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NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION

OPERATIONS

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PREFACE

1. This manual, *Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations*, B-GJ-005-307/FP-050, was prepared to detail CF procedures and processes to support the evacuation of Canadians abroad.
2. The Government of Canada bears a fundamental responsibility for the safety and well being of all Canadians. Abroad, this responsibility is assumed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Canadian diplomatic missions are responsible for planning for the evacuation of Canadians in their areas of responsibilities.
3. Due to the uncertainties under which evacuations are normally conducted the Canadian mission may require assistance from the Canadian Forces to conduct an evacuation. This “military assisted” operation is termed a non-combatant evacuation operation. In most instances the CF contribution will be in the form of an appropriate tailored task force to provide security so the DFAIT conducted evacuation can proceed at minimum risk to the evacuees. In extreme circumstances the CF may have to accept full responsibility for the evacuation. Non-combatant evacuations may be conducted with ad-hoc coalitions.
4. This manual is intended to guide the Canadian Force’s conduct of non-combatant evacuation operations. It is written at the operational and strategic level. Details of environmental specific tactical tasks will be contained in appropriate tactical level manuals, unit and formation standing operating procedures and in relevant plans and orders. As doctrine, this manual is authoritative but requires judgement in application.

FOREWORD

1. This manual outlines the Canadian approach to non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO). It is designed for use by the following:
 - a. Commanders and their staffs at the strategic and operational levels;
 - b. The Joint Staff (J Staff) at NDHQ;
 - c. Task forces established for NEO, as well as all formations and agencies supporting such operations; and
 - d. Command and staff colleges and other teaching institutions within the framework for officer professional development.
2. This manual is presented in five chapters. Chapter 1 - describes the fundamental concepts of NEO. Chapter 2 - outlines the roles and responsibilities of the diplomatic mission – both generally and the specifics for planning an evacuation. Chapter 3 - lays out basic task force organization, the broad conduct of a NEO and specific in-theatre tasks. Chapter 4 - outlines operational planning consideration while Chapter 5 briefly describes potential coalition issues.
3. This manual is to be used in conjunction with the *CF Operations Manual*, B-GG-005-300/AF-000 and other CF manuals.
4. Comments and recommendations for changes should be forward to the custodian: J7 Doctrine 2.
5. The Canadian Forces Doctrine Board is the ratification authority for this doctrine.

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CHAPTER 1

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

A military operation conducted to assist the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in evacuating Canadians and selected non-Canadians from threatening circumstances in a foreign host nation and moving them to a safe haven.

101. GENERAL

1. The Government of Canada has a fundamental obligation to ensure the safety and well being of Canadian citizens. For those citizens abroad, this responsibility is assumed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).
2. Life threatening circumstances can arise for a variety of reasons. They may be caused by natural disasters – in particular, rapid onset disasters like volcanic eruptions or they may erupt during civil strife. In whatever instance, the Canadian Diplomatic Mission accredited to an area where risks are developing is responsible to monitor conditions, advise in-country Canadians and plan the safe evacuation of Canadian Entitled Personnel (CEP) (see Chapter 2, subsection 212).
3. Threats may develop so rapidly or be of such a violent nature that it becomes beyond the capabilities of the Canadian Mission staff to ensure the safe evacuation of Canadians. In such situations DFAIT may request the assistance of the Canadian Forces (CF) to conduct the evacuation. The CF has select assets and resources that can both assist in the overall evacuation and provide it appropriate security. The CF military operation conducted in support of the Canadian Mission's evacuation is called a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO).
4. Non-combatant evacuation operations are fundamentally defensive in nature. They are conducted to reduce to a minimum the number of Canadian citizens at risk and to protect them during the evacuation process. They are not an intervention in the issues in the host nation. The end-state for a NEO is when all CEP who wish to be evacuated arrive at the safe haven and the CF task force (TF) has withdrawn from the host nation. No evacuee is forced to accept an offer of evacuation.

102. THREAT ENVIRONMENT

1. A NEO is only launched when there is a threat posed to the safety of Canadians in the host nation. This threat is a function of the hazard, or the dangers directly posed to the personal safety of Canadians, and the ability of the host nation government to contain that hazard and thereby safeguard Canadians. The NEO environment is characterized as being permissive, uncertain or hostile:
 - a. **Permissive.** The host nation government has control such that law and order are upheld in the intended area of operations, and the government has both the intent and capability to assist the NEO. Therefore, no obstruction of or interference with evacuation operations is expected. Host nation support in administrative terms will be made available;
 - b. **Uncertain.** The host nation government, whether opposed to or supportive of the NEO, does not have total effective control of the territory and population in the intended area of operations. Host nation governmental co-operation and host nation support may be limited or non-existent. There is a possibility of obstruction and interference on the part of individuals, crowds or mobs, or organized factions. The possibility of escalation leading to a hostile environment must be considered in planning; and
 - c. **Hostile.** Hostile forces have control and the intent and capability to effectively obstruct and interfere with a NEO for the purpose of embarrassing Canada or the host nation government, or to prevent a successful evacuation. Evacuees will be removed under conditions ranging from civil disorder or terrorist action to full-scale combat.

2. The importance of the NEO environment in planning is critical, particularly with respect to force structure, force capabilities, rules-of-engagement (ROE), and logistics: in a permissive environment - a TF can focus mainly on the evacuation with fewer security and logistics concerns; in an uncertain environment – there is an increased need for security and logistics elements, and a properly structured reaction/reserve force maybe required and more contingency planning will be required; in a hostile environment – force structures, ROE and reaction forces will have to be more robust and other tasks, such as crowd confrontation, may be required to be executed. In a hostile environment when opposing forces are well organized a NEO may not be feasible and a rescue operation may be required. See Figure 1-1.




Figure 1-1 The NEO Environments and Related Operations

103. RELATED OPERATIONS

1. **Complex Peacekeeping Operations (CPKO).** These operations are characterized by their impartial conduct, the low or uncertain level of consent of the parties to the dispute and the implementation force's broader authorization to use force. These operations are often initiated after a peace accord has been signed and the parties have consented to the operation. The consent and compliance of the actors may be uneven and inconsistently observed throughout their chain of command. The implementation force maintains its impartiality by applying the terms of the mandate equally to all parties. Commonly, these operations are launched in failed states or where intra-state conflict has weakened central authority and caused a humanitarian emergency. NEOs may be conducted within CPKO when a region of the host nation becomes overtly hostile or form part of a contingency plan when monitoring potentially contentious elections in the host nation.

2. **Extraction Operation.** If the situation in a mission area deteriorates beyond the point that a peace support operation can make a useful contribution, it may be withdrawn. Depending on its structure and deployment the mission may require a combat capable force to assist in its withdrawal. The military assisted withdrawal of a military force is called an extraction.

3. **Humanitarian Intervention.** Humanitarian interventions are launched to gain humanitarian access to an “at risk” population when the responsible actors refuse to take action to alleviate human suffering or are incapable of doing so and where actors internal to a state are engaging in gross abuses of human rights. Intervention is a combat operation intended to provide protection to the at risk population and aid workers by imposing stable security conditions that permit humanitarian access. These operations can be precursors to complex peacekeeping operations. a NEO may be conducted prior to a humanitarian intervention in order to remove Canadians from a potential combat zone.

4. **Humanitarian Operation.** Humanitarian operations involve the use of military resources to assist in the alleviation of human suffering. They may be conducted independently or during a PSO. The prime responsibility for the provision of humanitarian aid and assistance rests with specialized civilian, national, international, government or non-government organizations and agencies. Military forces are often employed on humanitarian operations because of their rapid response capability, sealift and airlift assets, ability to co-ordinate and plan, unique skills and structure, and where entry/delivery points may be contested. In many host nations, where risks are high, a large number of intergovernmental organization (IGO) and non-governmental organization (NGO) will likely be involved in delivering humanitarian aid, relief and development. Their operations are typically widely dispersed complicating the ability to provide them an easy opportunity for evacuation.

5. **Rescue Operations.** In some parts of the area of operations well-organized hostile forces may be completely occupying and controlling a region and this could include holding Canadians hostage. In these cases, a NEO proper is inappropriate and a rescue operation will have to be conducted to save the hostages. Rescue operations may form part of a broader NEO campaign plan where select areas of a host nation are dominated by hostile forces and Canadians are hostage to these forces.

104. PHYSICAL COMPONENTS OF THE EVACUATION CHAIN

1. The components of an evacuation chain are the following (see Figure 1-2 on page 1-4):
 - a. **Forward Mounting Base.** Forward Mounting Base (FMB) is a secure base, port, airfield or HMC Ship, from which an operation can be launched and supported. It is normally, but not necessarily, external to the host nation and may be an essential staging area depending on available strategic mobility assets and the distances from Canada to theatre. An FMB should have the capacity for the TF to complete its final preparations prior to insertion, serve as a holding area for reinforcements or reserves and be able to receive evacuees if necessary. Depending on the scale of an operation, the FMB may also be required to provide force echelon support;
 - b. **Forward Operating Base.** Forward Operating Base (FOB) is a base or HMC Ship established within the operational area, to support tactical operations;
 - c. **Warden System.** This system is a network of volunteers, usually selected from among well-known members of the Canadian community. Each Warden, responsible for no more than 20 families, acts as a point of contact between the Head of Mission and the wider Canadian Community passing on information and instructions by a fan-out system;
 - d. **Point of Entry (POE).** The place at which the TF enters a host nation before its sub-elements move to their position in the evacuation chain;
 - e. **Assembly Points (AP).** The location to which the wardens bring their evacuees. Evacuees are received into the custody of the Canadian evacuation organization;
 - f. **Evacuation Centre (EC).** The main facility for assembling, processing and organizing evacuees for onward movement;
 - g. **Embarkation Site (ES).** Location, usually a transportation terminal, where evacuees are embarked on transport for transfer to the safe haven;

- h. **Disembarkation Site (DS).** Location in the safe haven, usually a transportation terminal, where evacuees are disembarked and turned over to the local DFAIT authorities; and
- i. **Safe Haven.** An area beyond the effects of the disturbance to which evacuees are removed and in which they are administered pending final disposition. It may be elsewhere in the host nation, in another country, in one of Her Majesty's Canadian Ships, or in Canada itself. Movement to the safe haven may have to be staged through intermediate facilities.




Figure 1-2 The Evacuation Chain

CHAPTER 2
THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION AND EVACUATION
SECTION I - GENERAL

201. INTRODUCTION

1. Within the Canadian Government, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) is the lead department in evacuation operations outside of Canada. The aim of this chapter is to describe the following:

- a. the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and diplomatic missions;
- b. diplomatic mission contingency planning and preparatory measures in the host nation (HN); and
- c. pre-evacuation crisis response and Canadian Entitled Persons (CEP) designations.

202. THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

1. DFAIT has 7,000 employees in Canada and around the world, operating under five ministers:

- a. Minister of Foreign Affairs. Lead minister in the event of an evacuation operation;
- b. Minister for International Trade;
- c. Minister for International Cooperation;
- d. Secretary of State (Latin America and Africa); and
- e. Secretary of State (Asia-Pacific).

2. DFAIT's primary role is to manage Canada's day-to-day relations with the governments and peoples of other nations, both bilaterally and within the many international organizations in which Canada participates. Under the direction of its Ministers, DFAIT develops and implements policies governing the Canadian Government's international relations and response to international crisis. The Department's legal mandate, as set out in the *Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act*, RSC 1985, c. E-22, is to:

- a. conduct all diplomatic and consular relations on behalf of Canada;
- b. conduct all official communication between the Government of Canada and the government of any other country and between the Government of Canada and any international organization;
- c. conduct and manage international negotiations as they relate to Canada;
- d. co-ordinate Canada's economic relations;
- e. foster the expansion of Canada's international trade;
- f. co-ordinate the direction given by the Government of Canada to the heads of Canada's diplomatic and consular missions and to manage these missions;
- g. administer the foreign service of Canada; and
- h. foster the development of international law and its application in Canada's external relations.

3. Additionally, DFAIT also provides administrative support to other government departments with personnel abroad.

203. DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS

1. DFAIT represents the Canadian Government abroad through the medium of the diplomatic mission. a Canadian diplomatic mission assumes one of two forms: an embassy or high commission. An embassy is the charge of an ambassador, a diplomatic minister of the highest order and the senior-ranking Canadian diplomatic official accredited to a state. a high commission and high commissioner have this same status, a high commission being the embassy of one member of the Commonwealth to another. The ambassador or high commissioner is the head-of-mission (HOM). In addition to the embassy and high commission, consulates, honorary consulates, trade offices and development offices facilitate diplomatic efforts. The authority and privileges of these offices are more limited than those of the embassy or high commission.

2. Resident embassies and high commissions are not maintained in all countries with which Canada maintains diplomatic relations. An ambassador resident in one country may be accredited, along with some or all of the embassy staff (including the CF Defence Attaché (CDA)) to another or several other countries. a country without a resident Canadian embassy or high commission may have consular-type representation or Canadian interests may be represented by a third country diplomatic mission or consular office. Whether resident or not, the ambassador or high commissioner accredited to the HN remains the senior Canadian Government representative in-country, and the senior DFAIT official in the evacuation.

3. One of the functions of a diplomatic mission is consular services; the services that a country provides for its citizens abroad. Canada's consular services operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week, through a network of more than 270 offices in over 180 countries. The network includes embassies, high commissions, consulates, honorary consulates and development offices. In some places, Australian diplomatic officers provide consular services to Canadians. Registration of Canadian citizens resident in other countries and the warden system, both matters of critical importance to an evacuation operation, are the responsibility of the consular service.

4. DFAIT in Canada and all diplomatic missions and consular offices abroad maintain an active public information programme for the benefit of Canadians travelling abroad. Public web sites are maintained by DFAIT both in Ottawa and at most diplomatic missions.

5. No two diplomatic missions are organized the same. The roles and responsibilities of personnel in planning and implementing the consular emergency contingency plan will vary depending on the mission's structure. The general structure of specific missions is available through the DFAIT consular affairs website: <http://www.voyage.gc.ca/dest/intro-en.asp>. The current structure of a mission and its responsibilities will have to be confirmed through DFAIT, the mission or CDA when planning for a non-combatant evacuation operation begins in earnest.

SECTION II – CONSULAR CONTINGENCY PLANNING

204. GENERAL

1. As the lead department for evacuation operations, DFAIT, in conjunction with its diplomatic missions, develops and maintains contingency plans for all countries. These plans provide all the necessary information to have in times of natural or civil disasters. These plans are called Consular Emergency Contingency Plans (CONPLAN). The general direction for establishing a standing task force and developing the CONPLAN is contained in the DFAIT Manual of Consular Instruction.

2. **Personal Emergency Plan.** When traveling or living in a foreign host nation is considered risky DFAIT may issue a warning. Such warnings are posted at: <http://www.voyage.gc.ca/dest/sos/warnings-en.asp>. In such circumstances people are encouraged to prepare a personal emergency plan. In general terms, they are counselled to do the following:

- a. Keeping all vital documents such as passports, birth and marriage records, and vaccination, insurance, and bank records in one readily accessible location.
- b. Ensuring passport and any necessary visas are valid.
- c. Having sufficient funds available to deal with an emergency.
- d. Registering and remaining in regular contact with the nearest [Canadian government office](#) or the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa.

205 DFAIT - GENERAL PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES

1. DFAIT is the lead department in an evacuation and is responsible for the following:
 - a. Seeking ministerial approval and funding for planning and implementing evacuation of Canadian nationals from designated areas of potential or actual concern;
 - b. Issuing travel advisory and travel restriction notices and evacuation orders;
 - c. Developing evacuation plans;
 - d. Identifying safe haven locations in consultation with military planners when necessary;
 - e. Co-ordinating with other government departments to plan and implement an evacuation;
 - f. Repatriating or relocating, as necessary, of public service employees serving in threatened areas;
 - g. Conducting the evacuation; and
 - h. Requesting, if necessary, a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) or other Canadian Forces (CF) assistance.

206. HOM PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Specific responsibilities for the Canadian HOM include the following:
 - a. Promulgating the evacuation plan;
 - b. Administering the evacuation effort;
 - c. Requesting military support through DFAIT;

- d. Providing an estimate of Canadian Entitled Personnel (CEPs) to be evacuated;
- e. Delivering evacuees to evacuation points;
- f. Identifying and providing administrative support for evacuation facilities within the HN; and
- g. Liaising to ensure proper reception of evacuees at the safe haven.

207. CONSULAR STANDING TASK FORCE (STF)

1. The HOM is responsible for the preparation and updating of the CONPLAN. The consulate's standing task force carries out this function. Missions should identify members of a Standing Task Force (STF) (basically, those responsible for executing the contingency plan) that can be activated without delay. The STF could be led by the HOM or the Head of Chancery with full authority to draw resources as required from all sections of the Mission and DFAIT when a crisis situation occurs.

208. CONSULAR EMERGENCY CONTINGENCY PLAN

1. The aim of the CONPLAN is to prepare the diplomatic mission to operate in a crisis environment in which the embassy or high commission and members of the Canadian community in the HN are threatened by civil unrest or natural disaster, and to cope with such emergencies. It must not be confused with the Personal Safety Contingency Plan - which is for the personal safety of Mission staff. a CONPLAN is not synonymous with an evacuation plan. Comprehensive evacuation is, however, normally the second-last phase of a contingency plan. The intent of the CONPLAN is to emphasize self-help measures, including departure by commercial means while they are still available, which Canadians can implement before evacuation becomes necessary. The CONPLAN is designed to provide important information and guidance to Missions to assist them in their response regarding the safety of Canadians before, during the lead up to, and during crises. At the request of DFAIT planners, the CF may send a strategic recce team to assist with the preparation of more detailed CONPLANS in regions of heightened risk.

2. The CONPLAN should provide information and instructions as follows:
- a. possible courses of action for different threat environments;
 - b. the diplomatic mission's STF, including organization, appointments, responsibilities and tasks, and standing operating procedures (SOPs);
 - c. the diplomatic mission's emergency action infrastructure, including details of the control infrastructure, information management system and communications, transportation fleet, and supplies on hand. Local security arrangements should also be prescribed and described;
 - d. the notification system;
 - e. the warden system;
 - f. evacuee data, including numbers of people by area and by category;
 - g. evacuation chain data, including the locations (primary and alternate) of evacuation facilities, routes (primary and alternate), SOPs, and information such as HN points of contact for facilities, contracts, etc.;
 - h. evacuation supporting data, particularly the locations and technical data for terminals (for example, airports, sea ports, beach sites); and
 - i. critical staff data, staff checklists, and supporting planning aids (including standard map and imagery products of the local area).

3. The CONPLAN should be reviewed by the Canadian Defence Attaché (CDA) as the first step in synchronizing it with CF NEO doctrine and contingency plans.

