive loans, thus achieving that stability is an important incentive.

International Emergency (Emergencies Act/CF Ops Manual)

An emergency involving Canada or one or more other countries that arises from acts of intimidation or coercion or the real or imminent use of serious force or violence and is so serious as to be a national emergency.

International Organization (Guide to PSO)

Organizations formed to operate under international or national government mandates, conventions and legislation. Examples are the OSCE, ICRC and IOM.

Interoperability (AJP-01(A) -Adapted)

The ability of military systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces, including civilian systems, organizations and agencies, and use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate, cooperate and coordinate their civil-military activities and operations effectively and efficiently together.

Joint Task Force (CF Ops Manual)

Elements of two or more environments of the CF required to operate in the same theatre or area of operations in support of the same national objective as joint force structure.

Lead Agency (UNHCR)

A humanitarian agency which has agreed because of its expertise and knowledge, to initiate coordination between agencies volunteering to participate and contribute to an emergency operation, but which implies no legal authority or command responsibility in regards to the volunteer agencies.

Lead Department (Government Emergency Book)

A Federal Government department whose emergency functions are seen to be dominant in meeting a Government emergency.

Lead Minister (Government Emergency Book)

The primary responsible spokesperson with respect to Government handling of an emergency, usually the Minister responsible for the lead department or agency.

Lead Time (NATO Tasks List)

GLOSSARY (Cont)

The time from receipt of a warning or directive to initiation of military operations. Description: Minimal (minutes to hours); Short (hours to days); Moderate (days to weeks); Long (weeks to months).

Lines of Communications (AAP-6)

All the land, water and air routes that connect an operating military force with one or more basis of operations, and along which supplies and reinforcements move.

Line of Operations (AJP-01(A))

The directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to opposing forces. It connects a force with its base of operations and its objectives.

Local Settlement/Integration (UNHCR)

The long term establishment of refugees in the neighbouring country to which they fled (normally amongst a population of similar ethnic group).

Logistics (AJP-01(A))

The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, the aspects of military operations which deal with: (1) design and development, acquisition, storage, transport, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposal of materiel ;(2) transport of personnel; (3) acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; (4) acquisition or furnishing of services; and medical and health service support.

Measure of Effectiveness (US Center for Naval Analysis)

Tools used to measure results achieved in the overall mission and execution of assigned civil tasks, compared to stated strategic and operational objectives.

Military Information Environment (CFP 300-1)

To conduct information operations, commanders must deal effectively with both the traditional manoeuvre oriented battlefield, and that portion of the GIE relevant to this operation. This area is called the Military Information Environment. It is contained within the GIE, consisting of information systems and organizations - friendly and adversary, military and non military - that support, enable, or significantly influence a specific military operation.

Mission (AJP-01(A))

A clear and concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.

Multinational (AJP-01(A))

Adjective used to describe activities, operations, organizations, etc. in which forces or agencies of more than one nation participate. Also called combined.

National Support Elements (NATO Terminology Proposal)

Elements under national command and control which undertake national tasks and interface with a National Movement Coordination Centre or a Theatre Movement Coordination Centre.

GLOSSARY

Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (AJP-01(A))

Operation conducted to re-locate non-combatants threatened in a foreign country.

Non Combat Operations (CFP 300-Canada's Army)

Military Operation where weapons may be present, but their use is for self-protection purposes and not otherwise essential to the accomplishment of the mission. ROE for the use of weapons or of force in non-combat operations will normally be very restrictive.

Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies (A Guide to PSO)

The components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC, The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and its member National Societies) and NGOs involved in disaster response.

Non-Governmental Organisations (A Guide to PSO)

A wide range of primarily nonprofit organisations, both national and international, which are constituted separate from the government of the country in which they are founded. NGOs form themselves and write their own charter and mission. Examples are World Vision, CARE, OXFAM, MSF, MDM and Save the Children.

Non-Refoulement (UNHCR)

A principle of international protection which prohibits the return or expulsion of a refugee to the territory of a State where his or her life, freedom or personal security would be in jeopardy.

Normality Indicators (Operational Analysis Branch, HQ ARRC)

Relative measures of the state of normalcy characterizing an element of the civil environment, through data collected on a regular basis and assessed to have the frequency, quantity, consistency and coverage required to make a useful objective assessment of the changes occurring in the civilian populace.

Objectives (DPG 99)

Clear statements focussed on results which reflect an organization's mission and mandate and are achievable and measurable. Objectives also set the direction for strategies and programs.

Operational Command (AAP-6 and AJP-01(A))

The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. OPCOM may also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.

