



National
Defence

Défense
nationale

B-GG-005-004/AF-000

CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONS

(Supersedes B-GG-005-004/AF-000 Ch01 dated 1995-5-19)

Issued on Authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff

OPI: J7 DLLS 2

2000-12-18

Canada 

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

Insert latest changed pages, dispose of superseded pages in accordance with applicable orders.

NOTE

The portion of the text affected by the latest change is indicated by a black vertical line in the margin of the page. Changes to illustrations are indicated by miniature pointing hands or black vertical lines.

Dates of issue for original and changed pages are:

Original.....0.....	1997-05-15	Ch.....	4
Ch.....1.....	2000-12-18	Ch.....	5
Ch.....2.....		Ch.....	6
Ch.....3.....		Ch.....	7

Zero in Change No. Column indicates an original page. Total number of pages in this publication is 261 consisting of the following:

Page No.	Change No.	Page No.	Change No.
Title.....	0	19-1 to 19-8.....	0
A.....	0	20-1 to 20-6.....	0
i to ii.....	0	21-1/21-2.....	0
iii/iv.....	0	21-3 to 21-5/21-6.....	0
v to xv/xvi.....	1	21-7 to 21-11/21-12.....	0
1-1 to 1-2.....	0	21-13 to 21-16.....	0
1-3 to 1-5/1-6.....	0	23-1 to 23-5/23-6.....	0
1-7 to 1-9/1-10.....	0	24-1 to 24-3/24-4.....	0
2-1 to 2-4.....	0	24-5 to 24-6.....	0
2-5 to 2-6.....	0	25-1 to 25-5/25-6.....	0
2-7 to 2-8.....	0	25-7 to 25-9/25-10.....	0
3-1 to 3-3/3-4.....	0	25-11/25-11/25-12.....	0
3-5 to 3-10.....	0	26-1 to 26-2.....	0
4-1 to 4-6.....	0	26-3 to 26-5/26-6.....	0
5-1 to 5-2.....	0	26-7 to 26-10.....	0
5-3 to 5-5/5-6.....	0	26-11 to 26-14.....	0
5-7 to 5-11/5-12.....	0	27-1 to 27-11/27-12.....	0
5-13 to 5-14.....	0	28-1 to 28-2.....	0
5-15 to 5-16.....	0	29-1 to 29-3/29-4.....	0
6-1 to 6-4.....	0	30-1 to 30-7/30-8.....	0
7-1 to 7-7/7-8.....	0	31-1 to 31-6.....	0
8-1 to 8-2.....	0	32-1 to 32-7/32-8.....	0
9-1 to 9-9/9-10.....	0	33-1 to 33-5/33-6.....	0
10-1 to 10-9/10-10.....	0	34-1 to 34-4.....	0
10-11 to 10-16.....	0	35-1 to 35-4.....	1
11-1 to 11-8.....	0	A-1 to A-2.....	0
13-1 to 13-8.....	0	GL-E-1 to GL-E-9/GL-E-10.....	0
17-1 to 17-6.....	0	LA-E-1 to LA-E-5/LA-E-6.....	0
18-1 to 18-4.....	0		

Contact Officer: J7 DLLS 2
8 2000 DND/MDN Canada

FOREWORD

The Canadian Forces are the armed forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consist of one Service called the Canadian Armed Forces. **NDA, c. N-4, s. 14**

1. Although there is a fine distinction between the **integration** and **unification** of the Canadian Forces (CF), the structures and processes which constitute unification have been the subject of almost continual change since 1968. An understanding of the process which led to the creation of a single unified defence force is a critical component in comprehending the current operational employment concepts of the CF.

Integration 1964.

2. Reorganization required two legislative changes. The first, Bill C-90, which was introduced in the House of Commons shortly after the White Paper on Defence became policy in March 1964, amended the National Defence Act (NDA) by eliminating the three separate service Chiefs of Staff and creating a single Defence Staff and a single Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) with executive authority over the three services. Bill C-90 came into effect on 1 Aug 64. In the first phase under Bill C-90, NDHQ was reorganized along functional lines that cut across the existing three service organizations. The second phase of the reorganization began in June 1965 with the announcement of a new integrated field command structure which reduced the eleven commands in Canada to six: Maritime, Mobile, Air Defence, Air Transport, Materiel and Training. As part of this second phase, various bases across the country were reorganized. The command and base organizations were streamlined to reduce overhead and charged with carrying out the defence roles within the resources available and within the context of an integrated, functionally organized, highly mobile force, rather than a force organized in accordance with the traditions of the navy, army and air force.

3. The first two phases in the reorganization, which encompassed the period 1964-1966, and which were facilitated by Bill C-90, were commonly referred to as integration, although the 1964 White Paper, which had announced the government's intention to reorganize the armed forces into a single unified defence force, used the terms integration, unification and reorganization indiscriminately. In 1967, integration was described as:

... the process by which the three Services are brought together under single control and management with common logistics, supply and training systems, operating within a functional command and organizational structure but retaining the legal identities of the three Services and the legal barriers between them.

Unification 1968.

4. The second legislative change, Bill C-243, was introduced in the House of Commons in Nov 1966, was passed in Apr 67 and became effective on 1 Feb 68. Under the provisions of Bill C-243, titled the *Canadian Forces Reorganization Act*, the three existing services, The Royal Canadian Navy, The Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force, were abolished and Canada's armed forces became a single service called the *Canadian Forces*. Although the armed forces were already subject to unified control and management, Bill C-243 created one force with one name, a common uniform and common rank designation. This was generally referred to as unification, the last phase in the reorganization process to create a single unified defence force which the government had initiated in 1964.

5. The Honorable Paul Hellyer, the Minister of National Defence (MND) throughout the period of the reorganization, viewed this last phase in the reorganization as the end of a logical, continuous process to create a unified force. In the House of Commons during the 27th Parliament he stated:

Unification is the end objective of a logical and evolutionary progression. Although integration and unification are sometimes regarded as alternatives, and inherently different, they are, in fact, merely different stages in the same process. Integration was actually the term applied to the first stages of the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces.

6. Given this definition of unification, the difference between integration and unification was essentially legislative.

7. **The Integrated Headquarters.** Over the next few years, problems were identified in the management of the Department of National Defence. There was concern over the capital acquisition programs and the apparent duplication of interests and involvement on the part of the Deputy Ministers Office, CF Headquarters and the Defence Research Board. A Management Review Group, appointed in 1971 was directed to address and report on these concerns. As a result, a new National Defence Headquarters organization was implemented, integrating the staffs of the Deputy Minister (DM) and the CDS. The reorganizations and an accompanying program management system were instituted in 1972. This resulted in the basic model of NDHQ that has existed to the present, with the management and control of DND and the CF based on the diarchy of the DM and CDS.

8. **MCCRT.** With only minor changes, the CF operated for the next two decades, with a unified single national headquarters organized on functional lines with some subordinate functional organizations, three major environmental commands and an array of bases. As the CF approached the twenty-first century, change once again became necessary to meet the realities of the times. The 1994 Defence Policy White Paper contained direction to reduce the overall resources that are devoted to command and control (C2), and to this end, a management command and control re-engineering team was established to develop a new C2 structure, and a new resource management process for DND and the CF. The key findings were:

- ! the CF would remain unified and NDHQ would remain integrated;
- ! the new structure would deliver operationally effective sea, land and air forces capable of operating in a joint context; and
- ! operational HQs were reduced and Command HQs closed. The environmental heads, called Environmental Chiefs of Staff (ECS), would be subordinate to the CDS and would have specified strategic functions.

CF Doctrine

9. CF Doctrine provides the fundamental principles by which all CF Operations are conducted. A CF Operation is defined as **the employment of an element or elements of the CF to perform a specific mission.**

10. The CF is a unified force and, as a matter of routine, conducts operations involving elements of at least two environments. Notwithstanding the legal aspects of the NDA, which describes the CF as a single service, when elements of two or more environments of the CF are required to operate in the same theatre or area of operations in support of the same national strategic objective, they will operate under a joint structure using internationally recognized joint terminology.

11. ECS are responsible for the development and maintenance of their respective doctrine. However, Environmental doctrine does not provide adequate guidance for the employment of military forces when elements of two or more environments of the CF are required to cooperate. The CF requires well developed and clearly understood CF doctrine to underpin multi-Environment military operations, in either a domestic or international scenario. The DCDS is responsible for the development and maintenance of CF concepts and doctrine. The DCDS exercises this responsibility through the CFDB, which is chaired by the COS J3 and has representation from each of the ECS and NDHQ group principals.

12. This publication is the keystone manual within the CF doctrine publication system. The manual uses generic terminology and structures that are applicable to all CF Operations. For those operations described in paragraph 11 (above), the adjective *Ajoint* is added as necessary. This publication comprises a framework for a hierarchy of subordinate publications that provide amplifying guidance, principles and procedures regarding CF Operations (see Annex A). These subordinate publications will be produced as required by appropriate group principals and organizations at NDHQ with guidance from the CFDB and assistance from the ECS.

13. If, in a CF Operation, conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Environmental publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CDS, in consultation with the ECS, provides more current and specific guidance.

PREFACE

1. CF operations include a wide variety of military activities which generally involve maritime, land and air operations, in any combination, conducted unilaterally or in cooperation with allies. The doctrine presented in the following chapters seeks to develop the CF's potential to conduct operations in any scenario, either domestically or internationally.
2. While emphasizing conventional military operations, this publication recognizes that the CF must be able to operate effectively in any battlefield environment, across the spectrum of conflict.
3. Doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint staff (J Staff) at NDHQ, to commands established for routine, contingency or specific operations, as well as all formations and agencies supporting such operations. It also provides the command and staff colleges and other teaching institutions with the framework for officer professional development. It is intended to guide the employment of the CF, provide a basis for collective training, and provide the military education system with instruction material.
4. This publication concentrates on the operational level of force employment, where emphasis is placed on the synergistic integration of CF commands and agencies so that their total effort can be concentrated decisively to achieve the commander's mission.
5. This publication is divided into four parts: part one contains both strategic and operational concepts and guidance, part two deals with international operations, part three discusses specific types of domestic operations, and part four provides an insight to the enabling operations which create the conditions for a successful mission.
6. Part one is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 sets forth the basic strategic level framework, chapters 2 and 3 provide operational and organizational guidelines for the exercise of command and control of CF operations, and chapter 4 discusses the operation planning process (OPP). Chapter 5 focuses on the use of force in CF operations while chapter 6 deals with training and exercises. Chapter 7 introduces Task Force (TF) organization.
7. Part two is divided into five chapters dealing with various types of international operations. Chapter 8 introduces the concepts of combined operations, while chapters 9, 10 and 11 focus on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations, peace support operations, and non-combatant evacuations (NEO) respectively. Chapter 12 discusses continental defence.
8. Part three contains five chapters dealing with domestic operations. Chapter 13 discusses the general conduct of domestic operations, chapter 14 focuses on the protection of Canada, and chapter 15 explains aid of the civil power (ACP). Finally, chapters 16 and 17 discuss support to other government departments (OGDs) and search and rescue (SAR) operations, respectively.
9. Part four encompasses those critical elements which combine to enable a successful operation. Chapters 18 and 19 deal with personnel support and medical support respectively. Chapters 20, 21 and 22 discuss intelligence, security and surveillance. Military engineer support is detailed in chapter 23, while chapter 24 covers nuclear, biological and chemical defense. Chapters 25 and 26 involve airspace coordination and control, and space operations. Logistic support and movement are explained in chapters 27 and 28 respectively. Chapter 29 covers public affairs (PA), and chapter 30 focuses on civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). In chapters 31, 32 and 33 the aspects of communications and information systems (CIS), command and control warfare (C2W), and electronic warfare (EW) are introduced. Finally, chapter 34 discusses psychological operations (PSYOPS).
10. The chapters contained in this publication apply to CF activities as a whole, but may need to be adapted to the specific strategic and operational requirements of each operation or each theatre of operations.
11. This publication is authoritative but not directive. Commanders will need to exercise judgement in applying the guidance it provides to accomplish their missions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

PART I C DOCTRINAL CONCEPTS AND GUIDANCE

CHAPTER 1 - CONCEPTS AND GUIDANCE	1-1
Section I - Introduction.....	1-1
101. National Policy Framework	1-1
102. Mission of the Canadian Forces	1-1
103. Strategic Objectives.....	1-1
104. Operational Priorities	1-1
105. Canadian Forces Doctrine	1-2
Section II - Military Operations and Armed Conflict	1-3
106. Introduction.....	1-3
107. Levels of Operation	1-3
108. The Spectrum of Conflict	1-3
109. The Continuum of Operations.....	1-3
110. The Levels of Conflict	1-4
111. Strategic Level of Conflict.....	1-4
112. Operational Level of Conflict.....	1-5/1-6
113. Tactical Level of Conflict.....	1-5/1-6
Section III - CF Operations.....	1-7
114. Introduction.....	1-7
117. Domestic Contingency Operations	1-8
118. International Contingency Operations	1-8
119. Principles of CF Operations	1-8
120. Phases of an Operation.....	1-9/1-10
CHAPTER 2 - COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CF OPERATIONS 2-1	
Section I - Terminology and Principles.....	2-1
201. Introduction.....	2-1
202. Terminology	2-1
203. Principles of Command	2-3
Section II - Command and Control of Canadian Forces Operations.....	2-5
204. Introduction.....	2-5
205. National Command Structure.....	2-5
206. Operational Headquarters	2-6
Section III - Transfer of Command Authority	2-7
207. The Transfer Process.....	2-7
CHAPTER 3 - THE CAMPAIGN PLAN	3-1
Section I - Campaign Design.....	3-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

		PAGE
301.	The Strategic Environment.....	3-1
302.	Operational Art	3-1
303.	Campaign Design	3-1
304.	Operational Objectives	3-2
305.	Sequencing.....	3-3/3-4
Section II - Campaign Planning		3-5
306.	The Campaign Plan	3-5
307.	The Campaign Plan and Operations Planning.....	3-5
308.	Campaign Planning Concepts.....	3-6
309.	The Operational Framework	3-6
310.	Conducting the Campaign	3-7
311.	Preparation and Deployment.....	3-7
312.	Commanding the Campaign.....	3-8
313.	Conduct of the Campaign	3-8
314.	Concluding the Campaign.....	3-10
CHAPTER 4 - THE OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS 4-1		
401.	Introduction.....	4-1
402.	Levels of Planning.....	4-1
403.	Operation Planning	4-1
404.	Principles of Operation Planning	4-2
405.	The Operation Planning Sequence	4-2
406.	Methods of Operation Planning	4-3
407.	Canadian Forces Operational Plans	4-4
408.	The Planning Environment	4-5
CHAPTER 5 - THE USE OF FORCE IN CF OPERATIONS.....		5-1
Section I - General Principles.....		5-1
501.	Introduction.....	5-1
502.	Geographic Constraints on the Use of Force.....	5-1
503.	Fundamental Principles and Concepts on the Use of Force.....	5-1
Section II - Legal Considerations.....		5-3
504.	Purpose of Legal Constraints.....	5-3
505.	Canadian Domestic Law.....	5-3
506.	International Law	5-3
507.	Application of National and International Law	5-4
Section III - Controlling the Use of Force		5-7
508.	Basis for Controlling the Use of Force.....	5-7
509.	Use of Force Directive	5-9
Section IV - Use of Force in Domestic Operations.....		5-13
510.	The Canadian Forces and Domestic Operations	5-13

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

		PAGE
511.	Self-defence During Domestic Operations	5-13
512.	Rules of Engagement During Domestic Operations	5-14
Section V - Use of Force in International Operations		5-15
513.	The Canadian Forces and International Operations	5-15
514.	Self-defence During International Operations	5-15
515.	Rules of Engagement During International Operations	5-15
CHAPTER 6 - TRAINING AND EXERCISES 6-1		
601.	Introduction	6-1
602.	Types of Training	6-1
603.	Categories of Exercises	6-1
604.	Levels of Exercise	6-2
605.	Other Types of Exercises	6-2
606.	Training Organization and Responsibilities	6-2
607.	Training Requirements and Objectives	6-2
608.	Joint Task List.....	6-3
609.	National Training Plan	6-4
CHAPTER 7 - TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION 7-1		
Section I - The Task Force		7-1
701.	Introduction	7-1
702.	Establishing a Task Force.....	7-1
703.	Command of a Task Force	7-2
704.	Responsibilities	7-3
Section II - Task Force Headquarters Staff.....		7-5
705.	Staff Functions and Activities.....	7-5
706.	Composition of the TFHQ Staff.....	7-5
707.	Command and Control	7-7/7-8
708.	Structure and Size.....	7-7/7-8
709.	Support Unit.....	7-7/7-8
710.	CIS Unit.....	7-7/7-8
PART II C INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS		
CHAPTER 8 - COMBINED OPERATIONS 8-1		
801.	Introduction.....	8-1
802.	Structure of a Combined Operation.....	8-1
803.	Command and Control	8-1
804.	ROE for Combined Operations	8-2
CHAPTER 9 - NATO OPERATIONS 9-1		
901.	Introduction.....	9-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

PAGE

902.	Structure of the NATO Alliance.....	9-1
903.	NATO Military Commands	9-2
904.	NATO Precautionary System.....	9-6
905.	NATO Security and Defence Strategy.....	9-6
906.	Implementation of NATO's Security and Defence Strategy	9-7
907.	NATO Command and Control.....	9-8
908.	Canadian Commitments to NATO	9-9/9-10
909.	Canadian Command and Control.....	9-9/9-10

CHAPTER 10 - PEACE-SUPPORT OPERATIONS 10-1

Section I - The United Nations..... 10-1

1001.	Introduction.....	10-1
1002.	Sponsorship of Peace-support Operations	10-2
1003.	Purpose and Composition of the United Nations	10-2
1004.	Legal Basis for United Nations Peace-support Operations	10-3
1005.	Peace-support Operations Approved by the United Nations	10-3
1006.	Application of the United Nations Charter in Peace-support Operations.....	10-4
1007.	United Nations Planning Process for Peace-support Operations.....	10-5
1008.	United Nations Command and Control.....	10-6
1009.	Organization of United Nations Force Headquarters	10-8

Section II - Canadian Peace-support Planning and Operations.....10-11

1010.	Introduction.....	10-11
1011.	Canadian Participation Policy	10-11
1012.	Planning Process for Canadian Peace-support Operations	10-13
1013.	Canadian Command and Control.....	10-13
1014.	Rules of Engagement.....	10-14
1015.	Organization of the Canadian Task Force.....	10-14
1016.	Concept of National Support	10-14
1017.	Peace-support Training	10-15

CHAPTER 11 - NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS 11-1

1101.	Introduction.....	11-1
1102.	Evacuation Operations	11-1
1103.	Permissive NEO.....	11-1
1104.	Non-permissive NEO.....	11-2
1105.	Factors Involved in Evacuation Operations.....	11-4
1106.	Planning	11-6
1107.	Command and Control of Evacuation Operations	11-7
1108.	Combined Evacuation Operations.....	11-7

CHAPTER 12 - CONTINENTAL DEFENCE (To be issued) 12-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

PAGE

PART III C DOMESTIC CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 13 - DOMESTIC CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS		13-1
1301.	Introduction.....	13-1
1302.	Terminology	13-1
1303.	The Domestic Environment.....	13-2
1304.	The Continuum of Assistance.....	13-3
1305.	Command and Control of Domestic Operations.	13-4
1306.	Use of Force.....	13-5
1307.	The Emergencies Act	13-5
1308.	Aid of the Civil Power.....	13-5
1309.	Assistance to Law Enforcement Operations	13-5
1310.	Provision of Services to Other Than Law Enforcement Operations	13-6
1311.	Training and Equipment.....	13-7
1312.	Intelligence	13-7
1313.	Logistics.....	13-7
1314.	Public Relations	13-8
1315.	Conclusion.....	13-8
 CHAPTER 14 - (not allocated)		
 CHAPTER 15 - (not allocated)		
 CHAPTER 16 - (not allocated)		
 CHAPTER 17 - SEARCH AND RESCUE 17-1		
1701	Introduction.....	17-1
1702	Principles	17-1
1703	Composition of SAR Forces	17-2
1704	Types of Missions	17-2
1705	Distinction Between Wartime and Peacetime SAR.....	17-3

PART IV C ENABLING OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 18 - PERSONNEL SUPPORT		18-1
1801.	Introduction.....	18-1
1802.	Principles of Personnel Support	18-1
1803.	Concept of Personnel Support	18-1
1804.	Elements of Personnel Support.....	18-2
1805.	Operational Personnel Management.....	18-2
1806.	Personnel Services	18-2
1807.	Health Services Support.....	18-3
1808.	Associated Tasks.....	18-3
1809.	Personnel Support Planning Sequence	18-3
 CHAPTER 19 - HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT 19-1		
1901.	Introduction.....	19-1
1902.	Objective of Health Services Support	19-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

PAGE

1903.	Principles of Health Services Support	19-1
1904.	Health Services Support Policies	19-2
1905.	Concept of Health Services Support	19-3
1906.	Responsibilities and Relationships	19-4
1907.	Health Services Support and the Geneva Conventions	19-6
1908.	Planning of Health Services Support	19-7
1909.	Command and Control of Health Services Support	19-8

CHAPTER 20 - INTELLIGENCE 20-1

2001.	Introduction.....	20-1
2002.	Principles of Intelligence.....	20-1
2003.	The Intelligence Cycle.....	20-2
2004.	The Intelligence Estimate.....	20-2
2005.	Intelligence Planning.....	20-3
2006.	Areas of Intelligence Responsibility and Interest.....	20-4
2007.	Intelligence Sources	20-4
2008.	Intelligence in Operations	20-5
2009.	Geomatics Support to Operations	20-5
2010.	Command and Control of Intelligence Operations	20-6

CHAPTER 21 - SECURITY AND MILITARY POLICE 21-1/21-2

Section I - Introduction..... 21-1/21-2

2101.	Threat Environment	21-1/21-2
2102.	Security Measures	21-1/21-2

Section II - Operations Security and Deception 21-3

2103.	Introduction.....	21-3
2104.	Operations Security.....	21-3
2105.	Deception	21-4

Section III - Force Protection 21-7

2106.	General Concept	21-7
2107.	Objectives.....	21-7
2108.	Principles and Functions	21-8
2109.	Responsibilities	21-10
2110.	Force Protection Planning.....	21-11/21-12
2111.	Relationship to Other Protection Activities	21-11/21-12

Section IV - Security and Military Police Operations21-13

2112.	Introduction.....	21-13
2113.	SAMP Organization and Responsibilities	21-13
2114.	Command and Control	21-14
2115.	Operational Level SAMP Support	21-14

CHAPTER 22 - SURVEILLANCE (TBP) 22-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

	PAGE
CHAPTER 23 - MILITARY ENGINEER SUPPORT	23-1
2301. Introduction.....	23-1
2302. Principles of Military Engineer Support	23-1
2303. Concept of Military Engineer Support.....	23-2
2304. Organization and Responsibilities of Military Engineer Support	23-3
2305. Planning of Military Engineer Support	23-4
2306. Command and Control with Respect to Military Engineer Support	23-5/23-6
 CHAPTER 24 - NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL DEFENCE	 24-1
Section I - Defence Planning	24-1
2401. Introduction.....	24-1
2402. International Agreements, Conventions, Protocols and Treaties.....	24-1
2403. NBC Defence.....	24-1
2404. Requirements of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence.....	24-2
 Section II - Concepts and Considerations.....	 24-5
2405. Commander's Role	24-5
2406. Operational Considerations in a NBC Environment	24-5
2407. Special Considerations in a NBC Environment.....	24-6
2408. Command and Control with respect to NBC Defence.....	24-6
 CHAPTER 25 - AIRSPACE COORDINATION AND CONTROL	 25-1
Section I - Airspace Control	25-1
2501. Introduction.....	25-1
2502. Terminology and Principles	25-1
2503. Implementation of Airspace Control	25-2
2504. Organization of Airspace Control	25-3
2505. Responsibility for Airspace Control	25-4
 Section II - Air Defence	 25-7
2506. Introduction.....	25-7
2507. Concept of Air Defence	25-7
2508. Implementation of Air Defence	25-7
2509. Organization of Air Defence	25-8
2510. Responsibilities for Air Defence.....	25-8
 Section III - Targeting	 25-11/25-12
2511. Introduction.....	25-11/25-12
2512. The Targeting Process	25-11/25-12
2513. Planning and Execution of Targeting.....	25-11/25-12
 CHAPTER 26 - SPACE OPERATIONS.....	 26-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

PAGE

Section I - Introduction..... 26-1

- 2601. General 26-1
- 2602. History 26-1

Section II - Attributes of Space Systems..... 26-3

- 2603. General 26-3
- 2604. Environmentally Influenced Attributes 26-3
- 2605. Logistically Influenced Attributes 26-4
- 2606. Politically/Legally Influenced Attributes 26-4

Section III - Space Force Roles and Missions..... 26-7

- 2607. General 26-7
- 2608. Enhancing Operations..... 26-7
- 2609. Supporting Space Forces 26-8
- 2610. Space Control..... 26-9
- 2611. Force Application 26-10

Section IV - Space Employment Concepts.....26-11

- 2612. Command of Space Forces 26-11
- 2613. Role of Military Space Power..... 26-11
- 2614. Enhancing Operations..... 26-11
- 2615. Supporting Space Forces 26-13
- 2616. Space Control..... 26-13
- 2617. Application of Force..... 26-13
- 2618. Space Operations Planning 26-14
- 2619. Education, Training and Exercises 26-14

CHAPTER 27 - LOGISTIC SUPPORT 27-1

- 2701. Introduction..... 27-1
- 2702. Categories of Logistic Support 27-1
- 2703. Levels of Logistic Support..... 27-2
- 2704. Principles of Logistic Support 27-3
- 2705. Concept of Logistic Support..... 27-4
- 2706. Transportation and Distribution Sub-system 27-5
- 2707. Organization and Responsibilities of Logistic Support 27-6
- 2708. Planning of Logistic Support 27-8
- 2709. Command and Control of Logistic Support Operations..... 27-10

CHAPTER 28 - MOVEMENT 28-1

- 2801. Introduction..... 28-1
- 2802. Principles of Movement 28-1
- 2803. Movement Resources 28-1
- 2804. Organization and Responsibilities 28-2

CHAPTER 29 - PUBLIC AFFAIRS 29-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

		PAGE
2901.	Introduction.....	29-1
2902.	Management Of Public Affairs.....	29-1
2903.	Organization And Responsibilities Of Public Affairs.....	29-2
2904.	Planning Of Public Affairs.....	29-2
2905.	Command And Control With Respect To Public Affairs.....	29-2
 CHAPTER 30 - CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION 30-1		
3001.	Introduction.....	30-1
3002.	Objective of Civil-military Cooperation	30-1
3003.	Scope of Civil-military Cooperation	30-2
3004.	Civil-military Operations.....	30-2
3005.	Support to Civil Administration	30-4
3006.	Organization and Responsibilities of Civil-military Cooperation	30-5
3007.	Planning of Civil-military Cooperation	30-6
3008.	Command and Control of Civil-military Operations	30-7/30-8
 CHAPTER 31 - COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 31-1		
3101.	Introduction.....	31-1
3102.	Principles	31-1
3103.	Concept.....	31-3
3104.	Requirements	31-4
3105.	Organization and Responsibilities	31-4
3106.	Planning.....	31-5
3107.	Command and Control	31-6
 CHAPTER 32 - COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE 32-1		
3201.	Introduction.....	32-1
3202.	Applicability	32-1
3203.	C2W Concepts.....	32-1
3204.	C2W Components	32-3
3205.	Military Actions	32-3
3206.	Intelligence and Communications Support.....	32-4
3207.	C2W Organization and Responsibilities	32-4
3208.	C2W Planning Process.....	32-6
 CHAPTER 33 - ELECTRONIC WARFARE 33-1		
3301.	Introduction.....	33-1
3302.	Objectives of Electronic Warfare	33-1
3303.	Components of Electronic Warfare	33-1
3304.	Planning Electronic Warfare	33-2
3305.	The Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell.....	33-3
3306.	Command and Control	33-4
3307.	Electronic Warfare Operational Support Centre.....	33-4
 CHAPTER 34 - PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 34-1		
3401.	Introduction.....	34-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

	PAGE
3402. Purposes of Psychological Operations	34-1
3403. Classifications of Psychological Operations	34-2
3404. Propaganda and Other Actions	34-3
3405. Conduct of Psychological Operations	34-3
3406. The Canadian Forces and Psychological Operations.....	34-4
3407. Command and Control of Psychological Operations	34-4
CHAPTER 35 – METEOROLOGY AND OCEANOGRAPHY SUPPORT	
3501. Introduction.....	35-1
3502. Objective of Meteorology and Oceanography Support	35-1
3503. Principles of Meteorology and Oceanography Support	35-1
3504. Organization and Responsibilities	35-2
3505. Planning Meteorology and Oceanography Support	35-3
3506. Command and Control of MET OC Support	35-4
ANNEX A SUBORDINATE PUBLICATIONS	A-1/A-2
GLOSSARY.....	GL-E-1
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	LA-E-1

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE	PAGE
1-1 Military Operations and Armed Conflict	1-4
2-1 Table of Degrees of Command Authority.....	2-3
2-2 Decision Making Process and Transfer of Command - Planning Phase	2-7
2-3 Decision Making Process and Transfer of Command - Force Generation Phase.....	2-8
2-4 Decision Making Process and Transfer of Command - Force Employment Phase	2-8
7-1 A Generic Task Force	7-1
7-2 A Generic Operational Level Headquarters.....	7-6
8-1 Organization of a Combined Force involving Canadian forces	8-1
9-1 Allied Command Europe	9-3
9-2 Allied Command Atlantic	9-3
9-3 Allied Command Atlantic-Western Area	9-4
9-4 Allied Command Atlantic-Striking Fleet	9-4
9-5 Allied Command Europe-Northwestern Region	9-5
10-1 Command and Control for a Generic Peace-Support Operation	10-7
10-2 Organization of a UN Force HQ	10-8
10-3 Generic UN Peacekeeping Organization.....	10-13
11-1 Permissive NEO.....	11-2
11-2A NEO (Sea)	11-3

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)

	PAGE
11-2B NEO (Air)	11-3
11-3 Command Structure for an Evacuation Operation.....	11-7
11-4 Combined Evacuation Operation - Lead Nation Command Structure.....	11-8
13-1 The Continuum of Assistance.....	13-3
13-2 National Command and Control - Domestic Operations	13-4
19-1 Command and Control of HSS.....	19-8
20-1 Intelligence Support to Operations	20-5
21-1 SAMP Command and Control.....	21-14
23-1 Command and Control of Engineering Operations	23-3
27-1 General Staff - CF Operational Level Headquarters (J4 Division)	27-7
27-2 CF Logistic Support Organization	27-9
27-3 Command and Control of Logistic Operations.....	27-11/27-12
32-1 Hierarchy of Information Warfare.	32-2
32-2 Command and Control Warfare.	32-2
33-1 Electronic Warfare Operational Support Centre	33-4

CHAPTER 1
CONCEPTS AND GUIDANCE

SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

101. NATIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORK

1. National policy reflects Canada's interests both in the domestic and international environments. As Defence policy supports foreign policy, the CF becomes an instrument of national policy. It is the Government's responsibility to define Canada's national interests and to provide the necessary guidance and focus to strategic policy makers and planners. This strategic guidance is essential to influence domestic and international behaviour and attitudes towards peace, order and good government. The foreign policy objectives enunciated by the Government are:

- a. the promotion of prosperity (involving sustainable development) and employment;
- b. the protection of Canadian peace and security within a stable global framework; and
- c. the projection of Canadian values and culture.

102. MISSION OF THE CANADIAN FORCES

1. The mission of the Department of National Defence and the CF is: **"to defend Canada and Canadian interests and values, while contributing to international peace and security."**

103. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

1. The Strategic Objectives which support the mission of the Department and the CF are:
- a. to generate and employ effective, multi-purpose, combat-capable forces;
 - b. to provide sound advice on defence and national security to the Government and timely information to Parliament and the Canadian public;
 - c. to play a unifying role and provide effective support to the Government's broad programs and policies;
 - d. to strengthen the Defence Team based on our Vision and Shared Values; and
 - e. to optimize the use of resources available and to promote efficiency and cost effectiveness.

104. OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES

1. To achieve the strategic objectives, the 1994 White Paper assigns the following operational tasks to the CF:
- a. **Defending Canada** - protecting Canada's national territory and areas of jurisdiction, helping civil authorities to protect and sustain national interests, and assisting in national emergencies.
 - b. **Defending North America** - protecting the Canadian approaches to the continent in partnership with the US, in accordance with the CANUS Basic Security Plan and particularly through NORAD; promoting Arctic security; and pursuing opportunities for defence with the US in other areas.

- c. **Contributing to international security** - participating in a full range of multilateral operations through the UN, NATO, other regional organizations and coalitions of like-minded countries; supporting humanitarian relief efforts and restoration of conflict-devastated areas; and participating in arms control and other confidence-building measures.
- d. **Fostering emergency preparedness** - ensuring an appropriate level of emergency preparedness across Canada through an integrated and cooperative program.

105. CANADIAN FORCES DOCTRINE

1. CF doctrine provides the fundamental tenets for the employment of military forces to translate the CF mission and strategic objectives into action. More specifically, it provides commanders with underlying principles to guide their actions in planning and conducting operations. While CF and Environment specific doctrine are separate bodies of doctrine, the two must be compatible. All CF plans and operations will be based on the doctrine contained in this publication.
2. The CF will operate internationally as part of an alliance or coalition. Thus, CF doctrine should be consistent, as far as practicable, with the doctrine of major allies to provide the capacity to conduct combined operations.
3. Operational effectiveness of the CF depends on the development of doctrine and sufficient personnel, training and equipment to employ it effectively. Procedures should be developed from doctrine so that they will be suitable for use in any operation, with only minor changes to cater for different command structures or variations in force levels, structures and/or capabilities.

SECTION II

MILITARY OPERATIONS AND ARMED CONFLICT

106. INTRODUCTION

1. **Military Operations.** An operation is a military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, training or an administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objective of any battle or campaign. Gradations of scale and intensity exist in military operations. These gradations are described in terms of a continuum which distinguishes among low, mid and high-level military operations according to their objective, the use force, the scale, and the tempo of activity.

107. LEVELS OF OPERATION

1. **Low-level Operations.** Military operations that are normally conducted by forces-in-being, applying the minimum force necessary to achieve the mission. Contact with opposing forces may be infrequent.

2. **Mid-level Operations.** Military operations that involve most, if not all, of a nation's forces-in-being and may require the mobilization of additional resources. Deadly force will be applied, although there may be restrictions on the types of weapons used or the geographic area in which they are employed. Military activity will be conducted with speed and violence, but may be non-continuous and localized in an area of operations.

3. **High-level Operations.** The entire range of modern weaponry may be used, including weapons of mass destruction. The sustained conduct of such operations will demand the mobilization of a nation's entire military potential. Military activity will be conducted continuously with maximum speed and violence throughout the theatre.

108. THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

1. Relations between different peoples exist in a condition either of peace or of conflict. Peace exists when there is an absence of violence or the threat of violence. Conflict exists when violence is either manifested or threatened. The object of conflict is to impose one's will upon the enemy. The means to that end is the coordinated employment of the various instruments of national power including diplomatic, economic and political efforts as well as the application, or threat, of violence by military force. The spectrum of conflict (figure 1-1) describes the varying states of relations between nations or groups and the continuum of operations relates to the range of military responses to peace and conflict (including war).

2. In conflicts which have proven resistant to both peacemaking and peace enforcement efforts, there may be no alternative left but for the parties to embark on a policy of war. War is essentially a subset of conflict and not an isolated state; as with peace and conflict, the distinction between conflict other than war and war will be blurred, as a conflict may encompass a period of war fighting and then transition to prosecution through other means.

109. THE CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS

1. The continuum of operations embraces the concept of combat and non-combat operations. Combat operations are military operations where the use or threatened use of force is essential to accomplish a mission. Non Combat operations are defined as military operations where weapons may be present; their use is primarily for self-defence purposes and is controlled by established ROE.

2. The military response to war is referred to as war fighting. Activities during peacetime and conflict other than war are classified as operations other than war (OOTW).

3. While the overall focus must be on war fighting, the CF's frequent role in OOTW is critical and cannot be ignored. In military terms there may be little if any distinction between the conduct of combat operations in war fighting and OOTW. Canadian units, in peace and conflict, have proven repeatedly that well trained, well led and properly equipped combat capable forces can quickly adapt to the requirements of non-combat operations.




Figure 1-1 Military Operations and Armed Conflict

110. THE LEVELS OF CONFLICT

1. The military response to conflict must be consistent with national policy objectives. The translation of policy goals into military action must be done in a manner which ensures clarity and preserves unity of effort. Accordingly, military activity has been categorized into three levels: strategic, operational and tactical. These levels of conflict allow commanders to visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks. Each level is defined by the outcome intended - not by the level of command or the size of the unit or formations involved. While the levels form a hierarchy, there are no sharp boundaries and they often overlap.

2. This delineation into levels of conflict has limitations. Factors such as the advent of information technology are compressing these levels, blurring the distinction between each. The key is not the level at which an activity transpires or where the transition occurs, but to ensure that all activities are coordinated and focused towards achievement of the strategic objective.

3. An understanding of the complexities of working at the operational level in a joint and combined context is essential for the CF to participate in the planning and conduct of, campaigns and major operations. Commanders must develop an appreciation of the interaction of the levels of conflict in order that they may provide timely and astute advice to Government on the use of military force in domestic and international operations.

111. STRATEGIC LEVEL OF CONFLICT

1. At the top of this hierarchy is the strategic level of conflict. The strategic level of conflict is that level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives. Activities at this level establish strategic military objectives, sequence the objectives, define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of power, develop strategic plans to achieve the objectives, and provide armed forces and other capabilities in accordance with the strategic plans.

2. Within the context of national security strategy, a nation employs all of its resources — political, economic, scientific, technological, psychological and military — to achieve the objectives of national policy. Military strategy is that component of national or multinational strategy that presents the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of like-minded nations.

3. Strategy is the sole authoritative basis for all operations. It determines the conduct of all military actions and guides operations by establishing aims, allocating resources, and imposing conditions on military action. The overriding criteria for the conduct of military operations are the strategic objectives. The operational commander's principal task is to determine and pursue the sequence of actions that will serve most directly that objective.

112. OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF CONFLICT

1. The operational level of conflict is the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, and initiating actions and applying resources to bring about and sustain those events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time and space than do tactics: they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.

2. The operational level is not defined by the number and size of forces or the echelon of headquarters involved. In a large scale conflict, a corps may be the lowest level of operational command. However, in smaller scale conflict, operational level activity can take place at much lower levels. Regardless of its size, a military force tasked to achieve a strategic objective, is being employed at the operational level.

113. TACTICAL LEVEL OF CONFLICT

1. The tactical level of conflict is the level at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and manoeuvre of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives established by the operational level commander.

2. At the tactical level, forces are deployed directly for battle and combat power is applied directly to defeat an enemy at a particular time and place. However, the tactical level should never be viewed in isolation, for tactical success alone does not guarantee strategic success. Battles and engagements generally shape the course of events at the operational level. They become relevant only in the larger context of the campaign and the campaign, in turn, only gains meaning in the context of strategy. A comprehensive view is required to understand that the three levels of conflict are inextricably linked.

SECTION III

CF OPERATIONS

114. INTRODUCTION

1. A CF Operation is defined as **the employment of an element or elements of the CF to perform a specific mission**. Certain CF operations are enhanced when environmental components operate in concert. Force entry operations provide good examples: airborne operations require land and air forces to be employed together; amphibious assaults may involve maritime, land and air forces. Other operations that are normally co-planned and conducted include: PSYOPS; EW; C2W; intelligence; NBC defence; air defence; and peace support operations.

2. The CF is a unified force and, as a matter of routine, conducts operations involving elements of at least two environments. Notwithstanding the legal aspects of the NDA, which describes the CF as a single service, when elements of two or more environments of the CF are required to cooperate, they will do so under a joint structure, using internationally recognized joint terminology.

3. CF doctrine must cater to both domestic and international operations without generating confusion within a Canadian force or amongst our allies, hence the use of joint terminology. In all cases a commander will be named and appropriate elements will be assigned as required. C2 relationships will be based on the principles outlined in chapter 2 - Command and Control and will be specified in the DCDS wng O.

115. CATEGORIES OF CF OPERATIONS

1. There are two categories of CF operations which stem from the mission objectives in the DPG:

- a. Routine Operations; and
- b. Contingency Operations.

2. **Routine Operations.** Routine operations are those operations for which a given Capability Component (CC) has been specifically tasked, organized and equipped. Routine operations use existing command and control relationships and there is no requirement to use joint terminology. Doctrine for routine operations is generally Environmental in nature.

3. **Contingency Operations.** Contingency operations can be conducted in either a domestic or international theatre. If an operation does not clearly fall into the routine category, then it is a contingency operation, and a grouping, tailored to the operation is generated. Any grouping created for a contingency operation, regardless of size, is called a **Task Force (TF)**.

116. TASK FORCE

1. **Concept.** In previous doctrinal publications, the term "Force" was used to describe a grouping created for a specific mission. This term, while useful in many ways, is not found in NATO terminology and can have a variety of interpretations. The term "Task Force" is found in AAP-6, and is defined as **a temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission**. The TF concept provides a generic descriptor for a force of any size and composition ranging from a section sized organization to a major formation. It can be employed across the spectrum of conflict, at any level. As the TF will be a mission specific grouping, it may or may not contain elements of two or more environments of the CF. Should the TF be multi-environmental in composition, then the adjective "joint" shall be employed to describe all aspects of the operation. TF structure and organization is further described in chapter 7 - Task Force Organization.

2. **Command and Control.** As several elements of the CF may be required to cooperate to achieve the mission, the structure and C2 relationships for TFs must be clearly defined. In all cases, C2 relationships will be based on the principles outlined in chapter 2 - Command and Control. The CF has one deployable joint HQ, based on 1 Cdn Div HQ, known as the JHQ. It is intended primarily for employment on international contingency operations. When the JHQ, or any portion thereof, is tasked to deploy, it is referred to as the JTFHQ. A TF Commander (TFC), once appointed, reports directly to the commander who established the TF.

117. DOMESTIC CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

1. Domestic operations cover the spectrum from the simple provision of military equipment and personnel to assist in flood assistance or fire fighting, armed assistance to Corrections Canada, to the commitment of combat capable land forces to deal with major ACP missions. Domestic operations are classified as either limited or complex and are usually initially conducted by one of the existing formation-based HQs (MARLANT, MARPAC, LFAA, SQFT, LFCA, LFWA, 1CAD, CFNA).

2. **Limited Operations.** Limited operations, are those that fall within the delegated authority of the operational commander (see article 1302), and can be conducted with the resources integral to the formation units. In limited operations, TFs are formed and TFCs are normally appointed on the initiative of the operational commander. In this case, the TFC would report to the tasking formation. Normal C2 relationships apply to the formation-based HQ.

3. **Complex Operations.** There will be times when a domestic contingency operation is beyond the capabilities of the formation-based HQ. Such operations are often based on NDHQ contingency plans and are controlled by the DCDS, on behalf of the CDS, through the NDOC. The designated TFC will report to the CDS through the DCDS. The JHQ may be employed in complex domestic contingency operations. In such a scenario, the structure and C2 relationships would be similar to an international operation.

4. **Transitions.** As a limited operation develops, there may be indicators that it will soon overwhelm the capabilities of the initiating commander. The NDOC must monitor all limited operations to ensure that when support is requested or the limit of authority is insufficient, a supplementary opO is issued to designate the operation as complex and establish the revised chain of command.

118. INTERNATIONAL CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

1. As most international operations will be joint and combined in nature, CF personnel must understand the concepts, doctrine and procedures for planning, organizing and conducting joint and combined operations. Allied, coalition and UN mandated operations are all considered to be combined operations.

2. The JHQ is the deployable HQ for international contingency operations; further detail, on structure and organization, can be found in chapter 7 - Task Force Organization.

3. Forces generated for a specific contingency, will normally be assigned OPCOM to the TFC.

4. When a Canadian TF is deployed as part of a combined force, and:

- a. the Canadian TFC **is functioning** as an operational commander, the entire Canadian TF will normally be assigned OPCON to the Commander Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF); or
- b. the Canadian TFC **is not functioning** as an operational commander, the Canadian TF elements are normally assigned OPCON to the Commander CJTF. In this case, the principal function of the Canadian TFC will be as the Canadian National Commander (CNC) and the JTFHQ serves as a National Command Element (NCE).

119. PRINCIPLES OF CF OPERATIONS

1. The planning and control functions of NDHQ in operations should be confined, as far as practicable, to the strategic level, leaving operational activities to the TFC and tactical activities to subordinate commanders.

2. The TFC must be appointed as soon as the operation is initiated and must be provided adequate

resources and staff. The TFC must be delegated a level of command authority over all Canadian forces in the theatre of operations which will be exercised through subordinate commanders (see chapter 7 -Task Force Organization).

3. The TFC is responsible for determining manpower requirements to support the concept of operations (COO). This includes the requirement for combat troops, support personnel, and HQ staff (see chapter 18 - Personnel Support). As the TFC is also responsible for forecasting the logistic capabilities, including the level of support required from the Canadian Support Group, an appropriate level of administrative control must also be authorized (see chapters 2 - Command and Control and 27 - Logistic Support).

4. A properly organized and employed force can concentrate combat power that is greater than the sum of the combat powers of its constituent components. Application of the following guidelines will provide for more effective employment of the force:

- a. establish a command structure that clearly defines overall command responsibility as well as command responsibility for each phase of a campaign or operation. Once a command structure is defined, the appropriate level of command authority is delegated to subordinate commanders;
- b. ensure that communications and information systems (CIS) are interoperable, survivable, and complemented by standardized formats;
- c. select forces to participate in operations based on their utility, expertise, combat readiness and functions — not on equity. If a single-environment force is all that is required, only that force should be employed;
- d. plan and conduct, as necessary, training tailored to the circumstances of the operation; including such considerations as the religious, cultural, legal, political and operational aspects of the area of operations;
- e. delegate necessary decision making authority to the point of action. Commanders on the scene must be able to make instantaneous decisions in order to accomplish the mission and to protect their commands;
- f. apply overwhelming force at decisive points. Forces containing a wide array of military power should be employed against decisive objectives; and
- g. organize and train in peacetime for wartime operations.

5. The complexities of modern operations demand that forces train collectively and, when practicable, that operational plans are rehearsed. As there is no standing TF or TFC, it is essential that a full operational level task force, including the C2 structure (i.e., the JTFHQ), combat and support elements is assembled and trained regularly (see chapter 6 - Training and Exercises).

120. PHASES OF AN OPERATION

1. All CF operations are conducted in five (5) phases. These phases are:
 - a. warning;
 - b. preparation;
 - c. deployment;
 - d. employment; and
 - e. redeployment.
2. A more detail description of the activities associated with these phases is in chapter 4.

CHAPTER 2
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CF OPERATIONS
SECTION I
TERMINOLOGY AND PRINCIPLES

201. INTRODUCTION

1. C2 doctrine provides the framework within which military resources drawn from different organizations can operate together effectively to accomplish a common mission. This framework must be flexible and responsive to changing circumstances with which the CF might be faced. Up-to-date C2 doctrine will enhance the operational effectiveness of assigned resources.

2. For the C2 of CF Operations, the CF has two permanent joint HQs, one static (NDHQ) and one deployable (JHQ). The JHQ is intended primarily for employment on international contingency operations. When the JHQ, or any portion thereof, is tasked to deploy, it is referred to as the JTFHQ. See also articles 116, 118 and 119.

3. For C2 of domestic contingency operations, the CF has established eight formation based HQs. These HQs might not be permanently established with appropriate, deployable C2 organizational structures. Should a domestic operation require deployable C2 capabilities that are beyond their capacity, the JHQ will normally be tasked to meet this requirement. See also articles 116, 117 and 119.

202. TERMINOLOGY

1. Fundamental to the development of CF doctrine and procedures is the need to use agreed terminology. Where terms already exist in the *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, these shall be either used directly or adapted to meet Canadian requirements. The terms "command" and "control", although closely related and frequently used together, are not synonymous. The distinction is clarified in the following definitions.

2. **Command** — The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces. The CDS exercises command over the CF. Commanders exercise command over their own forces at all levels, under the authority of the CDS, as do subordinate commanders over their own units. Command is further defined in terms of three levels: full, operational and tactical command.

a. **Full Command** — The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. The term command, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. It follows that no alliance or coalition commander has full command over the forces that are assigned to him, as nations, in assigning forces to an alliance or coalition, assign only operational command (OPCOM) or operational control (OPCON). The term "full command" is equivalent to "command" as defined in QR&Os. It applies at all levels of command, from the CDS down to the unit commander. TFCs cannot assume full command of units or components over which they exercise authority; rather, they are delegated OPCOM of those assets. Within the TF, subordinate commanders continue to exercise command in accordance with regulations and Environmental doctrine.

b. **Operational Command** — The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate OPCON and/or tactical control (TACON) as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. OPCOM may also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander. In the CF, a commander assigned OPCOM may delegate that authority. While OPCOM allows the commander to assign separate employment to components of assigned units, it cannot be used to disrupt the basic organization of a unit to the extent that it cannot readily be given a new task or be redeployed. The commander will normally exercise OPCOM through commanders of subordinate components of a TF. OPCOM of one Environment's units by another Environmental commander may be necessary:

(1) when effective integration of effort is needed;

(2) when the peculiarities of the operation dictate; or

(3) when the distance from, or communication with higher authority presents unacceptable difficulties.

- c. **Tactical Command** — The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. It is narrower in scope than OPCOM but includes the authority to delegate or retain TACON.

3. **Control** — That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directions. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated. This term is defined specifically under operational, tactical, administrative and technical control.

- a. **Operational Control** — The authority delegated to a commander to direct assigned forces to accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign TACON of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. Units are placed under commanders' OPCON so that commanders may benefit from the immediate employment of these units in their support, without further reference to a senior authority and without the need to establish a forward agency. The commander given OPCON of a unit may not exceed the limits of its use as laid down in the directive without reference to the delegating authority. OPCON does not include the authority to employ a unit, or any part of it, for tasks other than the assigned task, or to disrupt its basic organization so that it cannot readily be given a new task or be redeployed. Since OPCON does not include responsibility for administration and logistics, that responsibility would have to be clearly specified. A commander assigned OPCON may delegate that authority.

- b. **Tactical Control** — The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. In general, TACON is delegated only when two or more units not under the same OPCON are combined to form a cohesive tactical unit. A commander having TACON of the unit is responsible for the method used.

- c. **Administrative Control** — The direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect of administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.

- d. **Technical Control** — The control applied to administrative or technical procedures and exercised by virtue of professional or technical jurisdiction. It parallels command channels but is restricted to control within certain specialized areas. Operational commanders may override this type of control if its application is seen to jeopardize the mission.

4. **Command, Control and Information System** — An integrated system comprised of doctrine, procedures, organizational structure, personnel, equipment, facilities and communications which provides authorities at all levels with timely and adequate data to plan, direct, and control their activities. This comprehensive command, control and information system enhances C2 which, in common military usage, describes the process by which commanders plan, direct, control and monitor any operation for which they are responsible.

5. **OPCOM and OPCON** — There are important differences between these concepts. OPCOM allows commanders to reassign forces away from their own force, to specify missions and tasks, and to assign separate employment of components of assigned units. OPCON is more limited and does not include authority to reassign forces or to assign separate employment of components of units concerned. If commanders have forces assigned for a continuing mission where they would need freedom to employ them with little or no constraint, and where delegation of OPCON to a subordinate commander may be necessary, they should be given OPCOM. However, if commanders have been given a limited mission or task, or if forces are assigned with limitations on their activities, commanders should be given OPCON. If a mission can be achieved without either authority being delegated to a commander, forces may be directed simply to act in support. Figure 2-1 summarizes the degrees of authority associated with OPCOM, OPCON, TACOM and TACON.

ACTIVITY	Authority	OPCOM	OPCON	TACOM	TACON	NOTES
Assign missions or tasks (1)	ALL*	YES	YES (2)	YES (2)	YES (3)	<p>1. A mission is a task that together with its purpose, clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for it.</p> <p>2. Provided it is in accordance with the mission assigned to the commander.</p> <p>3. Local direction only.</p> <p>4. Only for the particular mission or task</p> <p>5. Canada will normally retain OPCOM.</p> <p>* The term "ALL" means the described activity applies equally to all degrees of authority.</p>
Direct assigned forces	ALL	YES	YES	YES (3)	YES (3)	
Delegate authority in CF Ops	OPCOM	YES	YES	YES	YES	
	OPCON	NO	YES	NO	YES	
	TACOM	NO	NO	YES	YES	
	TACON	NO	NO	NO	YES	
Delegate authority in combined ops. (5)	OPCON	NO	YES	NO	YES	
	TACOM	NO	NO	YES	YES	
	TACON	NO	NO	NO	YES	
Reassign forces	ALL	YES	NO	NO	NO	
Assign separate employment	ALL	YES	NO	NO	NO	
Administrative responsibility	ALL	NO	NO	NO	NO	
Deploy units	ALL	YES	YES (4)	NO	NO	

Figure 2-1 Table of degrees of Command Authority

6. **Administration and Logistics** — Transfer of Command Authority (TOCA) does not include a delegation or change of administrative or logistic responsibilities. Such delegation or change must be specifically ordered, either separately or together with the delegation of command authority. On occasion, changes to the degree of command authority may require changes to administrative or logistic responsibilities, and circumstances will arise in which administrative or logistic considerations place constraints on operations. A delegating authority must, always consider the possible administrative and logistic implications of any intended operational arrangement.

203. PRINCIPLES OF COMMAND

1. The principles of command which must always be considered are as follows:

- a. unity of command;
- b. span of control;
- c. chain of command;
- d. delegation of authority;
- e. freedom of action; and
- f. continuity of command.

2. **Unity of Command.** In a military unit or formation, a single commander will be authorized to plan and direct operations. The commander will be held responsible for an operation's success or failure, and has the authority to direct and control the personnel and materiel committed to the task.

3. **Span of Control.** There is a limit to how much one person can effectively direct. A formation or unit's number of subordinates and activities, and its area of operations, must be such that one person can command or control the formation or unit.

4. **Chain of Command.** The structure of the C2 process is hierarchical. The commander at each level responds to orders and direction received from a higher authority and, in turn, issues orders and direction to subordinates. Bypassing levels of command in either direction is justified only in the most exceptional circumstances, such as the need for immediate action or the loss of communication with intermediate commanders. In such cases, the chain of command must be reestablished as quickly as possible and the intermediate commander advised of the action taken.

5. **Delegation of Authority.** If the scope and complexity of operations are such that one person alone cannot direct or supervise all tasks, command authority should be delegated. Commanders may delegate all or any part of this authority and will decide how much authority will be exercised on their behalf by the staff and how much by subordinate commanders. Delegation means that:

- a. a commander must identify the essential aspects which will be handled personally, and then delegate authority to subordinates for those activities which are within their capability or do not require the commander's personal involvement;
- b. authority which has been delegated may be withdrawn or adjusted by a commander at any time; and
- c. the transfer of authority and assignment of responsibility for functions or tasks within the formation or unit in no way relieves commanders of their ultimate responsibilities.

6. **Freedom of Action.** Once the task or mission has been established and the necessary orders have been given, subordinate commanders must be permitted maximum freedom to take initiative and exercise their skills and knowledge of the local situation in the planning and conduct of the operation.

7. **Continuity of Command.** Command must be maintained at all times. To do so, the following conditions must be met:

- a. commanders will establish a clear procedure for succession of command in the event that they become casualties or are unable, for any other reason, to exercise command themselves;
- b. plans, organizations and facilities will be put in place to provide for a capability to overcome physical fatigue, equipment failures and inevitable personnel and equipment casualties resulting from enemy attack, and any interruptions during moves or transfers of the command authority from one location to another;
- c. an alternate headquarters should be available to replace the main headquarters when it is out of operation, either in accordance with planned procedures or as a result of enemy attack; and
- d. subordinates must be fully aware of the commander's COO and intentions so that, if there is a loss of communications, headquarters, or commanders, the subordinates are capable of continuing operations without higher direction or consultation until the chain of command is restored.

SECTION II

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONS

204. INTRODUCTION

1. Effective and responsive C2 is vital to the success of operations. C2 of a TF may be exercised either directly or through subordinate components, or a combination of both. The achievement of military objectives in preparation for or prosecution of armed conflict depends primarily on the ability to put the right forces in the right place at the right time. C2 has its basis at NDHQ where the responsibility for establishing deployable forces is retained.

2. **Levels of Command.** CF operational doctrine calls for three levels of command: Strategic, Operational and Tactical, which correspond to the three levels of conflict – defined in articles 110-113.

- a. **Strategic Level of Command.** That level of command through which control of a conflict is exercised at the strategic level and overall direction is provided to military forces, advice is given to political authorities, and coordination is provided at the national level.
- b. **Operational Level of Command.** That level of command which employs forces to attain strategic objectives in a theatre or area of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. At the operational level, sea, land and air activity must be conceived and conducted as one single concentrated effort. Activities at this level link strategy and tactics.
- c. **Tactical Level of Command** That level which directs the use of military forces in battles and engagements designed to contribute to the operational level plan.

205. NATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE

1. **CDS.** The CDS is responsible to the MND for the conduct of military operations. The CDS, by virtue of his appointment, commands the CF and generally operates at the strategic level. The CDS issues orders and instructions to the CF through the chain of command. The authority and responsibility of subordinate commanders, including the ECS, formations and units, are promulgated in these orders and instructions. The CDS will delegate command authority and assign missions to subordinate commanders and adjust these assignments as circumstances dictate; group and regroup, concentrate or disperse forces; change priorities; and coordinate and support operations as deemed necessary to achieve the goals assigned to the CF by the Government of Canada.

2. **VCDS.** The VCDS is responsible to the CDS for force planning and development. As chief of staff (COS) at NDHQ, he coordinates the activities of the group principals.

4. **DCDS.** The DCDS is the chief operations officer for the CF and is responsible to the CDS for directing the operations of the CF. He is assisted by the COS J3 who is responsible to him for issuing all operational tasking for the CF to meet programmed and emergency activities.

5. **NDHQ J Staff.** The J Staff is responsible for the staff effort related to the planning, conduct and coordination of operations at the strategic level. Its purpose is to focus and accelerate NDHQ matrix activities in the planning, execution and sustainment of operations. It offers the J3 (DCDS) ready access to the NDHQ Groups and provides an operational commander with a single point of contact (POC) within NDHQ for each operation.

6. **The Environmental Chiefs of Staff.** Within the confines of their respective Environments, the ECS are responsible for

- a. exercising command of assigned units in accordance with the Canadian Forces Organizational Orders and as directed by the CDS;
- b. generating and maintaining operationally-ready forces;
- c. providing advice on matters affecting security, national defence and the Canadian Forces;
- d. providing inputs to the development of force structure options and providing input to the development of plans and taskings for CF operations;
- e. exercising command of assigned forces conducting force generation and routine operations; and
- f. exercising command of other forces that may be assigned.

206. OPERATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

1. **Introduction.** In keeping with the concepts and guidance described in chapter 1, commanders are responsible for accomplishing their missions with minimum loss of life and expenditure of resources and for ensuring that their actions lead to the achievement of strategic and operational objectives. Formation commanders are assisted in the execution of their duties by their headquarters and staff. For the conduct of operations, the CF has established one deployable joint HQ (JHQ / 1 Cdn Div HQ) and eight static formation-based HQs.

2. **Formation-based HQs.** The primary role of formation-based HQs is to plan, organize and direct the conduct of routine operations. They are tasked to be prepared, on order from NDHQ, to do the same for domestic contingency operations. These HQs do not possess a full deployable capability. Should a domestic contingency operation require the close presence of a deployed commander and HQ, then C2 would be exercised through a subordinate commander and HQ, tasked as the TFC and TFHQ respectively. In this case, the TFC would report directly to the tasking HQ, who would, in turn, deal with NDHQ. If the TF required augmentation from another Environmental formation, the request would be staffed through NDHQ, who would in turn re-assign the necessary elements to the TF, using the TOCA process. The TF would then be referred to as a JTF.

3. **JHQ / 1 Cdn Div HQ.** The primary role of this deployable HQ is to plan, organize and direct the conduct of international contingency operations. In certain circumstances, they may be tasked to deploy on domestic contingency operations. When any portion of the JHQ deploys on a contingency operation, that portion is called a JTFHQ and the subordinate elements, a JTF.

SECTION III

TRANSFER OF COMMAND AUTHORITY

207. THE TRANSFER PROCESS

1. In peacetime, the operational elements of the CF may not be under the command of the agency that will command them on operations. This is especially the case for contingency operations when the “force generators” are tasked to provide units / formations to the DCDS, the “force employer”. The mechanism by which units pass from OPCOM of one agency to another is known as Transfer of Command Authority and is defined as the formal transfer of a specified degree of authority over forces assigned to an operation between commanders of supporting elements and the supported commander. The degree of authority transferred and the mechanism to effect TOCA, is determined by the CDS and specified in orders when deemed appropriate by the CDS and TFC.

2. TOCA takes place during the planning, generation and employment phases of an operation and is normally effected through operational orders and instructions. In international contingency operations TOCA from National command to coalition/alliance command will **not** be undertaken without Government of Canada authority.





Figure 2-2 Decision making process and TOCA - Planning Phase

3. As a guiding principle units will not be transferred until the losing formation is satisfied that the unit is operationally ready. Thus the training of units warned for operations or active service remains the responsibility of the force generator. The TFC may direct that mission specific training be conducted as part of training activities during the force generation phase to meet mission requirements.

4. **Residual Responsibilities.** Once the TFC has assumed command of the TF elements through the TOCA process, supporting commanders, while no longer in the operational chain of command, will maintain their support responsibilities, minus that authority and responsibility which has been transferred to the TFC. These responsibilities are collectively referred to as **residual responsibilities**.

5. NDHQ / J4 Mov is responsible for the movement of forces to the Theatre of Operations. On arrival in theatre, units will come under OPCOM of the TFC. When the TFC is satisfied that the TF is ready in all respects for operations he will notify the NDHQ as to the details of the proposed transfer of command. On receipt of approval from NDHQ, the TFC may subsequently transfer the TF components to the command of the coalition/alliance. On completion of operations, there will be a “reverse TOCA” process for redeployment.



CHAPTER 3
THE CAMPAIGN PLAN
SECTION I
CAMPAIGN DESIGN

301. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

1. Government policy creates and directs the nation's response to conflict. The activity that strives to attain the objectives of policy, in peace as in conflict, is strategy. At the highest level there is national strategy. This involves the application and coordination of all elements of national power - economic, diplomatic, psychological, technological, and military. Subordinate to this is military strategy, which in essence is the applied or threatened use of military force to impose policy. Military strategy, being a subset of national strategy, must be co-ordinated with the use of other elements of national power.

2. Military strategy is the province of national policy makers, their military advisers, and the nation's senior military leadership. Their first concerns are: defining the national strategic conditions which determine success, translating policy goals into military terms by establishing military strategic objectives, assigning operational level command, imposing limitations, and allocating resources. These should be summarized in a strategic directive that should be issued to the operational commander at the commencement of the operations planning process.

302. OPERATIONAL ART

1. Operational art is the skill of translating this strategic direction into operational and tactical action. It is not dependant on the size of the committed forces, but is that vital link between the setting of military strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield through the skilful execution of command at the operational level. Operational art involves the design, planning, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. It requires a clear understanding of the consequences of operational level decisions, their tactical results, and their impact on strategic aims. Operational art requires commanders with broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and a careful understanding of the relationship of means to ends. Using operational art, the commander applies intellect to the situation to establish and transmit a vision for the accomplishment of the strategic objective

2. No specific level of command is solely concerned with operational art. In its simplest expression, operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will fight. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitments to or withdrawal from battle, and the sequencing of successive operations to attain operational objectives.

303. CAMPAIGN DESIGN

1. Regardless of the clarity and comprehensiveness of the strategic directive, the operational commander must formulate a vision for the conduct of the campaign that blends the maritime, land and air aspects into a single overarching concept. This conceptual vision is the essence of his campaign design. It also serves as the basis for subsequent development, with the staff, of the campaign plan, orders and directives. Generally, campaigns have a single strategic objective that will encompass at least two Environmental components. If there is more than one strategic objective, campaigns are waged sequentially or simultaneously. In this way, smaller campaigns may exist within larger ones. Regardless, the focus on the military strategic objective is the single overriding element of campaign design.

2. After the commander receives the strategic directive, his principal task is to determine and pursue the sequence of military actions that will most directly serve the strategic objective. The mission analysis of the strategic direction as part of a rigorous estimate process is a vital prelude to this process.

3. **Mission Analysis.** The operational commander must analyse and discuss the strategic directive with senior military or government leaders to ensure that the policy goals are clear and that the national level authorities are

made fully aware of the consequences of committing military forces to a campaign. When strategic aims and conditions appear unreasonable, the commander must so state. When they are unclear, he must seek clarification. While required to pursue the established aim, he is obliged to communicate the associated risks to his superiors. He must also state if the resources are insufficient and what he perceives are the consequences of any imposed limitations on the achievement of the strategic aim. When limitations imposed by the strategic authority are so severe as to prevent the attainment of the established aim, the commander must request relaxation of either the aims or the limitations.

4. **Military End-State.** Prior to the commencement of hostilities, commanders at all levels must have a common understanding of the criteria or conditions that constitute military success. The situation brought about by successful military operations should conform to the government's view of how success in combat will bring the country closer to its strategic goals. This situation is referred to as the military end-state. A military end-state includes the required conditions that, when achieved, attain the strategic objectives or allow other instruments of national power to achieve the final strategic end state. These conditions will vary between moral coercion by the threat of military violence and complete physical destruction of the enemy's means to fight. Generally, in war, where military factors are predominant, policy goals are translated into military terms entailing the defeat of enemy forces or occupation of terrain. Determining the military end state, and ensuring that it accomplishes the strategic objectives, are the *critical first steps* in the conceptual design of the campaign. Failure to make this determination will waste scarce resources and put the entire effort at risk.

304. OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES

1. Once the military end state is clearly defined the commander must identify the operational objectives of the campaign. These are the military goals that need to be achieved in the campaign to produce the desired end state. They may include the enemy's command, control and communications system, his logistic installations and elements, or those aspects which are vital to the morale of his troops or his public support. Operational objectives may also include elements of the enemy's forces whose neutralization or destruction will have a decisive effect. These objectives, taken in combination, will achieve the conditions necessary to produce the desired result.

2. Selecting the operational objectives is made easier with an understanding of the concepts of centre of gravity, decisive points, and lines of operations and how they apply to fighting the campaign.

a. Centre of Gravity.

(1) The centre of gravity is that aspect of the enemy's total capability which, if attacked and eliminated or neutralized, will lead either to his inevitable defeat or his wish to sue for peace through negotiations. It has also been described as that characteristic, capability, or location from which enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. **The identification of the enemy's centre of gravity, and the single-minded focus on the sequence of actions necessary to expose and neutralize it are the essence of operational art.**

(2) At the strategic level the centre of gravity may often be abstract, such as the enemy's public opinion or perhaps his strength of national purpose. Thus the strategic centre of gravity may be discernable but not accessible to military attack. In such cases an operational level centre of gravity must be selected which could contribute to the elimination of the strategic centre of gravity. Therefore, there is an obvious interrelationship between the strategic centre of gravity, the operational objectives and the operational centre of gravity.

(3) The centre of gravity may be moral or physical. If the centre of gravity at the strategic level is identified as a state capital or vital installation, or at the operational level as a military formation, then the military targets are clear. However, if the centre of gravity is moral, such as the public will (strategic level) or military cohesion (operational level), the problem of its elimination is more complex.

(4) While we are attempting to locate and attack the enemy centre of gravity, he will be trying to do the same to us. The friendly force centre of gravity must be determined as part of the campaign design. The campaign is then conducted by attempting to destroy or neutralize the opposing force's centre of

gravity while continuously defending the friendly force centre of gravity from opposing force actions.

b. Decisive Points.

- (1) It is not always possible or desirable to attack an opponent's centre of gravity directly. Indeed, since a judicious enemy commander will strive to protect his centre of gravity, logic suggests that an indirect approach which applies pressure to vulnerable points on which that centre of gravity depends will offer the best prospects of success. A vulnerability may have to be created to get at the centre of gravity or to strike it indirectly in an unexpected manner. Vulnerabilities created and exploited are known as decisive points. Consequently, a series of decisive points leading from the commander's base of operations to the opposing force's centre of gravity will need to be identified.
- (2) **Decisive points are those events, the successful outcome of which are preconditions to the defeat or neutralization of the enemy's centre of gravity.** They are the keys to unlocking his centre of gravity. They may be moral or physical events. An event need not be a battle. It may be the elimination of a capability (such as the destruction of early warning radar systems or the domination of the electro-magnetic spectrum), and may or may not have geographical relevance. The key consideration is the effect on the enemy.

c. Lines of Operation

- (1) **Lines of operation describe how military force is applied in time and space through decisive points on the path to the centre of gravity.** They are not synonymous with physical axes of advance. They establish the relationship between decisive points, produce a critical path to the centre of gravity, and ensure that events are tackled in a logical progression.
- (2) Lines of operation are established to flow through the defined decisive points towards the enemy centre of gravity. The approach to the centre of gravity may be direct or indirect. The best approach may be using multiple lines, attaining a three dimensional aspect allowing for multiple attacks to converge upon and defeat the enemy centre of gravity. The synchronization of multiple lines of operations can overload the enemy commander by presenting several simultaneous threats.
- (3) Where the decisive points are physical, a line of operation can be defined in physical terms; manoeuvring a force from its base of operations to operational objectives. Where decisive points are moral and intangible, the linkages between them will be harder to define. Moral decisive points can be achieved through special operations, deception, PSYOPS or the exploitation of the electro-magnetic spectrum. Proper sequencing of these activities through lines of operations is critical.

305. SEQUENCING

1. It is unlikely that a commander will be able to achieve success by a single operational gambit. He must therefore have a clear understanding of the relationship between events in terms of time, space, resources and purpose. Without this he cannot establish which events can be done simultaneously, which have to be done sequentially, and in what order. **Sequencing is the arrangement of events within a campaign in the order most likely to achieve the elimination of the enemy's centre of gravity.** It can also be thought of as the staging of decisive points along lines of operation leading to the enemy centre of gravity.

2. Skill at sequencing allows commanders to determine the correct relationship between time, space and forces available to achieve a higher purpose. This skill will also help to determine what instructions the operational commander must give his subordinates, who must understand the impact of their tactical missions on the campaign. This ability to design campaigns is essential to operational art.

SECTION II

CAMPAIGN PLANNING

306. THE CAMPAIGN PLAN

1. The commander's intent is a direct statement of his vision for the conduct of a campaign. It is a prelude to the drafting of the campaign plan and establishes the conceptual framework by focusing initial planning for staff and subordinates. The commander's intent is captured in the primary C2 instrument at the operational level, the campaign plan.
2. The campaign plan can be seen as a practical expression of the operational art. The campaign plan and its attendant planning process are techniques used to help the operational commander flesh out his concept, and to orchestrate operations and battles to conclude a conflict successfully. It highlights the strategic aim while providing focus and direction to the component commanders planning and executing tactical missions.
3. The campaign plan should describe, to subordinates and seniors alike, the end state which will achieve the strategic aim, the overall concept and intent of the campaign, the enemy's operational centre of gravity, decisive points, a tentative sequence of phases and operational objectives which will lead to success. It should also outline a command structure and general concepts for the supporting functions that will unify the efforts of subordinate commanders and staff.
4. There is no standard format for a campaign plan. In fact, the utility of a formal campaign plan diminishes as the scale of contemplated operations and the imminence of hostilities decrease. Therefore it may not always be required, especially for peacetime deliberate planning. Regardless of whether a campaign plan is prepared, the operational commander includes the equivalent of the "Plan of Campaign" within the COO of operation plans prepared in response to strategic direction.
5. The campaign plan should be concise, as it does not describe the execution of all phases of the campaign in tactical detail. Rather, it provides guidance for developing the operations plans and orders which will in turn provide the tactical design for those phases. The initial phases of the campaign may be described with some certainty. But the design for succeeding phases will become increasingly general as uncertainty grows and the situation becomes unpredictable. However, the final phase, the anticipated decisive action which will achieve the end state and toward which the entire campaign builds, should be clearly envisioned and described.
6. Until the end state is realized, the campaign plan must be continuously adapted to changing aims (including the enemy-s), resources, and limiting factors. It must be recognized that an important feature of any plan, no matter how detailed, is its usefulness as a common basis for change. Detailed planning should not become so specific that it inhibits flexibility.

307. THE CAMPAIGN PLAN AND OPERATIONS PLANNING

1. The campaign plan provides the framework within which operations are planned and executed. The campaign plan flows from the campaign design and is dominated by the intuitive, conceptual and creative aspects that reflect the commander-s use of operational art. Campaign design determines the commander's planning guidance, guides the concept development and is communicated through the campaign plan.
2. The development of the campaign plan (or COO) is intertwined with and guides the OPP (see Chapter 4). The campaign plan is like the architect-s drawings for a large and complex building which clearly and simply describe the finished product and provide general guidance on how it is to be done. The OPP is like the detailed engineering design and planning of the construction, which involves the coordination of a number of different disciplines, and is required before the project can be brought to fruition. In the same way, the OPP reflects the analytical, practical, and mechanical functions of the staff that produce the plans, orders and directives for the execution of the phases of the campaign. The campaign plan provides the concepts to be used in developing subordinate commanders-plans, which will also be executed by a series of operation orders. However, just as the

campaign plan shapes the operational planning process, the concepts in the campaign plan may need to be adjusted based upon the outcome of the operations planning process.

308. CAMPAIGN PLANNING CONCEPTS

1. Once the commander has determined the overall concept and intent of the campaign, and a tentative sequence of operations, he must provide sufficient guidance to focus the detailed planning for staff and subordinates.
2. Synergy is achieved through the integration of the efforts of subordinate commanders and the staff. This is accomplished by establishing operational and functional frameworks consistent with the commander's intent.

309. THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

1. The operational framework is the tool used to achieve decentralization of command by identifying subordinate commanders and establishing command relationships for each phase of a campaign. The layout of the operational framework should flow from the campaign design and be related to specific decisive points and lines of operation.
2. There are several ways of sub-dividing the theatre of operations, depending on the countries and resources involved, however in most cases it is sub-divided into a number of areas of operations. Each subordinate level of command will further define their area of operations by determining their area of influence and area of interest.

a. Area of Operations.

- (1) Areas of operations are allocated to define the geographical limits within which a subordinate commander has the authority to conduct operations. They will normally be associated with specific operational objectives and one or more lines of operation. The commander's authority should also include the control of all actions supporting his mission and allow him to employ his organic and supporting systems to the full extent of their capabilities. The area of operations may be changed with a change in mission.
- (2) At any one level of command areas of operations will never overlap; conversely, in dispersed operations there may be gaps between them. Boundaries and height bands are used to describe geographical limits of the area of operations.

b. Area of Influence.

- (1) An area of influence is the physical volume of space within which a commander is directly capable of influencing operations. It can be visualized as a three-dimensional "bubble" that moves with the force and expands and contracts depending on the type and location of weapon systems. Although it may change often, it will always be finite.
- (2) At higher levels of command, it is possible that the area of influence and area of operations may coincide.

c. Area of Interest.

- (1) An area of interest is the three-dimensional space, defined in geographic terms, in which a commander wishes to identify and monitor those factors, including enemy activities, which may influence the outcome of current and anticipated missions. A commander will decide for himself how wide he must look, in both time and space - forward, above, laterally and to the rear, wherever enemy action may affect his own force.
- (2) His area of interest will most likely overlap those of adjacent forces, therefore coordination is required to ensure unity of effort. The scope of this wider view is not limited by the reach of his organic intelligence sources, rather it depends on the reach and mobility of the enemy. Where it does extend

beyond his collection ability, it is the basis for integrating intelligence with other forces. Thus each level of command, having been given its area of operations, has in turn to decide for itself how far beyond those limits it must look in time and space for intelligence and warning.

310. CONDUCTING THE CAMPAIGN

1. The overriding consideration in conducting the campaign is an unwavering focus on the requirements of the strategic objective. The aims, resources, and limitations established by the strategic level become the filter through which all actions are viewed, even if, as at lower echelons of command, the connection with strategy is only derivative. This is done by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, and initiating actions and applying resources to bring about and sustain those events.

2. Command at the operational level involves deciding when, where, for what purpose, and under what conditions to conduct operations against the enemy. This includes deciding when to give - and to refuse - battle. The operational level governs the deployment of forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from combat, and the sequencing of successive tactical actions to achieve strategic objectives.

311. PREPARATION AND DEPLOYMENT

1. The first stages of conducting the campaign, whether it is for domestic or overseas operations, normally includes the preparation and deployment of the force. This entails establishing a point of entry, securing a base of operations, building up the complete force, and preparing to execute the campaign.

2. All deployment planning should be based on the commander's intent so that the right equipment and personnel arrive at the proper time to do the job. The commander must insist on the correct phasing and balance of command, information operations, manoeuvre, firepower, protection and sustainment assets to develop operations in line with his plans. The force will be at its most vulnerable in the early stages of a conflict and therefore must have satisfactory combat power, robust C2, and infrastructure elements to adapt to changes in the situation.

3. Co-ordination, at the operational level, of movement and logistics support during deployment is essential. Deployment is primarily a strategic responsibility, however the flow into the theatre should be monitored. Where facilities (e.g. airfields or ports) are limited, it should be coordinated and prioritized by the operational commander. The organization for the movement of the force will differ depending on whether or not the entry is opposed. If it is, then movement will be tactical with formed combat units leading. If unopposed, movement may be administrative with units sub divided to make the most efficient use of the available transport.

4. Consideration should be given to the commencement of C2W early in the campaign. Activities such as collection of intelligence, extension of information networks, deception, EW, OPSEC, PSYOPS, and PA often take time to produce results, but may not require extensive personnel resources. They can be conducted using the concept of Asplit-basing@ where the majority of resources are located either in Canada or a forward location. Information operations also give the commander flexibility to begin the conduct of operations without committing him irretrievably to a particular course of action.

5. Preparations for the campaign will also include realistic pre-deployment and in-theatre training for all personnel. The operational commander must provide direction to his subordinates to facilitate focused training. He must also train the senior commanders and staff, and get to know them personally. This fosters trust and mutual understanding, and can rectify weaknesses and misunderstandings. These personnel preparations must focus on the cohesion of the force. While destroying enemy cohesion is an essential element of success, building friendly force cohesion is a fundamental step in avoiding one's own defeat. In many cases, the force will be "ad hoc" in nature, including personnel from other environments and nations. Trust and mutual understanding will have to be built in the time available until all elements function together as a team. This can be partly achieved through the training process. However, the commander must ensure that prior to the commencement of operations, all personnel are well motivated, understand the commander's intent, and are confident in their ability to achieve their mission.

312. COMMANDING THE CAMPAIGN

1. After preparation and deployment are complete, the mission set, and the necessary orders issued, the commander focuses his efforts on establishing positive conditions for operations to occur in accordance with his campaign design. While the tactician prepares and fights the battle, the operational commander must look beyond the battlefield in both time and space.

2. **Operational Perspective.** The commander must maintain a broad perspective on the campaign. He must avoid the temptation to over-control tactical activities, thereby losing his wider perspective. The operational commander must understand how events at the strategic, operational and tactical levels are intertwined and affect each other. As the campaign forms the framework for combat, so do tactical results shape the conduct of the campaign. At the operational level, the task is to exploit tactical victories to strategic advantage and to minimize, nullify, or even reverse the strategic effect of tactical losses. The commander seeks to shape events to create the most favourable conditions possible for those actions he chooses to fight. Tactical results will impact on the progress of the campaign, so he must have the flexibility to react to any changes. He seeks to anticipate the results of combat and to be prepared to exploit them to the greatest strategic advantage.

3. **Freedom of Action.** To allow freedom of action for subordinates, the operational commander must first obtain maximum freedom of action for himself from the strategic authority. Military freedom of action is ultimately built upon the trust of the public and therefore the government. Diplomatic, economic and informational efforts at the strategic level can greatly increase the operational commander's flexibility and freedom to act. Sufficient logistic and personnel resources combined with reasonable and clear limitations, and good operational security also contribute to freedom at the operational level. Other elements, however, restrict the freedom of action such as sophisticated information technology and the nature of modern news reporting, which make tasks of ensuring operations security (OPSEC) and surprise more difficult. Perhaps the greatest threat to freedom of action at the operational level is the capability, through information technology, to over-control operations from the strategic level, especially when they have a high media profile. This tendency must be resisted in order to ensure that commanders maintain an appropriate degree of authority and flexibility to respond quickly to changing circumstances. Once the degree of freedom of action has been obtained at the operational level, the commander must decide the amount of freedom of action that subordinates can be allowed at various stages of the operation. In doing so, the commander must find the correct balance between centralization and decentralization. Although modern technology allows operational commanders to communicate and direct actions at the lowest levels, operations may have to be conducted in a severely degraded communications environment. Clear and simple orders with a clearly understood commander's intent enables subordinates to exercise initiative and flexibility while pursuing the commander's goals and priorities.

4. **Operational Level Intelligence.** A prerequisite for conduct of effective operations is timely and accurate intelligence as part of information operations. Operational intelligence supports the commanders continual search for enemy weakness and future intentions. This will be helpful in disrupting the enemy's campaign plan and attacking his centre of gravity. Compared to tactical intelligence, operational level intelligence must take a wider view beyond terrain and a longer view over time. At this level, the opposing commanders will likely be known by name and personality specific information will be essential. As the operational level of war is less a matter of actual fighting and more a matter of schemes and intentions, operational intelligence focuses less on current combat capabilities and more on forecasting future enemy capabilities, intentions and options.

313. CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN

1. **Seizing and Maintaining the Initiative.** The key to success at both the operational and tactical levels, regardless of theatre or type of conflict, is the early seizure of the initiative, and its maintenance, so that the enemy is forced to comply with the commander's will. At any level, the commander who has the initiative will be able to pursue his desired course of action. He will be able to foil the enemy's plans and force him to conform to his own campaign plan. This will lead to a rapidly deteriorating situation as the enemy is forced to react to the commander's actions, and he will be unable to determine when and where tactical battles and engagements will occur. Therefore it is a fundamental concern of the commander to seize the initiative, maintain it and regain it if it is lost. Only by doing so can he dominate and begin to impose his will on the enemy. This is a prerequisite for achieving the chosen operational objectives and destroying or neutralizing the enemy centre of gravity. Dominating the enemy is accomplished by viewing the campaign, and its component operations and battles as the interplay of

the two dynamic forces of holding and striking. The initiative can be seized by a combination of holding enemy strength and striking enemy weakness on both the moral and physical planes of warfare. At all levels, commanders attempt to ascertain the enemy's intentions; identify his main effort; isolate and target elements critical to his cohesion; manipulate his perceptions; delay enemy reinforcements by interdiction; and degrade critical enemy functions or capabilities such as C2, information operations, offensive air support or logistics. A campaign may be designed to hold the enemy initially by denying him his objectives, robbing him of his freedom of action, and shaping events in preparation for subsequent action. Subsequently, commanders should plan to strike the enemy by preemption to seize and exploit the initiative, then to defeat the enemy at successive decisive points and move the force toward the defeat or neutralization of the enemy's centre of gravity.

2. **Synchronization of Operations.** Within their respective areas of operations, commanders at all levels should conduct their operations simultaneously, or in rapid succession, in a manner that appears to the enemy as one continuous operation against him. Continuous synchronization of operations is a complex undertaking that must be balanced with the requirements of a command philosophy which emphasizes decentralization. It requires a clear understanding of the commander's intent and main effort throughout the force, stimulating both command and staff initiative. Dynamic, anticipatory responses are essential to synchronize quickly the wide variety of assets, including space-based systems, air and maritime elements that are under the commander's control.

3. **Tempo.** A faster relative tempo will allow one side to seize the initiative and dictate the conduct of operations. Tempo incorporates the capacity of the force to transition from one operational posture to another. By increasing and varying the tempo, or rhythm, of operations, one side seeks to impose threats to which the enemy is increasingly unable to react. It is focussed on completing the decision-action cycle faster than the enemy such that his responses are made increasingly inappropriate. Tempo does not imply an ever increasing speed of operations. Rather it is the competitive pace of operational change. While dictating the tempo one must be careful not to establish a pace he himself can not maintain. Commanders set and hold the tempo desired to achieve the proper sequencing of events. Subordinate tactical commanders attempt to establish tempo commensurate with the operational commanders design. There must be flexibility in both cases to compensate for unexpected success or failure at either level.

4. **Culminating Point.** An operation, battle or engagement reaches its **culminating point** when the current situation can just be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage. Identifying a culminating point in terms of time and space is a difficult task for any commander, because it is a natural temptation to make one further effort to achieve an objective. Because operations, battles and engagements can not be conducted continuously, the commanders at all levels must pay close attention to the logistic sustainability of forces, their morale and physical condition, and keep in mind the limit of their fighting power.

5. **Operational Pause.** If necessary, a commander will order an **operational pause**. The initiative can be retained by ensuring that when an operational pause is imposed on one line of operations, activity on another increases. This may include use of a stepped up air programme, deception, use of special forces, a temporary reversion to the defence, or political and diplomatic actions. By employing units held in reserve, depleted units are sent to the rear for rest, replacement and replenishment of ammunition and supplies, thereby denying the enemy time to regroup or retain the initiative.

6. **Use of Force.** Control of the use of force is an important aspect of all military operations. The overuse or under use of force may affect a mission's success and can lead to unnecessary loss of human lives, damaged property, destruction of natural resources, and alienation of the local and international public. Therefore, commanders at all levels must be provided with clear direction and orders that control the use of force. This direction is based on the guidance of the concepts of *The Law of Armed Conflict*, *self-defence* and *ROE*. Further details on the use of force are included in Chapter 5 and B-GG-005-004/AF-005, Volume 1 *The Use of Force in CF Operations*.

314. CONCLUDING THE CAMPAIGN

1. Military operations are conducted to end conflict in accordance with the strategic objective. Knowing when to end a campaign and how to preserve the objectives achieved are vital aspects of operational art. Military success should give political leverage to achieve the strategic objectives. Since war is fought for political aims, it is only successful when such aims are ultimately achieved. Success on the battlefield, however does not always lead to

success in conflict. Making sure that it does requires the close collaboration of political and military leaders and clearly understood strategic goals.

2. Although not the preferred solution, it is always possible that the conflict may be terminated before the originally envisaged end-state is reached. The commander must consider the consequences of a premature termination and the need for his force to take on new missions.

3. **Post-Conflict Activities.** A period of post-conflict activities will exist from the immediate end of the conflict to the accomplishment of the national strategic goals and objectives. A variety of non-combat operations may occur during this period. This transition can occur even if residual combat operations are still underway in other parts of the theatre of operations. Anticipation and appropriate planning during earlier stages will smooth the transition during the critical period immediately after the fighting ends. Planning should also consider the use of information operations, especially PA and PSYOPS to assist in the transition to post-conflict activities. Military forces may be the only source of stability in the area and may have to restore communications facilities and essential services, and to provide humanitarian relief. The operational commander may well have to be the conduit for negotiations with the belligerent political and military leaders as part of the initial conflict termination process. Military forces are very well suited for post-conflict operations, They have the skills and staying power to control prisoners, handle refugees, mark minefields, destroy unexploded ordnance, provide emergency health service support, provide emergency restoration of utilities and other civil affairs, and perform other required humanitarian assistance activities. However, they should always seek a quick transition to civilian control. The aim of post-conflict activities should be to speed up the stabilization of the area until international, non-governmental, or host nation agencies assume responsibility. As violence diminishes during the course of an operation, military control and co-ordination will become less critical and the delicate transition between military and civilian control can take place. This transition is an important consideration at the operational level.

4. **Redeployment/Transition to Future Operations.** At the campaign's end, the operational commander must consider the redeployment of the force. Redeployment should not be considered as a final activity but merely movement geared towards a transition to future operations. Unit and formation integrity should be maintained during redeployment whenever possible and the commander should always keep in mind the reconstitution process for the next operation. Consideration must also be made for the reintroduction of troops into a peaceful western society after service in war-torn areas and after witnessing widespread pain, suffering and death. The efforts spent to build and preserve cohesion within a force prior to and during operations must be continued after redeployment. Commanders at all levels are responsible for the successful integration of their personnel into post-conflict routine.

CHAPTER 4

FORCE EMPLOYMENT

401. THE FORCE EMPLOYMENT (FE) PROCESS

1. **Introduction.** The FE process includes all activities required to **plan, conduct** and **review** CF operations. The activities inherent to the FE process are independent of organization or command level. Commanders and staffs at the formation-based HQs plan and conduct routine commitments, for which the Environmental Chiefs of Staff (ECS) are wholly responsible and accountable to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). On behalf of the CDS, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) is responsible to conduct planning for Contingency Operations, and to pass CDS direction to subordinate commanders. This chapter provides an overview of the concepts and principles of the FE process; complete detail is contained in *B-GG-005-004/AF-004 Force Employment*.

2. **Plan Operations.** This sub-process describes the preparation of COPs and/or Op Os for CF operations tasked by the government, and amends or re-issues such plans and orders as required during the conduct of CF operations. The CF uses the term COP to describe all operations plans. The details of this process constitute the bulk of this chapter.

3. **Conduct Operations.** This sub-process is generally described in Parts II, III and IV of this manual and Environmental doctrine publications.

4. **Review Operations.** In the logical flow from doctrine to training to operations, the lessons learned process complements these activities by providing the feedback and follow-on action to ensure there is constant learning, correction of mistakes and recognition of what is done well. J3 LL is responsible for improving the CF's ability to plan and conduct operations by capturing lessons learned at the strategic military level. The strategic-level lessons learned process must evolve to ensure that implementation of solutions to operational problems becomes more streamlined and that valid performance measurements can be made. The CF employs a four step lessons learned process which includes: data collection; analysis; validation; and, follow-on action. When directed, the section will capture lessons learned at the operational-level.

402. COMMAND AND OPERATIONS PLANNING

1. **Command.** The exercise of command (defined at article 202.2) is the most important activity in the CF, whether in peace or in conflict, throughout the continuum of operations. Command by itself will neither ensure victory, nor drive home a single attack. It will not destroy a single enemy target, carry out an emergency resupply, or conduct a campaign. However, none of these warfighting or defence activities are possible without effective command.

2. **Authority, Responsibility and Accountability.** Command is vested in an individual who has total responsibility. Commanders possess authority and responsibility with regards to their assigned forces, and are accountable, while in command, to their superiors and to the nation. All members of the CF, as individuals, are responsible for their actions and the direct consequences of these actions. This is a basic legal precept. Commanders have a responsibility to make decisions, issue orders, and monitor the execution of assigned tasks. Together with these command responsibilities, commanders accept the additional burden of accountability to their superiors, and the nation, for the actions of their subordinates. This accountability is the complement of authority, and can never be delegated. Whether delegated, or inherent to a command, the precepts of responsibility, authority and accountability ultimately affect the lives of everyone under a commander's command.

3. **Command Organization and Planning.** The CF's approach to FE is command driven. Part of this encompasses the requirement to plan for operations. In this regard, because of the responsibility, authority and accountability inherent to the position, a commander has unique tasks to perform throughout the planning process. For instance, commanders should personally carry out mission analysis and provide planning guidance to the staff. In simple terms, the commander must arrive at a responsible solution within certain time constraints despite being faced with varying situations, which are often complex, ambiguous and uncertain. At most levels, a staff exists to assist and support the commander. The staff has no authority by itself; it derives its authority from the commander

and exercises it in his name. Therefore, all of its activities are undertaken on the commander's behalf. The staff is organized and their efforts focused and synchronized, to assist the commander throughout the decision making process.

403. CONCEPT OF AN OPERATIONS PLANNING PROCESS

1. The operations planning process (OPP) is a coordinated process to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned operational tasks or of planning for possible future tasks. Planning may be inhibited by inadequate information, insufficient time and limited resources. The planning process is designed to optimise logical, analytical steps of decision making in conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity. The process is applicable to any type of operation in both the Deliberate and Time-Sensitive Planning environments.

2. **Objectives.** The objectives of the planning process are to:

- a. standardise the planning process within the CF,
- b. ensure strategic/political control is effected during the development of the plan,
- c. enable the staff to translate strategic political objectives provided by the Government of Canada into strategic/ operational-level military objectives,
- d. enable commanders to guide development of the planning process, and
- e. maximise the staff's creative thinking and associated thought processes,

3. **Output.** The output of the planning process is a COP or Op O, designed to produce a desired end-state and to achieve an assigned mission.

404. DESIGN OF THE PLANNING PROCESS

1. The planning process is applicable to all CF operations. It consists of six steps, leading from the initiation of planning through to plan review and, if necessary, a repetition of the process. The six steps are:

- a. Initiation;
- b. Orientation;
- c. Course of Action (COA) Development;
- d. Decision (select COA);
- e. Plan Development; and
- f. Plan Review.

2. **Principles** Sound planning practices, leading to the production of clear comprehensive plans, are critical to the success of any mission. Although the time available significantly influences the planning environment, operations staffs must follow a fundamental planning process to ensure that the final plan can be successfully executed. The fundamental principles which apply to CF operations planning are listed below and are described in detail in article 203 of *B-GG-005-004/AF-004 Force Employment*:

- a. Mission;
- b. Viability;
- c. Security;

- d. Timeliness;
- e. Clarity;
- f. Flexibility;
- g. Economy of Resources; and
- h. Distribution.

3. **Planning Factors.** The CDS or any authorized subordinate commander, such as a TFC, may initiate operations planning. This top-down activity enables senior commanders to communicate their intentions to subordinate commanders and forces, so that they, in turn, can make the necessary preparations as part of a concerted effort. Operational effectiveness is of primary importance. However, commanders and their staffs must consider a number of factors when planning an operation. These factors, which include, *inter-alia*, the use of standard procedures, liaison and concurrent planning are detailed in article 204 of the FE manual.

4. **Viability Requirements.** During operations planning, staffs may propose many different COAs to accomplish military missions deriving from Government policy and/or taskings. To be viable, each COA must meet the following essential criteria:

- a. **Suitability.** Will the proposed COA accomplish the military mission and hence the desired end-state(s)? Staffs must review and test every COA to determine if it can accomplish the mission.
- b. **Feasibility.** Are there sufficient resources available and in-theatre conditions to conduct and sustain the operation?
- c. **Acceptability.** Is the COA militarily prudent, i.e., do the probable results justify the estimated costs in terms of potential losses in time, materiel and military personnel?
- d. **Compliance.** Does the COA comply with approved CF doctrine and applicable policy, regulations, legislation and/or guidelines?

5. **The Planning Environment.** The term A*planning environment*@ describes the operational situation, general atmosphere, and conditions under which a plan is produced. Factors affecting the planning environment include the time available, the degree of urgency, and the extent to which planners are able to undertake such tasks. The planning environment is described as either A*deliberate*@ or A*time-sensitive*@

- a. **Deliberate.** Deliberate planning includes planning that is not subject to the immediate pressures of time or prevailing threats. It encompasses the continuous development of COPs and associated products by planners at all levels. Deliberate planning produces a range of capability-based, non-scenario specific documents (eg. COP SABRE). COPs, once completed, are maintained, by J3 P&O, in a national library.
- b. **Time-Sensitive.** Time-sensitive planning occurs when the degree of immediacy of a crisis demands an accelerated operations planning process. However, it should neither disrupt the logical flow of information, nor divert the staff from considering all planning principles. The product of time-sensitive planning, is a scenario-specific Op O.

405. LEVELS OF PLANNING

- 1. There are three distinct, but related, planning levels which correspond to the three levels of conflict:
 - a. strategic;
 - b. operational; and

c. tactical.

2. Prior to or during an operation, there will be some degree of planning at all three levels; however, the level of command which conducts the planning will vary depending on the scope and complexity of the operation. The CDS always represents the strategic-level, with the DCDS and the J Staff being the focus of operations planning at NDHQ. For some operations, NDHQ could retain the responsibility for operational-level planning.

3. For Contingency operations, the CDS will appoint a TFC and TFHQ to conduct planning tasks and the subsequent execution of operations (This could involve any one of the formation-based HQs or the JHQ). Until the TFC and TFHQ are appointed, the NDHQ J Staff must develop the plan, with input from subordinate commands as required.

406. THE PLANNING PROCESS

1. The responsibilities associated with the six steps of the planning process, are not always clear. Thus, there are some areas of operations planning where it is impractical to state, in advance of an operation, who will perform which planning functions or tasks. Therefore, coordination between the strategic and operational planning levels is essential if a seamless transition of responsibilities is to be made as the process develops. The six broadly defined planning steps (see 404.1) become unique activities at the strategic and operational-level.

2. Figure 4-1 shows the general process flow for both the time sensitive and deliberate planning environments. The first four steps, which comprise the estimate are executed regardless of the environment. In the time sensitive environment, a series of Wng Os are issued in parallel with the progression of the estimate.




Figure 4-1 The Planning Process

3. **Initiation.** Operations planning may be initiated at varying levels in response to either political or military

events. Normally, at the commencement of a crisis, the CDS will receive political direction from the Government. This should be formalised in the planning process through the issue of an initiating directive by the Political Authorities to the CDS. An initiating Directive is a generic term for the instrument which starts operations planning. It usually takes the form of a Wng O. The Initiating Directive should be distributed to any subordinate or supporting commanders who may be involved in the operation.

4. **Orientation.** On receipt of an initiating directive, a commander must orient the staff towards the requirements of the new operation. This is where the commander must place his personnel energies to ensure that subsequent activities are focused. The commander is responsible for conducting the overall mission analysis with assistance from the staff in completing this task. This analysis has two objectives: it determines the nature of the problem, and confirms the results to be achieved. The mission analysis may indicate that the mission cannot be achieved by a single military action. Therefore, the commander may consider producing a campaign plan. If the mission analysis portion of the commander's estimate indicates that the mission can be achieved without a campaign plan, the commander may continue the planning process to produce a COP or Op O, and if appropriate provide a Wng O to a subordinate commander to begin the process at a lower level. The final output of the Orientation Step is the commander's planning guidance, which permits the staff to complete the estimate process and may form the basis of a Wng O to subordinate commanders. To orient the staff, the commander should present the results of the mission analysis using the format of the estimate. The commander should provide sufficient information to permit the completion of paragraphs 1-3 of the estimate and to develop a framework of paragraph 4 of the estimate. In general terms, planning guidance should include:

- a. the commander's mission analysis;
- b. the commander's mission statement, intent and COO;
- c. confirmation of the Area of Operations, Area of Influence and Area of Interest;
- d. the commander's critical information requirements;
- e. direction on COA development;
- f. latest date/time for issuing the Op O; and
- g. other information as required.

5. **Courses of Action Development.** COA development begins with a review of the commander's Planning Guidance, produced in the previous step. This provides the necessary direction and guidance to the planning staff to start the estimate process and shape the development of the initial COAs. A COA is a possible option open to the commander that would accomplish the mission. It is initially stated in broad terms, with further details determined during the actual COA analysis. Additionally, it provides a framework for the necessary staff analysis which must consider all factors and deductions to determine the viability of the various options. Planners produce a comprehensive range of initial COAs which achieve the mission. The commander may be briefed or intervene periodically to provide further direction and focus to the planning staff by eliminating some options and narrowing others. The final product of this planning stage is a range of COAs which can accomplish the mission.

6. **Decision.** When the staff have completed the estimate process to the point of selecting the preferred COA, the COS arranges for the Decision Briefing, where the commander will be presented with a recommendation and substantiation regarding the COA considered best. During the briefing, the commander will consider the information provided by the planners, select the best COA and give guidance concerning the next step in the planning process. The selection of a COA at the decision brief, completes the estimate that was started with the initiating directive. The selected COA is then developed into a COO and ultimately into a COP or Op O.

7. **Plan Development.** An approved COP or Op O will be the final product of the planning process. The following key events are included in this step of the process:

- a. develop / co-ordinate the production activities;
- b. seek approval from higher authority; and
- c. issue the COP or Op O.

8. **Plan Review.** A COP/Op O must be reviewed regularly to evaluate its viability. The evaluation may be

conducted through exercises, war gaming or techniques such as logistics flow-modelling. In terms of time and quantifiable results, the most effective method may be computer-based war games. However, an independent staff analysis (i.e. by officers not directly involved in plan preparation) is also an effective evaluation method. The choice of review methodology will be dictated by time and the availability of resources. If major changes are required and time permits, the planning process should be recommenced from the Orientation Step. Plan Review has two major applications: Progress Review and a Periodic Review.

408. PLANS AND ORDERS

1. Development, approval, promulgation, review, revision and implementation comprise the activities related to producing COPs and Op Os. These plans and orders address a variety of circumstances requiring either preparation or response, including:

- a. specific missions in support of national or international commitments made for contingency purposes, where it is possible to describe the scenario and/or the force to be employed in detail, significantly in advance of a potential operation;
- b. missions where it is possible to describe the scenario and/or the force to be employed in that scenario in detail, significantly in advance of a potential operation, but which subsequently change just prior to an actual operation, for any reason;
- c. missions which the CDS would order in response to developing situations, and in which it is not possible to specify the details of the scenario and/or the force to be employed significantly in advance of the operation; and
- d. exercises which the staff design to evaluate various aspects of operations.

2. **Plans.** Staffs prepare plans in the deliberate planning environment, before a potential operation begins. Plans are structured documents which contain an ordered arrangement of the thoughts and intentions of the commander. Plans are disseminated prior to the conduct of specific operations to facilitate the timely issue of orders. There are two types of plans: COPs, and SUPs. Plans are **not** executive documents. They must be transformed into orders before they can be implemented. Some COPs, contain sufficient specific detail that they are suitable for the commander to implement directly with an Impl O. The terms Adraft®, Aadvance® and Afinal® may form part of the title of these plans.

- a. **COP.** A COP addresses contingencies that the staff anticipated in a specific geographic area, using predictable conditions resulting from confirmed intelligence or approved assumptions, limitations and constraints. COPs may exist in progressively increasing degrees of detail. Generic, strategic-level COPs may provide only broad guidance concerning potential politico-military crisis or emergency situations. More detailed COPs may cover a variety of possible operations or scenarios, but may be missing several essential planning factors. The CDS or a TFC may implement a fully-developed COP at a prescribed time, in accordance with prescribed measures (eg NATO precautionary measures), or on order. The staff should prepare a COP in a format which would facilitate its implementation when necessary; thus, a COP should always contain specific implementation instructions that describe the procedures necessary to authorize a change in its status from a plan to an order. The CDS or a TFC orders this change in status with an Impl O.
- b. **SUP.** A SUP supports a COP by providing detailed direction and information on a particular aspect of the COP. The staff should prepare a SUP to address an unusually high volume or complexity of direction and data, (i.e., too much for an annex). A SUP must contain sufficient information about the COP it supports to satisfy users who do not receive the basic plan. The CDS or a TFC may task a subordinate authority to develop a SUP; then, the two planning staffs involved must coordinate their efforts. The superior commander must endorse the SUP.
- c. **Campaign Plan.** When analysing a contingency, it may become evident that a single plan will not achieve the objective. Thus, the commander may first have to develop a campaign plan (see chapter 3) which will

be supported by several COPs, each requiring development using the planning process.

3. **Orders.** An order is a communication, written, oral or by signal, which conveys instructions from a superior to a subordinate. Orders are an executive document which direct the recipient to execute the instructions. The CF use several different types of orders, at specific points, in the FE process. These orders are as follows:

- a. **Wng O.** Wng Os are intended to provide units and all branches of the staff the essential details of an impending operation. Correct use of a properly prepared Wng O maximises the available planning time provided to subordinate commands and allows them to prepare for the activities of the next mission in the shortest time possible.
- b. **Op O.** In contrast to the contingency scenarios for which staffs prepare COPs, an Op O addresses an actual, mission for which the Government has specifically tasked the CF to prepare and execute. An Op O is the final executive document in the process and contains executive orders and instructions to subordinates leading to the conduct of a specific operation.
- c. **Frag O.** In rapidly changing situations, commanders may not have time to issue a full Op O. Instead, an incomplete Op O may be issued and further supplemented by a Frag O, which is an abbreviated form of an Op O. The Frag O will include only the parts of the original Op O that have changed. The Frag O should conform to the same sequence as an Op O and all five paragraph headings must be used. After each heading, regardless of the paragraph, the issuing authority will send either ANo Change® or the new information. This ensures that recipients know that they have received the entire Frag O.
- d. **Impl O.** An Impl O is the mechanism used to direct the implementation of a COP. It has no other purpose. If anything other than minor changes / updates are required to the COP to permit its execution, then an Impl O is not appropriate and an Op O must be developed.
- e. **Term O.** A Term O is issued to formally terminate the operation.

CHAPTER 5

THE USE OF FORCE IN CF OPERATIONS

SECTION I

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

501. INTRODUCTION

1. The correct and comprehensive application of both national and international laws in planning and conducting CF operations is the responsibility of commanders at all levels. Consideration of these laws will affect the definition of an operation's mission and execution.
2. This chapter provides doctrine on the use of force. Detailed and specific direction for the development of ROE is provided in *B-GG-005-004/AF-005 - The Use of Force in CF Operations*.

502. GEOGRAPHIC CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF FORCE

1. Depending on whether an operation is conducted in Canada or abroad, the CF's use of force during the operation may be subject to different authorizations or restrictions. For planning and legal purposes, operations can generally be divided into two broad categories: domestic operations and international operations.
2. **Domestic Operations.** During domestic operations, in which military forces provide aid in the maintenance of public order and security, emergency relief, and the pursuit of national development goals through the provision of armed or unarmed assistance to civil authority, the application of force must be in compliance with Canadian law.
3. **International Operations.** During international operations, which consist of operations conducted outside Canadian territory and territorial waters or where the possibility of confrontation with hostile military or paramilitary forces representing other governments must be anticipated, the use of force is subject to international laws, alliance and coalition agreements and, if applicable, United Nations (UN) resolutions and mandates.

503. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS ON THE USE OF FORCE

1. **The Use of Force in Peacetime.** The following principles on the use of force apply to all operations conducted under the laws of peace, whether the operation is classified as domestic or international.
 - a. **Reasonable Belief.** Any use of force must be based on the reasonable belief that a threat exists warranting a use of force. Mere speculation does not constitute reasonable belief.
 - b. **Negotiations and Warnings.** While in no way negating the inherent right of self-defence and without assuming an unacceptable tactical risk, commanders should make every effort to control the situation through measures short of using force, including the use of personal contact and negotiation.
 - c. **Exhaustion of Other Options.** Every effort must be made to resolve a potential hostile confrontation by means other than the use of force, whenever the operational situation permits.
 - d. **Minimum Force.** Force must never be more than the minimum necessary to carry out duties and accomplish assigned objectives or the mission.

- e. **Proportionality.** Only a response proportionate to the perception of the level of the threat is justified. Any force used must be limited to the degree, intensity, and duration necessary to achieve the objective for which the force is used and no more.
- f. **Duration of Force and Disengagement.** The application of force, at whatever level, shall cease when the hostile act stops or when it is reasonably believed that there is no longer any hostile intent.
- g. **Escalation.** Unless specifically authorized, escalation of the level of violence is to be minimized.
- h. **Deadly Force.** Deadly force is justified only under conditions of extreme necessity and as a last resort when all lesser means have failed or cannot reasonably be employed.
- i. **Collateral Damage.** Collateral damage, which consists of unintentional injuries to people or damage to structures near targets, shall be minimized.
- j. **Retaliation and Reprisal.** The use of force in retaliation or in reprisal is prohibited.
- k. **Positive Control.** The use of force shall be controlled by the on-scene commander and is to cease once the aim has been achieved.
- l. **Direct Accountability and Liability.** An individual who uses force, or the commander who authorizes it, must be able to identify the facts that led to the belief that the application of force was necessary, that the level of force used was consistent with the level of the threat and that the engagement was terminated once the imminent threat ceased to exist. Commanders and individuals will be liable for the use of excessive force.

2. **The Use of Force During Armed Conflict.** Unlike operations conducted in peacetime, the principles that govern the use of force during periods of armed conflict allow for a much wider scope and latitude; however, the use of force during armed conflict is not unlimited, and certain principles must be adhered to. In accordance with the law of armed conflict three major principles apply:

- a. **Distinction.** The principle of distinction imposes an obligation on commanders to distinguish between legitimate military objectives and civilian populations and material when conducting military operations, particularly when selecting targets. This obligation is dependent on the quality of information available to the commander at the time decisions are being made. Thus a commander must make every effort to gather and review intelligence before initiating an attack or otherwise using force.
- b. **Non-discrimination.** There are two aspects to the principle of non-discrimination. First, the law of armed conflict binds all sides in an armed conflict. Although one side may label the other an unlawful aggressor, that side is not entitled to apply the law in a different way because of that assertion. Secondly, the law is applied without adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or any similar criteria.
- c. **Proportionality.** The principle of proportionality establishes a link between the concepts of military necessity and humanity. In accordance with this principle, a commander is not permitted to inflict injury on non-combatants or cause damage to property which is disproportionate to the reasonable anticipated military advantage to be gained.

3. **Key Concepts.** There are a number of key concepts which are common to the use of force in domestic and international operations and are fundamental to understanding the application of self-defence or ROE. These concepts are covered in detail in *B-GG-005-004/AF-005* and include:

- a. hostile intent,
- b. hostile act,

- c. non-deadly force,
- d. deadly force, and
- e. the spectrum of conflict.

SECTION II

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

504. PURPOSE OF LEGAL CONSTRAINTS

1. Whether an operation is classified as domestic or international, or takes place in peacetime or during armed conflict, the use of force during the operation must be regulated in order to protect people and property from unnecessary damage or injury. This is done by defining the situations in which force can be used and by delineating the intensity and duration of the applied force. These legal constraints are embodied in Canadian domestic law, which controls the use of force during domestic operations, and international law, serving to control the use of force during international operations.
2. Commanders at all levels are responsible for the correct and comprehensive application of both bodies of law in planning and conducting operations, since the interpretation of these laws will affect the definition of the operation's mission and its execution.
3. **Legal Considerations When Planning an Operation.** In planning an operation, strategic and operational level commanders must take into account a number of legal considerations. They must also respect obligations under bilateral and multilateral agreements to which Canada is a party.
4. All commanders and members should also be aware of the circumstances which might cause the legally recognized status of a combatant, neutral or protected person or object to change.
5. Legal considerations and requirements must be reflected in the mission statement, the strategic-level guidance provided to the TFC, and the authorized ROE. There must be a clear link between the approved political objectives, military objectives, legal bases for the operation, the TFC's COO and the ROE which are authorized for the operation. CF legal staff, therefore, must be involved in the planning process from its onset.

505. CANADIAN DOMESTIC LAW

1. The deployment of the CF in domestic operations is regulated in two ways: by statute, such as the NDA, as with *Part XI Aid of the Civil Power*, and through the federal government's exercise of the Crown prerogative.
2. Once the CF are deployed, their use of force during domestic operations is governed almost exclusively by the *Criminal Code of Canada*, except for the *Coastal Fisheries Protection Act*, which addresses the requirements for disabling fire. Other statutes, such as the *Food and Drugs Act* and the *Narcotic Control Act*, also specify the entitlement to use force.
3. The *Criminal Code* is the primary reference regarding the use of force in a number of situations. These situations, outlined below, will not all be applicable or authorized in each domestic operation; the use of force will depend on the particular legal mandate for the CF involvement or support in a domestic matter.
 - a. self-defence,
 - b. protection of others,
 - c. prevention of the commission of an offence,
 - d. protection of property, and
 - e. the right to make arrests or the occasions when arrests can be made.

506. INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. International law is the primary legal basis for the use of force during international operations. It provides stability in international relations and an expectation that certain acts or omissions will bring about predictable consequences. Nations therefore comply with international law because it is in their best interest to do so. Like most rules of conduct, international law is in a continual state of development and change.

2. **Main International Agreements.** There is no single document constituting international law. This is an umbrella term for describing a body of international agreements that have been developing and expanding, in particular since 1907. These various agreements led to the development and codification of the two primary components of international law:

- a. the law of peace; and
- b. the law of armed conflict.

3. **The Law of Peace.** The international law of peace includes but is not restricted to treaties, conventions, agreements and customary international law comprising the norms of international behaviour in times of peace. It regulates the conduct of nations in diplomacy, commerce, industry, resource development, transportation, and the protection of the environment. Examples include the *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*, the UN Convention on the *Law of the Sea*, and the *Canada-Russia Dangerous Military Activities Agreement*.

4. **The UN Charter.** One of the cornerstones of the law of peace is the UN charter. This charter discusses the purposes, principles, membership, organization and procedures of the UN. A key element of the charter is article 2's affirmation that all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. In order to respond to violations of article 2, the charter does make provisions for the UN to use military force to maintain international peace and security. The nature of such responses and their mechanisms are outlined in other articles in the charter, which describe the organization and authorities for enforcing the charter.

5. **The Law of Armed Conflict.** The modern law of armed conflict has its sources in international conventions (agreements or treaties between states), international custom and practice, general principles recognized by civilized nations, and national and international court rulings. The basis for the law of armed conflict consists of two sets of agreements, each named after the city where most of them were devised: the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the four Geneva Conventions for the Protection of the Victims of War of 1949, which have been supplemented by the Protocols to the Conventions. Three primary concepts underlie the law of armed conflict:

- a. military necessity,
- b. humanity, and
- c. chivalry.

6. The law of armed conflict, which restricts the use of force in certain situations, is not intended to inhibit commanders in the accomplishment of their military mission but to:

- a. protect combatants and non-combatants from unnecessary suffering;
- b. protect property of historic, religious or humanitarian value and the environment from unnecessary destruction; and
- c. facilitate the restoration of peace upon the conclusion of hostilities.

507. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. Legal considerations will have a variety of applications in all aspects of domestic and international operations. All members of the CF have a duty to comply with Canadian domestic law and international law and, to the utmost of their ability and authority, prevent violations by other individuals or groups.

2. Not all international laws apply at all times. Sometimes, certain bodies of international law may not apply based on the geopolitical situation. For example, Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions applies to international armed conflict. Protocol II applies to non-international armed conflict but does not apply to internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots and isolated and sporadic acts of violence. Finally, there may also be occasions when the use of force may be influenced by laws of a host nation.

3. During domestic operations, Canadian domestic laws will regulate the deployment, conduct and use of force by the CF; however, the NDA and the *Criminal Code* also apply to CF personnel even when they are deployed outside Canada. This may cause some confusion or potential legal controversy during international operations. Commanders should expect a degree of uncertainty in these affairs, but must make every effort to seek clarification and resolution. When in doubt, and if no guidance or direction has been given, at a minimum, the standards of conduct and treatment of others referred to in the Geneva Conventions (even if the Geneva Conventions are not applicable at the time) should be applied until direction is received from higher authority.

4. **Prohibited Actions Under International Law and Canadian Domestic Law.** In all operations, certain uses of force and acts of violence are forbidden under international law and Canadian domestic law. The following acts, whether committed by civilian or military personnel, are prohibited:

a. violent acts that threaten the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of persons, except when permitted against combatants under the law of armed conflict. These forbidden acts include:

(1) murder,

(2) physical and mental torture,

(3) corporal punishment, and

(4) mutilation;

b. outrages against personal dignity such as humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;

c. hostage-taking;

d. collective punishments; and

e. threats to commit any of the above acts.

5. **Treatment of Special Groups.** The Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols are quite specific with respect to the responsibilities of nations and their military commanders concerning the treatment of the following special groups:

a. all detainees,

b. the wounded and sick, and

c. civilians.

SECTION III

CONTROLLING THE USE OF FORCE

508. BASIS FOR CONTROLLING THE USE OF FORCE

1. In support of national interests, the Government of Canada may authorize the use of military force, up to and including deadly force, as a means to maintain peace or deter aggression and control conflict in order to return to a state of peace; the CF, as an element of national power, enable these objectives to be met.

2. Because the use of force can lead to damaged property, destruction of natural resources, injury and loss of human lives, the Government of Canada must establish mechanisms that authorize the force necessary to accomplish an assigned mission within specified limits. Thus, the CDS, whose authority is drawn from the Canadian government through the NDA, controls the use of force by the CF by issuing specific use of force directives or orders. This written direction is based on the following two mechanisms:

- a. self-defence, and
- b. ROE.

3. **Self-Defence.** CF personnel are entitled to use force in self-defence or in designated circumstances to protect others from death or serious bodily harm. Both Canadian domestic law and international law recognize the authority to use appropriate force in self-defence, up to and including deadly force. When self-defence is used, CF personnel and commanders must consider the following:

- a. **Application of Self-Defence.** Because of different legal regimes underpinning domestic and international operations, there may be differences in the application of self-defence between both types of operations. During domestic operations, the CF operate under the *Criminal Code*, and the use of force for self-defence and defence of others and property is authorized only in certain situations. During international operations, the CF may be operating under various international laws, including special UN Security Council resolutions, where the use of force in self-defence and defence of others may provide for a much wider latitude of actions than allowed under Canadian domestic laws.
- b. **Exercising the Right of Self-Defence.** Without assuming unacceptable risk, commanders or individuals (when alone) should make every effort to control a situation without the use of force. When time and conditions permit, the potentially hostile force should be warned of the situation and further warned that self-defensive action will be taken as necessary. In exercising the right of self-defence, the responsible commander or individual (as applicable) must identify the presence of an immediate and compelling need to use force. However, there is no obligation to use force in self-defence and commanders may legitimately order that individuals or units under their command do not respond to an imminent threat. Such an order would be based on that commander's responsibility, in certain circumstances, to control the escalation of force. If the responsible commander or individual (as applicable) identifies that action must be taken in response to an imminent threat the following actions are taken:
 - (1) control of the force used in terms of time, space and degree of intensity,
 - (2) limitation of the types of weapons used and the rates of usage to that which is reasonably necessary to repel the attack or anticipated attack, and
 - (3) demonstration of every effort to bring self-defence engagements to an end.

In domestic operations and peacetime international operations, the use of force must be regarded as a measure of last resort, and the commander in question must make every effort to bring hostilities to an end. To be successful, the use of force must be timely, but it must be preceded by a clear recognition that hostility is occurring or is imminent.

- c. **Government Restriction on Self-defence.** Notwithstanding the above, there may be an extraordinary case where the Government of Canada in support of higher national interests might direct that the CF may not use deadly force when faced with the threat of an imminent attack. Such direction would be exceptional and would be passed from the Government in writing to the CDS. The purpose of such direction would be to limit the escalation of a situation and in no way limits the ability of an individual or commander to respond to an attack which is occurring.
4. **ROE.** When a commander may need to use force to accomplish a mission, the Government of Canada, through the CDS, issues ROE, which consist of directions and orders regarding the use of force by Canadian forces. They constitute **lawful commands** and are designed to remove any legal or semantic ambiguity that could lead a commander to violate national policy by inadvertently under- or overreacting to an action by foreign forces. ROE are applicable to situations ranging from peacetime operations to armed conflict. Military, political, diplomatic and legal factors are all reviewed when considering the authorization of ROE, and the current or projected Canadian alert state and/or NATO precautionary measures are given due consideration. Authorization of ROE, however, does not depend on and is not restricted by the alert state and precautionary measures in effect. ROE serve as a mechanism for guiding and controlling the use of force in the following situations:
 - a. the transition from peace to crisis to armed conflict,
 - b. the application of force in peacetime and during conflict, and
 - c. the return to peacetime conditions.
5. **ROE and Non-Military Objects or Persons.** In operations which include law enforcement, sovereignty protection and peacekeeping, a commander may need to use military force against non-military objects, platforms or persons. As the use of force in these situations will normally be a politically and diplomatically sensitive issue with potentially far-ranging ramifications, commanders must have clear direction on the use of force.
6. **Factors Influencing ROE Formulation.** To control the use of military force, the Canadian government and the strategic military staff will be guided by the following factors (refer also to figure 2-1):
 - a. legal prescriptions,
 - b. political and policy considerations,
 - c. diplomatic considerations, and
 - d. operational requirements.
7. **Responsibilities of Commanders.** In controlling the use of force, commanders have responsibilities with respect to the following:
 - a. **Control of Subordinates.** Commanders at all levels must ensure that their subordinates are briefed and refreshed on the meaning and application of the ROE for assigned missions and for any subsequent changes. In addition, commanders at all levels must ensure that their subordinates take the following steps to ensure that authorized force is properly applied:
 - (1) read, understand, and appropriately interpret and disseminate the ROE;
 - (2) seek additional guidance or direction through the TFC should the situation change, or if the existing ROE are insufficient or a particular situation is not adequately covered by the ROE; and
 - (3) seek clarification if there is any perceived discrepancy within the ROE in effect, or if the role and the ROE have diverged and are no longer compatible.
 - c. **Preparatory and In-Theatre Training.** Commanders at every level must ensure that any individual or unit

capable of applying force, up to and including deadly force, has been trained in the interpretation and application of ROE.

- d. **Subordinate Commanders' Recommendations.** Commanders should consider the recommendations of subordinate commanders when ROE are being formulated and following their implementation. All commanders have an obligation to seek clarification or further direction if authorized ROE are considered to be unclear or inadequate to cover the military situation.
- e. **Implementation Authority.** Responsibility for implementation of ROE rests with the TFC.
- f. **Restrictions on ROE Imposed by the Force Commander.** ROE are issued by the CDS to a TFC. The TFC is not permitted to exceed the authorized ROE. A TFC may impose more restrictive limits on the actions of assigned forces; however, this should not limit the right of self-defence. The TFC disseminates the ROE and any additional direction or amplification, if required, to commanders of all components of a force.
- g. **Supplementary Instructions.** Subject to the direction contained in this publication and in the ROE themselves, the TFC may issue supplementary or abbreviated instructions as required to provide for specific forces or operational situations.
- h. **Conduct of Operations.** While subordinates can always be held accountable for their own actions, commanders are responsible for the actions of their subordinates and for ensuring that all operations are conducted in accordance with applicable legal prescriptions. Although commanders may delegate the authority for operations, they are still responsible for the conduct of their forces even if their forces are under someone else's operational or tactical control.
- i. **Response to Changes in Operational Situation.** Because military operations are dynamic, commanders must continuously evaluate the direction provided in terms of the situation and mission in order to ensure that their direction remains appropriate and applicable. Commanders must not hesitate to request changes or clarification to direction previously provided. Even when concurrence from higher authority is not required, consultation with superiors is encouraged whenever possible.
- j. **Procedures for Changes to ROE.** All requests for changes to ROE shall be forwarded through the chain of command to the level retaining approval authority. Normally, this will be from the TFC directly to the CDS.
- k. **Legal Considerations.** The correct application of both national and international laws in planning and conducting operations is the responsibility of commanders at all levels. Consideration of these laws will affect the definition of an operation's mission and its execution. Commanders are responsible for deciding what actions their forces will take, bearing in mind the orders received from superior military authorities. A commander will always be guided by the principles outlined in the authorized ROE, other directives and orders (e.g., QR&Os) as may be issued by higher authority. Commanding officers and the members of their units or elements must be aware that persons who are authorized by law to use force will be held criminally responsible for any excess thereof according to the nature and quality of the act that constitutes the excess.
- l. **Legal Review.** The above considerations and requirements must be reflected in the mission statement, the strategic-level guidance provided to the force, and the authorized ROE. CF legal staff, therefore, must be involved in the planning process from the onset.

509. USE OF FORCE DIRECTIVE

1. The use of force directive issued for a particular mission will be based on the self-defence and ROE requirements of the mission. Even if the mission does not require any ROE, written direction concerning self-defence will be provided to the TFC. However, should additional direction be required on the use of force, this will be accomplished through the RO

2. **Structure of Use of Force Directives.** A use of force directive for an operation could include use of force definitions, concepts and principles, commander's responsibilities, direction concerning weapons-readiness states, weapons release criteria and, at a minimum, a list of numbered ROE. The ROE authorized for a force may be taken from the numbered menu of supplementary ROE measures contained in *Volume 2 of B-GG-005-004/AF-005* or may be developed specifically for the particular operation. The purpose of publishing numbered ROE measures in a classified supplement is not only to provide a convenient means of promulgating and amending ROE, but also to specify those actions which are forbidden in peace and during periods of tension, unless specifically authorized.

3. The formats and procedures for promulgating, requesting and amending ROE measures are contained in *Volume 2 of B-GG-005-004/AF-005*. The initial ROE for a force must be provided before an operation begins. **Only the CDS may approve changes, additions and deletions to authorized ROE.** Requests for amendment to the ROE must be submitted through the TFC to the CDS, clearly substantiating any recommendation.

4. **Drafting Process for Use of Force Directives.** Strategic-level ROE drafting teams, lead by J3 Plans, should have representatives from, J3 DRS, J5 Legal, J5 Policy, other J Staff reps (e.g., J1 Med, J3 SAMP) if appropriate to the mission, and OGDs as necessary. The drafting team will require the following documents in order to produce use of force directives. (Note: The absence of any of these documents will undermine the effectiveness of the drafting process and the resulting use of force orders).

- a. legal basis for intervention (e.g., UN Security Council resolution);
- b. mission statement and mandate;
- c. a written statement of approved Canadian political objectives;
- d. a written statement of approved Canadian military objectives;
- e. status of forces agreement (SOFA), memoranda of understanding (MOU) and host-nation legal requirements;
- f. a written statement of force size, organization, equipment and ordnance;
- g. TFC's COO;
- h. risk assessment;
- i. other allied, coalition or UN ROE; and
- j. *The Use of Force in CF Operations B-GG-005-004/AF-005*.

5. Use of force directives must be in a clear, coherent format, easily understood, remembered and applied. The text must distinguish guidance or principles from the orders. Any legal concepts must be conveyed in standard and easily understood terminology. The orders must not only prevent commanders and their subordinates from overreacting with force, but also from under reacting and thereby possibly endangering the mission or personnel. The CDS will include overall guidance on the political policy to assist commanders in planning and reacting correctly as a crisis unfolds. This policy should normally be described in narrative terms that will convey the national approach to a crisis, the objective and the means. Finally, the use of force orders must provide direction in accordance with the mission or mandate and in accordance with the threat.

6. **Release of Use of Force Directives.** During operations, it may be necessary or appropriate to inform participating coalition forces and friendly states of all or part of Canadian use of force orders, which includes ROE and self-defence measures. This may only be done on the authority of the CDS. Before releasing ROE to other nations, it must be remembered that the intentional or inadvertent compromise of the Canadian ROE to a potential adversary may jeopardize a commander's options and the execution of the mission. Therefore, the risks of disseminating this information must always be weighed against the potential benefits.

7. **Summary Card for Use of Force Directives.** The meaning of the use of force directives, or ROE, must be carefully communicated to all ranks. To be certain of this, there must be a system in place to ensure that the ROE are understood and are being appropriately interpreted. The summary card is the primary means of providing direction and guidance to all members. This direction must outline those elements of the ROE considered to be most essential and the interpretation of the responses allowed. The direction to CF personnel must always be clear, whether dealing with warning shots, a fleeing individual who has previously been considered a hostile threat, or any other situation requiring the application of force. Consequently, whenever the cards should be amended to better reflect necessary guidance, they should be changed without delay. Although the summary card, or other amplifying direction, is normally issued by the TFC, it must receive CDS approval before it is disseminated to subordinate commanders and Canadian forces. The use of force summary card cannot be relied on as the sole method of providing direction to individuals and it cannot be used in isolation.

SECTION IV

USE OF FORCE IN DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

510. THE CANADIAN FORCES AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

1. Although the CF are not a law-enforcement agency, they may be called out to support civil authorities during a national emergency, to support law and enforcement agencies, or as a last resort. Regardless, the CF only assist in the enforcement of Canadian law and will only take action at the specific request of the federal or provincial government. The use of the CF in domestic operations is potentially sensitive and controversial. CF actions will result in the closest scrutiny by the government, the media and the general public. ROE for domestic operations must be carefully reviewed to ensure their compliance with government policy and objectives.

2. To ensure that Canadian forces react appropriately, commanders will be given direction on the use and implementation of ROE for the following domestic operations:

- a. ACP,
- b. assistance to civil authorities and support to OGDs, and
- c. security of defence installations and works for defence.

3. **Considerations When Planning and Conducting Domestic Operations.** The CF is neither the primary law-enforcement agency in Canada, nor the primary emergency-response organization. However, most domestic operations will comprise one or both of these types of missions. Therefore, the CF's specific role and their peace-officer status are two important considerations when planning and conducting domestic operations.

4. **Domestic Command, Control and Interdepartmental Coordination.** The C2 arrangements for domestic operations requiring ROE can be complex because, invariably, OGDs are involved. Often, DND is providing support to an OGD that is taking the lead or responsibility for the mission and objectives of the operation. When considering the necessity for ROE, liaison and concurrence from the appropriate lead department, its minister and, if necessary, the cabinet may be required.

5. Each OGD has different internal C2 arrangements which, in general, are less centralized than those of DND. In CF operations with an OGD, the TFC and staff must be familiar with the C2 organization and procedures of the other department. Notwithstanding whether DND or the OGD is the lead agency in a domestic operation which may involve the use of force, only military commanders may order the use of force by CF personnel, and military commanders remain responsible and accountable for the actions which they order.

511. SELF-DEFENCE DURING DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

1. The application of the principle of self-defence differs between domestic and international operations. Under Canadian law, justification to use force in self-defence has been codified in several overlapping sections of the *Criminal Code*. The *Criminal Code* specifies the occasions when force is authorized for self-defence, as well as the amount of force permitted. The criminal consequences for the illegal use of force are also prescribed. In addition to the principles listed in article 503, two additional principles must be adhered to when using force in self-defence during domestic operations:

- a. criminal liability, and
- b. civil liability.

2. **Use of Defensive Force.** Under Canadian law, the use of defensive force must be based on a reasonable belief that a threat exists. Defensive force may be used in the following contexts:

- a. self-defence,
- b. defence of others, and
- c. defence of property (only in very specific circumstances and with severe restrictions).

512. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT DURING DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

1. The ROE in support of a domestic operation will be drafted in accordance with the principles, concepts and direction contained in *B-GG-005-004/AF-005* and the authorized level of force (LOF) found in the *Criminal Code*. In particular, any actions or use of non-deadly or deadly force which are not found under the provisions of the normal military application of self-defence (i.e., defence of others, defence of property, etc.) must be authorized through the ROE.

2. It must be recognized that members of the CF generally lack the in-depth knowledge and training in terms of the *Criminal Code* and other legislation that professional peace-enforcement officers have. The use of force directive issued to a TFC of a domestic operation must therefore contain comprehensive and specific direction concerning the legal and political underpinnings for the use of force. In particular, numbered ROE providing for both the use of non-deadly force and, if appropriate, deadly force must be issued.

SECTION V

USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

513. THE CANADIAN FORCES AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

1. The use of force by members of the CF during all operations depends on diplomatic, political, operational and legal factors. Other important factors in deciding on the appropriate level of force include the nature of the operation as well as its perceived position on the spectrum of conflict (see figure 1-1).

2. International operations may take many forms, including peace support, sovereignty protection beyond the territorial sea, SAE or SPE, and international humanitarian assistance. Normally, these are conducted as one of three broad types of combined operations:

- a. alliance,
- b. coalition, and
- c. UN.

514. SELF-DEFENCE DURING INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

1. Under customary international law, nations have the right to use force in order to protect their citizens, territory and assets against an attack or an imminent attack, provided there is an instant, overwhelming need, leaving no choice of means or moment for deliberation. In such a situation, any action taken against a hostile or potentially hostile force must adhere to the use of force and engagement principles.

515. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT DURING INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

1. **ROE and the Type of Operation.** A number of ROE systems have been developed by individual nations, alliances and the Environments/Services within various armed forces. Canadian forces may not always operate under the Canadian system of ROE. Commanders must be aware that there are significant and subtle differences between the various ROE systems, and great care must be taken to ensure the underlying concepts and applications are not confused between systems.

2. **ROE and the Spectrum of Conflict.** In addition to considering the nature of the operation, i.e., whether it consists of a joint or combined international operation, the operation or mission's position on the spectrum of conflict must also be taken into consideration when formulating the ROE. Within the continuum, which ranges from peacetime to armed conflict, there are a variety of possible missions and associated legal underpinnings that will affect the ROE.

- a. **ROE in Peacetime.** Peacetime ROE draw their authority from the Government of Canada and are in compliance with Canadian and international law. They consist of a standard bank or menu of authorizations which commanders may use to direct, control and order the use of force to achieve an assigned mission in support of broad national interests, or to defend against large-scale attacks on an operational or strategic level or to protect other foreign forces or civilians. Actions described in peacetime ROE are prohibited unless specifically authorized.
- b. **ROE During International Armed Conflict.** The basis for the use of force in international armed conflict is international law, primarily the law of armed conflict. Conflict ROE draw their authority from the Government of Canada and are in compliance with Canadian and international law. During armed conflict, government policy would normally be to contain the conflict and return to peace on the most favourable terms to Canada. Consequently, the government may restrict a commander from exercising the full spectrum of force options available under international law. Therefore, conflict ROE consist of a series of restrictions on actions which would normally be permitted under international law and the law of armed conflict, but are prohibited based on national political or operational imperatives. Unlike peacetime ROE,

there is no standing bank or menu of conflict ROE. The conflict ROE will be drafted based on the unique requirements and objectives of each conflict mission. Finally, conflict ROE should not be statements of the law of armed conflict; rather, they are restrictions on the use of force which would normally be permitted under the law of armed conflict. The conflict ROE will draw their structure from the examples provided in *Volume 2 of B-GG-005-004/AF-005*.

3. **ROE at the Outbreak of Sustained Hostilities.** At or prior to the outbreak of hostilities or a declaration of a general alert, the CDS will normally issue immediate and clear direction specifying the belligerents, neutrals and allies, and the criteria for targeting the enemy's aircraft, ground forces, vessels and other interests. Direction concerning timings, territorial waters, airspace and landmass of other nations, theatres of operation and other concurrent operations should be included. In addition to this vital information, the status of peacetime ROE must be confirmed, and conflict ROE will also be issued. Commanders are reminded that a combination of peacetime and conflict ROE may be in effect to address the requirements of the conflict and provide direction on the use of force against nations that are not party to the conflict. In the absence of direction, the law of armed conflict is always in effect and will be followed. Once a conflict has ended, either through a cease-fire or an armistice, the ROE will once again require revision and further direction on the status of peacetime and conflict.

CHAPTER 6

TRAINING AND EXERCISES

601. INTRODUCTION

1. The complexities of modern warfare make it increasingly important to concentrate on training that simulates today's battlefield as closely as possible. The success of CF operations is directly related to training effectiveness.
2. Training and exercises, conducted in accordance with CF doctrine and procedures, are essential to adequately prepare CF elements for their roles in support of Canadian national policy. Headquarters and combat forces that may be expected to form a TF must train together routinely. Commanders must ensure that their line and staff subordinates are exercised in planning and making timely and independent decisions based on general direction and broad guidance.
3. Sustainable combat readiness requires logistics readiness C the availability and proper functioning of systems, materiel and resources to maintain and sustain operations. Training support units is as important as training combat components; therefore, support units should be exercised routinely under realistic conditions.
4. The guidance provided in this chapter concentrates on collective training of Canadian forces in their strategic, operational and tactical roles rather than on individual training, and relates to all levels of exercises. The role of training in preparation for international operations is further highlighted in DCDS 2/00 DCDS DIRECTION FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, dated 1 March 2000.

602. TYPES OF TRAINING

1. Training may be conducted on an individual or a collective basis.
2. **Individual training** is conducted by such national establishments as the CF Command and Staff College and the CF Maritime Warfare Centre and by such allied establishments as the Joint Warfare Staff in the UK and the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk in the USA. Courses conducted at these establishments are designed to impart both general and specialist knowledge and skills related to joint operations. Also, single-environment schools and colleges, while focusing on environment-specific studies, devote a percentage of their curriculum to joint studies. Seminars and conferences provide further means of broadening and updating officers' knowledge of joint matters.
3. **Collective training** is best achieved and evaluated through the use of joint exercises that can take the form of a live exercise (LIVEX), a command post exercise (CPX), a computer assisted exercise (CAX) or a crisis management exercise (CMX). These exercises serve to train assigned forces, validate contingency and capability-based plans, test concepts and doctrine, exercise C2 systems, exercise logistic-support systems, further define infrastructure requirements, and assess transition to war procedures. Joint exercises must be planned to ensure that participating forces derive the maximum possible benefit. They should be as realistic as possible, and should not only test personnel, systems and equipment, but should also identify shortcomings in doctrine and procedures. It is important that emphasis be placed on the requirement to identify exercise goals and objectives and to evaluate the relative success in achieving those goals

603. CATEGORIES OF EXERCISES

1. For exercise-planning purposes, three categories of exercises are identified and defined as follows:
 - a. **Combined Exercise**. An exercise which is planned and conducted by one or more components of the CF in combination with forces from one or more allied nations to accomplish a single mission.
 - b. **Joint Exercise**. An exercise which is planned and conducted by elements of two or more environments of the CF. When all environments are not involved, the participating forces are identified.

- c. **Single-Environment Exercise**. An exercise which is planned and conducted by a single environment to meet its specific objectives and requirements.
2. A joint exercise may be further defined as a minor or a major exercise on the basis of the exercise programming and planning criteria and the level of involvement of the components of the CF.
3. A **minor exercise** is programmed, planned, conducted, evaluated and reported on by the formation which may be responsible for deploying as an operational level TFHQ, with the assistance of, and in conjunction with, other appropriate HQs.
4. A **major exercise** is one programmed by NDHQ in conformity with the CDS' operational guidance to commanders. Depending on the CDS' requirements, responsibility for the planning and conduct of a major exercise may either be assigned to an NDHQ-directed exercise planning team or devolved to a subordinate HQ. The officer conducting the exercise (OCE), appointed by the CDS, is generally the DCDS. A major exercise is usually balanced in terms of involvement of the components, although, for certain exercises, the balance may exist between two, with the third having a lesser involvement.

604. LEVELS OF EXERCISE

1. Exercises will be further defined into levels as follows:
 - a. **Strategic**. The level of exercise in which the CF determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses CF resources to accomplish those objectives.
 - b. **Operational**. The level of exercise in which exercises are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.
 - c. **Tactical**. The level of exercise in which mock battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.

605. OTHER TYPES OF EXERCISES

1. There are other types of exercises which can complement or substitute for live exercises. Because they do not require the extensive deployment of forces and resources, they are a convenient means of achieving preparatory training for live exercises by involving the activation of headquarters, along with relevant communications, and their operation under simulated combat conditions. These exercises are:
 - a. **Command Post Exercise (CPX)** - conducted at all three levels.
 - b. **Crisis Management Exercise (CMX)** - usually conducted at the strategic or operational level.
 - c. **Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX)** - conducted at all three levels.

606. TRAINING ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The CDS retains the overall authority and responsibility to ensure that sufficient training is conducted to enable all CF elements to operate together effectively as a multi-purpose, combat capable force. The DCDS is responsible for conducting all collective training at the strategic level and collective training involving nationally assigned forces at the operational level in accordance with direction and guidance issued by the CDS. The ECS are responsible to ensure that the essential states of readiness at the operational and tactical level are maintained.
2. For strategic and selected operational level exercises, an NDHQ team coordinates exercise planning. The planning team includes representatives from the ECS and from appropriate NDHQ staff branches. An OCE

appointed by the CDS directs and controls all participating headquarters, forces and agencies to achieve the exercise objectives.

3. Planning for operational and tactical level exercises is conducted by the operational staffs of the individual Environments.

607. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND OBJECTIVES

1. The Defence White Paper details a number of training requirements based on CF missions. All exercises should be organized, planned and located to provide maximum realism and should simulate, as nearly as possible, an area of current or projected strategic importance.

2. CF training and exercises are designed with the following general objectives:

- a. to achieve and maintain the operational efficiency of the CF;
- b. to prepare the CF for operations;
- c. to enhance national security and, in conjunction with OGDs, to improve national measures for defence of Canada and for CIMIC;
- d. to train for special purposes such as drug enforcement operations and ACP;
- e. to test and refine operational infrastructure, systems concepts and plans; and
- f. to demonstrate visibly combat readiness.

3. Specific objectives regarding training and exercise are as follows:

- a. to exercise national crisis-management procedures;
- b. to exercise appointed TFCs and their HQs in national crisis management and operations;
- c. to exercise NDHQ coordination with OGDs in crisis situations;
- d. to train for defence of North America;
- e. to prove CF concepts and doctrine;
- f. to exercise and validate contingency and capability-based plans;
- g. to exercise CCIS and procedures;
- h. to exercise strategic, operational and tactical deployment systems and procedures;
- i. to exercise administrative and logistic support procedures;
- j. to exercise intelligence procedures; and
- k. to exercise PA and legal aspects of operations.

4. Plans for exercises should include provisions for assessing the capabilities of all components of a force to conduct operations. When assessments reveal deficiencies in doctrine, procedures or equipment, commanders should take appropriate steps to remedy the deficiencies.

608. JOINT TASK LIST

1. The Joint Task List (JTL) is the tool that enables Commanders and Staff at each level to determine a specific Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) based on direction provided by the White Paper, the DPG and operational imperatives. The JTL is a menu of mission-based capabilities, expressed in terms of tasks, conditions and standards which identify *what* is to be performed. The JTL is the means of translating training requirements into training objectives and will be used as the focus for all collective training activities as follows:

- a. Strategic level:
 - (1) conduct strategic deployment and redeployment;
 - (2) develop strategic intelligence;
 - (3) employ forces;
 - (4) provide sustainment;
 - (5) provide strategic direction and coordination;
 - (6) conduct mobilization; and
 - (7) conduct force development;
- b. Operational level:
 - (1) conduct operational movement and manoeuvre;
 - (2) develop operational intelligence;
 - (3) employ operational firepower;
 - (4) provide operational support;
 - (5) exercise OPCOM and OPGON; and
 - (6) provide operational protection; and
- c. Tactical level - *to be developed by the ECS.*

609. NATIONAL TRAINING PLAN

1. The National Joint Training Plan (NTP) is the coordinating document for all training activities at the strategic and operational levels based on the following:

- a. protection of Canada and assistance to other government department activities;
- b. international treaty activities; and
- c. Canada-US bilateral defence activities.

2. An annual letter from the CDS to commanders and staff will provide an updated strategic overview, the expected readiness level policy and the national training priorities. Commanders and key staff will be responsible for including their participation in the NJTP within their respective Business Plans. The NJTP is updated semi-

annually by the National Joint Training Working Group (NJTWG) and issued under the authority of the DCDS and will include the training calendars for the subsequent five years. These calendars are based on the CDS direction and imperatives at the strategic and operational levels.

3. The NJTWG is the policy development body for all aspects on the conduct of the NJTP. It reports directly to the DCDS and is comprised of appropriate NDHQ and environmental staffs under the direction of J3 Doctrine and Training.

610. PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PfP) PROGRAMME

1. In 1994, NATO launched a major initiative to enhance the stability and security throughout Europe after the breakup of the USSR. In addition to the 16 NATO nations, the PfP programme draws its members from the 28 former Warsaw Pact, non-aligned and neutral nations throughout Europe. In Canada, the PfP programme is administrated through the ***Canadian Forces Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP)***.

2. The PfP programme objectives are:

- a. facilitating transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
- b. ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
- c. maintaining the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the OSCE;
- d. developing interoperability of military forces with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen the ability of PfP participants to undertake missions in the field of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed; and
- e. developing, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

3. The military exercise training portion of the CF MTAP PfP programme is the responsibility of J3 Doctrine and Training. This responsibility extends to identification of exercises, funding and overall co-ordination of the MTAP PfP Programme. Canada hosts and participates in a number of international PfP exercises in Europe and in the United States. The Canadian-hosted exercises are rotated through the three environments.

611. EXERCISE PLANNING PROCESS

1. The exercise planning process commences with the exercise identification and description in the NJTP. Once the NJTP has been approved by the DCDS, the exercise enters into the planning conferences phases, involving an Initial Planning Conference (IPC), a Main Planning Conference (MPC), a Final Planning Conference (FPC) and any coordination meetings. The lead agency attending the IPC for international exercises such as PfP and NATO exercises will be NDHQ/J3 Training. Follow-on conferences will be attended by the operational and/or tactical level staffs.

2. J3 Training will be kept informed of all conference activities, and all post-exercise reports will be sent to J3 Training for DCDS review.

CHAPTER 7
TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION

SECTION I
THE TASK FORCE

701. INTRODUCTION

1. This chapter provides guidance for the formation of a TF and TFHQ. Specific titles will always be used to describe actual deployed forces; for example, Task Force - Haiti (TF HAITI) or to relate to a specific mission; for example TF IFOR. Should there be a requirement to create subordinate TFs, the TFC shall ensure that the name(s) selected will not generate confusion.

702. ESTABLISHING A TASK FORCE

1. A TF will be established for all contingency operations, domestic or international. As the TF will be a mission specific grouping, it may or may not contain elements of two or more environments of the CF. Should the TF be multi-Environmental in composition, then the adjective *Joint* shall be employed to describe all aspects of the operation. Figure 7-1 shows a generic organization of a TF.




Figure 7-1 A Generic Task Force

2. When a TF is established and a TFC appointed, the commander establishing the TF will:

- a. define the strategic/operational objectives;
- b. assign the task or mission;
- c. allocate forces to the TFC;
- d. define the scope and timing of the mission
- e. identify supporting commands and agencies;
- f. identify restraints and constraints on the mission;
- g. define the geographic area of responsibility;
- h. specify and direct the transfer of the appropriate level of command over assigned forces to the TFC; and
- i. identify the appropriate time for transfer of command authority to the TFC.

703. COMMAND OF A TASK FORCE

1. Command of combat units and support groups on contingency operations is vested in a TFC, in some cases a JTFC, appointed by the CDS. In such operations, the DCDS has responsibility to coordinate on behalf of the CDS, strategic level operational planning and CDS operational direction to the TFC. When the CDS establishes a TF, a separate chain of command is activated which has the appointed TFC responding to the CDS. ECS may be tasked to provide support to their forces assigned to an operation; however, they are outside the operational chain of command, except if appointed as the TFC.

2. The TFC, appointed by the CDS, is the operational commander. In appointing the TFC, the CDS must specify the mission, allocate the resources to execute that mission, and specify C2 arrangements, including the delegation of authority and the allocation of personnel, agencies or elements which will enable the TFC to effectively control resources to accomplish the mission. The TFC may have to deploy to a specific theatre or area of operations, should circumstances require it. Alternatively, in situations where a headquarters exists in the theatre or area of operations, it may be appropriate to operate out of fixed facilities. The TFC, aided by the NDHQ J Staff in the planning and execution of the mission, requires a deployable TFHQ as well as communications and administrative support units.

3. Commanders who are fully conversant with the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs and limitations of forces of their own Environments may have only limited knowledge of the tactics, techniques, etc. of the components of a TF. Commanders, therefore, must be provided with a staff which will enable them to command and control resources from other Environments and support agencies effectively. Military advice may also be provided by specialist liaison or staff officers and by the commanders of subordinate, supporting or higher commands.

4. **Command Relationships.** Once a TF is established, a separate chain of command is created under the TFC who reports directly to the establishing commander. This chain of command will then be activated at a time determined at the strategic level and specified in orders through TOCA (chapter 2, section III).

- a. Prior to TOCA, the TFC is authorized to direct planning for the operation through the designated TFHQ and designated supporting commanders. The designated supporting commanders retain their full range of command responsibilities, as specified in article 704.2, but are responsive to the TFC for planning and preparing forces for the operation.
- b. Once TOCA takes place, the TFC assumes the level of command and responsibility specified by the CDS. The supporting commanders will remain responsible for the provision of certain functions and resources to the TFC, using existing lines of communications (LOC) for these functions wherever possible and keeping the TFC fully informed. Supporting commanders will maintain their usual responsibilities, minus the

authority and responsibility that have been transferred to the TFC.

5. **Methodology.** In general, the number of resources assigned, and the required degree of control over these resources will depend on the task or mission assigned to a TFC. The C2 method used for an operation will depend on the resources allocated to the operation, the degree of authority delegated to the TFC, the nature of the task or mission, and the operational situation. The following two methods are available to the TFC for C2 of a TF.

