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PREFACE

1. This manual, *Peace Support Operations*, B-GJ-005-307/FP-030, was prepared in response to the Report of the Somalia Inquiry. It has been in formal development for two years. Previous Canadian manuals have focussed solely on what is now called traditional peacekeeping. This manual takes a broader approach to the issue of peacekeeping in line with its modern, multi-disciplinary requirements.
2. This manual differs from many current manuals on peace support operations (PSO) in several key ways:
 - a. It breaks from the common convention of dividing PSO by the Chapter of the United Nations (UN) Charter under which the Security Council mandates them: the academic division of PSO into peacekeeping (Ch 6) or peace enforcement (Ch 7). A study of the historical record does not provide this easy and clear distinction. Conversely, it makes sense to group them by the typical tasks that are performed during the mission. Here there is a clear distinction between those things done in a traditional peacekeeping mission, like Cyprus, and a modern mission that tries to stem a complex emergency, like Sierra Leone. The term peace enforcement has muddied the understanding of when the UN actually carries out a pure enforcement action, such as UNITAF. The terms used in this manual are "traditional peacekeeping operations" and "complex peacekeeping operations". The third type of UN sanctioned operation is termed enforcement.
 - b. It groups responses to complex emergencies as simply complex peacekeeping operations. Each such operation will be uniquely organized for the situation on the ground. This manual does not filter complex operations into "generational" categories as it serves little purpose.
 - c. It introduces the concept that PSO are not on a continuum but that the tasks carried out are. The typical security tasks associated with PSO may be found in any type of mission.
 - d. Finally, the concept of a force surge, not simply additional forces for theatre activation, at the start of a complex operation is introduced.
3. Where feasible the reforms suggested by the August 2000 Brahimi Report are included. As the proposed reforms are actually implemented they will be included in future changes to this manual.
4. This manual is intended to guide the Canadian Force's participation in peace support operations. As doctrine, this manual is authoritative but requires judgement in application.

FOREWORD

1. This manual outlines the Canadian approach to peace support operations (PSO). It is designed for use by the following:
 - a. Commanders and their staffs at the strategic and operational levels;
 - b. The Joint Staff (J Staff) at NDHQ;
 - c. Task forces established for PSO, as well as all formations and agencies supporting such operations; and
 - d. Command and staff colleges and other teaching institutions within the framework for officer professional development.
2. This manual is presented in nine chapters. Chapter 1 - describes the main actors that will be encountered on international operations. Chapter 2 - outlines the types of PSO and their key principles. Chapter 3 – lays out basic mission strategy and highlights key mission capabilities. Chapter 4 – broadly outlines the tasks in PSO including humanitarian assistance and peace building tasks. Chapter 5 – describes the conduct of specific missions. Chapter 6 – outlines operational planning consideration while Chapter 7 details command and control. Chapter 8 – covers logistic aspects of PSO. Chapter 9 – gives an overview of some of the training requirements.
3. This manual is to be used in conjunction with the *CF Operations Manual*, B-GG-005-300/AF-000 and other CF manuals.
4. Comments and recommendations for changes should be forward to the custodian: J7 Doctrine.
5. The Canadian Forces Doctrine Board is the ratification authority for this doctrine.

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CHAPTER 1

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

SECTION I - CANADA AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

101. GENERAL

1. The complex security problems confronted today defy easy solutions. Often the international community is required to respond to humanitarian emergencies in fragile or failed states where governance and the rule of law are weak or non-existent. Resolving these emergencies and the often-accompanying conflicts requires a broad range of nation building activities and long-term commitment.

2. The United Nations (UN) is the primary organization through which Canada seeks to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. A broad range of mechanisms is employed by the UN to achieve these ends, including enforcement and peace support operations. Peace support operations (PSOs) include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building. A variety of military response options support these mechanisms.