209. REGISTRATION OF CANADIANS ABROAD

1. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) offers a registration service for Canadians who expect to be living in a foreign country or who have already been living in a foreign country for three months or more. Canadians spending less than three months visiting areas and countries with potential for problems, or a developing crisis, should also register. The service is provided in the event there is a need to contact Canadians to offer urgent advice during a natural disaster or civil unrest, or of a family emergency at home. The registration is voluntary and personal information provided on the registration form is protected and used in accordance with the provisions of the Privacy Act. The service is offered for all countries and can be accessed from the DFAIT website: <http://www.voyage.gc.ca/main/sos/rocapage-en.asp>

2. The record of such registration is the Register of Canadians Abroad (ROCA), which becomes a vital planning document in the event of an evacuation. The ROCA provides a starting point for estimating the number and status of Canadians that may have to be evacuated. Not all people will register so some Canadians will be unaccounted for in the ROCA. It is therefore necessary that CF intelligence staffs consider alternative sources of information regarding the movement of Canadians abroad, and, in conjunction with DFAIT officials, refine estimates of CEPs.

210. THE WARDEN SYSTEM

1. An embassy establishes a warden network throughout the country in order to facilitate communications between the Embassy and resident Canadians in the event of a local crisis. Wardens allow the Embassy to convey information/advice to Canadians easily and quickly particularly in the early stages of a developing crisis situation. The principal role of a Warden is to relay information from the Embassy to individuals should an emergency situation develop. Wardens also act as a recognised point of contact between Canadians and the Embassy in the event that Canadians are unable to contact the Embassy in an emergency. Registered Canadians and their dependants are designated a warden according to their home location. In order for the warden network to be effective it is important that registration records be up to date.

2. A warden is a volunteer, usually selected from among the well-known members of the Canadian community. Wardens pass information on contingency measures and evacuation arrangements. In an actual evacuation, they direct people to the designated evacuation assembly points.

211. PHASES OF A CONTINGENCY PLAN

1. **Threat Assessment.** When a crisis develops in a country, DFAIT, along with other departments, monitors the situation closely to determine the threat to Canadian residents and interests. Threat assessment is based on three elements:

- a. the identification of groups posing a threat to Canadians;
- b. the assessment of these groups' capabilities versus their intentions; and
- c. the ability of the HN authorities to protect Canadians.

2. **Contingency Phases.** When a sufficiently severe threat is assessed, DFAIT will initiate a response based on four sequential phases. The phases are reversible should the situation improve. The focus of each phase is as follows (see Annex A for general tasks):

- a. **Phase I – Apprehensive.** This phase begins when a situation is developing or evolving which, if it deteriorates, could pose a threat to the security of Canadians in the area. Travel by Canadians into the HN, or at least into the area of disturbance, is discouraged. Reducing the inflow of Canadian travellers will reduce the magnitude of the evacuation problem should an evacuation ultimately

ensue. Canadians in the HN are encouraged to prepare a personal emergency plan. Communication equipment is prepared to monitor and co-ordinate activities within the affected area;

- b. **Phase II – Warning.** This phase occurs when a situation/crisis has deteriorated to the point where Canadians in the country are at risk. Canadians presently in the HN are encouraged to depart. Those who have no urgent need to remain are advised to leave on normal commercial transport. This may include dependents and non-essential staff of the mission. a letter is sent to Canadians in the AO strongly recommending they depart and encouraging those who remain to monitor communications closely. Contingencies to provide airlift if commercial means are restricted are examined;
- c. **Phase III – Protective.** This phase is implemented when a situation has deteriorated to the point where the Canadian Government may need to provide departure assistance to Canadians still in the country. Canadians are advised to leave by any means available to them. An indication may be made of a specific closing date for the embassy. If aircraft have been chartered, Canadians will be notified and they will be asked to confirm their interest in departure assistance (basics of evacuation planning are contained in Annex B); and
- d. **Phase IV – Withdrawal.** The decision is made to close the mission and evacuate all CEPs.

212. CANADIAN ENTITLED PERSONNEL

1. Consular Emergency Contingency Plans are designed to include all Canadian citizens and Australian citizens where applicable in each country of accreditation who choose to be included, and their dependants.
2. The term "Canadian community" is used to describe the group of persons that are to be assisted in times of crises. While Canadian citizens are our first responsibility, missions can also assist non-Canadians, such as those from countries with which we have cooperative arrangements or persons with a close association with Canada or Canadians, when it is possible to do so without detriment to Canadian citizens. Such persons could possibly include (a) dependant non-Canadian family members of Canadian citizens; (b) landed immigrants (including adopted children); (c) locally engaged employees and dependants of the mission; (d) others, who through their work have established a close association with Canada (for example, human rights workers).
3. The HOM has discretion to decide who may be assisted in times of crises. In doing so, the following principles should be followed:
 - a. no distinction should be made between Canadian government employees and their families and private Canadian citizens;
 - b. Canadian citizens with a second citizenship are to be treated exactly the same as citizens with only one citizenship;
 - c. every effort should be made to avoid splitting families; and
 - d. when non-Canadian citizens are included for consideration in an evacuation scheme, and there is an expectation that they will need to enter Canada, such persons should be processed in accordance with the Immigration Act and Regulations. As such, it is important that the accredited mission immigration officers are closely associated with and involved in the contingency plan implementation process.

213. CO-OPERATION WITH FRIENDLY COUNTRIES

1. Missions normally consult with missions of friendly countries during the development of its Contingency Plans. Some of the specific arrangements already in place are outlined below:

- a. **British Missions.** British representatives have the authority to co-operate with Canadian Missions. Where there are no resident Canadian Missions the British are prepared to accept, by arrangement with the accredited Mission, the inclusion of Canadians in their contingency plans on a space-available basis;
- b. **MOU with U.S.A.** By virtue of the “Memorandum of Understanding Between Canadian and United States Authorities Concerning Cooperation on Evacuation Planning”, American missions have standing instructions to co-operate with Canadian Missions on contingency planning and to accept Canadians for evacuation on a space-available basis;
- c. **Consular-sharing Agreement with Australia.** Canada and Australia have signed a consular services-sharing agreement for specific locations. Canadian Missions co-operate with Australian authorities in the area of contingency planning.

214. CO-OPERATION FROM CANADIAN COMPANIES/INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. When drawing up Consular Emergency Contingency Plans, Missions are encouraged to seek the co-operation of Canadian companies and International Organizations operating locally. If a company employs a contingent of Canadians it should be able to appoint one or more wardens from among its employees to help maintain the register of Canadians, and to provide a liaison point for the firm’s Canadian employees.
2. Canadian companies and international organizations may be able to provide additional facilities and resources in an emergency situation such as communications equipment, transport, supplies, assembly points, etc. Large Canadian companies employing significant numbers of Canadians often have their own contingency plans. If possible, these should be co-ordinated with Mission plans.

215. COMMUNICATION ASPECTS

1. The mission keeps the Canadian community updated on the situation in a variety of ways. It may do so by direct oral advice, through the warden network and through a combination of Consular Information Letters and Warning Letters. Depending on the nature of the emergency DFAIT may arrange for warnings to be broadcast on Radio Canada International (RCI), on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and on Voice of America (VOA) during their scheduled programs.

216. FINANCIAL ASPECT

1. Evacuation operations are conducted on a cost recovery basis: CEPs are responsible to bear the cost of their evacuation. Financial assistance may be extended to all those included under the Consular Emergency Contingency Plan. Such assistance is provided on a cost recoverable basis. The designated head of each participating family must sign an Application for Financial Assistance/Receipt and Promise to Repay form (Ext 1703) to permit recovery. If Canadian citizens are being included in an evacuation being carried out by another country, that is, U.S., UK, etc., Canadian consular officers must have the designated head of each participating family complete form Ext 1703 as these countries will seek recovery on a government to government basis.

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ANNEX A - GENERAL DIPLOMATIC MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES IN CONSULAR EMERGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING

	APPREHENSIVE	WARNING	PROTECTIVE	WITHDRAWAL
HQ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preliminary warnings and planning • ROCA updated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain awareness • Provide communications assistance • Issue Second warning letter • Confirm evacuation centre 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Authorize implementation of this phase where feasible • Arrange broadcast of Final Warning • Prepare nominal rolls of CEPs to be evacuated • Maintain info on availability of transport and security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decision taken to close the mission.
MISSION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish STF • Confirm assembly points • Check emergency resources • Establish gasoline reserves and emergency stores • Assess need for and availability of portable comms eqpt 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Update ROCA • Evacuate non-essential Canadian Based staff • Check on availability and clearance procedures for evac by aircraft or ship • Review CONPLAN <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Assembly points ➢ Transport and comms eqpt owned by Canadians ➢ Evacuation centres ➢ Movement of Canadians to evacuation points ➢ Staffing and eqpt of evacuation points 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Charter transport • Arrange clearance for evacuation means • Prepare assembly points, evacuation centres, embarkation sites and transportation in the evacuation chain • Open and staff evacuation points • Prep nominal roll to accompany each aircraft or ship • Advise Safe Haven organization of number of evacuees and ETA • Arrange to be complete Promise to Repay and any financial assistance forms. 	
CANADIAN COMMUNITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First warning letter • Contact wardens • Check hotels and hospitals • Contact Cdn organizations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Second warning letter • Contact wardens • Check hotel and hospitals • Keep major Canadian companies and organizations informed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Final Warning Letter • Advise Canadians through warden system of evacuation plan • Request wardens note any Canadians remaining and their intentions 	
HOST NATION AND FRIENDLY MISSIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain liaison 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inform HN ministry of Foreign Affairs that warning letters have been sent • Maintain liaison with friendly foreign missions • If local gov support required for evacuation ensure appropriate local officials kept up to date 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seek assistance from HN for <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Security for convoys ➢ Exemption from exit visas • Co-ordinate with friendly mission joint evacuation procedures. 	

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ANNEX B - BASIC EVACUATION PLANNING

B001. INTRODUCTION

1. This annex describes and explains some of the basic considerations in evacuation planning. Normally, the planning, staffing and execution of the evacuation chain remains a responsibility of the Mission's staff but depending on the scale of the NEO task force members may require familiarity with these issue.

SECTION I - EVACUEE MANAGEMENT

B002. DESCRIPTION

1. There are three basic evacuee management functions: processing, handling and movement.

B003. PROCESSING

1. Processing, the collection, collation and dissemination of information related to the evacuees, has three main purposes:

- a. for each evacuee, to confirm identity and eligibility for evacuation, to assign a priority for transfer and movement, and to allocate to an evacuation stream. This filtering is the necessary first stage of processing;
 - b. to inform and facilitate the handling and movement functions, primarily through classification of evacuees, production of nominal rolls, provision of special handling information, and tracing of groups and individuals. For example, the production of passenger manifests as part of the movement function begins with the information provided by the processing effort; and
 - c. to provide evacuee information to the command element in order to meet all other information requirements of the evacuation, including the CF aspect. The Canadian Government's crisis management organization (including DFAIT and DND specifically), the NEO TF chain-of-command, public affairs officers, administrative units preparing the temporary safe haven or similar intermediate transit facilities, governmental and non-governmental tracing organizations (such as the Canadian Red Cross Society), etc., will all require specific information relating to the custody, status, condition, location, and expected movements of evacuees.
 - d. The processing function is comprised of two parts: screening and detailed processing.
2. **Screening.** Intended to admit to or eliminate from the evacuation chain each person who seeks entry to it, three screenings are conducted:
- a. **Identification, Eligibility and Priority (IEP).** The potential evacuee's identity is confirmed, as is his or her eligibility for evacuation. The evacuee is then classified to assign priority for transfer and movement;
 - b. **Security.** The security screening seeks to identify individuals who may pose a threat to the safety of other evacuees and members of the evacuation organization. The assessment may be based on prior knowledge of the individual (for example, a criminal record) or indications evident at the time of screening (for example, carrying and attempting to conceal a deadly weapon); and
 - c. **Medical.** The medical screening seeks to identify individuals who are suffering from sickness or other medical conditions that may pose a threat to the health of other evacuees and members of the evacuation organization. An example is a person with a highly contagious illness.

3. Screening assigns potential evacuees to two groups:
 - a. **General Stream.** Evacuees whose identification and eligibility are confirmed, and who do not pose a real or potential security or health hazard to others; and
 - b. **Special Stream.** Evacuees whose identification and eligibility are confirmed, but who are assessed as posing a real or potential security or health hazard to others.
4. Screening also identifies and conducts initial information collection with respect to ineligible applicants, or people without entitlement to evacuation but who nonetheless seek entry into the chain. These fall into two categories:
 - a. **Unexceptional Applicants.** Ineligible people who seek evacuation, but excluding exceptional applicants (as described below). This group may include people purporting to be eligible for evacuation but who can provide no reasonable basis for such a claim, and people who make no claims to entitlement but still wish to be evacuated; and
 - b. **Exceptional Applicants.** People without normal eligibility for evacuation but who claim special entitlement (for example, seeking asylum).
5. Arrangements must be in place for the subsequent handling of special stream evacuees, the disposal of unexceptional applicants, and the interim and final disposition of exceptional applicants.
6. **Detailed Processing.** Detailed processing is conducted for evacuees who have been screened and admitted to the chain. There are four main areas:
 - a. **Health.** Health processing seeks to identify health conditions or problems that require either immediate or eventual attention during the term of the evacuation. Such conditions may require specific medical treatment (such as medication), avoidance of certain activities or stresses, or special diets. Follow-on requirements are also identified and forwarded to a medically-capable facility;
 - b. **Handling.** Handling processing seeks to identify conditions or problems that require special provision during the term of the evacuation. Examples include evacuees with limited mobility (for example, those in wheelchairs or who are very frail), persons with limited sight and hearing, parents with infants or young children, family groups, and evacuees with special dietary requirements (not based on a medical condition). The information from this processing allows special arrangements to be made to accommodate and move these individuals or groups;
 - c. **Welfare.** Welfare processing seeks to identify conditions or problems related to an evacuee's personal circumstances beyond his or her immediate situation in the chain. Examples include tourists who are anxious about the disposition of their family or home in Canada, expatriates concerned about their property in the host nation, and evacuees who wish a swift return to the host nation once the crisis is over. Evacuee queries regarding claims or complaints are also processed in this area. The information from this processing allows referral to such services as counselling (including stress counselling), chaplain and legal services;
 - d. **Debriefing.** Debriefing is the interview of all or selected evacuees with a view to obtaining information concerning the host nation situation. Debriefing is bifocal in character, with two levels of focus: immediate and general. Immediate information relates to such matters as the last known whereabouts of unaccounted evacuees, conditions in the area of the evacuee's place of origin (that is, home, hotel, place of work), and route conditions (in terms of physical condition and human interference, such as refugees or demonstrators). Such information is invaluable to search teams looking for unaccounted evacuees and transfer planners moving people between facilities and assigning escorts as required. General information is related to the evacuee's knowledge of and experiences in the host nation. Expatriates and temporary full-time residents (such as industrial

executives and workers on contract) often have useful perspectives on or information about the general situation.

7. **Products.** The evacuation plan must specify the following:
 - a. key registers to be maintained and by whom, with instructions for input, update, dissemination, and final disposition;
 - b. documentation to be completed by each evacuee, under whose supervision and where in the chain, formats, and instructions for submission, processing, dissemination, and final disposal; and
 - c. reports and returns, including formats, originators, action and information addressees, distribution, and final disposal.

8. **Concept of Processing.** The efficiency of the handling and movement functions depends on processing which is timely, efficient and tailored to suit the situation. The concept of processing will emerge from the overall concept for the evacuation and particularly the estimated flow rate for the evacuation. The vital factors governing the concept of processing are as follows:
 - a. the estimated number of evacuees;
 - b. the time available to effect evacuation;
 - c. the manning and skill levels of the processing organization;
 - d. the risk of infiltration into the chain of ineligible applicants, particularly those posing a security or health hazard to other evacuees and members of the evacuation organization; and
 - e. the threat level and consequent degree of urgency in removing Canadian Entitled Personnel (CEPs) from the area of disturbance.

9. With these in mind, the following key questions must be answered:
 - a. When and where will processing take place? Early in the chain or late? In the area of operations or outside? In what facilities? and
 - b. What processing will be undertaken? That is, to what degree of detail will processing be prosecuted and what are the priorities for both screening and detailed processing?

10. Basic screenings normally commence at the assembly point and are completed at the evacuation centre, and all detailed processing takes place at the evacuation centre. It is necessary to specify the degree of screening that will take place at the assembly point and evacuation centre. Threats or the urgency of the situation may preclude full processing on the ground in the area of operations and an alternative concept of processing will be required. Rapid screening may take place in theatre and then detailed in transit or in the safe haven.

11. In their deliberations, planners must keep in mind the following objectives:
 - a. first, the risk to evacuees and members of the evacuation organization must be reduced to the minimum, consistent with effective evacuee tracking and accountability. Risk is considered in terms of security, and safety and health hazards; and
 - b. second, the efficiency of the basic evacuation operations must be maximized and the reasonable comfort of evacuees and members of the evacuation organization provided for.

12. There are three main reasons for favouring early processing (both screening and detailed processing):

- a. first, to ensure the security and health of both evacuees and members of the evacuation organization;
 - b. second, to promote the effectiveness and enhance the efficiency of the evacuation chain. Information gained from evacuee debriefing is valuable in the planning and management of evacuee assembly and transfer from and between the assembly point and evacuation centre. Handling and movement plans and arrangements can be better prepared if timely, accurate information about evacuees is provided: this permits better use of available resources; allows for smoother flow through the chain; and improves load and embarkation planning; and
 - c. third, to provide for the comfort of evacuees. Comfort means the services and arrangements that will enhance and preserve morale, reduce tension and friction, and maintain alertness and energy suited to the demands of the evacuation effort. Early processing provides the handling and movement functions with the information required to maximize reasonable comfort, thereby enhancing evacuee co-operation.
13. Therefore, the following approach should be considered the normal or default approach to processing, to be modified only with good reason:
- a. processing is conducted in the area of operations and as far forward in the chain as possible;
 - b. processing is prosecuted to the greatest degree possible in every situation; and
 - c. priorities must be established with a view to obtaining in the time available the most important information from the greatest number of evacuees.

B004. HANDLING

1. Handling is all provisions and arrangements for the custody and care of the evacuees while they are in the evacuation chain including the manner in which evacuation officials (including CF personnel) interact with evacuees. Handling begins with the first reception of the evacuee into the evacuation chain and continues without interruption until the evacuee is handed over to the follow-on authority at the safe haven. Any member of the evacuation organization who comes into contact with an evacuee is involved in handling.