Operational Control (AAP-6 and AJP-01(A))

The authority granted a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned and to retain or assign tactical control of these units. It *does not include* authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

Operations Other Than War (AJP-01(A)- Adapted)

GLOSSARY (Cont)

A wide range of activities where military capabilities are used for purposes other than large-scale combat operations usually associated with war. NOTE: OOTW could involve a combination of air, land, sea, space and special operations forces, as well as the concerted efforts of governmental departments and agencies, IOs, NGOs and UN agencies in a complementary fashion. OOTW include Service Assisted Evacuation (HN *can* provide and guarantee the security of the evacuation operation); Service Protected Evacuation (HN *cannot* provide and guarantee the security of the evacuation operation); PSO; humanitarian operations; and domestic operations such as drug interdiction, illegal immigration and terrorist threats or acts, which could involve Joint Task Force 2 (JTF 2).

Operations Security (AJP-01(A) - Adapted)

The process which gives a civil-military activity, operation or exercise appropriate security using passive or active means to deny moral, material and tactical advantages to actual or potential adversary(ies) who could interfere with the peace process and achievement of the civil-military end state.

Outcomes/Objectives/Key Results (DPG 99)

A description of the actual effect, benefit or consequence that occurs, either in the short-term or long-term, due to the output of a program, process or activity - the overall result of a group of selected outputs over time to achieve a specific purpose. The hierarchical expression of these effects is in the order of Outcome, Objective, Key Result.

Peace Accord (CIDA/NGO)

Achievement of a commitment by hostile parties to stop fighting and work toward a stable peace is an important objective of diplomats (e.g., the Dayton Accords for Bosnia). The Accords, or the peace agreements, define the terms which are to be implemented in peace operations. It is important to note that often the commitment by the hostile parties is not total, nor the peace agreements sufficiently comprehensive to facilitate successful implementation. New peace implementation agreements during the course of peace operations are almost always required.

Peace Building; Development (CIDA/NGO)

Assistance provided to countries lacking modern economies in stable periods is "development assistance". It is generally oriented toward long-term economic growth and toward correcting conditions which lead to conflict. Peace building is similar, but generally refers to restoration of normal conditions permitting development following a conflict.

Peace Support Operations (MC 327/1)

Those multi-functional operations conducted impartially in support of a UN or OSCE mandate involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies, designed to achieve a long term political settlement or other conditions specified in the mandate. They include peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian operations.

Peace Support Psychological Operations (MC 402 and AJP-01(A))

Planned psychological activities conducted as an integral part of peace support operations, designed to create a supportive atmosphere and a willingness to cooperate among the parties in conflict and civilian population in the area of operations, to protect the force and assist in the achievement of mission objectives.

Planning

The development and articulation of a coherent course of action to achieve specific objectives (results) leading

GLOSSARY

to a desired end state.

Priority Intelligence Requirements (AAP-6 and CFP 300-1)

Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated or stated priority in his task of planning and decision making.

Programme (UNHCR)

An integrated plan, usually of one or two years duration, by which UNHCR address the needs of a caseload of refugees or displaced persons.

Project (UNHCR)

An activity of limited duration designed to provide particular needs within a programme (e.g. the Sarajevo window glass project, the cross IEBL bus lines).

Propaganda (MC 402 and CF Ops Manual)

Any information, ideas, doctrine or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinion, emotions, attitudes or behaviour of any specified group to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly. Propaganda falls into three categories: *white* propaganda is acknowledged and disseminated by the sponsor or by an accredited agency thereof; *grey* propaganda does not specifically identify any source; and *black* propaganda which purports to emanate from a source other than the true one.

Psychological Consolidation Activities (MC 402 and AJP-01(A))

Planned psychological activities in crisis and war directed at the *civilian population* located in areas under friendly control in order to achieve a desired behaviour which supports the military objectives and the operational freedom of the supported commanders.

Psychological Operations (MC 402 and AJP-01(A))

Planned psychological activities in peace, crisis and war directed to enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. They include strategic psychological activities, psychological consolidation activities, battlefield psychological activities and peace support psychological activities.

Public Affairs (CF Ops Manual)

The ongoing effort to establish a public understanding of Armed Forces' policies and actions in support of the Government by providing timely and accurate information to national and informational media and other target audiences.

Public Information (AJP-01(A) and AAP-6)

Information which is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding and support.

Public Order Emergency (Emergencies Act/CF Ops Manual)

An emergency that arises from threats to the security of Canada (meaning assigned by Section 2 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act) and that is so serious as to be a national emergency.

GLOSSARY (Cont)

Public Welfare Emergency (Emergencies Act/CF Ops Manual)

An emergency that is caused by a real or imminent:

- a. fire, flood, drought, storm, earthquake or other natural phenomenon;
- b. disease in human beings, animals or plants; or
- c. accident or pollution

and that results or may result in a danger to life or property, social disruption or a breakdown in the flow of essential goods, services or resources, so serious as to be a national emergency.

Readiness (NATO AJOD WP Proposal)

The time, not including transit time, within which a unit can be made capable of performing its task or mission.