102. CANADA AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

1. Canada is well known for its desire to promote international peace and security as the stability of the world directly affects the economy and the quality of life of Canadian citizens. The Canadian government strongly supports the Human Security Agenda: the right for all people in the world to live in peace, harmony and justice. Canada has promoted the development of institutions, particularly multi-lateral ones, that prevent violations of human rights, conduct conflict prevention, support international peace and security and a limited number that possess a capability to respond to aggression. As described in the 1994 Defence White Paper, Canada willingly works with other countries to improve the lot of the world's population regardless of where they live.

2. Military force is one means that Canada can use to promote its national aims. Canada regularly contributes forces to alliances and coalitions, within both Europe and other regions. The UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are the two most important organizations under which Canada participates in multilateral interventions. It serves Canadian national interests to remain engaged with these organizations.

3. Both these organizations are revising their crisis management procedures to improve their capabilities to respond to complex emergencies. The UN is promoting a broader application of conflict prevention combined with adopting many of the detailed recommendations to improve peacekeeping contained in the Brahimi Report. NATO has accepted obligations beyond the territorial defence focus of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Called "Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations" (NA5 CRO), peace support operations are included in this grouping.

103. PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1. Peace missions have changed dramatically from the Cold War constrained template. The traditional peacekeeping orientation and tasks were ill suited to assist in the resolution of post-1988 complex emergencies. Many difficult lessons had been learned by 1996 but enthusiasm for new missions waned in the late 1990's. Since the Brahimi Report was issued, there has been renewed emphasis on improving the delivery of UN services.

2. Few peace support operations now follow the traditional template. Both the military and civil requirements in modern multi-disciplinary peace support operations far exceed those of traditional missions. The wider range of military tasks can include assisting in disarmament and demobilization, monitoring of elections, de-mining assistance, restoration of infrastructure and conducting concurrent enforcement operations.

3. The planning and conduct of military activity in PSO will usually be a joint and, when appropriate, be coordinated activity with civilian agencies. Maritime and air forces may have particular diplomatic, deterrent, enforcement or intelligence gathering functions while land forces will generally conduct the detailed control of the operation at the tactical level. Maritime and air forces will thus help create the conditions for the conduct of land operations and their joint efforts will be designed to create an environment that assists the civilian agencies to achieve their mission. Civil agencies include the various UN bodies, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), international organizations (IOs), such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as CARE Canada.

SECTION II - THE UNITED NATIONS

104. GENERAL

1. The United Nations (UN) is the primary, internationally recognized authority dedicated to upholding international peace and security. This responsibility resides with the UN Security Council (UN SC) though on some occasions the UN General Assembly (UN GA) has played a role.
2. Canada supports an active and engaged United Nations. Canada has consistently supported efforts to improve the fielding of UN missions and strongly supports institutional change at UN HQ, New York, that will streamline and promote the planning and execution of missions.

105. THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

1. The United Nations Charter assigns the Security Council the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, a crucial role. The Charter provides the terms of reference for the various elements of the UN and for regional arrangements and agencies in fulfilling these responsibilities. Although the Charter makes no specific reference to peacekeeping, a mechanism that came into being through common practice, the three chapters, which most relate to PSO are the following:
 - a. **Chapter VI** - dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes;
 - b. **Chapter VII** - referring to such actions by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security; and
 - c. **Chapter VIII** - regional arrangements (See Annex A for specific details of these chapters of the UN Charter).
2. Peace support operations and enforcement actions are organized within the bounds of these three chapters of the Charter. Traditional peacekeeping mission, as well as conflict preventions and peacemaking activities, are normally established under Chapter VI. Complex peacekeeping operations and enforcement action, both requiring coercive force, are normally established under Chapter VII. As peacekeeping has evolved in the last decade the UN has placed greater emphasis on the early involvement of regional organizations in conflict prevention and in some specific missions their provision of the core forces.