2. **Handling Services.** Handling is comprised of the following functions:

a. **Physical Services**

(1) **Transfer.** Transfer is the provision of local transport to move evacuees between evacuation facilities, as well as the function of planning and co-ordinating local evacuee transfer and, with security officials, the integration of transport and escorts. Transfer must not be confused with movement, a term reserved for the function of strategic- and operational-level evacuee transit from the area of operations;

(2) **Holding Services**

(a) **Accommodation.** In its most basic sense, accommodation is the physical space provided to hold evacuees pending transfer to the next evacuation facility, including minimal conveniences (that is, latrines and ablutions facilities). If the expected waiting time is short, accommodation can be extremely austere (for example, a bare school gym, a tent with portable latrines outside). However, for longer waiting periods, the accommodation function includes the provision of shelter and such furnishings and equipment as are appropriate to the period of time it is anticipated evacuees will remain in such shelter. Thus, tables, chairs and cots will be required. Whether austere or developed, accommodation should provide for furnishings and equipment to provide comfort for the elderly and infirm;

- (b) **Feeding.** The evacuation organization is responsible for feeding evacuees in the evacuation chain. Feeding requirements will vary according to the length of time evacuees are in the evacuation chain. Any estimate of feeding must take into account such special persons as babies and children, persons with medical conditions (including illness), special diets (for example, for religious reasons), and the elderly. Provision of food services will also vary;
 - (c) **Amenities.** Amenities are personal conveniences, usually of a hygiene and sanitation nature (for example, soap, toothpaste, razors and razor blades) but also including minor items such as writing paper and instruments, matches, chewing gum and candy, sunscreen, etc.;
 - (d) **Recreation.** a long holding period in an evacuation facility necessitates a recreation programme to keep evacuees occupied and thereby reduce tension and prevent boredom;
- (3) **Personal Issue.** Certain circumstances and conditions will necessitate the issue of personal equipment and supplies to individual evacuees. For example, long waiting periods may necessitate the issue of blankets, climatic conditions at the temporary safe haven may require the issue of outerwear;
- b. **Psychological Services.** For an evacuee, the evacuation is but another stage of coping with a crisis situation. It has been preceded by a period of uncertainty and stress that has culminated in the present experience of having all routines disrupted and being uprooted. For tourists at least, the evacuation is the penultimate stage in the return to normality. However, for expatriates and temporary residents of the host nation, a further period of tension and strain will follow the evacuation as they cope with the question of a post-crisis return to the host nation or permanent re-location elsewhere. These general concerns are compounded by the immediate stress and strain of being moved about in a tense, perhaps turbulent, environment. a sense of humanity and sympathy with respect to evacuees on the part of the evacuation organization is entirely appropriate and, indeed, is ethically imperative. The following psychological services are normally provided:
- (1) **Counselling.** Professional counselling during an evacuation is most likely to be concerned with critical incident stress, and will be conducted with a view to getting the evacuee through the immediate situation. Other counselling may seek to simply reassure the evacuee, allow him or her to vent feelings, or help him or her to cope constructively with immediate difficulties;
 - (2) **Chaplaincy.** Chaplaincy services overlap counselling, and chaplaincy personnel are qualified to conduct some forms of counselling. However, counselling of a religious nature and the provision of specific denominational services (such as sacraments) are the exclusive responsibility of ordained ministers and recognized pastoral assistants;
- c. **Special Provisions and Arrangements.** The requirement for special handling of certain evacuees can emerge in three ways. First, people report unusual behaviour on the part of an evacuee. Second, an evacuee approaches members of the evacuation organization to report a particular condition or request special handling. Finally, processing, particularly the welfare area of detailed processing, reveals the requirement. The ability to respond to such needs will vary according to the level of manning and personnel capabilities incumbent in the evacuation organization. It will also depend on the location of the special handling evacuee in the evacuation chain when the requirement becomes apparent. During the planning process, consideration should be given to providing special handling escorts or enabling mobile special handling responders to work amongst several facilities.
4. **Handling Conventions.** There are a number of general conventions that characterize handling throughout the evacuation chain:
- a. **Interpersonal Handling Techniques.** All members of the evacuation organization must interact with evacuees in an effective and appropriate manner. The atmosphere of the evacuation is critically

important to success. From the beginning, the evacuation organization must establish and maintain in the evacuation chain an environment that is purposeful, professional and confident. Courteous and sympathetic treatment of the evacuee must be balanced by professional detachment and firmness;

- b. **Evacuee Groups, Sub-Groups and Escorts.** Evacuee groups are formed early in the evacuation chain and are usually confirmed at the evacuation co-ordination centre. Groups are organized primarily on an administrative basis to suit transfer, holding and movement requirements. Evacuation sub-groups are comprised of people who either must or should be kept together within a main group. Such sub-groups always include families, and may include neighbours, employees from the same firm, etc. Each evacuation group is assigned an escort from the evacuation organization who remains with that group throughout the evacuation chain, ideally up to and including the embarkation site. The escort acts as the intermediary between the group and the evacuation facility and transfer transport, and handles any documentation that must accompany the group. The escort is responsible for knowing the whereabouts of his or her group, co-ordinating with the evacuation facility (including transfer transport) with respect to special handling requirements or arrangements, and assisting the information effort;
- c. **Information.** In an evacuation operation, evacuees are cut off from normal means of information. This includes both means to receive information and the means to make inquiries. Rumours and frustration abound in such circumstances. Therefore, it is imperative in all stages of the evacuation that evacuees be informed of what is happening to them, and what will be happening to them in the future:
 - (1) **Briefings.** Briefings are conducted at the beginning and end of every stage of a group's progress through the evacuation chain. These normally coincide with transfer between evacuation facilities, and it is therefore expected that a group will be briefed on arrival at and departure from each evacuation facility;
 - (2) **Handouts.** For standardized information, handouts will prove useful and durable means of conveying information to evacuees. Advice and tips sheets, a general description of evacuation management and the evacuation chain, embarkation and safety procedures, and so on, are examples of handouts; and
 - (3) **Information Centre.** Each evacuation facility must have a designated Information Centre in a prominent location, from which evacuees can obtain information and submit queries. In the Assembly Point, this may take the form of a designated person with suitable identification (such as an armband) and a fixed location (for example, at a vehicle). At the evacuation centre and embarkation site, and in certain transport (such as a ship), the Information Centre may take the form of a booth and kiosk.

5. **Maintenance of Order and Discipline.** The security of the evacuation operation in general is not an evacuee management function, while the processing function is responsible for filtering out or isolating actual or potential security threats before they enter the evacuation chain. However, there remains the potential for disturbances among those evacuees who have been admitted, and the handling plan must anticipate and provide for these. The legal basis for the evacuation organization's authority over evacuees in its custody must be clearly established during planning and confirmed prior to the initiation of the evacuation. This authority must then be interpreted in terms of the specific basic evacuation operations and its task organization, specifying the authority and powers of evacuation officials, particularly executive officers and security officers. This applies to CF personnel who are part of the evacuation organization.

6. In providing for the maintenance of order and discipline, the handling plan must be co-ordinated with the security plan and the processing plan. In some cases, the basis of order and discipline may simply be existing legislation and regulations (for example, the Criminal Code of Canada, transport regulations governing aircraft, the National Defence Act as it applies to HMC ships). These may govern all or part of the evacuation chain. However, in an evacuation in which it seems likely that evacuees will remain in the evacuation chain for lengthy periods of time, consideration should be given to the promulgation of Rules of

Conduct for Evacuees . These are based on appropriate legal authority and expressed in simple terms sensible to the average evacuee. These rules, the basis of authority to enforce them, and the procedures for handling complaints and enforcing discipline must be conveyed to evacuees in briefings and posted in evacuation facilities when this is practicable. Standard operating procedures must include a methodology for handling manifest disturbances, and for receiving and responding to complaints, determining responsibility, and taking action that could include sanctions or even police action if necessary.

B005. MOVEMENT

1. Movement is the final removal of the evacuee from the area of disturbance and his or her conveyance to the safe haven. Movement excludes transfer between evacuation facilities within the area of operations, which is an aspect of handling. From the point of view of the movement function, evacuees are passengers.
2. The main responsibilities of movement are as follows:
 - a. movement planning and management, including production of passenger manifests;
 - b. evacuee tracking and accounting related to movement operations;
 - c. co-ordination and integration of the embarkation site(s) with terminal operations, both those operated outside of the evacuation organization (such as a host nation civil airport) and those conducted by the evacuation organization (such as an expedient beach terminal operated by the TF); and
 - d. passenger services , that is, ticketing, baggage services, and co-ordination of special provisions and arrangements. These are done in conjunction with the terminal operator and the transport into which evacuees will embark.
3. The final repatriation may be conducted in a single stage or in several stages should a multi-stage repatriation to the safe haven be necessary.

B006. EVACUEE TRACKING, ACCOUNTING AND DOCUMENTATION

1. Common to all three evacuee management functions is the absolute necessity to accurately track, account for and document all evacuees. Whether automated or manual, the evacuee tracking and accounting system must be able to do the following:
 - a. state accurately who has entered the evacuation chain and who has left it (and at what point);
 - b. know the location of each and every evacuee at every moment he or she is in the chain;
 - c. provide a basis for planning each evacuee's progress through the evacuation chain; and
 - d. allow efficient reconciliation of key nominal rolls, passenger manifests, and reports and returns.

SECTION II – EVACUATION POINT SELECTION

B007. SITE SELECTION CRITERIA

1. The selection of evacuation points is conditioned by three main considerations: security, holding capacity and flow rate.
 - a. **Security.** Security is a prime consideration in selecting an evacuation point particularly in a hostile environment. In all cases, the site should be defensible. The safety of the routes between points must also be evaluated.
 - b. **Holding Capacity.** Holding capacity refers to the number of evacuees that can be held in an evacuation facility at one time, and assumes the provision of normal handling services appropriate to the expected duration of the typical evacuee's stay. "Overflow holding capacity" is the holding capacity plus the number of additional evacuees that can be held for a very short period of time, and assumes a reduction in some handling services. Evacuation assembly points are intended to act as rendezvous points but need some holding capacity as evacuees await transport to the evacuation centre. The evacuation centre and embarkation site will hold the largest numbers of evacuees for the longest periods of time. The holding capacity of the evacuation points must be linked with the transport resources available to ensure a speedy evacuation.
 - c. **Flow Rate.** The flow rate of an evacuation operation is the number of evacuees that can pass through the evacuation chain and be removed from the area of operations within a specified time (for example, evacuees per 24 hours). Estimating the flow rate is important to properly planning the evacuation. It will be based on the following:
 - (1) estimated number of evacuees;
 - (2) forecasted time available to complete the evacuation (that is, period from start to finish);
 - (3) transport available (quantity, capacity, sortie rate);
 - (4) evacuation facilities (clearance rate and holding capacity); and
 - (5) miscellaneous factors (for example, multi-national co-operation).

CHAPTER 3
ORGANIZATION, CONDUCT AND TASKS
SECTION I - THE TASK FORCE

301. ESTABLISHING A TASK FORCE

1. A task force (TF) will be established for all non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO). See Figure 3-1. The scale and scope of the TF will depend on the NEO environment, the requirement to conduct preparatory, supporting or related operations and whether the NEO will be executed as part of a coalition. Details of command and control arrangements and responsibilities are described in Chapter 7, B-GG-005-004/AF-000, *CF Operations*.




Figure 3-1 A Generic Task Force

302. TASK FORCE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION

1. **Nature of a TF for NEO.** The TF will normally take the form of a task-tailored joint TF constituted particularly for a specific NEO. It may be broad-based and balanced, meaning it incorporates elements and capabilities from standing maritime, land and air formations or special operation forces (SOF) units, as well as joint and national level units. The TF may be narrow in its joint scope, being composed primarily of elements from one Environment with small elements attached from another. Finally, there remains scope for a “single-Service” force comprised of elements from one Environment. Hasty operations in particular provide scope for such single-Environmental Command contingents.

2. The tailoring of the TF is determined in great part by the needs of the entry/withdrawal and supporting operations within the overall NEO. It is these that most often necessitate a broad-based joint TF. In contrast the evacuation aspect of the NEO, with the possible exception of the final movement apparatus (for example, air transport), is not a military operation unique to one Environment, and is therefore more susceptible to a single-Command response.

3. **Character of the TF.** The TF can assume different forms that become the basis for force design and configuration. These include the following:

- a. **Unitary versus Dispersed Employment.** In an independent national operation, the Canadian TF will always be employed in a “unitary” form, meaning it will be a single force operating under its CF commander. In a combined operation, the Canadian TF will often be employed in a unitary form, particularly if assigned a geographical sector. However, it may also be distributed amongst components and formations within a coalition joint task force, with the TFC acting as the Canadian national commander, and the headquarters and certain service support elements as the National Command Element (NCE) and National Support Element (NSE) respectively. This is most likely to occur when Canadian maritime, land, air and SOF forces are assigned and the coalition is organized into functional components. Within either a unitary or dispersed TF, there may be a unitary sub-TF (that is, a NEO Task Group (TG)) assigned a separate mission, such as evacuating Canadian Entitled Personnel (CEP) from a remote locality; and
- b. **Prepared versus Re-Directed Forces.** Most TFs will be “prepared” TFs, meaning that they have been task-tailored in their organization and enjoy a degree, however modest, of specific preparation in terms of resource allocation and training. The re-directed TF is a CF formation or unit that is already deployed to conduct training or to participate in a routine or contingency operation, and to which a change of mission is issued to divert it to conduct a NEO. Almost all NEOs, however short-notice they may be, will be conducted by prepared TFs. Multi-purpose combat capable, globally deployable HMC Ships, whether conducting single ship operations or as part of a TG, are readily capable of performing re-directed force duties in the vanguard role of any littoral NEO. In a re-directed force, task organization becomes, by default, the responsibility of the TFC. Additionally, whereas a prepared force is developed with a specific situation in mind, the re-directed force is fixed in its resources and capabilities.

4. **NEO, Preparatory, Supporting and Related Operations.** The TFC may be responsible for conducting preparatory operations, the NEO, some supporting operations and even some related ones. The TF may be task organized to accomplish this (for example, components and echelons). Alternatively, the CDS may decide to constitute distinct organizations to carry out these missions under the control of and coordinated by the strategic level. This option may be chosen when the interval between the forward mounting base (FMB) and the area of operations (AO) is great, or due to the complexities involved in the supporting and related operations. Unless otherwise directed the, Commander CF JOG will be appointed JTFC for NEOs.

5. **Task Force Structure.** The TF inserted into theatre to conduct the NEO is normally structured as follows:

- a. **Advance Party.** The advance party may consist of any or all of the following components:
 - (1) **Forward Command Element.** The forward command element links up with the diplomatic mission and other specified agencies in the Host Nation for the purpose of effecting co-ordination and establishing communications. The forward command element is task-tailored to suit the mission, and may be a one-time provisional organization or a standing organization assuming the forward command element role. Normally, the forward command element is part of and deploys with the advance party, however, the crucial importance of its mission and the possibility that it may be deployed separately warrant its status as a distinct echelon. A typical forward command element includes an officer-in-charge (OIC), operations officer, specialist advisors (to incl the SOF LO) and representatives from the following functional areas: intelligence, engineer, sustainment, movements, medical, communications and CIMIC;
 - (2) **Evacuation Point Party (EPP).** The evacuation point party reconnoitres and assesses the security requirements for each evacuation facility, route, and associated terminal. If no proposed evacuation chain plans exist, the evacuation point party will develop one. The evacuation point party will also reconnoitre the battlespace in general, including assembly areas, landing and/or drop zones, helicopter landing zones, surface entry zones for

waterborne forces, and routes. The evacuation point party will also establish liaison with Canadian agencies in the area of operations, other evacuation forces, and relevant Host Nation agencies. The evacuation point party may be tasked to assist at the evacuation centre (EC) once the main body arrives;

- (3) **Other Elements.** This consists of the personnel, equipment and resources to establish a FMB, embarkation site (ES) or point of entry (POE) in order to receive and support the TF;
- b. **Main Body.** Upon arrival in theatre the main body will absorb the advance party and will also contain the following elements:
- (1) **Security Element.** Security forces are used as necessary at the assembly points (AP), the EC perimeters, landing zone (LZs), aircraft, staging and/or parking areas, landing sites for naval landing craft and ES. From a security perspective, the most critical evacuation facilities are the EC and ES, for they hold the largest numbers of evacuees for the longest periods of time. Security forces can also provide a reaction force if a Marshalling Team or other element encounters difficulty or requires assistance. Normally, the security and marshalling element are part of the assigned land component.
 - (2) **Marshalling Element.** In uncertain and hostile environments – when the ability of evacuees to make their way freely to the APs and EC is restricted – a marshalling element may be needed. It moves to and secures pre-designated APs, brings evacuees to the APs, and escorts them to the EC. The size of the marshalling force, composed of one Marshalling Team per AP, depends on the number of sites and evacuees. One Marshalling Team controls an AP and evacuates the citizens in that area and besides a command element consists of the following:
 - (a) **Search Party.** The search party locate evacuees and escort them to the AP. Each search party should have an interpreter and, if possible, a guide;
 - (b) **Security Section.** The security section provides security to the team during movement and in the AP. It establishes perimeter security, under the control and direction of the team's OIC even in a permissive environment. It ensures sufficient transportation is available to move evacuees to the EC and for the search parties and security sections.
 - (c) **TF Support Group.** The TF Support Group is responsible to provide for the integral support of the TF, and, if required, to provide basic life support to the evacuees.
- c. **Special Operation Forces.** SOF elements may augment or play the lead role in a NEO TF. They may carry out key liaison – particularly with other SOF forces – reconnaissance, surveillance and communications tasks. Depending on the threat they may be needed to augment security or marshalling elements.

303. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. The TFC will usually exercise command from the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) deployed in the JOA. The TFC is responsible for producing the tactical plan and conducting the NEO when ordered. The TFC may be from any Service, and could be forward deployed, for example on a maritime platform (see Figure 3-2 on page 3-4). The size and location of the JTFHQ will depend on the situation. In structuring the TF, appropriate means of liaison must be included between the TFHQ, the embassy/HOM and any deployed component commanders. Command and control relationships in the advance party, particularly when SOF elements are included in it, need to be clear in the operational plan.




Figure 3-2 TF Structure In-Theatre

SECTION II - CONDUCT OF A NEO

304. CANADIAN FORCES (CF) OPERATIONS - PHASES

1. CF operations are normally conducted in the phases listed below. Flexibility is required within each phase for changes in the mandate, the nature of the operational environment and other activities. This chapter focuses on activities during the employment phase of a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO).
 - a. **Warning.** During this phase, NDHQ/COS J3 is the primary agency for control and co-ordination. The warning phase is where the strategic and initial operational planning takes place for the mission. This phase ends with the issuing of the operation order to the task force commander (TFC) to mount the operation;
 - b. **Preparation.** The preparation phase covers the following activities prior to departure, including reconnaissance, planning, liaison, assembly, administration and training and deployment of the advance party. Reconnaissance, where possible, must cover the FMB, the Safe Haven and the host nation;
 - c. **Deployment.** The deployment phase covers the final preparations for departure, the move of the NEO TF from its home base to the Forward Mounting Base (FMB) and final training and acclimatization at the FMB. It ends with the declaration of the task force (TF) operationally ready (OPRED);
 - d. **Employment.** The employment phase begins with any preparatory operations required and includes the entry into theatre and the execution of the NEO.
 - e. **Redeployment.** The redeployment phase begins with the departure of the last evacuee. It includes the closure of the evacuation chain and the withdrawal from the host nation. Safe havens and FMBs are closed and the TF is repatriated to Canada.