Reconciliation (CIDA/NGO)

Conflict causes hostilities. Efforts to mitigate these hostilities and bring about reconciliation of differences among leaders and population groups are often undertaken in support of efforts to achieve a sustainable peace.

Reconstruction (CIDA/NGO)

The restoration of essential public services immediately after a cessation of fighting or a cease-fire agreement has been reached is necessary to begin bringing community life back to normal. Water, electricity, health, shelter, heating, food production, security, transportation, education are examples of services which need to be restored. Reconstruction of facilities and channels of services is often necessary to achieve restoration.

Refugee (UNHCR - 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees)

A person who: "...owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it".

Regional Governmental Organizations (A Guide to PSO)

Organizations constituted by two or more governments which include all UN agencies and regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Commission of the European Community or the Organizations of American States (OAS) which have humanitarian relief programs.

Reintegration (UNHCR)

The process by which a returnee resumes a normal life in his place of origin.

Relevance (DPG 98)

The importance of policy or guidance to the actual operation of DND and the CF.

Repatriation (UNHCR)

The operation by which UNHCR and IOM bring a refugee back home.

GLOSSARY

Resettlement (UNHCR)

The process by which UNHCR finds permanent residence in a third country (i.e. neither the country of origin or of asylum) for a refugee who will never be able to return to his home.

Resources

Refer to assets needed to achieve mission objectives and carry out associated tasks: time, funds or capital, personnel, materiel, machinery, facilities, information, technical support and technology.

Returnee (UNHCR)

A person who has been a refugee or displaced person, and who is in the process of returning to his place of origin and resuming a normal life. UNHCR normally continues to assist returnees for six to nine months after their return (depending on season and economic conditions).

Sanctions (CIDA/NGO)

Peace agreements often include sanctions which withhold a benefit (e.g., import of commodities, airline landing rights), or inhibit certain activities (e.g., re-armament, establishment of travel/trade barriers). These sanctions are designed to encourage compliance with the terms of the agreement. Enforcement of the sanctions is important.

Special Operations (AJP-01(A))

Military activities conducted by specially designated, organised, trained and equipped forces using operational techniques and modes of employment not standard to conventional operations. These activities are conducted across the full range of military operations (peace, crisis and war) independently or in coordination with operations of conventional forces to achieve military, political, economic and psychological objectives. Some tasks would include the rescue of hostages, combatting terrorism, provide assets for combat search and rescue, as well as the location, capture and recovery of designated personnel and materiel.

Structural/Sustainable Peace (CIDA/NGO)

The overall objective of intervention is to re-establish a stable environment and a lasting peace. Political, economic, military/paramilitary, police, cultural and religious forces must combine their efforts and set aside their differences, or compromise, to create social conditions for democratic structural reforms to reach a lasting peace. Extremist elements must be isolated by sapping away their popular base, through a skilful synergy of CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA. The exit out of a theatre of operations by a military force is problematic if a stable environment and lasting peace have not been achieved.

Sub-Agreement (UNHCR)

An agreement between UNHCR and an NGO, government department or other agency to supply services/goods or manage a project which is wholly or partly funded by UNHCR.

Tactical Control (CF Ops Manual)

The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvre necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

Target Audience (AAP-6)

GLOSSARY (Cont)

An individual or group selected for influence or attack by means of psychological operations.

Task (CF Ops Manual)

An activity which contributes to the achievement of a mission.

Task Force (CF Ops Manual)

Environment-specific CF elements required to operate in a theatre or area of operations in support of specific national objectives.

Time Available (NATO Tasks List - Draft)

The time available, normally the time allowed to complete a phase in a concept of operations. Description: Minimal (minutes to hours); Short (hours to days); Moderate (days to weeks); Long (weeks to months).

UN Charter Chapters VI, VII (CIDA/NGO)

The UN Charter includes chapters describing the rights of the international community to intervene in the affairs of a sovereign nation. *Chapter VI* describes peacekeeping operations i.e. intervention with the consent of all parties. *Chapter VII* describes coercitive measures including peace enforcement to force compliance i.e. intervention without the consent of the host nation or other parties to the conflict.

Unity of Effort (CIDA/NGO)

Political, civilian and military leaders have certain common objectives which permit them to cooperate on strategic planning and operations designed to achieve these common objectives. Civilian managers and military commanders base their specific operational objectives on these common objectives to achieve an effective unity of effort. Unity of effort also relies on the synergy created by political, civil and military elements deployed in a theatre or area of operations, focused on achieving the mission. Unity of effort implies a common strategy espoused by all stakeholders deployed and employed in an area of operations.

War Emergency (Emergencies Act/CF Ops Manual)

A war or other armed conflict, real or imminent, involving Canada or any of its allies that is so serious as to be a national emergency.

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