106. ESTABLISHING A MISSION

1. **Early Warning.** At the strategic level, the Secretary-General's Executive Committee on Peace and Security, consisting of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, the Emergency Relief Co-ordinator (ERC) and the representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, meet as required to review crises. Reports from the UN's early warning system or those established by regional agencies are reviewed. The key elements of any UN response to a crisis will generally consist of elements from the following departments (for the general UN organization see Annex B):
 - a. **The Department of Peacekeeping Operations.** The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is responsible for the planning, preparation, conduct and direction of all UN PSO.
 - b. **The Department of Political Affairs.** The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) provides advice and support on all political matters to the Secretary General.
 - c. **The Emergency Relief Co-ordinator.** The ERC is the UN's principal policy advisor, co-ordinator and advocate on humanitarian issues. The mission of the ERC is to mobilize and co-ordinate the collective efforts of the international community to meet the needs of those exposed to suffering in disasters and emergencies, and to ensure the response is rapid, effective and integrated. The ERC and his office, the Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), are also responsible for the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).

- d. **The High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR).** The HCHR is increasingly involved in PSO as the scale of human rights abuses justifies a separate element within the mission.
 - e. **The High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR).** The HCR and his office, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, will often take the lead in responding to crises where a refugee problem is paramount.
2. **Mission Lead Element.** There are many UN, international, and inter-governmental organizations, which may be actively engaged in a crisis area. One or another organ of the United Nations is normally the lead agency for international involvement in a particular country. If refugees and relief assistance are the main issues, for example, the lead agency may be either OCHA or UNHCR. Specialized agencies within the UN system, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) or the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), will often also play a key role in complex emergencies. These specialized agencies generally have subsidiary regional organizations that also could come into play. If necessary, the UN Security Council can also give its proxy to an individual country, a group of countries or a specific organization that then organizes and conducts the operation in accordance with the UN resolution. Depending on the nature of the mission, different agencies may be appointed as the lead element for specific components of the overall campaign plan.
3. **Mission Planning, Monitoring and Reporting.** The DPKO is the operational arm of the UN Secretariat for all UN PSO and is responsible for their conduct, management, direction, planning and preparation. Planning is carried out within DPKO through the combined efforts of the Office of Operations, the Military Division, the Civilian Police Division and the Office of Mission Support (see Chapter 7 for structural details). DPKO co-ordinates planning with other UN agencies for new missions through the establishment of integrated mission task forces (IMTF). DPA ensures that political direction provided to a PSO takes full account of the regional dimension of a conflict. DPKO relies on OCHA and other agencies to provide the necessary support for humanitarian and peace building related activities common to complex emergencies.
4. **Security Council – Seized of the Issue.** With appropriate information the UN SC can recognize that a threat to international security is developing and it can decide that it will remain seized of the issue, that is, maintain it on its agenda, until it is resolved. The UN SC will usually call on the UN Secretary-General (UN Sec Gen) to submit a report to the Council on any particular situation that it considers to be affecting international peace and security. Such reports will provide information as to the background of a conflict, the current situation, political developments, the military situation, potential role of the UN, view of the parties and other relevant information upon which the Council will be able to base its decision in considering possible courses of action. The UN Sec Gen may be requested by the Council to make recommendations as to a UN role: peacekeeping operation, fact-finding mission, mediation role, observer mission, humanitarian relief, etc. The UN SC resolution authorizing a peacekeeping operation will be based, ordinarily, upon such a report from the UN Sec Gen.

107. THE MANDATE

1. The UN SC or UN GA resolutions authorizing and defining a PSO is referred to as the mandate. The mandate is the authority under which a PSO is conducted. It is subject to periodic renewal and/or amendment. The mandate is usually prepared in a climate of crisis. Its preparation involves a great amount of diplomatic negotiation and compromise. Political consideration will often conflict with military operational requirements. The mandate is, therefore, often the result of a series of compromises. Ideally, the mandate should be acceptable to all parties (including troop-contributing nations). As a general rule, the clearer and more detailed the mandate, the easier it will be to determine the tasks required to fulfill it. Ideally, it should be flexible enough for peacekeeping forces to have freedom of action and movement.
2. The UN SC resolution usually includes the following:
 - a. The role of the PSO,
 - b. The mission of the PSO organization,

- c. The tasks or functions to be performed,
 - d. The size and organization of the force or mission, and
 - e. The time limit of the mandate.
3. **Non-UN Mandates.** Non-UN mandates usually result from treaties, accords, resolutions or agreements authorized by other international or regional organizations. The aim of these is the same as UN mandates to create a peacekeeping force (PKF) or mission to resolve a conflict. The contents of a non-UN mandate should be the similar to a UN mandate. Most international organizations seek sanction from the UN for their mandated missions.