- a. **Component Method.** This method is the norm for joint contingency operations. Using the component method, the JTFC exercises authority over a JTF through component commanders (JTF components are assigned to JTFCs under OPCOM or OPCON). The JTFC issues broad operational directives to each of the component commanders who then translate the directives into detailed plans and orders for their assigned units. Each component has a separate headquarters as its control organization. The JTFHQ and component HQs may be collocated or separate.
- b. **Direct Method.** The direct method is an alternate method of command used in contingency operations where the size, complexity, time span and mission of an operation is usually limited. It would be rare to employ this method in international operations. The decision to employ the direct method will normally be made in consultation with the ECS. According to this method, a TFC exercises command authority over a TF directly by issuing detailed orders to subordinate elements. An appropriate staff and control facilities are therefore required. In general, a TFC is provided with advice by his staff and by officers commanding elements of the TF. The span of control that a TFC can effectively manage depends largely on the capacity of the staff and the facilities available. A balance must be struck between the actual or potential span of control and the extent of a commander's involvement in the detailed conduct of operations. If necessary, commanders may delegate to subordinate commanders a level of command authority over elements of their forces.

704. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. **Commander-s Responsibilities** Once assigned, the TFC will:

- a. confirm the mission;
- b. define the operational level objectives;
- c. assign subordinate tasks;
- d. organize forces;
- e. describe the COO;
- f. set priorities;
- g. coordinate the use of logistics resources; and
- h. determine the sequence of operations.

2. **Responsibilities of the ECS and Group Principals.** ECS and Group Principals, collectively called supporting commanders, are responsible to the CDS for providing suitably trained and equipped forces and for sustaining their assigned capabilities. Generally speaking, sustainment includes the maintenance of operational and technical readiness through the provision of personnel and materiel, pre-deployment preparatory training, Environmental intelligence, EW analysis and advice on technical matters. Deficiencies or situations which cannot be rectified by the supporting commander because of lack of capability or authority will be submitted to the CDS for resolution. While the ECS and Group Principals are not part of the operational chain of command, they play a vital role in generating and supporting the forces assigned to TFs and in providing the CDS with strategic advice on environmental, technical and operational matters. They are responsible, within their area of expertise, for:

- a. translating strategic objectives and plans into direction for force generation;
- b. translating operational objectives and plans into support to operations;
- c. providing advice to the CDS on technical and operational matters;
- d. participating in the strategic-level decision-making process for the preparation and conduct of operations;
and
- e. retention of certain residual responsibilities such as flight safety.

3. **Relationship Between the Task Force Commander and Supporting Commanders.** There must be no confusion regarding the responsibilities assigned to the TFC, the supporting commanders and other agencies involved. Once the CDS establishes a TF, a separate chain of command is activated, and the TFC reports directly to the CDS and the assigned TF units, report directly to the TFC. Supporting commanders remain responsible for the provision of certain capabilities and resources to their forces, in cooperation with designated group principals. These responsibilities are collectively referred to as **residual responsibilities**. Existing LOC for personnel and logistics functions will continue to be used wherever possible; any changes deemed appropriate will be clearly identified in the directive ordering TOCA. Supporting commanders will maintain their usual responsibilities, minus that authority and responsibility which have been transferred to the TFC through TOCA.

SECTION II

TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS STAFF

705. STAFF FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES

1. The staff exists to provide advice to the TFC and to subordinate commanders. Its tasks are to collect and analyse information on which the TFC bases decisions and plans, to complete the detail of the plans, to transmit the TFC's instructions and orders quickly and accurately to subordinates, and to monitor execution of the plans. The staff assists the TFC by coordinating routine activities and resolving problems within the overall framework of the strategic commander's plans or directions. More specifically, the staff functions are to:

- a. gather and organize information for presentation to the TFC;
- b. assist in the preparation of estimates;
- c. make recommendations to the TFC on tactical and administrative matters;
- d. complete the detail of the TFC's plan;
- e. anticipate future tactical and administrative developments;
- f. inform higher, subordinate and adjacent commands of developing situations;
- g. assist the TFC in providing direction and coordination in the execution of the plan; and
- h. monitor accomplishment of the TFC's directions.

706. COMPOSITION OF THE TFHQ STAFF

1. The staff is comprised of three main categories of staff appointments: personal, special and general. Officers with sea, land and air experience will be assigned to the headquarters in a proportion determined by the nature of the operation and the needs of the TFC (see Figure 7-2 for the general organization of the TFHQ).

- a. **Personal Staff.** This staff, which includes aides-de-camp and executive assistants, is responsible for special matters over which the TFC chooses to exercise close personal control. It assists TFCs directly by meeting their personal needs and arranging their work and visit programmes (i.e., appointments, itineraries, documents, transportation, etc.). It also provides an additional link between the TFC and the general staff.
- b. **Special Staff.** The special staff assists the TFC with technical, administrative, legal and operational matters. Examples of specialist officers are the comptroller, who provides advice on all financial aspects; the commander of the medical group, who is the TFC's authority on health-service support; and the commander of the engineer unit, who keeps the TFC informed of all military engineering activities. The special staff is usually small and is made up of experts who also hold positions within the Environmental components and support group and unit staffs, or within the divisions of the general staff.
- c. **General Staff.** The general staff is organized along traditional lines, with a COS responsible for the overall staff coordination, and a number of divisions responsible for distinct staff activities. The general staff, which assists TFCs in meeting their responsibilities for overall command of the TF, is involved in planning, coordinating and supervising the execution of operations and training, and in arranging the support required by the TF to accomplish its mission. It includes specialist officers who possess particular knowledge or skills based on which they advise the TFC. Examples of general staff members are public information and legal officers. Distinct activities of the general staff will include some or all of the following and be titled as indicated below:

- (1) **Personnel (J1).** The J1 staff assists the TFC with the formulation of personnel policies for, and with the personnel management of, the TF. The staff is also responsible for administering the military and civilian personnel within the TFHQ.
- (2) **Intelligence (J2).** The J2 staff is responsible for providing the TFC with accurate and timely intelligence needed to plan and conduct operations. The staff monitors current operations and is responsible for controlling and coordinating all in-theatre intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance agencies and sources organic or available to the TF. The staff is also responsible for disseminating intelligence information to the TF.
- (3) **Operations (J3).** The J3 staff assists the TFC in planning, directing, controlling and coordinating operations and training. As all staff effort must support these activities, J3 is the preeminent staff branch.
- (4) **Logistics (J4).** The J4 staff assists the TFC with the arrangements for the logistics aspects of the operation; that is, supplies, accommodation, maintenance, and administrative movement.
- (5) **Civil-Military Cooperation (J5).** The J5 staff is responsible to the TFC for the development and execution of policies relating to local national authorities and the civilian population, including host-nation support (HNS) for the TF.
- (6) **Communications and Information Systems (J6).** The J6 staff assists the TFC by coordinating the procedures to identify, collect, process, present and distribute the information needed by the TFC and by coordinating the technical detail for information acquisition and distribution.




Figure 7-2 A Generic Operational Level Headquarters

2. **Liaison Staff.** The TFC is also supported by liaison staff. The use of qualified liaison staff contributes to the success of any mission. In any operation, liaison officers must be knowledgeable about the capabilities and limitations of their own Environments and units; in a combined operation, they must be knowledgeable about the capabilities and limitations of the CF. If required, liaison staff will be detached from the TFHQ to adjacent and other headquarters; liaison staff will also be attached to the TFHQ from other commands. Liaison officers normally work under the direction of the COS. The TFC may also designate an individual to perform liaison duties for a specific purpose or period of time. Liaison staff perform the following functions:

- a. acquisition of information for the TFC and the general staff;
- b. passage of information from the TFC; and
- c. representation of the TFC's interests.

707. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. The TFHQ staff, which is responsible for assisting the TFC to achieve the mission, supports the chain of command but is not part of it. Its purpose is to ensure that the TFC understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs and limitations of the component parts of the TF.
2. The TFHQ staff is headed by a COS, whose principal tasks are to organize, direct, supervise and coordinate all staff activities of the TFHQ; ensure the coordination of staff work with higher, lateral and subordinate commands; assist the TFC in decision making; and assist the TFC in directing and coordinating the execution of plans and orders.
3. The TFHQ staff has no authority independent of the TFC. Its influence is derived from the TFC and is exercised in his name. The TFHQ staff must never interfere with or impede the relationship between a senior and subordinate commander. Similarly, the TFHQ staff will not reject proposals or requests from a subordinate commander without the TFC's direction.

708. STRUCTURE AND SIZE

1. The precise structure and size of a TFHQ will vary depending on the nature of the mission. Similarly, location and facilities of the TFHQ will have a major impact on what the TFC and the staff can accomplish. For example, a TFHQ onboard a flag ship may have limitations of space and equipment which could affect manning levels and equipment capabilities. TFCs may reorganize the headquarters as required in order to better carry out their duties and responsibilities.
2. For deployed contingency operations in complex situations, the JTFHQ will be based on HQ 1 Cdn Div, which is permanently augmented by a cross environmental cadre. This cadre will be further augmented, as required, by specific designated individuals when it appears likely that operational level contingency planning will have to be conducted. The activation of the JTFHQ will be initiated through the CDS wng O.
3. For major domestic operations it may be necessary to augment formation based HQs such as a LFA HQ or maritime coastal command with personnel from the JHQ to allow a 24/7 capability or to carry out functions not normally resident in a formation based HQ.

709. SUPPORT UNIT

1. The support unit is responsible for providing the TFC and the TFHQ staff with the personnel, equipment and transportation required to command subordinate components and units of the TF, and for the administrative support and security of the TFHQ. The composition and functions of the support unit will vary depending on the nature of the operation. Details will be specified in the operation orders.

710. CIS UNIT

1. The CIS unit is responsible for providing the TFC and the TFHQ staff with the personnel, facilities and equipment required to install, operate and maintain operational level CIS facilities and resources as required to command the TF effectively. The CIS unit may be integrated with the headquarters support unit, in which case the operational level CIS and the administrative and security support to the TFHQ are provided by a single unit.

CHAPTER 8

COMBINED OPERATIONS

801. INTRODUCTION

1. Any military operation which involves the forces of more than one nation acting together to accomplish a single mission is referred to as a combined operation. Allied, coalition and UN mandated operations are all considered to be combined operations.

802. STRUCTURE OF A COMBINED OPERATION

1. Depending on the scope of the mission, land, sea and air components, logistics and communications support may all be included in a combined operation. Nations will contribute to the CFHQ staff and operational components in accordance with alliance agreements or as agreed at meetings of troop contributing nations (TCNs). The CFC is usually an officer of the nation contributing the largest number of forces to the operation.

2. Figure 8-1 is a graphic illustration of a typical combined force organization.




Figure 8-1 Organization of Combined Force involving Canadian forces

803. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. With the exception of single ship deployments, when one or more elements of the CF operate as part of a combined force, a TF will be established. If elements of two or more Environments of the CF are involved the TFC will be considered a JTFC. See also articles 116, 118 and 119.

2. As this is an international contingency operation, C2 of the TF would normally be executed by the Commander and staff of JHQ Kingston. Forces generated will normally be assigned OPCOM to the JTFC. These

operations are normally of such scope and complexity as to require the establishment of Component Commands.

3. The TFC's duties and responsibilities will be as stipulated in the Terms of Reference (TOR) issued to him by the CDS. These duties will be dependant on the organization of the combined force. The TOR will normally provide the TFC with the powers of punishment of a Formation Commander in accordance with relevant sections of the NDA. The TOR will also delegate OPCOM over Canadian forces assigned to the combined operation to the TFC while the CDS will retain full command authority. Normally, the TFC will retain OPCOM but will transfer OPCON of the Canadian force to the CFC. In rare cases, the CFC may be given OPCOM of Canadian forces.

Logistics. Generally, in coalition combined operations administrative and logistics support remains a national responsibility. In some instances mutual support arrangements are agreed between TCNs and HNS agreements are made. In Allied combined operations the degree of administrative control delegated to a CFC and the CFC's authority over logistics resources will be agreed to by TCNs and detailed in applicable documents and operation orders. See chapter 27 - Logistics for further information.

4. When the TFC **is functioning** as an operational level commander, the entire TF will normally be assigned OPCON to the CFC:

- a. the TFC exercises OPCOM of the TF and conduct missions as assigned by the CFC.
- b. all elements of JHQ Kingston that are necessary to provide a full C2 capability will deploy. The HQ must have the capability to plan, organize and conduct major operations including re-deployment planning and emergency withdrawal operations. This scenario may require that the TFHQ be augmented.

5. When the TFC **is not functioning** as an operational level commander, the TF elements are normally assigned OPCON to the CFC:

- a. the TFC becomes the Canadian national commander (CNC). The CNC's roles will be to provide administrative support to the CF elements and to coordinate the employment of the CF elements with the combined force headquarters (CFHQ). Other duties and responsibilities will include liaison with other Canadian government agencies in-theatre which may include Canadian consuls, ambassadors, Chargé d'affaires, Canadian Forces Attachés (CFA), CF staff in NATO posts and other Canadian NGOs. On occasion the TFC may be further tasked with an allied or UN command role. and
- b. only those HQ elements that are necessary to this limited role will deploy. As such, they will not have the capability to plan, organize and conduct major operations with the exception of re-deployment planning and emergency withdrawal operations which shall be commenced immediately on arrival in theatre. It will be designed to expand its capabilities, if required.

804. ROE FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS

1. ROE for combined operations will be as agreed by TCNs, personally reviewed and approved for use by Canadian forces in accordance with CF doctrine. For more detail see Chapter 5 or *B-GG-005-004/AF-005 The Use of Force in CF Operations*.

CHAPTER 9

NATO OPERATIONS

901. INTRODUCTION

1. In response to the expansionist policies and methods of the former Soviet Union in the late 1940s, ten European countries formed a unique alliance with the United States and Canada in 1949: NATO. Their common goal was to guarantee the security and freedom of member countries through a system of collective defence. Since then, NATO has expanded to 16 members as additional European nations joined the Alliance.

2. With the publication of the London Declaration in July 1990, NATO initiated a process of transformation in response to fundamental changes in the European security environment. Thus, a new Alliance strategic concept was developed, which was proclaimed at the Rome Summit in November 1991 and reaffirmed at the January 1994 Summit Meeting in Brussels. The new concept maintains the core functions of NATO but takes a broader approach to political stability and security. The new strategic concept includes the following key aspects:

- a. reaffirmation of the defensive nature of the Alliance;
- b. indivisibility of the security of Alliance members;
- c. security policy based on collective defence, integrated military structures and shared roles, risks and responsibilities;
- d. retention of the transatlantic link while strengthening the European security role;
- e. maintenance of the minimum appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces capable of providing a wide range of response options;
- f. maintenance of a smaller force structure at lower readiness levels but featuring enhanced mobility, flexibility and multi nationality;
- g. improved contribution to crises management and peaceful resolution of disputes; and
- h. contribution to dialogue and cooperation with former adversaries through participation in confidence-building activities.

902. STRUCTURE OF THE NATO ALLIANCE

1. The 16 member governments of NATO consult and coordinate their policies through the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The NAC is the highest authority in NATO. It is in permanent session and meets weekly, with full-time representatives of ambassadorial rank. The Council also meets at higher levels, involving foreign ministers or heads of government. Regardless of the level at which it meets, the NAC retains its authority, and its decisions have the same status and validity. When integrated defence matters are discussed, 15 permanent representatives meet as the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) (Note: While recent decisions on the part of France have led to her becoming involved in DPC matters, France is not a member of the DPC).

2. To assist in carrying out their roles, the NAC and DPC have established a number of committees. These committees, which cover the whole range of NATO activities, meet under the chairmanship of a member of the International Staff.

3. The secretary-general of NATO is nominated by member nations and chairs the NAC, the DPC, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and other senior committees. The secretary-general also directs the International Secretariat whose staff is drawn from member nations.

4. The NAC and DPC receive military advice from the Military Committee (MC), which is the highest military authority in NATO. The MC consists of the chief of defence staff or equivalent of the member countries of the DPC. Major NATO commanders (MNC) participate in meetings of the MC in the chiefs of staff session (MC/CS) and have direct links to the MC in the permanent session (MC/PS). The chiefs of defence staff are permanently represented at the NATO headquarters in Brussels. The MC meets at the military permanent representative level weekly and at the chiefs of defence staff level tri-annually.

5. The chairman of the MC is elected by the chiefs of defence staff and normally serves a three-year term. The chairman represents the MC at meetings of the NAC, DPC and NPG, providing advice on military matters.

6. The MC is assisted by an integrated International Military Staff (IMS) headed by a director who is elected by the Committee. The director may be from any of the member nations other than that represented by the chairman.

7. In addition to providing military advice to the NAC and DPC, the MC translates NATO political policy into military policy and provides strategic direction to the major NATO commands. Direction for all nuclear-related matters comes from the NPG, which is a political rather than a military body. In peace, the MC approves and coordinates war planning, studies the required force structure, and considers other matters such as nuclear arms control. The MC evaluates the needs of MNCs and reconciles them with overall requirements.

903. NATO MILITARY COMMANDS

1. NATO military forces are grouped into two major NATO commands:

- a. Allied Command Europe (ACE); and
- b. Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT).

A Canada-United States Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG) is responsible for the North American area and has equivalent status as a major command. These commands receive their direction from the NATO MC.

2. An **MNC** heads each of the major commands: Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). Subordinate levels of command are as follows:

- a. **Major subordinate commanders (MSC)** are NATO commanders operationally responsible to either SACEUR or SACLANT. Their command may be geographical (e.g., Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Western Atlantic Area (CINCPACWEST)) or functional (e.g., Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic (COMSTRIKFLEATLANT)). There are three MSCs in ACE and five in ACLANT (see Figures 9-1 and 9-2).
- b. **Principal subordinate commanders (PSC)** are commanders operationally responsible to a MSC for a geographical area (e.g., Commander Canadian Atlantic Sub-Area (COMCANLANT)) or for an operational function (e.g., Commander Carrier Striking Force (COMCARSTRIKFOR)) (see Figures 9-3 and 9-4).
- c. Below the PSC level, **subordinate-principal subordinate commanders (Sub-PSC)** are commanders responsible to a PSC for an allocated geographical area or a particular operational function (e.g., Commander Submarine Force Northwest Sub-Area (COMSUBNORTHWEST)) (see figure 9-5). SACLANT designates an essential subordinate commander as an **other NATO commander** directly subordinate to a MSC or PSC as appropriate (e.g., Island Commander Bermuda (ISCOMBERMUDA)) (see Figure 9-3). Sub-PSC headquarters are national in peacetime but function as NATO headquarters for planning during NATO exercises and if so designated for operational purposes. During crisis and war, they function as a NATO headquarters and may be required to receive reinforcements and to conduct combined operations.




Figure 9-1 Allied Command Europe




Figure 9-2 Allied Command Atlantic





Figure 9-4 Allied Command Atlantic-Striking Fleet




Figure 9-5 Allied Command Europe-Northwestern Region

3. NATO commanders are responsible in peacetime for developing defence plans for their respective areas, for determining force requirements, and for deploying and training forces under their command. Their reports and recommendations regarding their forces and their logistic support are referred to the MC. The MNCs are also responsible for implementing the NATO Precautionary System (NPS) and for implementing plans for the defence of their areas in war.

4. ACE covers the area extending from the North Cape of Norway to southern Europe, including the Mediterranean Sea, and from the Atlantic to the eastern border of Turkey, including the Channel and the British Isles but excluding Portugal. ACE is commanded by SACEUR, whose headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), are located at Casteau near Mons, in southern Belgium. Nations are represented in SHAPE by a National Military Representative (NMR).

5. SACEUR is responsible, under the overall direction of the MC, for the defence of the Allied countries situated within his command area, and for maintaining the sea lines of communication (SLOC) across the North Sea and English Channel and in the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas. In peacetime, SACEUR's available forces are limited to certain air defence forces, the Headquarters ACE Mobile Force (Land), the Standing Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN), the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), the NATO Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Force and the staffs of the integrated NATO headquarters. In wartime, SACEUR would control all the sea, land and air operations in his area. Internal security, however, remains a national responsibility. SACEUR would also support SACLANT operations.

6. ACLANT extends from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer and from the coastal waters of North America to those of Europe and Africa, including Portugal but excluding the Channel and the British Isles. ACLANT is

commanded by SACLANT whose headquarters is located in Norfolk, Virginia, USA.

7. SACLANT is responsible, under the overall direction of the MC, for the defence of the Atlantic sea area north of the Tropic of Cancer. In peacetime, forces under SACLANT's command are limited to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) and the staffs of the integrated NATO headquarters. In wartime, SACLANT is responsible for keeping the SLOC of the Atlantic Ocean open, and for conducting conventional and nuclear operations against the enemy. SACLANT would also support SACEUR operations.

904. NATO PRECAUTIONARY SYSTEM

1. The NPS is a military and civil arrangement which provides for Alliance political and military preparedness and crisis management. Policy and principles of the NPS are contained in *MC 67/4, NATO Precautionary System*. The NPS manual lists the precautionary measures and describes the procedures related to the NPS.

905. NATO SECURITY AND DEFENCE STRATEGY

1. The Alliance's strategic concept outlines a broad approach to security based on dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of a collective-defence capability. It integrates political and military elements of NATO's security policy into a coherent whole, establishing cooperation with new partners in central and eastern Europe as an integral part of the Alliance's strategy. It also provides for the major changes in NATO's integrated military forces in order to take account of the changed strategic environment, including substantial reductions in their size and readiness, improvements in their mobility and adaptability to different contingencies, greater use of multinational formations and much-reduced dependence on nuclear forces.

2. NATO's main purpose is to safeguard the freedom, vital interests and security of all its members through political and military means in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.

3. Enforcing security and stability has political, economic, social and environmental implications, as well as the indispensable defence dimension. In order to meet the diversity of its challenges, the Alliance requires a broad approach to security. This is reflected in three mutually reinforcing components of Allied security policy: peacetime activities, crisis management, and the maintenance of a collective-defence capability.

4. Peacetime activities:

- a. **Dialogue.** The Alliance establishes diplomatic liaison and military contacts with countries of central and eastern Europe to encourage greater mutual understanding of respective security concerns and, thus, to reinforce stability and to provide a foundation for the ability to resolve problems and conflicts by peaceful means.
- b. **Cooperation.** The Allies seek to develop productive patterns of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in all relevant fields of security with all states in Europe, including the field of arms control and disarmament, with the aim of preventing crises or, should they arise, ensuring their effective management.
- c. **Operational Planning.** Operational planning undertaken in peacetime by NATO military authorities (NMA) and individual members of the Alliance contributes to the overall operational readiness of allied forces necessary to achieve Alliance security objectives.
- d. **Presence.** Alliance presence in a specific area can contribute to regional stability. Routine presence is achieved by means of regular operations of Alliance forces throughout the NATO area.
- e. **Surveillance and Intelligence Gathering.** Peacetime surveillance in areas of geo-strategic importance is essential and is achieved through the routine presence of Alliance forces in those areas. In peacetime, NATO relies primarily on the intelligence information provided by member nations. (See also chapters 20 and 22.)

- f. **Maintenance of a Nuclear Deterrence.** The fundamental mission of NATO's nuclear forces is political (i.e., to preserve peace and to prevent coercion and war).
- g. **Exercises and Training.** Exercises and training of NATO's forces, including headquarters and their C2 arrangements, are important means to enhance readiness, to display Alliance solidarity, and to demonstrate NATO's military capabilities.

5. NATO supports, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping activities of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and of the UN. NATO support may be indirect or direct. Indirect support consists of support along the low end of the contribution spectrum and requires no NATO presence in or immediately around the crisis area. Direct support is more visible and more costly, and includes NATO presence in or immediately around the crisis area.

6. There are five levels of possible NATO support to OSCE or UN peacekeeping activities:

- a. to advise;
- b. to coordinate;
- c. to provide service support;
- d. to provide observers; and
- e. to provide forces.

7. **Crisis Management.** Crisis management through arbitration to resolve conflict between other parties is an important area of Alliance policy for the maintenance of stability and peace in Europe, as well as for global stability and peace.

8. **Collective Defence Capability.** NATO collective-defence arrangements rely on multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO. Multinational forces and, in particular, NATO's immediate and rapid-reaction forces demonstrate the Alliance's resolve to maintain a credible collective defence and to enhance Alliance cohesion.

906. IMPLEMENTATION OF NATO'S SECURITY AND DEFENCE STRATEGY

1. To implement NATO's security objectives and strategic principles, NATO forces are organized to provide capabilities that can contribute to protecting peace, to managing crises that affect the security of Alliance members, and to preventing war, while retaining at all times the means to defend, if necessary, all Allied territory and to restore peace and the territorial integrity to member states. The Alliance maintains security using the fewest number of forces at the lowest levels of readiness, consistent with the requirements of defence.

2. The primary role of NATO's military forces is to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of member states. This role takes account of the strategic environment in which a single, massive and global threat has given way to diverse and multidirectional risks. Alliance forces have different functions to perform in peace, crisis and war.

3. In peace, the roles of NATO military forces are:

- a. to guard against risks to the security of Alliance members;
- b. to contribute towards the maintenance of stability and balance in Europe; and
- c. to ensure that peace is preserved.

4. In support of the above roles, NATO military forces contribute to dialogue and cooperation in Europe by their

participation in confidence-building activities, including those which demonstrate interoperability and improve communication, and by verification of arms control agreements. Allied forces may be called upon to contribute to stability and peace by providing forces for OSCE- or UN-sponsored peacekeeping activities.

5. NATO's military forces contribute to the management and resolution of crises which threaten the security of Alliance members by complementing and reinforcing political actions. The military forces must therefore have a capability for measured and timely response to crises, and a capability to deter, respond to or repel aggression against any nation of the Alliance.

6. In war, Allied maritime, land and air forces combine to defend and restore the territorial integrity of NATO.

7. Alliance strategy calls for the maintenance of a nuclear deterrence to preserve peace and to prevent coercion and war. Alliance strategy does not depend on a chemical- and biological-warfare capability.

8. To ensure that NATO's forces can play an effective role both in crisis-management operations and in countering threat or aggression against any ally, they require flexibility, mobility and assured capabilities for augmentation when necessary.

907. NATO COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Effective implementation of Alliance military strategy depends on the delegation of an appropriate level of command authority to NATO commanders and on an effective deployable command structure supported by fast, secure and reliable communications and information systems.

2. A NATO Combined Force Commander (CFC) is generally delegated OPCON over Canadian forces assigned to the operation.

3. The degree of administrative control delegated to a NATO CFC and the CFC's authority over logistics resources is agreed to by nations and NATO and is detailed in applicable documents.

4. Authority for establishing a NATO combined force is vested in the NATO DPC in conjunction with the MC and the MNCs. The relevant MNC would appoint the CFC, assign the mission, define the geographic area of responsibility, assign the operational and support forces provided by the participating nations, and specify the commander's level of authority over assigned forces. The CFC would be responsible to the appropriate MNC. Authority for establishing a NATO force for peacekeeping operations rests with the NAC (16-nation membership) rather than the DPC (15-nation membership).

5. Whenever practicable, establishment of a NATO combined force is based on an existing NATO headquarters. The combined force employs established, manned, equipped and trained formations and units appropriate to the mission, which eases the burden of supporting commands with respect to C2, operational procedures, force preparation and sustainment planning. These formations and units may be augmented as required. If there is an operational requirement to form a new unit, it should be created as early as possible.

6. Under most circumstances, a NATO combined force would be under the command or control of a MNC, MSC or regional PSC in whose area the operation is to be conducted. In this event, the relevant headquarters, augmented as required, would assume responsibility for C2 and support of the operation. It may, however, be necessary to establish a separate headquarters for a combined force.

7. NATO military forces may be required to conduct operations in coalition with forces of other organizations or nations. In this case, C2 would be coordinated through a coordination, control, communications and integration centre which would link the NATO combined force headquarters with other headquarters.

8. Political control and guidance of a peacekeeping operation is exercised by the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) for a OSCE-sponsored operation, and by the UN Security Council for a UN-sponsored activity. OPCON of forces, including NATO forces, involved in a peacekeeping operation will be exercised by the CFC, who may or may not be a serving NATO officer. The CFC is appointed by the CSO for an OSCE operation, and by the secretary-

general for a UN operation.

908. CANADIAN COMMITMENTS TO NATO

1. Canada is committed to the security of the North Atlantic Treaty area and provides forces to NATO consistent with the current needs of collective defence.
2. Every year, Canada responds to the NATO Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ). In the DPQ, Canada states its five-year commitment to the Alliance in terms of forces and financing. Plans for the first year (i.e., the commitment year) are regarded as firm commitments, while plans for the next four years are viewed as statements of national intentions.
3. In the event of crisis or war in Europe, Canada will make forces available to NATO, as determined by the Government. Canada will also contribute to NATO crisis management operations on a case-by-case basis.

909. CANADIAN COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. When the CF are committed to a NATO combined operation, the C2 relationships will normally be as described in article 803.4 or 803.5. Additional related information is in chapters 7 & 8.

CHAPTER 10
PEACE-SUPPORT OPERATIONS
SECTION I
THE UNITED NATIONS

1001. INTRODUCTION

1. While the end of the cold war dramatically reduced the threat of nuclear world war, it has resulted in an upsurge of new forms of turbulence and disorder stemming from assertions of militant nationalism, ethnic, religious and cultural strife, poverty, famine, and the abuse of human rights, as well as the availability of large quantities of modern weaponry. The international community is therefore called upon to intervene in a multitude of localized or regional conflicts, with roles and objectives far broader than those of traditional peacekeeping operations.

2. The type and range of activities and the missions of military forces have changed because the line between peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance has become blurred. In the future, the CF could be involved in various activities such as enforcement actions related directly to humanitarian missions; actions to prevent disputes from arising between parties or to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts; and peacebuilding in a post-conflict environment. Demobilization of forces, monitoring of elections, demining, restoration of infrastructure and enforcement of sanctions are other activities in an evolving list of challenges facing the international community.

3. In view of these developments, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali put forward his June 1992 report entitled *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. It suggests that examining peacekeeping in isolation is no longer appropriate; rather, peacekeeping must be seen in the context of a broad range of mechanisms, from dialogue to intervention. Canada generally endorses the views in this document as a relevant conceptual blueprint for UN activity in support of international peace and security.

1002. SPONSORSHIP OF PEACE-SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1. The term "peace-support operations" is used in a generic sense to describe activities in international crises and conflict resolution and management in which the CF may be involved. These activities could be conducted in support of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping or post-conflict peacebuilding as described in the UN Secretary-General's June 1992 report.

2. For the foreseeable future, the CF will continue to be called upon to participate in peace-support operations. As the UN has traditionally been the focus of peace-support operations, the UN decision-making mechanisms and the process by which a UN-sponsored operation is established must be understood.

3. Although the UN has been the most frequent sponsor of peace-support operations, other international and regional organizations C NATO, the British Commonwealth, the Organization of American States, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the European Community, the Organization of African Unity, the Economic Community of West African States and the Arab League C have also acted or are prepared to act in a similar fashion to prevent, halt or contain conflict. Some nations have formulated multinational agreements to create peace-support operations outside the auspices of any permanent international forum. As well, the UN has worked in full cooperation with regional organizations to resolve disputes or crises.

4. The principles and guidelines for CF involvement in peace-support operations provided in section 2 relate primarily to operations mandated by the UN. However, when other organizations play a role in conflict resolution, these principles and guidelines apply equally to activities based on a mandate from any of these organizations.

1003. PURPOSE AND COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

1. In accordance with its charter, the UN's main purpose is "to maintain international peace and security and,

to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace...". While peace-support operations are not directly mentioned in the UN Charter, the Charter does add legitimacy to UN-sponsored operations. The following specific bodies within the UN are involved with initiating and conducting peace-support operations:

- a. General Assembly;
- b. Security Council;
- c. Secretary-General; and
- d. Secretariat.

2. The General Assembly is made up of the UN member states. While the UN Charter does not grant it any direct executive powers for maintaining international peace and security, the General Assembly has the power to:

- a. consider the general principles of cooperation involved in maintaining international peace and security and make recommendations to its own members or to the Security Council, or to both;
- b. discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any member state or by the Security Council, or by a state that is not a member of the UN, provided that state accepts in advance the obligations set out in the Charter for the peaceful settlement of disputes;
- c. make recommendations concerning such questions to the state(s) concerned or to the Security Council. Where follow-up is required, a question must be referred to the Security Council; and
- d. call the attention of the Security Council to situations that could endanger international peace and security.

3. The UN General Assembly may consider any matter referred to it by the Security Council or may consider any other situation or conflict which impairs the general welfare or friendly relations among nations. The General Assembly's recommendations are not binding and its powers in conflict resolution are undefined.

4. The **Security Council** consists of five permanent members and 10 non-permanent members, five of which are elected each year by the General Assembly. The permanent members are the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The Security Council has the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security under the UN Charter on behalf of the members of the General Assembly. The Council can take measures to effect the pacific settlement of disputes or take action involving the employment of armed force with respect to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.

5. The permanent members of the Council can veto any proposed resolution that may be debated in Council, other than matters dealing with procedures. Any permanent member of the Security Council can therefore block decisions on policy and action affecting the maintenance of international peace and security. Decisions taken by the Security Council are implemented by adopting a Security Council resolution, which provides legitimacy for a UN-sponsored operation.

6. The **Secretary-General**, who is appointed for a five-year term by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council, represents the international community and can act as an independent spokesperson on global issues. The Secretary-General is empowered under the UN Charter to notify the Security Council of any matter which, in his or her opinion, may threaten international peace and security. Besides being the UN's chief administrative officer (CAO), the Secretary-General has wide-ranging political responsibilities. He or she is responsible to the Security Council for security matters and, along with his or her staff (the Secretariat), is responsible for organizing and maintaining peace-support operations mandated by the Security Council.

7. The UN Charter provides for a **Secretariat** which acts as the UN New York HQ (UNNY HQ) staff and is composed of international civil servants drawn from all member states. The Secretariat staffs the UNNY HQ and provides civilian, diplomatic and field staffs for peace-support operations. It also includes military personnel, most notably the military advisor in the Department of Peace Operations whose duties are to assist the Secretary-General with the direction and conduct of field operations.

1004. LEGAL BASIS FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACE-SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1. The Security Council draws its authority from the UN Charter, and the adoption of a Security Council resolution is the authority under which a peace-support force operates.

2. A Security Council resolution provides the mandate for a peace-support operation. Other related agreements and documents which further define the operation and such elements as C2 authority are:

- a. Secretary-General's reports;
- b. Secretary-General's instructions to the chief of mission;
- c. SOFA;
- d. MOU;
- e. UN regulations; and
- f. force standing orders or directives.

3. To ensure consensus, the operative paragraphs of Security Council resolutions are often broadly phrased to reflect the concerns of all members of the Security Council, but especially those of the five permanent members so as to avert the possibility of a veto.

1005. PEACE-SUPPORT OPERATIONS APPROVED BY THE UNITED NATIONS

1. The UN Secretary-General's 1992 report set the tone for UN roles in the emerging world order and sparked a major international debate on ways of "strengthening and making more efficient...the capacity of the United Nations for preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping." The document makes a distinction among five categories of peace-support operations which have gained general acceptance in the UN and Canada and to which elements of the CF may be deployed:

- a. preventive diplomacy;
- b. peacemaking;
- c. peace enforcement;
- d. peacekeeping; and

e. peacebuilding.

2. **Preventive diplomacy.** Action taken to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. The military contribution to preventive diplomacy could include the use of military expertise in fact-finding missions or in efforts to improve some of the causes of disputes. At the upper limit, military involvement in preventive diplomacy could involve the deployment of military units to regions where disputes are likely.

3. **Peacemaking.** The process of resolving disputes that could lead to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation or other forms of peaceful settlement. Military involvement is generally limited to a few specialists.

4. **Peace Enforcement.** Military operations to restore peace or to establish specified conditions in an area of conflict or tension where the parties may not consent to intervention and may be engaged in combat activities. The military force acts to impose adherence to a resolution adopted by the Security Council. Enforcement actions may involve actions to enforce sanctions, no-fly zones or other specific limiting activities, and may be conducted under UN leadership or by a coalition of member states operating on behalf of the UN. Enforcement is an aspect of peace-support operations only when it is limited in scope, local in nature and in support of a peacemaking or peacekeeping mission. Enforcement actions that involve major campaigns, such as those necessary to restore lost territory, are beyond the scope of peace support and are treated as military contingency operations.

5. **Peacekeeping.** The prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states through an impartial third-party intervention organized and directed internationally for restoring and maintaining peace. This intervention is conducted using military forces, police and civilians and usually with the consent of the main belligerents. This category includes military observer missions and missions requiring formed military units.

6. **Peacebuilding.** Post-conflict actions in the aftermath of international conflict or civil strife to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Military involvement could include restoration of infrastructure, training of military forces in democratic processes, monitoring of elections and demining.

7. **Humanitarian Assistance.** CF elements may also be involved in humanitarian assistance operations which may be conducted independently or as part of a peace-support operation. These operations may involve such activities as providing security for convoys under the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) or providing the actual means of delivery of aid by land, sea or air.

8. Canadian doctrine recognizes a combined threshold between "peacekeeping" and "peace enforcement" shaped by the principles of consent and impartiality. Consent from the belligerents in a theatre of operations is ideal at all levels of command and war, especially when operations other than war are involved, such as peacebuilding and the delivery of humanitarian aid. Consent also involves a return to more peaceful forms of peace-support operations, such as peace enforcement to peacekeeping operations. Consent on the other hand, leaves the initiative to the belligerent(s) who, if they disagree, may impede peace-support efforts while impartiality leaves the initiative to peace-support forces.

9. In peace enforcement, the impartiality of the peace-support forces is lost in the eyes of the belligerent(s) as military force is used against them to impose a political will. Therefore, "consent" and "impartiality" are seen as complementary principles which vary in intensity at any given time within a theatre of operations.

1006. APPLICATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER IN PEACE-SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1. The UN Charter was signed and came into force in 1945. Under chapter VI entitled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" and chapter VII entitled "Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression", the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is able to establish peace-support missions and enforcement actions.

2. Under articles 33 and 34 of chapter VI, the UNSC may call for negotiations or investigate matters that

endanger international peace and security. Under article 42 of chapter VII, the Security Council may take military action to maintain or restore international peace and security. While such action would normally be taken only when all peaceful means have failed, the fact that it may be taken is essential to the credibility of the UN as a guarantor of international security.

1007. UNITED NATIONS PLANNING PROCESS FOR PEACE-SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1. The UN's effectiveness in maintaining or restoring international peace and security depends almost entirely on the actions and policies of the member states. The UN can act in accordance with the terms of its charter, i.e. to enforce collective action to redress or prevent conflict, only when nations agree to cooperate, as was the case during the 1990-91 operation to expel Iraq from Kuwait.

2. UN peace-support operations are conducted by the Secretary-General and the Secretariat, with the Secretary-General having overall responsibility for these operations. The Department of Peace Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, and the Field Operations Division are organizations within the Secretariat which contribute to the planning process.

3. The process to initiate a UN operation may vary from mission to mission; however, the following sequence of events is common to most missions:

- a. **Appointment of a Special Representative.** The UN Secretary-General will normally appoint a special representative or special envoy to the country or region in conflict. The special representative will conduct fact-finding visits and provide a report to the Secretary-General. Consultations are also made with potential host nations, belligerents and regional organizations.
- b. **Conduct of UN Technical Reconnaissance.** The Security Council may authorize a technical recon team to deploy to the conflict area to assess the situation. This team will offer recommendations on the scope, structure and size of a possible UN mission. A UN mission could include the traditional military element, plus such elements as police, humanitarian-relief agencies, electoral officials and human-rights officials.
- c. **Consultation Stage.** Preliminary consultations between the UN Secretariat and the permanent missions of potential troop-contributing member states take place to determine the extent of international support.
- d. **Secretary-General's Report.** The Secretary-General will present a report to the UNSC based on the special representative's findings and recommendations, the technical team report and the UN Secretariat.
- e. **UN Informal Request for International Support.** Informal requests are made by the UN to member states to identify what contribution, if any, the member states would be willing to make.
- f. **Bilateral and Multilateral Talks.** Member states, normally through their permanent missions, will discuss the situation in bilateral and multilateral meetings at the UN to determine possible UN courses of action. Draft UNSC resolutions are reviewed and reworked in an attempt to reach consensus.
- g. **UN Resolution.** The Security Council will consider the Secretary-General's report and recommendations. Based on the preliminary work in the bilateral and multilateral talks, the Security Council may adopt a UN resolution which establishes the measures that will be employed to restore peace and security. The resolution may include the following:
 - (1) measures excluding the use of armed forces (e.g., complete or partial interruption of economic relations or severance of diplomatic relations); or
 - (2) measures involving armed forces (e.g., demonstrations of military solidarity, blockades, direct military operations). In this case, the UN resolution will include the mandate for the UN operation.
- h. **Formal Request to Member States.** Once a UN resolution is passed by the Security Council to establish

a peace-support force, the UN will issue a formal request to those countries that responded favourably to the informal requests for assistance.

4. The Secretary-General's report to the Security Council will generally contain much of the following information which, if endorsed by the Council, provides the framework for a peace-support operation:

- a. the scope of the peace-support force;
- b. the tasks or functions the force is to perform;
- c. the size and organization of the force;
- d. the appointment of the commander, any special mediators, and their TOR;
- e. the nomination of the office responsible for the supervision of the operation;
- f. general arrangements for financial and logistical support;
- g. the terms or conditions the host nation intends to impose on the presence of the force;
- h. statements of the rights and immunities of force members; and
- i. the time limit of the mandate.

5. The UNSC resolution provides the mandate and the authority for the operation. As both the UNSC resolution and the mandate are usually prepared during a crisis and involve a great deal of diplomatic negotiation and compromise, political expediency often takes priority over military operational requirements.

6. Once the mandate is approved, the Secretary-General establishes SOFA. These agreements among the host nation, the UN and the states providing forces establish the detailed legal status of the force or mission. Based on the mandate and the SOFA, specific TOR, command directives and ROE are established.

7. Participating member states negotiate with the UN the extent of their contribution to the peace-support operation and may negotiate with the host nation, if it has agreed to the operation, for services or support not provided by the UN. The governments of member states then place military forces and equipment and facilities at the disposal of the Secretary-General as required for each operation.

8. Generally, the UN is responsible for the deployment of peace-support forces to the theatre of operations and may dispatch an advance party to establish the arrangements for reception and service support for the operation. Responsibility for deployment may be delegated to nations with a self-deployment capability, or another nation's resources may be used, under UN arrangements, to assist in the deployment of other national contingents. National contingents normally dispatch their own reconnaissance teams to the mission area prior to the UN deployment, and conduct the necessary deployment training and administrative preparations.

1008. UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. The UN Secretary-General establishes the C2 arrangement for a peace-support operation. The Secretary-General appoints a chief of mission, and asks governments of member states to provide military personnel as staff members in the force headquarters. Peace-support operations are normally placed under OPCON of the chief of mission. In certain cases, the Secretary-General may assign responsibility for the conduct of the operation to a special representative or envoy, with the UN Force Commander (UN FC) functioning as the military advisor and commander of the peace-support force. In multi-dimensional operations, there may also be a chief of civil affairs responsible for such matters as refugees and humanitarian affairs.

2. Military personnel are appointed by the Secretary-General as staff members to a peace-support operation.

The chief of mission is subject to the authority of the Secretary-General and is responsible for implementing the mission. In addition, to meet certain areas of technical expertise required during the initial- deployment or final- redeployment phase of an operation, the Secretary-General may ask the governments of member states to provide specialist military personnel as staff members for a limited period. This will be the case for specialists in such areas as logistic, communications and engineering planning, air movements and sea movements. Figure 10-1 illustrates of the C2 structure for a generic peace-support mission.

3. Although the C2 arrangement may vary from operation to operation, several characteristics are essential to an effective C2 authority:

- a. legal status;
- b. command relationships;
- c. an information-gathering capability;
- d. liaison;
- e. CIS; and
- f. staff and standard operating procedures.




Figure 10-1 Command and Control for a Generic Peace-Support Operation

4. **Legal Status.** Clear legal status for the operation is provided by the Security Council resolution.
5. **Command Relationships.** Once in the theatre of operations, national contingents are placed under OPCON of the UN, as exercised by the chief of mission. The chief of mission is responsible to the Secretary-General who, in turn, reports to the Security Council.
6. **Information-Gathering.** To conduct effective operations, the UN FC requires timely and accurate

information. The peace-support force will use overt methods such as observation, patrolling, liaison, and the use of the media to gather information. Other information may be provided by the UN higher headquarters, national headquarters, and other contingents.

7. **Liaison.** Effective liaison officers are valuable assets to C2. Assigning liaison officers to the belligerents' units or headquarters, if permitted, and to other UN agencies will provide the capability to anticipate and control potential confrontations.

8. **CIS.** Reliable and survivable CIS are an essential requirement of C2. They ensure the timely passage of information and orders in both directions along the chain of command.

9. **Staff and Standard Operating Procedures.** In a multinational force, several problem areas may need to be dealt with to ensure effective C2. These problem areas, some of which can be addressed by developing simple, concise and agreed-upon staff and standard operating procedures to guide staff activity, are as follows:

- a. different cultural and political bases;
- b. different languages;
- c. different levels of training and experience;
- d. different staff systems and SOPs; and
- e. lack of continuity due to rapid turnover of personnel.

10. The UNNY HQ operates a 24/7 situation room which passes along information and requests from field commanders to the appropriate offices in the UNNY.

1009. ORGANIZATION OF UNITED NATIONS FORCE HEADQUARTERS

1. The UN Secretary-General appoints a UN FC with the consent of the Security Council, the force-contributing countries and, if applicable, the host nation and the belligerents in the dispute. The UN FC, who is given detailed TOR by the Secretary-General, is the senior military officer of a peace-support force and is responsible for the C2 of the force and the conduct of the peace-support operation. Major policy matters are addressed by a UN political advisor or a Secretary-General special representative or envoy. The UN political advisor is a career diplomat or civil servant appointed to the force by the Secretary-General. The advisor is usually appointed as the civilian advisor to the UN FC. Figure 10-2 illustrates a typical UN force headquarters.




Figure 10-2 Organization of a UN Force HQ

2. The force-headquarters staff is usually grouped into three main categories:
 - a. UN FC's personal staff;
 - b. military staff; and
 - c. civilian staff.

4. The UN FC's personal staff consists of military officers or civil servants who act as assistants or advisors for specific functions. This staff may consist of a military assistant, aide, public information and legal advisors, translators and political advisors.

5. The **military staff** is comprised of military officers from the contributing nations. The staff, headed by the COS, is divided into operations, logistics and personnel branches. Economic and humanitarian branches may be established or grouped with other branches, depending upon the scope of the mandate.

6. The **civilian staff** is assigned by the UN Secretariat. These UN civil servants provide specialist administrative support to the force. The civilian staff is headed by the CAO.

SECTION II

CANADIAN PEACE-SUPPORT PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

1010. INTRODUCTION

1. The doctrine in this section applies primarily to peacekeeping operations. Peace-enforcement operations are planned and conducted in accordance with principles and guidance for a combined operation (chapter 8).

1011. CANADIAN PARTICIPATION POLICY

1. Canada has established a set of criteria regarding its involvement in international peace-support operations. All criteria are not necessarily applied to all operations; rather, they serve as evaluation guidelines for political and military decision makers responding to requests for Canadian peacekeepers. Depending on the type of mission, the following criteria, which are not all-inclusive, may apply:

- a. threat to international security;
- b. political settlement;
- c. clear and enforceable mandate;
- d. support of a peace-support deployment;
- e. agreement to Canadian participation;
- f. failure of peaceful means to resolve the dispute;
- g. C2 and COO;
- h. force composition, size and equipment;
- i. funding arrangement and logistics concept;
- j. single identifiable authority;
- k. clear ROE;
- l. acceptable level of risk to CF personnel; and
- m. interference with other missions.

2. **Threat to International Security.** Before accepting a peace-support mission, Canada must determine the existence of a threat to international security. Whereas UN involvement in a conflict that involves two sovereign states is more likely to be supported, UN intervention in the internal affairs of a nation violates a fundamental principle of international law and the sovereignty of states. Further, not all disputes or conflicts threaten international security and, with limited resources at their disposal, the UN and Canada must discriminately choose those crises which pose real threats to peace and stability.

3. **Political Settlement.** Attainability of a political settlement is an important criterion which is applied to most peace-support operations. The government carefully studies the mandate and Canada's participation in the operation to determine whether the arrangements are likely to serve the cause of peace and lead to a political settlement in the long term.

4. **Clear and Enforceable Mandate.** The mandate is generally prepared by the Secretary-General and

approved by the Security Council through a UNSC resolution. The resolution provides the legal authority for the peace-support operation. It establishes the scope and purpose of the operation, which should be clearly worded, defined, understood and agreed. The force must have the means, both in terms of resources and political will, to enforce the mandate.

5. **Support of a Peace-Support Deployment.** Under the Canadian concept of peace-support operations, at least one and preferably all of the parties involved in the dispute should agree to a peacekeeping deployment. This is usually achieved through the belligerent's formal acceptance of a cease-fire agreement and the mandate for the operation. Experience in peacekeeping operations has shown that, without this agreement, the probability of resolving a conflict through preventive deployment diminishes significantly.

6. **Agreement to Canadian Participation.** Once Canada is satisfied there is endorsement of a peace-support deployment, the belligerents who agree to a peacekeeping deployment must also agree to CF participation.

7. **Failure of Peaceful Means to Resolve the Dispute.** As an enforcement action is usually a measure of last resort, all peaceful means of resolution must have failed before an enforcement action is implemented.

8. **Command and Control and Concept of Operations.** Resolving conflicts and violations of international law is growing more complex and difficult, and routinely involves large and diverse military forces, civilian police forces and various humanitarian and non-governmental agencies. Some or all of these organizations have operated in ways that are detrimental to the objectives of other organizations and UN mission elements in the area. The mission must therefore have an appropriate C2 structure and a clearly defined COO.

9. **Force Composition, Size and Equipment.** Canada prefers to participate in UN-sponsored operations, although it has participated in non-UN operations. As a minimum, the force must be neutral. Moreover, the structure of the peacekeeping force must enable it to realistically enforce the mission's mandate. Thus the size, balance and equipment must be appropriate to the COO and mission objectives.

10. **Funding Arrangement and Logistics Concept.** If a peace-support operation is to be conducted effectively and successfully, it must have an appropriate funding arrangement and logistics concept. Otherwise, the mission's length and success will be needlessly jeopardized, and the lives of the personnel in the theatre of operations may even be endangered.

11. **Single Identifiable Authority.** Before agreeing to participate in a peace-support operation, the Canadian government insists on the existence of a single and identifiable authority able to sustain a peace-support operation, both politically and materially. This authority has usually been the UN. During non-UN peacekeeping operations, one or several states may act as guarantor.

12. **Clear ROE.** ROE are essential for guiding a commander's actions and options for the use of force. The ROE must be clear and appropriate to the mission and must be designed to remove any legal or semantic ambiguity which could lead a commander to inadvertently violate the mission's mandate or objectives when responding to an action by non-peacekeeping forces. Article 1015 further develops the ROE issue.

13. **Acceptable Level of Risk to CF Personnel.** Most peace-support operations present a level of risk to the participating personnel. The risks to CF personnel will always be weighed against the objectives and benefits of a particular mission. The risks during some conflicts or fragile cease-fires, however, may be high enough for Canada to reconsider its support of or participation in a particular mission.

14. **Interference with Other Missions.** The Canadian government will examine whether or not it can or will participate in a peace-support operation by determining if other missions will be jeopardized. Based on the advice of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and DND, the government will determine whether or not to commit Canadian resources and where these resources will be deployed. The lead department is DFAIT.

1012. PLANNING PROCESS FOR CANADIAN PEACE-SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1. For each UN operation, the Canadian planning process generally begins with the UN technical-reconnaissance phase, in which Canada would participate if it were expected to contribute to the mission. The initial flow of information and the request to participate in the technical reconnaissance is from UNNY to the Canadian Permanent Mission in New York (PRMNY) to DFAIT and to the Directorate of International Policy (DI Pol) at NDHQ.
2. On completion of the reconnaissance and during the consultation stage, PRMNY seeks direction from DFAIT and keeps both DFAIT and DND abreast of activities relating to the potential operation.
3. After the Secretary-General's report is presented to the Security Council, the UN makes an informal request to member states asking them to identify what contribution, if any, they would be willing to make. The informal request is staffed from PRMNY to DFAIT, who coordinates a response with appropriate departments (e.g., DND, Solicitor General). The MND and senior leadership are kept advised of the status of the UN request. A military-capability assessment is conducted and DND examines the potential task against other criteria such as funding and logistics limitations, and the range of existing Canadian peacekeeping commitments.
4. Canada participates in the bilateral and multilateral discussions at the UN to determine possible UN courses of action and makes recommendations on the content of the UNSC resolution.
5. Once the Security Council adopts a UN resolution to establish a UN force, the UN will issue a formal request to those countries who responded favourably to the informal request for assistance. In Canada, this request is staffed from the UN through PRMNY to DFAIT. Ministerial approval from the secretary of state for foreign affairs (SSFA) and the MND is obtained. In special cases, Cabinet approval is obtained.

1013. CANADIAN COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. OPCON of the CF TF is generally delegated to the UN FC.
2. In addition to holding a principal UN appointment, the TFC assumes the responsibilities of the CNC. The national chain of command for peace-support operations is as described in figure 10-3.




Figure 10- 3 Generic UN Peacekeeping Organization

1014. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. CF units and personnel assigned to UN peacekeeping operations are required to comply with ROE issued by the UN. Canada may issue supplementary national ROE for a particular operation, in which case national ROE and self-defence provisions take precedence.
2. ROE for a UN peacekeeping operation are formulated at UNNY by the headquarters staff, including the military advisor and the Department of Peace Operations. Before they are issued, the ROE are distributed to member states participating in the peacekeeping operation for endorsement. In Canada's case, the ROE are reviewed and approved by DND and DFAIT. The coordinating department is DFAIT-3. Chapter 5 provides the basis and criteria for DND's endorsement of ROE.

1015. ORGANIZATION OF THE CANADIAN TASK FORCE

1. In most UN operations, the TFHQ is a small organization, often with a variety of staff functions combined under a single staff officer. It is not responsible for, nor is it capable of planning, organizing and conducting operations. Rather, it handles purely national matters: pay and allowances; Canadian-specific supply matters; coordination of national support; maintenance of a national command, control and information system (CCIS); and dissemination of national policy. Matters such as pay and allowances and Canadian-specific supply matters are coordinated by the TFHQ through a national-support element (NSE).

2. The TFHQ is generally equipped with a CCIS extension to provide reliable communications between the TFC and NDHQ.

3. The field organization for the TF is in accordance with UN requirements for a given operation. It may be based on:

- a. formed units or sub-units;
- b. composite units or sub-units; or
- c. groups of individual observers and specialists.

4. Once established in accordance with UN requirements, the field organization cannot be changed without the approval of the Secretary-General.

1016. CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SUPPORT

1. The degree and scope of national support provided to peacekeeping TFs will vary in accordance with agreements reached with NDHQ and the UN. As a rule, if the peacekeeping operation is under its jurisdiction, the UN is responsible for providing administrative and logistic support to contingents. National responsibilities for the support of CF TFs are primarily concerned with the maintenance of Canadian standards and the support of unique Canadian requirements.

2. In general, national support to meet peace-support operational requirements is only provided following receipt of a formal request from the UN or in accordance with a formal standing agreement. Ongoing national support is provided for personnel administration, financial services, medical and dental services, and maintenance of nationally owned equipment.

3. The cost of any support provided to TFs from national sources which is not routed through and approved by the UN will normally be borne by Canada.

4. Agreements with regard to the deployment and rotation of TFs vary from operation to operation. At the national level, control of the deployment and rotation of a Canadian TF is exercised by the CDS.

1017. PEACE-SUPPORT TRAINING

1. The UN encourages member states to develop national training programmes for military and civilian personnel assigned to peace-support and peacekeeping operations. The CF, through ongoing training to develop a general-purpose combat capability, meet the guidelines established by the UN for military peace-support training.

2. Multi-purpose combat training provides CF personnel with most of the prerequisites for peace-support duties. To complement basic training programmes, the CF provide specialized training and indoctrination before committing personnel to a peace-support mission. This training, which concentrates on theatre operations, the mission's mandate, and environmental, cultural and administrative preparation for individuals and units, has been developed and conducted in accordance with UN training guidelines and includes the following:

- a. **Unit Training.** Training generally conducted by all units warned of possible participation in a peace-support operation. This training normally lasts between 10 and 30 days for composite or formed units.
- b. **Contingency Training.** Annual training conducted by the CF UN standby force.
- c. **Staff-Officer and Military-Observer Training.** Training conducted over a 5 to 7-day period as required for officers warned of appointments as staff officers or to existing or new observer missions.

- d. **Rotation or Replacement-Duty Training.** Training conducted over a 7 to 14-day period for personnel proceeding on individual rotation or replacement duties.
 - e. **Seminars.** Two or three-day peacekeeping seminars conducted periodically, as required.
3. In addition, the CFCSC provides education and training in peacekeeping at the operational level through a programme of lectures, seminars and exercises.
4. The need for training specific to peacekeeping operations will depend on:
 - a. the nature of the peace-support operation;
 - b. the size and composition of the Canadian TF;
 - c. the peacekeeping experience of designated personnel; and
 - d. the time and space factor (no-notice deployments have occurred).
5. The general syllabus for Canadian peacekeeping training follows UN guidelines to its member states. In accordance with these guidelines, the type of training described in the following paragraphs is conducted.
6. **Geopolitical Briefings.** These briefings on the region in which a peace-support operation is conducted are provided through background reading, lectures and locally produced aide-memoirs. They include:
 - a. geography;
 - b. history;
 - c. economy;
 - d. political systems, government;
 - e. defence and internal-security forces;
 - f. internal influences, including religion, militias, revolutionary movements, etc;
 - g. external influences; and
 - h. culture and customs.
7. **Mandate and Mission Study.** This training covers the history of the dispute, major developments, civilian involvement, civilian and military cooperation and coordination, and the specifics of the mandate.
8. **Legal Considerations and the Use of Force.** This training includes familiarization with legal considerations, the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the UN and ROE.
9. **Weapons and Equipment Training.** This type of training covers individual and crew-served weapons, familiarity with theatre weapons, vehicles and equipment, night-vision equipment, NBCD and mine awareness.
10. **General Military Training.** This involves physical fitness, map reading, communications and first aid.
11. **UN Operating Techniques.** This training provides an awareness of duties and responsibilities pertaining to such activities as observation posts, check points, road blocks and searches, vehicle and foot patrols, investigations, negotiations and liaison, use of force and leadership.

12. **Safety Measures and Precautions.** This training involves safety awareness with respect to the following:
 - a. shelters;
 - b. equipment;
 - c. travelling and movement; and
 - d. non-operation safety to recognize and prevent health problems (stress and depression), traffic accidents, fire, suicide, weapon-handling accidents and accidents on leave.
13. **Specialized Training.** This training includes driving training, helicopter training, UN staff training and procedures, familiarization with explosive-ordnance disposal and training in media relations.
14. **Field Exercises and Battle Procedures.** This training is conducted as annual training or during the pre-deployment phase. Where possible, battle simulation is incorporated.

CHAPTER 11

NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

1101. INTRODUCTION

1. There are many areas in the world in which situations could arise that would endanger the lives of resident or visiting Canadian citizens. The threat might be from terrorists, dissidents, guerilla forces, or a general breakdown of law and order. In such situations, the CF might be called upon to evacuate these citizens.

2. The type and size of a military force required to conduct an evacuation of Canadian citizens will vary according to the circumstances. The nature of NEO demand that they normally be conducted as joint operations. Additionally, depending on the evacuation scenario and existing DFAIT MOUs with other nations, the CF may operate in a combined operation with forces from other nations.

3. Success of a NEO depends on political decisiveness, the availability of well-conceived and up-to-date military and civil plans, and the acquisition of accurate and current intelligence on the situation and the area concerned.

4. All Canadian embassies and consulates must prepare and update civil evacuation plans. As well, they will usually have an up to date register of Canadians living in the region.

1102. EVACUATION OPERATIONS

1. The term NEO describes an operation conducted by the CF to evacuate Canadian citizens from a friendly host country experiencing civil disorder. Such operations presume that a local government, if one exists, agrees to the evacuation and to the provision of logistic and security support. NEO may be conducted in a permissive or non-permissive environment.

2. A permissive NEO is conducted when the host country is able to provide and guarantee the security of the operation. The use of military forces is limited to the provision of such assets as communications, transportation and medical support.

3. A non-permissive NEO is necessary when the host country cannot guarantee the security of the operation. In this case, military force is deployed to provide security and protection while conducting the evacuation.

1103. PERMISSIVE NON-COMBATANT EVACUATIONS

1. There are two important prerequisites for successful implementation of a permissive NEO: first is the local government's willingness to accept Canadian participation; second is the local government's ability to guarantee the security of the assisting forces and that of the evacuees. Assuming these conditions are met, the CF may provide aircraft and possibly road transport to assist the Canadian ambassador and embassy staff in the transfer of evacuees from outlying districts to evacuee assembly areas (EAAs) and on to a specified evacuation point (EP), which would normally be at an airfield or port. Ships and aircraft may also be provided to move evacuees to a selected reception point (RP) outside the country.

2. Assembly of evacuees at predetermined EAAs will be orchestrated by the Canadian embassy staff. The staff will then supervise the move of the evacuees to an EP using both Canadian military and local transport. Military helicopters may be required at this stage.

3. An EP will be established at a port, beach or airfield. It must be in a safe area and, ideally, all evacuees should pass through an EP that includes an evacuee handling centre (EHC). The processing system within the EHC should allow for the gathering of information on the local situation, in addition to offering medical facilities and basic administrative needs. Embassy representation will be required within the EHC for confirming the Canadian nationality of evacuees and establishing an order of priority of evacuation. If required, additional EPs can be established, although this would make the evacuation more difficult to coordinate and would require additional resources. From the EPs, evacuees are taken by air, land or sea to an RP, which would normally be established in an adjacent friendly country, but could be in Canada (see Figure 11-1).




Figure 11-1 Permissive CEO

1104. NON-PERMISSIVE NON-COMBATANT EVACUATIONS

1. The scale of non-permissive NEO may vary considerably depending on the geographic location, the threat to Canadian citizens in the region, the number of evacuees, and movement facilities available. In the worst case, the CF may need to mount a full-scale operation employing combat, combat-support and CSS forces.

2. During an non-permissive NEO, a military force is introduced into the area to secure an airhead, or port or beach, through which the threatened community may be evacuated. It may be necessary to insert an advance force to identify, reconnoitre and report on suitable air or beachheads, EAAs, forward operating bases (FOBs) and hostile activity.

3. For an evacuation by sea, the evacuation force would have to establish a beachhead in the country concerned, from which it may deploy to a FOB before making contact with evacuees in the EAAs. Those evacuees already assembled in the EAAs would be moved by helicopter or road under armed escort directly to the beachhead and EHC. People may need to be rescued from outlying areas and taken to the beachhead, where they would be moved by sea to an RP (see Figure 11-2A).




Figure 11-2A NEO (Sea)

4. For an evacuation by air, an airfield associated with a forward mounting base (FMB) would be established in an adjacent friendly country (if possible), to which the evacuation force would deploy and from which it would redeploy to an airhead in the country concerned. Once the evacuation force is deployed to the airhead, the evacuation procedures are the same as for a sea evacuation. A FOB is established, if required, and evacuees are escorted from EAAs to the airhead. From the airhead, evacuees are flown to an RP, which could be collocated with the FMB (see Figure 11-2B).




Figure 11-2A NEO (Air)

5. Circumstances may dictate that an evacuation be carried out by both sea and air. This does not affect the procedures described above. The activities of air- and sea-inserted forces would be coordinated by the TFHQ.

6. Like all other Canadian military operations, a non-permissive NEO is conducted in five phases:

- a. warning;
- b. preparation;
- c. deployment;
- d. employment; and
- e. redeployment.

7. The warning phase starts when the Canadian ambassador, or other representative in the country concerned, advises the government that Canadian citizens may be at risk. At the request of DFAIT, the CF may be requested to provide evacuation assistance. When this occurs, a wng O is issued by the CDS. The CDS begins operation planning. If a COP for the specific area or country exists, it is reviewed and updated; if not, a draft strategic-level COP is developed.

8. The preparation phase is initiated when the requirement for a non-permissive NEO is confirmed. Strategic- and operational-level COPs are developed by the CDS and the TFC. The CDS will issue an IMPLO from which the TFC prepares and issues the operations order. During this phase, the force structure and composition are determined, the FMB is established (if required), an airhead or beachhead is selected, and predeployment intelligence activities are initiated.

9. Before the evacuation force arrives in the country, the Canadian ambassador, as the situation develops, will advise the Canadian community to take one of the following actions:

- a. stay at home;
- b. leave while commercial transport is available (for those with no urgent need to remain); and
- c. leave by its own means, or by the official arrangements for evacuation.

10. The deployment phase involves the move of the evacuation force into the area of operations. Control of this phase is exercised by the CDS.

11. During the employment phase, the evacuation force:

- a. secures an airhead or beachhead close to the threatened community to be used as an EP;
- b. conducts initial military operations to ensure the safety of evacuees in the threatened area;
- c. moves the evacuees to the EP; and
- d. moves the evacuees from the EP to the RP.

12. The redeployment phase involves the withdrawal of the evacuation force back to Canada.

1105. FACTORS INVOLVED IN EVACUATION OPERATIONS

1. The planning and execution of evacuation operations are guided by a number of factors. These include:

- a. the aim;
- b. C2;
- c. political constraints;
- d. intelligence;
- e. PA;
- f. simplicity;
- g. flexibility;
- h. legal considerations and ROE; and
- i. rapid reaction.

2. **The Aim.** The TFC must be given a clear statement of the aim (mission) so that military operations do not deviate from intended political objectives.

3. **Command and Control.** A NEO will generally be a joint operation and will require a TFHQ. A TFC will be designated with authority over all participating forces for the duration of the operation.

4. **Political Constraints.** In any NEO, the political element will dominate; hence, the TFC will be responsive to the Canadian ambassador in the host country. The strategic-level commander, the CDS, will make the Canadian government and Canadian diplomats aware of the effects of any political constraints on military operations.
5. **Intelligence.** The success of a NEO depends, in part, on the acquisition of accurate and timely intelligence, particularly on such matters as local conditions, geography and facilities. In-country staffs have a vital role to play in providing the TFC with accurate and timely information.
6. **PA.** As soon as an evacuation operation seems likely, media interest will increase. A PA plan must be developed and include considerations for managing multinational media. The TFHQ staff must include PA officers. Rules for managing both national and international media must be established by the strategic-level commander and provided to the TFC.
7. **Simplicity.** Executing a NEO can be a complex task; if the operation is to be successful, it must be based on a simple and executable plan. Forces should only be assigned tasks for which they are equipped and trained to execute. Integration of the evacuation force must be accomplished before it is deployed.
8. **Flexibility.** Experience has shown that it is easier to modify existing operation plans than to develop new ones, especially when speed is critical. Existing COPs should form the basis for NEO.
9. **Legal Considerations and ROE.** The legal aspects of evacuation operations are complex, particularly with regard to political considerations and the degree of force that can be employed. The conduct of evacuation operations will be conditioned by the observance of political constraints, national and international laws, and ROE, which must be clearly defined and understood by all participants. The TFHQ must include both J5 Legal and political (DFAIT) advisors.
10. **Rapid Reaction.** Early political decisions and speedy deployment of the evacuation force are fundamental to the success of an evacuation operation.

1106. PLANNING

1. Generally, a military attaché is assigned to a Canadian ambassador's staff and provides advice and assistance to the ambassador with respect to military affairs. If not already on staff, a military attaché should be deployed to a country tending towards civil unrest on the request of an ambassador, or as soon as there are indications that Canadian citizens may be put at risk.
2. The planning process for evacuation operations involves DFAIT, including in-country ambassadors, and DND. The coordinating department is generally DFAIT.
3. Residents of a host country wishing to be evacuated along with Canadian citizens are dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Before an evacuation operation is initiated, the government develops a policy for this contingency. The policy is implemented by the in-country ambassador assisted by the TFHQ.
4. In-country ambassadors are responsible for:
 - a. requesting through DFAIT, CF assistance or protection when required;
 - b. developing embassy civil-evacuation plans including procedures for locating, notifying and assembling evacuees
 - c. advising and assisting the TFC;
 - e. providing the TFC with intelligence, on such matters as local conditions, geography and facilities;
 - f. providing liaison with the local government;

- g. establishing EAAs;
- h. contracting local services to support the evacuation operation; and
- i. identifying and documenting all evacuees, with assistance from the TFHQ.

5. For countries with a high probability for civil unrest, and in which a significant number of Canadian citizens reside, existing strategic- and operational-level COPs should form the basis for evacuation operations. These plans are developed by the CDS and the NDHQ J Staff or JFHQ Kingston respectively.

6. When an operation is initiated, the CDS develops a strategic-level COP, if a plan for the country is not available. The operational-level COP is developed by the TFC appointed for the operation.

7. The TFC appointed for the operation is responsible for:

- a. coordinating the military effort;
- b. establishing procedures for the predeployment intelligence process;
- c. determining, in conjunction with in-country staffs, the resources and force levels required to conduct the operation;
- d. assisting and augmenting in-country staffs as required; and
- e. planning the entry, evacuation and withdrawal stages of the operation.

8. As amplified in chapter 5, ROE are a critical planning consideration for evacuation operations. ROE are formulated and issued by the CDS, once direction has been given by the government, and are the means by which the CDS provides operational directions to the TFC to guide the application of force and the conduct of military operations. ROE must be clearly defined to remove any ambiguity which could lead the TFC to misapply force.

1107. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF EVACUATION OPERATIONS

1. On the government's approval of the CF's commitment to an evacuation operation, the CDS establishes the evacuation force, designates the TFC, and develops the strategic-level COP for endorsement by the government. The COP is developed in consultation with DFAIT.

2. The ambassador of the country concerned, under the direction of DFAIT, is generally responsible for the overall conduct of the evacuation operation, but the government may assign this responsibility to DND for certain operations.

3. In either case, the conduct of military operations and responsibility for military support rests with the TFC. The TFC reports to the CDS, but must remain responsive to the ambassador, with whom military actions are coordinated.

4. Liaison between the TFC and the ambassador facilitates C2. A diplomatic liaison officer should be attached to the TFHQ, and the ambassador's staff should include a military attaché.

5. The TFC would deploy with a task force headquarters (TFHQ) to the country or to an adjacent friendly country. The TFHQ may also be established on board a Canadian warship participating in the evacuation operation.

6. A command structure for an evacuation operation is illustrated in Figure 11-3.




Figure 11-3 Command Structure for an Evacuation Operation

1108. COMBINED EVACUATION OPERATIONS

1. The CF may be required to assist in the evacuation of citizens of another country, or may be assisted in evacuating Canadian citizens by forces from other countries. Such evacuations will be conducted as combined operations.
2. For a combined evacuation operation, guidelines and principles will be provided by combined doctrine, if available, or by the doctrine of the lead country in the operation.
3. The lead country concept provides for a single-command structure and for unity of command, which is essential for all military operations. The lead country designates a CFC, who controls the planning and execution of the operation; supporting countries provide forces and materiel as required. The CFC's headquarters staff should be augmented with military representatives from all supporting countries.
4. The lead country must be sensitive to the political, cultural and military needs of partner countries. Diplomatic as well as military planning groups should be established to coordinate the operation at the highest levels.

5. Figure 11-4 illustrates a lead-country command structure for a combined evacuation operation. Generally, a CNC is given OPCOM over Canadian forces participating in a combined operation. The CNC then transfers OPCON of these forces to the CFC.




Figure 11-4 Combined Evacuation Operation - Lead-National Command Structure

6. Countries may elect to retain control of their military forces for an evacuation operation, in which case a parallel command structure is established. Coordination cells are formed to provide interface among the participating countries, their joint commanders and their Environmental components. Coordination cells should also have host-country representation.

7. Because of the continuous need to coordinate such aspects as C2, support, and engagements with opposing forces, the execution of an operation under the parallel command structure may prove to be more difficult than under the lead-country arrangement.

CHAPTER 13

DOMESTIC CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

1301. INTRODUCTION

1. Domestic contingency operations are conducted to provide assistance during civil emergencies, support national development goals or support and/or restore the maintenance of public order and security. With the exception of ACP provided under Part XI of the NDA, TFs established for domestic contingency operations will be in a supporting role. In the particular case of ACP the CF takes control of dealing with an extraordinary situation beyond the ability of the civil powers to manage, although only until such time that the civil authorities are able to effectively resume control.
2. It must be emphasised that while operational chains-of-command exist in the CF for force generation, only the CDS will direct the CF in any domestic operation or crisis with a potential for use of armed force. CF resources will be employed under the control and direction of the CDS operating through a clear military chain of command.
3. CF resources employed in domestic operations shall be under military command and operate (if applicable) with guidelines on the use of force and ROE issued by the CDS.
4. The CF is organized, equipped and trained as a multi-purpose combat force. Provision of personnel, equipment or services for other purposes will be from within existing resources. Specialized equipment for police tasks (such as riot control) will not be procured. No specific training is to be conducted for non-defence roles, unless directed by the CDS.
5. Any decisions to employ defence resources for non-defence tasks must be consistent with the CF mandate, must not result in an unacceptable degradation of CF capability and must not compete with or duplicate similar services readily available within the private sector. Full cost is to be recovered when defence resources are expended executing tasks for which other agencies have both a mandate and resource allocation, unless other arrangements apply.
6. In most cases, authority to respond to requests for provision of services has been delegated to operational commanders, who may make further delegation commensurate with the responsibilities and resources of their subordinate commanders. The provision of routine, traditional and minor services within these delegations should be actioned at the lowest practical level.