305. NEO OPERATIONAL TEMPLATE

1. A NEO is normally executed in the following broad sequence (as illustrated on the following pages):
 - a. **Preparatory Operations.** These operations erect and operate facilities located between Canada and the area of operations. These facilities support the TF in general – for instance, the forward mounting base - and set the conditions to allow the NEO to be conducted. These operations can serve as a signal to the host nation as to the seriousness with which the situation is regarded;
 - b. **Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation.** NEO is sequenced as follows:
 - (1) **Entry/Insertion.** The TF gains entry into the mission area. The scale of this phase varies depending on the threat environment;
 - (2) **Evacuation.** Military support is provided to the evacuation;
 - (3) **Withdrawal.** Upon completion of the mission the TF is withdrawn. Depending on the threat it may have to be extracted;
 - c. **Supporting Operations.** Supporting operations are major activities conducted by the TF or other forces that support the NEO when it is being executed. Examples include air cover, fire support and strategic movement.
 - d. **Related Operations.** These are operations not directly related to the NEO but may be occurring in the area of operations or within the HN. These can include peace support operations (PSO) or sanctions enforcement or other enforcement operations.

306. FORCE SEQUENCE

1. The introduction of forces into the AO varies with the planning environment: deliberate or crisis action. The following elements may cycle into theatre:
 - a. **Strategic Recce Team.** In a deliberate planning environment the strategic recce team will consist of members of the NDHQ J Staff and the designated recce element of the TF's advance party. In a crisis action situation it will be only the select members of the NDHQ J Staff required to co-ordinate and execute key strategic tasks as the TF advance party will be completely deploying;
 - b. **Advance party.** In a deliberate environment, advance party members of the Strategic Recce Team return to Canada at the completion of the reconnaissance. In the crisis action environment, the advance party remains in-theatre to provide the advance HQ for the TF, finalize planning, conduct the necessary operational and tactical recces, arrangement for reception and support of the incoming TF, and activate evacuation points as necessary – FMB, FOB. Security elements will augment the advance party as necessary depending on the nature of the environment; and
 - c. **Main Body.** The main body is the bulk of the forces that will conduct the NEO. The advance party is absorbed into the main body on its arrival.

307. WARNING PHASE

1. The warning phase begins once the CF learns that its participation in a NEO operation is being considered. During this phase, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) establishes liaison with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and any relevant coalition military NEO planners, conducts mission analysis, prepares intelligence assessments on the potential AO, and begins planning. Specific activities include:
 - a. Establishing liaison and communications with DFAIT/ other coalition militaries and other government departments (OGD) supporting the NEO;
 - b. Preparing intelligence assessment of the affected region;
 - c. Drafting and issuing a Warning Order (Wng O);
 - d. Continuing to monitor information/intelligence on the affected region; and
 - e. Providing geomatics support.

308. PREPARATION PHASE

1. This phase commences once the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) issues his Wng O, and ends with the OPRED for deployment declaration of assigned forces. During this phase, NDHQ will focus on planning issues external to the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canada (such as status of forces agreements and over flight rights) while the TFC and force generators will focus on the constitution and preparation of the TF. If required, the TFC will provide a decision brief/ concept of operations to the CDS for approval. At the same time the TFC makes contact with the Canadian Mission and coalition partners, establishes liaison and initiates information exchange and planning using remote communications, a Forward Command Element (FCE) and Evacuation Point Party (EPP). Specific activities include:
 - a. Conducting of crisis action planning;
 - b. Confirming force structure requirements;
 - c. Deploying the task-tailored advance party;
 - d. Commencing planning and reconnaissance of the FMB and safe haven;

- e. Deploying liaison officers (LO) and consulting with coalition partners; and
 - f. Preparing and issuing the operation order (Op O).
2. **National Level.** Tasks at the national level include the following:
- a. Appoint TFC;
 - b. Coordinate with DFAIT for entry visas and diplomatic clearances;
 - c. Co-ordinate pre-deployment briefings for the NEO;
 - d. Provide a military assistance planning team to assist and help validate the consular plan as well as de-conflict with other nations planning teams;
 - e. Co-ordinate with DFAIT and the TFC the identification and reconnaissance of an FMB and safe haven;
 - f. Co-ordinate the movement of the advance party to the AO;
 - g. Prepare Op O;
 - h. Co-ordinates with the TFC, force generators and the CF Joint Operations Group (CF JOG) the NEO task organization;
 - i. Issue Op O;
 - j. Prepare ROEAUTH for issuance; and
 - k. Assess the requirement for and, if necessary commence warning and preparation of follow-on force options.
3. **Task Force.** Task carried out by the TF include the following:
- a. Conduct/co-ordinate in-theatre reconnaissance with the strategic level planning group. Make contact with the Canadian Mission and coalition partners, establish liaison, and initiate information exchange and planning using remote communications, a FCE and EPP;
 - b. Identify and be prepared to establish the FMB for CF assets;
 - c. Submit concept of ops and task organization to CDS for approval;
 - d. As required, conduct confirmatory reconnaissance;
 - e. Be prepared to assist the HOM in the establishment and support of evacuation facilities;
 - f. Be prepared to provide limited communications capability to HOM in support of NEO;
 - g. Support, where possible, the evacuation plans of other nations;
 - h. Develop a contingency plan to extract our own forces; and
 - i. Prep Op O with DCDS for CDS.




Figure 3-3 Flow of TF into Area of Operations

309. DEPLOYMENT PHASE

1. This phase commences with the deployment of the advance party to the FMB and ends with the OPRED for employment declaration. During this phase the TFC completes preparations for the TF in the FMB. Specific activities include:
 - a. Conduct tactical planning;
 - b. Deploy advance party;
 - c. Establish forward mounting base (FMB) and safe haven as required;
 - d. Pre-position forces to air points of embarkation (APOE) as required;
 - e. Conduct confirmatory reconnaissance;
 - f. Pre-operational training and preparation of assigned personnel and assets, acquisition of entry visas and diplomatic clearances;
 - g. Deploy the main body of the evacuation force to the FMB;
 - h. Complete pre-employment training (joint) and preparations in the AO; and
 - i. Transfer of Command Authority (TOA) of CF forces to TFC.
2. **National Level.** Tasks at the national level include the following:
 - a. Co-ordinate the movement of the advance party to the AO;
 - b. Co-ordinate the movement of the main body to the AO;

- c. TOA of CF forces to the TFC; and
 - d. Co-ordinate and control general support to the TF
3. **Task Force.** Task carried out by the TF include the following:
- a. Deploy the advance party into the AO to prepare for the reception and service support of the main body. As required, establish an FMB;
 - b. Assume OPCON of assigned forces;
 - c. Complete prep for TF in FMB;
 - d. Provide reception and staging of Canadian forces deployed to the AO;
 - e. Deploy main body in coord with DFAIT and NDHQ J4;
 - f. As required, complete pre-employment training and preparation of assigned forces; and
 - g. Submit OPRED for employment declaration to the CDS.

310. EMPLOYMENT PHASE

1. The employment phase commences with the entry of the TF into the HN and ends when the mission's end state has been achieved. During this phase evacuees are moved through the evacuation chain and delivered to a safe haven. Specific activities include:
- a. Evacuation of CEPs;
 - b. As required, assist in closeout of the Canadian Diplomatic Mission and evacuation of remaining DFAIT staff;
 - c. Support to coalition evacuation plans as directed; and
 - d. Withdrawal of CF personnel from evacuation area.
2. **National Level.** Tasks at the national level include the following:
- a. Monitor the operation and provide ongoing operational support to the TFC;
 - b. Provide guidance for redeployment planning; and
 - c. Prepare redeployment order.
3. **Task Force.** Task carried out by the TF include the following:
- a. In support of the HOM, conduct/assist the evacuation;
 - b. As required, assist in closeout of the Canadian Mission and evacuation of remaining DFAIT staff;
 - c. Support coalition or other national evacuation plans; and
 - d. Withdraw CF personnel from the host nation (HN).

311. REDEPLOYMENT

1. In this phase the TF and all supporting elements are repatriated from the FMB to Canada. Some TF elements may flow back to Canada on the same means used to move the evacuees. The lessons learned

process is completed and forces are re-fitted. Command authority over the forces assigned to the TF is transferred back to the appropriate force generator.




Figure 3-4 Outflow of Evacuees and TF Withdrawal

SECTION III - IN-THEATRE TASKS

312. GENERAL

1. A non-combatant evacuation (NEO) supports and assists a Canadian Mission's evacuation plan. In most instances, a CF task force will provide the security element necessary for the Mission's staff to carry out the other functions in the evacuation chain. The CF may be required to assist in evacuee processing and if the situation is excessively hostile may be required to carry out marshalling tasks to ensure evacuees can be safely assembled.

313. TACTICAL TASKS FOR NEO

1. The fundamental asset that the CF commits to international operations is tactically self-sufficient units (TSSU). TSSUs embody a collection of tactical capabilities and must be supported by - and have the ability to be supported by - a wide range of tactical, operational and strategic enabling capabilities. TSSUs must have an adequate combat capability including suitable self-defence and reasonable offensive capability. Examples of TSSUs include a naval task group (TG), a composite battle group or a wing of aircraft.

2. CF TSSUs must have the capability to provide the deployed logistic and other support required in the conduct of operations. The overall force design must ensure that these TSSUs are linked to those nationally based support structures that sustain them. This harmonization is essential to ensure that operational support requirements are developed as part of the overall Canadian Forces support concept. A key competency within this capability is that of timely mission planning and theatre reconnaissance and activation. TSSUs are flexible in their organization and structure - this is particularly true in the case of support structures, which are shaped by a range of inter-related planning factors. The TSSUs operate within the framework of a Canadian Task Force organization.

3. Most tasks in non-combatant operations are core tactical tasks. TSSUs assigned to these missions must therefore be capable of performing their normal core tactical competencies. For instance, land component elements would be required to perform battle task standards in accordance with their base manuals – the B-GL-383-002 series. Some typical tasks that could be performed during a NEO include the following: conduct a route/point recce; fight in a built-up area; defend in a built-up area; conduct a convoy escort; conduct road movement; establish a roadblock/checkpoint; and treat and evacuate casualties. Individuals deployed on a NEO should receive training in the following areas: crowd confrontation techniques; rules of engagement; evacuee handling procedures; aspects of military urban operations; media awareness; and the Laws of Armed Conflict.

4. **Crowd Confrontation Operations (CCO).** CCO conducted in a defensive manner, allows for the protection of embassy or high commission personnel as well as members of the Canadian community in the host nation that are threatened by civil unrest. Furthermore, in a view to keep a low profile and not inflame the situation, all means possible must be exhausted by the security force to avoid the use of deadly force. Deadly force will be determined by specified rules of engagement before leaving Canada

314. ADVANCE PARTY TASKS

1. Some of the tasks for advance party elements are as follows:

a. Forward Command Element (FCE). The FCE coordinates with in-country Embassy personnel and HN authorities and establishes a communication link between the TF HQ and the Mission. The following FCE tasks should be accomplished during this phase:

- (1) Request permission from the TF Commander to enter the country;
- (2) Obtain visitor visas for all members of the FCE;

- (3) Deploy as soon as possible, and in advance of the TF, to allow maximum time for coordination and to determine external support requirements;
 - (4) Develop and brief a communication plan for the FCE;
 - (5) Identify information exchange and communication requirements for the TF;
 - (6) Acquire and review appropriate maps;
 - (7) Review the Embassies CONPLAN and the Mission-TF Link-up checklists (see Annex B Chapter 4);
 - (8) Assemble and inspect required equipment;
 - (9) Develop and brief an escape and evasion plan for the FCE;
 - (10) Due to possible sensitivity of the political situation in the host country, in consultation with NDHQ determine whether the FCE should deploy in civilian clothes;
 - (11) Consider weapon and ammunition requirements based on the threat assessment;
 - (12) Confirm the medical requirements;
 - (13) Identify translator and linguistic requirements; and
 - (14) Request over-flight and landing rights for appropriate countries in co-ordination with parent HQ and NDHQ.
- b. Evacuation Point Party (EPP). The Evacuation Point Party identifies and, where possible, assists in the establishment of the Assembly Points (AP), Evacuation Centre (EC), and the Embarkation Site (ES). When the TF force enters the country and the evacuation commences, the Evacuation Point Party assists the operations centre at the EC. The EPP carries out the following tasks:
- (1) Plan, organize, and establish the EC in preparation for the TF main body;
 - (2) Provide direct liaison with the Embassy Consular Offices;
 - (3) Maintain liaison with civilian or HN government agencies involved in the evacuation;
 - (4) Conduct ground reconnaissance of proposed AP, EC, beaches, helicopter LZs, and/or drop zones (DZs), airports, and ports; obtain photographs, where possible;
 - (5) Recommend and/or confirm AP, EC, LZs and/or DZs, and Embarkation Sites. If required to move AP operations, coordinate approval with the Ambassadors;
 - (6) Prepare initial AP defensive plan and evacuation security requirements;
 - (7) Plan and coordinate emergency aeromedical operations for evacuees with serious medical problems;
 - (8) Plan and co-ordinate operations of AP and EC with Embassy representatives;
 - (9) Conduct initial preparation of APs and EC to clear minor obstacles, plan and layout APs and ECs, and plan and provide for initial terminal guidance at beaches and LZs and/or DZs;
 - (10) Collect essential planning information to include assessing potential hostage threats, determining the number, categories, and medical status of evacuees, and any known political constraints;

- (11) Be prepared to assist Embassy personnel with news media on an as requested basis;
- (12) Establish and maintain communications with the TF HQ, if deployed, and Embassies; and
- (13) Be prepared to assist with the co-ordination of additional security requirements the HN police may be able to provide:

315. SECURITY ELEMENT TASKS

- 1. Task of the security force includes the following:
 - a. Monitor threats to the evacuation;
 - b. Anticipate the response of HN police, military forces and other friendly forces in and around the evacuation objective area
 - c. Provide crowd confrontation measures as required at each site;
 - d. Provide security for marshalling and search teams as necessary;
 - e. Secure perimeter at all evacuation points;
 - f. Maintain personal security of the Ambassador and key personnel, if required; and
 - g. Maintain reaction force/reserve

316. MARSHALLING ELEMENT TASKS

- 1. If required a Marshalling Element carries out the following tasks:
 - a. Move to pre-designated APs;
 - b. Establish perimeter security;
 - c. Bring evacuees to the APs;
 - d. Escorts evacuees to the EC;
 - e. Identify primary and alternate routes and check points;
 - f. Plan for convoy control and security;
 - g. Identify safe houses or areas if vehicles break down or become separated or lost;
 - h. Ensure sufficient transportation is available to move evacuees to the EC and for the search parties and security sections; and
 - i. Ensure that adequate communications equipment is available for search and convoys.

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CHAPTER 4

PLANNING

SECTION I - GENERAL

401. INTRODUCTION

1. Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) are contingency operations with responses developed through the crisis action planning process. This chapter outlines the planning considerations that bear on the conduct of NEO. Details of planning at the operational and strategic levels are contained in B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, *The CF Operational Planning Process*.

402. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. The general principles governing planning for NEO are as follows:
 - a. **Co-operation.** An evacuation involves a large number of different players: the TF itself, a multitude of Canadian Government departments, a wide variety of host nation (HN) and civil agencies, and any coalition partners. Arrangements may be formal agreements or informal. Broad based co-operation is required to ensure success. Co-operation with the HN is a key factor. A NEO will rarely be conducted unilaterally. Whether conducting a Canadian NEO co-operatively with other national NEOs, or operating as an integral part of a coalition TF, the Canadian Forces (CF) TF will have to co-ordinate with or conform to external arrangements and procedures;
 - b. **Assistance.** CF assistance may range from the provision of individuals to advise an all-Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) or governmental inter-departmental task force, through the provision of small detachments to provide support, to a balanced JTF capable of conducting almost an entire evacuation virtually on its own. Assistance is extended in the following manner:
 - (1) the CF NEO is part of an overall Canadian evacuation process, which is an inter-departmental effort of the Canadian Government supervised from the highest levels;
 - (2) DFAIT is the lead government department in an evacuation, and its head-of-mission (HOM) in the host nation (usually the Canadian ambassador or high commissioner) is the senior Canadian Government representative in-country; and
 - (3) the role of the CF is to assist DFAIT in evacuating Canadians and selected non-Canadians from life-threatening circumstances in a foreign host nation and in moving them to a safe haven. This supporting relationship prevails even when the CF is providing the major Canadian effort and most of the Canadian resources;
 - c. **Unity of Control.** NEO is a partnership between the Canadian diplomatic mission and the TF. The TF supports the diplomatic mission but retains its own chain-of-command up to the strategic level. No single person has full authority over both elements but the TF carries out operations in support of the HOM evacuation plan. A clear division-of-labour is required between the consulate's and the TF's responsibilities. Control of the overall mission must be co-ordinated between senior DFAIT and CF officials at the strategic level;
 - d. **Security.** Security is an important concern in three respects:
 - (1) Normal force protection measure for the TF itself;
 - (2) Measures taken to protect the evacuation chain; and

- (3) Safekeeping of evacuees, not only from external threats but also from threatening individuals within the evacuee population;
- e. **Service Support.** The TF may be required to provide service support to the Canadian evacuation organization as a whole but as the force on the ground will be lightweight in nature so too will be the support available;
- f. **Prioritization of Effort.** The TF will be limited in size and capability. It will be required to complete its mission within a limited time frame under constant pressure to accelerate the process. Assignment of and enforcement of priorities must be practiced at all times and in all matters;
- g. **Flexibility.** There will be great uncertainties in planning – reaction of host nation elements, the location of all evacuees, etc. - highlighting the need for flexibility in the execution of an evacuation plan;
- h. **Minimization of Presence.** NEO should be conducted with the smallest force and least activity consistent with the assigned mission, the environment and restriction/constraints. This reduces inadvertent political signals that may increase tension in the area of operations; exacerbate the crisis in the Host Nation, or present difficulties for Canadian international relations during the period of crisis. For instance, in the case of Op Bandit in 1988, a naval task group deployed to the waters off Haiti to stand-by to assist in the evacuation of up to 2000 Canadians. Remaining in international waters, it was self-sustaining and could monitor the situation without being intrusive;
- i. **Sovereignty.** The Host Nation is a sovereign state, the laws and customs of which must be respected by the TF throughout the operation. The status of the CF in the Host Nation must be determined and codified. Notwithstanding the foregoing, certain inalienable rights are retained by the CF, such as self-defence. The legal status of the NEO and the TF conducting it must be firmly established prior to entry, if possible, and arrangements made for providing immediate legal advice to the TFC; and
- j. **Use of Force.** The use of force must be considered inclusively, that is, for the entry and withdrawal operations and supporting operations, as well as the evacuation portion of the NEO. The stance of other national NEO forces or coalition forces will exert their own influence and demand reconciliation between Canadian and Allied or multi-national policies and rules of engagement. The use of force includes non-deadly as well as deadly means. The use of force will be constrained by the nature of the environment and will be developed in accordance with B-GJ-005-501/FP-010, *The Use of Force in CF Operations*.