108. SOVEREIGNTY

1. Prior to 1990, PSO were established fully respecting most, if not all, aspects of state sovereignty. The end of the Cold War has brought less restraint in the use of force by many non-state actors in many modern intra-state conflicts. The UN now more fully involves itself in intra-state conflicts. As well described in the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, nation states have certain fundamental obligations to their citizens. If a state fails to carry out these obligations to the extent where there is serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, in particular, large-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing, the UN may mandate intervention.

109. KEY UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES IN HUMANITARIAN CRISES

1. Four UN entities -- UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF and UNDP -- have primary roles in protection and providing assistance in humanitarian crises (see Annex C for greater detail).
- a. **UNICEF.** In acute emergencies, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) works alongside other relief agencies to help re-establish basic services such as water and sanitation, set up schools, and provide immunization services, medicines and other supplies to uprooted populations.
 - b. **UNHCR.** The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provides international protection and assistance to people who have fled war or persecution, both refugees and returnees, and internally displaced persons.
 - c. **WFP.** In emergencies, the World Food Programme (WFP) provides fast, efficient, self-sustaining relief to millions of people who are victims of natural or man-made disasters, including refugees and the internally displaced.
 - d. **UNDP.** The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the agency responsible for coordinating activities for natural disaster mitigation, prevention and preparedness.

SECTION III - REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

110. GENERAL

1. Some of the more demanding modern peace support missions have proven to be beyond the capabilities of the UN NY to organize and command as it has no inherent warfighting capability. The UN now encourages regional organizations to assume greater responsibilities for resolving conflicts especially when the need for credible combat power is evident.

2. There are advantages and disadvantages to this “contracting-out” of more robust peacekeeping to regional organizations. The advantages include: they possess a local self-interest in promoting regional stability; they will have greater familiarity with the culture and language in the area; a more rapid force projection capability with acclimatized soldiers is possible; and the capacity to field a coordinated regional response is ensured. Disadvantages include concerns over the influence on the organization’s actions exerted by the regional hegemonic state and problems with traditional local inter-state rivalries.

3. Not all regional organizations possess the same capabilities to respond to conflict. In many cases conflict prevention and response mechanisms are just now slowly being developed. A regional organization may not have experience with mounting, commanding and sustaining multinational joint operations. In addition, differences in doctrine, training and equipment might make effective combined operations difficult.

111. EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS

1. **Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE).** The OSCE plays an essential role in promoting peace and stability, enhancing co-operative security and advancing democracy and human rights in Europe. It is particularly active in the fields of human rights, preventive diplomacy, early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post conflict rehabilitation. The OSCE is able to mandate certain PSO type activities, for example the Kosovo Verification Mission, an observer mission, and may request the support of NATO in conducting such operations. NATO and the OSCE have developed close practical co-operation.

2. **European Union (EU).** The European Union (EU) has been developing both a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). EU members have contributed individually to PSO, most recently in Afghanistan. Under the ESDP, the EU is fielding a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of 60,000 troops by 2003. The RRF is to be deployable within 60 days for up to a year. It will carry out the so-called Petersburg tasks and will therefore include policing, civil administration, rule of law, and civil protection capabilities. An associated 5,000 strong police force is also being established. While its strategic capabilities are still weak, the EU can be expected to broaden its participation in PSO as its structures mature.