1302. TERMINOLOGY

1. The following terminology is used in this chapter:
 - a. **Emergencies Act.** For domestic operations, the act which authorizes a Governor in Council to declare a public welfare emergency or a public order emergency. Upon declaring one of these emergencies, the Governor-in-Council is empowered to pass regulations in specified areas so as to enable the taking of special temporary measures to deal with a national emergency. A public welfare emergency or a public order emergency must be declared by an Order-In-Council under the Emergencies Act.
 - b. **National Emergency.** An urgent and critical situation that seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such proportion as to exceed or threaten the capacity of a province or the Government of Canada to deal with it. A national emergency may be one of the following:
 - (1) **Public Welfare Emergency.** An emergency which results in danger to life or property, social disruption or a breakdown in the flow of essential goods, services or resources so serious as to be a national emergency. Public welfare emergency may include: fire, flood, drought, storm, earthquake, disease, accidents or pollution.
 - (2) **Public Order Emergency.** An emergency that arises from threats to the security of Canada. Threats

to the security of Canada may include: espionage, sabotage, foreign influenced activities that are detrimental to the interests of Canada, acts of serious violence against persons or property, and activities directed toward undermining the Government in Canada.

- c. **Aid of the Civil Power.** ACP is specifically addressed and defined in Part XI of the NDA as assistance to provincial governments. Thus, ACP is assistance provided by the CF to provincial authorities following an appropriate requisition, where a riot or disturbance of the peace is beyond the powers of the provincial authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with, for the purpose of restoring order to the extent that the Civil Authority can again exercise its responsibilities.
- d. **Canadian Forces Armed Assistance Directives (CFAAD).** CFAADs are orders-in-council that authorize, as part of the CF mandate, CF support to Law Enforcement Agencies.
- e. **Canadian Forces Assistance to Provincial Policing Directions (CFAPPD).** The order-in-council covering CF assistance to Provincial, Territorial and Municipal Law enforcement Agencies.
- f. **Law Enforcement Agency (LEA).** Any police force at federal, provincial, territorial or municipal level, including OGDs with law enforcement mandates such as Correctional Services Canada (CSC), Fisheries, Customs and Excises and Immigration.
- g. **Non-defence agencies.** Agencies other than DND, including OGDs and the Canadian public in general.
- h. **Requisition.** A demand for CF assistance to which the CDS must, in law, respond.
- i. **Request.** An application for CF assistance for which the CF response is discretionary. In some cases approval authority may be delegated.
- j. **Operational Commander.** In the context of domestic operations the designated operational level commanders are: Commander MARLANT, Commander MARPAC, the LFA Commanders, Commander 1 Cdn (Air) Div and Commander CFNA.

1303. THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT

1. The mandate of the CF is to train for and conduct military operations on behalf of the Government of Canada. Military operations conducted in the domestic environment will inevitably be subordinate to the mandate of some other government or agency. The CF will operate in a supporting role with limitations and restrictions on the extent of the support which can be provided. Notwithstanding that responsibility for a specific emergency or crisis is assigned to others, the CF will inevitably be regarded as a source of manpower, material and expertise.

2. The following list, while not comprehensive, serves to indicate the spectrum of activities in which the CF could become involved:

- a. nationally sponsored cultural or sporting events and conferences (G7);
- b. natural disasters (floods, forest fires, landslides, severe storms);
- c. accidents (aircraft crashes or train wrecks);
- d. nuclear or chemical accidents;
- e. serious disturbances in federal or provincial penitentiaries;
- f. pollution incidents;
- g. counter-smuggling operations against such items as drugs, alcohol, or tobacco;

- h. infringement on Canadian sovereignty or commercial interests, such as unauthorized fishing in Canada's territorial seas;
- i. disputes among ethnic groups and communities; and/or
- j. terrorist activities against Canadian citizens or foreign consulates or embassies in Canada.

3. The CF will endeavour to tailor its response to any request for assistance to make best use of capabilities to support the lead department or agency dealing with a particular situation. In most cases, the CF's most useful and valuable contributions will be in areas such as strategic communication, transportation and logistics. In certain circumstances, unique CF capabilities such as EOD support or utility helicopter support may be requested or requisitioned. In extreme circumstances, first response deployments by units or bases closest to the scene of an incident or situation may be appropriate pending the arrival or reinforcement of the appropriate civil agency.

1304. THE CONTINUUM OF ASSISTANCE

1. Domestic operations have been classified over a broad continuum of assistance, often with little clear definition between one type of assistance and another. Figure 13-1 shows this continuum. The various types of domestic assistance operations are represented as being conducted under the reference document (x-axis) and the corresponding approval authorities (y-axis). Domestic operations seldom occur in discrete, well defined packages. They must be planned as operations which can move and mutate on the surface created by the axes.




Figure 13-1 The Continuum of Assistance

2. The visibility of CF involvement, potential for the use of force, and ROE requirements for CF personnel increase proportionate to the distance from the origin of each type of domestic operation. CF assistance under the Emergencies Act, ACP and assistance to LEA is covered in HQDP 200 - Domestic Operations.

1305. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS.

1. C2 arrangements for domestic operations must be specified by the CDS and will depend on the location and nature of the operation. Either on receipt of a written requisition from a provincial attorney general, or when directed by the MND or Governor in Council to provide assistance to civil authority, or when a request for assistance for which authority has been delegated has been approved, the CDS will designate an appropriate commander, most probably one of the operational level commanders. While it is likely that the CDS will designate the applicable LFA Commander (or Commander CFNA) as his on-site commander, he may use another commander as the situation dictates. See also articles 116, 117 and 119. The national command and control structure for domestic operations is at Figure 13-2.




Figure 13-2 National Command and Control - Domestic Operations

2. The ECS retain, as a primary role, the responsibility for force generation, and operational commanders are doubled-hatted as subordinate commanders in this role. Operational commanders are responsible directly to the CDS for the conduct of domestic operations, and to their respective ECS for force generation. These two roles, while mutually supporting, are separate and distinct.

3. Commanders at every level (down to unit) have a responsibility to maintain contact and liaison with such authorities as the Federal, Provincial or Municipal Police as well as other civil authorities as necessary to maintain community relations and guard against local contingencies. There is one important exception. With respect to potential requisitions for ACP, it is the responsibility of LFA commanders to maintain liaison with the Provincial Government(s) in their areas. While all commanders have a responsibility to keep lines of communications open, it is the CDS who will designate the responsible commander. This will usually be one of the operational commanders.

4. The CDS is responsible to conduct the national assessment, assign forces and order the commencement and cessation of any domestic operation. The operational commander is responsible for the operational level plan, synchronization and the sustainment of assigned forces. Component commanders (if assigned) are responsible to execute and to provide advice to the operational commander. The operational level plan must be developed in cooperation or in partnership with the civil authorities who are being supported.

5. Success of domestic operations is assisted by effective liaison and coordination among all involved forces, agencies and organizations at the national and operational levels. Liaison links and joint planning and operations cells with provincial governments, OGDs and other civil authorities should be established and maintained as a matter of course. For a domestic operation, the operational commander uses existing liaison links and establishes additional links, if required.

1306. USE OF FORCE

1. The deployment of the CF in domestic operations is regulated in two ways: through the federal government's exercise of the Crown prerogative or by statute under the NDA in Part XI Aid of the Civil Power. Crown prerogative is the basis for orders-in-council such as CFAADs, the Penitentiary Assistance Order, and the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, which permits the appointment of CF personnel as fishery protection officers.

2. Chapter 5 and *B-GG-004-004.AF-005 The Use of Force in CF Operations* provide further details.

1307. THE EMERGENCIES ACT

1. CF operations under the Emergencies Act will be directed by the federal government. The MND and the CDS will conduct the strategic assessment required to determine the CF response appropriate to the emergency situation, and direct the action to be taken.

1308. AID OF THE CIVIL POWER

1. ACP is assistance by the CF provided to provincial authorities following an appropriate request where there is a riot or disturbance of the peace which is beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with. ACP is specifically addressed in Part XI of the National Defence Act. ACP operations will maintain or restore the rule of law and order. The CDS must respond to a requisition for assistance in ACP, however he has the authority to determine and adjust the level of the CF response. Response to disturbances of the peace outside provincial jurisdiction are the responsibility of the Federal Government and any request for CF assistance that might arise would be in the form of a request for assistance from an OGD, i.e., Solicitor General.

2. The CDS will designate an operational commander, in most cases the applicable LFA Commander, to act as his personal representative to the province concerned and to conduct operations in support of civil authorities to restore and maintain order until such time as the civil authorities can again effectively manage the situation.

3. The aim of ACP operations is to support and restore the capability of the appropriate civil authority to discharge its lawful mandate. CF activity will be directed towards freeing the resources of the civil authority to deal with the crisis, and will only become directly involved as a force of final resort. In the conduct of ACP operations the CF will be prepared to undertake one or a combination of the following roles:

- a. **Complementary role.** Employment in specialized tasks which are beyond the capability of the LEA. Typical complementary roles include the provision of assistance in the form of support for EOD, medical, logistical, air transportation and other technical capabilities organic to the CF.
- b. **Supplementary role.** Employment of the CF for various tasks not related to the direct suppression of a disturbance of the peace in order to relieve the LEA of such tasks. Example of a supplementary tasks that could be assume by the CF are the protection of VIPs and key installations.
- c. **Restoration role.** Employment as a military force to restore law and order when a situation is clearly beyond the capability of the LEAs to manage. The very prospect of CF assistance, as a force of last resource, for an restoration role must be seen as a powerful deterrent, and any commitment of personnel or resources must be deliberate, decisive and final.

1309. ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

1. CF assistance to LEAs may be provided under legislation, or under the authority of the Governor-in-council (e.g. CFAAD OICs). CF assistance can also be provided by virtue of an MOU approved by the MND. Examples of these Acts, OICs and MOUs include the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, Food and Drugs Act, Narcotic Control Act, CF Armed Assistance to Provincial Policing Direction, Penitentiary Assistance Order, and CF assistance to RCMP for counter drug operations.
2. CF assistance to CSC, normally in a perimeter security role, will be provided in response to a written requisition made directly to the CDS by either the Solicitor General or the Commissioner of Corrections. Under the Penitentiary Assistance Order-in-Council, the CDS must respond and will determine the level of the CF response.
3. Requests for CF assistance from LEAs, with the exception of CF assistance to CSC, are discretionary, and the CDS will determine the level of response, if any. The CFAPPD makes it necessary to define the classes of support that may be requested.
4. The CFAPPD refers to operational equipment and CF personnel and to non-operational equipment. The critical consideration in determining whether equipment is operational or not is the potential public visibility of CF resources. Operational commanders have primary responsibility for making decisions on this criteria when advising provincial or territorial authorities and authorizing requests within their delegated authority. Operational commanders will also have the primary responsibility for determining any potential involvement in a disturbance of the peace. In practical terms, if there is any potential for confrontation or the direct interface of CF personnel with members of the Canadian public in the context of law enforcement operations, there is potential for a disturbance of the peace.
5. The operational status of equipment such as armoured vehicles, weapons and other war fighting equipment is self-evident. The operational status of other CF resources is more nebulous, and the potential for their employment in either an operational or non-operational role will require careful consideration, based on the specifics of situations that will arise.
6. CF support to Provincial, Territorial and Municipal policing is divided into five classes, in accordance with the continuum of assistance at figure 13-1:
 - a. **Class 1.** CF assistance in support of provincial or territorial law enforcement operations where a disturbance of the peace is occurring or may occur, and where the support is in the form of CF personnel and/or operational equipment. Class 1 support must be approved by the MND. Whether the request for assistance is from a provincial or territorial LEA, a written requisition from the Solicitor General to the MND is required. This means that the provincial attorney general or the provincial or territorial minister responsible for public order and security will have first to seek assistance to the Solicitor General of Canada, who has the primary mandate for law enforcement responsibility in Canada. Any assistance requested by a Federal LEA not covered by a CFAAD or under an MOU will follow the same process.
 - b. **Class 2.** CF assistance, in support of provincial or territorial law enforcement operations, where a disturbance of the peace is occurring or may occur, and where the support is limited to non-operational equipment.
 - c. **Class 3.** CF assistance, in support of provincial or territorial law enforcement operations, where there is no potential for a disturbance of the peace, where the support is in the form of CF personnel and/or operational or non-operational equipment. Responses to class 2 and 3 requests are discretionary and approved at the operational commander level.
 - d. **Class 4.** CF assistance, in support of other than law enforcement operations, where the support is in the form of CF personnel and/or operational or non-operational equipment.
 - e. **Class 5.** CF assistance, in support of other than law enforcement operations, where the support is in the form of use of ranges, training areas, or infrastructure facilities. Responses to Class 4 and 5 requests are discretionary and approved at the lowest practical level consistent with DNDP 55.

1310. PROVISION OF SERVICES TO OTHER THAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

1. Other requests for CF assistance will consist essentially of the provision of services to non-defence agencies such as OGD, Provincial and Territorial authorities, civilian agencies, defence industries, and the Canadian public. CF assistance provided could range from a CF mandate such as Search and Rescue operations to the requests for support from charitable organizations. The level of approval required varies depending on the nature of the request, its aptness to the pursuit of national development goals, its relation to a CF mandate, and the availability of CF resources or impact on ongoing CF activities. These requests fall within the categories of Class 4 or 5 requests, in accordance with figure 13-1. Approval authority for this type of assistance ranges from unit CO to the MND, and are specified in DNDP 55.

1311. TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT

1. The CF is organized, equipped and trained for general purpose combat operations in accordance with its defence mandate. This general purpose combat capability gives the CF a wide range of both specific and general capabilities that can be employed in domestic operations. The CF will not develop a capability for operations for which it does not have a mandate, i.e. - police duties such as crowd and riot control. The CF will maintain a general purpose combat capability with a view to employment in domestic operations only as a force of last resort. The very prospect of CF deployment should be seen as a powerful deterrent, and any commitment of personnel or resources must be deliberate, decisive, and final.

2. Domestic operations will normally rely on the skills and equipment already possessed through general military training or trades training. Unique training will be conducted only on an exceptional basis, as directed and authorized by the CDS.

3. Training.

a. **Riot Control and Crowd Confrontation.** Whether in domestic operations, peacekeeping or combat operations, unanticipated crowd confrontations can occur, and troops must have the threshold training necessary to react to provide security for themselves and their operation. However, this training must not be confused for or expanded into training for a pro-active role in suppressing riots or performing other police duties. Crowd confrontational duties remain a police responsibility.

b. Equipment.

(1) No special equipment or ammunition will be procured or trained with, for domestic operations. CF policy is to deploy military forces with military equipment. Troops, and in particular infantry units and armoured reconnaissance units, will deploy with their normal unit vehicles and equipment, i.e. light wheeled or tracked armoured fighting vehicles.

(2) Normally, only single shot weapons will be used (i.e.-pistols and rifles on single shot semi-automatic). Heavy fire-power weapons and platforms will not be deployed on domestic operations without CDS approval. These include: machine guns, anti-tank weapons, mortars, crew served weapons, artillery, and tanks.

(3) The procurement of non-lethal munitions such as baton rounds or plastic ammunition is not foreseen.

1312. INTELLIGENCE

1. Domestic operations are governed by the Criminal Code of Canada; consequently not all approved military doctrine and procedures for the gathering of intelligence for joint and combined operations can be applied.

2. The gathering of intelligence in Canada is the responsibility of the Law Enforcement Agencies. Liaison with the Law Enforcement Agencies for the sharing of intelligence and others information on Canadian citizens is the responsibility of J3 SAMP/D Secur. Commanders must exercise caution to ensure that police intelligence reports are validated assessments provided through authorized liaison channels. See also chapters 20 and 21.

1313. LOGISTICS

1. In domestic operations, logistics are provided by CF Formations, units and bases augmented, as required by national capabilities and resources and civil services and infrastructure. Primary responsibility for sustainment of assigned forces rests with the designated operational commander. Refer to chapters 27 and 28 for further detail.
2. During certain domestic operations, there is provision made by such means as MOU, letters of agreement or written agreement for DND to recover costs of providing goods and services to OGDs. Regardless, the operational commander must identify, record and report all resources expended in support of the operation.

1314. PUBLIC RELATIONS

1. Domestic operations are characterized by intense political, public and media interest. In a particular domestic operation, an effective public-information programme, along with any other initiatives to establish an aware and sensitive public constituency, is essential to further national objectives and to assist military activities. The operation is unlikely to succeed without the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the public, especially the local population. Pro-active and aggressive use of public affairs officers and video - and - still camera teams provide the operational commanders with the means to record and publicize significant events during the operations.
2. In most domestic operations, civil authorities are in control and responsible for establishing the appropriate public and community relations policy and for the directing the public information programme. The CF have a vital role to play in such a programme. Government and other public officials have insufficient knowledge of military capabilities, weapons effects, planning and deployment procedures, reaction times or methods of command and control. Therefore, any issues on such matters, or any other purely military matter, must be dealt with by the CDS at the national level and by the operational commander in the area of operations.
3. To achieve an effective civil-military division of responsibility for public relations, the public information programme should be an integrated effort with civil authorities responsible for overall policy and direction and civil and military authorities working together to implement the programme.
4. Public Affairs in domestic operations will be an integral part of the operational plan and a prime concern of the operational commander. Public Affairs Officers working in the designated operational HQ will establish and maintain the contacts and conduits for public information dissemination during domestic operations occurring in their areas of responsibility. Augmentation of PA personnel must be anticipated and may be requested from other sources depending on availability and the scope of the operation. In general, public affairs officers engaged in this function during domestic operations are responsible for all aspects of public affairs including the development and execution of communications strategies and plans. They are also responsible to provide advice and guidance to the operational commander and maintain liaison at the national level if appropriate. Refer also to chapter 29.

1315. CONCLUSION

1. Domestic operations and the associated continuum of assistance are only a sub-set of tasks undertaken by a general purpose combat force. While domestic operations can, by their nature and visibility, be nationally significant and put the CF in a prominent, seemingly liable light, the military force will always be responsible to and under the direction of the civil authority, which retains responsibility for the overall situation. The operational level HQs have a vital responsibility in preparation for potential domestic operations by establishing and maintaining liaison with civil agencies and authorities. An equally vital role is educating provinces, territories, law enforcement agencies and OGDs about CF capabilities and limitations in this important area, in advance of any crisis which may cause a request for CF assistance.

CHAPTER 17

SEARCH AND RESCUE

1701 INTRODUCTION

1. Search and Rescue is a both a peacetime and wartime task which has as its goal, the prevention of injury and loss of life through alerting, responding and aiding activities. This objective is met through both SAR operations (detection, search and rescue) and SAR prevention (efforts to reduce incidents through education).

2. National SAR doctrine cannot be developed in isolation. It is highly desirable that Canadian SAR procedures be as similar as possible to those used by nations participating in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), NATO, Air Standardization Co-ordinating Committee (ASCC), Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and Maritime SAR conventions. This requires a high degree of liaison and the acceptance of mutual agreements and standards.

1702 PRINCIPLES

1. Incidents which generate SAR activities may occur day or night and under any climatic or topographic conditions. SAR forces need the following characteristics if they are to respond effectively to such diverse incidents:

- a. mobility and flexibility;
- b. the ability to provide rapid response;
- c. the ability to conduct extended SAR operations;
- d. the capability to render on-scene assistance;
- e. the capability to evacuate distressed personnel; and
- f. the ability to reach any incident in the area of responsibility.

2. **Mobility and Flexibility.** Primary SAR forces must be prepared for the rapid deployment of all SAR resources, or elements thereof, tailored as necessary to the scope of the operation. SAR units must, therefore, be organized and equipped to deploy rapidly and to operate wherever suitable minimal facilities exist. Minimal facilities include fuel, communications, housing, and mess accommodations. The urgency of SAR incidents may require the immediate dispatch of aircraft, aircrews, critical spares, and minimum support personnel. SAR forces must be prepared to respond to a variety of incidents and changing circumstances. They must be equipped to provide the flexibility to respond with minimum delay to different and changing scenarios. If the scope of the operation is such, the entire unit must be prepared to deploy using special airlift. Extended operations may require further special airlift support to replenish supplies and essential spares.

3. **Rapid Response.** Since the probability of survival of incident victims decreases rapidly with passage of time, particularly if injuries or severe climatic conditions exist, the most essential characteristic of SAR forces is the ability to provide a rapid response. SAR forces must, therefore, be organized and equipped to locate distressed aircraft or ships in minimum time and to render immediate rescue service once the object of the search has been located. Should the initial search response be unsuccessful, primary SAR forces must be capable of mounting full-scale operations as soon as possible thereafter. To provide this rapid response, trained crews and aircraft equipped to perform essential SAR tasks must be maintained on alert status. The aircraft must also have sufficient endurance and suitable navigation and radio aids to conduct an effective search and the capability of locating the object of the search.

4. **Extended Operations.** The second most essential characteristic, which is coupled with rapid response, is the ability of SAR forces to conduct extended operations and rapidly search large areas. This is important, particularly when the distress object is an aircraft, and the search area may be vast. Ideally, primary SAR forces should be capable of extending the operation to provide complete and effective coverage of the search area in a minimum period of time without the use of secondary forces.

5. **On-Scene Assistance.** Having located the personnel in distress, SAR forces must be capable of providing immediate assistance when the situation so warrants. If the on-scene forces are rotary-wing equipped, this task is simplified in that the aircraft may alight or hover to permit crew members to assist survivors. With fixed-wing aircraft, survival gear may be dispatched or, if survivors are disabled, SAR Technicians may be parachuted to the scene to provide emergency medical care and survival assistance until evacuation can be achieved.

6. **Evacuation.** The capability to evacuate distressed personnel must exist. Rotary-wing aircraft are usually most suited for the retrieval of personnel; however, fixed-wing aircraft, surface craft or land vehicles may prove more effective in some situations.

7. **Range.** SAR forces must have the capability to reach any incident within their designated SRR boundaries.

1703 COMPOSITION OF SAR FORCES

1. The composition of SAR forces is normally based on a thorough analysis of the need for SAR services within each region. Various factors are taken into consideration, such as the size of the area in which coverage is required, the type of terrain or waters, the type and levels of craft activity, historic levels of distress incidents and possible future trends. SAR forces will normally be comprised of primary and secondary resources. The primary or dedicated resources include CF fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft with SAR Technician teams and Canadian Coast Guard vessels; the secondary resources include all federal government vessels and aircraft which are suitable and available for multitasking to a SAR role. At bases where incident potential is high by virtue of the type of aircraft assigned or the nature of operations conducted, local base rescue units may be established.

1704 TYPES OF MISSIONS

1. SAR missions in both peacetime and wartime essentially can be grouped into two types:

- a. pre-planned precautionary missions; and
- b. emergency SAR missions for craft in distress.

2. **Pre-planned Precautionary Missions.** During operations involving military aircraft in isolated areas and during transoceanic operations of short-range aircraft, SAR aircraft may be positioned to be immediately available, should a distress situation develop, or to provide navigational assistance. Positioning may be at an airport close to the area of operation, orbiting at prearranged positions or flying predetermined routes. Similar precautionary measures may be taken whenever flights carrying members of the Royal Family fly in airspace for which Canadian SAR forces are responsible.

3. **Emergency Search and Rescue Missions.** By far, the greatest demand placed on SAR forces by way of required skill and effort expended is in the performance of emergency SAR missions. The scope of these missions ranges from simple intercept and escort of distressed craft to large-scale searches of thousands of square miles for missing aircraft, surface craft or submarines. Extended SAR missions in all areas require direction and execution by highly experienced SAR personnel. All available incident data must be collected and evaluated to determine the type and extent of SAR activity required. Advanced bases may be necessary because of the distance to the search area and search patterns must be selected for most effective search depending on weather and terrain. SAR crews must be briefed and communications must be established to control search participants. Rescue and recovery of survivors may also be a formidable task, particularly if the incident occurs in a remote area and large numbers of survivors are involved.

1705 DISTINCTION BETWEEN WARTIME AND PEACETIME SAR

1. While the aim of SAR is unchanged between peacetime and wartime, the two circumstances are best separated in a discussion of doctrine. The differences between the two circumstances include geographical areas of responsibility (fixed as opposed to fluid), resources available (domestic versus deployed) and potentially, command and control relationships.

Peacetime

2. **Inter-Departmental Coordination.** DND is only one of the government departments with some responsibility for SAR in Canada. The other key national agency is the Canadian Coast Guard. However, to establish a single spokesperson for the government on SAR matters, the MND has been identified as the Lead Minister and the government spokesperson for SAR. The CDS has been tasked to execute the SAR mission using CF resources. Coordination activities between government departments is conducted through the National Search and Rescue Secretariat (NSS) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Search and Rescue (ICSAR).

3. Specifically, the CF have been given the following primary and secondary SAR tasks:

a. Primary SAR tasks:

- (1) to co-ordinate, control and conduct SAR operations in relation to air SAR incidents within the Canadian area of responsibility;
- (2) to provide resources in support of the prosecution of marine SAR operations and to exercise ultimate authority in the allocation of all SAR resources during a SAR incident; and
- (3) to conduct ground searches in relation to air and marine SAR incidents.

b. Secondary SAR tasks:

- (1) to provide SAR resources when and where available; to assist in the prosecution of humanitarian and civil incidents which occur within provincial or municipal areas of responsibility (this task is handled in accordance with CF directives); and
- (2) to support Transport Canada (TC) and CCG in SAR prevention through participation in related educational programmes and by advising the appropriate authority of possible infractions of regulations.

4. It should be noted that the CF not only has responsibility for federal air SAR services but also the responsibility for effective operation of the coordinated SAR system, inclusive of marine incidents. As well, the distinction between air and marine incidents and missing person cases (unrelated to air or marine incidents) must be understood in terms of jurisdiction. Missing person cases come under federal, provincial or municipal jurisdiction (with any assistance being provided under the terms of assistance to civil authorities).

5. In accordance with IMO and ICAO agreements to provide SAR services in Canada and adjacent ocean areas, the country has been divided into three Search and Rescue Regions (SRR) for marine and air SAR co-ordination. The international boundaries are in accordance with ICAO and IMO agreements. Each region has a commander and is served by a rescue coordination centre (RCC).

6. Marine Rescue Sub-Centres (MRSCs) are established for the purpose of co-ordinating, conducting and controlling response to marine incidents within the boundaries of local SRR sectors, as well as maximizing use of local knowledge and resources in providing an effective response. MRSCs keep parent RCCs fully informed of their activity and transfer control of an incident to the parent unit in accordance with established criteria. The RCC/MRSCs are manned on a 24 hour / 7-day a week basis and will respond to all incidents until such time the incident is resolved or until responsibility can be transferred to the appropriate authority.

7. RCCs at Victoria, Trenton and Halifax co-ordinate Air and Marine SAR. MRSCs are established at Quebec

City, Quebec and St John's, Newfoundland. The SRR commanders are:

- a. Comd MARLANT for Halifax SRR;
- b. Comd 1 CAD for Trenton SRR; and
- c. Comd MARPAC for Victoria SRR.

8. Due to the national nature of the SAR mandate, the SRR commander shall be responsible through the DCDS to the CDS for co-ordination of searches within his/her region. The SRR Commander can also authorize the use of SAR resources for humanitarian and civil assistance. He/she can approve the reduction of minor searches and recommend reduction of major searches [essentially, a search longer than four days or potentially sensitive] within his/her region.

9. Comd 1 CAD has been delegated operational command of all primary SAR resources and each SRR commander has operational control over primary SAR resources in his region. Secondary SAR resources are defined as aircraft, vessels or formations established and equipped for other than search and rescue, but which can be expected to respond (when available) to SAR tasking. These include multi-tasked government resources.

10. SRR commanders may utilize all primary and secondary resources available in providing SAR services. In instances where a commander's resources are considered to be inadequate for a specific task, he may request assistance from any suitable source. These may include:

- a. CF resources from other regions or commands which may be tasked through NDHQ/NDOC;
- b. CCG resources not assigned to SAR which may be tasked through the appropriate CCG responsibility manager;
- d. other government departments - SRR commanders shall ensure that procedures exist so that SAR capable resources and the methods for tasking them are readily available to RCC/MRSC controllers;
- e. the resources of neighbouring SRRs which may be available and are to be requested through the appropriate RCC/MRSC;
- f. marine resources which may be tasked under the Canada Shipping Act by the RCC controller, acting for the SRR commander; and
- g. chartering of required resources by the RCCs if no other resource is available.

11. **Underwater Search Operations.** Suspension or continuation of an underwater search may depend on underwater detection and recovery measures to locate a missing aircraft or marine craft and establish the fate of its occupants. However, if identification of floating wreckage or an accumulation of evidence which clearly established the fate of the aircraft or vessel and its occupants is possible without recourse to underwater search, then there is no responsibility for the SAR system to co-ordinate or participate in underwater detection or recovery action.

12. **Submarine SAR Operations.** The overall responsibility for SAR in the event of a missing Canadian submarine remains with the SRR commander. The formulation of plans and the control of SAR operations in a Submiss-Subsunk operation is the function of either Commander MARLANT/ MARPAC. In the event of a lost USN submarine, the responsibility for overall co-ordination of SAR activities rests with the "USN Submarine Operating Authority".

13. **Joint Areas of Responsibility - Canada/US.** When a SAR incident occurs in Canadian territory, involving an aircraft other than US military, US SAR forces will be permitted to provide facilities they consider necessary, but the appropriate Canadian RCC will be responsible for the search. USAF or USCG SAR forces will inform the Canadian RCC of action taken or proposed, but all decisions and activity shall be under the control and subject to ratification by the Canadian RCC.

14. When an emergency incident occurs involving a US military aircraft in Canadian territory (for which search participation may become necessary), USAF forces will be permitted to take any action that is necessary. Under such conditions, a USAF search master will be designated. He/she will report details to the appropriate RCC and the RCC will be kept informed of developments; however, the SRR Commander may assume control of any search that arises in his/her area. This power normally will only be exercised when CF search aircraft are participating or when, in his/her opinion, the CF are better qualified to conduct the search. When a USAF SAR unit gains knowledge of such an incident, immediate notification will be given to the appropriate Canadian RCC giving:

- a. full information on the flight plan;
- b. action being taken; and
- c. future plans.

15. The USCG is responsible for the co-ordination of SAR activities in the maritime regions and the inland waters which are under the jurisdiction of the US.

Wartime

1. The primary task of the SAR system in wartime is to support air operations of our own and allied forces with the aim of recovering downed aircrews. In addition, the service is used to recover other armed forces personnel during and after combat activities. The diversity of this task dictates that SAR planning be an integral part of overall war operations planning. If required, national SAR forces will be made available to NATO or an Allied Coalition to meet combined operations requirements. The CF has ratified STANAG 7030 on Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). Amplifying material can be found in *B-GA-460-000/FP-000 Search and Rescue Operational Doctrine*.

2. The specific nature of wartime SAR missions will vary from place to place, and the response required of individual SAR organizations will be determined by factors such as support capabilities, type of SAR facilities available, operating location, tactical situations and enemy threat. For this reason, only broad principles are established to provide guidance for more detailed planning. The development of wartime SAR plans by national SAR authorities should be based on the missions and needs of NATO forces within their area of responsibility.

3. **Air Component Commander (ACC).** To provide for SAR operations in wartime, the ACC should:

- a. establish liaison with national SAR authorities;
- b. include SAR contingency plans in applicable campaign plans;
- c. provide SAR facilities and supporting forces to Search and Rescue Point of Contact (SPOC) as required by campaign plans and the tactical situation;
- d. co-ordinate planned tactical operations and potential SAR requirements with appropriate SPOCs; and
- e. develop procedures for notifying appropriate SPOCs of downed aircrew and recovery action.

4. **National SAR Authorities.** CF SAR authorities will:

- a. prepare detailed wartime SAR plans for their areas of responsibility in accordance with the SAR requirements of NATO commands; and
- b. establish rapid and reliable lines of communication with the NATO command and control facilities within their areas of responsibility.

5. **NATO/Allied Coalition Units.** NATO/Allied Coalition unit commanders will:

- a. conduct local SAR operations in conjunction with SPOCs in accordance with the provisions of ATP-10;
- b. notify NATO/Allied Coalition command and control facilities and appropriate SPOCs of overdue or suspected downed aircraft as required by applicable war plans; and
- c. provide Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) data on downed aircrew personnel to the controlling SPOC.

CHAPTER 18

PERSONNEL SUPPORT

1801. INTRODUCTION

1. Personnel support consists of the administrative control of military personnel and those matters which affect them as individuals. Personnel support is a command responsibility carried out in accordance with applicable regulations and orders.
2. NDHQ J1 is the strategic level authority for all personnel support to operations. Authority for approval of operational task establishments and their modification is subject to NDHQ J3 control. Direction of personnel support is carried out strictly according to the chain of command with NDHQ J1 in direct communication with operational level pers staff. Personnel support is included in the broad category of administration.
3. **Headquarters Defence Plan (HQDP) 101 - Personnel Support to Operations** is the authoritative reference for all natures of policy and procedure relevant to this subject. HQDP 101 is published under the authority of the ADM (Per) at NDHQ.

1802. PRINCIPLES OF PERSONNEL SUPPORT

1. Personnel support to operations is based on the following principles:
 - a. operational necessity;
 - b. foresight;
 - c. economy;
 - d. simplicity;
 - e. flexibility;
 - f. precision; and
 - g. maintenance of well-being and morale.

1803. CONCEPT OF PERSONNEL SUPPORT

1. For the purposes of personnel support, an operation is defined as: "Deployment of an expeditionary formation or unit to an area of operations in or beyond Canada for purposes other than military training or administration and subject to orders from the strategic and/or operational level." Personnel support is devised in accordance with the appropriate forecast of operations.
2. The objective of strategic direction of personnel support is to ensure that provision and maintenance of effective manpower in the area of operations is commensurate with the operational requirement.
3. Personnel support to operations is implemented in five escalating and cumulative levels. Levels 2 - 5 relate to planning stages devised for application to the crisis spectrum up to and including mobilization as outlined in the (1994) Defence Policy of the Government of Canada. Personnel support levels are:
 - a. Level 1 - continuous monitoring of current operations with adjustments in support as required;
 - b. Level 2 - (corresponding to the Force Generation stage) - measures to prepare a formation or unit(s) to meet an expeditionary requirement. Manning is achieved through augmentation with Reserve Force volunteers. Optimal readiness of the standing CF would accrue in the process of Force Generation - Level 2. Under

normal circumstances, personnel support would revert to Level 1 after completion of the initial deployment

- c. Level 3 - (corresponding to the Force Enhancement stage) - application of the objective capability of the total force up to a state of maximum readiness of the standing CF to undertake operations of increasing scope and a more rapid tempo. Level 3 could involve the designation and maintenance of a strategic reserve.
- d. Level 4 - (corresponding to the Force Expansion stage) - prompted by a requirement to significantly increase beyond the extant structure of the CF and DND and equating to the commencement of mobilization. It is anticipated that placement of the Reserve Force on active service would be initiated early in Level 4 (if not prior) and the CF Special Force (CFSF) activated to include all standing elements; and
- e. Level 5 - (National Mobilization stage) - To meet the requirements of general war or a radically increased threat to the security of Canada. It is assumed that a two year period of strategic warning will precede the necessity for Level 5 measures.

1804. ELEMENTS OF PERSONNEL SUPPORT

1. Personnel support to operations includes the following:
 - a. Operational Personnel Management (OPM);
 - b. Personnel Services (Pers Svcs); and
 - c. Health Services Support (HSS).

1805. OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

1. OPM is defined as: "Distribution of effective manpower in accordance with operational priority." Administrative control of manpower is exercised by personnel staffs at all levels on behalf of respective commanders.
2. OPM consists of:
 - a. determination of personnel requirements and development of the operational task establishment for J3 approval;
 - b. personnel accounting including strength reporting; and
 - c. manpower distribution including casualty replacements.
3. Personnel administration is an enabling element of OPM. This includes records keeping, promotion, personnel evaluation, casualty reporting and notification of next-of-kin.
4. Although not strictly relevant to operations, recruiting and individual training are adjuncts to personnel management at the strategic level. These complementary functions are carried out to meet manning targets derived from projection of the consolidated operational requirement.

1806. PERSONNEL SERVICES

1. Pers Svcs are provided to help sustain the individual sailor, soldier and airman and assist commanders in the maintenance of morale. Without prejudice to operations, comprehensive pers svcs can alleviate hardships encountered by members of an expeditionary force and enkindle greater attention to duty and skill-at-arms.
2. Pers Svcs include:
 - a. Chaplaincy;

- b. welfare and amenities;
- c. fitness and recreation;
- d. dress and ceremonial;
- e. honours and awards;
- f. compensation and benefits (entitlements);
- g. leave;
- h. messes and institutes; and
- i. graves registration.

1807. HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

1. HSS includes CFMS and CFDS participation in and support to operations. Strategic level Health Services are directed by Director General of Health Services (DGHS) and the discipline is integral to NDHQ J1 (J1 HS). The appointment of Surgeon General (Surg Gen) is retained as the professional title for the senior CF clinician.
2. The senior medical officer (SMO) at every level is the medical advisor to the commander with right of access and right of consultation with higher medical authority. Surg Gen functions as medical advisor to the CDS.
3. Detail on Health Services is provided at Chapter 19.

1808. ASSOCIATED TASKS

1. Disciplinary standards and enforcement are a command responsibility.
2. A number of functions complement or supplement personnel support but are carried out under authorities other than personnel staff:
 - a. pay services (J4 Fin);
 - b. postal services (J4 Mov);
 - c. quartering (J4 Log);
 - d. transportation booking (J4 Mov);
 - e. legal/judicial (advisory/J5 Leg); and
 - f. Military Police (J3 SAMP).

1809. PERSONNEL SUPPORT PLANNING SEQUENCE

1. Development of task-specific personnel support commences at the outset of operational planning. OPM is devised in accordance with the forecast of operations and based on one of three methods:
 - a. implementation of a COP with integral personnel establishments for designated units modified as required;
 - b. non-forecast tasking of existing HQs and units with personnel establishments modified as required; or
 - c. development of task establishments intended to meet the specific requirements of a given operation.

2. NDHQ J3 is responsible for the manpower ceiling imposed for each operation and final approval of personnel establishment and changes. Modification of existing/contingency establishments and development of specific task establishments may be undertaken by NDHQ J1 in response to direction from J3. More commonly, the environmental staff most closely associated with the forecast operation (or primary force generator) or a subordinate HQ designated as the TFHQ may be directed by J3 to develop an establishment model. The model can be subsequently validated and transposed into establishment format for approval by J3 and entered in the Establishment Management Information System (EMIS) by NDHQ J1.

3. The Task Force Management Control System (TFMCS) is the OPM derivative of the Integrated Personnel Data System (IPDS). TFMCS is controlled by NDHQ J1. Outstations on the TFMCS data network include NDHQ manning agencies, environmental staffs and the designated JFHQ (1 Cdn Div HQ). TFMCS provides establishment modeling and manpower accounting applications. Subordinate pers staff will employ TFMC as directed by NDHQ J1.

4. Details of personnel support for respective operations should be promulgated in the appropriate administrative order. Otherwise, NDHQ J1 will issue a task-specific Pers Sp Instr.

1810. SUMMARY

1. Personnel support to operations combines the varied aspects of personnel matters into one arena, to ensure the focus is directed to the achievement of operational requirements. Personnel support itself develops in conjunction with the operational needs as they increase in size and complexity. The purpose remains the provision and maintenance of effective manpower in areas of operation, commensurate with their operational requirements.

CHAPTER 19

HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

1901. INTRODUCTION

1. Effective HSS is essential to operational success. By rapid evacuation, treatment, recovery and return to duty of the wounded, sick and injured, the health services make a major contribution to personnel effectiveness. To achieve this, health services capabilities must be consistent with the strength of the force and the nature of the operation (i.e., the risk involved).
2. HSS consists of medical and dental support, and participation of CFMS and CFDS personnel in operations. Medical and dental staff duties are organic J1 functions, and, as such, HSS constitutes an adjunct to personnel support (chapter 18).
3. While general logistic support principles and concepts apply to HSS, health services staff face unique problems affecting the health of armed forces. Distinct principles and guidance are, therefore, defined for HSS.
4. This chapter addresses strategic to operational level direction and coordination of HSS. Detail is oriented primarily to operational aspects of medical support and excludes clinical subject matter.

1902. OBJECTIVE OF HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

1. The objective of HSS in operations is to maximize the availability of fit personnel for operations. This takes several forms, including the prevention of illness and injury. In the context of pre-deployment to the area of operations, HSS consists of maintaining personnel at a high level of medical and dental fitness. In the area of operations, it means the salvage of life and limb and the rapid return to duty of both the sick and injured, and the evacuation, definitive care and rehabilitation of those who are not expected to return to duty within a reasonable period of time.
2. The effectiveness of HSS is measured by its ability to return patients to duty quickly and as far forward in the area of operations as possible, while minimizing mortality and morbidity.

1903. PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

1. HSS must comply with the Geneva Conventions and also be guided by the following principles:
 - a. conformity;
 - b. control;
 - c. continuity;
 - d. flexibility;
 - e. mobility; and
 - f. proximity.
2. **Conformity.** HSS must conform to the constraints imposed by the physiology and pathology of the sick and injured, and be governed by the highest standards of medical and dental practice and ethics. In addition, HSS must conform to operation plans and requirements. Early involvement of HSS planners helps to ensure conformity.
3. **Control.** To ensure that all HSS requirements are considered and that resources are used effectively and economically, control and coordination of HSS resources are exercised at the highest possible level. Effective

control of HSS resources depends on the exchange of accurate and timely information between operational commanders and HSS staffs.

4. **Continuity.** Since interruption of treatment results in increased mortality and morbidity, treatment must be continuous and progressive to the level necessary for definitive treatment of patients' conditions. Patients are evacuated through a series of HSS facilities, each with an increasing capability for treatment. Sorting of patients to reflect priorities for treatment and evacuation, or return to duty as far forward and as soon as possible is a critical function of every HSS treatment facility.
5. **Flexibility.** Detailed and carefully planned HSS supporting plans help to ensure minimum reaction time by the medical and dental services. During an operation, flexibility essential for rapid response is maintained by initially committing only the HSS resources that are required for current or imminent tasks.
6. **Mobility.** The HSS elements must maintain close contact with and be as mobile as the supported force.
7. **Proximity.** HSS facilities should be located as far forward as possible without interfering with operations or unnecessarily subjecting patients to enemy action. Medical resources should be positioned so that initial surgery can be performed within six hours of wounding, taking into account the available evacuation means. Initial surgery, carried out as soon as possible after wounding, is the most important factor in reducing mortality rates and is the focal point of operational medical support.

1904. HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT POLICIES

1. Except when the size and location make it impractical, HSS to deployed CF elements will be provided by Canadian medical and dental services.
2. As a general policy on medical and dental care, patients are treated on the basis of their clinical need and the resources available. If there is a wide disparity between the workload (i.e., the number of patients or the degree and complexity of treatment required) and the treatment capacity, the capacity is concentrated to optimize the benefit to the maximum number of patients.
3. An evacuation policy reflects a command decision for the evacuation of patients from an area of operations. The policy is established by the CDS, assisted by DGHS, in conjunction with the appointed TFC. An evacuation policy should indicate the time frame (i.e., the maximum length, in days) for which patients who are expected to return to duty may be held at a given treatment level. Patients not expected to return to duty within the time frame are evacuated rearward as soon as possible, provided the travel involved does not aggravate their medical condition. The evacuation policy for a given operation is determined by such factors as:
 - a. the distance of the area of operations from Canada or a designated support base;
 - b. the operational situation;
 - c. the availability of strategic evacuation means; and
 - d. the replacement or reinforcement situation.
4. The medical service is responsible for the safety, feeding, clothing, discipline, and general welfare of all patients from the time they come under medical care until they are discharged to duty or are otherwise released. HSS organizations are not responsible for collecting and burying the dead, except for their own dead and those who die while under medical care.
5. In certain situations, it may not be possible to evacuate all patients. If patients are subject to capture, they are to be left with the minimum number of HSS personnel necessary for their treatment and only such supplies as are required until their captors become responsible for them. The decision to abandon patients to the enemy rests with the operational commander, with medical authorities providing necessary information and advice.

1905. CONCEPT OF HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

1. HSS is an integrated system that entails the evacuation of patients in the shortest possible time to facilities capable of providing the necessary treatment.
2. HSS is provided through **organizational lines** which extend rearward through the area of operations to Canada: first and second line (tactical support); third line (operational or theatre level support); and fourth line (strategic support). HSS is also based on **treatment capabilities** that meet the characteristics of the operational environment and that play a specific part in preventive medicine and dental processes, progressive treatment, hospitalization, and evacuation of the sick and injured. These capabilities are referred to as Roles, which are unique to HSS. Each successive Role includes some or all the treatment capabilities of the previous Role.
3. The medical Roles of support are:
 - a. **Role 1.** This capability includes locating casualties, providing them with first aid and emergency medical care, evacuating them from the site of injury to a safer location, sorting them according to treatment precedence, and stabilizing and preparing them for evacuation to the next Role of care, if required.
 - b. **Role 2** This Role emphasises efficient and rapid evacuation of stabilized patients from supported elements, and en route sustaining care. Emergency lifesaving resuscitative procedures may be performed. Patients who require minor care may be held for short periods and returned to duty. Medical resupply may be provided to supported Role 1 facilities.
 - c. **Role 3.** This capability provides resuscitation, initial wound surgery, post-operative care, and short-term surgical and medical in-patient care. Diagnostic services such as x-ray and laboratory, and limited scope internal medicine and psychiatric services are available. In-theatre reception and storage of medical supplies and blood, and distribution to supported units is provided, as well as repair of medical equipment within the area of operations. Other ancillary capabilities include medical liaison teams for tracking Canadian patients in allied or host-nation facilities, teams providing assistance with combat-stress management, and coordination of preventive medicine activities in the area of operations.
 - d. **Role 4.** This Role includes reconstructive surgery, definitive-care hospitalization, rehabilitation, storage and distribution of national medical stocks, and major repair or replacement of medical equipment.
4. The dental Roles of support are:
 - a. **Role 1.** This capability is the most basic, consisting of emergency care to treat acute conditions, to control life threatening oral circumstances such as haemorrhage or respiratory distress and to stabilize patients for evacuation if necessary.
 - b. **Role 2** This Role involves sustaining care to deal with additional urgent oral conditions and those measures required to intercept potential dental casualties. Role 2 care includes diagnostic services (radiography, laboratory), temporary and basic fillings, extractions, simple denture adjustments, debridement of oral lesions, gingival curettage, and stabilization of maxillofacial injuries for evacuation.
 - c. **Role 3** Role 3 dental care maintains the overall fitness of personnel at functional status, allowing operational deployment without the need for routine care. While Role 3 care includes the same types of procedures as Role 2, time and space permit more time-consuming and complex treatments and the active involvement of specialists, where required.
 - d. **Role 4.** Role 4 dental care provides a full range of dental services, including comprehensive rehabilitative care. Its aim is to repair and restore full oral function (including aesthetics) incurred because of wounds or disease.

5. Personnel belonging to organizations without integral HSS elements, or personnel dispersed throughout an area of operations, will receive HSS on an area basis. Various HSS units are allocated on the basis of personnel supported and are established in appropriate locations.

6. For CF operations, the first three HSS Roles are provided by Canadian resources in the area of operations, while Role 4 is provided through negotiations with allies or other foreign nations, or by military and civilian resources in Canada. An HSS support link is established between deployed resources and facilities in Canada.

7. Third line (i.e., operational or theatre level) HSS is provided through the Canadian Medical Group (CMG). In an operation abroad, the CMG is required to perform the following functions:

- a. hospitalization, including resuscitation, initial surgery, diagnostic services such as x-ray, short-term patient holding, limited specialist consulting services, out-patient services and preparation of patients for further evacuation;
- b. ground evacuation rearward, including rearward evacuation to allied or host-nation in-theatre Role 4 facilities, or to an aeromedical staging facility;
- c. medical escorts for forward aeromedical evacuation to Role 3 facilities;
- d. specialist assistance for combat-stress management;
- e. in-theatre reception, storage and resupply of medical materiel and blood to supported medical facilities, and third line repair of medical equipment;
- f. coordination of preventive medicine;
- g. theatre level dental support; and
- h. command, control and coordination, including national medical liaison teams to track Canadian patients admitted to allied or other foreign-nation facilities.

8. To carry out its HSS functions, the CMG consists of a number of hospitalization and ancillary-support units. The size and number of units are based on casualty-planning figures approved by NDHQ J3. The CMG also requires the capability for deploying separate elements to support the Environmental components of a joint force.

9. CMG elements must be capable of operating in an NBC environment in accordance with the principles and guidance in the NBC chapter of this publication. This includes decontamination of CMG facilities attacked directly and patients who arrive at a facility without being decontaminated or who become contaminated while at the facility.

Provision of a patient decontamination element in the area of operations is a CMG responsibility assisted by other HSS resources and, when required, by the CSG.

1906. RESPONSIBILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS

1. The provision of HSS to operations is a command responsibility at each level of command. In exercising this responsibility, commanders are assisted by the CFMS and CFDS, which are responsible to commanders for:

- a. advice on health measures;
- b. planning and implementing HSS, including:
 - (1) preventive medicine,
 - (2) collection of the wounded and evacuation and tracking of patients to HSS facilities,

- (3) medical treatment, including hospitalization,
 - (4) dental treatment,
 - (5) procurement, storage, distribution, maintenance and disposal of medical materiel,
 - (6) storage and distribution of blood and blood products,
 - (7) distribution and location of HSS units,
 - (8) medical intelligence, and
 - (9) HSS aspects of CIMIC programmes; and
- c. training of HSS personnel and providing advice, assistance and supervision for para-medical training of other personnel.
2. NDHQ is ultimately responsible for ensuring the provision of adequate HSS to operations. The NDHQ J Staff, on behalf of the CDS, are responsible for the following measures which influence HSS:
- a. **J1 staff** - organizing the overall provision of HSS within the context of the personnel support plan;
 - b. **J3 staff.**
 - (1) establishing casualty planning figures from which HSS capability requirements can be developed, and
 - (2) developing the strategic level operation plan from which the required HSS structure can be developed;
 - c. **J4 staff** - coordinating and controlling the strategic movement of HSS forces and resources; and
 - d. **DGHS** is the senior HSS staff officer in the CF and is also the Commander of the CF Medical Group (CFMG). DGHS normally holds the appointment of Surg Gen. If DGHS is not a clinician, the senior medical clinical adviser in the CF is appointed as Surg Gen. The senior dental clinical adviser in the CF is Director Dental Services (D Dent Svcs). J1 HS representation for the NDHQ J Staff is provided from within the DGHS staff. DGHS/Comd CFMG is responsible for:
 - (1) developing strategic HSS plans to support operations,
 - (2) developing and issuing standards of medical care, and orders, directives and clinical policies on operational HSS matters,
 - (3) exercising peacetime C2 of third and fourth line HSS units under the CFMG HQ,
 - (4) developing, organizing and equipping CFMG units prior to transfer of authority on deployment to an operational Commander, including individual and unit training, and assembly of CMG third line elements,
 - (5) in conjunction with J4 Log, coordinating HSS aspects of host-nation or other support agreements, and,
 - (6) in conjunction with J3 Engr, the coordination of any military engineer support to HSS in the way of provision of utilities, infrastructure and the disposal of medical waste.
3. The operational Commander is responsible for forecasting HSS capabilities and resources needed to support the COO and, once in the area of operations, for the overall provision of HSS. The operational Commander exercises these responsibilities through the J1HS staff of the operational HQ and through the CMG commander.

4. Because of its size and degree of expertise, the TF J1HS staff can facilitate coordination of HSS aspects of the Environmental components of the TF. Specific responsibilities of the TF J1HS include:

- a. developing the HSS estimate;
- b. developing the HSS annex to the operation plan and operation order;
- c. assisting the TFC to develop the TF evacuation policy in the area of operations;
- d. coordinating medical intelligence activities;
- e. issuing instructions concerning medical and dental technical and clinical matters;
- f. coordinating HSS activities in support of CIMIC programmes; and
- g. coordinating, in conjunction with the J4 staff, HSS agreements with allies or other foreign nations.

5. The commander of a deployed CMG is the TF surgeon and is the senior medical advisor to the TFC and is directly responsible for:

- a. commanding third line (i.e., operational or theatre level) HSS resources;
- b. developing and implementing operational level HSS plans for the CMG to support operations;
- c. controlling patient evacuation, medical regulating and patient tracking rearward;
- d. controlling Role 3 patient management;
- e. controlling in-area reception, storage and distribution of medical materiel, blood and blood products;
- f. controlling maintenance of medical materiel;
- g. controlling operational level preventive-medicine activities;
- h. conducting in-area training of CMG personnel; and
- i. liaising with allied or other foreign-nation medical and dental authorities to coordinate medical regulating and the use of medical materiel and evacuation resources in support of the Canadian TF.

1907. HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT AND THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

1. Under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, certain personnel, when captured, are protected against being classified as PWs and are classified as retained personnel instead. These personnel are retained by the enemy for the purpose of providing care for Canadian or allied PWs until the enemy assumes that responsibility. Protected (retained) personnel should then be repatriated. Protected personnel include:

- a. HSS personnel exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of the sick or injured, the prevention of disease, and the administration of HSS units and establishments; and
- b. non-HSS personnel while assigned to HSS units.

2. To warrant protected status, eligible personnel must carry a Geneva Conventions identification card and wear, on the left arm, an armband bearing the red cross emblem. Personnel whose legal status as protected personnel is in doubt are treated as PWs until their situation is adjudicated. HSS units, facilities and equipment may also qualify for protection status as follows:

- a. HSS units and facilities may be distinguished by the conspicuous display of one of two emblems officially recognized by the Geneva Conventions: the red cross emblem on a white background and the red crescent (used by such countries as Turkey). Emblems used by other countries, such as the red Shield of David worn by Israel, should also be respected.
- b. All HSS facilities and vehicles are entitled to protection by the Geneva Conventions and may display the red cross emblem even when not used directly for patient care. Unit headquarters, support areas and vehicles are entitled to display the emblem if they are engaged exclusively in supporting an HSS unit.
- c. Non-HSS vehicles are entitled to display the red cross emblem only while used exclusively for HSS tasks such as transportation of patients or medical supplies. Protection of vehicles may depend on specific agreements between adversaries such as special marking of vehicles, adherence to certain land routes, air corridors and shipping lanes, and limitations on travel times.
- d. HSS units, facilities and vehicles should not display the red cross emblem while otherwise camouflaged, and are not entitled to protection without displaying the emblem. The decision to use camouflage rests with the operational commander. Because camouflage may deprive personnel of the protection to which they are entitled under international law, any order to conceal the red cross should be given only in exceptional circumstances.

3. Protected personnel may carry only individual small arms for self-defence and to defend patients placed under their care; however, overall security plans must not require protected personnel to take offensive action against the enemy. Protected personnel are permitted to fire only when they or their patients are under direct attack. HSS units and facilities may be located within defensive perimeters protected by HSS-unit personnel. Protected personnel should not be employed as perimeter guards of resources other than those entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions.

4. HSS support for enemy PWs interned in the area of operations is provided by establishing and operating HSS facilities at each PW camp, where retained enemy HSS personnel may be employed. Fit PWs may be employed as litter bearers for sick PWs. Hospitalization of PWs in the area of operations is effected through CMG resources. Security of these patients is provided by SAMP forces.

1908. PLANNING OF HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

1. Effective and timely HSS planning and coordination are essential to ensure adequate and sustainable HSS in an area of operations. HSS planning is a complex process, and HSS planners must remain sensitive to the demands for support based on changing operational requirements. Proper planning permits a systematic examination of all HSS aspects of an operation and ensures critical requirements are met, including the following:

- a. HSS must conform to the operational plan;
- b. HSS must be consistent with the TF strength and risks involved, identified through the casualty estimates;
- c. HSS units and personnel must be at the same state of readiness and availability as the TF they support;
- d. HSS units must be as strategically and operationally mobile as the TF they support; and
- e. HSS units should be sited so that attacks against military objectives cannot imperil their safety.

2. The organization of HSS is largely determined by the mission of the TF, medical intelligence, the TF evacuation policy, and evacuation and hospitalization requirements.

3. Procedures and techniques for planning of HSS to joint operations are provided in B-GG-005-004/AF-017, *Health Services Support To CF Operations*.

1909. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

1. A typical arrangement for C2 of HSS to deployed operations is illustrated in Figure 19-1.




Figure 19-1 Command & Control of HSS

2. First and second line HSS resources are under the command authority of the Environmental component commanders. Command authority of third line medical resources (i.e., OPCOM or OPCON) is transferred to the senior Canadian Commander on arrival of the CMG in the area of operations. Fourth line HSS resources in Canada remain under national (strategic) control.

3. Technical and professional guidance on clinical aspects of medical support is provided by the Surg Gen and on clinical aspects of dental support, by the D Dent Svcs.

CHAPTER 20

INTELLIGENCE

2001. INTRODUCTION

1. Intelligence is the product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity. Information is unprocessed data of every description which may be used in the production of intelligence.
2. Intelligence is fundamental to the conduct of military operations. Proper direction of intelligence is an important responsibility of command. An intelligence organization provides this intelligence to commanders and their staffs. Conversely, commanders are responsible for stating their requirements for intelligence. Without sufficient intelligence on the enemy, operations cannot be properly planned and executed.
3. Commanders must also have information on the terrain and waters in a theatre of operations if they are to deploy their forces to execute operations effectively and efficiently. The geomatics operations staff is responsible for providing commanders with this information.

2002. PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE

1. The intelligence process is governed by the following eight basic principles:
 - a. **Centralized Control.** Intelligence activities must be centrally controlled to avoid duplication of effort, to provide mutual support, to ensure the efficient and economic use of all resources, and to ensure responsiveness to a commander's requirements.
 - b. **Timeliness.** The provision of timely intelligence is essential. Intelligence that arrives late is of little use. Therefore, the tasking system must ensure that significant changes in the operational situation are reflected without delay. This calls for a direct reporting chain between the commanders and their intelligence staffs.
 - c. **Systematic Exploitation.** Intelligence sources and agencies must be exploited methodically, based on a thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations.
 - d. **Objectivity.** Intelligence must state the known facts about a situation and the logical conclusions that those facts support. Any temptation to distort information to fit preconceived ideas must be resisted.
 - e. **Accessibility.** Relevant intelligence must be readily available to intelligence staffs and to users. While the "need to know" principle must be applied, the unnecessary use of restrictive security classifications and caveats is to be avoided.
 - f. **Responsiveness.** The intelligence staff must be responsive to the commander's requirements. To ensure responsiveness, as operational tempo increases, they must be able to anticipate these requirements.
 - g. **Source Protection.** All sources of information must be adequately protected. Exploitation of intelligence must take into account the penalties of compromising the source.
 - h. **Continuous Review.** Intelligence must be reviewed continuously and, where necessary, revised, taking account of all new information and comparing it with existing information.

2003. THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

1. The intelligence cycle describes the activities whereby information is obtained, assembled, converted into intelligence and made available to users. The cycle comprises four steps which are repeated continuously.

- a. direction;
- b. collection;
- c. processing; and
- d. dissemination.

2. **Direction.** Direction is the key step, as intelligence requirements must first be determined. Commanders are responsible for stating what they need to know, and when they need to know it. Once intelligence requirements are known, the intelligence staff meets the requirements from existing data bases or through the collection process.

3. **Collection.** Collection involves the exploitation of sources by collection agencies as well as the exploitation of sources and agencies by intelligence staffs. It includes the timely delivery of collected information to intelligence staffs for use in the production of intelligence. Collection agencies must be kept aware of the operational situation and of the importance of relaying information which they believe to be important, even if they have not been specifically tasked to provide that information. They must also inform their tasking authority immediately whenever they are unable to carry out their assigned task so that other agencies can be employed.

4. **Processing.** Processing is a five-step sequence that converts information into intelligence.

- a. **Collation**, the registering, recording, and sorting incoming information into related groupings to facilitate systematic processing;
- b. **Evaluation**, the determination of the reliability of a source and the credibility of the information provided;
- c. **Analysis**, the identification of salient facts from information received and the derivation of conclusions based on these facts;
- d. **Integration**, the creation of an overall pattern of knowledge from the sum of analysed information; and
- e. **Interpretation**, the assessment of what the processed information means.

5. **Dissemination.** Dissemination is the timely distribution of intelligence, in an appropriate format, by any suitable means, to those who need it. Regardless of format, intelligence products must be disseminated in accordance with the principles of clarity, brevity, regularity, standard terminology, appropriate security, and urgency. The intelligence staff is responsible for ensuring that all information and intelligence is passed to those who need it, including intelligence staffs in superior, subordinate and flanking HQs.

2004. THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

1. The intelligence estimate is the appraisal of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. This estimate, expressed orally or in writing, provides commanders with a reliable basis for making operational decisions.

2. There is no standard format for an intelligence estimate, but it should take into account the following:

- a. the mission;

- b. the terrain, waters and weather;
 - c. the enemy situation;
 - d. the enemy's activities and capabilities, including the possibility of reinforcements and forces in adjacent areas being brought to bear on friendly operations;
 - e. the enemy's options and possible courses of action in the area of operations and in adjacent areas; and
 - f. the enemy's likely intentions, including the aims and objectives in immediate and subsequent operations.
3. In developing the intelligence estimate, assessments must be based on the best available intelligence rather than on speculation. When there are gaps in intelligence on the enemy situation, assumptions may be made; however, the assumptions have to be identified clearly and separated from known facts.

2005. INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

1. An intelligence organization must be established with necessary personnel and equipment well before the deployment to a theatre of operations. A TFHQ should include intelligence staff as part of its permanent cadre.
2. For any operation, an intelligence plan, which explains how the intelligence staff will provide intelligence support, needs to be prepared. The plan takes into account the following:
- a. **Personnel.** The intelligence plan must consider the need for intelligence personnel to maintain the intelligence cycle on a 24/7 basis. In combined operations, personnel will also be required to liaise with allied intelligence organizations and staffs. The plan must also identify the sources from which the intelligence personnel will be drawn.
 - b. **Communications.** Intelligence relies on dedicated, rapid, secure communications for the relay of collected information to the intelligence staff and the dissemination of intelligence to users. The intelligence plan, along with the force communications plan, must provide for this requirement.
 - c. **ADP.** The intelligence staff requires access to adequate ADP equipment, which must be capable of handling information at the highest security classification level.
 - d. **Special Compartmentalized Information Facility (SCIF).** A deployable SCIF is an essential element of a TFHQ. It allows the reception and processing of highly sensitive, compartmented information and intelligence
 - e. **SOPs.** Simple, concise SOPs to guide the activity of the intelligence staff need to be developed.
3. The intelligence plan is generally provided as an annex to the TFC-s plan. Alternatively, it could be prepared separately as one of a number of supporting plans. The TFC's operation order will also include an intelligence annex.
4. In a CF operation, the tasks of the intelligence staff include:
- a. collection, processing and dissemination of current intelligence;
 - b. preparation of a collection plan and a surveillance plan which incorporate all assets available to the force;
 - c. preparation of the intelligence estimate;
 - d. provision of intelligence on the enemy's, or potential enemy's, location, organization, capabilities and intentions;

- e. provision of intelligence on the terrain, waters and weather in the theatre of operations and how these affect the enemy's ability to operate;
- f. provision of target intelligence;
- g. assessment of battle damage;
- h. coordination of counter-intelligence operations;
- i. liaison with allied intelligence staffs in the theatre of operations; and
- j. liaison with national intelligence staffs.

These tasks will be performed in the priority established by the TFC .

2006. AREAS OF INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITY AND INTEREST

1. A TFC, will usually be allocated an area of intelligence responsibility: within which he is responsible for the provision of intelligence. The main effort of the intelligence staff, within capabilities of the TFs reconnaissance and surveillance assets, will be directed to this area.

2. The TFC also needs intelligence about enemy activities and capabilities in adjacent areas if these can affect the mission, or if the TFC can affect the enemy's operations in these areas. Surrounding the area of intelligence responsibility, therefore, is an area of intelligence interest, and is defined as: **that area within which a commander requires intelligence on those factors and developments likely to affect the outcome of his current or future operations.** Since this area will likely be beyond the TFC's intelligence collection capability, they will be required to request information or intelligence from higher or adjacent formations. For this, intelligence liaison staff may be required, particularly in combined operations.

2007. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

1. The TF J2 staff must possess sufficient knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of sources and agencies available to them to be able to evaluate their reliability and to select and task them appropriately.

2. Sources can be categorized by the type of sensor by which information and intelligence is obtained. Sources which are likely to be of greatest operational value include:

- a. **Signal Intelligence (SIGINT).** SIGINT is obtained from the interception and interpretation of all electromagnetic emissions. It is divided into communications intelligence (COMINT) and non-communications electronic intelligence (ELINT).
- b. **Imagery Intelligence (IMINT).** This type of intelligence is derived from imagery obtained by photographic, electro-optical, radar, infra-red and thermal sensors. Imagery sensors range from hand-held cameras to sophisticated electro-optical devices mounted on satellites and aircraft.
- c. **Human Intelligence (HUMINT).** The generic term for any intelligence obtained from human sources. This includes reconnaissance patrols, prisoners of war and defectors, espionage, contact reports, and liaison and attaché reports. HUMINT is often the only means of ascertaining enemy activity and intentions.
- d. **Documentary Intelligence (DOCINT).** This type of intelligence is based on the assessment of information derived from both published material and the broadcasting media (open sources). However, it may also use material not published in open sources.
- e. **Acoustic Intelligence (ACINT).** ACINT is derived from the collection and analysis of acoustic phenomena.

- f. **Technical intelligence (TECHINT).** TECHINT, consisting of intelligence concerning foreign technological developments and the performance and operational capabilities of foreign equipment, is an end product of the analysis process, where information from several sources is fused to provide a technical assessment.

2. The intelligence collection plan should use sources in a manner that maximizes the individual advantages of each source and collectively provides the fullest picture of the enemy. In selecting particular sources, intelligence staff should consider the time lapse between the tasking of the source and the receipt of the requested information.

2008. INTELLIGENCE IN OPERATIONS

1. The TFC is served by an intelligence staff which obtains information and intelligence from a variety of sources and agencies and provides timely intelligence on the enemy and the theatre of operations.

2. The CDS, in allocating forces and defining the support available for an operation, defines the level of intelligence support available to the TFC. The CDS is assisted in this responsibility by the DCDS and the COS J2.

3. The COS J2 organization comprises the primary strategic intelligence capability of the CF. This is a CF intelligence organization with capabilities across the full intelligence spectrum. COS J2 maintains a 24/7 watch, in the National Defence Intelligence Centre (NDIC), which is the main conduit for intelligence to and from a TFHQ. The TFC determines what intelligence capabilities and assets are needed to support the COO and then liaises with COS J2 to establish how the force can be supported by the COS J2 organization. Requests for intelligence support from other national agencies and from allied agencies are routed through COS J2, although, once these links are established, the TFC may liaise directly with these agencies (see Figure 20-1).




Figure 20-1 Intelligence Support to Operations

2009. GEOMATICS SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

1. Geomatics support planning must start as soon as an operation is initiated (preliminary planning should be undertaken during the warning phase). Acquisition and standardization of geomatics data and products must begin early to ensure a sufficient level of support to operations. All operation plans will have a Geomatics Support Annex produced in conjunction with the development of the Military Engineering SUP.

2. Geomatics support plans provide two levels of support. The first consists of national level support through the provision of capabilities and materiel such as digital data, charts and maps. The second consists of direct support to the TFC through the provision of specialist personnel and equipment for such functions as terrain analysis, surveying and map distribution.

2010. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

1. The J2 staff of a TFHQ is directly responsible to the TFC for intelligence and geomatics matters.

2. The J2 staff is mainly responsible for assisting the TFC by providing all possible intelligence concerning the enemy, the situation, and the terrain and waters in the area of operations. Besides determining enemy force location and what their apparent activities, this intelligence includes a sophisticated knowledge of the enemy, which includes enemy goals, objectives, strategy, intentions, capabilities, doctrine and tactics, and vulnerabilities. The J2 staff also provides the TFC with the geomatics data and products needed for the conduct of operations.

3. The J2 staff must interact closely with the TFC and with other TFHQ staffs, as well as with intelligence staffs in superior, adjacent and subordinate HQ. Since intelligence and operations are closely related activities, the J2 and J3 divisions must cooperate.

CHAPTER 21
MILITARY POLICE

SECTION I
INTRODUCTION

2101. THREAT ENVIRONMENT

1. The end of the once stabilizing East-West Cold War has dramatically altered the security threat environment. No longer is there one dominant, highly skilled and capable adversary, an adversary whose capabilities and intentions were once well known and understood in terms of the threats to security - espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorism and criminal activities.

2. There now exists a new security threat environment, one which is notably more complex and uncertain. This new environment is reflected in the growing number of regional conflicts and profusion of adversaries who are, for the most part, unknown in terms of their capabilities and intentions. The threat may emanate from the belligerents, NGOs, other participating contingents/forces, criminal organizations and special interest groups. Corruption, transnational organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, extremism and severe economic disparity further complicate the identification and countering of security threats.

2102. SECURITY MEASURES

1. **General.** Security is described as the condition achieved when designated information, materiel, personnel, activities and installations are protected against espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorism, criminal acts and against loss or unauthorized disclosure. Security provides a commander with the freedom of action to conduct operations in an environment where the threat to operations and to forces is reduced. The threat environment described above clearly demonstrates that greater emphasis is required on protecting a forces finite resources. A degree of security commensurate with the threat is essential to all operations; however, security measures can only be expected to reduce the risk but not to eliminate or reduce the threat itself. Security is further amplified in *B-GG-005-004/AF-009, CF MP Doctrine*.

2. **Security in Operations.** The measures available and utilized to provide security in periods of reduced threat or tension are essentially the same as those employed during periods of emergency and increased tension. Security is achieved through the cooperative effort of all functions, disciplines and organizations. One aspect of security cannot be viewed or considered in isolation of others. Security is an integral part of the overall operation planning process. The security posture of military forces is enhanced through:

- a. **Operations Security.** OPSEC measures, further described in Section II, are those activities unique to a specific operation or exercise which are employed in conjunction with other security measures; and
- b. **Force Protection (FP).** The fusion of protective security and CI measures to enhance the protection and survivability of forces. This fusion requires a coordinated staff effort. This does not imply that one staff discipline assumes control or responsibility for issues managed by another. FP is described in Section III.

3. **Military Police (MP).** Police, security, custodial and FP technical advice and personnel are provided to support commanders and staffs in planning and effecting security operations. MP support is described in Section IV.

SECTION II

OPERATIONS SECURITY AND DECEPTION

2103. INTRODUCTION

1. The scale and thoroughness of the reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities of modern forces, insurgent groups and terrorist organizations are formidable. An intelligence attack may be mounted by a non-belligerent power or force for its own use or to provide support to an ally or friend. An adversary's knowledge of an operation, plans or force capabilities would compromise surprise and perhaps the overall operation. Definitions as found in AAP-6 are:

- a. **OPSEC.** The process which gives a military operation appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces; and
- b. **Deception.** Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.

2. There is a relationship between OPSEC and deception. OPSEC aims to prevent an adversary from identifying friendly dispositions, capabilities and intentions, whereas deception aims deliberately to present a false picture. While an OPSEC plan need not include deception; a deception plan must include OPSEC to hide the reality and assist in presenting a false picture to the adversary. While OPSEC denies information to an adversary, deception fills that void with information tailored for his consumption.

2104. OPERATIONS SECURITY

1. **General.** Security is an integral part of the overall operation planning process. OPSEC concentrates on identifying and protecting those aspects of an operation plan which are considered vital to the success of the operation. As it is not possible to conceal every military action in support of an operation, security measures should concentrate on those activities which could indicate an impending operation or reveal any vulnerabilities.

2. **Principles.** The successful application of OPSEC principles leads to the implementation of appropriate measures. If a particular measure is inappropriate or fails, an operation may either be unsuccessful, or disrupted to such a degree that it is ineffective. The principles which govern the implementation of the OPSEC process are:

- a. **Adversary's Viewpoint.** An OPSEC assessment should be conducted from the adversary's viewpoint. The key to identifying critical information is to determine what can be deduced from a particular event or piece of information; hence the importance of protecting essential elements of friendly intelligence (EEFI). Where there is more than one adversary, care must be taken to conduct an assessment from each of their points of view as the value of an EEFI may vary from one adversary to another.
- b. **Critical Information.** OPSEC assessments must identify those critical EEFI which an adversary might use to disrupt or defeat an operation. It is a process to ensure protection of critical, not all, information.
- c. **Coordination at the Highest Level.** The plan must be coordinated at the highest level of command and distributed on a strict need to know basis. General dissemination could result in individual units initiating independent OPSEC measures, to the detriment of the overall plan.
- d. **Comprehensiveness.** OPSEC must address all operational activities, including administration, logistics, communications and information systems and movement.
- e. **Timeliness.** Vulnerability assessments must be made before, or early in the operation planning process. OPSEC cannot successfully be imposed after an event as it is difficult to determine what may have been compromised and what remedial measures are required.

- f. **Appropriateness.** An accurate assessment of friendly indicators and of the adversary's RISTA capabilities will ensure that measures taken are appropriate, and do not divert valuable assets from the operation itself.
 - g. **Flexibility.** The plan must be capable of change at short notice and should be continuously reviewed to examine past events and anticipate new threats.
 - h. **Systems Analysis** The security of coordinated programmes and procedures should be examined. Static or isolated installations, documents, equipment and/or events should be included in the plan only when they form or contribute to EEFI. Otherwise, they should be addressed in standing security measures.
3. **Responsibility.** OPSEC is a command responsibility. At the operational level, J3 Plans is responsible for planning OPSEC and J3 Ops is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the OPSEC measures. The J3 Staff is assisted in their efforts by the J2 staff, the formation Provost Marshal (PM) and other appropriate staff branches.