SECTION II - STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

403. GENERAL

1. While the actual situation on the ground will have an enormous influence on all levels of planning the following general consideration also need to be considered at the strategic level:
 - a. **Host Nation.** Whenever possible it will be the Canadian Government's intention to conduct evacuations with the agreement and assistance of the host nation government. Despite the need to conduct these operations an aim remains to maintain relations between governments. The long-term political effects of these operations must be considered. While the safety of CEPs will have primacy, Canada's national interests as well as any trade or commercial interests must be safeguarded.
 - b. **Domestic Political Considerations.** During the development of a situation that may require evacuation of CEPs, considerable pressure to take action might be applied to the Canadian Government by a concerned public.
 - c. **Diplomatic Options for Evacuation.** From the outset, the Government will attempt to resolve difficult situations through diplomatic channels. Regional political considerations will influence the nature and extent of CF participation. In many situations it might be more appropriate to respond to a request for assistance with civilian rather than a military capability.
 - d. **Shared Understanding of Operational Success.** It is important that both TFC and Head-of-Mission (HOM) have the same understanding of what constitutes operational success and can agree on what are reasonable efforts to complete an evacuation. During a NEO, in a situation of rapidly deteriorating conditions, decisions might need to be taken quickly in regard to the status of the operation. Contingency planning should take this into account and clearly state who has the authority to initiate a withdrawal of military forces or to declare the evacuation as completed.
 - e. **Availability of Intelligence.** Knowledge of a nation's political leadership, alliances, demography, geography and topography, infrastructure including ports and airfields, military and paramilitary organizations, and special interest groups is essential for planning a NEO.

404. CRITERIA FOR CANADIAN FORCES INVOLVEMENT

1. The following criteria are used when considering the employment of the CF in a NEO:
 - a. the agreement of the recognised host nation authorities (with some significant exceptions);
 - b. a manifestly direct threat to major Canadian security interests;
 - c. a finite time frame for the military operation;
 - d. a clear and achievable operational objective; and
 - e. consultation with, and if possible the cooperation and participation of, other nations in the region.

405. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SUCCESSFUL MOUNTING OF A NEO

1. The following factors influence the successful mounting of a NEO:
 - a. At least tacit HN support has been brokered;
 - b. Diplomatic clearance for over-flights, landings, the transport of dangerous cargo and entry visas for personnel going into the HN and the safe haven have been received;

- c. Establishment of SOFA/MOU to allow armed security forces into HN for employment at evacuation facilities;
- d. Development/promulgation of rules of engagement (ROE);
- e. Clearance for airspace of both HN and surrounding nations for CF aircraft over flights;
- f. Clearance for CF personnel and equipment to land in the HN;
- g. Clearance for warships and support vessels to enter HN territorial waters; and
- h. Clear understanding of the capabilities and tasks assigned to the TF and those of allies if part of a coalition.

406. OTHER STRATEGIC LEVEL FACTORS

1. **Multinational Forces.** In planning for a NEO, the ambassador and the TFC may have to consider the possibility of operating within a coalition or along side other national forces conducting a NEO. Any situation that would cause a nation to initiate a NEO would likely cause other countries to react similarly. It may be politically or militarily expedient to employ multinational forces in conducting the operation. These may be either host nation forces cooperating in the evacuation or third nation forces whose citizens are also threatened. Other nations' forces should not be integrated with national forces unless political considerations recommend such action or in the event that the other nations' forces have trained and operated with national forces, thus engendering the requisite confidence.

2. **Force Sequencing.** Force sequencing is the phased introduction of forces into and out of the area of responsibility, amphibious operation area, or joint operations area. Force sequencing provides the commander with the option to provide a flexible and rapid response to a NEO through employment of forward-deployed forces, which may form the nucleus for a larger tailored force to be deployed from an forward mounting base (FMB). Effective force-sequencing requires detailed knowledge of available Service, joint, and multinational military capabilities.

3. **Duration of Deployment Phase.** Planning time is normally greatly compressed in mounting a NEO. Once the TF arrives at a forward staging area the operation may be mounted immediately – the transition from deployment to employment is nearly immediate. Conversely, the TF may be held poised to conduct the operation for an extended period of time. These different time windows affect the resources and forces that can be brought to bear on the operation.

SECTION III - OPERATIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

407. INTELLIGENCE

1. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (JIPB) will be used as a predictive tool set to assess the mission and support the war-gaming of friendly courses of action. The steps of JIPB in the sequence they are to be considered are described below:
 - a. **Step 1 - Define the Battlefield Environment.** The location of the non-combatants to be evacuated and the identity and locations of all groups that might influence operations are key to planning the NEO. The countries that might shelter evacuees or assist or hinder the operation must be determined. The nature of the NEO environment and operational time constraints must be identified. The scope of the demographic situation that has prompted the evacuation must be analyzed: the political, social, economic, legal and religious situations, as well as the government, military, and population in general.
 - b. **Step 2 - Describe the Battlefield's Effects.** The following should be considered:
 - (1) Identify how local political issues will shape friendly COAs: hostile groups opposing the evacuation and areas where anti-evacuation sentiment is strongest; areas where sympathy for the evacuation is strongest.
 - (2) Identify the infrastructure that might support the evacuation. Evacuation points are secure from attack and well equipped with power, water, rest rooms and heat. Evacuation routes are fast and secure. Means of transportation are available for evacuees. Sources of food and potable water are available for evacuees. Communications systems can support evacuation operations. Map key facilities to include foreign embassies, military installations, hospitals, police stations and government buildings.
 - (3) Identify probable locations for ambushes on evacuation routes. Identify infiltration routes and assembly areas for threat attacks on evacuation points. Identify places suited for demonstrations and their relative position to evacuation points.
 - c. **Step 3 - Evaluate the Threat.** The following should be considered:
 - (1) Identify all groups that might intentionally interfere with the evacuation: HN law enforcement agencies, military forces, political groups, religious factions, and the general population. Where do hostile groups live and gather in relation to evacuation points. How are these groups organized? What kind of weapons do they possess? Tactics? What resistance methods and techniques can these groups employ against the evacuation: attacks, raids, ambushes, sniping, bombings, hijacking, hostage taking, kidnapping and demonstrations?
 - (2) Identify all groups that might unintentionally interfere with the evacuation.
 - (3) Use the LOC and key facilities and targets overlays to determine where interference might occur.
 - d. **Step 4 - Determine Threat Courses of Action.** Consider threat influence on the infrastructure. Look for control of workers such as bus drivers, dock workers, police, food service personnel and labour groups. Use the key facilities and targets overlays to identify the most likely points of interference with the evacuation. Template intentional interference with the evacuation by hostile groups at each likely interference site. Determine alternate routes or COA at these points.

408. MISSION ANALYSIS

1. There are factors particular to NEO that need to be considered both within mission analysis and within the broader operational planning process. They are expanded upon below.
2. **Constraints and Restraints.** The following constraints and restraints apply:
 - a. The HN is a sovereign state, the laws and customs of which must be respected by the TF throughout the operation.
 - b. The legal status of the NEO and the TF conducting it must be established prior to entry into the HN.
 - c. Arrangements must be made for providing immediate legal advice to the TFC.
 - d. No direct liaison is authorized with the HN Authorities without prior approval of DFAIT.
 - e. Without prejudice to the effectiveness and efficiency of the evacuation, the NEO will normally be conducted with the smallest force and least activity consistent with the assigned mission, the situation and acceptable risk. The purpose of this is three-fold:
 - (1) first, to reduce inadvertent political signals which may increase tension in the area of operations (AO), exacerbate the crisis in the HN, or present difficulties for Canadian international relations during the period of crisis;
 - (2) second, to reduce friction and confrontations with unsympathetic HN elements and minimize the risk of encounter with such groups; and
 - (3) third, to prevent an additional burden on the evacuation chain.
 - f. To control inadvertent political signals no overt military preparations are to take place until the execution order is received or orders for such activities are received from NDHQ.
 - g. As required, diplomatic clearances for over-flight and entering territorial waters and airspace will be obtained.
3. **Unique Planning Factors.** Evacuation operations differ from other military operations in several important respects. Planning staff will need to take into account these differences:
 - a. **Limited Objectives.** Evacuation operations are essentially humanitarian and protective in character. The primary purpose is to remove CEPs from the scene. The objectives of evacuation operations are limited, in that the length of time in-country for Canadian military forces will normally be restricted to that required to complete the evacuation;
 - b. **Limited Application of Force.** NEOs are defensive operations. The application of force, in most cases, will be limited to self-defence of both evacuees and CF elements involved. The ROEs will reflect these limitations;
 - c. **Size of TF.** Planning of an evacuation must consider the implications of a deteriorating situation. The number of CF personnel deployed into the host nation must be kept to the minimum necessary to accomplish the mission. This does not necessarily imply that the force deployed to a forward mounting base (FMB) or forward operating base (FOB) located in a third nation should be kept to a minimum;
 - d. **Host Nation Support (HNS).** Regardless of the status of the HN in a time of crisis, many of its normal support services may still be functioning. Such support could include security forces, transport services, air and seaport authorities, immigration, and other elements of logistical support. CF planners should consider the use of HNS where possible to minimise the required size of the TF, which will in turn reduce the possibility of further inflaming the situation. Even though the host nation

may indicate that it can or will provide certain logistic or other support, the CF must be prepared for the 'worst case' situation;

- e. **Minimal Profile.** Where possible, the TF should maintain a low profile during the conduct of an evacuation operation. TF planning and execution should aim to minimise the risk of potential hostilities between CF elements and belligerent or hostile forces as well as between evacuees and belligerents. This affects the scale, timing, rules of engagement (ROE), scheme of manoeuvre, route selection, locations and support arrangements selected by the TFC;
 - h. **Host Nation Permission.** Even if permission is gained from the host nation to conduct an evacuation, planning should be prepared for the possibility of transitioning to a hostile scenario. Consideration should be given to how this transition should occur; including any effects it will have on the proposed command and control (C2) structure;
 - i. **Security.** Planning must ensure the security of all personnel involved in the evacuation. Security elements may be necessary for the protection of CF personnel, evacuees and key equipment such as aircraft. Whatever the status of the host nation's security forces, consideration should be given to deploying an armed security element to all evacuation points;
 - j. **Forward Control.** Close and early integration with DFAIT mission staff will clarify both the local situation and the force's probable tasks. A forward command element (FCE) should be deployed to the mission at the earliest opportunity and in advance of the force;
 - k. **Organization of the Evacuation Chain.** An effectively organized evacuation chain, good standing operating procedures, practised assembly point (AP) and evacuation centre (EC) teams and control measures are required;
 - l. **Evacuation Route and Points.** The determination of evacuation routes and points is an operational planning matter requiring cooperative consultation between DFAIT and the CF; and
 - m. **Communication and Information Exchange.** The nature of a NEO and the requirement to establish close liaison with the Canadian Mission staff will create a unique requirement for information exchange, liaison and communication.
4. **Resources.** Planners should take account of the availability of local resources and HNS and make full use of these where it will not deprive the local population. J9 staff can assist with the identification and availability of local resources.
5. **Other Agencies.** At all levels commanders should make a careful assessment of other agencies operating within their area of responsibility. This may include diplomatic and military representatives and forces from other political authorities. Planning should take account of the identity, role, interests, intentions and methods of operation of these other forces and agencies, and the need for co-ordination to achieve unity of effort. The J9 Staff will be key in co-ordinating information on non-governmental organizations (NGOs), inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and other agencies.
6. **Command.** The complex political and multi-agency nature of NEO creates unusual problems of command. The conduct of NEO is likely to be politically highly charged, and strategic and operational level considerations may have a considerable and disproportionate effect, even at the lowest tactical level. There could be a tendency for the operational and tactical levels of command to overlap as individual incidents assume a high profile in political terms. Each national contingent is likely to have separate national command arrangements which could affect many aspects of the operation, particularly if sudden and unexpected escalations of violence occur which place new demands upon the military force.
7. **End State.** NEO is complete when all CEPs who wish to be evacuated have been removed to a safe haven and the CF TF has withdrawn from the host nation.

409. OTHER ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL PLANNING

1. **Own Forces.** Identify essential factors relative to Canadian and allied forces assigned to the operation, and other friendly agencies, including:
 - a. readiness, notice to move, location (including evacuation points) and capabilities of maritime, land and air elements;
 - b. command and control arrangements including readiness, assets, support requirements, relationship/liaison with HOM and friendly forces including information exchange requirements (IERs) and communications;
 - c. administrative and logistic support including forward mounting bases, forward operating bases, assembly points (AP), evacuation centres (EC), evacuation points (EP), disembarkation points (DP) and air and sea movement resources;
 - d. specialist support including chaplain support, health teams, screening teams, special equipment, humanitarian aid, food, shelter, evacuee handling organization, integration with other agencies, quarantine and customs and special force support; and
 - e. support from other agencies including those of the host nation government and relief and humanitarian aid agencies, and associated arrangements for coordination and cooperation.
2. **Reserves.** The potentially volatile nature of NEO requires the creation of reserves, at each level of command, to allow for the unexpected. Possible reserve tasks may include preventive deployment or the extraction of personnel from evacuation sites under threat.
3. **Public Affairs Planning for NEO.** The aim of CF PA for a NEO is to inform Canadians and other audiences of CF activities associated with the operation, considering any applicable operational security measures and host nation media restrictions. PA planning and support for a NEO is coordinated with DFAIT at the strategic level and with the Head of Mission (HOM) at the operational level.

410. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. ROE are orders issued by military authority that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, manner, and limitations within which force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied to achieve military objectives in accordance with national policy and the law. With the exception of self-defence, during peacetime operations and operations prior to a declaration of armed conflict, ROE provide the sole authority to Canadian forces to use force. ROE are applicable throughout the entire spectrum of conflict. Prior to a declared armed conflict ROE are generally permissive; in armed conflict, ROE are generally restrictive. ROE are designed to ensure that the application of force is appropriately controlled. ROE are not intended to be used to assign specific tasks or as a means of issuing tactical instruction. In passing orders, subordinate commanders at any level must always act within the ROE received but they are not bound to use the full extent of the permissions granted. ROE are determined for each specific operation based upon the objectives of the mission. They are formulated by the military in accordance with principles of international and domestic law.
2. For a NEO, the ROE must be developed in view of the particular operation – insertion, evacuation, withdrawal – and how it is situated in the campaign plan and in light of the NEO environment. Special concerns may include such matters as pursuit, patrols, crowd confrontation, detention of agitators or other disruptive people, and treatment of troublemakers amongst evacuees. In multi-national and combined operations, synchronization of rules of engagement may be necessary, particularly in a formally combined operation. The extension of Canadian rules of engagement to defend the diplomatic assets and evacuees of a third country with which Canada has a special agreement will have to be considered. If the area of operations is contiguous to the international boundary of the HN and a neighbouring country, rules of engagement may have to consider the possibility of threats to or interference with the evacuation by elements operating from or retiring to the neighbouring state at their convenience.

3. The ROE do not limit the inherent right of self-defence. In any event, under all circumstances, the principles of necessity and proportionality apply. Details on the development of ROE are contained in B-GJ-005-501/FP-000, *The Use of Force in CF Operations (Revision 1)*.

SECTION IV - DIPLOMATIC MISSION AND CF TF INTERFACE

411. GENERAL

1. In a NEO, DFAIT and the CF remain two distinct yet tightly integrated team members. At the diplomatic mission, CF advice is available from the CF Defence Attaché (CDA) accredited to the HN. CF personnel or elements may augment the diplomatic mission for communications, protection, or liaison and planning purposes. During an evacuation, CF elements in the minor assistance role may augment selected parts of the evacuation chain if it is being operated by DFAIT alone. The diplomatic mission may be augmented by other government departments (OGD) to enhance diplomatic mission protection or to assist in the evacuation. Examples include Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

412. OPERATIONAL AUTHORITY AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. **Primacy of the Ambassador or High Commissioner.** Once authorized by DFAIT, the ambassador or high commissioner (hereafter called the HOM) can implement the preparatory measures in the evacuation plan. On receipt of further approval, the actual evacuation may be initiated. In the event circumstances in the HN deteriorate suddenly and authorization cannot be sought or awaited, the HOM may initiate the evacuation on his or her own authority.

2. **Authority Relationships.** Within the HN, the ambassador or high commissioner is the senior Canadian Government representative and therefore the responsible authority for the evacuation. Subject to the overall authority of the ambassador or high commissioner, the TFC is responsible for the conduct of military operations in support of an evacuation, and for the security of personnel, equipment and installations within the AO. Whenever possible, either the TFC or his deputy should co-locate with the HOM to ensure detailed co-ordination and control of planning and execution of the operation.

3. Notwithstanding this relationship, neither the HOM nor the Canadian Defence Attaché (CDA) exercises military command over the TFC and TF elements. The chain-of-command from the TFC to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) remains within the CF throughout. This necessitates the following approach to integration and co-operation with the inherent IERs and communications:

- a. **Consultation between the HOM and TFC.** In the course of planning and executing NEOs, the HOM obtains and considers the professional judgment and opinions of the TFC. This requirement in no way limits the HOM's overall responsibility;
- b. **Decisions during Planning.** Due to time constraints and the unusual command relationship with respect to NEOs, operational planning and decision-making must be based on a foundation of common understanding concerning the mission, objectives, procedures, and free exchange of information. In those cases when significant differences between the HOM and the TFC become obstacles to the success of the operation, they must be referred to their respective superiors for resolution;
- c. **Direction to Personnel.** All necessary orders from either the HOM or the TFC to corresponding personnel are, insofar as possible, issued through the appropriate chain-of-command. In the event communications cannot be established with higher authority or if the situation deteriorates to one of combat operations rather than a NEO (regardless of the stated environment) and the lives of CEPs, diplomatic officials, and/or military personnel are at risk, the TFC takes whatever action is necessary to protect the lives of Canadians, informs the HOM of actions taken, and reports and requests guidance through the CF chain-of-command;
- d. **Co-ordination.** Existing DFAIT liaison, points-of-contact and channels-of-communication with the HN and other diplomatic missions should be used by the TF where advantageous. After due

consultation and co-ordination, the TF may find it necessary to establish direct liaison with certain HN agencies (for example, local security forces, airspace control authority, port and terminal authorities, commercial agencies, and NGOs and IGOs). The establishment of new relationship with other national NEO forces warrants particular attention both within the CF chain-of-command and vis à vis the HOM;

- e. **Evacuation Organization Relationships.** In addition to CF elements protecting and supporting the evacuation chain, there will be CF personnel working within the chain. If the evacuation becomes primarily a TF undertaking, there is still likely to be DFAIT officials and personnel (including wardens) in the task organization. The evacuation plan should specify both the division of labour and authority relationships at each level and within each facility.