3. **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).** NATO has particular competencies that make it an ideal regional organization to conduct complex peacekeeping operations. It has a broad role to play in the European theatre especially under the sanction of the UN SC. Over the years, NATO has established and maintained the unique political and military structures required to deter potential enemies. These structures have proven adaptable, since the Alliance has accepted the NA5 Crisis Response Operations concept. NATO will consider on a case-by-case basis UN requests to mount PSO. The most important NATO capabilities and strengths for PSO are outlined below:

- a. **Combined Joint Planning Staff.** The Bi-Strategic Commands’ (SC) Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) has been actively involved in the planning and preparation of operations. This has provided valuable experience and a capable planning staff at the strategic level that could greatly facilitate the activities of a joint commander.
- b. **Common Doctrine, Equipment and Training.** Interoperability in any multinational operation is a critical requirement. The Alliance has developed doctrine and a wide range of NATO

Standardization Agreements (STANAG) on procedures and equipment that can be applied to a PSO. Equipment interoperability, while not fully achieved, also supports the conduct of combined NATO military operations. The importance and value of common exercises and training on land, at sea and in the air is recognized. This permits the smooth integration of Alliance and non-NATO forces.

- c. **Multinational Command and Control Structure.** Since its inception, NATO has integrated diverse military forces to achieve common objectives using common doctrine. Alliance headquarters have established procedures for most types of operations and crises, and have gained the collective expertise to overcome the obstacles posed by differences in language, culture and national military procedures. This experience is especially applicable to the initial stages of a PSO, when military units of different nations arrive in a new geographic area to form a multinational force. The implementation of the Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC) Concept will improve sustainability in a joint operations area (JOA).
- d. **Alliance Infrastructure and Communications Systems.** A sound communications and command and control infrastructure is crucial to mounting and sustaining any operation. NATO's assets in this area would prove to be important assets for any PSO. Such resources could also be made available to support non-NATO elements participating in a NATO-led operation.
- e. **Reaction Forces.** The rapid establishment of a PSO will greatly improve its chances of success. Alliance forces, especially designated reaction forces, maintain a high state of readiness. They could quickly establish a PSO on short-notice.
- f. **Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF).** NATO has developed the CJTF concept and structure to have a rapidly deployable command and control capability so as to be able to respond to non-Article 5 crises better. Headquarters elements and assigned forces could respond rapidly to establish a PSO.

112. AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS

1. The key, continent-wide regional organization in Africa is the African Union (AU), formerly the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It is in the process of developing conflict prevention measures and is undertaking some limited peacekeeping tasks. Larger PSO in Africa have been supported by various sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC).

2. The interventions of the sub-regional organizations are part of a layered response to complex emergencies that integrate complementary regional and international capabilities. ECOWAS fielded forces in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, while SADC continues to play a significant role in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. These initial, African-led initiatives suffered from equipment, training and personnel limitations. Strengthening African regional capabilities will permit more effective responses in the future.

113. OTHER REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. Other regional organizations engage in PSO within their capabilities. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has carried out a variety of operations with little UN recognition. The Organization of American States (OAS) has mounted a number of election monitoring missions but has not organized, nor does it seem inclined to, any large-scale multinational peace operations. While individual Asian nations have participated in peacekeeping the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has not yet developed a regional capability.

SECTION IV - NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

114. GENERAL

1. Non-governmental organization (NGO) is an official term used in Article 71 of the UN Charter. NGOs are private (primarily non-profit) organizations generally motivated by humanitarian or religious values (the term Private Voluntary Organization may also be used). The NGO sector is extremely diverse, including thousands of organizations differentiated by size, maturity, expertise, quality and mission. Donors, discussed in the next Section, funnel most of their assistance through NGOs. There are a few very large international NGOs (10 US NGOs and 20 European Union NGOs) that handle an estimated 75 percent of NGO emergency aid. In most emergencies, NGOs will be found managing a wide variety of field operations, including food distribution; emergency health; transport and logistics; family tracing for separated children; agricultural rehabilitation; and water and infrastructure repair programs. Prominent examples of NGOs include CARE, OXFAM and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) (see Annex C for more details).