2105. DECEPTION

1. Deception can make a direct contribution to the achievement of surprise and an indirect contribution to security and economy of effort. Successful deception multiplies force effectiveness, reduces the expenditure of time, effort and resources, and can have far-reaching psychological effects for both friend and foe. The aims of deception are to gain surprise, maintain security, increase freedom of action, mislead the adversary and induce him to take action which is to his disadvantage and which can be exploited. There are two types of deception measures:
- a. **Offensive Measures.** These involve the active dissemination of false information in order to mislead an adversary about future intentions. Their main purpose is to achieve surprise, and to hold the initiative, at least at the local level.
 - b. **Defensive Measures.** These offer deceptive information to an adversary who holds the initiative. Credible substitutes are used to divert his attention and effort away from genuine dispositions and targets.
2. Deception measures aim to give an adversary a false idea and presuppose an effective counter surveillance designed to prevent the adversary from observing indications of genuine activity. Deception planning is conducted and coordinated by operations staff at all levels and should, like security, involve all staff functions.
- a. **Strategic.** This level intends to mislead an adversary at the highest level about the time, place, strength and nature of intended operations. In allied operations, this level of deception would normally be planned at the NATO HQ level, taking into account the position of countries adjoining the area of operations. NDHQ J3 coordinates national strategic level deception planning, as necessary, with allied forces.
 - b. **Operational.** Deception at this level covers those measures which mislead the adversary about the conduct of operations. It is planned and directed at the TFHQ level and must support the strategic deception plan.
 - c. **Tactical.** Tactical deception incorporates all measures to mislead the adversary in the maritime, land, air or space environments. It supports operational deception plans, and should be coordinated at TFHQ.
3. **Principles.** When developing a deception plan, the following principles should be selectively applied:
- a. a clear aim C deception must have a clearly defined aim which supports the operation plan;
 - b. centralized control C success depends on a high degree of staff cooperation in the planning, execution and monitoring of the deception plan. Uncoordinated deception activities may cause confusion amongst friendly forces and may compromise the deception plan;
 - c. preparation C deception must be directed at a specific target. Successful deception requires detailed prior knowledge of the target and their procedures. All measures needed to support and monitor the deception plan must be thoroughly prepared, including the assessment of the target's reaction to the measures;

- d. credibility C deception must never be seen to be incongruous or illogical. Where possible, it must be consistent with the pattern of events an enemy has reason to expect;
- e. corroboration C false indicators must be presented to the enemy through as many of his own sources as possible. Confirmation of these multiple sources must not produce so complete a picture as to arouse suspicion, but must be sufficiently persuasive to allow the enemy to accept the indicators as valid;
- f. flexibility C the ability to abandon or change the deception plan without revealing its original aim, or to take advantage of an adversary's reactions, is required.
- g. timing C a crucial element. An adversary must be given sufficient time to notice, interpret and react to false information, but insufficient time to analyse it thoroughly; and
- h. security C even though deception entails the release of information to an adversary, the principle of security must still be applied. Information has to be released in such a way that the absence of normal security rules does not arouse suspicion. More importantly, the deceptive purpose of the information released must be strictly concealed from the enemy. To achieve this, it may be necessary to conceal from friendly forces the true purpose of their operations.

SECTION III

FORCE PROTECTION

2106. GENERAL CONCEPT

1. Commanders are responsible for the protection of their operations, activities, establishments, personnel, information and materiel. FP embodies the means, resources and measures available to a commander to fulfill these responsibilities and thus enhances the conduct and continuity of operations.
2. FP is the fusion of existing military components: counter-intelligence (principally counter HUMINT) activities and information; protective security (physical, personnel, and information security) programs and certain military police activities. These mutually supporting components are organized in depth and coordinated, to prevent gaps and overlaps, to effect FP; this permits the detection, identification, assessment and countering, neutralization or exploitation of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, subversion and criminal activities.
3. FP is mainly a national responsibility. Reflective of the threat, FP commences at the strategic level and extends down to the tactical level, through the operational level. The TFC applies FP within the TF area of responsibility, which is coordinated with the host nation and Allied forces. The exchange of FP threat analysis information is a precondition to achieving FP.

2107. OBJECTIVES

1. Secrecy is a critical element in dominating the area of operations and enhancing freedom of action to carry out the mission. The TFC preserves the principle of secrecy, by fulfilling the following objectives of FP:
 - a. to reduce the risk posed by an adversary to operations, information, personnel and material identified for protection, such that operations and routine activities can be conducted relatively free from interference;
 - b. to reduce the fear and uncertainty generated by an adversary and instill a feeling of well being, safety and confidence; and
 - c. to facilitate and enhance operations and activities.
2. FP objectives are achieved when the activities of an adversary, and the apprehension generated by these activities, are reduced to a level such that operations or routine activities can proceed relatively free from significant interference. FP reduces the vulnerability of those assets designated for safeguarding, but does not, in actuality, eliminate or reduce the identified threat agents. If required, this elimination or reduction will require the TFC to take offensive action, such as the commitment of combat or combat support resources. FP is achieved by:
 - a. providing for FP at the earliest possible stages of planning;
 - b. establishing interlocking protective measures in depth;
 - c. minimizing risks through defensive measures, containment, avoidance or acceptance. For example, concentrating what is to be protected into the smallest area possible;
 - d. enforcing common minimum standards of security;
 - e. conducting threat awareness training of all ranks; and
 - f. ensuring cooperation and information exchange between allied counter-HUMINT, MP and J2 staffs.

2108. PRINCIPLES AND FUNCTIONS

1. **Principles.** The principles of FP are:
 - a. **Measures Proportioned to Threat.** Any attempt to achieve as absolute FP is impracticable and wasteful of resources. Any FP measure is vulnerable, hence the need for threat-risk and vulnerability assessments;
 - b. **All-round Protection.** FP must meet the adversary from any direction;
 - c. **In-depth Protection.** FP must be provided for in depth. TF units are responsible for internal measures;
 - d. **Legality.** FP, in particular counter-HUMINT investigations and operations, must respect the rule of law;
 - e. **Universality.** Although the TFC bears the ultimate responsibility for FP, everyone regardless of position or status has a personal responsibility; and
 - f. **Centralized Control.** FP is centrally controlled, with assigned tasks decentralized for execution. Centralized control ensures that FP operations and activities are:
 - (1) coordinated to ensure FP resources and activities are dedicated to attaining the TFC's mission; and
 - (2) in compliance with Canadian Law, international agreements, SOFAs, ROE and DND/CF policies.
2. **Components.** The principle components that comprise FP are:
 - a. **Counter Intelligence.** Activities principally in the field of counter-HUMINT, intended to counter the threat from espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorism and organized criminal activities. This includes threat information on the adversary that results from the conduct of investigations, operations and liaison. Information obtained through CI initiatives is the basis from which security intelligence is developed and maintained. Threat and risk assessments are subsequently developed from this intelligence;
 - b. **Counter-Terrorism (CT).** Measures to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism, and to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.
 - c. **Protective Security.** The organized system of defensive measures instituted and maintained at all levels of command with the aim of achieving and maintaining security. Generally, this includes:
 - (1) **Physical Security.** That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, materiel and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. The TF Engr is responsible for advising the TFC on physical security engineering and FP and to coordinate physical security engineering tasks with the J3 and CF Provost Marshall (PM);
 - (2) **Information Security.** The identification and marking of information (paper and electronic) which requires protection, physical segregation, limitation of access to on a need to know basis, and the exchange of multilateral protocols which permit commanders to retain confidence while releasing their sensitive information to allied forces or those who need to know but have not otherwise been security certified/cleared; and
 - (3) **Personnel Security.** The authorization, by security certification/classification procedures, of selected personnel to have access to classified or designated information or assets.
 - d. **Military Police Operations.** The very nature and scope of duties assigned, permits MPs to contribute directly to FP objectives. Exchange of information between MP and CI personnel is essential and frequently develops information which may fall into the jurisdiction of the other. Both can develop measures to deny an adversary information and materiel. When permissible by law, both cooperate with and may jointly

conduct raids, cordon and search operations, and apprehend persons of CI interest.

3. **Force Protection Capabilities and Functions.** FP provides a number of capabilities to a TFC. The main functions and purpose of selected FP capabilities are as follows:

a. **CI.** The threat from foreign intelligence services is multifaceted in form. These services collect information through the systematic exploitation of a designated target making use of multiple sources. CI as a function of security/FP aims to identify and counter the HUMINT threat; other CI measures are administered under the intelligence function (chapter 20). FP support to CI collection and operations includes:

- (1) **Deployable CI Teams.** For safety reasons, CI operators are deployed in two person teams. The next organizational level is a six-person team comprising five MP CI/FP personnel and one CI analyst. CI teams consist of accredited and trained CI officers and NCMs. Intelligence and MP personnel may be attached to the teams. CI teams provide for the C2 of CI, conduct investigations and information collection, analyse CI products, and provide input to intelligence and security operations; and
- (2) **CI Investigations and Operations.** CI investigations are conducted, in accordance with Canadian law, DND/CF policies and MOUs with Allied forces, to detect, exploit, neutralize or prevent espionage activities; and to detect and resolve incidents of foreign directed sabotage, subversion, terrorism and organized criminal activities. CI operations engage foreign intelligence services (FoIS) through human or technical efforts.

b. **Assessment and Information Management**

- (1) **Force Protection Estimate.** This assessment of the adversary's capabilities, situation, likely intentions, and most probable course(s) of action, aids the development of operational and FP plans;
- (2) **Force Protection Analysis and Threat Assessments.** FP analysis provides planners and policy makers with threat knowledge about any adversary or area of the world in which the CF may operate. It is obtained by fusing information and intelligence acquired from security intelligence, counter-HUMINT activities, and military police service or criminal intelligence sources and agencies.
- (3) **Force Protection Collection Plan.** A FP collection plan is prepared by FP staffs to coordinate the FP/ counter-HUMINT collection effort. This collection plan is coordinated with the intelligence collection plan and is based on the FP estimate and the FP threat assessment. The FP collection plan is continuously monitored and is adjusted as the situation changes; and
- (4) **Force Protection Database.** The FP database contains baseline and current intelligence and information acquired from security intelligence, counter-HUMINT activities and military police service/criminal intelligence sources and agencies. The FP database normally concentrates on personnel, organizations and installations of FP interest, and is developed and maintained by FP staff.

c. **Defensive Security Measures.** Although many defensive means are available, some of the key capabilities/functions of FP include:

- (1) **Defensive Security Briefings and Debriefings.** These activities are conducted at the strategic and operational level. They involve own forces personnel, deserters, defectors, detainees, POWs, refugees, or any other source of FP interest;
- (2) **Technical Support Activities.** Technical support activities include technical surveillance countermeasures, polygraph and information technology security. These specialized services are deployed, as required, from strategic resources; normally no lower than the operational level;
- (3) **Vulnerability Assessments.** A vulnerability assessment is a process of compiling and examining information on the security posture of establishments, operations, activities, personnel, information

systems technology and activities. An assessment from the adversary's viewpoint is central to the design and conduct of adequate and appropriate measures to enhance the TFC's FP capability;

- (4) **Awareness Training.** Personnel must understand the definition, nature and dimensions of the threat and their role in achieving and maintaining FP; and
 - (5) **Personnel Protection.** Threat dependant, specially trained body guards and protection personnel and/or teams can be provided for the protection of designated personnel.
- d. **Vetting of Foreign Nationals.** This activity involves investigations by counter-HUMINT personnel of the character of personnel applying for employment, to prevent persons of doubtful reliability from having access to sensitive or classified information.
 - e. **Liaison.** Liaison is conducted to obtain information, gain assistance and coordinate or procure material. The nature of counter-HUMINT activities and the many legal restrictions, including SOFAs or other agreements, make the collection of information largely dependent on effective liaison.
 - f. **Special Operations.** Support to OPSEC, PYSOPS, IW, deception programs, as well as criminal and CI investigation/operations.

2109. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. **General.** TFCs, based on threat-risk and vulnerability assessments, tailor FP to support the mission profile, commensurate with available resources. The TFC decides when and to what degree FP is applied to each phase of an operation by balancing the security risks posed by a hostile adversary against time, resources or priorities.
2. **Strategic Level Coordination.** CF PM, through CF PM Int, is responsible, in coordination with the J2, to provide the CDS, and the NDHQ J staff with FP threat analysis/assessments and advice. CF PM will advise on the need for FP forces and as appropriate, develop the supporting concept and generate the necessary personnel and equipment from strategic MP assets.
3. **Operational Level Coordination.** All formations, units and staff contribute to FP through their various disciplines and functions. The HQ staff assists the TFC in the coordination and planning of FP measures as follows:
 - a. J2 is responsible for coordinating the counterintelligence programme and the integration of all source intelligence. Accordingly, FP analysis and assessments must be coordinated with the J2;
 - b. J3 provides overall staff coordination for all security measures, protective security and OPSEC; and
 - c. The PM is the TFC's MP and FP advisor. The PM is responsible for FP staff advice, planning and for the coordination of MP/FP operations. In this context, the PM maintains close liaison with the J2 and J3.
4. The MP unit includes a FP element which is responsible to provide MP/FP support to the TF. Normally, a FP (CI) coordinator is appointed to assist the J2 with staff coordination of FP/CI matters. The MP unit is tasked for FP tasks by the TFC via the TF intelligence collection plan and operations orders. The J2 coordinates authorized FP/CI matters directly with the MP unit's assigned FP staff coordinator.
5. **Domestic operations.** Domestic operations generally follow the same protocols described above for FP planning and coordination. However, the senior MP FP officer assigned to support the TFC would complement the planning staff and FP elements would normally be assigned OPCON to the TFC.

2110. FORCE PROTECTION PLANNING

1. FP must be integrated into the OPP and addressed in all contingency plans. CF PM Plans is the OPI for FP input to planning; CF PM Int and J2 Plans have OCI concerns. As the role of FP support to a TF is to provide threat information on the area of operations, early notification of deployments is necessary to effect the collection and analysis efforts. This ensures the provision of timely and accurate threat information. During the early phases of deployment a TF is most susceptible to the threat. Therefore, predeployment of FP resources is essential to provide the TF direct and immediate contact with HN security and intelligence services to collect FP information.
2. The TFC, with the advice of the FP advisor and with input from J2, formulates, validates and prioritizes the FP intelligence collection requirements. Responsibility for the execution, quality and timeliness of the collection effort rests with the senior FP advisor.
3. Factors in determining FP requirements are as follows:
 - a. assigned mission;
 - b. area of responsibility to be protected;
 - c. nature and scope of operations and activities;
 - d. classification/designation level of operational activity, information or equipment;
 - e. strategic, operational, tactical value of operations, activity, information or equipment;
 - f. vulnerability of operational activity, information or equipment;
 - g. environmental (political, economic, legal or geographical) issues; and
 - h. feasibility.

2111. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER PROTECTION ACTIVITIES

1. FP may, as the situation dictates, interface with OPSEC, IW and military intelligence, EW, PSYOPS, area security and CIMIC activities which all have secondary FP roles. Specifically:
 - a. **Military Intelligence.** FP threat analysis and reporting is separate and distinct from military intelligence., which is concerned with threats originating from foreign military and paramilitary forces. Notwithstanding, the intelligence that results from FP analysis must be coordinated with the J2;
 - b. **OPSEC.** FP supports the TFC's OPSEC programs by providing assessments of friendly vulnerabilities; threats of espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism; and assistance in guarding against these threats;
 - c. **Deception.** See article 2105;
 - d. **Information Warfare.** All aspects of FP are applicable to IW, which is discussed in chapter 32.; and
 - e. **PSYOPS.** FP support to PSYOPS consists of detecting, deterring, or neutralizing FoIS targeting of PSYOPS plans, operations, personnel, and equipment, especially at the operational level. See also chapter 34.

SECTION IV

MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS

2112. INTRODUCTION

1. MP support to operations is provided through the coordinated effort of all MP units. Generally, close support is provided by integral or assigned MP unit(s) while general support is provided by the Canadian Military Police Support Regiment (CMPSR). MP support to domestic operations is provided by the assigned/integral MP forces and the Special Investigation Unit. CF PM retains technical control over all MP operations.
2. MP units are commanded by MP officers who are responsive to their respective commander. To ensure operational efficiency and integrity of operations, MP unit commanders perform both line command and staff advisory functions, while MP units are structured to provide permanent staff support to the supported HQ.
3. Further detail on MP support may be found in *B-GG-005-004/AF-009, MP Support to CF Operations*.

2113. MP ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. CF PM is responsible to the CDS for strategic level MP planning and coordination. Although reflected under a J3 title, CF PM is, in essence, an autonomous staff cell responsible to DCDS. The broad scope of CF PM's responsibilities, requirements to liaise and coordinate actions with all J Staff Branches and the legal constraints imposed upon MP personnel require this measure of independence.
2. The TFC is assigned a MP officer who is designated the PM. The PM is responsible for MP planning and the coordination of all MP operations. The PM is responsible to the COS for routine staffing with direct access to the TFC as required. The PM normally establishes a staff cell at the TFHQ, with responsibilities to:
 - a. advise the TFC, staff and subordinate commanders and units on MP matters;
 - b. develop operational level policies and plans for MP and FP matters;
 - c. plan and coordinate operations and matters pertaining to police, custody, security and FP, including criminal and security intelligence;
 - d. liaison with allied and civilian police and security agencies;
 - e. assist J2 in planning and coordinating CI operations, and in developing the threat assessment;
 - f. assist J3/J4 in planning operational/administrative movement, assigning routes and traffic control;
 - g. assist J3 in OPSEC planning;
 - h. in conjunction with J5, plan and coordinate population movement and support to CIMIC; and
 - i. In conjunction with J1, coordinate matters pertaining to discipline and custody.
3. The size and structure of close and general support MP units is based on the mission, COO and TF structure. Notwithstanding the composition of the line capability, a MP/FP advisor is assigned to the TFHQ; normally the rank of the senior MP officer allocated to a TFC for international operations is as follows:
 - a. JTF - LCol;
 - b. TF - LCol or Maj;

- c. TF of independent brigade / regimental size - Maj (Capt if a senior MP officer is elsewhere in theatre); and
- d. TF of battalion size - Capt. The minimum rank to advise on tactical matters is normally a WO.

2114. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. NDHQ CF PM retains technical control of MP operations of a TF through the PM. Likewise, the PM exercises technical control over all component MP personnel on MP matters. The TF PM is authorized direct liaison with NDHQ and any allied military or civilian police and may delegate such authority for technical matters.

2. The TF PM commands the MPU and is subordinate directly to the FC. The TF PM normally reports to the FC through the COS for routine staffing matters but may exercise the right of direct access for either line or MP staff matters. C2 is shown graphically in figure 21-1. See figure 21-1.




Figure 21-1 MP Command and Control

2115. OPERATIONAL LEVEL MP SUPPORT

- 1. **General operational support.** MP operational support includes:
 - a. Providing commanders with case management and rapid investigation capability for serious incidents;
 - b. Protecting designated high risk personnel;

c. Supporting the production of movement plans and assisting with traffic control by:

- (1) route reconnaissance, signing and surveillance;
- (2) traffic regulation on military routes and through defiles;
- (3) control of stragglers, refugees/displaced persons and other noncombatants; and
- (4) dissemination of traffic and route information.

d. Assisting with FP/area security along lines of communication by:

- (1) reconnaissance and surveillance, including monitoring, marking and reporting NBC contamination;
- (2) escorting high value convoys;
- (3) reporting and controlling incidents;
- (4) vital point/installation protection and special security operations;
- (5) security surveys, inspection, screening and investigation;
- (6) security threat/vulnerability assessments;
- (7) defensive security briefing/debriefings;
- (8) counter-HUMINT collection;
- (9) CI operations/investigations;
- (11) identification services; and
- (12) prisoner of war/detainee control, evacuation, holding and international transfer/exchange.

2. **Crime Prevention.** Includes the following:

- a. advising and assisting in the maintenance of security;
- b. providing high profile uniformed patrols to deter and reduce opportunities for crime and terrorism; and
- c. providing advice and assistance in crime prevention, including personal security, drug abuse and fraud.

3. **Law Enforcement and Assistance with Maintaining Discipline.** MP provide the following:

- a. conducting criminal/service offence investigations and providing evidence required to exonerate or to report persons for possible judicial or disciplinary action;
- b. investigating serious non-criminal incidents affecting persons or interests;
- c. investigating complaints and claims against the CF and providing a Courts liaison service;
- d. assisting commanders and staffs with information and advice on police and disciplinary matters;
- e. advising and assisting with the restoration and maintenance of law and order;

- f. assisting and supporting other allied and external law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies; and
 - g. operating a Detention Barrack and providing custodial services when required.
4. **Provision of 24 Hour Response Service of Assistance, Advice and Information**
- a. providing commanders with an interface between the military and the civil police;
 - b. collecting, collating and disseminating criminal, vehicle and terrorist information;
 - c. providing a 24 hour response service to military forces; and
 - d. providing a 24 hour interface and coordination service with civilian emergency and other public services.
5. **Support to Civil Military Affairs**
- a. civil law enforcement/restoration operations;
 - b. oversight, training and coordination for the restoration of police, penitentiary and custom services;
 - c. coordination with police, security, custom and penitentiary services to support military operations;
 - d. advice/support to J5 CIMIC regarding routes, population control, law enforcement and security matters; and
 - e. joint police and security patrols with UN/Allied civil police or host/national/civilian police and security services to enhance cooperation and trust.

CHAPTER 23

MILITARY ENGINEER SUPPORT

2301. INTRODUCTION

1. Forces at all levels require military engineer support. Military engineers provide support to intelligence, operations, logistics and CIMIC activities. In a CF operation, environmental components of the TF include organic engineer elements to provide close support to tactical operations. Operational level military engineer capabilities and resources are required to provide general support to the TF. Military engineer support throughout the entire area of operations is coordinated by the TF Engr staff and his staff. Specialist engineer support such as architecture design, civilian contracting or fire protection services (FPS) which exceed the component engineer capabilities are part of the engineer general support provided to the TF by the Engineer Support Unit (ESU).

2302. PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY ENGINEER SUPPORT

1. The following planning principles serve as a guide for the provision engineer support:
 - a. **Centralized Coordination, Decentralized Execution.** The execution of engineer tasks requires careful control and coordination of personnel, equipment and materiel. The most efficient use of scarce resources is generally achieved through centralized coordination at the highest practicable level, with execution delegated to the lowest practical level.
 - b. **Allocation of Priorities.** To ensure the best use of engineer resources, commanders at each level must assign priorities to all engineer tasks. The completion of high priority tasks may require non engineer personnel to execute lower priority tasks under military engineer supervision.
 - c. **Early Warning and Reconnaissance.** The successful and timely completion of engineer tasks depends upon the availability of personnel, equipment and materiel. Good engineer intelligence and timely reconnaissance are also needed. Engineers must participate in the operation planning process from the onset since a surge of engineer effort is normally required at the beginning of an operation in order to establish basic services.
 - d. **Logistic Support.** The successful execution of engineer tasks depends on the availability of a variety of equipment, stores and materiel. Appropriate arrangements must be made to coordinate the supply, maintenance and repair of military engineer resources.
 - e. **Communications.** Communications are vital to engineer commanders to allow them to command their widely dispersed troops effectively, to review priorities, and to keep the TFC informed of engineer matters. Engineer commanders must be able to receive reconnaissance reports and engineer intelligence, issue orders quickly and clearly, and receive regular progress reports.
 - f. **Continuity.** The most effective and efficient means to complete engineer tasks is to ensure the unit or personnel that commence the task remain to complete the same task. Redeployment or reassignment of engineer forces can break continuity, cause delays or the loss of detailed knowledge of the situation at hand.
2. The following organizational principles serve as a guide for the provision of engineer support:
 - a. **Close Support.** The first organizational principle of employing engineer forces is the "task organized" concept of close support. It provides sufficient quantities of engineer personnel, equipment and other task specific resources to provide immediate engineer support (mobility, counter-mobility and survivability) to assist the TFC. This concept of close support can be equally applied to either of the land or air components of a TF. Within the maritime component there is only limited close support capability.

- b. **General Support.** The second related organizational principle, the concept of general support, encompasses the larger spectrum of the organization of an engineer force. Its purpose is to execute such tasks as water supply, maintenance of MSRs, provision and maintenance of accommodations, utilities and services, provision of air landing facilities, bulk water and fuel storage, and EOD/ Battlefield Munitions Disposal (BMD) to the TF as a whole. Regardless of the location within the theatre of operations, the concept of general support could be applied by personnel from any of the environmental components. A general support engineer element may also reinforce the close support engineer capabilities if required. However, in the context of airfield engineering support, the breakdown of close and general support does not specifically apply due to the inherent capabilities within the Airfield Engineering Squadron (AES) structure.


2303. CONCEPT OF MILITARY ENGINEER SUPPORT

1. The **role** of military engineers is to assist friendly forces to live, move and fight, and to deny the same ability to the enemy. Land force engineers have the secondary role to fight as infantry when required.
2. Military engineer support, as a whole, includes the entire spectrum of those **functions** of combat engineering, airfield engineering, construction engineering, geomatics and fire protection services. The application of the principles of employment will guide any of the three environmental component engineers in the type of engineering support given to an operation.
3. The **tasks** that military engineers perform are grouped into five basic areas:
 - a. **Maintain Mobility.** Mobility involves those actions to support the ability of air, land and sea forces to move and to conduct operations throughout the theatre at will. It can include mobility support to land formations, construction and repair of facilities and utilities to support air operations, such as in Airfield Damage Repair (ADR), and the provision of port facilities to support maritime operations.
 - b. **Counter-Mobility.** Counter-mobility includes actions to deny the use of terrain, airspace, waterways, infrastructure or utilities to the enemy in order to impede his mobility. Counter-mobility obstacles shapes the enemy forces into situations favourable to our forces and fires.
 - c. **Enhance Survivability.** Survivability includes the combination of hardening, dispersal, camouflage, concealment and physical protection of personnel and equipment from the effects of sabotage, conventional munitions, and nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) attack. It also includes construction support to deception operations. The removal of hazards associated with enemy weapon systems such as mines, booby traps and UXO are survivability tasks which require specialist skills, equipment and personnel. Survivability must be carefully planned, coordinated and executed to enhance the security of the operation.
 - d. **Sustainment Engineering.** Sustainment engineering involves infrastructure construction and maintenance, the provision of engineer advice, technical expertise, and other engineer support to allow the TF the ability to maintain, reconstitute and regenerate itself. It also includes the provision of utilities, CIMIC tasks, emergency response services (ERS), FPS and the provision of ship berthing/services. While sustainment engineering tasks will normally be performed in rear areas, they will also be performed throughout the theatre and as part of all operations.
 - e. **Geomatics.** Geomatics are those scientific and engineering activities involved in the capture, storage, analysis, processing, presentation, dissemination and management of geospatial information. As every environmental component of a TF will require some form of military geographic information to conduct operations, coordinated geomatics support is essential.

2304. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF MILITARY ENGINEER SUPPORT

1. The NDHQ J3 Engr, on behalf of the CDS, coordinates and provides engineer support to operations. Engineer resources are provided by national-level engineer units and by the force generators. At the national level, engineer support is provided by 1 Construction Engineering Unit (CEU), and geomatics support is provided by the Mapping and Charting Establishment (MCE) as coordinated by J2 Geomatics. Other engineer capabilities are developed as required.

2. On CF operations, the TFC is responsible for coordinating military engineer support to the TF. This responsibility is exercised through the TF Engr, with assistance and coordination from the ESU (see Figure 23-1).



FIG

3. The ESU is the intermediary between the tactical engineer units of the TF components and the strategic engineer-support system. The TF Engr is responsible for advising the TFC on engineer matters that affect the TF and for coordinating engineer support to the TF, including the following:

- a. specialized reconnaissance and geomatics studies, both prior to deployment, and while in the theatre or area of operations;
- b. engineer intelligence, including advice on terrain, battle-damage assessment of facilities and structures, and TECHINT on mines and unexploded ordnance;
- c. evaluation of requirements for and carrying out repair, construction and maintenance of LOC, including roads, bridges, railroads, ports and airfields;

- d. survivability support and hardening of existing facilities. This may include construction to improve the physical security of installations and to meet camouflage, concealment and deception requirements;
- e. provision and maintenance of facilities for accommodation and basing of friendly forces. This may also include the construction of prisoner of war camps;
- f. location, production, storage and supply of potable water for consumption and non-potable water for construction, decontamination and firefighting;
- g. provision and maintenance of utilities, including electrical power;
- h. restoration of facilities after attack or natural disaster;
- i. liaison with allied engineers;
- j. in cooperation with J4 and J5, real estate and municipal services for the TF, including negotiation of leases and other agreements;
- k. arrangement and supervision of civilian contractors for completion of engineer tasks;
- l. in cooperation with J4 and J5, the engineer support portion of HNS;
- m. coordination and assistance in the procurement of specialized construction material;
- n. land-mine clearance and BMD. Engineers will also provide staff coordination for EOD;
- o. fire-protection services such as fire prevention and emergency-response services;
- p. decontamination of an NBC area;
- q. advice on environmental protection and response to environmental disasters;
- r. combat-diving support;
- s. geomatics support to operations; and
- t. execution of CIMIC related engineer tasks.

2305. PLANNING OF MILITARY ENGINEER SUPPORT

1. On behalf of the TFC, the TF Engr, in concert with the Commanding Officer of the ESU, is responsible for formulating engineer support policies and for developing the Military Engineering Supporting Plan (SUP), the engineer annex to the operation plan and the engineer annex to the operations order. The TF Engr then coordinates the implementation of these plans.

2. Specific information is needed in order to develop an accurate and effective SUP or the engineer annex to the operation plan. This information may be collected using a number of sources and methods; however, on-site reconnaissance is the preferred method. Information requirements include but are not limited to the following:

- a. the order of battle and disposition of the TF;
- b. an estimate of the duration and intensity of the operation, including projected war damage;
- c. a threat assessment indicating requirements for survivability and physical security;

- d. climatic and geographic data for the theatre of operations and their effects on engineer support;
 - e. the TFC's direction on accommodation standards, especially in austere theatres of operations;
 - f. requirements for water, electricity and waste disposal;
 - g. the condition of existing facilities and LOC;
 - h. the TF's requirements for new facilities;
 - i. the availability of engineer support from allies and through HNS agreements;
 - j. the availability and suitability of civilian contractor support;
 - k. the availability of construction materials;
 - l. the requirement for BMD and land-mine clearance;
 - m. the impact of operations on the environment and the TFC's environmental policy;
 - n. engineer support requirements for CIMIC; and
 - o. transportation requirements for heavy and oversize engineer equipment and materials.
3. Once the engineer support concept is defined and the operational engineer support plan developed, subordinate commanders begin detailed engineer support planning for their forces.

2306. COMMAND AND CONTROL WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY ENGINEER SUPPORT

1. At the strategic level, the NDHQ J3 Engr, on behalf of the CDS, is responsible for planning and coordinating engineer support to operations. J3 Engr is a member of the NDHQ J Staff under the direction of the DCDS (J3).
2. In the theatre of operations, operational level engineer capabilities and resources are under the command authority (OPCOM or OPCON) of the TFC. Technical control of the ESU is exercised by the TF Engr. The TFC is assisted in planning engineer support by the TF Engr. The TF Engr coordinates and monitors engineer support operations in the theatre of operations and is the commander's engineer advisor. In a combined operation, engineer personnel are assigned to the CFC's liaison staff to assist in the coordination of engineer support activities.
3. Engineers of the TF components are under command authority of the component commanders, unless the TFC, on the advice of the TF Engr, chooses to centralize certain component resources with the ESU.

CHAPTER 24

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL DEFENCE

SECTION I

DEFENCE PLANNING

2401. INTRODUCTION

1. Traditionally, NBC weapons have been considered collectively, as all are weapons of mass destruction and the basic fundamentals of hazard avoidance, protection and contamination control apply to all three. However, their effects, and the defences needed to minimize these effects, differ from one weapon type to the other. Therefore commanders and staffs must plan their defences according to consider the threat posed by each weapon type.

2402. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, CONVENTIONS, PROTOCOLS AND TREATIES

1. Canada subscribes to NATO and America, Britain, Canada, Australia (ABCA) standardization agreements to ensure Canadian doctrine is interoperable with our allies. In addition, Canada subscribes to and has ratified, or is in the process of ratifying, the following conventions, protocols or treaties relating to NBC warfare:

- a. the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare;
- b. the 1970 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty;
- c. the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction;
- d. the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime; and
- e. the 1993 Chemical Weapon Convention.

2. While Canada has subscribed to the above agreements, some nations have not. Also, some nations which have agreed to such treaties in the past have disregarded them and have developed, stockpiled or employed NBC weapons.

3. In accordance with the provisions of these agreements, conventions, protocols and treaties, Canada's policies on NBC weapons are as follows:

- a. **Nuclear.** Canada does neither possesses nuclear weapons nor has any intention of acquiring them.
- b. **Biological.** Canada will neither possess, nor develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or use biological or toxin-based weapons. At the 1991 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Review Conference, Canada withdrew its reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol's biological provisions.
- c. **Chemical.** Canada does not possess chemical weapons, other than those devices used for crowd and riot control purposes. Canada, along with all parties to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention renounce any right to develop, produce, acquire, transfer, stockpile or use chemical weapons. The holding or manufacturing small amounts of chemical and biological agents for use in developing effective counter-measures is permitted. They also undertake not to use riot control agents (RCA) as a method of warfare. This restriction does not affect the use of RCA for military training or for law enforcement purposes.

2403. NBC DEFENCE

1. NBC defence (NBCD) is defined as the process and functions that enable forces to survive and operate in an NBC environment. It encompasses both the training for, and the implementation of plans and procedures to establish and exercise NBCD measures. NBCD measures employ the principles of hazard avoidance, protection, and contamination control.

- a. **Hazard Avoidance.** Hazard avoidance consists of all actions taken to identify, avoid and minimize the effects of immediate and residual NBC hazards. It may reduce or even eliminate the need for protection and contamination-control measures, thus increasing combat effectiveness.
- b. **Protection.** Protection includes both the individual protective equipment (IPE) and collective protection (COLPRO) necessary to counter an NBC threat.
- c. **Contamination Control.** Contamination control includes all measures taken to control the spread of contamination and provide for its eventual removal (i.e., decontamination). During and after an NBC attack, priority must be given to contamination control and to prevent exposure to any toxic substances. The situation will dictate the level of decontamination to be conducted; however, commanders must clearly identify who may order operational or thorough decontamination. Decontamination is both manpower and equipment intensive, but generally eliminates the need to wear IPE. There are three levels of decontamination:
 - (1) **Immediate.** Conducted by an individual immediately after an attack to survive and minimize effects;
 - (2) **Operational.** Conducted by crews or units to enable the continuation of the mission or task; and
 - (3) **Thorough.** Conducted, out of contact with the enemy, at the formation or higher level to remove or neutralize residual contamination.

2. CF involvement in NBC warfare is limited to defensive aspects. NBCD does not imply the offensive use of NBC weapons in the defensive role. Active measures to neutralize or destroy an opponents NBC weapons or delivery systems, through conventional attack, form part of the overall NBCD strategy, but not within NBCD doctrine.

3. The aim of NBCD is to enable forces to survive and operate effectively in an environment where:

- a. at least one of the adversaries has the capability and possible intention to use NBC weapons;
- b. NBC weapons have been used and the effects persist at levels requiring the use of NBCD measures; or
- c. NBC contamination is intentionally or unintentionally released from civilian NBC equipment or industrial facilities, and military operations are affected.

4. In addition to the threat and hazards from traditional NBC weapons, commanders must be aware of the threat posed by a release other than attack (ROTA) resulting in a low level ionizing radiation (LLR) or a toxic industrial chemical (TIC) hazard. Some of these hazards could have a direct affect on operations restricting either movement, use of terrain, or causing mass casualties. Other hazards may not have an immediate effect on operations, but may have a significant effect on the long term health of personnel.

2404. REQUIREMENTS OF NBC DEFENCE

1. Commanders are responsible for NBCD planning and implementation. They must have a current and accurate intelligence assessment of the NBC threat (including LLR and TIC) for the theatre of operations, which considers enemy's intentions and concept for employing NBC weapons, local information on topography and meteorological conditions, as well as the following:

- a. the situation under which an enemy is expected to mount offensive NBC operations;
- b. the categories of weapons available to the enemy;

- c. the characteristics of biological or chemical agents that may be employed;
 - d. the available means of delivery; and
 - e. possible hazards from accident, sabotage or combat damage to civilian NBC equipment or facilities.
2. Commanders must be aware of the NBCD equipment which is available to their forces, the protection the equipment will afford, and the impact of its use on the performance of individuals and units. In ordering specific levels of NBC protection, they must balance the need to prevent unacceptably high casualties against the increasing degradation in performance that results from the adoption of higher levels of protection.
3. Commanders must also be aware of limitations in their forces' training and experience under real or simulated NBC threat conditions. NBCD training must be as continuous as possible so that troops react correctly when a hazard is encountered. Preparatory training must include operations in a simulated NBC environment.
4. Finally, commanders must be aware that, in addition to the loss of combat effectiveness, difficulties in exercising command functions may arise when wearing IPE. Subordinate commanders should be prepared to act independently to achieve the original mission, if the normal C2 channels are destroyed or degraded. Operation plans and orders, therefore, must be written in terms that give commanders at all levels enough freedom of action to adjust individual plans without delay to respond to the NBC situation.

SECTION II

CONCEPTS AND CONSIDERATIONS

2405. COMMANDER'S ROLE

1. A commander's role is to plan and organize an operation in such a way that a change from conventional to NBC conditions occurs without significant loss of combat effectiveness or major adjustment of the operation plan. Normal security activities such as CCD, dispersal, emission control, rapid reaction and redeployment will be of increased importance. The degree to which they are adopted will be governed by the mission and tactical situation.

2406. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN A NBC ENVIRONMENT

1. **Threat Assessment.** The NBC threat must be considered in terms of agents available to an enemy and means of delivery. Threat or hazard assessments, which depend on good intelligence, must be promulgated regularly to enable subordinate commanders to make timely and appropriate decisions on minimum protective measures needed to avoid the NBC hazards warfare while avoiding unnecessary degradation.

2. **Task.** The nature of the task and its vulnerability to NBC attack must be considered. Amphibious and mine-clearance operations are more vulnerable because they involve concentrations of personnel, in the open.

3. **Location of Personnel.** This will have an effect on the protection levels a commander selects and the resulting performance degradation that might be expected. The use of CCD, dispersion and emission control minimize the probability of an enemy acquiring a target, and will make his use of NBC weapons more difficult.

4. **Meteorological Conditions.** Meteorology is critical to the effective use of NBC weapons. A commander must consider prevailing meteorological conditions so as to predict the most likely threat direction and the times when an enemy NBC attack would be most effective.

5. **Topography.** Topography is critical to the effective use of NBC weapons on or near land. Open, flat areas will allow vapour hazards to disperse and dissipate, while rolling or mountainous regions with valleys, estuaries, or fjords will concentrate and channel them. Soil type and its absorption ability will affect the possible hazard duration.

6. **Work Load.** Commanders must consider the work load associated with a particular task. Personnel engaged in heavy work while wearing IPE are prone to heat exhaustion, even in temperate environments.

7. **Detection, Prediction, Warning and Reporting Systems.** A commander can reduce NBC protection if there is a good NBC detection, prediction, warning and reporting system. A commander must consider the capability and location of NBC detection equipment. Most detection equipment will only sound an alarm indicating the presence of an NBC agent in the immediate vicinity of the detector. Most chemical detection equipment will indicate the presence of liquid or vapour, but not both.

8. **Proficiency in NBC Defence.** A TF with a proficient NBCD organization and with personnel well trained in individual drills and team responsibilities, will have a significantly greater chance of sustaining operations and will give a commander much more flexibility when operating in an NBC environment. Clear plans must be in place for individual and COLPRO, and a decontamination policy must be established and adhered to. Plans must include procedures to ensure that contamination is contained and not spread by the movement of individuals and units.

9. **Physical and Mental Degradation.** Commanders must consider the psychological and physiological effects associated with wearing IPE. When full IPE is worn, planning and direction must be provided to personnel with respect to normal bodily functions. Commanders must also consider the mental effects of being encapsulated in IPE, such as feelings of isolation, anonymity and even claustrophobia. Leaders, because of their need to communicate, gather and assimilate information, and make decisions, are often the first to suffer degradation.

11. **Morale and Physical State of Personnel.** The reaction time needed to implement NBCD procedures and drills will be shorter for keen and alert personnel than for tired, sick or poorly motivated personnel. Personnel who

are well prepared and alert may not need to be as well protected in a NBC environment, in which case the associated degradation is reduced.

2407. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS IN A NBC ENVIRONMENT

1. A TFC will also have to take into account a number of special considerations for support organizations when operating in an NBC environment.
2. **Logistic Support.** Operating in an NBC environment inflicts additional requirements on the logistic system:
 - a. **Supplies.** Supplies and equipment will need frequent replacement due to contamination or destruction.
 - b. **Transport.** Transportation priorities will have to take into account the additional burden of mass casualty evacuation and increased resupply. In addition, drivers wearing IPE may have to be rotated more frequently.
 - c. **Maintenance.** Where IPE has to be worn, maintenance and repair of equipment will take longer and may prove impossible. Allowance for this will need to be made in TF stock levels.
 - d. **Engineer Support.** There will be an increased demand for engineer support for such tasks as removal of contaminated soil and materiel, replacement of defensive structures, and installation of additional systems for COLPRO. There will also be a greater demand for potable water due to higher individual consumption rates while in an NBC environment. The requirement for large water source to produce sufficient quantities of clean water for decontamination operations will also be a consideration.
 - e. **Medical Support.** The medical support system must provide for the evacuation and management of casualties from a contaminated environment. Evacuation to medical treatment facilities will be carried out by medical evacuation transport, supplemented by unit or support transportation assets as required. Contamination control procedures must be enforced so as to limit the spread of the contamination. Ambulances, including air ambulances, should have appropriate COLPRO.

2408. COMMAND AND CONTROL WITH RESPECT TO NBC DEFENCE

1. The C2 arrangements for an operation must be structured to allow for the establishment of NBC cells at the operational and tactical levels. These cells are responsible to the TFC (through the J3) and component commanders respectively.
2. The NBC cells form the basis of an NBC C2 system to direct, collect, process and disseminate NBC intelligence, produce hazard prediction, and manage the detection, warning and reporting system. In addition, they provide the NBC specialist staff to advise commanders and their staffs on all aspects of NBCD.

CHAPTER 25
AIRSPACE COORDINATION AND CONTROL

SECTION I
AIRSPACE CONTROL

2501. INTRODUCTION

1. The airspace in a theatre of operations is a critical dimension of warfare as it is used by all components of a TF to conduct assigned missions. A high concentration of friendly sub-surface, surface and air-launched weapon systems must share this airspace without unnecessarily hindering the application of combat power.
2. The primary goal of theatre airspace control is to enhance air, land, maritime and special operations ability to accomplish the commander's objectives. Theatre airspace control procedures must prevent interference from all users of the airspace, facilitate air defence identification, and safely accommodate and expedite the flow of all air traffic in the theatre of operations. In accomplishing these broad tasks, the basic principles of war and the TFC's COO remain the cornerstone of operations.

2502. TERMINOLOGY AND PRINCIPLES

1. **Terminology.** The following terms are used in describing and defining airspace coordination and control:
 - a. **Airspace Control System (ACS)** C An arrangement of those organizations, personnel, policies, procedures and facilities required to perform airspace-control functions.
 - b. **Airspace Control Area** C Airspace which is laterally defined by the boundaries of the area of operations. The airspace-control area may be subdivided into airspace-control sub-areas.
 - c. **Airspace Control Authority (ACA)** C The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace-control system in the airspace-control area.
2. **Principles.** The concept of airspace control in a theatre of operations is based on the following principles:
 - a. airspace control should be a major consideration throughout the planning and execution of an operation;
 - b. an airspace control area is established by the TFC with boundaries coincident with the area of operations;
 - c. an ACS must be based on unity of effort. A coordinated and integrated ACS is essential for success;
 - d. the ACS must be durable and redundant given the likely targeting of this critical system by the enemy. This will require reliable, jam-resistant and, where appropriate, secure C3 networks;
 - e. an ACA is appointed by the TFC and is delegated the necessary authority to allow the ACA to plan, coordinate and organize the ACS and to be responsible for its operation;
 - f. close liaison and coordination among all airspace users is necessary to promote timely and accurate information flow;
 - g. the ACS needs to be responsive to enemy threat conditions and to the evolving operation. Its design, responsiveness, and procedures must promote the rapid massing of combat power;
 - h. airspace control procedures must be simple (i.e., undue restrictions should be avoided). Restrictive

measures should be clearly identified, established for as short a period of time as possible, in defined airspace only, kept to a minimum, and disseminated to all users expeditiously;

- i. airspace control procedures must be flexible enough to accommodate both planned operations and unforeseen or quick-response operations; and
 - j. airspace control procedures do not deny the right of self-defence to any airspace user.
3. Airspace control must allow for the largely unrestricted use of friendly airspace by friendly air forces, while still permitting effective air defence as well as fire-support operations of maritime, land and air forces. There are two main premises in airspace control:
- a. restrictions cannot be avoided (this affects the opening fire policy for sea- or ground-based weapons); and
 - b. the ACS must be capable of supporting day or night and all-weather operations.

2503. IMPLEMENTATION OF AIRSPACE CONTROL

1. Airspace control can be exercised using two methods: positive and procedural.
2. **Positive control** is a method of airspace control based on positive identification, tracking and direction of aircraft, conducted with electronic means by a designated authority. Positive control relies on real-time data derived from facilities such as radar, identification friend or foe (IFF) and communications which may be specifically established or available in the area for other reasons. Positive-control facilities may be subject to attack or sabotage and may be restricted by line-of-sight coverage or electronic interference.
3. **Procedural control** is a method of airspace control which relies on a combination of previously agreed and promulgated orders and procedures. This method while more restrictive than positive control, is less vulnerable to interference. It ensures continuity of operations under adverse environmental conditions and must always be available as an immediate fall-back system should positive control be degraded. Security is an important consideration and procedures should be changed periodically to safeguard them. The procedural method includes a system of routes and corridors for friendly air traffic and areas where the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted. It may involve rigid identification procedures and separation standards, or it may enable weapon systems and aircraft to operate relatively freely. There may be restrictions on timing, altitude, speed and formation size. These routes, corridors, areas and restrictions are called airspace-control means (ACM). While there is no need for dedicated communications, a reliable CIS is needed to promulgate ACM. The ACA selects those ACMs which are most suitable for the area of operations and the mission. The variety of ACM available to control friendly aircraft include the following:
 - a. **air routes** established to route non-operational and operational-support traffic through air defences in the rear area, providing minimum-risk passage;
 - b. **transit corridors** established to route operational-combat traffic and operational-support traffic through air defences in the rear area;
 - c. **traverse levels**, consisting of vertical displacements within a designated area, expressed as specific flight levels or altitudes, at which aircraft may transit the rear area;
 - d. **low-level transit routes**, which are temporary corridors of defined dimensions established in the forward area to ensure that friendly aircraft are not attacked by friendly air defences or surface forces;
 - e. **special corridors** established to accommodate the special routing requirements of large formations or specific missions;
 - f. **base-defence zones (BDZ)**, which are air-defence zones established around an air base and limited to the

engagement envelope of short-range air-defence systems defending that base. BDZ have specific entry, exit, and IFF procedures established;

- g. **restricted operating areas/zones**, which are airspaces of defined dimensions designated by the ACA in response to specific operational situations and requirements, within which the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted;
- h. **weapons free zones**, which are air-defence zones established for the protection of key assets or facilities, other than air bases, where weapon systems may be fired at any target not positively identified as friendly;
- i. **high-density airspace-control zones**, which are airspaces in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons and airspace users. These zones, which are designated in an ACP or an airspace-control order, are volumes of airspace which usually coincide with geographical features or navigational aids, and are used for the coordination of air-to-ground operations;
- j. **coordination levels (CL)** which are advisory heights established to provide altitude separation between slow- and fast-moving traffic at low level. The height of CL will be published in the ACP. Slow-moving traffic will normally operate below CL and fast-moving traffic will normally operate above them;
- k. **safe lanes** established to route aircraft to and from an air base, or to connect adjacent activated routes or corridors; and
- l. **time windows** used in the coordination and management of all aspects of airspace control.

5. An effective ACS employs a combination of methods for positive and procedural control. The degree to which each control method is used depends on such factors as:

- a. the nature and strength of the enemy threat;
- b. the availability, capability and vulnerability of friendly airspace-control facilities;
- c. the type and intensity of air operations;
- d. the type and intensity of land and sea operations;
- e. the terrain and weather in the combat zone; and
- f. the number, deployment and characteristics of friendly air defence systems.

6. In a high-electronic-threat environment, the emphasis is on procedural methods. IFF is the primary means of identification with the procedural system allowing further discrimination. Airspace is divided into forward and rear areas with different procedures for each.

2504. ORGANIZATION OF AIRSPACE CONTROL

1. An airspace-control area is the basic geographical element of an ACS. The ACA, appointed by the TFC, plans and coordinates airspace-control operations in the control area, using resources and capabilities of those components and agencies of the TF capable of effecting airspace control. The airspace-control area may be subdivided into airspace-control sub-areas. The number of sub-areas depends upon the operational situation, the capabilities of the ACA's C2 facilities, geographical factors, the complexity of airspace control requirements, and air defence requirements. Whenever possible, the sub-areas should conform to tactical boundaries.

2. In cooperation with component commanders and other airspace users, the ACA is responsible for the ACS, the development of the ACP and the preparation and promulgation of periodic airspace-control orders (ACO).

3. The ACP details the boundaries of the airspace-control area and any sub-areas, lists the ACA and any sub-

area ACAs, and describes the workings of the ACS. ACPs may come into effect automatically at alert states or on direction of the TFC. New ACPs are issued as required.

4. The ACA implements the ACP by issuing ACO at specific intervals, as promulgated in the ACP, to all components of the TF. Urgent amendments may be issued at any time.

5. ACO contain the specific ACM which are in effect for the period of the ACO. The ACM permit friendly forces to conduct operations with minimum risk of engagement by friendly air-defence systems. Commands or agencies requiring ACM to be established, activated, deactivated or modified forward requests to the ACA.

6. To plan, organize and operate the ACS in accordance with the authority delegated, the ACA establishes an airspace-control centre (ACC). The ACC performs the following functions and tasks:

- a. coordinate and approve or deny requests for ACM;
- b. resolve conflicting requests for ACM; and
- c. promulgate the activation, deactivation or modification of ACM by ACO.

2505. RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIRSPACE CONTROL

1. Responsibility for airspace control in a theatre of operations is exercised by the TFC through a designated ACA. A TFC may assign a staff organization to accomplish the broad functions of airspace control. Because airspace control primarily affects air operations, the air component commander is normally appointed the ACA. However, based on such factors as the primary mission, airspace-control capabilities and combat air resources, another component commander may be appointed the ACA. The ACA's authority is limited to the implementation of airspace control. In addition, the TFC is responsible for:

- a. defining the COO for airspace use within the area of operations;
- b. assigning tasks to subordinate commanders and providing priorities for airspace use; and
- c. monitoring the ACS to ensure that it operates in accordance with their guidance and direction.

2. The ACA, in coordinating the airspace-control activities for a TF, has the following planning responsibilities:

- a. planning and establishing an ACS that is responsive to the needs of the TFC and all airspace users;
- b. developing coordinating policies and regulating procedures to achieve unity and standardization in the application of airspace control in the airspace-control area;
- c. determining the requirements for airspace-control sub-areas and naming sub-area ACAs, if applicable; and
- d. developing the ACP.

5. During the conduct of operations, the ACA supervises the functioning of the ACS and is responsible for:

- a. promoting the safe, efficient and flexible use of the airspace;
- b. preparing and issuing periodic ACOs;
- c. modifying the ACP, specifically the airspace-control procedures and ACM, as required; and
- d. authorizing deviations from established policies and procedures.

6. Component commanders of a TF have the following responsibilities with respect to airspace control:
 - a. ensuring that all units under their command comply with the ACS;
 - b. coordinating their requirements for airspace use with the ACA;
 - c. establishing and maintaining a link with the ACA for planning and coordinating airspace-control activities;
 - d. providing facilities and personnel, when required, to conduct airspace-control in airspace control sub-areas;
 - e. providing representatives and liaison to the ACA and sub-area ACAs as required; and
 - f. providing airspace control in designated airspace, when required, in accordance with promulgated policies.

SECTION II

AIR DEFENCE

2506. INTRODUCTION

1. Air defence consists of all measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action.
2. In peacetime, air-defence operations involve the surveillance of friendly airspace and SLOC to assist in denying a potential enemy the freedom to conduct reconnaissance and harassment missions and to provide early warning of an attack. During periods of conflict, air defence involves such measures as deception and dispersion, and the detection, identification, interception and destruction of enemy aircraft and missiles.

2507. CONCEPT OF AIR DEFENCE

1. Air defence encompasses both active and passive measures.
2. Active air defence is direct defensive action taken to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action. It includes such measures as the use of aircraft, air-defence weapons, weapons not used primarily in an air-defence role, and EW. Airspace control in an active air-defence environment can be extremely difficult, but it is crucial to successful air operations and effective air defence. Positive- or procedural-control methods must be implemented to ensure that friendly air assets can safely transit the airspace without inhibiting air defence or other air operations. Regardless of other controls and measures imposed within defended airspace, air-defence forces must be able to readily identify all air assets in the area by electronic, visual or procedural means.
3. Passive air defence is all measures, other than active air defence, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air action. These measures include deception, dispersion and the use of protective construction. Active air defence may not be able to prevent all hostile air missions from reaching their targets. The TFC, therefore, must ensure that passive air-defence measures complement active defence to degrade the enemy's targeting capability, to minimize any degradation of the TFC's own combat capability, and to reduce the effects of enemy air attacks.
4. The basic types of air defence are as follows:
 - a. area defence C the defence of a broad area;
 - b. point defence C the direct protection of vital elements or installations; and
 - c. self-defence C the ability of friendly units to defend themselves against direct attack through the use of organic weapons.

2508. IMPLEMENTATION OF AIR DEFENCE

1. Integration of the TF-s air-defence resources and capabilities into one air-defence system is essential to provide a quick, flexible response to changing combat situations. The principle of centralized C2 and decentralized execution ensures a maximum degree of efficiency and allows different air-defence weapon systems to operate with optimum freedom of action. Responsibilities for C2 must be carefully defined for all levels of command and for each weapon system to ensure a smooth and controlled flow of orders, directives and information.
2. An air-defence C2 arrangement should enable the air-defence commander (ADC) and component commanders to manage air-defence operations effectively by providing facilities for:
 - a. timely and effective planning, tasking and coordination of all air defence resources;
 - b. surveillance through the coordinated use of all available sensors to complete a real-time air picture;

- c. airspace control to ensure maximum freedom of action and minimum risk to friendly forces;
- d. information exchange;
- e. survivability against physical attack;
- f. deployable components including mobile control or operations centres;
- g. effective CIS; and
- h. alternate C2 facilities if primary facilities are lost.

3. To coordinate and integrate air-defence and airspace control in a theatre of operations, the ADC requires a responsive CIS to transfer and process the air-defence and ACO for the maritime, land and air forces involved. The CIS must be inter-operable within the TF and, in a combined operation, between the Canadian TF and its allies.

2509. ORGANIZATION OF AIR DEFENCE

1. Air-defence operations are controlled by a system made up of a number of sub-systems, all of which are interdependent and complementary. These include:

- a. early-warning, surveillance and aircraft-control sensor systems;
- b. C2 systems;
- c. fighter aircraft;
- d. surface-to-air weapons systems, both missiles and guns;
- e. CISs;
- f. appropriate electronic-warfare assets; and
- g. air-defence intelligence systems.

2. In a theatre of operations, an air-defence area is a specifically defined airspace for which air defence must be planned and provided. The air defence is accomplished by an ADC appointed by the TFC. The ADC is defined as a duly appointed commander responsible for the air defence of a designated area.

3. Whether defending maritime, land or air forces from air attacks, airspace control and air defence should be accomplished concurrently. In the confusion inherent in areas where forces are engaged, situations are created wherein friendly aircraft could be engaged by friendly forces or enemy aircraft could fail to be engaged because of uncertainties in aircraft identification. For this reason, the TFC generally appoints a single authority for any given airspace (i.e., a single authority to perform the duties of both the ACA and the ADC). This ensures that airspace-control and air-defence efforts are coordinated and, if necessary, integrated. The single authority is generally the Forward Air Control Centre (FACC).

4. To exercise responsibility for air defence, the ADC may establish an air-defence control centre (ADCC), which is defined as the principal information, communications and operations centre from which all aircraft, anti-aircraft operations, air-defence artillery, guided missiles and air-warning functions of a specific area of air-defence responsibility are supervised and coordinated. Where the designated ADC is also the ACA, the ADCC and the ACC are collocated.

2510. RESPONSIBILITIES FOR AIR DEFENCE

1. With the advice of subordinate commanders, the TFC establishes broad planning objectives and guidelines for airspace control and air-defence operations, and for targeting. The TFC's specific responsibilities with respect to air defence include the following:
 - a. defining the air-defence area and appointing the ADC;
 - b. setting priorities and determining the weight of effort to be devoted to air defence; and
 - c. ensuring that air-defence operations are conducted in accordance with ROE.
2. In conducting air-defence operations in the air-defence area, the ADC is responsible for:
 - a. exercising OPCON of all air-defence resources and capabilities, as delegated by the TFC;
 - b. coordinating all operations involving air-defence weapon systems;
 - c. coordinating and integrating other airspace usage with air-defence operations;
 - d. developing air-defence coordinating policies and air-defence procedures;
 - e. integrating TF components' air-defence resources and capabilities; and
 - f. when necessary, delegating control of air-defence resources and capabilities to those units of the TF that have the facilities to control and coordinate activities.
3. Once individual ACMs are implemented, air-defence operations are conducted under specific ROE with component commanders responsible for the detailed and usually local direction of air-defence operations necessary to achieve specific missions or tasks.

SECTION III

TARGETING

2511. INTRODUCTION

1. To achieve effective fire power against the enemy, several operational functions must be well coordinated and executed. Systems and procedures for allocating priorities must be effective and targets must be accurately located and identified. To achieve this, a targeting process must be established.

2. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching to them, the appropriate response. It considers strategic and operational requirements and capabilities and the threat to friendly forces. Targeting occurs at all levels of command and is performed by forces capable of attacking targets with both lethal and non-lethal disruptive and destructive means. Targeting is complicated by the requirement to deconflict duplicative targeting by different forces or echelons within the same force and to synchronize the attack of those targets with other components of a TF. An effective and efficient target development process and air tasking cycle are essential for the staff to plan and execute air operations. This targeting process should integrate capabilities and efforts at all levels.

2512. THE TARGETING PROCESS

1. Targeting is a cyclical, multi-disciplined effort requiring interaction among TF components, separate staffs and cells of the TFHQ, and different weapon systems and delivery platforms or vehicles. On behalf of the TFC, targeting is the responsibility of the J3 division of the general staff. Alternatively, the TFC may establish a targeting coordination cell (TCC) whose role is to assist the TFC with the planning and execution of targeting.

2. The TCC is led by the J3 and consists of representatives of the J2 and J3 divisions, and other staffs and cells of the TFHQ as required (e.g., the EWCC). It may also include representatives from the TF components. The TCC is responsible for such activities as coordinating target information, preparing and refining target lists, providing target priorities, establishing no-fire areas, and assigning weapon systems to specific targets.

3. The TCC should meet daily to disseminate the TFC's targeting guidance, monitor the effectiveness of targeting efforts, update the target list, validate no-fire areas, and ensure that operations conducted by TF components are not in conflict and that they mutually support and focus on the TFC's COO.

2513. PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF TARGETING

1. The provision of target intelligence is a function of the J2 staff. The J2 staff identify and locate those enemy targets which pose the greatest threat to the TFC's mission; are high-value targets; or are high-payoff targets (i.e., represent the greatest potential for exploitation). Having identified the targets, each is considered for its criticality in terms of its value to the enemy and its vulnerability to successful attack by friendly forces.

2. Given the targets, their criticality and their vulnerability, the TCC prepares a prioritized target list and attack strategy, along with the desired effects (e.g., destroy, neutralize, disrupt, etc.). The target list should reflect a coherent strategy to degrade or disrupt enemy operations and not just list available targets. Once the target list is approved by the TFC, it is published with instructions on who is to attack each target and when, and the preferred weapon system to be used. As timing is a key factor in targeting, targeting efforts must be synchronized with other operations to maximize the benefits gained through the confusion and disruption before the enemy can recover.

3. The J2 staff provides battle-damage assessments which assess the effectiveness of targeting efforts. The target list and attack strategy are revised or updated based on these assessments.

CHAPTER 26
SPACE OPERATIONS

SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

A Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.

Giulio Douhet

2601. GENERAL

1. Space has been called the ultimate high ground. Control of the high ground, while not a guarantor of victory, confers a strong military advantage. In the information age, this military advantage is more important than ever. This was demonstrated to the world during the Gulf War, where the coalition had complete air and space supremacy over Iraq.

2. While the CF do not currently, and may never, possess systems that perform all the space missions, it is important for CF personnel to be familiar with space doctrine. Canada does participate in the use of space systems through participation with allies and other governmental departments. Canada was the third nation to have a satellite in orbit, continues to be a major player in the civil and scientific space arenas, and has an evolving military space capability. Additionally, Canada's size and geographic location may allow, or require, space to play a larger role in providing surveillance of, and enforcing Canadian sovereignty over our territory.

3. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the fundamental principles and basic doctrine for the military use of space. These principles serve as a starting point to inform personnel on what capabilities are possible utilising the space medium. This doctrine describes what can be accomplished for the military in space, not necessarily what the CF will do in space. It is restrained by current Canadian policy. National policy, doctrine and real world restrictions will lead to a space strategy and space projects to support Canadian national objectives. This doctrine does not contain specific techniques and procedures, rather it provides a framework for what is possible. It is left up to the user to develop solutions to given military situations. Operational level space doctrine will be developed to provide guidance on the employment of specific space systems once they are acquired or become available through allies or commercial means.

2602. HISTORY

1. Canadian interest in space dates back to the 1930-s, when scientists began to study the upper atmosphere using ground-based sensors. They studied the interaction between solar plasma and the earth's magnetic field, which results in such things as the Aurora Borealis - northern lights - magnetic storms, ionospheric disturbances and changes in weather patterns. Upper atmospheric research was first conducted using high altitude balloons and, later, sounding rockets.

2. Canada first began developing rocket technology in the early 1950-s. This early rocket work has culminated with the development of Bristol Aerospace's Black Brant family of sounding rockets. The Black Brant currently serves as the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration's primary sounding rocket.

3. In 1956 and 1957, the Churchill Research Range was built 900 km north of Winnipeg to support sounding rocket launches for the International Geophysical Year. A commercial venture is developing the Akjuit Space Port using the Churchill Research Range facilities. When fully operational, the Akjuit Space Port will support both sounding rocket and polar orbit launches, and will be Canada's first space launch facility.

4. The Department of National Defence through the Defence Research Board started space-based scientific observation through the Alouette Project with the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the US National Academy of Sciences in 1958. In September 1962, Canada became the third nation, after the USSR and

the US, to place a satellite into orbit, Alouette 1. Alouette 1 was followed by the ISIS program, designed to explore the space environment and the upper atmosphere. ISIS was terminated before the last planned satellite could be launched when the government redirected Canadian space efforts towards applications instead of scientific exploration.

5. From 1967 to 1970, Canadian space efforts were effectively >demilitarised=. In 1967 Canada signed the UN=Outer Space Treaty, which made the commitment that space was to be used for peaceful purposes only. Canada interpreted this to mean no use of space for defence purposes. Space research and development was turned over to industry. TELESAT Canada was formed in 1969, as a private company owned jointly by nine telephone companies and the government. TELESAT Canada=s mandate was to develop a domestic satellite communications network. TELESAT Canada=s efforts resulted in the Anik series of domestic communications satellites, the first geosynchronous domestic communications satellites.

6. DND became involved in space again in 1979, when Canada agreed to help develop a search and rescue satellite system under the COSPAS-SARSAT agreement with France, the USSR and the US. The COSPAS-SARSAT agreement committed Canada to develop a search and rescue repeater to be orbited by the US on one of their weather satellites. The DND developed search and rescue repeater first flew in 1982, and DND continues with this program today. Thousands of people around the world have been saved as a result of this Canadian space project.

SECTION II

ATTRIBUTES OF SPACE SYSTEMS

2603. GENERAL

1. Space systems have a number of attributes, or characteristics, which make them different from terrestrial-based systems. These attributes affect how space systems can be used by militaries, and can be grouped into three broad categories: environmentally influenced attributes, logistically influenced attributes and politically/legally influenced attributes.

2604. ENVIRONMENTALLY INFLUENCED ATTRIBUTES

1. Environmentally influenced attributes are those that arise from operating in the unique medium of space. Where exactly space begins is somewhat ambiguous, and there is no universally or legally defined point where space starts. For practical military applications, space can be defined as starting where a satellite can orbit, but this still leaves some ambiguity. Technically, a satellite can orbit at 100 km, but the atmospheric effects are still fairly strong at this altitude and no satellites orbit at this altitude. The effects of the atmosphere gradually taper off with altitude, so the higher a satellite orbits the less it is affected by atmospheric drag. The hard vacuum, or the end of atmospheric influence on satellites, begins at approximately 1,600 km. The environmentally influenced attributes of space include the following:

- a. **Global presence.** Because of their altitude above the earth's surface satellites can see large portions of the surface at a time. A satellite's potential field of view can vary with altitude, from a circle with a radius of 2,000 km in low earth orbit to approximately a third of the earth's surface at a geosynchronous orbit. Constellations of satellites can cover the entire surface of the earth continuously. For missions such as communications and launch detection this can provide a tremendous advantage over terrestrial-based systems. For low earth orbiting satellites, their ability to scan the entire surface every day or every few days is their prime advantage, particularly for environmental and intelligence satellites.
- b. **Predictability.** Because satellites are in unpowered flight, essentially they are falling, physical laws fix their position in space and time. If you know a satellite's orbital element set, essentially its position and velocity at a precise time, you can accurately predict its future position. This gives satellites more of the attributes of fixed, terrestrial sites compared to more typically manoeuvrable military systems.
- c. **Cluster areas.** Satellites tend to cluster within certain orbits that are useful, depending on their mission. There are three primary clusters and a secondary cluster used by the military. These clusters are:
 - (1) Low earth, highly inclined orbits (approximately 90-120 minute period), used by intelligence, environmental and some types of communications satellites;
 - (2) Semi-synchronous highly inclined orbits (12 hour period), used primarily for navigation satellites;
 - (3) Geosynchronous orbits (24 hour period), used by communications and launch detection satellites; and
 - (4) The less often used highly elliptical, or Molniya, orbit (12 hour period), used, primarily by the Russians, for communications and early warning satellites to provide coverage in the extreme north.
- d. **Vacuum environment.** Because space is a vacuum, the way satellites manoeuvre and the effects of some types of weapons in space are different. The environment of space requires unique methods of controlling satellites, and these methods are often not well understood by those not familiar with space systems. The vacuum of space also creates differences in the effects of certain weapons, particularly nuclear and directed energy weapons. The vacuum of space does not begin at any given point, rather, the effects of the atmosphere gradually taper off. At lower orbits, atmospheric drag effects require satellites to use their on-board engines to maintain their orbit.
- e. **Vast operating area.** Space is essentially an infinite arena for military operations. Even within cluster

areas, space systems generally operate at large distances from each other by terrestrial standards.

2605. LOGISTICALLY INFLUENCED ATTRIBUTES

1. Space is a difficult area, perhaps the most difficult, in which militaries operate. It is expensive to get space systems into orbit, so only missions where the operational benefit outweighs the cost should be performed by space systems. The following logistically influenced attributes must be considered when making this decision:

- a. **Remote command and control.** Military space systems are rarely manned. Ground systems provide C2. To provide this C2 often requires a large network of geographically separated ground stations to be able to link with satellites in various orbits.
- b. **Self-sufficient.** Satellites are physically on their own once launched, with rare exceptions. All the consumables, such as fuel, coolants and redundant systems, required by a satellite must be on board at launch. The only maintenance that can usually be performed is switching from a failed system to a back-up system, if one is on board. Since back-up systems and fuel add weight as well as lengthen the expected life, they also add to the launch cost. A trade-off on cost versus redundancy must be made when a satellite is designed. Normally, fuel is the limiting factor in determining the planned life of a satellite, so manoeuvring a satellite more than planned reduces its expected life.
- c. **Altitude trade-offs.** Satellites can add to their security from attack by anti-satellite weapons by orbiting at a higher altitude. This often means some compromises in how effectively the satellite can perform its mission, particularly for intelligence satellites, which provide better resolution the lower they orbit. Lower altitude orbits also require more fuel to maintain. This is caused by the atmosphere affecting their orbit through aerodynamic drag, requiring frequent commanding and fuel usage to maintain the desired orbit. Frequent commanding may also require a larger network of ground stations to perform the commanding.

2606. POLITICALLY/LEGALLY INFLUENCED ATTRIBUTES

1. Numerous international treaties and agreements govern the use of space, resulting in the following politically/legally influenced attributes:

- a. **Legal overflight.** Space is not subject to claims of sovereignty by any nation, unlike territorial waters and air space. This means satellites may overfly the territory of another nation without permission, and without hindrance.
- b. **Vehicular sovereignty.** A satellite remains the sovereign property of the nation that owns it. Additionally, the nation that owns a satellite is responsible for any damage it does to another nation's territory if it decays from orbit.
- c. **Weapons restrictions.** The deployment or testing of weapons of mass destruction in space is prohibited. Additionally, military installations are prohibited on the moon and other celestial bodies.

2. Politically/legally influenced attributes are really restrictions placed on the use of space, and unlike the environmental and logistical attributes, in theory could change. The attributes mentioned above have persisted for some time now, and it is unlikely that space will have fewer political/legal restrictions in the future. The following is a list of the current treaties and international agreements regulating the use of space (not all of which involve Canada):

- a. **UN Charter (1947)** - made applicable to space by the Outer Space Treaty. It prohibits the use of force, or threat of its use, against the territorial integrity of another state. It recognizes a state's inherent right to self-defence. These provisions apply to military space systems;
- b. **Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963)** - prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons in space or the detonation of any nuclear explosive in space;

- c. **Outer Space Treaty (1967)** - the primary agreement placing limits on a states use of space. Among other limits, this treaty prohibits military bases or installations on the moon or other celestial bodies and prohibits placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies. Additionally, the Outer Space Treaty states that space and celestial bodies are not subject to national claims of sovereignty, use, or occupation. It also says states retain jurisdiction over their space objects, and any personnel in those objects, while they are in space;
- d. **Return and Rescue Agreement (1968)** - requires signatory nations to return astronauts and space objects that land on their territory to the launching nation. It requires the launching nation to pay reasonable costs associated with the return and to pay for any damage caused by hazardous materials the space object may have contained. Also applies in international waters;
- e. **Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972)** - prohibits the US and Russia from basing ABM systems in space. It also prohibits interference with the other party's national technical means to verify compliance with this treaty. This is taken to mean they cannot interfere with each other's space-based intelligence gathering capabilities. The treaty also limits both the US & Russia to two ABM sites, one each to protect their capitals and their ICBM fields. The protocol to the ABM treaty further restricts each to only one ABM site (Canada not a signatory);
- f. **Liability Convention (1972)** - makes the launching nation liable for damage to people or property on Earth or in the atmosphere caused by its space objects. Liability for damage caused by a space object to persons or property on board another space object is determined by who is at fault;
- g. **Convention on Registration (1974)** - requires parties to maintain a registry of all objects they launch into Earth orbit or beyond. It also requires information on each registered object be furnished to the UN as soon as practical, including the basic orbital parameters and general function of the object;
- h. **Agreement Governing Activities on the Moon and Celestial Bodies (1979)** - restates many of the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty with respect to the Moon and other celestial bodies. Adds the establishment of an international regime for the exploitation of the Moon's natural resources. It further states that the benefits from this exploitation shall be shared equitably by all states party to the agreement. (Canada is not party to this agreement); and
- i. **Environmental Modification Convention (1980)** - prohibits military or hostile use of environmental modification techniques to do damage if such use has widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects. Environmental modification techniques are defined as any technique for changing the dynamics, composition, or structure of the earth or outer space through deliberate manipulation of natural processes.

SECTION III

SPACE FORCE ROLES AND MISSIONS

2607. GENERAL

1. There is a worldwide explosion of the use of space systems, both in the civil/commercial and military arenas. Modern information-based economies are becoming increasingly reliant on the generation of data from, and the movement of data through, space-based systems. The number of nations that recognise the utility of space systems and develop the capability to launch and operate satellites will almost certainly continue to grow in the future. One of the main reasons for this, in particular for military use of space, is that there are functions that can be performed better, or only, from space. The dependence of modern nations on space-based systems has also opened another avenue for attack. This has made space another medium for military operations.

2. The CF will protect the nation's security and sovereignty and increase operational effectiveness utilising space forces. Protecting national security and sovereignty involves both protecting Canadian interests in space and protecting Canada from threats from space. In the broad context of the emerging space security environment there are four fundamental military operational space force roles used to accomplish these two goals: enhancing operations for terrestrial forces, space forces support, space control, and force application. There are a number of missions within each of these roles. For economic or political reasons, many of these missions may be closed to the CF, but our personnel may in some cases participate with allies or coalition partners in operations utilising space forces we don't own, to achieve Canadian objectives.

2608. ENHANCING OPERATIONS

1. Enhancing operations are those missions space systems perform to support sea, land and air forces. Space systems fulfilling this role act as a force multiplier, increasing the effectiveness of the forces they support. Enhancing operations include: surveillance and reconnaissance; communications; environmental observation; navigation; and missile warning and defence. Enhancing operations will use both civil and military satellites to increase our forces' ability to detect, plan and act faster than an adversary.

2. **Surveillance and Reconnaissance.** This area covers support to both reconnaissance, or intelligence, and surveillance missions. Space systems may be dedicated to one or the other, or perform both missions as needed. Generally, surveillance implies performing a broader search with less resolution, whereas reconnaissance implies maximising resolution to gain specific information about a small area or system. Historically, support in this area from space has been more heavily weighted to the reconnaissance side. In the near future, it is possible space systems may replace current ground and air based systems in the surveillance role. In the future these space-based systems may perform roles such as ocean, air and ground surveillance and tracking.

3. **Communications.** Space-based systems can provide world-wide, secure, jam resistant communications to military forces. This can be accomplished with dedicated military satellites, leasing channels on commercial satellites, or a combination of the two. Dedicated military satellites are designed to be more robust and more secure than their civil counterparts. The military frequencies are selected so they are robust, or jam resistant, and they use a wider frequency band so the system can use spread spectrum techniques. Military satellites also tend to use more directional transponders, making it more difficult to intercept their signals and they are designed from the outset for encryption. Commercial communications satellites, on the other hand, are generally cheaper, since you can buy or lease just the capacity you need, leaving someone else to pay for the rest of the satellite. Commercial systems can be particularly valuable during contingencies, when extra capacity is required for a limited time.