4. **Immediate Link-Up and the Forward Command Element (FCE).** Diplomatic mission TF planning and integration benefit immensely from very early link-up between the CF and the diplomatic mission in order to establish liaison, set up communications, and commence planning. The TF will despatch at the earliest opportunity a Forward Command Element (FCE). This is the TF's essential first foot on the ground in the AO, and may be accompanied by an Evacuation Point Party (EPP) intended to prepare or assist in preparing the evacuation chain and a security element if necessary.

5. Ideally, the FCE will be rapidly deployed. However, if a significant interval is expected to pass before the FCE is fully constituted, prepared and dispatched, the CF may choose to immediately dispatch a smaller team to immediately provide advice to the HOM and start gathering planning information.

6. **Other Co-ordination Issues.** The political sensitivity of the operation will ensure that it will be monitored, and to a degree, may even be controlled at the highest level. See Figure 4-1. Co-ordination and liaison will probably be complex, frequently involving a number of other different agencies and Non-government Organizations (NGOs). Depending on the HN Government's degree of control, it may be necessary for the JTFC to establish direct liaison in separate areas of government, including the local security forces, airspace control and port authorities, as well as with commercial agencies and individual NGOs. This will require recognition and a clear articulation of mutual aims, to ensure co-operation wherever possible.




Figure 4-1 Generic Command Relationship between Mission and CF Task Force

SECTION V - LEGAL ISSUES AND DIRECTIVES

413. GENERAL

1. The following general legal issues need to be considered:
 - a. **Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).** SOFA is a document that defines the legal authority and responsibilities of a TF. The SOFA may be a treaty or an international agreement, depending on the degree of accord obtained. It establishes the detailed legal status of the TF. The SOFA will normally be negotiated with the host nation, as well as with the nation(s) that provides part of its (their) territory for use as Lines of Communication (LOC) or Forward Mounting Bases. These negotiations will normally also involve close co-ordination between Task Force Commanders (TFC), DND, DFAIT and COS J3. Authority to negotiate and conclude international agreements is held at the national level.
 - b. **Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).** These arrangements may be reached between Canada and the host nation. Such memoranda are primarily concerned with administrative matters such as the use of airports for rotation, national visitors, rest & recreational (R&R) activities, etc. MOU do not have the same legal status as SOFAs and are not regarded as treaties.
 - c. **National Law.** In regard to discipline and disciplinary action, TF members remain subject to national and military law. CF personnel continue to be subject to the Code of Service Discipline.
 - d. **The Law of Armed Conflict.** The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is the body of international law that governs the conduct of hostilities during an armed conflict. Though not party to the conflict, the spirit and principles of the LOAC will be applied by the TF Commander. B-GJ-005-104/FP-021, *Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level*, offers more detail.

414. KEY LEGAL ISSUES IN THEATRE

1. The following areas require particular legal scrutiny in theatre:
 - a. **Special Cases among Evacuees**
 - (1) **Diplomatic Personnel.** It is likely members of the Canadian diplomatic mission and their families and household will be amongst the evacuees. If designated, foreign diplomatic personnel may also be evacuated under Canadian auspices. Certain privileges and protocol attach to such persons and their families, and must be respected. The Operation Order (Op O) must identify these privileges and immunities, and specify special handling measures to members of the TF;
 - (2) **Persons Seeking Asylum or Refuge.** The circumstances of a NEO make it likely that there will be persons seeking political asylum in Canada or temporary refuge. CF commanders may not grant asylum, and any such requests must be directed to the diplomatic mission or to higher headquarters for referral to the appropriate authority in Canada. Nonetheless, procedures must be specified for the handling of such requests by the TF, including the disposition of the applicant pending a response or referral. CF commanders may grant temporary refuge under emergency conditions when there is imminent danger to the safety, health or life of any person. However, the criteria for granting such refuge and the procedure for termination of refuge and disposition of the applicant must be specified;
 - (3) **Evacuee Order and Discipline.** The legal authority of the Canadian Government, particularly the TF, over evacuees in its safekeeping during the evacuation must be clearly understood and articulated. This is important to such concerns as maintaining order amongst evacuees in the evacuation chain or in transports; detention of troublemakers or suspicious persons; and

the final disposition of persons held in custody (for example, handing over to the follow-on authority);

b. Critical Matters Regarding the TF

- (1) Status of Forces. The default premise for a NEO is a permissive environment and the co-operation of the HN government, which remains in effective control of the area of operations. Therefore, members of the TF are accountable under the law of the HN, subject to any immunity granted by a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The legal basis for the deployment of the TF into the HN must be determined. In the event a SOFA or MOU is negotiated, the following items should be considered:
 - (a) Undertakings by the Host Nation
 - i. that there is protection for TF members (and any auxiliaries such as Citizenship and Immigration Canada or RCMP personnel) from foreign criminal jurisdiction, proceedings, and imprisonment in the HN;
 - ii. that there is explicit acknowledgment from the HN that any activities undertaken by the TF in carrying out their assigned tasks will be regarded by that HN as being respectful of, and in conformity with, the laws and customs of that HN;
 - iii. that the host country grants all ships and aircraft operating as part of or in support of the TF all necessary diplomatic clearances to enter sovereign waters and airspace of the HN for the purpose of undertaking their assigned tasks;
 - iv. that the HN accepts that the TF while on its sovereign territory may possess and carry arms for the purpose of undertaking their assigned tasks;
 - v. that the HN agrees to waive all customs and immigration requirements which would otherwise apply to both the entry and departure of the members of the TF and to their weapons, vehicles, and equipment. That the HN will accept as valid, without driving test or fee, the driving licences (and CF equivalents) of members of the TF;
 - vi. that the HN agrees to waive any claim it may have against the Canadian Government or members of the TF for damage or injury (including injury resulting in death) caused by acts or omissions of members of the Canadian TF in the course of official duty. The HN government will deal with and, if necessary, settle at its own cost any claim which may be brought by any person or government in respect of damage or injury so caused;
 - vii. that members of the TF will remain under Canadian command and be subject to Canadian military law in all matters;
 - viii. that members of the TF are authorized to wear their uniforms;
 - ix. that no civil proceedings will be entertained by any court of the HN with respect to any act or omission of a member of the TF done in the performance of their assigned duties;
 - x. that where a member of the TF is arrested under the law of the HN for any offence committed or alleged to have been committed against the law of the HN, that member will be handed over to the Canadian authorities without delay;
 - xi. that any HN coroner with the jurisdiction in the HN to hold an inquest will not hold that inquest into the death of a member of the TF unless so authorized in extraordinary circumstances by the commander of the CF in that country;

- xii. that the HN government will provide where possible any material assistance required by the TF in the performance of its official duties. That a regime is (or can be readily) established to ratify irregular acquisition of supplies from HN sources;

(b) Canadian Government Undertakings

- i. that members of the TF force will comply with Canadian and international law; and
- ii. Canada will prosecute any breach of that law by TF members.

SECTION VI - SERVICE SUPPORT

415. SERVICE SUPPORT

1. The conduct of personnel and materiel support is crucial to the success of the NEO. The scope of such efforts is broader than in conventional military operations, and embraces the following:
 - a. movement and service support to the TF in preparatory, entry/withdrawal, evacuation and supporting operations;
 - b. movement and service support, if required, of the evacuation organization and evacuees. It must be kept in mind that the evacuee population is far more variegated in terms of age, health, and relationships than is the TF, and there will be requirements for unconventional services and supplies; and
 - c. as directed, movement and service support to other elements, including the diplomatic mission, separate CF elements engaged in associated operations, or co-operating multi-national or combined forces.

2. The following NEO-related considerations must be appreciated as well:
 - a. **Personnel Support.** Personnel planning must address the following:
 - (1) documentation required by or with respect to TF personnel for entry into the Host Nation;
 - (2) certification and documentation (customs, immigration, health) required for evacuees to depart the HN, enter into a third country hosting a safe haven or forward mounting base, and re-enter Canada; and
 - (3) counselling requirements and resources, which must be assessed early in order to incorporate a suitable capability into the TF;

 - b. **Material and Services.** In most respects, TF service support in an evacuation operation will conform to those arrangements and requirements for other international operations. The significant differences are:
 - (1) DFAIT and the diplomatic mission may have integral or HN-contracted administrative goods and services already arranged. These should be confirmed and their reliability assessed early in planning;
 - (2) due provision will need to be made for operations in uncertain circumstances. Local sources of supply and contracted support may be available, but in a confused or deteriorating situation may be problematic. The reliability of HN support and the degree of guarantee will need careful assessment. Flexibility is best served by standing arrangements that reflect a self-contained force capable of moving and sustaining itself independently. This reflects a worst case planning approach;
 - (3) operations in the area of operations will need to be conducted swiftly and logistics arrangements will need to be tailored to this. In particular, movements will be both concentrated and critical during the Employment Phase. Most service support in the area of operations will be at unit echelon;
 - (4) given the requirement for rapidity in the area of operations during the Employment Phase, the question of the logistics base is crucial. The relative benefits of a logistics base in the area of operations (perhaps as part of a forward operating base) *versus* a forward mounting base outside the area of operations or a sea-based support capability must be weighed. Similarly,

the size and complexity of supporting logistics elements must be carefully assessed. The role of aircraft and helicopters in sustainment must be examined in this light; and

- (5) support requirements for the non-CF element – the diplomatic mission, the evacuation organization, and evacuees – must be assessed. Such assessment will include requirements for routine CF supplies and services (such as individual protective equipment for evacuation staff and evacuees) and unconventional items (such as baby formula).

416. MOVEMENT

1. The movement of personnel and equipment is critical to the success of a NEO. Military movement resources will be required for the deployment, sustainment and redeployment of the TF, and depending on the form and environment of the NEO, may also be required for the safe evacuation of CEPs from the HN. The following factors must be considered:

- a. Movement planners must be involved from the outset of planning. Selection of ports and airfields in the area of operations and the safe haven can dictate what movement assets can be used and the eventual timeline for the operation. Movement personnel must be embedded into the TF orbit;
- b. Points of Entry and Departure must ideally be capable of handling both the entry and withdrawal of the TF and also the evacuation of CEPs. Where possible, details of ports and airports should be available and routine confirmatory recce undertaken as part of the planning process;
- c. Payloads must be maximized and ruthlessly prioritised to make optimal use of air movement assets. In a small-scale operation, each flight will have strategic significance; and
- d. Liaison must be undertaken with the movement staff of any other nations conducting their own NEO operations in order to consider pooling resources and to prioritise and de-conflict the flow through ports and airports.

417. HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT

1. Medical Support. Medical support in the evacuation will be grouped as follows:

- a. **Medical Support to CF Personnel.** Role 1 medical staff will provide support to CF personnel that are involved in the NEO. Role 2/3 medical support should be available through existing arrangements in place for HOM staff in the HN. Sea and/or air evacuation of CF personnel will be used if available. The possibility of utilising coalition medical facilities should be investigated by the recce party or by the CDA prior to the arrival of CF elements.
- b. **Medical Support to Evacuees.** The HOM staff is responsible for arranging medical support to evacuees. Only in an emergency will CF medical personnel provide medical support to evacuees.

2. **Other Medical Consideration.** Other medical and health considerations include the following:

- a. the evacuee population is far more variegated than a normal military group. The age range will encompass infants, children and the elderly. The range of medical conditions and special conditions (such as limited mobility and mental capacity) is much greater as well. Information regarding the numbers and medical conditions of the evacuee must be obtained as early as possible;
- b. environmental health assessments are required for effective force preparation. These may also be required for evacuees if a significant change of environment within the AO or from the HN to a safe haven or forward mounting base is anticipated; and
- c. the policy and procedures governing mortuary matters (that is, the disposition of human remains) related to the evacuees must be determined and specified in the Op O.

418. FINANCE

1. Once a concept of operations is determined for an NEO, a cost estimate will be prepared. This cost estimate will incorporate the anticipated costs of all known aspects of the operation. Considerable costs will be incurred from strategic lift to TF procurement activity. Thus, it is essential that a financial tracking mechanism be immediately established in the Financial Managerial Accounting System (FMAS) for cost capturing. Details of expenditures in support of the NEO must be prepared for recovery of departmental funds from the Government.

419. MILITARY POLICE

1. Military Police will be deployed to the FMB and may be sent into the evacuation area on order of the TFC. These Military Police are only in place to support CF personnel. If no SOFA or MOU is in place, the ability of the Military Police to intervene in matters with the HN will be limited or non-existent. There is a CF Military Police representative, seconded as a military security guard, at each Canadian Mission who may be able to provide some liaison capability, however their primary duty is the security of the HOM and the staff.

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ANNEX A - CANADIAN STANDARD QUESTION LIST

A001. SITUATION

Environment

1. Will this be a permissive, uncertain or hostile NEO? If the crisis is a natural disaster, what conditions threaten the evacuees and the conduct of evacuation operations? If the evacuation is permissive, is obstruction or interference expected? If so, will this be undertaken by unorganized individuals and crowds, or by organized groups? What form will it take: passive resistance or other forms of civil disobedience, physical intimidation? If the evacuation is uncertain or hostile, what form will hostile actions against evacuees or CF elements take, and by whom will it be taken? What is the likelihood of transition, that is, from permissive to hostile, or *vice-versa*?
2. What is the current situation in the host nation: In the area of the embassy or high commission? Near concentrations of host nation (HN) citizens?
3. What concurrent operations are presently underway in the host nation? What is the Canadian involvement in these? What is the relationship of Canadian elements in a concurrent operation to the embassy or high commission?

Host Nation Elements

4. What cultural nuances and customs should be known by the CF Task Force (TF) to avoid friction and confrontation with the local populace?
5. Who are the key host nation country personnel and what are their attitudes towards the evacuation?
6. Where are host nation military forces and facilities?
7. Where are host nation police forces and facilities?
8. Where are host nation fire and emergency services and facilities?
9. Where are host nation hospitals and other health services and facilities?
10. What host nation administrative support is expected to be available and to what degree? Ground transport? Feeding and water? Utilities, buildings and works? Amenities? Labour?

Canadian and Other Evacuation Activities and Operations

11. What form will the Canadian response in the host nation take? Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)-conducted with assistance from other Government departments (OGD), including the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Forces (CF)? Inter-Governmental Department (IGD) task organization in the host nation, including CF assistance? DFAIT evacuation with a CF NEO? What role is anticipated for commercial carriers (sea, land, air)?
12. What is the anticipated CF role: provision of limited assistance or a formal NEO?
13. What actions are other states taking with respect to their nationals? Will other national forces be operating in the area? What is the prospect for multi-national operations, ranging from separate but co-ordinated operations to formal combined operations? If multiple evacuations remain national and separate, what arrangements are in place or are required to effect co-ordination, particularly de-confliction?

A002. CF NEO

1. How soon is the employment phase of the NEO anticipated?

2. What preparatory operations are anticipated? Supporting operations?
3. What other tasks are anticipated in addition to the evacuation? Consular protection? VIP close protection? Hostage rescue?
4. What is the chain-of-command for the CF TF?
5. What is the relationship of the CF TF to CF elements in related operations?

A003. THE EMBASSY OR HIGH COMMISSION

1. What is the status and nature of Canadian consular representation in the host nation? Is the ambassador or high commissioner resident in the host nation? If not, who is accredited to represent the Canadian Government and what powers or authority does the resident representative normally possess or had had delegated from the accredited ambassador or high commissioner?
2. Who is the senior Canadian Government official in charge of the overall evacuation operation? What is the diplomatic chain-of-command? What channels of communication does that official possess, including those with other embassies and diplomatic missions, and the host nation government? What is the relationship with the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC)?
3. Who is the in-country official with the authority to initiate the evacuation operation? Who will give the TF permission to complete the evacuation and to leave the area of operations (AO)? Who are the alternative authorities and what arrangements are in place or required to make them effective?
4. Does the embassy or high commission have a Consular Emergency Contingency Plan (CONPLAN)? Is it up to date?
5. Does the embassy or high commission maintain a Register of Canadians Abroad (ROCA)? Is it up to date?
6. Does the embassy or high commission operate a warden system?
7. Is there an information and notification dissemination system in place in the host nation for Canadian Entitled Personnel (CEPs)? What type (for example, Internet, telephone answering service, information desk, broadcast)?
8. Who is the primary point-of-contact within the embassy or high commission to work with the CF TF force on details of the operation? What other channels-of-communication and direct liaison (DIRLAUTH) are authorized?
9. Is there a Personnel Safety Contingency Plan for the embassy or high commission? Will all officials be departing? If not, who will remain? What action should be taken if an embassy or high commission official refuses evacuation? What is the plan for non-diplomatic employees, particularly those who are host nation nationals?
10. Is there any sensitive information or materiel that will need to be evacuated or destroyed? What special access and custody restrictions apply in either case (for example, special clearances)?

A004. EVACUATION CHAIN

1. What is the total number of Canadian national evacuees to be evacuated? Number of VIPs, sensitive cases, or unaccompanied children.
2. What is the total number of designated third nation nationals to be evacuated? Number of VIPs, sensitive cases, or unaccompanied children.

3. What action should be taken concerning Canadian evacuees not on the list for evacuation but who meet the criteria of CEPs? What action should be taken for third nation nationals not on the list for evacuation but who meet the criteria of designated evacuees?
4. Is there an estimate of the number of non-entitled persons who may seek evacuation?
5. What is the policy regarding the evacuation of host nation dependents and household members of eligible evacuees?
6. Have the primary and alternate evacuation facilities and routes been verified and surveyed?
7. What is the present notification stage?
8. What will be the handover procedure when evacuees arrive at the Disembarkation Site (DS)? Who will assume custody of the evacuees at the DS?

A005. COMMAND & CONTROL/COMMAND SUPPORT

1. Does the CF TF have permission to drop sensors and insert special operations forces?
2. Does the CF TF have permission to insert a Forward Command Element (FCE) and other advanced party elements? Do any special restrictions apply to these elements (for example, no wearing of uniform, limitations on movement)?