2. **Missions and Values.** NGO missions might range from a general remit to “alleviate poverty” to a specific mission to ‘support health care services in communities affected by conflict’. An NGO’s mission is usually underwritten by values or principles that guide their conduct and which may be expressed, among others, in terms of human rights, emphasizing that their work promotes rights to life, food, water, health, freedom of expression, etc.

115. PRINCIPLES OF NGOS

1. NGOs typically provide services in accordance with the principles for the provision of humanitarian assistance defined in UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1992. They are as follows:

- a. **Humanity.** Human suffering should be addressed wherever it is found. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected;
- b. **Neutrality.** Humanitarian assistance should be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature; and
- c. **Impartiality.** Humanitarian assistance should be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.

116. ORGANIZATIONAL CATEGORIES OF NGO

1. Organizationally, NGOs can be characterized into the following groups:
 - a. **International NGOs (INGOs).** NGOs whose main mission is to work overseas and that work in more than three countries can be termed International NGOs (INGOs). While most are not primarily emergency organizations, many will mount emergency operations if the need arises in or beyond their normal programme areas. Organizations like Save the Children and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) are examples of INGOs with a strong speciality in emergency programmes.
 - b. **Multinational INGOs.** Many INGOs now have sister organizations in countries around the world and an international umbrella organization that represents them as a whole. A multinational structure is increasingly important to INGOs if they are to influence the institutions of the international community and raise funds from them in a concerted fashion.
 - c. **National NGOs.** In many countries there are national NGOs that often work as the operational partners of INGOs or international development donors and UN agencies. The majority of these local organizations are not primarily emergency organizations but mount emergency operations if appropriate.

117. FUNCTIONAL CATEGORIES OF NGOS

1. There is a wide variety of NGOs but they can be functionally grouped into these four main areas:
 - a. Humanitarian assistance,
 - b. Human rights,
 - c. Civil society and democracy building, and
 - d. Conflict resolution.

118. METHODS OF OPERATING

1. NGOs usually operate in one of four main ways:
 - a. **Direct Implementation.** An INGO or local NGO recruits its own staff, procures its own equipment, and manages all aspects of a program itself;
 - b. **Subcontracting.** Increasingly INGOs are being used as subcontractors to the large bilateral donors or UN agencies that will give them funds and responsibility to carry out particular relief tasks, notably large scale food transportation and distribution;
 - c. **Working through Partners.** INGOs or NGOs channel their emergency funds and resources through a third party organization that acts as their operational partner. These partner organizations might be a local NGO or government ministry that is best placed to implement the program; or
 - d. **Staff Secondment.** Some INGOs work in humanitarian emergencies by seconding members of their staff as advisers and technicians to other operational organizations. These might be local NGOs at a grassroots level.

119. NGO OPERATIONAL STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

1. **General.** NGOs have particular operational advantages in humanitarian emergencies, and military staffs have to be aware of their operational characteristics and comparative advantages over government, UN, and military humanitarian operations.
2. **Strengths.** The following characteristics summarize the main strengths of the larger and/or more professional NGOs in humanitarian emergencies. Military staff should seek to maximize in their relations with the NGO sector:
 - a. **Independent and Non-partisan.** Operational independence and perceived impartiality are extremely important to NGOs and play a major part in the rhetoric of their mission. Most NGOs aim to respond to emergencies purely based on the "humanitarian imperative" alone. Planners need to be aware of the importance of independence and impartiality to NGO operational posture.
 - b. **Flexible and Non-bureaucratic.** NGOs frequently can move fast into and within any situation because organizational authority and power is devolved to field level - the person in charge on the ground makes many of the key operational decisions.
 - c. **Well-Informed and Committed.** NGOs with a history of experience in a country tend to have a depth of contacts and a high level of commitment to a country and its various communities. NGOs with this type of profile are likely to be either national NGOs indigenous to the conflict zone that are a part of that society, or INGOs whose history and experience in a given country is highly developed, with national staff and extensive long-term programs.