4. The cost and size of satellite ground stations has limited the utility of satellite communications in the past. This has now changed and man-portable satellite communications terminals are available. Additionally, new commercial low earth orbiting satellites have the potential to revolutionise communications. These new systems will provide cellular phone service, and potentially computer connectivity, to forces deployed around the world. For peacetime/contingency operations they should prove very useful, however, military users must recognise these systems are new and their vulnerability may degrade their availability during a major conflict.

5. **Environmental Observation.** Accurate knowledge of the terrain and weather in an area of operations can be critical for a successful mission. Space's unique perspective gives tremendous advantages to supporting these two areas. Geosynchronous orbiting satellites can give a continuous weather picture for large areas of the globe, and low earth orbiting satellites can provide a more detailed snap-shot of any given point on earth, twice a day. Land use satellites, such as RADARSAT, France's SPOT or the US's LANDSAT can provide a fairly detailed picture of the terrain in an area of operations, with resolutions as good as 5 metres. By fusing the data from several different types of sensors, invaluable data can be provided to military planners.

6. **Navigation.** Another important capability that space adds to military operations is very accurate geospatial positioning. Systems such as Russia's GLONASS or the US's Global Positioning System (GPS) use constellations of satellites to transmit radio signals that allow users to determine their precise three-dimensional position, velocity and time. This capability is provided 24 hours a day and in all weather. Additionally, since the GPS receivers operate passively, the user's position remains secure. These systems can greatly increase the effectiveness of weapons delivery, allowing accurate first round artillery shots and precise delivery of bombs, as well as aiding navigation.

7. **Missile Warning and Defence.** Missile warning and ballistic missile defence capabilities combine to provide the capability to protect the nation or troops from weapons transiting through space. Missile warning can be performed using either space-based or terrestrial-based systems or a combination of both. Canada participates in the missile warning system operated with the US through NORAD. The NORAD system uses satellites that detect the infrared signature of a missile launch to provide initial warning, and ground based radar to confirm the attack and determine the impact points. Using both types of warning systems provides better confidence that an attack is actually occurring, and not just a system malfunction.

8. There are two methods of missile defence that the missile warning function serves: passive and active. The passive defence relies on the capability to correctly characterise an attack before it can hit its target, allowing a retaliatory attack to be launched that will inflict unacceptable damage to the attacker. This system is called deterrence. An active missile defence system uses the missile warning data to cue some form of weapon that is capable of destroying the incoming missiles or warheads before they can strike their targets. There are two basic types of anti-ballistic missile weapons and two basing options. Interceptors, or anti-ballistic missile missiles, use a warhead or the kinetic energy of the collision to destroy the incoming warheads. Directed energy weapons use concentrated electromagnetic radiation, such as a laser, to destroy the inbound warhead. Either of these weapons can be terrestrial-based or space-based, though no space-based system has ever been deployed or tested by any nation to date. Currently, only the Russians have deployed a ballistic missile defence system.

2609. SUPPORTING SPACE FORCES

1. The supporting space forces mission is the support given to space systems from terrestrial-based forces. These activities deploy and sustain the space systems involved in the missions listed in the other sections. Supporting space forces includes two missions: launch operations and satellite operations.

2. **Launch Operations.** For space systems to perform their missions they must first get into space. The capability to perform launch operations is critical to assure access to space. Ideally, a military launch capability should provide the capacity to quickly integrate satellites and launch vehicles and rapidly launch to replace satellites that fail or reconstitute systems that have been destroyed or degraded by the actions of another party. Launch capability can be independent, through allies or purchased on the commercial launch market. Canada currently has no domestic launch site, but a commercial company, with support from the Manitoba government, is developing a new launch site at Churchill, Manitoba. This launch site, called Akjuit, will be capable of launching satellites into high inclination and polar orbits.

3. **Satellite Operations.** Once space systems are deployed to space they require constant support to sustain their mission capability. This requires a mission control centre to plan and perform the necessary commanding and a system of ground stations to provide the command uplink and telemetry downlink. Satellite operations also involve monitoring the satellite telemetry to ensure the satellite systems are operating properly. While maintenance generally cannot be performed on a satellite to repair failures, most satellites have redundant systems. These redundant systems allow ground operators to bypass failed equipment, maintaining the satellite's mission capability.

2610. SPACE CONTROL

1. Space control is roughly equivalent to the air superiority or sea control missions. Space control involves assuring access to, and the utilisation of space in support of friendly operations while denying the same to enemy forces. There are three primary missions within the space control mission area: surveillance of space, protection and negation. Canadian policy prohibits the weaponization of space and anti-satellite weapons.

2. **Surveillance of Space.** Surveillance of space involves the detection, tracking, and identification of space objects. Surveillance of space allows manoeuvring satellites to avoid collisions with space debris and ensures launches of new satellites will not collide with either another satellite or space debris. An effective surveillance of space capability allows friendly forces to know when enemy intelligence satellites are overhead and provides the warning for effective protection operations and the targeting data for effective negation operations. In order to assure friendly use and deny enemy use we must be able to track and identify objects in earth orbit. To be effective, surveillance of space must be broad and continuous. This allows changes to be detected quickly and the threat characterised.

3. To give an indication of the size of the surveillance of space task, since 1957 over 24,000 objects have been catalogued and over 8,000 objects are currently tracked and reported to the UN. The United States has accepted, under the Outer Space Treaty, the obligation to track and report on all manmade earth orbiting objects. This is a civil obligation, but is fulfilled by US Air Force sensors and NORAD/USSPACECOM work centres reporting the data to the UN.

4. Two capabilities are needed to meet the surveillance of space mission requirements: the surveillance sensors to acquire the data and the analysis capability to exploit the data. Three different types of sensors can be used to collect the data: radar sensors, either parabolic dish, radar interferometry, or phased array; optical sensors, essentially large cameras or optically scanning detection fences; or passive systems. Each system has its advantages and disadvantages. Ideally, a surveillance of space system would incorporate all three types, however this is very expensive. A surveillance of space sensor system, to provide coverage of all orbits, must include a worldwide network of sensors. In the future, surveillance of space sensors may be space-based, eliminating the requirement to base sensors outside national territory.

5. To be useful, surveillance of space sensors must provide data to a work centre that can process the data. This data correlation involves tasking the sensors to watch a particular position in space at a given time, correlating the observations with known objects, updating the orbital data for the known objects, and classifying and cataloguing the new objects detected. This is a very complex task, requiring skilled personnel operating powerful computers with complex software. This work must be accomplished continuously, or objects will become Alost@. A Alost@ object is one for which we can no longer correlate observations to a given object. There are always going to be Alost@ objects because there are so many objects, many objects are breaking up, and some objects are small and difficult to track. The task of the surveillance of space analysis centre is to minimise the number of Alost@ objects and maximise the number of known objects.

6. **Protection.** Protection, also known as defensive counter space operations, assures our use of space systems. There are two components to protection operations: active and passive. Active defensive counter space measures involve detecting an attempt to neutralise a friendly space system, then manoeuvring the spacecraft to avoid the threat, deploying decoys, using alternate ground links (if it is the space/ground link that is under attack), or using an active counter space attack to neutralise the threat (see negation below).

7. Passive defences must be built into a space system when it is designed. Passive defence measures include hardening the satellite against electromagnetic pulse or kinetic attack, encrypting the space/ground links, spread spectrum techniques to protect the uplink/downlink, and giving the satellite an autonomous capability. An autonomous capability allows the satellite to operate for extended periods without commanding from ground stations. Additionally, ground to satellite links can be made mobile, making it more difficult to attack a space system through its ground station. Finally, hiding their true mission or leaving a satellite turned off until it is needed can protect satellites. By doing this, it makes it less likely an adversary will realise that a satellite should be attacked.

8. **Negation.** Negation, or offensive counter space, operations prevent an adversary from using their space systems. Negation operations can involve attacks by, and against, either space-based or terrestrial-based forces. These attacks can be lethal or non-lethal. Currently, for most militaries, including the CF, the only lethal negation capability involves attacking the terrestrial-based portion of a space system with terrestrial-based forces. Canadian policy prohibits the weaponization of space, including anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. Most space systems must be constantly commanded, or flown, to effectively perform their mission, so this can be very effective. An additional advantage to attacking with terrestrial-based forces is it does not require specialized forces or weapons, it can be performed using systems designed for general sea, land and/or air combat.

9. Attacking the space portion of a space system is more difficult, requiring dedicated ASAT weapons. ASATs can employ either directed energy, explosive or kinetic weapons, capable of destroying or disabling the targeted satellite. Lethal ASATs can leave significant space debris in orbit, which may adversely affect friendly space systems in the future.

10. Non-lethal negation operations can use a friendly ground station to either jam a satellite's links, disrupt its payload or actively take over the commanding of the satellite. Diplomacy can also have a negation role. If the adversary relies on other nations' systems, as Iraq did prior to the Gulf War, diplomacy can be used to convince those nations to turn off access.

2611. FORCE APPLICATION

1. Force application consists of systems based in space that are capable of applying force against ground, sea and air targets in support of terrestrial military operations. Currently no military openly has the capability to perform this mission, but this doesn't mean they won't in the future. The only system that met this definition in the past was the Soviet fractional orbit bombardment system or FOBS. The FOBS was a nuclear weapon launched into orbit, in a southerly direction. The weapon would achieve orbit, but be deorbited over its target before the first orbital revolution was complete. This system was intended to avoid NORAD's north facing missile warning systems. This system was tested 18 times between 1966-1971. It was to have been dismantled under the SALT II Treaty, but this treaty was never ratified. Unclassified sources are uncertain as to its current operational status. It is clear, however, that any nation that possesses nuclear weapons and the capability to orbit payloads could develop a similar system.

2. Other examples of potential force application from space would include space-based lasers that could attack earth-based targets. A space-based laser for the purpose of destroying ballistic missiles would not fall under this category; it would be an example of missile defence, an enhancing operation. It would also be possible to have a space-based system that could fire some sort of conventional warhead or kinetic weapon to hit terrestrial targets. It is not legal, under current treaties, to base nuclear weapons in space. A final example of force application could be a space plane or transatmospheric plane acting as a bomber. It is unlikely any of these examples will become operational within the next decade, in any military.

SECTION IV

SPACE EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS

2612. COMMAND OF SPACE FORCES

1. Centralised C2 of space operations supporting CF operations is critical. Space forces are global in nature, so this centralised control will normally reside at the national level. The CDS will co-ordinate the use of national, and if available, allied, space resources for the operational commander. Where appropriate, this task may be delegated to the DCDS.

2. The operational level commander may be given control of ground equipment, such as satellite communications terminals, that utilise space systems. When control of ground equipment is given to the operational commander, it should be made clear that control of the actual space asset is being retained at the national level. Commanders, however, should be aware of the potential capabilities of Canadian, allied and available commercial space systems, and how to integrate these capabilities into their military operations. Operation commanders can then request the space support that will best meet their operational requirements.

2613. ROLE OF MILITARY SPACE POWER

1. Space forces can influence and participate in military operations across the spectrum, from peacetime and contingency operations through the full range of armed conflict. This support can come from dedicated Canadian or combined Canadian/allied military space systems or commercial space systems.

2. During future conflicts, space systems will act as force enhancers, allowing today's smaller militaries to continue to perform the missions of their larger predecessors. Space systems will support every facet of combat, combat support and combat service support. The importance of military space support is increasing, as the world moves from the industrial age to the information age.

3. Space systems are capable of supporting the CF through the full spectrum of military operations, from peacetime operations through operations other than war to full-scale war. The various space systems contribute in different ways as operations move through the spectrum.

2614. ENHANCING OPERATIONS

1. **Surveillance and Reconnaissance.** During peacetime operations space assets provide data to the intelligence community to develop and maintain a detailed picture of world events and threats. This data supports military planning, ensures timely warning of changing threats and supports national leaders in their political, economic and diplomatic interaction with the rest of the world. Data derived from space sources can also support military assistance to civil authorities during natural disasters and humanitarian missions. During operations other than war and hostilities, surveillance and reconnaissance space assets support the area of operations to the maximum extent possible. Space assets provide troop locations and, during war, indications of enemy plans, target and route planning information, and support battle damage assessment. After peace returns, surveillance and reconnaissance space assets provide information to ensure peace terms and conditions are met.

2. **Communications.** Communications satellites perform their mission continuously in essentially the same manner through the spectrum of military operations. Satellite communications can be critical to forces operating on missions outside the country, particularly those operating in remote regions in support of peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, by their very nature, often operate in areas without access to modern, or intact communications networks.

3. During hostilities, communications capacity between the theatre of operations and NDHQ will be maximised. Satellite communications are essential for operations at all levels, providing necessary data for planning and tasking to strategic, operational and tactical forces. Direct broadcast satellites are used to ensure needed data, including space derived intelligence, geomatics and weather data is received by the fielded forces in a timely manner. Consideration may be given to moving satellites to improve coverage and throughput capacity. It is unlikely in any

future conflict that any coalition will have enough military communications satellites to support the information requirements of modern warfare. Commercial satellite communications channels will almost certainly be required to augment the communications system capacity.

4. After a conflict, terrestrial communications systems will probably have been destroyed in enemy territory, and may be damaged or destroyed in friendly territory. Space communications systems can support the re-establishment of critical civil infrastructure and legitimate government institutions until terrestrial based communications grids can be rebuilt.

5. **Environmental Observation.** Environmental observation satellites provide data for military forecasters, who in turn provide weather forecasts for all military operations as well as contingency operations. Earth resource satellites provide data to track iceberg locations as well as providing updated geomatics data. Geomatics data will be critical when planning new peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, since these tend to be in areas for which up-to-date maps are not available.

6. During hostilities data collection in support of the theatre of operations is emphasised. Accurate weather data is critical to determine danger areas in the event of nuclear, biological or chemical attacks on friendly forces. Dissemination of weather data must be maximised, probably utilising space communications. Remote sensing is gathered on the area of operations to support geomatics and targeting. Remote sensing data may be used to cue surveillance and reconnaissance space systems. Post-hostilities, environmental systems and remote sensing systems support damage assessment so rebuilding can begin. Accurate weather data will be necessary, as large segments of the population are likely to be displaced by the conflict.

7. **Navigation.** Navigation satellites provide accurate, all weather navigation assistance during normal peacetime operations, as well as supporting peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Satellite aided navigation may also be used, in the near future for precision approaches by aircraft. Its importance during search and rescue operations will grow also. The next generation of military and civilian search and rescue beacons will have an integrated GPS capability. During conflicts, navigation satellites remain critical for accurate navigation, and necessary for precise delivery of weapons to ensure target destruction and minimise collateral damage. Navigation data provides precise position and timing for rendezvous and coordinated attacks without resorting to radio communications. Navigation warfare measures will be taken to assure friendly use, and deny adversaries the use, of navigation satellite signals.

8. **Missile Warning and Defence.** Missile warning systems, especially if there is no anti-ballistic missile (ABM) capability, are primarily peacetime systems. The capability to immediately detect and characterise an attack contributes to deterrence. The capability to detect any attack and launch a devastating counterattack is the principal defence against nuclear war. Essentially, missile warning systems maintain wartime level operations even during peace. This is one of the pillars of NORAD's and NATO's defensive capability. For limited wars, such as the Gulf War, emphasis is placed on providing missile warning coverage of the area of operations. Additional processing systems may be used and warning satellites may be moved to ensure coverage is maximised. Missile warning satellites cue any available missile defence systems to protect friendly forces from tactical ballistic missile attack. Additional communications channels will be needed to ensure missile warning data can quickly be disseminated to the friendly forces. Once the conflict has ceased, peacetime missile warning and missile defence systems return to their normal operations.

9. If an ABM system is available, the missile warning systems cue the ABM system's tracker, which provides guidance to the actual ABM weapon. ABM systems can be developed to protect either a limited theatre, called theatre missile defence (TMD) systems, or national/continental missile defence systems. Canada currently has neither type of system, but could participate in operations where TMD systems are available. Within NORAD, Canada is currently participating with the US in research and consultations investigating a possible Ballistic Missile Defence of North America (BMD-NA) system. If a BMD-NA system is developed it would only provide a limited defence against an accidental, unauthorised or rogue nation attack. Any BMD-NA system would have to be compliant with the ABM Treaty.

2615. SUPPORTING SPACE FORCES

1. **Launch Operations.** During peacetime launch operations replace satellites as needed. After a conflict starts, launch operations will replace friendly satellites that are damaged by enemy action or fail due to normal causes. Launch processing times will be trimmed to the maximum extent possible to ensure needed space support is maximised. The emphasis is on maintaining support to the area of operations with minimal interruptions. For a time after a conflict ends launch processing may remain in the conflict mode if many systems must be replaced over a short period of time.

2. **Satellite Operations.** Satellite operations maintain C2 over all satellites, keeping systems operating efficiently while maximising satellite life during peacetime operations. During hostilities or operations other than war, satellite controllers ensure satellite payloads provide the necessary support to the area of operations. Satellites may be moved to adjust coverage and maximise support to the required geographic locations. Maximising support will be the driving factor, and satellite life may be traded for increased support. Mobile satellite control systems may be deployed to make the ground to satellite link less vulnerable to direct or terrorist attacks. After operations return to their peacetime tempo, satellites that were moved during a conflict may be moved back to their pre-conflict orbits.

2616. SPACE CONTROL

1. **Surveillance of Space.** The mission of surveillance of space is to maintain a catalogue of all objects in orbit. The catalogue is used to determine the space order of battle. Occasionally, low earth orbit satellites may need to manoeuvre to avoid space debris, exercising satellite protection capabilities. When a conflict starts, surveillance of space assets detect attacks on friendly space assets so protective measures can be taken.

2. **Protection.** Protection measures begin during peacetime, when satellites must be designed and built with survivability measures. Passive protection measures that can be designed into satellite systems include hardening against electromagnetic pulse, armour to protect critical components and some autonomous capability. Passive protection measures also make satellite systems more robust against normal hazards of space such as static build up and micro meteors. Once a conflict starts, active protection measures will be our primary concern. Friendly satellites, particularly those in more vulnerable low earth orbits, may need to manoeuvre to avoid enemy threats. Camouflage and occasional relocation, to keep their location hidden, protect friendly satellite ground links in the theatre.

3. **Negation.** Prior to a conflict, negation measures consists primarily of maintaining good intelligence on potential adversaries. Detailed knowledge of an enemy's space systems is required for an effective negation campaign if a conflict starts. The first negation measures will likely be diplomatic efforts to deny enemy forces access to other nations' space systems. Friendly land and air forces can target enemy ground stations and launch infrastructure to break their ground to satellite links and cut their ability to reconstitute their space systems. If the enemy forces have their own satellite systems, those satellites may be attacked if national authorities, allies and coalition partners approve (government policy prohibits the CF from participating in attacks against satellites). Satellites may be attacked by either destroying them or by disrupting or jamming their payloads and satellite to ground communications. The physical destruction of a satellite would result in a significant number of small fragments left in orbit. These fragments will be difficult or impossible to track and could have a significant adverse impact on friendly space operations. The use of non-lethal weapons or attacks against the ground component of a space system should be preferred when planning space control operations.

2617. APPLICATION OF FORCE

1. It is unlikely that Canada, or any of our potential coalition partners, will deploy or use space weapons designed to target ground targets. Principally, we must just maintain awareness that these weapons could potentially be developed and used against us. The only defence against these weapons would be to either eliminate their launch facilities with ground or air forces before the weapons can be launched.

2618. SPACE OPERATIONS PLANNING

1. **Space Operations Integration.** Space forces provide presence and capabilities that enhance the ability to sustain military operations effectively and efficiently. Space capabilities should be fully integrated into all planning efforts as soon as they are initiated. This will ensure the planning optimises the force multiplier effect for space support to terrestrial forces.
2. **Space Control Planning Factors.** To be effective, policy compliant counter space planning must be carried out early to maximise its impact at the critical time during a conflict. In addition, many aspects of space control must be integrated into the design of space systems. It is much more difficult to create an effective protection strategy after space systems have been designed and launched. Day to day operations for space systems require detailed procedures and advanced planning. Mistakes during routine satellite commanding can require the switch to back-up systems with the resulting loss of future failure recovery, the use of fuel to re-stabilise the orbit or, in rare cases, cause the loss of a satellite. Space operations must remain error free.
3. **Peacetime Planning.** Even during peacetime, space support will be a scarce commodity. There are often more requests for support from space systems than they are capable of satisfying. By having detailed, prioritised plans in advance, competing requests for support can quickly be resolved. This ensures space support is optimised.
4. **Crisis and Wartime Space Operations.** Crisis, contingency and war plans should have an integrated space support component. Integrating space support at the beginning of the planning process ensures space support is maximised. Advanced planning provides a good indicator of where additional support will be needed. This allows for commercial or allied support to be requested early, allowing access to the needed capabilities to be acquired.

2619. EDUCATION, TRAINING AND EXERCISES

1. **Education and Training.** Effective utilisation of military space systems and the military use of civil space systems require specialised training. All military officers that expect to be effective leaders in the future will require training and knowledge on the effective use of space to support military operations that further national objectives. This fact must be recognised, and military space capabilities need to be taught throughout the spectrum of military training and professional education. Training and experience in space operations are critical skills. Personnel who have the training and experience to serve in space operations positions must be managed properly.
2. **War Games and Exercises** Space systems provide effective support from peacetime operations, through operations other than war such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and ultimately to high intensity warfare that NATO must be prepared to wage. To ensure all levels of leadership receive experience utilising space systems to support operations, space systems should be incorporated into all levels of war gaming and exercises. The experience gained from using space systems to support exercises will allow the CF to integrate better with allies in future operations. Because space systems aren't readily visible, and interface with users primarily through computers, they lend themselves to effective simulation. By incorporating space systems in exercises and war games that simulate this full spectrum of military operations, CF personnel gain experience that will prove invaluable when they are called upon to perform real world missions in support of Canadian interests.

CHAPTER 27

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

2701. INTRODUCTION

1. Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with:
 - a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel;
 - b. movement, evacuation and hospitalization of personnel;
 - c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and
 - d. acquisition or furnishing of services.
2. Logistic support to CF operations is also described in the following terms:
 - a. **Administration C** The management and execution of all military matters not included in tactics and strategy, primarily in the fields of logistics and personnel management.
 - b. **Combat Service Support (CSS) C** The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics.
3. Operational success depends on effective logistic support. Commanders require a clear understanding of the logistic factors that affect their missions and must give adequate and timely direction to CSS commanders and logistic staffs for effective logistic planning to take place. Also, CSS commanders and logistic staffs must understand the nature of CF operations and the implications of logistic support on such operations.
4. In combined operations, unless other arrangements are made, logistic support, including the control of logistic capabilities and resources, is a national responsibility. For example, in a NATO Article V operation, theatre or operational level support is a shared responsibility, while strategic (and, normally, tactical) support remains a national responsibility.
5. Among the topics dealt with in this chapter are the levels of logistic support: strategic, operational and tactical. The doctrine in this chapter relates primarily to operational level logistics.

2702. CATEGORIES OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

1. Logistic support deals with several broad areas, namely:
 - a. supply C providing combat forces with the materiel required to initiate and sustain operations;
 - b. maintenance and repair C the action taken to keep materiel in a serviceable condition, to return it to service, or to update and upgrade its capability;
 - c. transportation C the movement of personnel and materiel over LOC from a point of origin to a destination;
 - d. construction engineering C the construction, maintenance and operation of facilities and services as a requirement of sustainability and survivability;
 - e. finance C the provision of pay, accounting and general financial services;

- f. food services C the efficient management of food services resources and the provision of an appropriate standard of nourishment to military forces in all operational settings;
 - g. medical and dental support C medical activities and tasks to care for and treat sick and injured personnel. Dental support involves the provision of emergency and routine dental treatment; and
 - h. general support C various logistic functions and tasks, such as postal services and other personnel support services, that are essential to the morale, technical management and support of a force.
2. Doctrine with respect to personnel support, medical and dental, military engineer support and movement is fully detailed in chapters 18, 19, 23 and 28 respectively.

2703. LEVELS OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

1. There are three levels of logistic support to CF operations which correlate to the three levels of war discussed in chapter 1: strategic, operational and tactical logistics. While lines of support are not specifically addressed, the correlation between lines and levels of logistic support is roughly as follows:

- a. strategic logistics C fourth line;
- b. operational logistics C third line; and
- c. tactical logistics C first and second line support (i.e. CSS).

2. **Strategic logistics** has significant civil as well as military components. Strategic logistics is the bridge between a nation's economy and its military. A nation's capability to deliver logistic resources may be the major limiting factor in the production and maintenance of combat power for military operations.

3. Strategic logistics involves the provision of military forces and the national means to support these forces and their operations. General considerations of strategic logistics include:

- a. the availability of logistic resources necessary to create combat forces and to sustain their operations;
- b. the procurement process to ensure the availability of logistic resources in a timely manner;
- c. the process of allocating available logistic resources to a commander; and
- d. the distribution system necessary to achieve the maximum combat effectiveness.

4. **Operational logistics** is a military effort, but may include augmentation with civil services and infrastructure. Operational logistics involves activities to support forces in campaigns and major operations within a theatre or area of operations. Specific activities of operational logistics include:

- a. identifying resource requirements sufficient to ensure continuity of operations through all phases of a campaign or throughout an operation;
- b. establishing priorities for the employment of the resources provided;
- c. planning and executing the movement of personnel and materiel and the maintenance of facilities;
- d. balancing resource consumption with the need to build up logistic support for subsequent operations;
- e. adjusting LOC to maintain the tempo of operations (e.g., staging logistic support forward);
- f. maintaining forward sustainment locations and LOC;

- g. providing medical and dental support and evacuating non-combatants; and
- h. obtaining logistic support from other sources (e.g., HNS).

5. **Tactical logistics** is normally left to tactical commanders; however, commanders at higher levels may change CSS tasks, priorities, apportionment or command relationships to influence the outcome of an operation.

6. Strategic logistics is a government-wide responsibility involving a number of government departments in addition to the DND. Operational logistics is the responsibility of the strategic and operational level commanders, and tactical logistics that of the operational and tactical level commanders.

2704. PRINCIPLES OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

1. A number of principles of logistic support, which are intended to serve as a guide to commanders and their staffs for organizing, planning and conducting logistic support operations, have evolved through experience. These principles are not rigid rules to apply in every situation. Seldom will all of them exert equal influence in any given operation; usually, one or two will dominate. Identifying those principles that have priority for a specific situation is essential to establishing effective support. The principles of logistic support are:

- a. foresight;
- b. simplicity;
- c. flexibility;
- d. economy;
- e. cooperation;
- f. self-sufficiency; and
- g. visibility.

2. **Foresight** is necessary to ensure the existence of suitable personnel, equipment and materiel and the flexibility to make reserves available when and where required. To minimize shortfalls in logistic support to the operation, logistic planners must be made aware of operational intentions as early as possible. Also as plans will seldom be executed exactly as forecasted, logistic plans must flexible to successfully meet changes as they arise.

3. **Simplicity** leads to efficiency in both the planning and execution of logistic operations. A clear COO, straightforward C2, clear orders, standardized operating procedures, and sound doctrine contribute to simplicity. Established priorities and the pre-allocation of supplies and services also simplify logistic operations.

4. **Flexibility** is the ability to adapt logistic structures, functions and procedures to changing situations and concepts of operations. The principle of flexibility includes the concepts of alternative planning, anticipation, reserve assets, redundancy, forward support, and centralized control with decentralized execution.

5. **Economy** is the provision of logistic support at the least cost in terms of resources available and necessary to accomplish the mission. Because logistic resources are always in short supply, they must be economically employed. When allocating resources, a commander must continuously consider economy. However, economy must not be allowed to limit mission accomplishment. Centralized control with decentralized execution offers a balance between responsiveness and economy.

6. **Cooperation** among staffs at all levels of command greatly enhances the effectiveness of logistic support. Cooperation is cultivated by the early involvement of logistic staffs in the planning process. Liaison staff are key to developing mutual confidence and, in turn, cooperation. Force elements must be able to rely on their logistic

staffs and support organizations. Similarly, logistic staffs and support organizations must be confident that they will not continually be asked to satisfy unreasonable demands. Commanders and staffs at all levels must ensure that this level of cooperation exists.

7. **Self-Sufficiency** implies that combat elements of a force initially have at their disposal the essential resources for combat for a pre-determined period. Commanders must be able to forecast what resources and capabilities are needed for a particular operation and hold in reserve in rear areas those that are not required. This may mean reducing a unit's basic load for the operation but augmenting supporting replenishment elements to ensure self-sufficiency for that unit.

8. **Visibility.** Proper control or coordination of support cannot be exercised if the commander does not have sufficient visibility of in and out of theatre assets, stocks, supplies and services and the means to direct changes.

2705. CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

1. The TFC, in cooperation with the strategic level staff at NDHQ, is responsible for developing the logistic support concept and the overall plan for using logistic resources effectively.

2. The logistic support concept is the organization of logistic capabilities and dedicated resources into a coherent concept of support for a given operation. It gives special attention to the major LOC to be developed and used and the general echelon of support across the LOC, and to HNS and mutual support to be provided by allied and friendly nations.

3. In developing the logistic support concept, the following conditions should be met in addition to the principles of logistic support:

- a. the operational and logistic planners' efforts must be integrated throughout the planning and execution phases of an operation, since operations and logistics are inseparable facets of war;
- b. logistic support must be sustained throughout an operation. Attention must be focused on the long term objectives and requirements of the TFC. A system of continuous replenishment should be standard and may take the form of either automatic or requisitioning replenishment;
- c. dedicated circuits, rather than common user circuits, should be available either permanently or for limited periods of intensive administrative activity in order to provide the necessary level of logistic support throughout all phases of an operation. Administrative CIS links to the CFSS must be provided;
- d. the TFC must establish both priorities for, and a system of allocating available resources among subordinate commanders based on the COO and the subordinate commanders' stated requirements;
- e. disciplined use of logistic resources is essential in any operation. Logistic resources are always limited. At the operational and tactical levels, common limitations are transportation means, port capacities, certain munitions and equipment, critical repair parts, availability of logistic personnel, and availability of automated logistics-management systems;
- f. logistic constraints may dictate the size of the combat force assigned to a CF operation and may affect time and space aspects of the operation (e.g., speed of advance, depth of attack);
- g. just as operational reserves must be established to exploit combat successes or to respond to unforeseen events, reserves of logistic resources that can be committed only by the TFC must be established;
- h. adequate provisions must be made to protect logistic resources and capabilities from damage or destruction. Logistics assets are high value targets that must be safeguarded by both active and passive measures, as must LOC between logistic installations and facilities and the supported units. Survivability requires some degree of dispersion and duplication during transit to and within an area of operations. Although the physical

environment will most often only degrade rather than destroy logistic capabilities, it must be considered when planning logistic operations; and

- i. the TFC should consider the use of HNS and allied systems as well as locally procured labour and services outside the terms of HNS agreements for out of country operations.

2706. TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION SUB-SYSTEM

1. A critical component of operational logistic support is the transportation and distribution sub-system, described as the means to move supplies and military forces forward and to evacuate them to the rear. All functional areas of logistic support and all combat power rely on the transportation and distribution sub-system.

2. The key elements of a transportation and distribution sub-system are:

- a. **LOC.** The LOC consists of all routes that connect an operating military force with bases of operations and along which supplies and military forces move.
- b. **Seaports, Railheads, Airports and Bases.** These facilities serve as the shipment, reception, transshipment, maintenance and holding facilities for supplies and military forces moving into and out of an area of operations along the LOC.
- c. **Units.** Specified units are responsible for operating the seaports, bases and airports.
- d. **HNS and Mutual Support.** Civil and military assistance provided by host and allied or friendly nations for reception, onward movement and sustainment of forces (see also chapter 30 - CIMIC).

3. A number of considerations must be taken into account when developing a sub-system for transportation and distribution. Among the more significant are:

- a. **Efficiency of Transportation.** Sealift is the most efficient means of transporting bulk tonnage; airlift is often the most efficient means of moving personnel, or of moving equipment and supplies when time is a critical factor. On land, rail and pipeline are more efficient than wheeled vehicles. These factors should influence the selection of transportation modes to best meet operational requirements.
- b. **Logistic Capability.** The ability of the basic infrastructure to receive, warehouse and forward logistic resources influences the efficiency of the entire logistic system.
- c. **Echelon of Support.** The logistic system must be designed to respond to the needs of the most forward combat forces, providing supplies and services when and where they are needed. Proper echeloning pushes logistic support forward through the strategic, operational and tactical levels in succession.
- d. **Geography and Climate.** Geography and climate must be considered when establishing LOC.
- e. **Logistic Enhancements.** Any asset that reduces transportation bottlenecks should be considered and planned for in advance (e.g., high capacity ports, materiel handling equipment, etc.).
- f. **Construction Engineer Support.** The capability of the ESU to improve the existing infrastructure, if required, impacts on the efficiency of the logistic system.
- g. **Logistic Infrastructure Protection.** Because the logistic system is an integral element of combat power, specific provisions must be made for its security.
- h. **Responsibility.** Responsibility for controlling the deployment or redeployment of forces and materiel travelling through seaports, bases and airports and along LOC rests with the National Defence Movement Coordination Centre (NDMCC) as exercised by 4 Canadian Forces Movement Control Unit (CFMCU).

Supporting commanders and component commanders in the theatre of operations (or host nations, if applicable) may be tasked to assist when required.

- i. **Availability of HNS and Mutual Support.** The level of logistic support provided by host and allied or friendly nations will affect the amount of airlift and sea lift available for moving combat and CSS forces.

2707. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

1. For a CF operation, logistic resources are provided by J4 Mat and by the force generators.
2. Logistic responsibilities in a CF operation are shared as follows:
 - a. the CDS must ensure that:
 - (1) logistic support is comprehensive;
 - (2) effective use is made of all available CF resources; and
 - (3) duplication is avoided;
 - b. supporting commands and agencies are responsible to man, equip and train their components, including CSS units, assigned to the force; and
 - c. the TFC is responsible for:
 - (1) forecasting the logistic support necessary to support the COO;
 - (2) establishing priorities for obtaining and employing logistic resources, including host nation and mutual support; and
 - (3) ensuring logistic resources are used to the best effect.
3. J4 Mat, on behalf of the CDS, coordinates and provides logistic support to a CF operation through the National Defence Logistic Coordination Centre (NDLCC), the NDMCC and the coordination component of the CSG Coord. J4 Mat is assisted in this responsibility by J4 Log and J4 Mov.
4. The TFC exercises responsibility for operational logistics through the force J4 and the CSG (figure 27-1).




Figure 27-1 General Staff-CF Operational levels Headquarters (J4 Division)

5. The J4 staff is charged with assisting the TFC with formulating logistic plans and with coordinating and supervising logistic activities to ensure effective logistic for all forces of the force.
6. The following is a list of some of the more significant J4 staff responsibilities:
 - a. coordinate the overall logistic functions and requirements of the force;
 - b. advise the TFC on logistic matters that affect the accomplishment of the mission;
 - c. formulate the force logistic policies;
 - d. develop the logistic estimate, taking into consideration HNS and allied requirements;
 - e. prepare the TFC-s concept of logistic support;
 - f. prepare administrative and movement orders and provide logistic input to operation plans and orders;
 - g. coordinate materiel support;
 - h. if required, coordinate the apportionment or redistribution of critical resources such as fuel and ammunition;
 - i. in conjunction with the force J3, authorize release of controlled stores;
 - j. determine requirements in terms of food services support and coordinate food services operations;
 - k. arrange for and monitor transportation requirements in the area of operations (operational movement);
 - l. establish and control LOC in the area of operations;
 - m. coordinate the operation of beaches, airports and seaports in the area of operations;

- n. coordinate maintenance and repair of equipment; and
 - o. advise the TFC on financial matters, coordinate the provision of financial services and to coordinate the provision of public funds to the force;
 - p. coordination of logistic support for the ESU that will be provided by the CSG; and
 - q. coordination with the TF Engr cell for procurement and control of engineer resources and the financial management of engineer works.
7. Operational level logistic support in a theatre of operations is coordinated and provided by a CSG which is under the command authority of the TFC. The CSG is the intermediary between the tactical support units of the combat components of the force and the strategic support system. For smaller contingency operations, logistic support may be provided by a NSE.
8. Under normal peacetime circumstances, the CSG exists in cadre form only. Whenever a CF operation is initiated, the permanent cadre is augmented from across the CF to the level required for the particular operation.
9. The CSG may be comprised of a number of components depending upon the nature of the operation and the level of support required. The CSG Rear component is the Canada based component which functions as the interface between the in-theatre component, the CSG Deployed, and national bases of operations and support agencies. The theatre based component, the CSG Deployed, is responsible for providing CSS to the components of the force and for maintaining a logistics link with the CSG Rear. A Direct Support Unit (DSU) provides internal logistic support to the CSG, as well as supplementary tactical level support to components/elements lacking a full tactical level support capability. Depending upon the nature of the operation and the location of the force components, several CSG detachments may also be required. CSG detachments are described in *B-GG-05-004/AF-013 Logistics Doctrine for CF Operations*. The CF logistic support organization is illustrated at Figure 27-2.

2708. PLANNING OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

1. The logistics plan must support the TFC's COO. It should also make provisions for changes to that concept. If the logistic SUP is developed to incorporate flexibility, then emergency measures and improvizations, which are costly and adversely affect subordinate commands, can be reduced.
2. Logistic planning must be concurrent and integrated with operation planning, must support operation planning, and must define the logistic concept sufficiently to allow detailed support planning to take place.
3. In a CF operation, J4 Mat, on behalf of the CDS, is responsible for such matters as:
 - a. activating and equipping the CSG and forwarding staff requirements to J1;
 - b. in cooperation with the TFC, determining the level of logistic support required;
 - c. acquiring readily available resource shortfalls from civilian industry;
 - d. in conjunction with the TFC, arranging for and activating agreements for HNS and bilateral support;
 - e. activating strategic LOC; and
 - f. deploying personnel and materiel to the area of operations.




Figure 27-2 Logistic Support Organization

4. The TFC is responsible for developing the logistic concept and the operational logistic plan to use logistic resources to support the COO. The logistic concept is derived from the logistic estimate as prepared by the logistic staff.

5. In developing the operational logistic plan, the TFC-s logistic staff requires certain information to forecast the support needed for the operation. This information is provided from numerous sources and includes but is not limited to the following (where information is not available, assumptions are made):

- a. the order of battle of the force;
- b. an estimate of the duration and likely intensity of operations, including mission intensity factors, and types of combat activities;
- c. the types and quantities of equipment to be deployed;
- d. the boundaries within which the force will operate, and the LOC;
- e. the impact of climate and geographic conditions on logistics in the area of operations;
- f. the requirement to operate in an NBC environment;
- g. an estimate of the personnel casualty rate and attrition rates for prime mission equipment (PME);
- h. an estimate of the daily rates of ammunition expenditure;
- i. an estimate of days steaming for naval vessels;


- j. an estimate of daily distances travelled by tracked and wheeled vehicles;
 - k. an estimate of aircraft flying rates;
 - l. the requirement for advance bases in support of deployed operations;
 - m. the availability of local resources;
 - n. the condition of existing infrastructure and the availability of the ESU to effect improvements;
 - o. the requirement for defence stores, mines and explosives;
 - p. the levels of reserves of PME and personnel to be held in theatre;
 - q. the frequency and method of resupply;
 - r. transportation requirements, including those for casualty evacuation;
 - s. the casualty holding and treatment policy in theatre;
 - t. an estimate of the numbers of prisoners of war;
 - u. the projected volume and movement direction of refugees; and
 - v. the location and types of rest and recreation facilities.
6. Once the logistic concept is defined and the operational logistic plan developed, component commanders can begin detailed logistic support planning for their forces.

2709. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1. The TFC is responsible for the operational and logistic efficiency of all forces assigned or attached to the force. The TFC must have the authority to control various administrative and logistic functions in a CF operation to ensure effective execution of approved operation plans, to provide efficiency and economy in operations, and to prevent or to eliminate unnecessary duplication of facilities and effort.
2. Supporting commands and agencies provide logistic capabilities and resources, exercise technical control of the capabilities and resources, and exercise administrative control of them outside the theatre of operations. The TFC exercises administrative control of the capabilities and resources in the theatre of operations (to the level authorized by the CDS).
3. The delegation of authority to the TFC in terms of OPCOM or OPCON does not include the delegation or change of administrative or logistic responsibilities (administrative control). Any such delegation or change must be specifically ordered, either separately (by means of an administration order) or together with TOCA.
4. The level of administrative control a TFC is authorized within a theatre of operations includes such responsibilities as the authority to coordinate and establish priorities for the logistic support of the force, the authority to allocate or redistribute critical logistic resources, the authority to negotiate and procure logistic support through host nation and bilateral agreements, and a level of authority for powers of write-off.
5. The TFC is responsible for coordinating maintenance and repair within the force. Operational level maintenance of facilities for items common to all combat components may be incorporated within the CSG. However, Environment specific maintenance support and technical control of the maintenance organization is a residual responsibility, and is exercised through component commanders. Procurement and control of engineering

materiel is coordinated with the Force Engr cell. (See chapter 23.)

6. In the theatre of operations, the CSG is under the OPCOM or OPCON of the TFC and under the technical control of J4 Mat. The comptroller organization within the CSG is under the technical control of J4 Fin. Figure 27-3 illustrates the C2 arrangement for logistic operations.



CHAPTER 28

MOVEMENT

2801. INTRODUCTION

1. Movement consists of the change in location of personnel and materiel as part of a military operation. Movement requires the supporting capabilities of transport, infrastructure and movement control.
2. Movement is classified as either strategic or operational. Strategic movement is conducted to carry personnel and materiel between areas of normal location or support areas and an area of operations, or between widely separated areas of operations. Operational movement involves the movement of personnel and materiel within an area of operations.
3. Movement is further categorized as either surface, air or sea transport. Surface transport is normally more economical than air transport; however, surface transport is relatively slow and, where land and sea LOC are limited, or insecure, the requirement for timely movement can only be met through the use of air transport. For an operation abroad, sea transport is an essential requirement. Sea transport is capable of moving large numbers of personnel and large amounts of freight over long distances to an area of operations with the flexibility of being able to unload at either an established or expedient port.

2802. PRINCIPLES OF MOVEMENT

1. The planning, control and coordination of movement support are guided by the following principles:
 - a. centralized control;
 - b. regulated movement;
 - c. fluid and flexible movement; and
 - d. maximum utilization of carrying capacity.
2. **Centralized Control.** Successful military movement is achieved through centralized control at the highest practical level. Only through centralized control can optimum use of scarce resources be achieved, maximum flexibility be gained, priorities be assessed accurately, and time and effort be employed most effectively.
3. **Regulated Movement.** Movement must be regulated to avoid congestion or breakdown in the system, thus achieving an even flow. Generally, materiel consignments are called up only when transport and terminal capacity is sufficient to cope with them.
4. **Fluid and Flexible Movement.** Personnel and materiel should be moved forward in a continuous and even flow. There must, however be enough flexibility to allow for occasional demands of special urgency to be met with certainty. To retain flexibility and to ensure a continual even flow, potential congestion points must be identified and, where practical, eliminated. Where this is not possible, contingency plans must be made.
5. **Maximum Utilization of Carrying Capacity.** Economic movement depends on planned and correct loading, minimization of turn-around times, and optimum use of the carrying capability of available transportation resources consistent with operational requirements.

2803. MOVEMENT RESOURCES

1. The CF must be able to deploy from areas of normal location or support areas to an area of operations in a timely manner. This is accomplished through a combination of Canadian military and civil airlift and sealift capabilities, allied military capabilities and international commercial capabilities.

2. The CF's strategic lift resources for contingency operations are limited to a small number of transport aircraft. No dedicated CF sealift is available, although auxiliary oiler replenishment ships can provide some emergency sealift. National commercial resources for strategic transport by air or by sea are also limited.
3. Some CF movement requirements may be met through agreements with allies for the use of allied military transport. The Integrated Lines of Communication (ILOC) agreement with the United States, for example, when activated by mutual consent, provides Canada with access to US airlift and sealift capability when both forces are operating in the same theatre.
4. The CF's movement structure relies on international commercial transportation. The immediate availability of commercial transportation in times of crisis, however, cannot always be assured. Thus Canadian planners are often at the mercy of external factors when planning the deployment phase of a contingency operation.

2804. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. J4 Mat is responsible to the CDS for planning, routing, scheduling and controlling the movement of personnel and freight by all modes along the LOC within Canada, between Canada and an area of operations, and between areas of operations. J4 Mat is assisted in this responsibility by J4 Mov, who exercises authority through the NDMCC.
2. Movement control is the planning, routing, scheduling and control of personnel and freight movements over LOC; also an organization responsible for these functions. Strategic level movement control is the function of 4 CFMCU. This unit is under the OPCOM of J4 Mat and the OPCON of J4 Mov. 4 CFMCU is not fully operational in peacetime and must be activated and augmented whenever a large scale military operation involving strategic movement of personnel and materiel is initiated.
3. Details regarding C2 relationships, movement doctrine, movement planning, movement coordination, movement control and movement control organizations are contained in *B-GG-005-004/AF-014, The Canadian Forces Manual of Movements*. The OPI for this publication is J4 Mov (Director Transport and Movements).

CHAPTER 29

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

2901. INTRODUCTION

1. Military PA is the ongoing effort to establish public understanding and support for CF policies and actions by providing timely and accurate information to national and international media and other target audiences.
2. PA is divided into two categories: DND PA and CF PA. The former deals with broad-scale issues such as personnel policies and equipment procurement, whereas the latter is concerned with the day-to-day operational activities of the CF. This chapter provides doctrine relating to CF PA only.
3. The PA and PSYOPS programmes are related but separate activities. PA personnel must not participate in disinformation activities or PSYOPS. If they did, media trust would be damaged. See chapter 34 - PSYOPS.

2902. MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. The management of PA is a key element in the planning and conduct of military operations. Experience has shown that the presence of correspondents can have a profound effect on the execution of an operation plan.
2. Commanders and staffs must be aware of the need to maintain a positive relationship with the media and to foster a spirit of cooperation that is consistent with CF objectives. During an operation, steps are to be taken to ensure that, without compromising OPSEC, as much information as possible is disclosed. This does not mean that correspondents should be permitted access to secure, or sensitive areas without an escort. In the case of operation centres, it is the responsibility of the operations staff to ensure that classified material is removed or concealed prior to visits by the media. Information releases should be as informative as possible without containing classified information. Information should be declassified as quickly as possible, as determined by the TFC.
3. While correspondents nominated by the media to cover CF operations are welcomed, for operational reasons, their numbers may be restricted. Each correspondent should go through an NDHQ initiated accreditation process and once accredited, allocated to various force elements. Where practicable, accreditation provides such privileges as facilities for travel, escort officers, accommodations, briefings and access to communication facilities. Accredited correspondents should be given a list of subjects on which they cannot report without prior agreement of the TFC. The following subjects may be included:
 - a. the order of battle;
 - b. military movements;
 - c. plans or intentions;
 - d. tactics;
 - e. operational capabilities and deployments;
 - f. location of ships, units and aircraft;
 - g. names of ships, units and aircraft; and
 - h. names of individual service personnel.

2903. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. A PA policy is established and a PA plan is developed for every CF operation. The CDS, assisted by J5 PA, is responsible for developing and issuing the PA policy, normally through the DCDS wng O. The policy should identify objectives to be achieved at the operational level and should flow from:

- a. national PA policies and plans;
 - b. national political aims;
 - c. national military objectives; and
 - d. the CF's strategic concept including any imposed limitations.
2. The TFC, advised and assisted by a CDS designated PA staff, develops a PA plan or annex to the operation plan and implements it through directives and orders issued to subordinate commanders. The PA staff forms part of the J5 division of the strategic and operational staff, and part of the Information cell of a unit.
3. The TFC is responsible for ensuring that:
- a. subordinate commanders comply with PA policy directives and guidelines;
 - b. force security is maintained; and
 - c. a positive relationship with correspondents is maintained consistent with the achievement of the mission.

2904. PLANNING OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. PA staff must be involved in planning from the outset, as effective management of PA and the formulation of a PA plan is facilitated by early and frequent consultation between the TFHQ, J5 PA and J5 legal staffs. Assisted by the PA staff, the TFC is responsible for preparing the PA plan, which should at least identify the following:
- a. operational PA objectives;
 - b. PA approach;
 - c. PA messages;
 - d. the target audiences; and
 - e. execution of the PA plan.
2. The plan for accommodating the media should include the following essential elements:
- a. the provision of information regarding the conduct of the operation;
 - b. the provision of facilities and coordinating procedures for correspondents;
 - c. arrangements for correspondents to accompany elements of the force on operations; and
 - d. arrangements for correspondents to transmit copy using local CIS services, subject to availability, on a non-interference basis, and only in those cases where commercial services are unavailable.

2905. COMMAND AND CONTROL WITH RESPECT TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. Overall control of the PA programme for an operation is exercised by the CDS.
2. TF PA staff are directly responsible to the TFC for PA matters and responsive to NDHQ J5. At all levels, PA staff must have direct access to both commanders and correspondents to ensure that the CF speaks with one voice and that the media have access to accurate and timely information.

CHAPTER 30

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

3001. INTRODUCTION

1. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) has always been an integral part of the military profession, whether it be civilian assistance in preparation for war, or military assistance in a nation's economic recovery and infrastructure rehabilitation, such as in Europe following WWII, under the Marshall Plan. CIMIC activities and operations have become an integral part of, and help achieve politico-military objectives in, domestic and international operations.

To exploit potential force multiplier effects, particularly in complex emergencies, CIMIC is vital dimension of CF operations. This chapter constitutes the doctrinal justification for CIMIC activities and operations, planned and conducted by the CF for domestic and international operations. The amplifying doctrinal publication is *B-GG-005-004/AF-023, Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War*.

2. CIMIC activities and operations involve political, military, civil and humanitarian elements. The complexities and scope of CIMIC require commanders at all levels to understand that civil-military problems are best resolved through interrelationships focused on a multidisciplinary approach to problem-solving. CIMIC encompasses the application of military capabilities to *support the civil environment* and address civil concerns, such as the basic humanitarian needs of a civil population, and *support to the military force* such as the ensuring the maximum cooperation of civil authorities, organisations and the population to support and sustain a military force's mission and presence. In this context, it is important to distinguish from article 5 operations, which are based on the NATO Charter requiring NATO leadership, from non-article 5 operations, such as a PSO, which are UN or OSCE led and which NATO could support with military forces.

3. CIMIC, whether domestic or international, is a command responsibility and requires leadership from the highest military appointments in cooperation with the heads of civilian agencies. CIMIC will be conducted in or near populated areas where the threat varies from peaceful to armed conflict and in territories where domestic and international laws apply. In this context, CIMIC is essential to enhance operational effectiveness which requires leadership, training and equipment to achieve the TFC's military objectives.

4. CIMIC requires that military commanders, all levels of government and the civilian population cooperate and mutually support one another in peace, emergencies, crisis and war. Responsive information and logistic systems, regardless of time and space, terrain, weather and climate, will greatly assist civil and military authorities in the conduct of civil-military cooperation operations (CMO) and support to civil administration. DND and CF relationships with OGDs, IOs, NGOs and the Canadian federal, provincial and municipal levels of government must become a standard practice for CIMIC to benefit from specialists' skills, knowledge and expertise, and civil resources available in the non-military environment. CIMIC is a *force multiplier*.

3002. CANADIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY STATEMENT - CIMIC

1. The Government of Canada has identified three key, interdependent and mutually-reinforcing objectives for its international actions:

- a. **The promotion of prosperity and employment.** Canada wishes to see other countries and regions prosper, help anchor international stability and make progress towards sustainable development.
- b. **The promotion of global peace as the key to protecting Canadian security.** Stability and security are prerequisites for economic growth and development. A range of issues that transcend borders, namely mass migration, crime, disease, environment, overpopulation and underdevelopment have peace and security implications at the local, regional and, in many cases, at the global level.
- c. **The projection of Canadian values and culture is important to Canadian success in the world.** Application of values - respect for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the environment - is critical to the struggle for international security in the face of new threats to stability. Their adoption internationally is essential to ensuring they are viable within Canada.

3003. CANADIAN OBJECTIVES IN CIMIC

1. The main objective of CIMIC is to achieve the necessary cooperation between civil authorities and the CF to improve the probability of success of CF operations. CIMIC, when conducted in an impartial, neutral and independent manner, in the eyes of national authorities and the local population, is a *force multiplier*. Notwithstanding, a TFC must be aware that some IOs and NGOs will conduct themselves in a manner which does not permit them to promote or associate with any political ideologies, such as national objectives or interests. In fact, the uniqueness of the ICRC, which stems from its mandate and role defined in the Geneva Conventions, separates it from typical NGOs, OGDs and agencies. In CF operations, CIMIC objectives are to:

- a. support Canadian national interests;
- b. fulfil obligations imposed by domestic law (eg. NDA and Criminal Code) and international law (eg. LOAC, International Human Rights Law), the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols of 1977, Treaties and such memoranda of understanding (MOU) and agreements or technical arrangements reached between national authorities or parties;
- c. advise, assist or reinforce foreign governments according to national policy and operational requirements;
- d. support the TFC's mission and COO;
- e. support specific Canadian politico-military objectives in the theatre or area of operations (AO);
- f. assist TFCs, in support to civil administration, in achieving developmental goals by assisting or reinforcing the judicial, executive and legislative branches of government, as well as political and socio-economic infrastructure to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of public institutions and civil services;
- g. facilitate the TFC's mission by minimizing interference by the local population in the military phase of an operation while obtaining civil support for the civil phase and associated tasks;
- h. assist the TFC in meeting legal and moral obligations to the local population;
- i. assist all commander's by providing those resources necessary to meet essential civil requirements, avoiding damage to civil property and usable resources, and minimizing loss of life and human suffering, assuming a dedicated CIMIC organization is available;
- j. identify and coordinate the use of local resources, facilities and level of support such as civilian labour, transportation, communications, maintenance, medical facilities and essential services and supplies for restoring local government;
- k. support, as required, IOs, NGOs, the UN and OSCE, as well as NATO or national civilian agencies, in all types of CIMIC and PSO, to a level specified by the Government or NDHQ; and
- l. assist Canadian and foreign civil authorities in creating, restoring and maintaining public law and order.

3004. CIMIC PLANNING PRINCIPLES

1. **CIMIC Planning.** It is defined as a cooperative civil-military venture aimed at selecting and implementing a coherent course of action which will achieve mission objectives and the desired end state. Canadian CIMIC doctrine establishes ten guiding-principles which constitute a coherent framework in CIMIC campaign planning and time-sensitive operations, particularly in planning for complex emergencies:

- a. **Mission Primacy.** All stakeholders and partners involved in a military operation seek to attain mission objectives. The mission directive must generate complementary civil and military mission statements in campaign design, regardless of stakeholders' respective Charter, mandate, structure and capability. Goals must be established to focus common understanding, unity of purpose and unity of effort on mission objectives and the civil-military end state. A civil-military partnership is the cornerstone of success in military and civil phases. These efforts require common centres of gravity, decisive points and lines of operations to be identified. Consequently, the synergy of integrated efforts must generate one civil plan for a theatre of operations to reach a common civil-military end state.

- b. **Command Responsibility.** CIMIC is a command responsibility. Although unity of command is essential, military commanders have no legal authority or command responsibility over civilian agencies in the AO. Civilian and military personnel must understand the scope of their mandate, know the resources available to them, identify the constraints of the environment and their own limitations. Commanders must understand the existing agreements (SOFA, MOU, HN and international agreements and technical arrangements) which will support the mission and its objectives. To increase operational effectiveness, education of all personnel, joint training and exercises with IOs/NGOs must be organized and specialist functions and requirements identified. Unity of command is a fundamental C2 principle in CIMIC which must lead to unity of purpose, based on common goals, and unity of effort among all stakeholders and partners.
- c. **Political Influence.** Commanders must understand the political dynamic in the AO, particularly the political parties represented, their political views and agenda. Political parties may be represented at the municipal level and will certainly influence, if not determine, the degree of compliance by the population, police forces and military or paramilitary forces, with existing agreements. Strategies must be developed in cooperation with IOs/NGOs to foster compliance towards the desired civil-military end state. Political pressures may have to be exercised by the UN SRSG or OHR to ensure compliance.
- d. **Freedom of Movement.** To achieve the desired civil-military end state, there must be no restrictions to the movement of civilian agencies and military elements within a defined AO. If military commanders and civilian agencies are to have the freedom of action to take initiatives and apply their skills, knowledge and expertise, they must be able to operate freely without geographic restrictions, as well as have unhindered access to buildings, or commercial and industrial installations. HN civil or military interference with mission objectives is unacceptable.
- e. **Cooperation.** As no legal authority or command responsibility exist over civilian agencies, commanders at all levels must seek their cooperation. A unit commander must know the civilian agencies operating in his AO, their respective Charter, mandate, capabilities, range of civil tasks and funding sources. Cooperative teamwork is essential to gain the trust, confidence and support of IOs and NGOs as joint projects will be required for reasons of scope, complexity, skills, knowledge, expertise and funding levels. Cooperative attitudes and behaviour toward civilian agencies, as well as civil authorities and the population, will improve relations and mutual understanding. Civil-military priorities will be discussed and common goals established accordingly. Notwithstanding, civil tasks will always be subordinate to military tasks when using military resources. Furthermore, cooperation and coordination of effort among stakeholders and partners will ensure that local political leaders do not play stakeholders against one another for their own political gain.
- f. **Coordination.** To maintain unity of purpose, unity of effort must be sought from all stakeholders and partners in an AO. The J5 CIMIC has no dedicated resources and will submit requests for CMO and CMA to the J3 Ops. In addition, the coordination of CIMIC activities with PSYOPS and PA is a 'force multiplier' in gaining the support of the local populace and civil authorities for peace efforts, to further isolate extremist elements, as well as minimizing reliance on military forces to impose the TFC's will. In the end, active participation in periodic IO/NGO/military meetings and in unit sponsored meetings with civil authorities (subordinate Joint Civil Commission) and armed forces representatives (subordinate Joint Military Commission), will foster a constructive dialogue conducive to the effective coordination of civil-military efforts and the efficient management of scarce resources. Liaison is critical to strengthen coordination efforts and meet mission objectives.
- g. **Flexibility.** Unforeseen tasks, sometimes referred to as *mission creep*, require flexibility from a TFC, including a reassessment of the tasking priority list. Consultation with partners may be required for additional tasks affecting joint projects. Usually, delays encountered can be managed without negative results but in time-constrained situations, additional resources can be requested from formation J5 Operations. Resources (means) and methods (ways) will vary depending on the extent of the civil request. Lastly, a TFC can temporarily withdraw his support to civil authorities to foster compliance with a peace agreement.
- h. **Security.** OPSEC and Force Protection (FP) measures are required to ensure a secure environment for the conduct of civil-military operations. They also support campaign pillars such as: economic recovery; demining; UN police; international war crime tribunal and judicial reforms; the return of displaced persons

and refugees to their former residence; elections; arms control and monitoring; and the reestablishment of common institutions, such as regulating air traffic, passports; licence plates, bus lines, etc. Civilian agencies are preoccupied with their own security and their evacuation plan. The TFC must address the legitimate concerns of both civilian and military personnel. Impartiality towards all parties to a conflict and transparency in civil-military relationships will increase security but the operational requirements of FP versus mission objectives will generate levels of risk which must be managed by all stakeholders.

- i. **Information Sharing.** Area and economic assessments, as well as unclassified formation and unit assessments provide useful information which can be shared with IOs/NGOs to facilitate their work and improve 'team' cohesion. Similarly, NGOs gather, process and disseminate their own information which may be useful to military commanders for IO, particularly in the planning of CIMIC operations and joint projects, and in fostering a secure environment. Consent from civilian agencies to share their information must be encouraged. Information will be shared only if civilian agencies have trust in the military.
- j. **Communications.** The conduct of CIMIC activities requires an effective communication and information system (CIS), as well as compatible and interoperable radio equipment and information technology (IT) in the AO among all stakeholders and partners. All means of communication (E-mail, Internet, fac-simile, satcom...) must be exploited in the AO. In addition, information is available through CIMIC Centres located in the community and accessible to civil authorities, the local populace as well as IO and NGO representatives. Internal and external communications operational requirements must be assessed.

2. At the operational level, CIMIC seeks to achieve strategic objectives, but always within military capabilities. CIMIC planning principles provide guidance to the TFC's staff whose efforts must be integrated in the unit and formation C2W structure, which includes PSYOPS and OPSEC considerations. These principles apply to CIMIC campaign planning or CIMIC planning for time-sensitive civil-military activities or CMO in all CF operations.

3005. TYPES OF CIMIC

1. CIMIC encompasses three functional areas:
 - a. **Negotiation of Coordination and Support Arrangements and Agreements.** Coordination and support arrangements should be pre-planned and negotiated by a single in-theatre authority delegated by the national or TFC, during the early stages of campaign or operational planning.
 - b. **Coordination of Civil-Military Support.** CMS is a command responsibility in UN or OSCE led operations, which NATO may support with military forces. CMS comprises all activities that entail civil-military interaction, coordination or cooperation and describes activities undertaken by allied forces and civilian organizations to achieve common goals.
 - c. **Civil Emergency Planning.** CEP is a national responsibility. Emergency Preparedness Canada (EPC) operates as a Branch of DND and is headed by an Executive Director who reports to the DCDS. EPC is a civilian organization which supports the MND in carrying out his mandate to *advance civil preparedness in Canada for emergencies of all types*. In the international environment, EPC's responsibilities cover the CANUS Agreement, participation on the NATO Senior Civil emergency Planning Committee and corresponding Planning Boards and Committees, and contribution to the UN Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) to support the UN' international disaster relief efforts.
2. There are two types of CIMIC: civil-military operations (CMO) in support of the TF; and support to civil administration or the civil environment. Figure 30-1 illustrates the various CIMIC components and their interrelationships in support of a military operation.




Figure 30-1 Types of Civil-Military Operations

3006. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION OPERATIONS

1. CMO is defined as a **military operation, the primary intention and effect of which is to support a civilian authority, population, IO or NGO, the effect of which is to assist in the pursuit of a military objective.** The types of CMO are described in the following paragraphs.

2. **Host Nation Support.** HNS is defined as **civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peace, emergencies, times of crisis or armed conflict based upon agreements mutually concluded between nations.** HNS supplements combat service support (CSS) operational requirements by acquiring goods and services from local, regional or other international sources which can be used to support exercises during peace and to prepare for and provide CSS in peace, emergencies, crisis and war or armed conflict. The provision of support and assistance by UN and NATO forces are pre-arranged to the greatest extent possible. Before HNS resources are used for a specific operation, whether by formal or ad hoc agreements, the following factors must be considered in the TFC's CMO estimate (or CIMIC estimate):

- a. the operational environment;
- b. the types and levels of threats and risks in the AO, including rear area security tasks;
- c. the existence of multilateral agreements, MOU, domestic laws or other support arrangements;
- d. the HN capability and capacity to provide support;
- e. the national infrastructure in place to provide HNS;

- f. the degree of control of the HN government over civil infrastructures and the local population;
- g. the capacity of the HN to sustain CMO in all intensities of conflict at the strategic and operational levels;
- h. the financial costs to the supported host nation (HN);
- i. the CF's capability to accept, allocate and manage HNS resources;
- j. the level of FP to ensure freedom of movement and delivery of HN resources to their final destination; and
- k. OPSEC enhances freedom of action by limiting vulnerability to hostile activities and threats. It is driven by the essential elements of friendly information which must be protected.

3. **Population and Resources Control.** *Population controls* include curfews, movement restrictions (e.g., the imposition of restricted and prohibited zones), travel permits, registration cards and resettlement of civilians. *Resource controls* include licensing, regulations, checkpoints (e.g., road blocks), ration controls and inspection of facilities. Peacekeeping, peace enforcement and combat operations, including complex emergencies will require some type of population and resources control, especially in rear areas. In addition, measures will be taken to protect places and objects, such as historic monuments, works of art, museums and places of worship against attack or unwanted destruction.

4. Operations involving dislocated civilians are a special category of population and resources control. Dislocated civilians is a generic term that include a refugee, an internally displaced person (IDP), an evacuee or a stateless person. The movement and physical presence of dislocated civilians, who most likely require some degree of humanitarian aid such as medicine, food, water, shelter, clothing and similar items, can hinder military operations. Dislocated civilians operations are conducted to:

- a. minimize local population interference with military operations, particularly along lines of communications, by coordinating with civil authorities to implement population and resource controls;
- b. protect civilians from combat operations;
- c. prevent and control the outbreak of disease among dislocated civilians, as this could jeopardize the health of military forces (communicable diseases from humans and animals), as well as all other participants in the operation: police forces, IOs, NGOs, UN agencies' personnel, civilian contractors and civilian labour force deployed and employed in the AO;
- d. alleviate human suffering by providing relief supplies to civilian communities to prevent disease, starvation, or such unrest as might interfere with the effectiveness and efficiency of military operations; and
- e. centralize the large populations of dislocated civilians into selected and controllable areas.

5. The control of civilians is essential during military operations. In hostile or occupied territory, commanders must segregate civilians from belligerent forces or enemy POW, and civilian internees to protect them as required by International Humanitarian Law. Under International Humanitarian Law, all commanders must provide a minimum standard of humane care and treatment for all civilians, establish law and order, and protect private property within their AO.

6. When the CF is part of a multinational force, commanders must recognize their obligations and duties to civilians in the hostile or occupied territory as specified under international humanitarian law and the LOAC. Civilians who are in an hostile or occupied territory must not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits to which they are entitled under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the additional Protocols, more particularly Geneva IV relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war.

7. **Support to Civil Authorities and the Civilian Population.** Under international law, commanders have certain obligations to the government, civilians and economics of the country in which an operation is conducted. Commanders are expected to enforce the SOFA as well as meet HN Government expectations in economic recovery and rebuilding the civilian infrastructure. More importantly, a TFC must handover, when appropriate, the

responsibility for the administration of local communities to lawful civil authorities. A TFC may be required to support the local government or the civilian population by assisting local civil authorities with:

- a. **Humanitarian Assistance.** It is a crisis or armed conflict which endangers the civilian population and calls for humanitarian action. UNHCR normally has the role of lead humanitarian agency. The primary responsibility for the well-being of a population rests with the lawful Government or *de facto* authorities of the affected State. Where the Government or authorities are unable or unwilling to protect or support their populations appropriately, an international humanitarian response may take place. In friendly territory, humanitarian assistance encompasses short range programmes aimed at ending or alleviating suffering caused by natural or man made disasters, including peace enforcement and combat operations.
- b. **Military Civic Action (MCA).** Activities are intended to win the support of the local population for the military and the HN civilian leadership. Examples of MCA are the hiring of local contractors and labour, as well as fostering national development such as repair of roads, health clinics, schools.
- c. **Civil Defence.** Civil defence is addressed in Protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention and is primarily the responsibility of the civilian government and its agencies. It deals essentially with the immediate emergency conditions created by an attack. The effectiveness of civil defence plans and organization has a direct impact on ongoing CMO. Support by the military of humanitarian assistance planning and exercises in civil defence will result in public support for the military in disaster relief operations. Examples of civil defence are provision of emergency accommodation and supplies, emergency repair of indispensable public utilities and decontamination and similar protective measures.

3007. SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

1. Support to civil administration fulfils obligations arising from treaties, Agreements and other requirements of international law. There are four forms of support to civil administration: civil- assistance, civil administration in friendly territory, civil administration in occupied territory, civil administration in Canadian territory.

2. **Civil Assistance.** A TFC may begin civil assistance in friendly territory to maintain law and order, provide potential life sustaining services, and control distribution of goods and services. The TFC will therefore determine the capabilities of the HN civil administration, develop plans to assist or support the civil administration and coordinate civil assistance plans with the HN. Civil assistance differs from the other three forms of civil administration because it is based on the TFC's decision. It provides short term military support to an established government or population and does not incur a long-term commitment.

3. **Civil Administration in Friendly Territory.** Governments of friendly territories may request military forces to perform basic government functions during PSO, international emergencies, OOTW or war emergency. As situations stabilize, the functions performed by the armed forces return to civilian agencies. Generally, the transition is gradual and requires detailed long-range planning.

4. The TFC, assisted by a legal advisor, negotiates a support arrangement for civil administration with a nation's government when authorized by and in accordance with the political and strategic military policy and direction of higher authority. In a CF context, higher authority is the CDS who acts on direction of the Canadian Government. The arrangement to provide civil administration support outlines: the expected nature, extent and duration of the support; defines the limits of authority and the liability of military personnel and defines the civil-military relationships that will exist. Guidelines for the allocation of resources are:

- a. the support requirements identified;
- b. the damage and disruption suffered by the national economy and civil infrastructures and institutions;
- c. the general welfare of the populace; and
- d. the CIMIC resources available in theatre or which can be obtained externally (region, allied sources).

5. In exceptional cases, and on direction of higher authority, support to civil administration may begin before a formal agreement is negotiated. However, there must be some form of agreement between the HN and Canada or a multinational force, whether an alliance or coalition, representing the military forces providing the support.

The level of support rendered is tailored to meet the needs of the existing situation, but in no case should it exceed the foreign nation's request for assistance, the limitations imposed by applicable international treaties, agreements or MOU, and the limitations imposed by the LOAC or other international law. Civil administration support in friendly territory is temporary. It ends as soon as the foreign government can assume its national responsibilities and resume its duties and activities.

6. **Civil Administration in Hostile or Occupied Territory.** Alliances, coalition forces or a nation, may be required to conduct civil administration activities during PSO, international emergencies or war. This form of support to civil administration differs from the other two activities described above, in that it is imposed force on a HN population by a military force acting on the authority of a nation, alliance or coalition of nations. The administered territory is effectively under military control. The occupying force has an obligation under the 1949 Geneva Convention IV on the Treatment of Civilians and the 1977 Additional Protocol 1 to ensure a just and effective administration of support to an hostile or occupied territory. Specific obligations are laid out in these conventions and must be complied with by the occupying force.

7. Support to civil administration in an hostile or occupied territory should emphasize that:

- a. the system of control furthers the political and military objectives of the occupying power, alliance or coalition of nations;
- b. the population receives responsive and effective government services;
- c. the population is able to receive essential goods and services;
- d. the measures taken enhance the social and economic well-being of the occupied territory;
- e. law and order prevails;
- f. the obligations of international law, treaties, agreements (SOFA...) or MOU are met;
- g. restoration, rehabilitation and development take place in the occupied territory's social institutions and economic system;
- h. human rights abuses against collaborators, minority groups and discriminated social classes or individuals are prevented;
- i. an orderly and efficient transition occurs from civil administration to civilian government; and
- j. the population and the country are better off at the end of civil administration, as at the onset of occupation, to ease the return to civil authorities.

8. The head of an established civil administration system in occupied territory, the civil administrator, is a military commander or other designated person who exercises authority over the occupied territory. Under the civil administrator's control and supervision, the existing government structure may continue or the government may be replaced and a new structure built. The occupying power must obey domestic laws but if some of these laws need to be changed, the occupying power must meet the requirements of international law when changing civil law in an occupied territory. The level and nature of Canadian support to civil administration in hostile or occupied territory is on authority of the Canadian Government.

9. **Civil Administration in Canadian Territory.** In domestic operations, the focus of military activities will primarily be on emergencies and assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies. As time allows, support to civil administration will be subject to five operational phases: warning, preparation, force deployment, employment and redeployment. The scope of emergencies and assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies, including the Arctic region, is on short periods of conflict, armed assistance and unarmed assistance to include:

- a. aid of the civil power;
- b. terrorism;

- c. counter-drug operations;
- d. arms smuggling;
- e. illegal immigrants;
- f. humanitarian assistance to needy communities involving food, medical, shelter, clothing, basic services and facilities;
- g. emergency disaster relief caused by oil spills, floods, forest fires, earthquakes, accidental NBC release and other such disasters under a declaration of a public welfare emergency;
- h. search and rescue; and
- i. fisheries.

10. These scenarios are governed by the Emergencies Act, Orders in Councils such as CFAADs and CFAPPDs, Part XI of the NDA, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Canadian Human Rights Act and other agreements and MOU concluded between the federal, provincial and municipal levels of government.

3008. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION STAGES, TASKS AND FUNCTIONS

1. Figure 30-2 illustrates the CIMIC stages, tasks and functions which will, in practice, overlap and intertwine in the course of a military operation.




Figure 30-2 CIMIC Stages, Tasks and Functions

2. A brief explanation for each stage is required:

a. **Pre-Operational.** Before a military operation begins, the CIMIC task is to prepare the TF to deal with the civilian conditions it will meet in the AO. This process will involve four functions:

- (1) **Planning.** CIMIC staff write the TFC's CIMIC annex to the TF Op O. To develop the plan, it will be necessary to carry out an area assessment based where possible on detailed recce. Because many of the civilian agencies with which the TF will have to cooperate are likely to be on the ground already, particularly UNHCR, ICRC, UNHCHR, the host nation Red Cross/Red Crescent and local NGOs. These organizations must be approached to contribute to the area assessment to assist operational planning and division of responsibilities between the TFC and civilian agencies in the AO. CIMIC representation on the TFC's R-Group is an operational necessity.
- (2) **Advice.** CIMIC staff will be responsible for briefing the TF's subordinate commanders on civilian conditions in the AO. It is important at this stage that commanders are given clear advice on interrelationships between military operations, civilian agencies, civil authorities and the civilian population. Specialist functions such as J5 Policy, J5 Legal, J5 CIMIC, J5 PA, J5 Engineer, CIVPOL, and PSYOPS officer will provide the TFC's operational planning requirements, complementing the advice of the organic functions to the TF (J1 to J7 functions).
- (3) **Education.** CIMIC staff will produce troop information to ensure the TF enters the area of operation knowledgeable about critical aspects of the geographical area which will help them understand, cope and resolve civil-military issues. Topics of interest in the pre-deployment phase must include: history of the region; history of the conflict; culture of the ethnic groups; political structure; economic capacity of the region; civilian agencies' culture, mandate, structure, capabilities; and cultural awareness of the troops in dealing with civilian and HN agencies. Well-informed and knowledgeable troops are a measure of the operational readiness of the TF.
- (4) **Training and Exercises.** Pre-deployment training with IOs and NGOs must be included in training and exercises. Continuous training on topics such as mine awareness, hostage survival, security

issues and evacuation plan, including safety and health matters, are also essential. Operational readiness requires constant training by the TF and sub-units to maintain the advantage, as the nature of employment in PSO tends to erode individual and collective skills in conventional warfare.