Communications

3. What information will the HOM require from the TFC and what information does the TFC require from the HOM to facilitate planning and execution of the NEO?
4. What communications and information systems support will be available from the embassy or high commission? How will the communications architecture be set up to support the operation (for example, networks, frequencies, secure equipment availability, relays)?
5. Does the ambassador or high commissioner and staff require specialist military advisors or resources? In particular, what are the embassy or high commission's requirements for command support expertise and resources (for example, national rear link communications, communication with evacuation facilities)?

Intelligence

6. What non-routine sources are available to provide intelligence and information on all aspects of the host nation and area of operations (AO)? Are there Canadian Government officials, CF members or Canadian civilians available who have recently visited the host nation?
7. What intelligence support is required by other nations conducting evacuations?
8. Is there a requirement to question evacuees to obtain information related to conditions and unaccounted evacuees?

A006. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. What are the rules-of-engagement of HN security forces assigned to protect the evacuation? Of other national forces conducting national evacuation operations?

A007. LEGAL

1. What will be the status of Canadian forces in the host nation? Is a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in force between Canada and the HN? If not, what legal device will provide for the status of Canadian forces in the host nation?
2. Are there procedures to handle claims against members of the CF TF?
3. Are there procedures to handle claims against CEPs being evacuated?
4. What action should be taken if a non-eligible person asks for political asylum? Non-host nation national? HN national?
5. What arrangement will be made for host nation or other ineligible persons who seek protection at Canadian evacuation facilities? Will there be containment areas? Is there a local evacuation plan to remove such persons from the immediate area to a place of safety? To whom can they be handed over?

A008. PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. *What is the Canadian Government's public affairs (PA) direction for this operation? What is DFAIT's PA strategy? What are the CF messages for this operation?*
2. Will the host nation's media support the NEO? If so, what coordination has taken place? What degree of coordination can be established between CF PA, HN media and Canadian media?
3. Is it intended to provide support from the CF TF to Canadian media (that is, access to communications link, provision of transport, etc)?
4. *Will Canadian media representatives be evacuated?*
5. Are there restricted access areas that exclude media representatives?
6. Will PA support be required at AP/EC/ES/DS?

A009. CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION

1. What role will CIMIC play in the evacuation?
2. Will interpreter support be available from the host nation or the embassy or high commission?

A010. SECURITY

1. Will the HN government be providing any security for evacuation facilities? If so, what are the details of such security (for example, location, time, description of security)?
3. What is the legal status of CF personnel *vis à vis* evacuees? Of CF personnel in general? Of security and military police (SAMP) in particular?
4. Will it be necessary to search the baggage and personal property of all evacuees for weapons and explosives?
5. What will constitute "contraband" among evacuee personal effects and baggage? What action will be taken concerning confiscation and disposition of contraband?
6. What is the policy regarding bomb, sniper and similar threats and immediate action drills for evacuees in the evacuation chain? Who will provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capability?
7. What discipline problems are expected from the evacuees? Who are the potential troublemakers? What action should be taken if there is an outbreak of violence among evacuees?

8. What arrangements are required to deal with criminal activity among evacuees in the course of the evacuation (for example, threats and intimidation, black market dealing)?
9. What is the policy concerning evacuees with contraband and the disposition of that contraband?
10. Who will be available to physically search females?
11. What is the policy for detaining host nation or third nation persons who penetrate the evacuation chain with a view to harming evacuees or otherwise disrupting the evacuation?
12. Is special support required to ensure that the initial screening process filters out undesirable persons such as criminals, subversives and opportunists (for example, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, Citizenship and Immigration Canada)?
13. Will security personnel be permitted to have weapons, non-lethal weapons and ammunition? If not, is there a plan to deliver such weapons and ammunition if required?
14. Is a general security operation required with a dedicated element to defend evacuation facilities, secure vital points on which the evacuation chain is dependent and provide a quick-reaction force?

A011. MARSHALLING

1. Will search parties be required to seek out and recover evacuees not yet in the evacuation chain?
2. What is the action if someone refuses evacuation?

A012. PROCESSING

1. What proof of citizenship is acceptable in establishing evacuee eligibility?
2. Who will conduct the initial screening to determine eligibility? DFAIT or CF? DFAIT with CF support?
3. Is a detailed processing instruction in effect? Does the embassy or high commission or the CF TF have all the required documents and equipment?
4. Who will conduct processing in general? Are there evacuees who can assist in processing (for example, wardens)?
5. Can detailed processing be postponed until evacuees are embarked?
6. Is a list of evacuees available?
7. Will the embassy or high commission be able to assign evacuation priorities before they schedule evacuation?
8. Are there any changes in the standard priorities for evacuation?
9. What is the policy concerning a listed mandatory evacuee refusing evacuation? A discretionary evacuee?
10. What is the policy concerning seriously ill, injured and wounded evacuees? Will they be given precedence over all other evacuees?
11. Will animals (pets) be transported?

A013 HANDLING

1. What Is The General Physical Condition Of Evacuees?
2. What essential administrative support is required to support evacuees – location, time, and quantity: accommodation, feeding (including special diet requirements), water, transport, health services, and amenities?
3. Do any special health threats exist, for example, biological or chemical? Are protective inoculation, gear and/or apparatus required?
4. What arrangements are required to handle evacuees with special needs (for example, non-ambulatory, limited mobility)?
5. Is psychological and emotional support required (for example, stress counselling, chaplain services)?

A014. MOVEMENT

1. Will host national terminals be functioning? Will the CF TF be required to conduct expedient terminal operations in addition to passenger movement functions?
2. What transportation means – CF and civilian -- are available? What is the capacity rate for each? What is the sortie rate for any aircraft?
3. Is aeromedical evacuation required?
4. If transfer of animals is permitted what special requirements are needed? Have restrictions concerning animals been identified at the safe haven location?

A015. ADMINISTRATION

1. What are the service support requirements of the evacuation chain? What are the personal needs of both the evacuation organization personnel and the evacuees (for example, accommodation, feeding, water, medical support, hygiene & sanitation)? What are the materiel requirements (for example, buildings and works repair and/or improvement)? Transport requirements within the host nation?
2. In the event of an evacuee death, what is the policy for disposition of the remains?

Note: These questions should form the basis of the Commander's Critical Information Requirements.

ANNEX B - SAMPLE DIPLOMATIC MISSION TASK FORCE LINK-UP CHECKLIST

This checklist is intended for use by the diplomatic mission as a means of gathering key information essential to the task force commander (TFC) and staff during early link-up and planning.

B001. KEY QUESTIONS

1. Names, titles and description of duties of key officials in the diplomatic mission. Name, title and contact information of the Canadian official in charge of the evacuation.
2. Canadian officials remaining behind: (attach list with names, means of contact).
3. Diplomatic mission officials available to assist in the processing and evacuation: (attach list, including name, probable location, means of identification, means of contact, probable function).
4. Where and at how many stations will the military be conducting screening and/or detailed processing of evacuees? Who will assist the military?
5. Is the environment permissive, uncertain, or hostile?
6. Perimeter security requirements (state them). Assembly Points (APs), Evacuation Centres (ECs) and Embarkation Sites (ES) (state them).
7. What security will the HN government or controlling authority provide?
8. Are alternate AP/EC/ES sites available if required?
9. Where is the diplomatic mission's contingency plan (CONPLAN) and supporting documentation for an evacuation operation held and who has custody of them?
10. Could unauthorized persons forcibly attempt to join the evacuation? If so, what action does the diplomatic mission recommend?
11. What action does the diplomatic mission propose if someone asks for political asylum?
12. Will the diplomatic mission's officer-in-charge vouch for the baggage of personal property of all or some evacuees or should a search for weapons and explosives be conducted?
13. Does the diplomatic mission want the military to physically search those evacuees the diplomatic mission cannot vouch for?
14. If it becomes necessary to physically search a woman, who can conduct the search?
15. If the evacuation priority is different than stated in the diplomatic mission's CONPLAN, what is the modified priority?
16. Will food be required? (State total meals required.)
17. Is potable water available? (State quantity of bottled water available.)
18. Does the diplomatic mission anticipate there will be Canadians who refuse evacuation?
19. What is the diplomatic mission's policy on evacuees taking pets? If pets are allowed to be transported, have requirements such as customs and quarantine restrictions been considered to ensure the pets will be allowed into the safe haven? If pets are not allowed to travel, what will happen to the pets evacuees bring with them to the EC?

20. Does the diplomatic mission anticipate that military personnel will be needed to search for missing evacuees? If so, in which areas are evacuees likely to be located. (Give telephone numbers and/or radio call sign frequencies, if known.)
21. Would a search party meet armed resistance?
22. Will the diplomatic mission require assistance to destroy sensitive materials and/or equipment?
23. What portable communications devices (categorized as mobile telephones and radios) are available to assist in the assembly, transfer, and control of evacuees? (State in terms of how many sets and, for radios, frequency ranges.)
24. Who will prepare evacuee rolls and evacuee passenger manifests? The diplomatic mission? The military? (State identity.)
25. What details are known about the following:
 - a. travel restrictions, curfews, and road blocks;
 - b. local security forces activities;
 - c. political or security factors affecting evacuation;
 - d. public information considerations; and
 - e. Canadian media in the host nation.
26. If interpreters are required, can the diplomatic mission provide them?
27. Is the diplomatic mission prepared to provide copies of the CONPLAN, particularly details of the evacuation plan, communications annex, service annexes (that is, supplies, transportation, medical, etc.), evacuation reference materials (for example, imagery, maps), and all information related to potential evacuee numbers, categories and priorities, and identity and residence?
28. How many evacuees are:
 - a. wounded, injured, or ill – litter cases;
 - b. wounded, injured, or ill – ambulatory; and
 - c. pregnant?
29. What medical assistance (including special equipment) will be required?
30. What is the breakdown of evacuees by age and sex?

SEX	0-7 YEARS	8-16 YEARS	17-20 YEARS	21+ YEARS
Male				
Female				

31. Will doctor(s) and nurse(s) be among the evacuees?
32. Will any influential religious or community leaders be among the evacuees?
33. What is the weight and volume of any sensitive materials or equipment requiring evacuation?
34. Will sufficient public affairs (PA) staff be available to the TF to assist with media and CF requirements in the host nation (HN) during the NEO?

B002. KEY INFORMATION

1. The diplomatic mission should be prepared to provide an intelligence estimate of the local situation and HN military status. In addition, the following information should be fully prepared in advance of an evacuation.

Evacuation Facility (AP, EC, ES):

1. Date this information was prepared.
2. Type and designation of evacuation facility.
3. Location –

	CIVIC ADDRESS	UTM GRID REFERENCE	LATITUDE-LONGITUDE (GPS)	REFERENCE POINTS
Primary Site				
Alternate Site				

4. Size and estimated capacity.
5. Shelter. (Describe enclosures, such as a building. For a building, describe heating and ventilation characteristics.)
6. Feeding –
 - a. cooking facilities;
 - b. food stocks (estimate person/days on hand);
 - c. water (estimate person/days on hand).
7. Latrine and shower facilities.
8. Security considerations.
9. Control point location.
10. Telephone number. Radio call sign (as per diplomatic mission evacuation plan).
11. Access and choke points.
12. Nearest police station.
13. Nearest medical facility.
14. Emergency power supply.
15. Distances and routes to adjoining evacuation facilities and the diplomatic mission.
16. Helicopter Landing Zone (if available): give designation and location (as per No.3, above).
17. Name, appointment, and contact information of the person who prepared this report.
18. Attachments:

SUPPORTING INFORMATION	YES	NO
Sketch		
Site and/or Floor Plan		
Photographs		
Videotape		
Other (Describe)		

Routes

1. Date this information was prepared.
2. Route designation.
3. Purpose of route. (Example: connection between AP [Designation] and EC [Designation]. Describe in terms of main flow of evacuees, that is, *from X to Y.*)
4. Description. (Include distance, directions, critical points, landmarks and reference points.)
5. Condition.
6. Bridges, overpasses, etc. State load limits and conditions.
7. Hazards, including choke points.
8. Bypasses.
9. Name, appointment and contact information of the person who prepared this report.
10. Attachments:

SUPPORTING INFORMATION	YES	NO
Sketch		
Map (General)		
Map (Strip)		
Photographs		
Videotape		
Other (Describe)		

Helicopter Landing Zone (HLZ)

1. Date this information was prepared.
2. HLZ designation.
3. Purpose of HLZ. (Example: to support EC [Designation], or MEDEVAC [Hospital].)
4. Location –

	CIVIC ADDRESS	UTM GRID REFERENCE	LATITUDE- LONGITUDE (GPS)	REFERENCE POINTS
HLZ				

5. Reference points.
6. Dimensions.
7. Surface.
8. Obstacles.
9. Recommended air approach(es).
10. Recommended ground approach(es).
11. Distance and route to supported facility.
12. Comments.
13. Name, appointment and contact information of the person who prepared this report.
14. Attachments:

SUPPORTING INFORMATION	YES	NO
Sketch		
Map (General)		
Photographs		
Videotape		
Other (Describe)		

Airfield Survey

1. Date this information was prepared.
2. Airfield name and evacuation plan designation.
3. Purpose of airfield in evacuation plan. (Example: main air extraction site.)
4. Location –

	CIVIC ADDRESS	UTM GRID REFERENCE	LATITUDE- LONGITUDE (GPS)	REFERENCE POINTS
Airfield				

5. Elevation.
6. Runway(s) – Length and width.
7. Runway(s) – surface composition and estimated single wheel loading factor, and condition.

8. Available parking area.
9. Largest aircraft that can be accommodated.
10. Material and passenger handling equipment.
11. Instrument approach facilities and navigation aids.
12. Aircraft obstacles.
13. Are runway(s) and taxiway(s) lighted?
14. Communications – frequencies and call signs used.
15. Physical security.
16. Is the airfield under civilian or military control?
17. Key contacts – names, appointments, telephone numbers or radio call signs (and net information).
18. Distances and routes from evacuation facilities (primary and alternate in each case) and diplomatic mission. (See “Routes”, above.)
19. On-site holding area capability and capacity. (See report for the ES for that site. If there is no ES at the airfield itself, prepare an evacuation facility report as if for an ES.)
20. Name, appointment and contact information of the person who prepared this report.
21. Attachments:

SUPPORTING INFORMATION	YES	NO
Sketch		
Map (General)		
Airfields and Seaplanes of the World Entry		
Photographs		
Videotape		
Other (Describe)		

Seaport Survey.

1. Date this information was prepared.
2. Seaport name and evacuation plan designation.
3. Purpose of seaport in evacuation plan. (For example, main surface extraction site.)
4. Location –

	CIVIC ADDRESS	UTM GRID REFERENCE	LATITUDE- LONGITUDE (GPS)	REFERENCE POINTS
Seaport				

5. Entrance restrictions and minimum anchorage.
6. Channel depth (by season).
7. Tide (by season).
8. Navigational aids.
9. Port or beach obstacles.
10. Are pilots required? Are pilots available?
11. Jetties, wharves, quays. (Describe in terms of length, width, type of construction, features such as sheds or cranes.)
12. Fuel availability and type.
13. Availability of small craft and/or lighters for ferrying between ship and shore.
14. HLZ. (See "Helicopter Landing Zone", above.)
15. Physical security features.
16. Key contacts – names, appointments, telephone numbers or radio call signs (and net information).
17. Distances and routes from evacuation facilities (primary and alternate in each case) and diplomatic mission. (See "Routes", above.)
18. On-site holding area capability and capacity. (See report for the ES for that site. If there is no ES at the airfield itself, prepare an evacuation facility report as if for an ES.)
19. Name, appointment and contact information of the person who prepared this report.
20. Attachments:

SUPPORTING INFORMATION	YES	NO
Sketch		
Map (General)		
Nautical Chart		
Port Entry Information		
Photographs		
Videotape		
Other (Describe)		

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CHAPTER 5 COALITION OPERATIONS

501. STRUCTURE OF A COALITION OPERATION

1. Depending on the scope of the mission, land, sea, air and special operations force (SOF) components, logistics and communications support may all be included in a coalition operation. Nations will contribute to the coalition force HQ staff and operational components in accordance with alliance agreements or as agreed at meetings of troop contributing nations (TCNs). The Force Commander (FC) is usually an officer of the nation contributing the largest number of forces to the operation. A typical combined force structure is illustrated below.




Figure 5-1 Organization of Coalition Force involving Canadian Forces

502. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. With the exception of single ship deployments, when one or more elements of the Canadian Forces (CF) operate as part of a combined force, a task force (TF) will be established. If elements of two or more Environments of the CF are involved the TFC will be considered a JTFC. As this is an international contingency operation, command and control (C2) of the TF would normally be executed by the Commander and staff of the Joint Operations Group (JOG). Forces generated will normally be assigned OPCOM to the JTFC. The exception to this rule may be CF SOF elements which may be OPCOM to the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) vice the JTFC.

2. **Logistics.** Generally, in a coalition NEO administrative and logistics support remains a national responsibility. In some instances mutual support arrangements are agreed between TCNs and host nation support (HNS) agreements are made.

503. ROE FOR COALITION NEO

1. Rule of engagement (ROE) for combined operations will be as agreed by TCNs, reviewed and approved for use by Canadian forces in accordance with CF doctrine. For more detail see Chapter 2 of B-GJ-005-501/FP-000, *The Use of Force in CF Operations (Revision 1)*.

504. COALITION DOCTRINE

1. Individual nations have their own national doctrines for NEO. The doctrines of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States are summarized in Annex A.

ANNEX A - SYNOPSIS OF DIFFERENCES IN NEO DOCTRINE

This annex describes differences between Canadian, Australian, United Kingdom (UK), and United States (US) NEO doctrine.

EVACUATION CHAIN TERMINOLOGY			
Canada	Australia	UK	US
Standing Task Force	Crisis Planning Committee	Consular Emergency Unit	
Consular Emergency Contingency Plan	Consular Contingency Plan	Civil Contingency Plan	Emergency Action Plan (EAP)
		Reception Centre (RC)	
Assembly Points (AP)	Evacuation Assembly Area (EAA)	Evacuation Point	Assembly Area
Evacuation Centre (EC)	Evacuation Handling Centre (EHC)	Evacuee Handling Centre (EHC)	Evacuation Control Center (ECC)
Forward Mounting Base (FMB)	Forward Mounting Base (FMB)	Forward Mounting Base (FMB)	Intermediate Staging Base (ISB)
Safe Haven	Reception Point (RP)	Safe Haven	Safe Haven

For differences in categorization of evacuees see the appropriate appendix.

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
ANNEX A - APPENDIX 1 - AUSTRALIAN EVACUATION OPERATIONS
(adapted from ADFP 43)

A101. DEFINITIONS

1. Some other key definitions for Australian non-combatant evacuation operations are as follows:
 - a. **Special Recovery Operations (SRO).** Operations undertaken by special forces to rescue personnel or equipment from hostile territory, and return them to safe areas.