- d. **Long-Term Perspective.** NGOs with a long history of commitment to a country and a developmental way of working usually have a valuable longer term perspective on any given crisis and its aftermath.
 - e. **Access.** NGOs can be in a position to access areas during an emergency in which other organizations cannot engage.
3. **Weaknesses.** The following characteristics summarise the weaknesses inherent in NGO organizations:
- a. **Uneven Quality.** Some NGOs are better than others are. The standard and quality of NGOs working in any emergency is uneven often reflecting their size and maturity as an organization.
 - b. **Narrow Focus.** NGOs may be narrowly focussed on the delivery of a particular good or service and be geographically limited. This may hinder their participation in a wider campaign in a mission area.
 - c. **Competition.** Within the community, individual NGOs are extremely competitive. Each prides its performance and seeks to outshine its rivals in its operational results and media coverage. They often also have to compete for donor funding.
 - d. **Training.** Often NGOs are too busy to train due to operational tempo nor do donors always encourage money being diverted to training purposes. At times, therefore, most training takes place “on-the-job” and NGO planning and execution may suffer in a complex environment.
 - e. **Accountability.** NGOs are not held to the same degree of accountability for their actions as the military or UN agencies.

120. NGO CODE OF CONDUCT

1. In the last two years, a number of international NGOs have teamed up with the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) to produce a code of conduct for the NGO community: an attempt to standardize NGO operating principles and encourage the NGO community to follow agreed procedures for emergency operations. Some 52 NGOs have already signed up to the code and it is hoped that eventually all NGOs will be able to agree to and abide by the code’s principles.

SECTION V - INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

121. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. Many inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) have already been described in this manual. The UN is an inter-governmental organization as is the OSCE and many other regional organizations. IGOs exist when two or more governments sign a multilateral treaty to form such a body and agree to fund its operations. Their aim is to protect and promote the shared interests of the member states. They can be multifunctional or serve a single purpose, be geographically restrictive or all-inclusive.

2. **The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.** The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, an important IGO that has not been described elsewhere, consists of three independent parts: the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (see Annex C for more detail). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is financed by voluntary contributions by governments (85 %), the National Societies (10%) and private sources (5%). Based on the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, the mission of the ICRC is to protect and assist victims of armed conflict, specifically to:

- a. Visit and interview, without witnesses, prisoners of war and detained or interned civilians;
- b. Provide aid to the populations of occupied territories;
- c. Search for missing persons and transmit messages to Prisoners of War (PW) and detained civilians;
- d. Offer services for the establishment of hospital zones and localities, and security;
- e. Receive requests for aid from protected persons;
- f. Exercise its right of initiative to pursue the above tasks and, in internal disputes, to offer its services to the parties to the conflict; and
- g. Exchange human remains and PW.

122. INTERNATIONAL AND GOVERNMENT DONORS

1. Governments are by far the greatest source of funding for humanitarian assistance and PSO. Governments provide support for the military response elements through their defence budgets and channel humanitarian assistance (development and emergency) to a large number of other PSO elements through their donor agencies. These may be national donor agencies, such as US AID or CIDA, or international bodies like the European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO).

2. **Donor Channels.** Channels chosen by donors are changing. Government to government aid, which once accounted for the bulk of bilateral emergency aid, now only represents a small fraction of the total flow. Governments may still be important channels but in complex emergencies when there is political instability, and weak government institutions they may be ineffective. Multinational channels such as through the UN, EU, World Bank through NGOs are becoming increasingly prevalent.

3. **Nature of Donor Operations.** Donor operations are most often of a facilitating kind. For example, donors or their proxies may become involved in organizing projects that develop local capacities and that require local support. Donors have the greatest influence in designing and delivering programs in permissive environments and can contribute significantly to conflict prevention.

4. **Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).** CIDA supports sustainable development activities in order to reduce poverty and to contribute to a more secure, equitable and prosperous world. Development is a complex, long-term process that involves governments and organizations at all levels.