- b. **Operational.** The core CIMIC task is to secure effective CIMIC from all stakeholders and partners in the execution phase of the TFC's CIMIC plan. A list of civilian agencies in the AO will have to be maintained and updated regularly in light of new organizations and the integrity of the evacuation plan. Some civilian agencies may require periodic military support to function effectively. There are eight CIMIC functions: effective internal and external communications to the TF; the sharing of relevant information with stakeholders and partners; the coordination of effort to prevent duplication of effort and manage scarce resources effectively and efficiently; knowledge of formal agreements and how they will impact on CIMIC activities and operations, to include liaison and projects, in the AO; continuous assessment of the civilian populations and civil authorities' perceptions of the TF; and lastly, the CIMIC operational function in support of the TFC's plan must be closely coordinated by the J5 CIMIC with the J3 operational and planning staffs, which control the TF resources on behalf of the TFC.
- c. **Transitional.** Based on the relationships established in the operational phase, the CIMIC task is to ensure transfer to follow-on forces, should the military mandate be renewed, or to civilian agencies and civil authorities should the TF exit the theatre of operations permanently. The military is normally responsible to ensure a secure environment to provide civilian agencies freedom of movement and freedom of action. Once this is achieved, the military will handover its responsibilities to civilian agencies. A smooth transition is the best guarantee to achieve the civil-military end state.

3009. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION - A CAMPAIGN VISION

1. The TFC must have a vision for the conduct of CIMIC in his AO. This vision must be based on a systemic approach coupled with proactive attitudes and behaviour by military leaders, civilian agencies and civil authorities. All stakeholders and partners are interdependent, while supporting each to achieve the mission but within their respective Charter, mandates, capabilities and resources. To reduce mission creep, a TFC must harness these energies, skills and knowledge in fields of expertise, and coordinate civil-military activities to achieve economy of effort in terms of military resources and manpower expenditures. In return, a TFC provides FP, an evacuation plan, logistic support within military capabilities and periodic situational and intelligence briefings. To achieve this synergy, a TFC must gain the trust and confidence of stakeholders and partners and encourage the sharing of information to foster cooperation. The object is to establish a sense of teamwork and constructive interrelationships. Common goals lead to common understanding of a mission among stakeholders, which in turn lead to unity of purpose and unity of effort. The systemic approach is the cornerstone of this vision. Figure 30-3 illustrates the dynamic exchange and interaction occurring on a daily basis between stakeholders and partners in an AO.




Figure 30-3 The Systemic Approach in Civil-Military Cooperation

2. The definition of CIMIC and operational considerations define the borders of the international community system, which is visualized as a 'box'. *Inputs* are directed at the international system in the form of *demands* by civil authorities, HN armed forces, the population, etc., as well as *support* by the media, the local population, businesses, including the injection of new resources from the troop contributing nations (TCNs), to sustain international community efforts in support of mission objectives. The various functional organizations shaping the international community and the HN organizations, constitute sub-systems which are the beneficiary of *outputs* in the form of *decisions* and *actions* taken by the international system (box), of which the military is but one functional sub-system. These *decisions* and *actions* are assessed by the beneficiaries in each municipality of an AO and a *feedback* is provided the international community by the beneficiaries; the feedback process itself preceded by a new set of demands generated by previous *outputs* and directed at the international community system. The systemic approach focuses solely on interrelationships between the international community system and its environment.

3. The international community system has the capacity to accept some level of *stress*, such as indicated by the management of unforeseen tasks (quantitative stress), but resources are not unlimited. Some demands will be approved, some rejected, some will be under consideration and/or demands will be matched by a corresponding level of support. In addition, a drastic change in the mission or mission evolution provoked by the departure of a key IO or NGO (qualitative stress), will produce a level of stress which may incapacitate the international system and or render it incapable of functioning effectively and efficiently. This international community system is seen a continuous dynamic exchange of resources between stakeholders and partners; exchanges which often occur between two parties, without the knowledge of the others. Therefore, it becomes critical to use periodic IO/NGO meetings, as well as those organized by the military and civil authorities, to discuss civil-military issues and elaborate methods to manage duplication of efforts and prevent the wastage of scarce HN and international resources. Exchanges of information through a viable and reliable unit internal and external communications system is key to success.

4. A vision of success must provide suitable guidance to unit staff and personnel to operate effectively in the AO, as well as benefit from the services offered by civilian agencies to achieve the TF mission. The J5 staff will most likely include military LOs with HN Armed Forces, with IO/NGOs and civil authorities, in addition to a TST

placed under OPCON of the unit, as well as military or HN interpreters and translators. The J5 CIMIC will be responsible to the TFC for civil tasks but will coordinate all his activities with the J3 Operations who controls the unit resources on behalf of the TFC. Based on the strategic directive or guidance, this vision for an AO could include:

- a. the mission;
- b. the command philosophy and interrelationships with the lead humanitarian agency and IOs/NGOs;
- c. the strategic objectives to be achieved at the operational level;
- d. consideration of decisive points and centres of gravity corresponding to our own forces and potential adversary(ies);
- e. basic strategies to achieve these objectives, including effective and efficient joint civil-military resource management;
- f. performance criteria used by stakeholders and partners to measure success and how they can be mutually supporting of each other. These performance criteria will tell a TFC what is expected of him;
- g. division of responsibilities and labour, including mutually agreed upon coordination mechanisms to foster trust and confidence, provide economy of effort and prevent wastage of resources. This effort will require consultation and joint planning among stakeholders and partners;
- h. confidence and security building measures to be adopted with the HN civil authorities, population, military, paramilitary forces and extremist elements; the latter contained through concerted efforts directed at their political and popular base;
- i. decision making process(es) and accountability in collective and collaborative problem-solving; and
- j. ethical standards of attitudes and behaviour in a multicultural environment.

5. All CIMIC activities and operations must be integrated in effective and efficient C2 arrangements to generate unity of purpose and unity of effort, which enhance CIMIC aspects but deny an adversary(ies) the ability to interfere with CIMIC activities.

3010. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION CAMPAIGN - A STATEMENT OF INTENT

1. The vision of success will lead to the formulation of a TFC's intent. The TFC's intent describes the commander's end state, establishes the purpose of the plan and communicates the commander's vision on how he sees the CIMIC campaign being conducted in the course of the military operation. Consistent with the command philosophy, the commander's intent provides subordinates with the freedom to adapt their actions to achieve success. The intent should be expressed in a few sentences that clearly state why an operation is being conducted, the desired end state and how elements of the TF will achieve that end state. This intent must recognize that unity of both military and civil efforts remains essential and that the ultimate success of a military campaign or operation is directly linked to its impact on the success of the international effort in a HN. Success in one and failure in the other amounts to mission failure.

2. To provide a concrete example from SFOR, the following is the statement of intent of Commander MND (SW) in his direction to Battle Group commanders: "My intent is to continue to enforce robustly the military tasks of the GFAP laid down in Annex 1A to the GFAP, and COMSFOR's Instructions to the Parties (ITP), as the necessary prerequisite for the provision of a secure environment, whilst, within resources and capabilities, supporting the civilian agencies in the implementation of the civil aspects of the GFAP, without which Bosnia and Herzegovina will not become a democratic state. In short, *I seek a unity of purpose and action.*"

3011. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION - A CAMPAIGN DESIGN

1. A campaign plan is designed around a number of building blocks to help the TFC visualize how the campaign will unfold. CIMIC is one of those crucial building blocks to enable the TFC to achieve his mission.

Campaign design has two aspects: mission analysis and defining complementary military and civil end states. The mission analysis is a logical process, achieved through a rigorous estimate process, used for extracting and deducing from a superior's order the military and civil tasks necessary to fulfil a mission. At the operational level, it places in context what effect is to be achieved by the campaign. The mission analysis should consider what national support is required particularly in terms of diplomatic, political, legal, economic, health and social needs and specialist functions to support the commander in his mission. The TFC must consider the military and civil end states, as well as the operational objectives to achieve them. The TFC's mission analysis allows him to provide planning guidance to his staff and should clearly state the tasks to be accomplished, as well as the framework within which the estimate process is to be conducted.

2. *The military end state* is that state of military affairs and civil conditions which must be met to achieve an established objective. This means that a TFC must win the trust and confidence of military and paramilitary forces, and create in his AO a stable and durable peace, making it possible for civilian agencies to operate freely in a secure environment, without any fears of threats or reprisals. This also means, in conjunction with international and HN police efforts, that extremist or terrorist elements must be won over to the peace process, isolated or neutralized to the point of becoming ineffective. The military end state will be reached or the mandate of a military force ended, well before the civil-military end state is achieved.

3. *The civil-military end state* is that state of affairs and civil conditions that need to be achieved for the international community and civilian agencies to end their mandates and exit the HN. The military has the lead in providing a secure environment in addition to having resources and skills, within existing capabilities, to support other lead agencies in the accomplishment of their respective mandates.

4. The absence of unified civil-military political guidance in complex emergencies impairs military operations and often results in disagreement between NATO forces and civilian agencies as to how best to proceed. NATO military forces exercise their mandate under the political authority of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or in the case of disaster relief, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and will provide forces in support of the UN or OSCE which have political control of a PSO. The problem lies in that although the UN SRSG or High Representative may have responsibilities related to the coordination of civilian activities, they usually enjoy, in non-article 5 operations, no political authority delegated to them by the UN or OSCE, over the civilian implementation of an Agreement. The definition of lead agency is a mirror-image of this problem as it authorizes a humanitarian agency, such as UNHCR, to initiate coordination between civilian agencies but implies no legal authority or command responsibility in regards to the volunteer agencies.

5. As civilian agencies are protective of their respective Charter, mandate and are reluctant to surrender any powers or autonomy to military forces, one course of action is through consultation and joint planning efforts from the onset of a military operation. The purpose is to reconcile cultural differences and the joint requirement to achieve a common civil-military end state. Integrated efforts must lead to unity of effort, requiring consenting IOs/NGOs to join the R-Group of the military force to begin joint planning. Civilian agencies and military forces do have one thing in common: the public purse funds their activities. Therefore, every mechanisms must be put in place to prevent duplication of effort between military and civilian agencies, and minimize the waste of resources through an effective and efficient resource management body. Effective coordination of civilian and military tasks is paramount to the mission, particularly joint and long-term projects, to ensure the assessment of tasks is matched with adequate resources. Figure 30-4 illustrates the civil-military arrangement which can be formalized though an MOU or joint SOP.




Figure 30-4 Civil-Military Joint Planning Efforts in Campaign Design

6. Complex emergencies require complementary mission statements and joint planning efforts to begin early. Freedom of action is based on a sound and constructive division of responsibilities and labour, focused on the attainment of the civil-military end state through economy of effort. This focus will help determine the military end state and the civil conditions which must exist for the TF to exit the AO and leave civilian agencies to achieve the desired civil-military end state. This achievement is only possible if lead agencies are more aggressive in coordinating civilian agencies' efforts in the AO. Freedom of action must be exercised at the right place, at the right time by the right civilian agency and specialist functions, requiring military and civilian organizations to continuously synchronize their efforts and assess their environment. An Inter-Agency Task Coordinating Body formed by the major IOs (UN, OSCE, ICRC...), major donor agencies (CIDA, EC, ECHO, USAID, World Bank...) and key NGOs involved in major projects would provide effective resource management. The coordinating body should be co-chaired by the military and the lead humanitarian agency to show transparency of the resource management and decision making processes, and transparency of the joint planning effort.


7. A campaign design must determine the planning lead (the military to date); the planning support (UN, OSCE, NATO supporting agencies depending on the mission and scope of tasks, as well as donor agencies); the lead humanitarian agency, primarily UNHCR; CIMIC Centres (unit and higher formation including materiel and personnel support resources); the requirement for Tactical Support Teams; Joint or Military Observers; Monitoring Missions; divisions of responsibility, labour and resources between military (to include PfP as dictated by the situation) and civilian agencies relying on campaign pillars; a preliminary list of joint priority projects; and C2 arrangements in the course of civil-military operations and associated joint projects. This campaign design should be formally submitted for the approval of key stakeholders in an AO to ensure agreement and operational support for the campaign plan. As well, HN civil authorities, national Red Cross/Red Crescent and local NGOs should be involved or approached to determine their level of support for the campaign design and also to provide advice to the TFC and lead agencies.

8. A collaborative effort is vital to the success of the mission and its sustainment over an indefinite period of time to achieve the civil-military end state. Campaign design for the civil aspects will usually rely on campaign pillars established at the theatre (operational) level. As an example, campaign pillars and lead agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina are established along functional lines:

- a. secure environment - SFOR (all pillars)
- b. economic recovery - OHR
- c. demining - UNMAC
- d. police - IPTF
- e. displaced persons and refugees (DPRE) - UNHCR
- f. elections - OSCE
- g. arms control - OSCE
- h. common institutions (car plates, passport, bus lines...) - OHR

3012. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION - A CAMPAIGN PLANNING CONCEPT AND PROCESS

1. In normal circumstances, CIMIC planners at the operational level will synchronize and harmonize their efforts through preparation of a CIMIC annex to the Op O. Dependent upon the complexity of the PSO, CIMIC planners will prepare a supporting CIMIC campaign plan. In practical terms, this means that a military campaign plan and a civil plan approved by the UN, OSCE and NATO, must merge and be harmonized to produce *one theatre civil plan*. In this way, all stakeholders will focus on unity of purpose, unity of effort and economy of effort to achieve the mission. The CIMIC campaign planning concept and process at figure 30-5 integrates campaign



planning in B-GG-005-004/AF-004 FORCE EMPLOYMENT.
Figure 30-5 The CIMIC Campaign Planning Concept and Process

2. The process begins with the definition of the civil-military end state and TFC's end state which, in turn, determine the TFC's objectives and the civil-military objectives in order of priority. The combination of end states and objectives define the appropriate resources, methods and tasks to achieve the civil-military end state. The process is then reversed and decisive points leading to each centre of gravity are identified. Each decisive point is assigned specific tasks, matched with the adequate resources and methods to overcome the corresponding centre of gravity. The linking of each decisive point to its corresponding centre of gravity establishes the line of operation which leads to the TFC's end state (civil conditions which must exist to exit the theatre of operations) when to and the civil-military end state. This two way process requires a continuous assessment of the operational environment, synchronization and harmony between civil and military tasks, and balance between military and civil considerations of the campaign planning process.

3. UN and OSCE led operations have shown that the early integration of all political, civil, economic, development and humanitarian agencies in the AO is essential to unity of effort and to a unified campaign plan. To establish coherence between all levels of command, the operational campaign plan must achieve civil-military strategic objectives while civil-military tasking, at the tactical level, seek to achieve operational objectives. Joint military and civilian planning, preparedness, training and execution must be emphasized to deal effectively and efficiently with mostly complex humanitarian emergencies. Unity of command for the TF ensures the mission will reach its coherent strategic and operational objectives. Figure 30-6 illustrates the second part of the campaign planning process and lines of operation leading to the centres of gravity (CIMIC objectives), as described at paragraph 2.




Figure 30-6 Lines of Operations to the Centre of Gravity

4. Theory, doctrine and experience suggest the key elements in campaigns against top-down violence, are: *firstly*, an effective separation of factions as part of the military phase; and *secondly*, a public information campaign (PSYOPS+PA) targeting the civilian population to modify attitudes and behaviours in support of the peace process and its objectives, can be useful *multipliers* of military efforts. Combining the assurances of effective patrolling and pervasive presence with routine meetings, such as Joint Commissions, can systematically reinforce the “live-and-let-live” system. Confidence and security building measures are also effective at the lowest levels. These key elements also confirm that military and civil phases of a military operation are complementary to achieve the mission.

5. In the military and civil phases of a military operation, civil tasks such as: the re-establishment of the civil infrastructure and the return to a stable, secure and normal way of life in which basic humanitarian needs can be provided, have a direct impact on the mission. In peace building efforts, the type of information traditionally collected by a military force does not provide sufficient data to evaluate and analyse the progress of recovery to a stable and progressive civil society. The collection of both military and non-military data is required to ensure that credible and reliable data is available to the TFC so he can make informed decisions in support of the civil-military campaign. Strategic and operational guidance are imperative to the success of the mission.

6. **Mission Success.** Mission success must be defined in terms of effectiveness (objectives stated versus results achieved) and efficiency (results achieved versus resources invested) and relevance (resources invested versus objectives stated) in executing multiple civil tasks, leading to the attainment of mission objectives, whether strategic, operational or tactical. The end result of CIMIC is to seek to *maximize*, or at the very least *optimize* the investment of all stakeholders' resources in peace building; the collective resources of the military, IOs and NGOs. Measures of effectiveness (MOE) and normality indicators seek to achieve some performance measurement of civil tasks executed in a theatre or AO. These efforts must lead to a rapid handover of civil responsibilities to civil authorities who must carry on civil infrastructure reforms. Consequently, success is measurable, qualitatively (quality of life) and quantitatively (amount of resources), well beyond the departure of a military force from a theatre of operations. Success must also be durable and self-sustaining in the long term to maintain a quality of life acceptable to civilian authorities and the civilian populace. Mission success is establishing the civil conditions conducive to a lasting peace.

7. Military planners seeking to achieve strategic objectives must consider the following civil-military factors:

- a. the political and civil implications of the strategic end state;
- b. the civil end state inherent in the strategic end state;
- c. centres of gravity which derive from civil authorities, civil infrastructures, capabilities and locations (public opinion, political parties, alliances or coalitions, economic sector, financial backers, vital industries, balance of payments, political regime, HN military support for the policies of the government...);
- d. the alliance or coalitions which provide logistic support. Viable administrative and logistic systems capable of rapid deployment are required to sustain a military force in PSO, OOTW and combat;
- e. national civil objectives which support the operational objectives;
- f. the civil end state inherent in the operational end state;
- g. decisive points associated with centres of gravity;
- h. the synchronization of civil-military activities with the campaign lines of operations, sequencing, manoeuvre, tempo, supporting operational plans and culminating point;
- i. the required civil and military resources to achieve operational objectives, requiring HN and inter-agency cooperation and coordination within the AO; and
- j. the methods (ways) involving structure, augmentation, policies, liaison, commissions, boards, committees and information programs, etc., to utilize resources in an effective and efficient manner.

8. A CIMIC campaign plan applies primarily to international operations. In domestic operations, OGDs and government agencies, as well as provincial and municipal levels of government, possess mandates, functions, responsibilities and resources to meet CIMIC requirements, aided by the Canadian Red Cross and local NGOs. Nonetheless, CIMIC planning notions (ways, means, decisive points, lines of operation, centres of gravity and the civil-military end state) are also applicable to domestic operations.

3013. THE FORCE EMPLOYMENT PROCESS

1. The fundamentals of the FE process are covered in *B-GG-005-004/AF-004 Force Employment* and apply

to both domestic and international operations. It is important to understand the CIMIC planning process and how it provides input to the main TF operational planning process and related decision making. The six steps of the FE process from a CIMIC perspective are:

- a. **Initiation.** While CIMIC has no direct input in the initiation stage, it is clearly important that the CIMIC staff have the basis for an AO assessment. Even a sketchy assessment of civil conditions at this early stage will help direct the CIMIC staff's attention towards relevant civil-military considerations. For this reason, appropriate OGD desk officers at CIDA, DFAIT and UNHCR Office in Ottawa can assist J5 CIMIC staffs in obtaining preliminary information, particularly when there is a requirement to involve Canadian embassies/Consulates and embassy Military Attachés in collecting data for the initial area assessment. As well, every effort must be made to contact IOs and NGOs already in the AO, particularly UNHCR, ICRC, UNHCHR organizations or representatives, the national Red Cross/Red Crescent, as well as local NGOs. Canadian NGOs may already be in the AO and may provide relevant information through their Canadian NGO field or regional offices. The purpose is to obtain political, economic, social and humanitarian information to develop the area assessment and to provide a clear picture of the situation which will contribute to the analysis of operational factors and the formulation of courses of action (COAs). Collection of reliable statistical and technical data may only be possible during the recce.
- b. **Orientation.** The CIMIC mission analysis and estimate will be used to identify potential tasks, restraints and constraints, and probably key assumptions. Moreover, the civil-military analysis of the situation should facilitate early CIMIC planning by the TF.
- c. **COA Development.** In the COA development stage, the CIMIC staff analysis will inform the TFC's courses of action and provide some clear idea of potential CIMIC tasks. It is important at this step, that the CIMIC staff have a well developed concept of civil-military support, particularly in terms of CMO and corresponding military civic actions. It will allow the TFC to double check that the general thrust of the civil-military effort in support of the military force and of the civil environment, is as he wishes. There may only be one CIMIC COA.
- d. **Decision.** The TFC's selected course of action will be translated into a concise statement of the TFC's decision. This decision is reflected in the TFC's statement of intent depicting why an operation is being conducted, how it will unfold and what the military campaign should achieve. The CIMIC course of action will be developed into a COO for approval by the TFC. Once approved, the CIMIC annex to the Op O can be developed.
- e. **Plan Development.** Once the decision is taken, the concept of civil-military support is fully integrated in the TFC's main COO which ensures coherence of the civil-military plan. The final product of this step is a SUP or a CIMIC annex to the Op O.
- f. **Plan Review.** A plan is only as good as it is current and practical in coping with the existing situation on the ground. CIMIC priorities will change as well as matching resource allocation. Such changes will always be accompanied by a repeat of the preceding stages and should result in either a new plan, or branches and sequels to the existing COP or Op O. The important planning aspect for CIMIC staff is always to remain focussed on the civil-military end state.

2. Figure 30-7 illustrates the FE process and the CIMIC input in the TF operational planning process. It is essential that the CIMIC operational planning process be synchronized and in harmony with the TF operational planning process throughout the six steps discussed above. This continuous effort will ensure that adequate resources are assigned CIMIC tasks.

STEPS	OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS	CIMIC OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS
STEP 1 INITIATION	GATHER PLANNING TOOLS INITIATING DIRECTIVE GET ORGANIZED	INITIAL AREA ASSESSMENT INITIAL OP ESTIMATE ESTABLISH CONTACTS (POCs)
STEP 2 ORIENTATION	MISSION ANALYSIS MISSION STATEMENT TFC's PLANNING GUIDANCE WARNING ORDER/RECCE OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE	MISSION ANALYSIS MISSION STATEMENT CIMIC PLANNING GUIDANCE RECCE/FULL AREA ASSESSMENT CIMIC ESTIMATE/CIMIC FACTORS
STEP 3 COA DEVELOPMENT	STAFF ANALYSIS DEVELOP and REFINE COAs ANALYSE FACTORS DECISION BRIEF	STAFF ANALYSIS CIMIC COURSE(S) OF ACTION
STEP 4 DECISION	TFC's DECISION ON COA STATEMENT OF INTENT DEVELOP COA into COO	CIMIC COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOP COA into COO for APPROVAL PROCEED w/PLAN DEVELOPMENT
STEP 5 PLAN DEVELOPMENT	SEEK COO APPROVAL PREPARE COP/Op O DEVELOP ANNEXES or SUP ISSUE OPLAN or Op O	CIMIC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS DEVELOP CIMIC SUP TO COP or CIMIC ANNEX to OPLAN or Op O
STEP 6 PLAN REVIEW	PLAN REVIEW REVISED DECISION BRIEFING PREPARE and ISSUE PLANS	REVIEW CIMIC PLAN (as required) UPDATE OPLAN/Op O (as required) COORDINATION w/STAKEHOLDERS

Figure 30-7 The Force Employment Process and CIMIC Planning

3014. OPERATIONAL FACTORS IN CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

1. The overall mission objectives and the TFC's command philosophy are two of the most important factors in determining command focus on CIMIC activities, as means of achieving the military end state and civil end state. The following operational factors pertaining to the scope of CIMIC activities in an AO should be considered in the estimate process and deliberate planning for a military operation in PSO, OOTW and combat:

- a. threats and risks;
- b. intelligence or military information;
- c. operational objectives in harmony with strategic objectives;
- d. civil-military end state in harmony with the military end state (military success will usually constitute the creation of a stable and secure environment for civil tasks to be carried out without the presence of military forces, thereby achieving strategic goals);
- e. common CIMIC doctrine among all stakeholders;
- f. time, space and volume (3 dimensions);
- g. civil-military coordination centre (CMCC);
- h. CIMIC centres, TST and liaison officers;
- i. state of civil infrastructures and support required;
- j. command, control, communications and information systems (C³IS);

- k. information technology to maintain operational effectiveness and efficiency in the GIE through the overall strategy of IO, contributing to Mission protection and FP;
- l. standardization of equipment and interoperability;
- m. decisive points and corresponding lines of operations leading to friendly and adversaries' centres of gravity;
- n. PSYOPS activities based on the transparency of operations;
- o. media/PA to publicize success in civil tasks and enhance human rights awareness and abuses;
- p. stakeholders and partners in the AO;
- q. cross-cultural dimension;
- r. civil and military engineer resources;
- s. FP in the AO balanced against mission objectives and acceptable risks;
- t. logistics (supply, transport, maintenance, medical...) and movement control;
- u. lines of communications from the rear COMM Z to the FCZ;
- v. HNS;
- w. sustainment;
- x. minor and major economic recovery and infrastructure rehabilitation or reconstruction projects;
- y. legal considerations, including host nation laws; and
- z. national and international funding sources.

3015. TASK FORCE COMMANDER'S STATEMENT OF INTENT - OPERATIONAL LEVEL

1. The TFC's selected course of action is the logical result of the estimate process. This decision represents the TFC's outline COO and also covers the commander's intent on a selected course of action. The intent statement expresses the TFC's intentions on the use of the military force, time and space to achieve his CIMIC objectives and how the available resources are to be utilized following assigned tasks. Within a given operational plan or order, there is only one commander's intent - that stated by the issuing commander. Supporting commanders may provide concepts for support of the plan or order, but they will not devise separate intent statements. This fact makes it imperative that dedicated J5 staff be part of the TFC's R-group so that CIMIC considerations are an integral part of the estimate process, beginning with the warning and preparation phases.

2. The vision of success will be reflected in the formulation of a TFC's intent. This intent must recognize that unity of both military and civil effort remains essential and that the ultimate success of a military campaign or operation is directly linked to its impact on the success of the international effort in a HN.

3016. CF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

1. **General.** The CIMIC structure provides the conduit to the civilian agencies and population, and provides functions which include CIMIC support, assistance, advice, coordination, analysis, information, planning, preparation, training, supervision and evaluation to the TFC and his staff. CIMIC requires closer cooperation and interrelationship among the elements of the peace process: sustainable development, diplomacy and defence. In PSO, OOTW and combat, military tasks and civilian tasks have become interdependent and complementary to achieve the mission. Once the Government has taken the political decision to participate in an operation, the level of support to civil administration by the Government must be specified and lead time must be exploited by the appointed TFC to plan, organize and consult with internal and external organizations (DFAIT, embassies,

military attachés, CIDA, EPC, RCMP, UN DPKO, UNDHA, UNHCR, UNHCHR...).

2. **Organization Elements.** The J5 CIMIC is the qualified authority and advisor to the TFC on CIMIC activities within an AO. A TFC should also have on his staff, a J5 Policy, J5 Legal and J5 PA whose primary functions would be as advisors. In addition, the TFC requires a tailor-made CMCC, at the formation or unit level, to plan and coordinate CMO as well as support to civil administration. The CMCC composition and structure would vary with the nature and levels of threats and risks, the type of operation, the mission and the scope of civil tasks to be performed by the military. The area assessment will help define operational and organizational requirements and provide information to analyse the factors of the operational estimate. The CMCC would be manned, augmented and sustained by Primary Reserve elements from all capability components, particularly maritime, land, air components. This effort would require a minimal number of Regular Force personnel to provide some training as well as operational and administrative support. These realities require a modular approach to the organization of a CMCC, similar to the method used to man the CIMIC section of the CJTF HQ. CIMIC centres would complement the CMCC at the unit level. The elements of formation and unit CMCC organizations would involve:

- a. organic civil-military nucleus which is a permanent, minimum staff formed from personnel of formation or unit HQ who may be dual-hatted;
- b. a key nucleus from within the nucleus, composed of double-hatted personnel on the personnel establishment of the parent HQ, identified within each functional staff element (J1 through J7 or CJ1 through CJ-9) to ensure the cohesion of the nucleus and organize respective functional elements;
- c. civil-military augmentation planning elements for CMO and support to civil administration, to augment the organic civil-military nucleus and to provide depth of civil-military planning and expertise (CIMIC area assessment, CMO estimate, CIMIC annex to a plan or Op O, CIMIC SUPs);
- d. CMCC at the formation level and CIMIC centre(s) and TST at the unit level which would require additional personnel in complex emergencies, although the existing CMCC and CMO cell, the latter operating under the J5 Ops, would be adequate to provide civil-military coordination capabilities in non-complex emergencies; and
- e. use of specialist augmentation of military and civilian experts to compensate the absence of military qualifications, knowledge and expertise in non-military fields related to CIMIC activities.

3. **Warning and Preparation.** The R-group must involve a dedicated J5 CIMIC officer, J5 Ops and J5 Engineer to generate an adequate CIMIC area assessment and CMO estimate of activities in theatre. The mandates of civil organizations in the TFC's AO must be known so planning and coordination for the civil phase of the operation can begin early. CIMIC capabilities and resources must be identified and could include communications, engineer, logistics (medical, transport, finance, supply, maintenance...), PA, aviation, civilian police, J5 staff, military and civilian specialists (DND, OGDs and agencies, NGOs...) and materiel. These CIMIC capabilities must be identified and coordinated with the lead agency in theatre, humanitarian or military, to prevent mission creep prior to and during the civil phase. Once the conditions for peace building have been created, civil tasks must be sustained to completion requiring a responsive logistic support system adapted to theatre requirements.

4. **Cultural Awareness and Integration.** The TFC in an AO must focus on a bottom up process to coordinate and integrate IOs and NGOs' activities and provide them with the necessary FP (security, alert status, evacuation plan which may require aviation and naval support) so civil tasks can be carried out safely in the AO. The civilian organizations are an excellent source of military information to plan CMO and support to civil administration, but this information will only be forthcoming if organizational cultural differences are overcome and trust and confidence are fostered among all the stakeholders. The TFC must seek to build a "team spirit" within his AO and translate CIMIC doctrine and capabilities into a force multiplier.

5. **Force Protection.** The TFC would be required to maintain rapid reaction forces with the appropriate notice of degree to move, at various levels of command to deter, protect and defend civilian and military personnel in an AO. Escort of specific IOs, NGOs and UN agencies may be required to protect humanitarian convoys, carry out demining tasks or provide protection for urgent civil tasks in contested populated areas, involving belligerent forces or extremist elements. The unlimited operational scenarios require the TFC to acquire some flexibility and

versatility in terms of FP. In the absence of adequate military police resources, the TFC may consider that his contingent include a CIVPOL component which would advise and liaise with the TFC and military units and elements to plan, conduct and coordinate operations in urban areas. If there is a military police detachment in the TF, the civilian police component, preferably under OPCON, will report through the military police commander to the TFC.

6. **Division of Responsibilities.** The J3 cell is the focal point through which the TFC directs the conduct of operations, including CIMIC activities. The J5 cell would carry out its own detailed planning, coordination and conduct of CIMIC activities in coordination with J2, J3 Ops, J3 Plans, J3 Engr and J4 Log cells, as well as external civilian agencies through their CMCC field representatives. J3 Ops will always supervise the conduct of CMO. It is accepted that the J5 cell will always be subordinate to but not under the authority of the J3 cell since the execution of military tasks has absolute priority over civil tasks. In effect, military personnel can be withdrawn temporarily from civil tasks to complete priority military tasks. Once military tasks are completed, the military can be reassigned to civil tasks. It is therefore preferable to assign minor projects to the military so as not to disrupt the timetable for the civil phase.

7. **UN MILOBS.** MILOBS or UNMOs deployed in an AO will be of great assistance to a TFC in terms of liaison with IOs, NGOs and UN agencies as they can carry out duties and tasks normally assigned to a formed troop CIMIC centres. There is usually no C2 relationship between a TFC and MILOBS deployed in an AO. MILOBS fall under a MILOBS Group, composed of Sector HQs, which reports to the theatre Force Commander. Notwithstanding, close ties and timely exchanges of information (daily sitreps) between formed troops and MILOBS are required and must be encouraged to meet mission objectives. A typical MILOBS Sector HQ has a Sector commander, a Deputy who also acts as the Ops O, Log O and Hum O. MILOBS, can increase visibility and deal in a timely and effective manner with local civil authorities and belligerent forces, similar to a TST.

8. **Primary Reserve.** The Primary Reserve would be used extensively in CMCC and CIMIC centres as well as TST. CMCC and CIMIC centres complement each other and would employ Primary Reserve from all capability components to man, augment and sustain the CMCC with staff positions mostly filled by university trained personnel to include legal, communications, engineers, logistics, PSYOPS, media and interpreters. Liaison officers at formation and unit levels would liaise with military and civilian organizations to coordinate J5 plans and J5 projects in CMO.

9. **Force Multiplier.** The TFC must exploit at every turn the synergy of CIMIC, PSYOPS (coordinated by J5 cell and supervised by the J3 Ops) and PA, especially in the development, execution and completion of minor and major civil-military projects, to reinforce peace building efforts, create confidence and security building measures, and give hope to the local population. More importantly, the media "blitz" would counter belligerents' propaganda while building up local and international public opinion in support for the civil phase. This in turn will facilitate the political decision making in TCNs to support the civil phase until completion. Funds will be channelled to civilian agencies, thereby facilitating the attainment of the TFC's mission and objectives. The synergy created by CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA constitutes a force multiplier as it reduces the dependence on military force to achieve mission objectives, while minimizing interference by the local population with military operations.

3017. CMCC AND CIMIC CENTRES IN CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONS

1. **CMCC.** The primary purpose of the CMCC is to provide the TFC a secure area to conduct formal or informal meetings, to consult or discuss classified matters and issues with heads of IOs, NGOs and UN agencies, occasionally with local community or military leaders, as well as plan, coordinate and conduct CIMIC activities in the AO. The CMCC serves as a focal point for policy, military, civilian agencies' matters in the AO, all related to CIMIC activities. There is no command relationship between civilian and military leaders at any level, requiring a cooperative spirit from all stakeholders. A CMCC would be required in complex emergencies and large scale PSO, OOTW and combat to analyse, plan, consult, decide, conduct, coordinate, control and monitor CMO and support to civil administration. In an area of operations in which CIMIC activities are high or on the increase, a TFC could split the CMCC into two levels: a "Current Operations Group", which could be chaired by the J5 CIMIC, focused on short-to-medium term planning and a "Steering Group", which could be chaired by the Deputy or COS, to provide policy guidance with its focus on the long term perspective. A CMCC has the following characteristics:

- a. the CMCC would be located *inside* a military compound and headed by the J5 CIMIC. It would be composed of the normal HQ staff focused on the civil phase and civil tasks of a military operation. The definite structure of the CMCC is mission and task dependent.

- b. The J5 CIMIC would run the CMCC assisted by a J5 staff which would be composed of a J5 Ops, J5 Plans, J5 Projects (minor and major projects), J5 Medical/Dental/health, J5 Veterinarian, J5 Admin/Fin, a PSYOPS cell and the heads of key humanitarian organizations in the AO. Logistics and movement coordination would remain with the J4 staff at the Area Logistic and Mobility Coordination Centres, respectively, depending on theatre logistics arrangements. The logistics cell would provide the input for, and coordination of logistic and health service support, including HN support. In large scale combat operations, the Main and Rear HQ of a formation could include a CMCC Main and a CMCC Rear;
- c. the CMCC would rely on a minimal number of regular cadre and be primarily manned, augmented and sustained by the Primary Reserve which would provide the required military and civilian specialists and fields of expertise, including interpreters, to conduct effective and efficient CMO and support to civil administration. The composition of a CMCC will vary with the type of operation, the nature and levels of threat and the scope of civil tasks to be performed. Some officers/NCO's may be double-hatted when formation and unit organic resources are used for CIMIC activities; and
- d. the CMCC must strive for unity of purpose and unity of effort in the absence of unity of command to coordinate military efforts with civilian agencies.

2. **CIMIC Centres.** CIMIC centres are subordinate to the CMCC and would be deployed *outside* the military compound within the communities. At least one CIMIC centre, should be co-located with the lead agency to provide information on the tactical situation in the AO and coordinate plans and projects with IOs, NGOs and UN agencies, as well as brief local authorities and the population at large. The CIMIC centre is composed of four elements: a commander, operations, admin/log and representatives from military, civilian agencies and specialist fields.

3. CIMIC centres seek to decentralize the information and coordination processes from the CMCC. CIMIC centres are focal points for civilian agencies where problems associated with a lack of familiarity in military compartment, rules and procedures may be overcome. CIMIC centres also provide ready access by members of IOs, NGOs, UN, OSCE or NATO agencies, civil authorities, military or paramilitary personnel and the local population. When feasible, at least one CIMIC centre should be co-located with the lead humanitarian agency in the AO to analyse, plan and coordinate activities. CIMIC centres would operate along the same guidelines as a CMCC and could perform tasks such as to:

- a. provide liaison in order to harmonize political, military, civil, and humanitarian agencies' activities;
- b. facilitate the transparency of CMO and support to civil administration in the AO among all stakeholders through media and PA efforts, briefings, backgrounders and inter-agency meetings;
- c. provide up-to-date route and minefield maps, mine awareness training as well as useful information on issues such as freedom of movement, minor and major plans/projects, the general situation in the AO, the general activities of the formation and units in the AO, security issues and the evacuation plan;
- d. brief policies and procedures to all concerned and coordinate IOs, NGOs and UN, OSCE or NATO agencies' activities;
- e. keep abreast of IOs, NGOs, UN, OSCE or NATO agencies' activities, and donors who finance them, with assistance from the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) or similar agency in the AO;
- f. conduct daily operational/situational briefings, as required; and
- g. provide information to J5 Ops for inclusion in the daily CIMICREP and the periodic commander's area assessment report (COMASSESSREP) or operational estimate.

4. **Tactical Support Team (TST).** CMO specialists would deploy with the R-group, under the J5 CIMIC, to assess the situation and begin initial coordination of CIMIC activities in the HN (population and resources control, humanitarian assistance, civil defence and military civic action) or provide temporary augmentation to deployed units, as decided by the TFC. TST provide a TFC with a rapid response capability and specialist skills to support CIMIC activities in an AO, such as to:

- a. provide staff augmentation and CIMIC planning or assessment support to deployed units;

- b. provide interpreters and cultural training/briefings to supported units;
- c. augment the CMO staff as required;
- d. provide basic CIMIC training to unskilled personnel such as collecting data for MOE and normality indicators;
- e. maintain liaison with other CIMIC elements deployed in the AO;
- f. execute rapid deployment in the most remote areas; and
- g. provide general CIMIC support to formations and units, as directed by the TFC.

5. **Interpreters and Translators.** Interpreters are invaluable in multinational operations in daily contacts, negotiations and patrols. In practice, both interpreters and users must become accustomed to one another, particularly the user's dialect and manner of speech. Obtaining an interpreter's point of view following a meeting is a good practice as he/she is well aware of local customs and culture. HN authorities may make the regular reporting of information by local interpreters, a prerequisite for permission to work in this capacity. In addition, translators may be required in the translation of documents but routine translation can be accomplished by hired local interpreters.

6. **Liaison Officers in International Operations.** The maximum use of LOs will enhance interoperability and unity of effort in a domestic, coalition or multinational operations. The cultural awareness and language skills of LOs can be beneficial to a TFC, especially with formations and units whose communication equipment may not be compatible with the lead nation. Interoperability will make it imperative that LOs be equipped with compatible communications for effective liaison with military and civilian agencies involved in CIMIC activities. LOs can assist in planning and coordination with civilian agencies and should be located with lead agencies for planning and coordination purposes. LOs will also be in daily contact with civilian agencies and local authorities, civil contractors and civil labour for the planning, execution, coordination and control of minor or major rehabilitation and reconstruction projects occurring in the AO.

7. **Liaison Officers in Domestic Operations.** LFA commanders are responsible, within their areas, for domestic operations and for maintaining liaison with provincial authorities, to facilitate the sharing of information among all stakeholders; a procedure which may not be familiar to all civil agencies. LFAs maintain appropriate liaison with each provincial/territorial capital, to provide liaison, to develop personal working relationships and to build mutual understanding and confidence. Liaison between stakeholders, crisis managers and decision makers will be required in case of major disasters disabling utilities and essential communication services. The essential points of contact to be maintained are with:

- a. Emergency Preparedness Canada at the strategic level;
- b. provincial emergency measures organizations and provincial Attorney Generals' staffs;
- c. emergency planning staffs in major urban centres;
- d. provincial law enforcement agencies; and
- e. the Canadian Red Cross, particularly if it becomes the lead humanitarian agency.

3018. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

1. The aim of CIMIC support of a domestic operation is to contribute to the accomplishment of the mission. In the majority of situations, the paramount requirement will be to establish effective liaison with civil agencies including government and private organizations, and important public figures to communicate the scope and limitations of the military support that will or may be provided. The other component is harnessing civil plans and resources to military intentions and capabilities to accomplish secondary objectives which contribute to the military commanders primary mission. Other components may include joint arrangements to provide for military discipline, enhance military security and provide for mitigation or handling of damage claims from military operations.

2. The primacy of the civil authority and legalistic nature of domestic operations often produces limitations which will be overriding factors. These may well be the focus of CIMIC planning for domestic operations. Commanders and staffs will require immediate access and continuous reference to legal advice from attached JAG staff. Similarly, the public relations plan will be a vital component of both the commanders plan and the supporting CIMIC annex to the Op O. Indeed, the CIMIC annex to the Op O will usually be a function of the public relations plan.

3. Domestic operations are usually economy of force missions where, for political or financial reasons, the military force deployed must be kept to a minimum. The impact on overall defence readiness and other ongoing CF operations or programs will also often be a significant factor. CIMIC planning must consider these factors and ensure that CIMIC initiatives do not affect military readiness or unnecessarily commit other CF resources.

4. The requirement for interface with civil police agencies under CIMIC planning must be clearly differentiated from assistance to LEA as a domestic operation. Assistance to LEA must be approved and direction provided by the CDS. Interface with local LEA to facilitate military movement, to provide for police liaison in the maintenance of military discipline as well as ensure the safety and security of deployed forces, is an essential part of CIMIC planning. The interface with civilian police authorities in the domestic environment, remains a military police function.

5. Where the TF may be required to use force, the CIMIC plan may be useful in underlining the scope of force that might be employed to produce and emphasise its deterrent effect, or alternatively to underline the limitations that might be imposed to calm undue public fears and promote public confidence. Instruction for the use of force for each domestic operation will be determined and directed by the CDS.

6. It is important to delineate the type(s) or levels of assistance required from the CF in support of civil authorities, to achieve trust and confidence among stakeholders. The key to building a viable and workable civil-military relationship is to establish early in the warning or preparation phases, that responsibilities and authorities are clearly understood by each stakeholder. This will usually be a prime objective of the CIMIC plan.

3019. CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONAL LEVEL TASKS

1. In PSO, OOTW and combat, the following operational tasks, although not exhaustive, may be assigned a military force:

a. Land Forces

- (1) observation and monitoring;
- (2) supervision of truces and cease-fires;
- (3) interposition conducted as peace enforcement without necessarily the consent of the belligerent parties;
- (4) demobilization operations of irregular forces and militias involving: the securing of agreements; withdrawal and assembly of belligerent forces; disarming belligerent forces; and the dispersal and rehabilitation of such forces;
- (5) conflict prevention to include early warning, surveillance, the introduction of stabilizing measures as well as intervention activities such as preventive deployment and forcible separation of belligerents;
- (6) military assistance to assist civil authorities within a state or region where effective government has ceased to exist or to provide support to civilian elements in the election process;
- (7) humanitarian relief and the protection of personnel and physical property;
- (8) the establishment and supervision of Protected Areas;
- (9) mine awareness and mine clearance operations;
- (10) guarantee and denial of movement and the enforcement of sanctions;

- (11) non combatant evacuation operations by sea, land and air in cooperation with HN, OGDs and agencies to facilitate the proper receiving, screening, and relocating of threatened civilians;
- (12) nation security assistance operations involving: security assistance to provide economic advice; to support Canadian cooperative efforts in areas of public health, communications, utilities, safety, administration controls, civil information and military civic action;
- (13) counter insurgency operations, mainly as part of rear area security tasks in an AO; and
- (14) rear area security tasks.

b. Naval Forces

- (1) naval diplomacy or show of force;
- (2) evacuation operations;
- (3) sealift;
- (4) offshore support to include air support, naval gunfire support; surveillance, C³I, search and rescue, medical support, accommodation facilities, and logistic support;
- (5) mine countermeasures;
- (6) naval sea and air patrols;
- (7) enforce an embargo;
- (8) board and search civilian shipping; and
- (9) convoy escort.

c. Air Forces

- (1) provide air support and air strikes, as required by the operational situation;
- (2) monitoring of an AO, through Maritime Patrol Aircraft;
- (3) combat search and rescue;
- (4) evacuation operations;
- (5) strategic and tactical transport;
- (6) disaster relief and humanitarian assistance;
- (7) provide air-to-air refuelling; and
- (8) provide sustainment.

3020. MAIN CIMIC ACTIVITIES - OPERATIONAL PHASES

1. Guidance on specific CIMIC policies, including the formation commander's direction to commanders, may not be available to the TFC until the deployment is initiated. The preparation phase is critical to the success of the mission. The following CIMIC activities for four of the operational phases are not exhaustive, but critical to the success of the mission:

a. Warning and Preparation Phases

- (1) obtain from the TFC, the list of Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) as part of the mission CIMIC collection plan: essential elements of information (EEI), elements or agencies gathering information, fluctuation in attitudes and behaviour of the populace, status of PIR to include when, where and how to report;
- (2) obtain from NDHQ/J2/DG Int through J2 Plans Policy 2, an area study and assessment of the theatre or AO which constitutes the basic intelligence document for military operations in the civil phase. An area assessment format is found in B-GG-005-004/AF-023, chapter 5, annex B, with appendix 1 listing the positions to be considered when designing the CMCC. Assessments (area and economic) must be conducted early in the preparation phase and updated periodically. The ongoing area assessment is used to update the J2 Int area study;
- (3) obtain from NDHQ/J2 Geomatics the series of maps to conduct the initial recce and operations. An adequate set of maps is required especially in humanitarian operations involving refugees and cross-border activities, in which military forces may be involved in to support the lead humanitarian agency in theatre. Required map updates could be performed by a Terrain Analysis Team in theatre;
- (4) NDHQ must identify and exploit all information sources, particularly HUMINT, early in the initial planning process of humanitarian assistance such as alliance or coalition members, embassies, military attachés, IOs, NGOs, OSCE and UN agencies;
- (5) establish a R-group to include a dedicated J5 staff to conduct a CMO/CIMIC estimate and liaise with IOs/NGOs in the AO. Essential elements of the area assessment covered in MC 411 (NATO CIMIC Policy) are: the geography; the political and cultural history of the area; the state of the government; public administration and public services; the media; the industrial, economic, commerce and agricultural capacity of the region; and the involvement, capability and structure of IOs and NGOs in the AO;
- (6) planning staff should liaise early in the warning phase with J2/DG Int through the J2 Plans and Policy 2 and the Director of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence (NDHQ/DNBCD) to determine additional operational requirements;
- (7) establish a Vital Points List which should be categorized with a brief statement of significance and actions. The NDHQ/J2/DG Intelligence area study/assessment would be a good starting point. This list would include: medical and utilities facilities, cultural or religious institutions, communication centres, broadcasting facilities/relay stations, banks, embassies, judicial institutions, storage sites, port facilities, airfield and airstrip facilities;
- (8) J5 Engineer planning and coordination considerations, as well as policy guidelines must be defined in relation to the mission, the scope of civil tasks, the nature and levels of threat, as well as expected HN, IOs and NGOs, UN, OSCE or NATO support in the AO;
- (9) conduct legal training on the LOAC and ROE;
- (10) establish the range of civil-military tasks, specialist requirements, capabilities, projects and funding sources;
- (11) conduct education, sending the commander and key J3 and J5 staff on a CIMIC course once the warning phase is activated, as well as planning a series of lectures and briefings for unit personnel. Training and exercises must be conducted with IOs, NGOs and national Red Cross/Red Crescent in a PSO scenario, including hostage taking situations/survival skills and mine awareness training; and
- (12) logistic support.

b. Employment Phase

- (1) review agreements, liaison matrix, internal and external communications, and information exchange

- procedures with civil authorities, IOs, NGOs, HN police;
- (2) review SOPs, operational requirements and CIMIC capabilities, if not completed in the previous phase;
 - (3) develop strategies for integrating CIMIC, PSYOPS and PA as a 'force multiplier';
 - (4) FP issues for military and civilian personnel: security, safety and health;
 - (5) review security and evacuation matters;
 - (6) attend IO/NGO meetings and organize IO/NGO meetings at the unit location;
 - (7) review the legal implications on ROE and other legal matters;
 - (8) review the evacuation register/matrix and conduct rehearsals;
 - (9) organize a subordinate Joint Civil Commission and a subordinate Joint Military Commission, as per direction;
 - (10) reinforce campaign pillars and create incentives and rewards for compliance by civil authorities, the local populace and HN armed forces/paramilitary forces;
 - (11) conduct a revision of mine awareness and hostage survival skills for military and civilian agencies. This is a good opportunity to introduce your unit and to gain the trust and confidence of IOs/NGOs; and
 - (12) mid-tour report, as directed.

c. Redeployment Phase

- (1) handover and briefings;
- (2) transfer of responsibilities to follow on forces and to civilian agencies; and
- (3) end of tour report, lessons learned, feedback into SOPs, CIMIC doctrine and first principles.

3021. MILITARY INFORMATION IN CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

1. In international operations not involving a "war emergency", the standard military function of intelligence may be called "military information" or simply "information". The aim is to prevent doubt and suspicion relative to the future intentions of the occupying force. The traditional intelligence cyclical process (direction, collection, processing and dissemination) will apply for PSO, OOTW and combat although methods and procedures for gathering, assessing and disseminating information may vary with those developed for conventional warfare and operations. To protect the civil phase, J2 "Priority Intelligence Requirements" must clearly reflect the TFC's intent towards CIMIC activities.

2. The purpose of military information is not to gain a military advantage but to protect the military force and civilian agencies deployed in an AO from threats and risks to their security. Great care must be taken not to compromise the security of individuals providing information. Sites where the populace congregates or assembles as part of its daily life should be identified as a source of military information. Information will normally be gained from the following sources in theatre and within an AO:

- a. imagery from a variety of sensors such as hand-held photographs, videography, air recce (including drones), remote sensor data, as well as other tactical and national-level sources;
- b. patrols by infantry (foot, air recce, air patrols), transport drivers (road conditions, attitudes of the local populations, INCSPOTREP, location of check points and the ability to pass), civilian police component, CF maritime, land and air recce units and UN MILOBS;

- c. inspection results/reports by the UN, OSCE and NATO;
- d. factional commanders, HN military personnel and/or local civil police on the status of their own forces;
- e. civil organizations and agencies' personnel who by their mandate and functions entertain regular contacts with local nationals and civil authorities in the AO;
- f. contributing nations' CIVPOL or UNCIVPOL;
- g. local population, assisted by an interpreter;
- h. IDPs and refugees;
- i. television news channel (CNN...), local and international newspapers or magazines;
- j. school principals, teachers and administrators;
- k. hospital and health centres' administrators and staff;
- l. religious congregations, clergy or priests;
- m. local civil authorities/administrators at the municipal and provincial levels; and
- n. visitors from a neighbouring state to the crisis or conflict, or from an international body close to the crisis or conflict.

3022. NDHQ ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

1. The CDS, assisted by the NDHQ J5 staff (J5 CIMIC, J5 PA, J5 Policy, J5 Legal, J5 Ops, J5 Engineer) and J3 staff to include J3 Plans & Ops and a J3 Engineer, is responsible for establishing broad CIMIC policies based on national strategic objectives. For a particular operation, the CDS will:
 - a. designate the commander for specific humanitarian operations which, in complex emergencies, may require deployment of the DART for domestic or international operations;
 - b. task the appropriate ECS/Environmental commanders to provide identified units, specialists and support personnel;
 - c. designate a formation to create the CFFET and TO&E, and provide the equipment and materiel, within limitations imposed by the CDS;
 - d. establish specific CIMIC policies in accordance with international and domestic laws, and based on broad policies, to meet the requirements of the military situation;
 - e. ensure that the operation plan adequately addresses CIMIC aspects; and
 - f. ensure that CIMIC support is commensurate with the aim of the operation.
2. Based on the specific CIMIC policies established by the CDS, the TFC must:
 - a. determine the level of staff support needed to plan and conduct CIMIC activities; and
 - b. plan for the conduct of such CIMIC activities as may be appropriate in the AO.
3. CIMIC aspects of an operation will affect several divisions of NDHQ, particularly the J1, J3, J4 and J5 divisions. The detailed cooperative arrangements for CIMIC are the responsibility of the J5 division. This responsibility involves:
 - a. preparing the estimate of CIMIC involvement in CMO, support to civil administration and the supporting plan;
 - b. advising the TFC on military requirements for CIMIC activities and recommending policies and procedures for such activities;
 - c. collecting, interpreting, collating and disseminating information on civil-military matters;
 - d. advising the TFC on matters concerning the civilian population, local government, institutions, the economy, and resources available for military use;
 - e. recommending to the TFC policies concerning obligations to the population in the AO and obligations relative to treaties, agreements and international and domestic laws;
 - f. establishing policy and procedures for coordinating military support to the population and for resources control programmes;
 - g. establishing policy and procedures for the supervision of community relations by the TFC in the AO;
 - h. establishing or coordinating policy and procedures for standing Joint Military Commissions in the AO;
 - i. assisting SAMP and J1 staffs in processing and reorienting POW and detained persons, and in relocating and settling dislocated civilians. The J1 is responsible for administering policies and procedures for dealing with POW, civilian internees and other detained persons; and
 - j. in conjunction with the J4 staff, coordinating the procurement of local resources and HNS for operations.

4. Depending on the extent of CIMIC activities for a given operation, a CMCC may be established within the HQ. Under supervision of the J5 CIMIC and with representation from other divisions of the HQ, this centre would coordinate all CIMIC activities on behalf of the TFC, without intruding on the security or operation of the HQ operations centre.

5. To obtain the cooperation of the civilian population, CIMIC integrates PSYOPS. PSYOPS support CIMIC through political, military and economic actions planned and conducted to mould the opinions, attitudes and behaviours of foreign groups to support Canadian national objectives. The J3 staff supervises PSYOPS but the J5 staff coordinates those PSYOPS directed against the civilian population.

6. J4 Log and J4 Fin, assisted by the J5 cell are responsible for logistic HNS arrangements. J4 Log staff identify projected shortfalls, determine available goods and services within the AO and, in cooperation with the J5 cell, negotiate for such support.

3023. LOGISTIC SUPPORT

1. CIMIC activities and operations in foreign countries are conducted in accordance with the requirements of applicable international and domestic law and are influenced by such variables as:

- a. Canadian foreign policy;
- b. the requirements of the military situation;
- c. Canada's relationship and any special agreements with the HN government in question; and
- d. the participation of allies in an alliance or coalition force.

2. For operations in countries where the procurement of support is through ad hoc arrangements, representatives of J4 and J5 staffs should be among the first to arrive in the AO to identify locally available support and to coordinate and integrate the support into the logistic plan. Once support agreements are concluded, logistics staff continue to serve as the link between local activity and the supported units of the force.

3. The main CIMIC areas of logistic interest are:

- a. the existence of HNS agreements and arrangements;
- b. the appropriate level of support and self-sufficiency;
- c. sources of procurement and resupply of equipment and materiel;
- d. timely availability of resources and CSS facilities and infrastructure for the maintenance and sustainment of the force, particularly for IOR and UOR;
- e. availability and suitability of specific civilian services related to maintenance and logistics;
- f. use of civil airfields and seaports;
- g. medical cooperation;
- h. movement control;
- i. damage control;
- j. logistics support to military engineer operations;
- k. logistics support and assistance for the civilian population;
- l. mobilization and provision of civilian labour;

- m. transportability of equipment and supplies, and use of civil transport asset; and
- n. financial controls of the military operation, including audit procedures based on existing directives / SOPs.

4. Logistics should be able to support both military and non-military humanitarian operations. Coordination with NGOs will facilitate support to humanitarian operations. The TFC's operation plan must include planning for handling dislocated civilians (DPREs). The dislocated civilians plan must allow for accomplishment of the military mission, be within restrictions imposed by the strategic level of command and guide subordinate commanders in the handling and routing of dislocated civilians. The dislocated civilians plan must also address the:

- a. status and disposition of all dislocated civilians;
- b. allowed extent of migration and evacuation;
- c. minimum standards of care;
- d. designation of routes and control measures for movement control;
- e. cultural and dietary considerations; and
- f. designation and delegation of responsibilities.

3024. MILITARY TRAINING AND EXERCISES

1. The increasing complexity of PSO, OOTW and combat makes it important to concentrate on CIMIC training by simulating in the pre-deployment phase, CIMIC scenarios that would be encountered in operations. The operational effectiveness and efficiency with which the CF conducts CIMIC activities is directly related to the effectiveness and efficiency of its training. Combat forces as well as other elements of the CF (communications, medical, logistics...) must introduce CIMIC in their operational-level training.

2. CIMIC will continue to increase in importance in joint and combined operations. Quality CIMIC training would provide trained personnel to contribute effectively to the civil phase of joint and combined operations. Training with stakeholders and partners must emphasize the joint perspective, enhance connectivity and interoperability of equipment, emphasize efforts toward the development of a common civil-military doctrine, as well as a common understanding of the operational language. These principles will achieve economy of effort, minimize confusion, increase trust and confidence, and contribute to the accomplishment of the mission and its objectives.

3. The lead time should also be used to conduct multidisciplinary education, training and exercises of the military force and other players (CMX, CPX, field exercises, CAX). Individual and collective training must be planned well in advance to benefit from the range of CIMIC courses available and to plan and coordinate the participation of civilian agencies in pre-deployment field exercises.

3025. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. CIMIC operations are directed from the strategic level, coordinated and managed at the operational level, and conducted at the tactical level. Assuming a single authority is designated at theatre level to synchronize or coordinate political, military and civilian efforts, CF C2 arrangements for CIMIC activities would include:

- a. a humanitarian force to assist the lead Canadian humanitarian agency in theatre (OGDs or agencies, primarily CIDA) or the lead UN humanitarian agency in humanitarian operations (UNHCR);
- b. TOCA of CF elements to the UN, OSCE or a NATO commander during the deployment phase, normally OPCON, will occur at the APOE/SPOE. TOCA of CF elements to national control during the redeployment phase, normally OPCOM, will occur at the APOE/SPOE;
- c. establishment of a CMCC for the TF/JTFHQ, to coordinate activities and establish priorities in cooperation with in theatre NGOs. In addition, CIMIC centres are also required in communities to facilitate the exchange of information as well as the coordination of J5 Plans and J5 Projects with civilian agencies and

civil authorities concerned;

- d. no command relationship with civilian agencies in an AO. Coordination of activities relies on cooperation among stakeholders. Inter-agency meetings, whether formal or informal, become conduits through which the TFC can plan and coordinate CMO and support to civil administration;
 - e. establishment of an integrated intelligence data base to include ethnic, paramilitary and terrorist groups, as well as criminal /mafia groups, which have the potential to incite or exploit unrest to their benefit. This should be coordinated with the CIVPOL detachment in the AO by accessing reliable data sources through means such as Internet and Interpol. Such information must be managed efficiently and disseminated quickly; and
 - f. creation of an integrated data base of minor and major projects showing a description of military and civilian rehabilitation and reconstruction projects, agencies involved, funding amount and financial source, beginning and date of completion of projects as well as the hiring of civil contractors and/or local labour. This integrated data base must be maintained by the TFC for control and monitoring functions.
2. Based on operational requirements, national policies and other political efforts, the national commander or TFC has the authority to negotiate CIMIC arrangements with a foreign government or other authority in the AO, including assistance by the military force to civil authorities.

CHAPTER 31**COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS****3101. INTRODUCTION**

1. A CIS is the assembly of equipment, methods and procedures and, if necessary, personnel organized so as to accomplish specific information conveyance and processing functions. Military CISs must provide reliable, rapid and secure exchange of information throughout the chain of command to enable commanders to execute C2 and supporting functions of military forces. All commanders must have the communications facilities and resources necessary to accomplish the mission.

2. For CF operations, a chain of communications must extend from the CDS to the TFC, and on to the commanders of support groups and units participating in the operation. The required communications capability for CF operations is drawn from the following sources:

- a. the Defence Information Services Organization (DISO);
- b. Environmental CIS;
- c. leased commercial systems; and
- d. arrangements with allies for assured use of their military CIS.

3102. PRINCIPLES

1. The following principles relating to a CIS must be considered and selectively applied to military operations:

- a. command responsibility;
- b. inseparability of operations and CIS;
- c. security;
- d. timeliness;
- e. reliability;
- f. availability;
- g. survivability;
- h. flexibility;
- i. capacity;
- j. compatibility; and
- l. interoperability.

2. Proper application of these principles will ensure that the CIS possesses the essential qualitative elements to enable it to function effectively under a wide variety of conditions. Although these principles are discussed separately, interrelationships and mutual effects exist. Some principles, although desirable, may have to be sacrificed to some degree in favour of others which are of greater relative importance.

3. **Command Responsibility.** Commanders at all levels (strategic, operational and tactical) are responsible for the effective employment and control of CIS resources.

4. **Inseparability of Operations and CIS.** The CIS required to support a military operation are an integral component of the operation plan. Changes to an operation plan must take into account the possible impact on CIS requirements. Conversely, CIS must be planned, implemented and maintained in a manner consistent with the projected rate of activity and scope of operations.

5. **Security.** Security is an integral element of all military CIS and must be considered at the earliest possible stage. Information Systems Security (IS SEC) includes administrative and procedural security, aspects of physical and personnel security and information technology security (computer, network, cryptographic, transmission and emanations security). IS SEC is concerned with the protection of information in electronic environment against the loss or compromise of confidentiality, integrity, availability and authenticity. The degree of protection provided must meet the users' requirements and be commensurate with the sensitivity of the information to be protected.

- a. Confidentiality refers to the sensitivity of information or assets to unauthorized disclosure. It is expressed as a classification or designation which denotes a degree of injury should unauthorized disclosure occur.
- b. Integrity is the quality or condition of being accurate and complete.
- c. Availability is that characteristic that ensures that information and resources will be available to authorized users when they are needed.
- d. Authenticity refers to measures designed to provide protection against fraudulent transmission and imitative communication deception by establishing the validity of a transmission, message, station or individual.

If any of these conditions are not met, users cannot be assured that the information or assets in question have not been subjected to unauthorized disclosure, destruction, removal, modification or interruption.

6. **Timeliness.** Information has no value if it is not available when a decision must be made. The timely transfer of information is required for such functions as C2, administration, logistics, intelligence and personnel management. However, because of the cost, the element of speed should not be built into a system that is required to handle only routine traffic. A CIS must be capable of delivering information when it is required.

7. **Reliability.** A measure of the probability that a CIS will function properly under operational conditions. Reliability is achieved by designing equipment and systems with low failure rates, providing alternate routes, and enforcing adherence to SOPs.

8. **Availability.** A CIS must be available to support operations when required. Availability is described in terms of total hours of operation and downtime for maintenance or repair.

9. **Survivability.** Survivability for elements supporting the C2 function should be balanced with the survival potential of the associated HQ. CIS survivability can be improved by dispersal, multiplicity of communications routes and alternate modes of transmission, mobility, hardening, or a combination of these techniques.

10. **Flexibility.** This principle is required to meet changing situations and diversified operations with minimum delay or disruption. Flexibility is achieved by system design (standardization, including standardization with allied systems) and through the use of commercial facilities, mobile units or prepositioned facilities.

11. **Capacity.** Refers to system requirements in terms of the volume and type of information transmitted. Degrees of urgency will vary widely in an operation, as will the volume of traffic; therefore, CIS must be able to handle urgent demands and traffic peaks.

12. **Compatibility.** The capability of two or more items or components of equipment to function in the same environment without mutual interference. Electromagnetic compatibility, including frequency availability, must be

considered throughout the planning, design, development, testing and evaluation, and operational life of all systems.

13. **Interoperability.** CIS are interoperable when necessary information can be exchanged at appropriate levels of command and in usable form. To ensure CIS interoperability, all aspects of achieving it must be addressed throughout the life cycle of a system. These aspects include the following:

- a. acquisition of interoperable systems;
- b. development of concepts, doctrine and operational procedures;
- c. development of interoperability standards;
- d. close coordination of standards with allies;
- e. testing and verification of interoperability; and
- f. training and evaluation.

3103. CONCEPT

1. CIS capabilities and resources are organized into an integrated network for supporting operations in a particular theatre. In all operations, an operational or theatre level CIS must incorporate the following elements:

- a. secure CIS between the TFHQ and NDHQ (strategic level);
- b. secure CIS between the TFHQ and the tactical level HQs as well as the support groups and units of the operation;
- c. secure CIS between the support groups and units participating in the operation and national systems supporting the operation (e.g., between the CSG and the CFSS);
- d. internal secure CIS to support the TFHQ;
- e. PA staff require access to military facilities for rapid transmission of military material; and
- f. media information may be passed over military CIS at the discretion of the TFC where no suitable civil telecommunications exists (see article 2904).

2. Depending on the nature of the operation, the operational level CIS may also need to include communication circuits from the TFHQ to local government or administrative authorities, police, local forces and other agencies, and if in a combined operation, circuits for liaison with allied forces operating in conjunction with or adjacent to Canadian forces.

3. The CIS link between NDHQ and the TFHQ is referred to as the National Command and Control Information System (NCCIS). This is the main communications link between the CDS and the TFC. It also serves as the major national administrative communications route connecting the operation with logistic installations and other support facilities outside the area of operations.

4. CIS are also required to support all elements of the TF. Each element is responsible for providing, operating and maintaining its respective tactical CIS. They support their immediate commanders within the guidance provided by the operational level CIS plan.

3104. REQUIREMENTS

1. The nature of operations varies widely and it is not always possible to produce standing CIS requirements.

For a particular operation, requirements will depend on a number of factors, some of the more significant being:

- a. the nature of the mission;
- b. the complexity of the operation and the consequent C2 and liaison requirements;
- c. the size, composition and geographic location of the TF;
- d. the threat to CIS;
- e. the immediacy of deployment;
- f. the mode of transport to the area of operations;
- g. the extent and availability of the CIS infrastructure in the area of operations;
- h. the size of the area of operations and the location of the TFHQ, aerial port of disembarkation, sea port of disembarkation and other principal operational and logistic installations; and
- i. the anticipated duration of the operation.

3105. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. For any operation, the NDHQ J6, on behalf of the CDS, is responsible for defining the strategic and operational level CIS available to the TFC to accomplish the mission.

2. CIS responsibilities in any operation are shared among the CDS, the TFC, and the TF elements. In addition, DISO and the force generators are responsible to provide, organize and train CIS personnel and to provide CIS equipment for any operation as directed by the CDS.

3. NDHQ J6/DISO, on behalf of the CDS, is responsible for providing strategic level guidance, direction and coordination concerning CIS matters and for ensuring that strategic and operational level CIS capabilities and resources needed to support the aim of the operation are available. Specific J6/DISO responsibilities include:

- a. the NCCIS link into the area of operations between NDHQ and the TFHQ;
- b. in a combined operation, CIS links between NDHQ and the HQ of the lead organization or alliance; and
- c. technical control of all national CIS resources in Canada, including line, HF and satellite links to the TF.

4. The TFC, assisted by the TFHQ J6 staff and the TF CIS unit, is responsible for establishing an operational level CIS to support the operation and for employing the system to the best effect. This involves:

- a. forecasting and submitting to NDHQ requirements for operational level CIS capabilities and resources needed to accomplish the mission;
- b. controlling and allocating critical CIS capabilities and resources in the area of operations; and
- c. developing and promulgating the operational level CIS plan and appropriate operating procedures and instructions to support the COO.

5. The TF J6 is responsible to the TFC for identifying and coordinating operational level CIS requirements in the area of operations. The following is a list of some of the more significant J6 activities in this regard:

- a. providing advice to the TFC and the staff on all aspects of strategic and operational level CIS;

- b. determining the requirements for operational level CIS capabilities and resources to support the mission;
- c. developing the CIS estimate;
- d. developing the CIS SUP or CIS annex to the operation plan, and the CIS annex to the operation order;
- e. determining the relative priorities and recommending the allocation of operational level CIS capabilities and resources in the area of operations, including those required by TF elements;
- f. on behalf of the NDHQ J6, exercising technical control of strategic and operational level CIS; and
- g. supervising CIS equipment maintenance within the TF.

6. The CIS unit may be a DISO resource or a resource belonging to an Environmental command. When an operation is initiated, CIS unit personnel are augmented by NDHQ J1 from across the CF to the level needed for the particular operation. Additional capabilities and assets may be derived from other sources (commercial and allied military sources), if required and as directed by the CDS.

7. The CIS unit may be integrated into the HQ support unit, in which case the operational level CIS staff and resources and the administrative and security support are provided by a single unit.

8. In any operation, the TF CIS unit is responsible to the TFC for the following:

- a. providing CIS representation to the predeployment reconnaissance team;
- b. installing, operating and maintaining operational level CIS facilities and resources in the area of operations including:
 - (1) internal CIS requirements of the TFHQ,
 - (2) connectivity with the forces tactical components, if applicable, and with the support groups and units,
 - (3) connectivity with local government or administrative authorities or other agencies, and
 - (4) in a combined operation, connectivity with superior or flanking commands; and
- c. controlling the use of operational level CIS capabilities and resources in the area of operations.

9. CIS staffs of the TF elements are responsible for:

- a. developing tactical level CIS plans consistent with the theatre CIS plan; and
- b. providing, operating and maintaining the CIS facilities organic to the TF elements.

3106. PLANNING

1. Effective planning can be achieved only if representatives of all CIS staffs are involved as early as possible in the development of the CIS plan. The CIS plan, normally an annex to the operation plan, must be prepared concurrently and must form an integral part of the overall operation plan. There must be close coordination between other staffs of the TF (e.g., operations, intelligence, security and EW) and CIS staffs at all stages of planning. CIS links have a finite capacity and competition for access to them may be intense during operations. It is important that potential conflict be resolved in the planning stage.

2. To ensure that appropriate CIS security safeguards are provided to counter the threat to confidentiality,

integrity, authenticity and availability, CIS planners must conduct a risk assessment prior to committing CIS resources. A risk assessment will identify particular threats to and vulnerabilities of the CIS, identify the type of ITSEC measures which should be integrated into the CIS, and recommend the level of residual risk to be managed.

3. Once CIS requirements are determined, the TFC develops an operational level CIS plan that incorporates all operational and tactical level requirements and that reflects the integrated nature of CIS activities. Subordinate commanders develop their CIS plans based on the TFC-s plan.

4. In planning for any operation, priorities for movement of CIS elements (personnel and equipment) must be considered at an early stage. It is essential that adequate CIS services are available and effective immediately on entry into an area of operations. For this reason, on site reconnaissance is an important aspect of the overall planning process; as is early identification of frequency spectrum requirements.

5. Permanent CIS facilities in an area of operations, if available for use by the TF, may offer advantages in capacity and reliability over military facilities. This should be taken into account in the theatre CIS plan and appropriate political clearance sought for their use.

3107. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Regardless of the source, national CIS capabilities and resources in the area of operations are under the command authority of the TFC and are an integral part of the TFC's C2 organization. The TFC develops plans that integrate those resources available into an effective operational level CIS.

2. C2 of tactical CIS is exercised by subordinate commanders within the overall command authority of the TFC.

3. Technical control of all national CIS resources in Canada is the responsibility of NDHQ (J6/DISO). The TF J6, who responds to the NDHQ J6/DISO on technical matters, is responsible for technical control.

CHAPTER 32**COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE****3201. INTRODUCTION**

1. Today, highly sophisticated communications systems, computers, data bases and networks, which form the backbone of C2 systems, are found at all levels of the military and civilian hierarchy; all are vulnerable to IW. The exploitation, corruption or destruction of information will, therefore, be an important factor in a successful campaign. IW is the preservation of one's own information and information system while exploiting, disrupting or denying use of an adversary's information and/or information system. This implies both defensive and offensive concepts. At the strategic level of conflict, IW includes both military and civil applications. The relationship between IW and C2W along with the integration of C2W actions is depicted at figure 32-1. IW will be further described in *B-GG-005-004/AF-002 - Command and Control*.

2. C2W, the military application of IW, is defined as the integrated use of all military capabilities including OPSEC, deception, PSYOPS, EW and physical destruction, supported by all source intelligence and CIS, to influence, degrade, destroy or deny information to an adversary's C2 capabilities while protecting our own against similar actions. It is a modern and comprehensive concept replacing the former command control and communications counter measures (C3CM) (US) or counter command control and communications (Counter C3) (NATO), as these terms proved to be too focused on equipment solutions. C2W differs significantly, as it is an objective oriented element of military strategy. Each independent C2W action may have significant effects; however, the power of C2W is maximized through the combination of the five actions described at article 3205.

3. The extent of C2W will depend on resources and the influence of political, social and economic factors. Legal and social restrictions related to ROE, PYSOPS, electromagnetic spectrum sovereignty, media, security and training all effect the way in which C2W is applied.

3202. APPLICABILITY

1. Effective C2 is essential to success in modern military operations; conversely, disrupting a component of the decision making process serves to isolate the command and leadership elements from the combat forces.

2. C2W combines physical destruction with the denial and influence of information, deception and disruption. The aim is to achieve decisive and concentrated action on an adversary's C2 system while simultaneously protecting one's own C2 from similar actions. It should be noted that the concept:

- a. applies across the entire spectrum of conflict at all levels;
- b. is applicable at different levels of command with greatest significance at the level utilizing the full range of resources to support the concept; and
- c. is a refocusing of thought and concepts on the conduct of operations to integrate all available actions.