A102. COMPONENTS

1. The major components of an Australian evacuation operation are:
 - a. **Emergency Response Plan (ERP).** The military portion of an overseas post's Consular Contingency Plan (CCP). It forms the basis of the NEO.
 - b. **Evacuation Assembly Area (EAA).** Location at which evacuees normally first assemble prior to onward movement to the evacuation handling centre.
 - c. **Evacuation Handling Centre (EHC).** Location where evacuees are processed and held prior to onward movement to the evacuation point (EP). It is best to be co-located with the EP.
 - d. **Evacuation Point (EP).** The point from which the evacuees depart – can be air, land or sea. Can also be known as a Point of Departure (POD).
 - e. **Point of Entry (POE).** The place at which the evacuation force enters a nation before moving to its final destination.
 - f. **Reception Point (RP).** The place, either in Australia or in a safe third nation, where the evacuees are landed and processed.



Australian Evacuation Chain

ANNEX A - APPENDIX 2 - BRITISH NEO (adapted from JWP 3-51)

A201. COMPONENTS

1. The major components of a British NEO are:
 - a. **Forward Mounting Base.** Forward Mounting Base (FMB) is a secure base, port or airfield, from which an operation may be launched. It is normally, but not necessarily, external to the theatre of operations and may be an essential stepping stone into the theatre. An FMB should have the capacity for an insertion force to form-up within it and subsequently to be able to handle reinforcements, reserves and evacuees. Depending on the scale of an operation, the FMB may also be required to provide Third and/or Fourth Line support.
 - b. **Forward Operating Base.** Forward Operating Base (FOB) is a base established within the operational area, to support tactical operations. It will be resourced to provide minimum services commensurate with sustaining the required level of effort.
 - c. **Warden System.** The Warden System is a network of volunteers, usually selected from among well-known members of the British community, known as wardens, who act as a point of contact between HM Representative and the wider British community. They pass information and instructions by a cascade system with each warden usually being responsible for no more than 20 families.
 - d. **Civil Contingency Plan.** Civil Contingency Plan (CCP), produced by the Embassy/High Commission, establishes the Warden System and provides a procedure for an orderly evacuation if required.
 - e. **Reception Centre.** Reception Centres (RCs) are pre-designated sites, selected by Her Majesty (HM) Representative as part of the CCP, where UK Entitled Personnel (UKEP) enter the evacuation chain and are gathered by their local warden.
 - f. **Evacuation Point.** Evacuation Points (EvPts) are sites where the wardens deliver the UKEP for extraction and where the military assume responsibility. They are selected by HM Representative, often with military advice and are normally designated in the CCP.
 - g. **Evacuation Handling Centre (EHC).** The primary purpose of the EHC is to organize the onward movement of the UKEP to a place of safety. It will also provide a screening facility to ensure that only entitled evacuees are moved and will have the administrative arrangements needed for the provision of adequate medical and logistic support.
 - h. **Place of Safety.** Place of safety is where UKEP exit the evacuation chain and are no longer reliant on diplomatic or military assistance. There will be a number of different places of safety dependent on the needs and perceptions of individual UKEP.


A202. CLASSIFICATION OF ENTITLED PERSONS

1. An Embassy's primary responsibility is for the safety of its own nationals. However, many embassies also have responsibility for other nationalities without diplomatic representation in country. As an example, for contingency planning purposes, the UK has responsibility for the following:
 - a. All British nationals including dual nationals (although some categories of British nationals may require immigration clearance to enter and remain in the UK).
 - b. The UK may also have responsibility for unrepresented EU nationals, unrepresented Commonwealth nationals (Australian, New Zealand, Canadian and other) and /or American nationals. All other

nationalities are included on a space available basis and subject to guarantees from their respective governments to repay any evacuation costs.

2. It is UK policy not to split families in an evacuation. This means that the UK would take responsibility for immediate family members (spouse and dependent children) whatever their nationality, assuming local authorities would allow them to leave.

*These classifications have been proposed as part of an amendment to JWP 3-51.




3. UK NEO CONCEPT: The requirement is to receive evacuees into the chain, to process and to screen them as early as possible, and then to move them possibly through a number of points within the country and then to a place of safety. The focus should be on the functions rather than geography.


ANNEX A - APPENDIX 3 - US NEO
(Adapted from JP 3-07.5)

A301. COMPONENTS

1. The major components of a US NEO are as follows:
 - a. **Intermediate Staging Base.** Temporary location used to stage forces prior to inserting the forces into the host nation.
 - b. **Warden System.** An informal method of communication used to pass information to US citizens during emergencies.
 - c. **Marshalling Element.** The element, consisting of marshalling teams, that locates evacuees and moves them to assembly areas and eventually to the ECC.
 - d. **Marshalling Team.** Marshalling team controls an assembly area and evacuates the citizens in that area. The marshalling teams are organized into two sections: search squads and security squads. Search squads may not be needed if the Embassy's evacuation plan has been successfully implemented. When necessary the search squads locate evacuees and escort them to the assembly area.
 - e. **Evacuation Control Center (ECC).** The ECC supports the Department of State (DOS), which conducts processing, screening, and selected logistic functions associated with emergency evacuation of non-combatants. Size and composition of the ECC will be determined by the number of evacuees, evacuation environment and location of the evacuation area.
 - f. **Temporary Safe Haven.** Location, designated by the DOS, in an area or country to which evacuees may be moved quickly and easily. A temporary safe haven may be required if adequate transportation is not available to move all evacuees directly from the evacuation sites to the United States or where a US Navy ship has been used as an intermediate safe haven.
 - g. **Safe Haven.** Designated area(s) to which non-combatants of the United States Government's responsibility, and commercial vehicles and materiel, may be evacuated during a domestic or other valid emergency.



US CLASSIFICATION OF EVACUEES	
MAJOR CATEGORY	DESCRIPTION
I	American citizens.
II	Alien immediate family members of American citizens.
III	Foreign Service Nationals and Third Country National employees of the US Government.
IV	Eligible non-Americans, who are seriously ill, injured, or whose lives are in imminent peril (but who do not qualify for a higher priority).
V	Others eligible (as directed by the Ambassador or JF Comd).
MINOR CATEGORY	DESCRIPTION
A	Pregnant women.
B	Unaccompanied children under 18.
C	Aged and infirm.
D	Adults with children.
E	Adults 18 or older.



US Evacuation Chain

GLOSSARY

Advance Party

The first TF elements to arrive in the HN to link up with the diplomatic mission, continue detailed planning, and mark preparations for the arrival of the TF main body. The advance party consists of two parts, which may deploy together or independently: the Forward Command Element and the Evacuation Point Party.

Ambassador

A diplomatic minister of the highest order and the senior-ranking Canadian diplomatic official accredited to a state. (In Commonwealth countries, the Canadian ambassador is known as the high commissioner for Canada.) The ambassador or high commissioner is normally the Head-of-Mission.

Assembly Point (AP)

An evacuation facility, normally first in the evacuation chain. The AP is the formal gateway to the evacuation chain. Basic screening commences with emphasis on identification and entitlement, security, and medical.

Canadian Citizen

Strictly speaking, a person holding Canadian citizenship. The term may nonetheless include people with varying legal standing in Canada, including landed immigrants and bearers of visas (such as work or student visas). The term "Canadian Citizen" must always be defined when specifying eligible evacuees.

Canadian Entitled Persons (CEP)

Canadian citizens (civilian but also military personnel classified as non-combatant and non-essential), categories of persons holding legal status in Canada (ranging from landed immigrants to various visa holders) as specified by the Canadian Government, and designated third-country nationals and HN persons as specified by the Canadian Government, deemed to be eligible applicants for evacuation. The exact definition of CEP is confirmed for each specific NEO.

Consular, Consul, Consulate

The consular function concerns the provision of services to Canadian citizens abroad. It is one of the main functions of the diplomatic mission and is normally the element of the diplomatic mission that handles Canadian community affairs (including the Canadian community register and warden system) and evacuation planning. Some states without a resident Canadian embassy or high commission have consulates, while others have consular offices with honorary consuls. The exact nature of a consulate or consular office and its senior officer, and their relationship to the accredited ambassador or high commissioner, must be determined early in the course of NEO planning.

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)

Within the Canadian Government, the lead department in evacuation operations outside of Canada. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is the lead minister in the event of an evacuation operation. DFAIT operates all Canadian diplomatic missions.

Diplomatic Mission

For the purpose of this publication, a diplomatic mission is assumed to be an embassy or high commission accredited to the HN. Caution is required in the use of this term. There may be occasions when a resident subordinate branch of a non-resident embassy or high commission is capable of and authorized to carry out the embassy or high commission's evacuation functions on its behalf. This is unlikely to affect the ultimate responsibilities of the Head-of-Mission. Additionally, other offices with diplomatic status are maintained by DFAIT and may be referred to as diplomatic missions in other contexts, but which are unable to act in place of a resident embassy or high commission.

Disembarkation Site (DS)

An evacuation facility, the last in the evacuation chain. The DS is the hand-over point at the safe haven

where evacuees are passed from the custody of the evacuation organization to that of the follow-on authority.

Embarkation Site (ES)

An evacuation facility, normally the third or fourth in the evacuation chain. The ES is the final passenger preparation and embarkation facility. From the ES, evacuees embark on to transport for removal to the safe haven.

Embassy

An embassy is the charge of an ambassador. A high commission and high commissioner have this same status, a high commission being the embassy of one country which is a member of the Commonwealth to another member country. The ambassador is the head-of-mission.

Entry/Withdrawal Operations

The operation and activities pertaining to the deployment of the TF into the area of operations in the HN, and its extraction at the end of the mission. Such operations range from non-tactical and administrative movements (in a highly permissive environment) to tactical operations facilitated by "type" operations (for example, air landing, amphibious).

Evacuation Centre (EC)

An evacuation facility, normally the second or third in the evacuation chain. The EC is the main processing facility, where basic screenings are conducted (or completed) and detailed processing takes place. The EC must act as an Assembly Point for evacuees proceeding directly to it from their place of residence.

Evacuation Chain

The system formed from a combination of evacuee management functions and evacuation facilities – AP, EC, ES and DS -- through which evacuees proceed from initial assembly to hand-over to the follow-on authority at the final safe haven.

Evacuation Point Party (EPP)

The EPP is the reconnaissance party for the evacuation chain. It reconnoitres and assesses requirements for each evacuation facility, routes and associated terminals. If no proposed evacuation chain plans exist, the EPP will develop a plan. The EPP will also reconnoitre the battle space in general, including assembly areas, landing and/or drop zones, helicopter landing zones, surface entry zones for waterborne forces, and routes. The EPP will also establish liaison with Canadian agencies in the AO, other evacuation forces, and relevant HN agencies.

Evacuee Management Functions

Essential functions related directly to the evacuee and performed continuously throughout the evacuation chain.

Flow Rate

The number of evacuees who pass through a particular evacuation facility or the evacuation chain as a whole in a specified period of time. The key factors in assessing the flow rate are the key factors are the estimated number of evacuees, the time window for evacuation (that is, period from start to finish), evacuation units (number, capacity, sorties), evacuation facilities; and various miscellaneous factors.

Follow-on Authority

The Canadian Government organization that assumes custody of the evacuees from the TF at the safe haven and *before* formal entry into Canada.

Forward Command Element (FCE)

The first element of the TF to deploy. It is assigned to the diplomatic mission and may represent strategic-

level command interests in addition to the TF pending arrival of the latter in the AO. The tasks of the FCE include the following: link up with the diplomatic mission; establish communications between the AO and strategic- and operational-level headquarters in Canada; review DFAIT plans and arrangements with a view to informing higher headquarters (particularly the NEO TFC) and integrating diplomatic mission- TF planning; establish liaison as appropriate with other armed forces in the AO (Canadian, like-minded nations, HN); and gather information.

Handling

All provisions and arrangements for the custody and care of the evacuees, both physical and psychological, while they are in the evacuation chain. Additionally, handling includes the manner in which evacuation officials (including CF personnel) transact with evacuees at all times.

Handling Services

There are two aspects of handling. Physical Services are transfer, accommodation, feeding, medical care, provision of amenities, escort techniques and personal kit issue. Psychological Services are concerned with the evacuees' mental and emotional treatment and include information efforts (such as briefings and timely responses to questions), counselling and chaplaincy services, and the inter-personal dimension governing evacuees and members of the evacuation organization.

Head-of-Mission (HOM)

The senior Canadian Government official in charge of a diplomatic mission. For the purposes of this publication, the HOM is assumed to be an ambassador or high commissioner at an embassy or high commission.

High Commissioner

The title given to the Canadian ambassador to a Commonwealth state. The full term is "High Commissioner for Canada", and the term "ambassador" is not used.

Holding Capacity

The maximum number of evacuees that can be held and serviced at one time in an evacuation capacity. Once the holding capacity is exceeded, the evacuation facility cannot accept additional evacuees from evacuation facilities upstream in the evacuation chain. Each evacuation facility has a normal holding capacity rated with normal services, and a surge capacity at reduced services.

Hostile Environment

Hostile forces have control and the intent and capability to effectively obstruct and interfere with a NEO for the purpose of embarrassing Canada or the HN government, or to prevent a successful evacuation. Evacuees will be removed under conditions ranging from civil disorder or terrorist action to full-scale combat.

Movement

Movement is the final removal of the evacuee from the area of disturbance and his or her conveyance to the Evacuation Final Point in the final safe haven. Movement excludes transfer between evacuation facilities within the area of operation, which is an aspect of handling.

Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO)

A military operation conducted to assist the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in evacuating Canadians and selected non-Canadians from threatening circumstances in a foreign HN and moving them to a safe haven (Cdn Defn).

Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO)

A non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) is an operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety (NATO – AAP-6).

Permissive Environment

The HN government has control such that law and order are upheld in the intended AO, and the government has both the intent and capability to assist the NEO. Therefore, no obstruction of or interference with evacuation operations is expected. HN support (HNS) in administrative terms will be made available.

Preparatory Operations

Operations and activities to erect and operate facilities located between Canada and the area of operations.

Processing, Detailed

Processing conducted subsequent to screening. There are four main areas of detailed processing: Health (identify health conditions or problems that require either immediate or eventual attention during the term of the evacuation), Handling (identify conditions or problems that require special provision during the term of the evacuation), Welfare (identify conditions or problems related to an evacuee's personal circumstances beyond his or her immediate situation in the chain), and Debriefing (obtain information concerning the HN situation in general, conditions related to the evacuation chain, and unaccounted CEP).

Processing, Rapid

Screening and highly-condensed detailed processing conducted in the area of operations prior to removal of evacuees from a particularly unstable or unsafe environment. Detailed processing resumes in the safe haven after removal.

Processing

The collection, collation and dissemination of information related to the evacuees. Processing includes screening, which is initial processing intended to admit to or eliminate from the evacuation chain each applicant who seeks entry.

Safe Haven (SH)

Designated safe area outside of the area of disturbance and usually outside the area of operation to which evacuees are removed.

Screening

The initial stage of processing intended to admit to or eliminate from the evacuation chain each person who seeks entry to it.

Search Party

A military detachment from the TF sent to locate and collect CEP.

Supporting Operations

Operations that facilitate and assist the NEO, but are not integral to it.

Temporary Safe Haven

A temporary location outside the HN to which evacuees are removed from the AO. Simultaneously, it is a staging and trans-shipment point during the evacuees' repatriation to the safe haven, and therefore a holding facility. It may be an Evacuation Unit, such as a ship. If the basic evacuation operation has been conducted under pressure and evacuation chain re-arrangement is necessary, the Evacuation Control Centre may be erected and operate there, or some portion of detailed processing may be conducted while in the temporary safe haven. The temporary safe haven may also be the location of the Evacuation Final Point, and therefore the terminus of the evacuation chain. See "Evacuation Chain".

Transfer

A handling function. The movement of evacuees between evacuation facilities in the evacuation chain.

Uncertain Environment

The HN government, whether opposed to or supportive of the NEO, does not have total effective control of the territory and population in the intended AO. HN governmental co-operation and HNS may be limited or non-existent. There is a possibility of obstruction and interference on the part of individuals, crowds or mobs, or organized factions. The possibility of escalation leading to a hostile environment must be considered in planning.

Warden System

An informal system of information passing from the diplomatic mission to members of the Canadian community in the HN. It is based on the use of "wardens", who are volunteer members of the Canadian community in the HN who pass information to designated Canadians, assist in evacuee assembly, and may assist in processing once they enter the evacuation chain.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AO	Area of Operations	JIPB	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
AP	Assembly Point	JTF	Joint Task Force
APOE	Air Port of Embarkation	JTFC	Joint Task Force Commander
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation	JOG	Joint Operations Group
C2	Command-&-Control	LZ	Landing Zone
CCRA	Canada Customs and Revenue Agency	LO	Liaison Officer
CDA	Canadian Defence Attaché	MAT	Mission Activation Team
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff	MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
CEP	Canadian Entitled Personnel		
CF	Canadian Forces	NCE	National Command Element
CF OPP	CF Operational Planning Process	NDHQ	National Defence HQ
CIC	Citizenship and Immigration Canada	NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
CJTF	Combined-Joint Task Force	NEO TF	NEO Task Force
CONPLAN	Contingency Operation Plan	NEO TFC	NEO Task Force Commander
CPKO	Complex Peacekeeping Operation	NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
CSIS	Canadian Security Intelligence Service	NSE	National Support Element
CSS	Combat Service Support	OGD	Other Government Department
DCDS	Deputy Chief of Defence Staff	OIC	Officer-in-Charge
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade	OPLAN	Operation Plan
DIRLAUTH	Direct Liaison Authorized	OP O	Operation Order
DND	Department of National Defence	PA	Public Affairs
DS	Disembarkation Site	POC	Point-of-Contact
DZ	Drop Zone	POE	Point of Entry
EC	Evacuation Centre	PSO	Peace Support Operation
EPP	Evacuation Point Party	PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
ES	Embarkation Site	RCI	Radio Canada International
FCE	Forward Command Element	RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
FMB	Forward Mounting Base	ROCA	Register of Canadians Abroad
FOB	Forward Operating Base	ROE	Rules of Engagement
HLZ	Helicopter Landing Zone	SAMP	Security and Military Police
HN	Host Nation	SH	Safe Haven
HNS	Host Nation Support	SIOP	Standing Instructions and Operations Procedures (for NEO)
HOM	Head-of-Mission	SOF	Special Operation Forces
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization	SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
IMS	Information Management System	SOP	Standing Operating Procedure

STF	Standing Task Force (DFAIT)
TCN	Troop Contributing Nations
TF	Task Force
TG	Task Group
TSSU	Tactical Self-Sustaining Units
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
VOA	Voice of America

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