3203. C2W CONCEPTS

1. All war fighting capabilities may be employed in C2W operations, the level of applicability of each being conditioned by the circumstances and resources available. Similarly, C2W strategy is required in all aspects of military operations as an integral part of the overall plan.

2. The advantage of C2W is that it does not entail a commitment to a particular course of action at an early stage, but can nevertheless have a significant effect on the conduct of a campaign. In this respect, the concept allows for the application of limits or control measures which may preclude escalating a crisis, yet allow for timely actions. Further, targeting a C2 capability is but one part of the wider reaching targeting function.




Figure 32-1 Hierarchy of Information Warfare

3. Figure 32-2 describes C2W as the integrated use of OPSEC, military deception, PSYOPS, EW, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C2 and to protect friendly C2 against such actions. C2W, an integral part of the overall theatre war fighting strategy, is a force multiplier.




Figure 32-2 Commands and Control Warfare

4. C2 systems consist of personnel, equipment, information systems and procedures. Each element is vulnerable, in varying degrees, to military action. Actions that degrade one or more components of a C2 system degrade the entire C2 system. This introduces uncertainty in the C2 structure and influences a TFC's ability to effectively conduct operations.

5. The point at which the components of a C2 system come together is defined as a node. Nodes are classified as critical, vulnerable or dependant.

- a. **Critical Node.** A critical node is defined as an element, position or communications system whose disruption immediately degrades the ability of a commander to conduct effective operations.
- b. **Vulnerable Node.** A vulnerable node is one which is susceptible to attack, exploitation or degradation.
- c. **Dependant Node.** A dependant node is one which can be linked and is synergistic, e.g., the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) improves fighter performance.

3204. C2W COMPONENTS

1. C2W is divided into offensive and defensive components. The amount of effort directed to each component will be based on such factors as level of command, capabilities, imposed restrictions and allies' intentions. C2W activities are inherent to operations centres, intelligence and EW coordination cells, targeting boards and the like.

2. **Offensive C2W.** Offensive C2W is an effective way of reducing an adversary's combat effectiveness. This is achieved principally by disrupting the enemy commander's decision cycle. It is applicable at all levels of command. The objectives of offensive C2W are as follows:

- a. to disrupt the enemy commander's decision cycle;
- b. to degrade the opposing commander's C2 systems;
- c. to slow the opponent's tempo of operations; and
- d. to disrupt the adversary's operations and ability to sustain and reinforce.

3. **Defensive C2W.** Safeguarding friendly C2 systems must be a fundamental consideration, as failure to do so may result in loss of freedom of action and initiative, misdirected effort, or failure of the operation. Intelligence and CIS staffs will be vital in the development of defensive C2W, by preparing CI estimates outlining the adversary's collection capabilities (all sources) and identifying friendly vulnerabilities. The primary objective of defensive C2W is to ensure that friendly information, C2 assets and installations are protected against enemy C2W activities.

3205. MILITARY ACTIONS

1. C2W objectives are achieved by integrating five fundamental military actions within the mutual support of operations, coordination and specialist support centres at respective levels of command. These actions are:

- a. **Deception.** This action can be offensive and defensive in nature. The use of deception in various guises has proven to be very effective, and it may be the activity which gives the highest return on effort and resources expended. Deception is a complex art which demands significant effort and a high level of security; it also requires a studied insight into the adversary's way of thinking.
- b. **OPSEC.** This action is defensive in nature. OPSEC comprises numerous methods and procedures, such as ITSEC, to reduce or deny information and ensure the security of an operation. OPSEC measures are specific to the operation and include, but are not limited to, personnel and physical security (see chapter 21).
- c. **PSYOPS.** When directed against the enemy, this is an offensive action. PSYOPS have the potential to

damage the enemy C2 chain by lowering morale, instilling fear and breeding distrust. It also has potential for providing insights into an adversary's reactions and can be used to direct other C2W activities, such as deception, into areas where they are most likely to succeed. PSYOPS will be coordinated at the strategic level to ensure the proper coordination and timing of all elements of an operation. See also, chapter 34.

- d. **EW.** This action is offensive and defensive in nature. EW can degrade and deceive the performance of an adversary's electronic and weapon systems, warn of enemy action, support self-defence, locate and identify emitters and reduce the odds of their engaging friendly forces. EW plays a significant role in the process of information degradation or destruction. Information transmitted by electromagnetic means is extremely vulnerable to attack by electromagnetic or high energy weapons. EW is coordinated through the establishment of the EWCC at all levels of command. These cells coordinate the application of EW in support of C2W. See chapter 33 for further details.
- e. **Physical Destruction.** This is an offensive action. An adversary's C2 nodes are high value targets, however, long term advantage from their destruction cannot be assumed, as the enemy can be expected to place equally high value on their reconstitution. The timing of the application of physical destruction is vital to ensure that subsequent operations exploit even short term effects. Physical destruction may be the only choice available to attack an enemy's HQs and associated CIS which may be within hardened facilities.

2. These actions are planned and directed by the operations staff; however, the intelligence staff has a vital contribution to make in the planning and execution phases.

3206. INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT

1. The intelligence staff's main contributions to C2W are described at article 3207.5. This support is a dynamic process as an adversary can be expected to respond to our C2W effort by creating new C2 nodes and alternate C2 structures. In fast paced C2W operations, near real time current intelligence reflecting changes to the adversary's C2 system is required by the C2W planners. Intelligence systems must be linked to allies or coalition partners' systems and must therefore have compatible architecture.

2. C2 facilities, adequate connectivity, ADP support and interoperable data bases are essential to the success of C2W. The five military actions fundamental to C2W must be linked with an integrated CIS capable of operating effectively in both offensive and defensive environments. The extent of these actions will vary across the spectrum of conflict. Further, C2 facilities must be linked with those of allies or other coalition partners.

3207. C2W ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. **Commanders.** Responsibilities include:

- a. ensuring that offensive and defensive C2W is included in operational plans at all levels of command;
- b. identifying and reporting deficiencies, vulnerabilities and requirements for C2W resources; and
- c. ensuring alignment with higher headquarters C2W planning.

2. **ECS.** Responsibilities are as follows:

- a. disseminating and implementing environment specific C2W doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures;
- b. exercising capabilities applicable to C2W strategies and conducting training, exercises and tests in a simulated C2W environment;
- c. training subordinate commanders and staff to understand, detect and combat hostile C2W; and
- d. training subordinate commanders to understand and conduct offensive C2W operations when authorized.

3. **National Operations Staff.** Staff responsibilities involve the following activities:
 - a. ensuring that strategic plans include C2W employment and objectives;
 - b. conducting assessments on the effectiveness and deficiencies of C2W planning and collective training;
 - c. ensuring that exercises include C2W activities with realistic objectives;
 - d. ensuring that a TFHQ is capable of operating in a C2W environment;
 - e. allocating national C2W resources as required by CF operations; and
 - f. ensuring maximum coordination among all staffs.

4. C2W is an element of modern warfare; responsibility for its application rests with the operations staff at all levels. It is unlikely that conduct of C2W will require new dedicated staff organizations. Operations staff will need to cooperate with the intelligence, security, communications, targeting, air operations, deception and EW staffs.

5. **Intelligence Staff.** Responsibilities include:
 - a. directing the intelligence effort in support of C2W;
 - b. ensuring that all source intelligence products are provided, as required, for C2W planning;
 - c. coordinating with allied and coalition staffs to support the development of an integrated intelligence collection plan and C2W target list;
 - d. assessing the vulnerability of the adversaries=C2;
 - e. constantly monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of offensive C2W efforts; and
 - f. developing CI estimates for defensive C2W planning.

6. **Security Staff.** Specially trained SAMP personnel have specific C2W responsibilities in supporting the J2 staff's CI effort. In concert with communications and EW staff, the SAMP staff will provide:
 - a. CI on the HUMINT threat to IT;
 - b. advice on ITSEC and physical, personnel and system security;
 - c. threat assessments as to the threat to and vulnerabilities of IT; and
 - d. security awareness training.

7. **Communications/Information System Staff.** Responsibilities include:
 - a. providing global communications/ information services in support of the five C2W military functions;
 - b. in conjunction with EW, security and intelligence staffs, identifying unique requirements for information and communications support for C2W operations;
 - c. in conjunction with EW, security and intelligence staff, assessing the vulnerabilities of information and communications facilities to hostile C2W operations in peace and war; and
 - d. training commanders, their staff and operators in offensive and defensive C2W activities.

8. **EW Staff.** At all levels of command, where practical, an EWCC will be established to coordinate all EW operations and activities. Responsibilities include:

- a. planning and coordinating ESM and ECM operations against an adversary's critical C2;
 - b. in conjunction with J6 staff, coordinating ESM and EPM that deny and degrade an adversary's access to information and that reduce friendly forces vulnerability to an adversary's EW activities;
 - c. coordinating the EW support to C2W;
 - d. in conjunction with J2 and J6 staff, coordinating friendly ECM operations to ensure frequency management and prevention of harmful interference to friendly CCIS; and
 - e. in conjunction with J2, J3 and J6 staff, developing the Restricted Frequency List (RFL).
9. This coordinated effort must be carefully planned in a logical manner. Consequently, a clearly identified planning process must be formulated as early as possible under the lead of J3.

3208. C2W PLANNING PROCESS

1. Commanders and staff should be aware that C2W may be the most expeditious and economical means of exploiting time and space in favour of the friendly forces, and of reducing the adversary's capability to obstruct the accomplishment of assigned tasks. Early in the planning process, commanders and staff should examine how the five C2W functions can generate favourable conditions for the commitment of the TF. When considering the use of offensive C2W, they must bear in mind that potential C2W targets may also be significant sources of strategic and operational intelligence. Therefore, C2W activities may be restricted in targeting certain assets, e.g., RFLs.
2. **Offensive C2W Planning Process.** To accomplish offensive C2W objectives, the planning staff should use the following process:
 - a. **Identify Offensive C2W Objectives.** C2W operations should be selective; the objective is to strike the adversary's C2 to support the TFC's operational intentions.
 - b. **Identify the enemy C2 nodes** This requires planners to examine the functions of the enemy's C2 system. The Intelligence staff must develop models of the adversary's C2 system by function, and examine those nodes that serve more than one system.
 - c. **Analyse the nodes for criticality and vulnerability.** Planners must be analyse to identify those nodes which, if degraded, will cause a severe impact on the enemy C2 system and determine their vulnerability to C2W action. The ideal target is a critical, vulnerable, accessible node that serves several C2 systems.
 - d. **Prioritize the nodes.** With the support of intelligence staff, the operations staff should prioritize the nodes. The operations planner needs to look at the priorities by resource expenditure and how the degradation of the node will support the mission and COO in order to achieve optimum results for the assets expended.
 - e. **Determine desired effect, and how the five C2W actions will contribute to the overall objective.** The planning staff must determine what desired effect on a particular node, which part of the adversary's C2 system should be attacked, how long should the effect last, and where the effect should occur in relation to the position of friendly forces. The next step is to determine which one, or combination, of C2W actions will best support the TFC's overall plan.
 - f. **Assign assets.** The planners should then select the air, land, maritime assets, or combination thereof, that are best equipped to degrade the node and achieve the desired effect. This requires planners to understand the weapon system capabilities of all force elements, EW, deception, PSYOPS and OPSEC.
 - g. **Determine the effectiveness of the operation.** The planners need to know if the desired effect was achieved, what was the degree of degradation of the node, for how long was the node degraded, and what were the enemy's recovery actions. This information is required to refine future C2W operations plans.

3. **Defensive C2W Planning Process.** There are three OPSEC planning actions that should be taken when developing a defensive C2W plan:

- a. **Identify Friendly Critical C2 nodes.** Examine operational objectives and the methods available to achieve them. Then consider specific tasks, and what friendly C2 nodes are essential to their accomplishment.
- b. **Analyse the Nodes.** Conduct a nodal analysis to determine the nodes= vulnerability. J2 staff will assist by providing an assessment of the adversary's capabilities to attack our C2 nodes. i.e. in what ways and with what effect. This information provides the planner with a priority listing of C2 nodes requiring protection.
- c. **Recommend options.** Recommend options to protect a critical C2 node is vulnerable to enemy C2W.

4. In this age of automated, interactive C2 systems, it is critical that commanders and staffs appreciate the vulnerability of our own C2 systems to C2W. They must also plan for the exploitation of an adversary's systems. Carefully planned and conducted C2W has the potential to optimize the conditions for successful operations.

CHAPTER 33

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

3301. INTRODUCTION

1. EW, one of the five pillars of C2W, consists of military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce or prevent its use by hostile forces and to retain its effective use by friendly forces. EW is a force multiplier and is an integral part of operations and the overall C2W strategy. Success at any level of modern conflict demands the domination of the electromagnetic spectrum. Thus it is essential that commanders have experienced EW staff to provide the appropriate focus for the use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

2. Traditionally, each CF Environment has employed EW differently; it is important to appreciate these differences when planning the operational employment of EW assets. For a CF operation, the development of an EW policy and the applications of EW by the TFC must consider the capabilities and resources of the TF elements.

3302. OBJECTIVES OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1. EW objectives must be consistent with the C2W objectives of the TFC. Specific EW objectives are to:
 - a. determine and assess enemy capabilities by monitoring the enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum;
 - b. provide immediate threat warning;
 - c. deny an enemy the effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum;
 - d. ensure maximum exploitation of hostile and neutral electromagnetic radiation;
 - e. retain the effective use of one's own electromagnetic equipment in the face of hostile, neutral or friendly electronic countermeasures (ECM) activity; and
 - f. retain the effective use of friendly electromagnetic equipment in the face of hostile intelligence collection.
2. Both enemy and friendly forces will vie to gain dominance by using their full suite of communications, surveillance, target acquisition and weapon systems operating across the electromagnetic spectrum.

3303. COMPONENTS OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1. EW is comprised of the following three basic divisions:
 - a. electronic support measures (ESM);
 - b. ECM; and
 - c. electronic protective measures (EPM).
2. **ESM.** ESM involve actions taken to search for, intercept, identify and locate radiated electromagnetic energy sources with the aim of exploiting such radiation. ESM provide supporting EW information for ECM, EPM, and other actions such as threat detection, warning, avoidance, target acquisition and homing. ESM are passive and can be employed across the spectrum of conflict. In peacetime, they build up an intelligence data base for operations.
3. **ECM.** ECM involve actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's use of electromagnetic energy to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum. ECM operations are either planned (this is the preferred type since ECM operations may adversely affect the activities of nearby friendly forces) or spontaneous. Spontaneous operations should only be conducted when, in the TFC's judgement, they would favourably influence the ongoing operation or are required

to protect essential resources. ECM are sub-divided into the following categories:

- a. **Electronic Jamming.** This countermeasure, which can be carried out from any number of platforms using a wide variety of techniques, consists of the deliberate radiation, re-radiation or reflection of electromagnetic energy, with the aim of impairing the enemy's use of electronic devices, equipment or systems. The control of jamming resources is exercised by the TFC; however, under certain situations, control may be delegated to subordinate commanders. As jamming can cause interference in friendly electronic systems, it must be:
 - (1) authorized by appropriate ROE;
 - (2) fully coordinated with all other operations or offensive actions;
 - (3) fully coordinated with the J2 staff to determine the effects of jamming on intelligence activities; and
 - (4) fully coordinated with the communications staff to avoid self-defeating mutual interference.
 - b. **Electronic Deception.** The deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, absorption or reflection of electromagnetic energy so as to confuse, seduce, distract or reduce the effectiveness of an enemy's electronic systems. It is particularly effective when the enemy relies upon the use of electromagnetic emissions, and when it is fully integrated into the overall operation as part of an overall deception plan. Electronic deception requires detailed planning, coordination and execution as it is vulnerable to detection. It has few of the disadvantages of jamming, but can be very manpower and resource intensive.
 - c. **Electronic Neutralization.** This countermeasure involves the use of electromagnetic energy to temporarily or permanently damage enemy electronic devices. It may occur as a by product of jamming or through the use of directed energy weapons. Coordination of electronic neutralization is the same as for jamming.
4. **EPM.** These measures involve actions taken to ensure effective use by friendly forces of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy's use of electromagnetic energy. EPM are sub-divided as follows:
- a. **Active EPM.** Detectable measures, such as altering transmitter parameters, to ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
 - b. **Passive EPM.** Undetectable measures, such as operating procedures and technical features of equipment, which are meant to ensure effective, friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

3304. PLANNING ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1. EW, as one of the five pillars of C2W, must not operate in a vacuum, void of integration with other C2W activities (see chapter 32 - C2W). As a coordinated C2W effort must be carefully and logically planned, a well defined role for EW must be formulated as early as possible and included in the TFC's EW policy.
2. Control and coordination of EW operations flow from and are a function of the EW policy issued to the TFC by the strategic level commander. The EW policy is implemented by the TFC, and coordinated by the operations staff, in the form of plans, orders and instructions, provides guidance or direction on such matters as the following:
 - a. allocation of EW capabilities and resources;
 - b. responsibilities for the control and coordination of EW capabilities and resources;
 - c. development of EW procedures and techniques; and
 - d. restrictions on the use of ECM.
3. The planning of EW operations is complicated by the need to coordinate the activities of elements which are often functionally different and geographically scattered. EW must, therefore, be integrated into the TFC's operation

plan. The operation plan must provide flexibility for the component commanders to optimize their EW capabilities. Component operation plans provide direction for accomplishing specific EW missions to support the operations plan, and the necessary tasking for subordinate EW units. To this end, the TFC's operation plan should:

- a. identify EW capabilities and resources available and how these are to be employed;
- b. assign tasks commensurate with EW capabilities of the TF elements; and
- c. promulgate procedures and methods for the control and coordination of EW activities.

4. As part of the EW coordination process, critical frequencies must be identified and catalogued by means of the RFL. This list must be held to a minimum and must be continuously evaluated for operational and tactical significance. The RFL is comprised of the following three frequency classifications:

- a. **Taboo Frequencies.** Friendly frequencies on which jamming or other intentional interference is prohibited (e.g., distress, vital communications and early warning air defence radar frequencies). Taboo frequencies are identified by the J3 division of the general staff.
- b. **Protected Frequencies.** Friendly frequencies on which interference must be minimized. The decision to jam these frequencies rests with the commander conducting EW. Protected frequencies are identified by the TFHQ J3 and J6 divisions.
- c. **Guarded Frequencies.** Enemy frequencies used as a source of information and on which jamming is controlled. These frequencies may be jammed if the tactical advantage gained would outweigh the subsequent loss of intelligence. Guarded frequencies are identified by the TFHQ J2 and J6 divisions.

5. In addition to being integrated with C2W efforts, EW operations, EW operations must be coordinated with other operational activities such as air defence and airspace management. This is achieved through close cooperation among the divisions of the general staff and among higher, lower and lateral headquarters. Overall coordination of EW resources and activities is exercised by the EW Coordination Cell (EWCC).

3305. THE ELECTRONIC WARFARE COORDINATION CELL

1. The role of the EWCC is to plan, direct, monitor and coordinate all EW activities on behalf of the TFC. Manning is determined by the overall structure of the TFHQ, and is proportionate to both the scale and nature of the operation and the available EW resources. The EWCC's primary responsibility is the effective and efficient management of EW capabilities and resources. EWCC staff must continually perform the following functions:

- a. collect and process EW information relevant to the conduct of operations;
- b. access the CF EW Operational Support Centre (EWOSC) data base for:
 - (1) the electronic order of battle (EOB),
 - (2) military and civil communications, and
 - (3) EW equipment capabilities and vulnerabilities;
- c. assist intelligence staff to evaluate EW information and draw appropriate conclusions;
- d. coordinate the dissemination of EW information throughout the TF;
- e. provide recommendations to the TFC on the use of EW in response to various measures; and
- f. collate the RFL.

3306. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. The EWCC is a cell within the headquarters and is responsible to the TFC through the J3.
2. EWCCs should be established in all component HQs at a level commensurate with the task. Tactical EWCCs are responsible to the component commanders within the overall command authority of the TFC.

3307. ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTRE

1. The CF use software (s/w) intensive EW systems. To utilize fully these s/w driven systems, operational s/w support is essential. This support should comprise an EW data base, a threat analysis facility, and Environmental operational s/w support through their respective integrated support stations (ISS).




Figure 33-1 Electronic Warfare Operational Support Centre

2. The EWOSC provides the necessary EW operational s/w support. It houses the CF EW data base (CFEWDB), threat analysis facility and the Environmental ISS (see Figure 33-1). Each ISS is under the functional control of and tasked by its respective command. The EWOSC, through the EWCC, provides the following support:

- a. The CFEWDB provides database support for:
 - (1) platform, weapon and emitter location correlation,
 - (2) the EOB,
 - (3) scenario development, and

- (4) a central EW library; and
- b. The threat analysis facility:
 - (1) supports reprogramming of EW equipment by:
 - (a) threat interaction and analysis, and
 - (b) threat vulnerability analysis;
 - (2) supports programming of threat simulators, and
 - (3) provides analysis of threat changes.

CHAPTER 34

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

3401. INTRODUCTION

1. Canada and NATO define Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) as planned psychological activities in peace, crisis and war directed to enemy, friendly and neutral audiences to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. Some knowledge in the fundamentals of human psychology is helpful in the effective planning of PSYOPS.

2. The purpose of PSYOPS is to analyse, and when required, influence the perceptions, emotions, opinions, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of selected individuals or groups with the goal of achieving political or military objectives while preventing the effective use of these activities by an enemy or adversary. PSYOPS are an important component of the political, military and ideological actions that support the attainment of both immediate and long term objectives. PSYOPS tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for understanding and changing the perceptions, emotions, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of selected individuals or specific target groups provide commanders with their primary means of communication with opposing military forces, potential adversary-s and civilian groups.

3. The conduct of PSYOPS is a continuous process and their success or failure is often known only after an operation is executed. When effectively integrated with other operations, PSYOPS contribute significantly to the success of the mission. It is important to note that PSYOPS are not confined to influencing the attitudes and behaviour of enemy troops on the battlefield, but also encompass activities undertaken in times of peace and crisis to support the achievement of national political objectives. Although this chapter is concerned with military psychological operations, it is important that these are consistent with any concurrent psychological activities conducted by non-military agencies; therefore coordination is paramount. It is very important that good liaison is maintained with civilian agencies and OGDs in the AO to avoid conflicting PSYOPS activities. PSYOPS is one of the pillars of Information Operations (IO) and thus must not operate in a vacuum from other IO activities.

4. PSYOPS must be fully integrated with IO and the intelligence cycle to provide the Force protection required by the military force and civilian agencies, across the spectrum of conflict. PSYOPS, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Public Affairs (PA) also create a synergy which is an effective force multiplier to shape public opinions, perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour in support of CF operations and the mission. It is always advantageous to begin operations as early as possible to modify perceptions, emotions, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour away from confrontation, to deter violence and to foster the peaceful resolution of disputes or conflicts. When possible, PSYOPS activities should be initiated prior to the introduction of forces into an AO.

5. The conduct of PSYOPS in domestic operations could include aid of the civil power, counter-terrorist activities or CF assistance in support of provincial or territorial law enforcement agencies, as authorized by Canadian laws. In domestic operations, a primary target audience would be identified with the intent of saving lives and preventing or minimizing injuries and damage to public and private property. PSYOPS would be subject to strict CDS directives and conducted under the principle of transparency. As an example, in the early stages of the 1990 Oka crisis, the CDS sent a Master message approved by the Government: *The CF will not be the first to open fire*. This master message could be interpreted as a PSYOPS message which, in the end, had very positive effects on all parties to defuse and resolve the crisis peacefully. This message would constitute an example of strategic level white propaganda.

6. The remainder of this chapter discusses PSYOPS doctrine in broad terms and also how PSYOPS relate specifically to CF operations. In the planning and conduct of CF PSYOPS, the NATO definitions are used.

3402. PURPOSES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. The four basic objectives of PSYOPS are:

- a. to weaken the will of the enemy or adversary by lowering morale and reducing the efficiency of his force through the creation of doubts, dissidence and disaffection within their ranks (i.e., activities directed at the enemy or potentially hostile target audiences);
 - b. to reinforce the feelings of loyalty (i.e., activities directed at friendly target audiences);
 - c. to gain the support of the uncommitted for TF mission objectives (i.e., activities directed at neutral target audiences); and
 - d. to isolate extremist elements from their support base and disrupt, if not neutralize, their ability and capacity to influence or modify perceptions, opinions, emotions, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour in support of their cause while increasing support for the TF-s mission objectives.
2. Planned psychological activities pursuing any of these four basic objectives may comprise:
- a. dissemination of information, involving primarily the projection of audio, visual and audiovisual messages;
 - b. other actions planned (exclusively or partially) to achieve psychological impact on a target audience and may include:
 - (1) Political/diplomatic actions:
 - (a) statements by leading political figures;
 - (b) UN Security Council, OSCE or North Atlantic Council initiatives;
 - (c) the negotiation of alliances;
 - (d) the breaking or restoration of diplomatic relations;
 - (e) political inducements or coercion within an area of conflict;
 - (f) limitations imposed by political authorities; and
 - (g) legal aspects of domestic and international operations.
 - (2) Economic response options:
 - (a) the imposition of economic sanctions;
 - (b) the imposition of tariffs; and
 - (c) civil aid programmes.
 - (3) Military response options:
 - (a) deployment and show of force;
 - (b) limited combat operations (e.g. raids);
 - (c) military assistance to friendly/neutral nations and military participation in civil aid programmes;
 - (d) restrictive measures within an area of conflict (e.g. curfews); and
 - (e) the actual or threatened application of military force and employment of particular weapons systems

in a manner planned to achieve a psychological impact.

3403. PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. The following principles apply to the conduct of a PSYOPS campaign:
 - a. PSYOPS must support strategic objectives and be conducted in accordance with government policy;
 - b. overall planning and control of PSYOPS must be exercised at the strategic level;
 - c. the purpose of PSYOPS should be understood and supported by commanders at all levels;
 - d. there must be close coordination among all agencies involved in the planning and conduct of PSYOPS;
 - e. the planning and conduct of PSYOPS must be based on thorough research and target analysis, and on accurate and timely intelligence;
 - f. the PSYOPS plan must be developed in conjunction with the IO strategy and complement the overall operation plan;
 - g. PSYOPS should be initiated at the earliest possible time, once resources and an opportunity exist, and closely monitored and amended throughout to ensure the intended effects are achieved; and
 - g . in military operations where the level of threats and risks is low, PSYOPS will be conducted under the principles of truth, verifiability, credibility and unity of effort.

3404. FACTORS AFFECTING A PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CAMPAIGN

1. The following factors affect a PSYOPS campaign planned at the strategic level, controlled at the operational level and executed at the tactical level:
 - a. **Selection of Suitable Target Audiences.** Targeting is defined as the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities. The goal is to obtain from selected target audiences a desired response in support of the TFC=s mission. The three types of target audience are groups (collections of people bound together by common activities and goals); categories (collections of people who share specific demographics such as race, religion, sex or age); and aggregates (collections of people identified by a common geographic area). A target audience analysis is necessary to plan and conduct PSYOPS. Such an analysis requires the designated target audience=s identity, location, conditions, vulnerabilities, susceptibilities and effectiveness. Therefore, PSYOPS will always rely heavily on specialized areas of study, such as social and behavioural intelligence for careful planning. Nonetheless, the scarcity of PSYOPS resources will require careful prioritization of selected target audiences. The following should be considered:
 - (1) policy and legal framework of the intended action against the selected target audience;
 - (2) the vulnerability of a particular audience to a psychological approach. The potential targets of PSYOPS remain various adversarial military groups and factions. Can they be persuaded or influenced?;
 - (3) the ability of that audience to produce a desired response, either by themselves or in other groups; and
 - (4) the accessibility of that audience to various forms of the media available (Internet, TV, radio, films/video, newspapers, leaflets...). A thorough knowledge of the local culture (values, beliefs, customs and traditions) is required so the message is delivered, by appropriate means, to a selected target audience so as to achieve a desired response.
 - b. **Selection and Development of Credible Themes.** A theme is an idea or topic on which a psychological

operation is based. Once a target audience is selected, care must be taken to select corresponding themes which will produce the desired response. Themes must be believable and support the mission, and PSYOPS objectives. Themes (e.g. >mine awareness saves lives within a community=; >freedom of movement, of goods and services improve the quality of life of citizens=...) must urge the target audience to adopt attitudes and behaviour which are realistic and acceptable to this target audience. Themes can be disseminated through leaflets, with each leaflet focusing ideally on one theme so as not to confuse the target audience. If more than one theme is used, they should be closely related to a single task. The examples provided are true and credible themes which can be disseminated by PA, without any chance of compromise.

- c. **Coordination of Operations.** PSYOPS themes will be perceived by target audiences as expressions of national policy or that of the organization leading the operation. Any inconsistency between themes used by political authorities, military forces at various levels of command or civilian agencies, may discredit the mission. Careful coordination of PSYOPS among all organizations and agencies, authorized to conduct such operations, is paramount.
- d. **Timeliness.** Psychological activities conducted at the correct moment will significantly enhance or, if required, minimize the impact of operations on the day-to-day activities of the population. The PSYOPS staff must be able to analyse the enemy or adversary=s psychological situation, identify suitable target audiences, select themes, plan, coordinate and execute operations as the situation develops. This said, PSYOPS, unlike other forms of operations, seldom produce immediate results. Time is required for ideas to mature, or to erode an enemy=s or adversary=s morale, or foster cooperation among former warring factions and hence increase the combat effectiveness of the TF. To be effective, PSYOPS must be initiated at the earliest possible time.
- e. **Results.** Given the delay in achieving results and the dynamic nature of individual or group attitudes and behaviours, PSYOPS activities must be closely monitored throughout and activities modified to ensure selected target audiences and themes remain relevant. PSYOPS activities must include measurements of actual outcomes to determine whether PSYOPS objectives and intended effects are achieved.

2. When conducting PSYOPS, PA must not be compromised and must maintain its credibility and reliability in the eyes of the national and international media, as well as the national and international public. Therefore, PSYOPS messages should be formulated in close cooperation with PA. As specified in the IO doctrine, PA activities allow a TFC to influence an adversary=s or a potential adversary=s perception about the friendly force=s intent, capability and vulnerability. At the same time, PA activities will not be used as a military deception capability or to provide disinformation to either internal or external audiences. PA activities will be consistent with ongoing OPSEC efforts, another pillar of C2W.

3405. CLASSIFICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. Further to Article 3401, PSYOPS fall into four classifications which, in the context of combined warfare, facilitate the division of responsibility among national authorities, host nations and operational commanders. To prevent loss of credibility, coherent planning among all levels of command, including civilian agencies, must permeate PSYOPS. These classifications are known as:

- a. Strategic Psychological Activities (**SPA**);
- b. Psychological Consolidation Activities (**PCA**);
- c. Battlefield Psychological Activities (**BPA**); and
- d. Peace Support Psychological Activities (**PSPA**).

2. **SPA** are Canadian Government planned psychological activities in peace, crisis and war and directed towards friendly, hostile, potentially hostile or neutral audiences. SPA pursue objectives to gain the support and

cooperation of friendly and neutral countries, and to reduce the will and the capacity of hostile or potentially hostile countries to wage war. SPA aim to undermine the adversary=s or a potential adversary=s readiness for conflict, and will to fight, and to reduce his war-making capability while gaining the support and cooperation of neutral and friendly populations. SPA are generally planned at the highest level of government and may be implemented exclusively by civilian agencies. The objectives of SPA are generally long term and political in nature.

3. **PCA** are planned psychological activities in peace, crisis and war directed at the civilian population located in areas under friendly control, to achieve a desired behaviour which supports the military objectives and the operational freedom of the supported commanders. The aim of PCA is to win the cooperation and support of the local population. PCA are normally a national responsibility when military forces are operating in their own country, and are the responsibility of a host nation and the TFC when operating in a theatre of operations within the national boundaries of the host nation. PCA must be in consonance with SPA and conducted in coordination with the TFC.

4. **BPA** are planned psychological activities conducted at the operational and tactical levels as an integral part of combat operations. BPA aim to reduce an enemy or adversary=s combat power by eroding the morale of his leadership and troops, or the willingness of civilians to support his operations. BPA are designed to bring psychological pressure to bear on opposing military forces and civilians under enemy control in the battle area, to assist in the achievement of operational and tactical objectives. BPA, which must be consistent with SPA and PCA, are the responsibility of the TFC and are conducted as a coordinated part of combat operations. BPA are planned initially in peacetime and executed as a component of operations after the commencement of hostilities.

5. **PSPA** are planned psychological activities conducted as an integral part of PSO. They are designed to create a supportive atmosphere and a willingness to cooperate among the adversaries and the local population in an AO, to assist in the achievement of Peace Support mission objectives and to protect the TF. PSPA are the responsibility of the TFC and are planned and conducted to ensure that perceptions are accurate and to promote positive perceptions, emotions, opinions, attitudes and behaviour towards the TF and its mission. PSPA specifically address the problems of rumours, misinformation and disinformation by providing information and messages directly to key communicators and local audiences, without the filter of any local leadership or local media. PSPA are conducted as part of an overarching PSYOPS campaign and are closely coordinated with the activities of CIMIC, PA and all of the aspects of PSO. PSPA objectives could be to:

- a. enhance security and safety;
- b. facilitate orderly peace implementation;
- c. gain civilian adherence to implementation measures;
- d. establish the force as a credible information source;
- e. dissuade interference with operations;
- f. alleviate local population anxieties about operations and expected civil-military end state;
- g. limit the effectiveness of hostile propaganda, disinformation or the impact of other forms of negative information on the achievement of the mission;
- h. curb the development of unreasonable expectations of all ethnic groups in areas of operations;
- i. magnify the positive effect of CIMIC activities; and
- j. reduce accidental injury and death from unexploded munitions/ordnance (UXO).

6. BPA and PSPA conducted by a TFC will not target the international media, friendly nations or forces, or civilian audiences outside the AO. In peace, crisis and war, PSYOPS activities will be conducted in the TFC=s AO, which will include its area of influence and occasionally, portions of the TFC=s area of interest. The latter could

infringe on an adjacent unit's AO. For instance, PSYOPS activities in an area of interest could apply to a municipality or community straddling the boundary separating two units or formations. Therefore, the coordination of PSYOPS activities among adjacent units becomes crucial to unity of purpose and unity of effort at all levels of command.

3406. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ACTIONS

1. Planned psychological activities are categorized functionally as propaganda or other actions planned to have a psychological impact. Each propaganda is categorized by both an apparent source (white, grey or black) and an objective (cohesive or divisive). The definitions of apparent sources of propaganda are as follows:

- a. **White Propaganda.** Propaganda disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency of the sponsor;
- b. **Grey Propaganda.** Propaganda which does not specifically identify any source; and
- c. **Black Propaganda.** Propaganda which purports to emanate from a source other than the true one.

2. A range of other actions may be planned, exclusively or partially, to achieve psychological impact on a particular audience. These actions may include:

- a. political actions such as amnesties for political prisoners and imposition of emergency legislation;
- b. diplomatic actions such as creating alliances and breaking or restoring diplomatic relations;
- c. economic actions such as imposing or lifting economic sanctions, trade tariffs and civil aid programmes; and
- d. military actions such as shows of force, limited combat operations (e.g., raids), military assistance to friendly or neutral nations and military participation in civil aid programmes, and restrictive measures in areas of low intensity conflict (e.g., curfews).

3. While these actions are not the direct responsibility of military PSYOPS agents or units, they must be coordinated with the psychological activities of agents or units supporting the operational commander.

3407. COUNTER PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. The aim of counter PSYOPS is to shield an audience from hostile messages and lessen their impact. In this context, PSYOPS aim to counter information, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour detrimental to the objectives of a CF operation. Any misinformation or disinformation propagated will be exploited by extremist political, paramilitary and military groups to gain public support in support of their own objectives.

2. Counter PSYOPS uses capabilities to analyse an enemy or adversary's propaganda and its effect on friendly populations and friendly forces. Analysis of propaganda sources (white, grey and black), content, intended audience, media selection and effectiveness are done using subjective or objective methods:

- a. **Subjective Methods.** These methods are based on the background, experience and judgement of the analyst or specialist; and
- b. **Objective Methods.** These methods employ classification systems and statistical databases over a period of time. Staffs must therefore streamline and coordinate their data collection and data processing activities to prevent duplication of effort and wastage of resources. Network connectivity of information systems at the strategic level is the responsibility of NDHQ/J6. CIS support and connectivity at the TFHQ is planned and coordinated by the TF/J6.

3. Counter PSYOPS methods in peace, crisis and war rely on the critical collection of information pertaining to an enemy or adversary's intentions. These intentions are the focus of the TFC's >Priority Intelligence

Requirements=. Themes are identified and techniques are employed to counter the effect of propaganda. Themes selected for this purpose aim to reduce the enemy=s or adversary=s real or potential prestige and status, counter the effects of his propaganda and inform audiences about the TF=s intentions and measures, so as to prevent or minimize civilian interference with the orderly conduct of military operations. The TFC=s direction and close coordination of PSYOPS, PA and information passed on to the TF remain critical to the employment of effective counter PSYOPS techniques. In the course of their daily activities, CF members and liaison officers should expect questions by civil authorities and the populace on the TF mission and mission objectives.

3408. THE CANADIAN FORCES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. PSYOPS shall not be conducted in peace, crisis or war unless approved by the CDS. PSYOPS shall be authorized within the approved AO, to include the area of interest to a TFC. Once a military operation is launched, concurrent PSYOPS can be planned, conducted, executed and coordinated at all three levels simultaneously, within directives and limitations issued by the CDS. Coherence between the political and military messages is paramount to achieving the mission.
2. CF planners at all levels must understand the potential of PSYOPS and selected CF personnel should be qualified as specialists in the planning and application of PSYOPS.
3. Any information or intelligence gathering in support of domestic and international operations involving PSYOPS, may only be conducted within the constraints of Canadian laws and policy. It is therefore paramount that friendly forces have an understanding and an appropriate level of training of the TF PSYOPS program, objectives and current themes.

3409. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. When the CF must conduct PSYOPS to support a military operation, the CDS will authorise the policy and guidance for use by the TFC through the national Information Operations Coordination Cell (IOCC) within the J staff. The CDS may also assign specialist staff officers to the TFC as required.
2. At the operational level, the TFHQ staff is responsible to the TFC for integrating PSYOPS into the IO activities of their operations. The implementation of PCA, BPA and PSPA are the responsibility of the TFC. The TFC may also be involved in the implementation of SPA. The J3 staff would supervise PSYOPS, in close coordination with PA and J5 CIMIC, through the TFHQ IOCC. The TFHQ IOCC should include as a minimum, members from the J3 Division, J2 Division and specialist staff including PA, PSYOPS and J5 CIMIC officers.
3. At the tactical level, PSYOPS units or teams will conduct PSYOPS activities as authorized by the chain of command, within the CDS guidelines.

3410. CANADIAN FORCES PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES

1. The CF has no dedicated PSYOPS capabilities. However, the CF may, on an ad-hoc basis, generate a PSYOPS capability to support operations. As required, selected personnel will undergo PSYOPS training should there be a requirement to plan for or use PSYOPS. A list of CF personnel trained in PSYOPS is maintained by COS J3 staff.
2. In considering the generation of a PSYOPS capability, the Task Force TO&E would detail the personnel, individual and collective training, and equipment required to provide all or some of the following capabilities:
 - a. command, control, communications and information systems (C³IS);
 - b. research and analysis, and propaganda production;
 - c. intelligence/military information and military police resources with access to >Internet= and >Interpol=, in light of criminal activities prevalent in an AO;
 - d. access to radio, television and film/video productions, including a broadcast capability;

- e. graphic production;
- f. newspaper/leaflet publication;
- g. printing capability;
- h. loudspeaker teams;
- i. man-portable loudspeaker systems to address large crowds or groups spread over large areas;
- j. combat camera cell, both for civilian police (CIVPOL) and the military, in domestic and international operations;
- k. audio-visual teams;
- l. language proficiency/ethnic background among PSYOPS teams deployed in the AO;
- m. interpreters and translators, as required; and
- n. combat service support resources.

3. Effective PSYOPS TTPs enhance Force protection and the security of individuals and material in an AO. These TTPs will help modify attitudes and behaviours in support of the TF political and military objectives. PSYOPS will be most effective, as a force multiplier, when employed with PA, whose function it is to help bridge cultural differences, and CIMIC. The use of all available means of disseminating credible and factual information, including the troops in direct contact with the local population, such as in the case of foot patrols, must be exploited by the TFC to enhance the combat effectiveness of the TF.

CHAPTER 35

METEOROLOGY AND OCEANOGRAPHY SUPPORT

3501. INTRODUCTION

1. During military operations, accurate, timely and reliable Meteorology and/or Oceanography (Met Oc) information can provide the commander with the knowledge necessary to anticipate and exploit the best window of opportunity to plan, execute, support and sustain specific operations. Exploiting Met Oc information to optimize employment of sensors, weapons, logistics, equipment and personnel and, to assess hostile forces' limitations is key to successful military operations. Likewise, military operations can be made needlessly difficult by failing to consider the effects of Met Oc conditions. A thorough knowledge of weather, and an ability to exploit this understanding, enhances tactical effectiveness, efficiency and safety of military forces.

2. This chapter provides the basic doctrine, roles and planning considerations to describe how Met Oc resources should be employed in support of joint operations.

3502. OBJECTIVE OF METEOROLOGY AND OCEANOGRAPHY SUPPORT

1. Met Oc personnel provide tailored information on the climatological (historical), current and forecast conditions of the atmosphere, ocean and land environments within or through which military forces, both friendly and hostile, operate. Met Oc resources operate as an integral part of the joint force. Their most important function is to provide the commander and subordinate forces with an environmental characterization of the theatre of operations. This information can enhance mission effectiveness through optimum employment of resources and by leveraging the limitations of hostile forces that may result from environmental factors.

3503. PRINCIPLES OF METEOROLOGY AND OCEANOGRAPHY SUPPORT

1. The following principles must be considered for the provision of Met Oc support:

- a. **Timeliness.** Met Oc operations are only effective when users receive accurate Met Oc information in time to consider its impact within their decision making cycle. The rapidly changing nature of the air and ocean environments makes Met Oc data extremely perishable. Therefore, effective environmental support to joint operations is dependent upon timely and reliable communications that allow for the rapid transfer and refresh rate of Met Oc data to all deployed forces.
- b. **Accuracy.** Operators depend on accurate Met Oc information to plan and conduct their operations. The capability to collect data within the area of interest with sufficient spatial and temporal coverage to model and forecast the Met Oc conditions along with the perishable nature of Met Oc data will affect accuracy. The impact these factors have on forecast accuracy should be explained to enable operators to weigh these factors when making weather sensitive operational decisions.
- c. **Relevance.** Each operation requires tailored Met Oc information so that the user can quickly identify and apply relevant information without additional analysis or manipulation. Meeting this principle requires users to define specific requirements for conciseness, content, format, medium and frequency of delivery.
- d. **Consistency (“One Area, One Forecast” Concept).** Met Oc products and services consistency is essential. Consistency is achieved through the “One Area, One Forecast” concept whereby operational planning is based on a common official forecast. It is expected that the component tactical level forecast may take various forms because of a difference in mission focus. However, Met Oc personnel will use the official forecast as a starting point and fuse in situ data to produce tailored mission specific products.
- e. **Telecommunications.** The perishable nature of environmental data, particularly meteorological data, makes timely data manipulation key to effective Met Oc support. Telecommunication of Met Oc information should be designed to fulfil the data collection, storage, retrieval and dissemination efforts of the Met Oc forces at all levels. To the maximum extent possible, common CIS systems should be used

to conduct Met Oc operations. Close coordination between the Met Oc and J6 staffs is required to ensure Met Oc telecommunication requirements are addressed.

- f. **Information Control.** Implementing meteorology (METCON), oceanography (OCCON) and/or ice (ICECON) information control procedures may be required to deny unauthorized use of operationally sensitive environmental information without prejudice to friendly operations.
- g. **Readiness.** Met Oc forces, data bases, products and equipment must be responsive to the requirements of operators. Communications equipment will be interoperable with joint and component capabilities.
- h. **Effectiveness.** Effectiveness requires Met Oc organizations at all levels to be fully integrated in the planning and execution of operations and to use client feedback to continually improve their overall effectiveness.
- i. **Centralized Coordination, Decentralized Execution.** The execution of Met Oc tasks requires careful control and coordination of personnel, equipment and materiel. The most efficient use of scarce resources is generally achieved through centralized coordination at the highest practical level, with execution delegated to the lowest practical level.

3504. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The provision of Met Oc support to operations is a command responsibility at each level of command.
2. At the strategic level, the Director Meteorology and Oceanography (D Met Oc) at NDHQ is ultimately responsible for ensuring the provision of adequate Met Oc support to operations. D Met Oc on behalf of the CDS is responsible for developing and executing Met Oc concept of operations, identifying information requirements and ensuring unity of effort.
3. At the operational level, Formation HQ Met Oc OPIs are ultimately responsible for assembling, organizing and tasking the resources required to support operations. The Met Oc OPIs are best positioned to develop the details of the required Met Oc support given their proximity to the operations planners. Formation Met Oc OPIs consists of:
 - a. OIC Met Oc Operations Support Centre Pacific, Esquimalt;
 - b. SSO Met Oc MARLANT, Halifax;
 - c. Army Meteorology Officer, Combat Training Centre, Gagetown (for NDHQ DLFR); and
 - d. A3 Meteorology, 1 CAD, Winnipeg.
4. The Canadian Forces Weather and Oceanography Services Advisory Committee (CFWOS AC) consists of D Met Oc representatives and the Formation Met Oc OPIs and serves as the focal point for Met Oc support to the CF. When planning is initiated for an operation, especially a joint operation where the required Met Oc resources are beyond the capability of a single command to provide, the CFWOS AC can assist the Joint Met Oc Coordination Officer by focusing the experience, expertise and technical capabilities of the Met Oc community to support the operation being planned.
5. When required, a Joint Met Oc Coordination Officer (J Met Oc Coord O) will be identified to serve as the focal point for the coordination of Met Oc support for a specific operation. In all phases of the operation planning process, the J Met Oc Coord O will work with planners to ensure the appropriate mix of Met Oc resources are identified for the operation. The J Met Oc Coord O responsibilities are as follows:
 - a. Ensure Met Oc capabilities, considerations and requirements are included in the operation plan including the provision of Met Oc inputs to the development of functional annexes such as intelligence, operations, command and control and CIS;
 - b. Assist planners at all levels understanding the state of the Met Oc environment in which the operation will take place;

- c. Ensure that all available Met Oc information and systems, as well as allies and indigenous assets and data, are properly considered and made available;
- d. Identify Met Oc requirements from all joint force components, establish Met Oc product requirements and coordinate Met Oc support services for the joint force;
- e. Formulate a concept of Met Oc operations which supports the overall concept of operations;
- f. Generate the joint force Met Oc staff and equipment;
- g. Ensure the widest dissemination of Met Oc operations information, ideally, through the use of network homepage technologies;
- h. Consistent with the scope and mission of the joint force, recommend the establishment and location of the Joint Met Oc Forecast Unit (JMFU); and
- i. Actively monitor and evaluate the planning and execution of the operation.

6. If required, Environment Canada's Weather Services Centres at 19 Wing Comox, 8 Wing Trenton, 14 Wing Greenwood and in Halifax could be tasked with Joint Met Oc Forecast Unit (JMFU) responsibilities. An invaluable aspect of the JMFU is the ability to fuse Met Oc information from several sources with operational and tactical information from the joint force into a coherent Met Oc picture and provide a comprehensive suite of customer tailored products. Under the direction and guidance of the Joint Met Oc Coordination Officer, the JMFU develops, integrates and maintains the theatre operational database including the "official theatre forecast" from which tailored mission specific products are produced.

3505. PLANNING METEOROLOGY AND OCEANOGRAPHY SUPPORT

1. Proper planning permits a systemic examination of all Met Oc aspects of an operation and ensures critical requirements are met. The work of the J Met Oc Coord O should focus on two distinct tasks which must be accomplished concurrently throughout the operation planning process sequence. The two tasks consist of developing the framework for Met Oc support in theatre and, identify key Met Oc impact factors and integrate them into the planning process.
2. During the *initiation phase*, the Met Oc planner should gather broad operation characteristics such as likely area of operations/interest and time scales. He should also identify key Met Oc impact factors to be integrated into the Commander's Planning Guidance and the Intelligence Estimate and to be considered during the mission analysis process. At this early stage, Maritime Rapid Environmental Assessment (Maritime REA), if required, should focus on Category 1 activities (assessment activities performed from outside the AOI) such as archive searches and remote sensing.
3. In the *orientation phase*, focus is on determining the broad requirements, assessing the available Met Oc support, initiate support for immediate requirements and provide products and advice to the planning process. Liaison with nations involved to check national support plan and first coordination should be started. The requirement for subsequent categories of REA, particularly those requiring assets in theatre, should be identified from comparing the outcome of Category 1 REA with the operational requirement (gap analysis). When implemented, the location and manning of the REA fusion and command centres requires attention and coordination. At the same time, the critical Met Oc impact factors, including preliminary results of an REA program, have to be reviewed in more detail and their effect on the planning of the operation considered.
4. In the *course of action development phase*, the Met Oc support planner should develop a framework for Met Oc support to the operation, while taking into consideration the basic principles for Met Oc support. The requirement for a dedicated REA operation should also be established. Climatological data, especially critical Met Oc factors should be verified and impact factors refined and provided to planners.
5. During the *plan development phase*, the Met Oc support planner should review the mission characteristics in more details and analyse those operations which may experience a major impact from Met Oc factors. Key mission characteristics that need to be examined include the mission, the order of battle and disposition of the TF, the areas of

operations and interest, an estimate of the anticipated duration of the operation, the availability of Met Oc support from allies and through HNS agreements and, the extent and availability of the CIS infrastructure in the area of operations. The Met Oc support plan must be fully defined, using outputs from the previous planning phases while ensuring that the support plan is fully integrated with the overall plan. Note that Met Oc issues may also need to be addressed within other functional annexes (intelligence, operations, CIS, etc), and this can only be achieved by full integration with the planning team. The following aspects should be addressed by the Met Oc support plan:

- a. Definition of the scope and intent of Met Oc support along with a statement of the mission critical Met Oc parameters that may influence operations and the probability of their occurrence;
 - b. Planning assumptions, constraints and restraints that affect the Met Oc support plan;
 - c. Met Oc support mission statement and operation objectives;
 - d. Concept of support, defining the overall organization, manning, equipment and product requirements;
 - e. Taskings allocated to subordinate commands, assigned Met Oc units and assets for the provision of products and resources;
 - f. Responsibilities, defining roles of the key players involved;
 - g. Coordinating instructions, which concern arrangements for forecast coordination and coordinated production and exchange of Met Oc information;
 - h. Service support, describing in broad terms how Met Oc forces will be sustained logistically and administratively; and
 - i. Command and control, indicating the channels for controlling Met Oc operations and a brief description of strategic and tactical communications architectures that will be developed to support Met Oc data transmission and information flow. Instructions for denying Met Oc data and information to the enemy through implementation of METCON, OCCON and/or ICECON procedures should also be included as required.
6. Both during the planning and execution phase of the operation, Met Oc support arrangements must be adaptive to changes in concepts of operations, requirements and capabilities. Met Oc planners should closely monitor developments in the mission or scope of the operation, anticipate changes in operator requirements and assess impacts on Met Oc support.

3506. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MET OC SUPPORT

1. Although Met Oc support staff and resources are normally part of the Operations (J-3) staff, the Task Force commander may organize them as necessary to best support the mission.

ANNEX A
AMPLIFYING PUBLICATIONS

APPROVED

- B-GG-005-004/AF-004 Force Employment
- B-GG-005-004/AF-005 Use of Force in CF Operations
- B-GG-005-004/AF-007 Communications and Information Systems
- B-GG-005-004/AF-008 Intelligence
- B-GG-005-004/AF-010 Information Operations
- B-GG-005-004/AF-013 Logistics Doctrine for CF Operations
- B-GG-005-004/AF-014 Movement
- B-GG-005-004/AF-015 Military Engineer Support to CF Operations
- B-GG-005-004/AF-023 Civil-Military Cooperation

IN PROGRESS

- B-GG-005-004/AF-011 Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence
- B-GG-005-004/AF-017 Medical Support to CF Operations
- B-GG-005-004/AF-021 Peace Support Operations
- B-GG-005-004/AF-019 Domestic Operations

B-GG-005-004/AF-000

NOT YET WRITTEN

B-GG-005-004/AF-001 Glossary of CF Military and Related Terms

B-GG-005-004/AF-002 Command and Control of CF Operations

B-GG-005-004/AF-003 Task Force Organization

B-GG-005-004/AF-006 Training and Exercises

B-GG-005-004/AF-009 Security

B-GG-005-004/AF-012 Airspace Coordination and Control

B-GG-005-004/AF-016 Personnel Support to Operations

B-GG-005-004/AF-018 Public Affairs

B-GG-005-004/AF-022 Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

B-GG-005-004/AF-024 Psychological Operations

B-GG-005-004/AF-025 Space Operations

GLOSSARY

Administration (AAP-6)

The management and execution of all military matters not included in tactics and strategy; primarily in the fields of logistics and personnel management.

Administrative Control (AAP-6)

Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.

Aid of the Civil Power (NDA)

Armed assistance by the CF provided to provincial authorities following an appropriate request in any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace is beyond the powers of civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with.

Airspace Control (AAP-6)

A service provided in the combat zone to increase operational effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient and flexible use of airspace. Airspace control is provided in order to permit greater flexibility of operations, while authority to approve or deny combat operations is vested only in the operational commander.

Airspace Control Area (AAP-6)

Airspace which is laterally defined by the boundaries of the area of operations. The airspace control area may be subdivided into airspace control sub-areas.

Airspace Control Authority (AAP-6)

The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area.

Airspace Control System (AAP-6)

An arrangement of those organizations, personnel, policies, procedures and facilities required to perform airspace control functions.

Alliance (FM100-5 modified)

The result of formal agreements between two or more sovereign nations for broad, long term objectives.

Area of Influence (AAP-6)

A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by manoeuvre or fire support systems normally under his command and control.

Area of Intelligence Interest (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

That area concerning which a commander requires intelligence on those factors and developments likely to affect the outcome of his current or future operations.

Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AAP-6)

An area allocated to a commander in which he is responsible for the provision of intelligence within the means at his disposal.

Area of Interest (AAP-6)

That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations, and areas occupied by the enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.

Area of Operations (AAP-6)

That portion of an area of war necessary for military operations and for the administration of such operations.

GLOSSARY (Cont)

Assigned Forces (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

Forces in being that have been placed in an organization, or under the command authority of a commander, where such placement is relatively permanent.

Attached Forces (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

Forces in being that have been placed in an organization, or under the command authority of a commander, where such placement is relatively temporary.

Campaign (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

A series of military operations in one theatre of operations designed to achieve a specific strategic objective.

Campaign Plan (US Joint Pub 1-02)

A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a specific strategic objective, normally within a given time and space.

Canadian Forces (NDA)

The Armed Forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consisting of one Service called the Canadian Armed Forces.

Canadian Forces Operation (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

The deployment of an element or elements of the CF to perform a specific mission.

Capability (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

The state of having sufficient power, skills and ability to carry out a military activity or operation.

Capability-Based Planning (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

A planning process for the development of force employment options for contingency operations based on current force structures and strengths.

Capacity (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

The ability to execute a military activity or operation.

Chain of Command (AAP-6)

The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised.

Civil-Military Cooperation (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

All actions and measures undertaken by a military commander which concern the relationship between a military force and the government, civil agencies or civilian population in the areas where the military force is stationed or employed.

Coalition (FM 100-5 modified)

An ad hoc agreement between two or more sovereign nations for a common action.

Coalition Commander (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

A commander authorized to exercise operational command or operational control over a coalition of forces.

Combined (AAP-6)

An adjective that connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. *See also joint.*

Command (AAP-6)

The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces.

Command and Control Warfare (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

GLOSSARY (Cont)

The integrated use of all military capabilities including OPSEC, deception, PSYOPS, EW and physical destruction, supported by all source intelligence and CIS, to influence, degrade, destroy or deny information to an adversary's C2 capabilities while protecting our own against similar actions.

Command, Control and Information System (AAP-6)

An integrated system comprised of doctrine, procedures, organizational structure, personnel, equipment facilities and communications which provides authorities at all levels with timely and adequate data to plan, direct, and control their activities.

Communications and Information System (AAP-6)

The assembly of equipment, methods and procedures, and if necessary personnel, organized so as to accomplish specific information conveyance and processing functions.

Component Command (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

A subordinate command of a task force consisting of the commander and all individuals, units, detachments, organizations and installations that have been placed under the command, by the authority establishing the component command.

Concept (AAP-6)

A notion or statement of an idea, expressing how something might be done or accomplished, that may lead to an accepted procedure.

Concept of Operations (AAP-6)

A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his mission.

Conflict (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

A struggle or clash between alliances, individual states or factions within a state to achieve political objectives. When military force is used, the conflict becomes an armed conflict.

Contingency (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

An unforecasted or chance situation which may require a military response.

Contingency Operation Plan (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

An operation plan for contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated in a specific geographic area.

Contingency Planning (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

A process which takes account of contingencies by preparing likely courses of action to deal with a range of potential incidents or situations in specific geographical areas.

Control (AAP-6)

That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directions. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

Coordinating Authority (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services, or two or more subordinate elements of the same Service. It includes the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but not to compel agreement. Matters are referred to appropriate higher authority in cases of disagreement that cannot be resolved through discussion.

Course of Action (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

GLOSSARY (Cont)

A option that would accomplish or is related to the accomplishment of a mission.

Crisis (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

An incident or situation involving a threat to Canada, its territories, citizens, military forces and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political or military importance that commitment of Canadian military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.

Delegation of Authority (AAP-6)

The action by which a commander assigns part of his authority commensurate with the assigned task to a subordinate commander. While ultimate responsibility cannot be relinquished, delegation of authority carries with it the imposition of a measure of responsibility. The extent of the authority delegated must be clearly stated.

Demining (AAP-19)

Activities to remove the hazard of all mines and unexploded munitions from a defined area.

Directive (AAP-6)

- (1) A military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered.
- (2) A plan issued with a view to putting it into effect when so directed, or in the event that a stated contingency arises.
- (3) Broadly speaking, any communication which initiates or governs action, conduct or procedure.

Doctrine (AAP-6)

Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.

Domestic Operations (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

CF activities to provide assistance during civil emergencies, support national development goals or support and/or restore the maintenance of public order and security.

Emergencies Act (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

An act to authorize the Governor in Council to issue a proclamation declaring one of the following national emergencies:

- (a) public welfare emergency;
- (b) public order emergency;
- (c) international emergency; or
- (d) war emergency.

Upon declaring one of these emergencies, the Governor in Council is empowered to pass regulations in specified areas so as to enable the taking of special temporary measures necessary to deal with the national emergency.

Full Command (AAP-6)

The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national Services. The term command, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. It follows that no alliance or coalition commander has full command over the forces assigned to him. This is

GLOSSARY (Cont)

because nations, in assigning forces to an alliance or coalition, assign only operational command or operational control.

Host-Nation Support (AAP-6)

Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peace, times of crisis or armed conflict based upon agreements mutually concluded between nations.

Intensity (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

The level of effort assigned in support of a commitment commensurate with its overall importance.

Joint

An adjective that connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate. (When all services are not involved, the participating services shall be identified).
See also combined.

Levels of Force (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

Directions issued by competent military authority for the application of military force in the enforcement of national laws and legally binding resolutions and decisions, in ascending order of severity, against any individuals or objects that pose a threat, although not a traditional military threat.

Military Strategy (AAP-6)

That component of national or multi-national strategy that presents the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations.

National Command (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

A command that is organized by and functions under the authority of a specific nation. It may or may not be placed under an alliance or coalition commander.

National Commander (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

A commander who has national responsibilities. For large scale commitments of CF elements, the national commander will not normally be part of the alliance or coalition chain of command, but will represent national interests and concerns to the coalition commander. For smaller scale operations, the national commander may be part of the chain of command.

National Emergency (R.S.C. 1985 c E-4.5)

An urgent and critical situation of a temporary nature that

- (a) seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal with it, or
- (b) seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada.

Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence (NDHQ Policy Directive P6/93)

The process and functions that enable general purpose, combat capable forces to survive and operate in a NBC environment. It entails the methods, plans and procedures involved in establishing and exercising defensive measures against the effects of an attack utilizing NBC weapons. Further, it encompasses both the training for and the implementation of these methods, plans and procedures.

Operational Art (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

The skill of employing military forces to attain strategic objectives in a theatre of war or theatre of operations through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations.

Operational Command (AAP-6)

GLOSSARY (Cont)

The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. OPCOM may also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.

Operational Control (AAP-6)

The authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

Operational Level of War (US Joint Pub 1-02)

The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.

Operational Personnel Management (HQDP 101)

The distribution of effective manpower in accordance with operational priority.

Operation Planning Process (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

A coordinated staff process used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission.

Peace Enforcement (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

Military operations to restore peace or to establish specified conditions in an area of conflict or tension where the parties may not consent to intervention and may be engaged in combat activities.

Peacebuilding (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

Post-conflict actions in the aftermath of international conflict or civil strife to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Peacekeeping (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

The prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states through an impartial third-party intervention organized and directed internationally for restoring and maintaining peace.

This is conducted using military forces, police and civilians and usually with the consent of the main belligerents.

Peacemaking (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

The process of resolving disputes that could lead to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation or other forms of peaceful settlement.

Preventative Diplomacy (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

Action taken to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

Propaganda (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

Any information, ideas, doctrine or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly.

Psychological Operations (AAP-6)

GLOSSARY (Cont)

Planned psychological activities in peace and war directed to enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. They include strategic psychological activities, psychological consolidation activities, and battlefield psychological activities.

Public Affairs (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

The ongoing effort to establish a public understanding of Armed Forces' policies and actions in support of the government by providing timely and accurate information to national and international media and other target audiences.

Public Order Emergency (R.S.C. 1985 c E-4.5)

An emergency that arises from threats to the security of Canada and that is so serious as to be a national emergency.

Public Welfare Emergency (R.S.C. 1985 c E-4.5)

An emergency that is caused by a real or imminent

- (a) fire, flood, draught, storm, earthquake or other natural phenomenon,
- (b) disease in human beings, animals or plants, or
- (c) accident or pollution

and that results or may result in a danger to life or property, social disruption or a breakdown in the flow of essential goods, services or resources so serious as to be a national emergency.

Reach (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

The range to which forces can be massed and employed decisively.

Residual responsibility (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

When forces are assigned from an Environmental command to an operational level force, a level of responsibility less than Full Command will remain with the Environmental commander (designated a supporting commander of the forces assigned from him to the TFC). The authority which the TFC exercises over the TF represents a portion of Full Command, while the responsibilities retained by the supporting commander and other agencies are collectively referred to as residual responsibilities. Residual responsibility plus the authority and responsibility that has been transferred to the TFC equals Full Command.

Rules of Engagement (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

Directions issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations within which armed force may be applied to achieve military objectives in furtherance of national policy.

Strategic Level of War (US Joint Pub 1-02)

The level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives.

Strategic Mobility (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

The capability to move forces and their associated logistic support effectively and when practical, efficiently, and can be between theatres (inter-theatre), or between regions (inter-regional) and out of area.

Strategic Reserve (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

GLOSSARY (Cont)

A reinforcing reserve of personnel and material that is not committed in advance to a specific operation but that can be deployed to a theatre or area of operations for a mission decided at the time by the strategic level commander.

Support (AAP-6)

The action of a force, or portion thereof, which aids, protects, complements, or sustains any other force.

Supported Commander (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of an operation.

Supporting Commander (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

A commander who provides forces and other support to a supported commander.

Supporting Plan (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

A stand-alone planning document that supports another plan by providing specific and detailed direction and information on a particular aspect of that plan.

Sustainment (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

The requirement for a military force to maintain its operational capability for the duration required to achieve its objectives. Sustainment consists of the continued supply of consumables, and the replacement of combat losses and non-combat attrition of equipment and personnel.

Synchronization (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

The arrangement of military actions in time, space and purpose to produce maximum combat power at a decisive place and time.

Tactical Command (AAP-6)

The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

Tactical Control (AAP-6)

The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvre necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

Tactical Level of War (US Joint Pub 1-02)

The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.

Task (B-GL-303-002/JX-Z03)

An activity which contributes to the achievement of a mission.

Task Force (AAP-6)

A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission.

Technical Control (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

The control applied largely to administrative or technical procedures and exercised by virtue of professional or technical jurisdiction. It parallels command channels but is restricted to control within certain specialized areas such as legal, medical or communications. Operational commanders may override this type of control any time its application is seen to jeopardize the mission or the military force.

Theatre of Operations (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

That area within a theatre of war within which operations are directed toward a common strategic objective.

GLOSSARY (Cont)**Theatre of War** (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

The continental territory, including adjoining sea areas and corresponding air space, in which a war is conducted. Operations in a theatre of war are invariably joint and usually combined. A theatre of war normally comprises several theatres of operations.

Transfer of Command Authority (B-GG-005-004/AF-000)

The formal transfer of a specified degree of authority over forces assigned to an operation between commanders of supporting commands and the supported commander.

Note:

AAP-1	NATO Glossary
NDA	National Defence Act
R.S.C. 1985 c E-4.5	Emergencies Act
NDHQ Policy Directive P6/93	CF NBC Defence Policy
HQDP 101	CF Emergency Personnel Support Plan

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used in this publication. The bracketed figure indicates the chapter of first use.

ABCA	America, Britain, Canada, Australia (24)	C2IS	command, control and information system (9)
ACA	Airspace Control Authority (25)	C2W	command and control warfare (Pref)
ACC	Air Component Commanders (17)	C3CM	command control and communications counter measures (32)
ACC	airspace-control centre (25)		
ACE	Allied Command Europe (8)	C3IS	command, control, communications and information systems (1)
ACINT	Acoustic Intelligence (20)	CAO	chief administrative officer (9)
ACLANT	Allied Command Atlantic (8)	CAX	Computer Assisted Exercise (6)
ACM	airspace-control means (25)	CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff (Fwd)
ACO	airspace-control orders (25)	CF	Canadian Forces (Fwd)
ACP	airspace-control plan (25)	CFA	Canadian Forces Attachés (12)
ACP	Aid of the Civil Power (Pref)	CFC	combined force commander(8)
ACS	Airspace Control System (25)	CFDB	CF Doctrine Board (Fwd)
ADC	air-defence commander (25)	CFDS	CF Dental Service (18)
ADCC	air-defence control centre (25)	CFEWDB	CF EW data base (33)
AEW	Airborne Early Warning (8)	CFMCU	Canadian Forces Movement Control Unit (27)
AFC	Armed Forces Council (1)	CFMG	CF Medical Group (19)
ASCC	Air Standardization Co-ordinating Committee (17)	CFMS	CF Medical Service (18)
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System (32)	CFOO	CF Organization Order (12)
BDZ	base-defence zones (25)	CFSF	CF Special Force (18)
BMD	Battlefield Munitions Disposal (23)	CI	counter intelligence (21)
BPA	Battlefield Psychological Activities (34)	CIMIC	civil-military cooperation (Pref)
BTWC	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (24)	CIS	communications and information systems (Pref)
C2	command and control (Fwd)	CL	coordination levels (25)
CMO	civil-military operations (30)	CMG	Canadian Medical Group (19)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (Cont)

CMOC	civilian-military operations centre (30)	DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (9)
CMPSR	Canadian Military Police Support Regiment (21)	DFO	Department of Fisheries and Oceans (16)
CMX	Crisis Management Exercise (6)	DGHS	Director General of Health Services (18)
CNC	Canadian national commander (1)	DI PoI	Directorate of International Policy (9)
COLPRO	collective protection (24)	DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorization (16)
COMINT	communications intelligence (20)	DISO	Defence Information Services Organization (31)
COO	concept of operations (1)	DM	Deputy Minister (Fwd)
COP	contingency operation plan (4)	DMC	Defence Management Committee (1)
COS	chief of staff (2)	DOCINT	Documentary Intelligence (20)
Counter C3	counter command control and communications (32)	DPC	Defence Planning Committee (8)
CPA	Consolidated Psychological Activities (34)	DPMS	Defence Program Management System (4)
CPX	Command Post Exercise (6)	DPQ	Defence Planning Questionnaire (8)
CSG	Canadian Support Group (1)	DSU	Direct Support Unit (27)
CSO	Committee of Senior Officials (8)	EAA	evacuee assembly areas (10)
CSS	Combat Service Support (27)	ECM	electronic countermeasures (33)
CT	Counter-Terrorism (21)	ECS	Environmental Chiefs of Staff (Fwd)
CUSRPG	Canada-United States Regional Planning Group (8)	EEF	essential elements of friendly intelligence (21)
D Dent Svcs	Director Dental Services (19)	EHC	evacuee handling centre (10)
DC	Defence Council (1)	ELIINT	electronic intelligence (20)
DPG	Defence Planning Guidance (6)	EMIS	Establishment Management Information System (18)
DEB	Departmental Emergency Books (1)	EOB	electronic order of battle (33)
DEM	Daily Executive Meeting (1)	EP	evacuation point (10)
EPC	Emergency Preparedness Canada (1)	EPM	electronic protective measures (33)
		ESM	electronic support measures (33)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (Cont)

ESU	Engineer Support Unit (23)	IMS	International Military Staff (8)
EW	electronic warfare (Pref)	IPCRC	Interdepartmental Program Coordination and Review Committee (16)
EWCC	EW Coordination Cell (33)	IPDS	Integrated Personnel Data System (18)
EWOSC	EW Operational Support Centre (33)	IPE	individual protective equipment (24)
FACC	Forward Air Control Centre (25)	IPR	Isolated Personnel Report (17)
FMB	forward mounting base (10)	ISS	integrated support stations (33)
FOB	forward operating bases (10)	ISS	Information Systems Security (31)
FoIS	foreign intelligence services (21)	IT	information technology (1)
FP	Force protection (21)	IW	information warfare (1)
GEB	Government Emergency Book (1)	J Staff	Joint Staff (Pref)
GEOC	Government Emergency Operations Coordination (1)	JMETL	Joint Mission Essential Task List (6)
HNS	host-nation support (7)	JSAT	Joint Staff Action Team (1)
HQ 1 Cdn Div	Headquarters 1 Canadian Division (7)	JTL	Joint Task List (6)
HQDP	Headquarters Defence Plan (18)	LLR	low level ionizing radiation (24)
HSS	Health Services Support (18)	LOC	lines of communications (2)
HUMINT	Human Intelligence (20)	LOF	level of force (5)
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization (17)	MC	Military Committee (8)
ICSR	Interdepartmental Committee on Search and Rescue (17)	MNC	Major NATO commanders (8)
IFF	identification friend or foe (25)	MND	Minister of National Defence (Fwd)
ILOC	Integrated Lines of Communication (28)	MOU	memoranda (memorandum) of understanding (5)
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence (20)	MRSC	Marine Rescue Sub-Centres (17)
IMPLO	implementation order (4)	MSC	Major subordinate commanders (8)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Pref)	NAC	North Atlantic Council (8)
		NBC	nuclear, biological and chemical (Pref)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (Cont)

NCCIS	National Command and Control Information System (31)	OPM	Operational Personnel Management (18)
NDA	National Defence Act (Fwd)	OPP	operation-planning process (Pref)
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters (Pref)	OPSEC	operations security (3)
NDIC	National Defence Intelligence Centre (20)	OSCE	Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (8)
NDLCC	National Defence Logistic Coordination Centre (27)	PA	public affairs (Pref)
NDMCC	National Defence Movement Coordination Centre (27)	PCO	Privy Council Office (1)
NEO	non-combatant evacuation operation (Pref)	Pers Svcs	Personnel Services (18)
NGO	non-governmental organization (1)	PM	Provost Marshal (21)
NMA	NATO military authorities (8)	PME	prime mission equipment (27)
NMR	National Military Representative (8)	POC	point of contact (2)
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group (8)	PRMNY	Permanent Mission in New York (9)
NPS	NATO Precautionary System (8)	PSC	Principal subordinate commanders (8)
NSE	National Support Element (9)	PSYOPS	psychological operations (Pref)
NSRC	National Search and Rescue Secretariat (17)	RCC	rescue coordination centre (17)
NTP	National Training Plan (6)	RFL	Restricted Frequency List (32)
NTWG	National Training Working Group (6)	RISTA	reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition (21)
OCE	officer conducting the exercise (6)	ROTA	release other than attack (24)
OGD	other government departments (Pref)	ROE	rules of engagement (3)
OOTW	operations other than war (1)	RP	reception point (10)
OPCOM	operational command (2)	s/w	software (33)
OPCON	operational control (2)	SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe (8)
SAMP	Security and Military Police (21)	SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (8)
SAR	search and rescue (Pref)	SCIF	Special Compartmentalized Information Facility (20)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (Cont)

SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (8)	TOR	Terms of Reference (12)
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence (20)	UN	United Nations (5)
SLOC	sea lines of communication (8)	UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees (9)
SMO	senior medical officer (18)	UNNY	UN New York (9)
SOFA	status of forces agreement (5)	UNSC	United Nations Security Council (9)
SOLAS	Safety of Life at Sea (17)		
SPA	Strategic Psychological Activities (34)		
SRPOC	Search and Rescue Point of Contact (17)		
SRR	Search and Rescue Regions (17)		
SSFA	secretary of state for foreign affairs (9)		
Sub-PSC	subordinate-principal subordinate commanders (8)		
SUP	supporting plan (4)		
Surg Gen	Surgeon General (18)		
TACON	tactical control (2)		
TC	Transport Canada (17)		
TCC	targeting coordination cell (25)		
TCN	troop contributing nations (12)		
TECHINT	Technical intelligence (20)		
TF	Task Force (Pref)		
TFC	Task Force Commander (1)		
TFHQ	task force headquarters (2)		
TFMCS	Task Force Management Control System (18)		
TIC	toxic industrial chemical (24)		
TOCA	Transfer of Command Authority (2)		