Working with partners in the private and public sectors in Canada and in developing countries, and with international organizations and agencies, CIDA supports foreign aid projects in more than 100 of the poorest countries of the world. Their objective is to work with developing countries and countries in transition to help them develop the tools to meet their own needs eventually.

123. THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS

1. The establishment of a working economy in an assisted state will almost certainly require the involvement of financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They help create the financial environment into which private or civil sector companies may invest and support any reconstruction and rebuilding programs.

2. The IMF works closely with the World Bank. Its original mandate was to bring stability to currency exchange rates and discipline to the international monetary system, to promote international trade and capital flows, and to support high rates of sustainable economic growth. The IMF has become the central institution of the international monetary system. It oversees the economic policies of member states, provides economic and financial advice, and gives short- and medium-term financial assistance to countries facing balance of payments problems and other difficulties

3. The World Bank offers loans, advice and a wide range of resources to developing countries or countries in transition. The Bank is the world's largest supplier of development aid, with some US\$20 billion in new loans every year. The Bank also plays a vital co-ordinating role with a host of other organizations, governments, multilateral agencies and private firms: it ensures that the sums lent are used as efficiently as possible with a view to helping the recipient countries' development programs take shape. Funds from loans are used to support a wide variety of projects in such fields as energy, agriculture, transportation, the environment, health care and education, with the general objective being to improve living standards in the recipient countries. The main goal is to make the world's poorest countries less poor. To that end, the Bank pays special attention to the development of rural regions and the role of women in development.

124. THE CORPORATE AND CIVIL SECTOR

1. The Corporate and Civil Sector is the term used to describe multinational business, finance institutions, civil sector companies and business interests which might be operating in the environment of a complex emergency or whose staff might be persuaded to engage in post conflict reconstruction activities. Should the economy of a nation be dependent on a particular natural resource, and the extraction and marketing of that resource by a multinational or large national company, that company should be consulted and its advice sought on the economic implications of the development of the mission plan?

2. Multinational corporations may have either a beneficial or an adverse effect on a PSO. They may assist in the peace building process by establishing manufacturing plants, advising nascent national businesses on best practices or facilitating the import or export of goods. They may make a straight donation to a particular project. They may provide support to a mission in such areas as communication, transportation or infrastructure. Conversely, some corporations may be involved in the economic exploitation of resources in the conflict area. They may simply seek to gain an economic advantage from the collapse of government structures regionally or in a particular state. They may have secure local arrangement with warlords that permit them to exploit natural resources, like timber and oil. Unchecked, their activities may prolong the conflict.

SECTION VI - SECURITY SECTOR ORGANIZATION

125. GENERAL

1. Within a mission area, typically, there will be a wide variety of organizations and agencies involved in security issues. They will consist of the security forces in the assisted state itself, both of the recognized government and opposing elements, plus the “mission” assigned military forces, international civilian police and in some instances other international military forces and private military companies. There will be a variety of NGOs and agencies engaged in various aspects of security sector reform. In any assisted state, careful co-ordination is required between the mission’s assigned military and the law enforcement triad: police, judiciary and penal system.

126. MISSION ASSIGNED MILITARY FORCES

1. Mission assigned military forces are those forces operating under international authority to execute the assigned mandate. These forces may be operating as part of an alliance, a coalition or a very loose ad hoc structure. The nature of the particular mission will affect the structure, the command and control measures and the means available to forces participating in a mission.

127. CIVILIAN POLICE FORCES

1. The United Nations Civilian Police (UN CIVPOL) is the key secondary security partner in peace support operations. Their role has generally been to monitor the performance of the local police (including militia) and to assist them in the conduct of their duties. From the operational standpoint, UNCIVPOL is a separate component of the mission under the command of a police commissioner, who reports directly to the Special Representative. It complements and works closely with other components: military, humanitarian, electoral and administrative. A strong relationship with the assigned military forces is necessary to execute the security strategy successfully. Canada provides police officers, both Royal Canadian Mounted Police and those from other services, to UN missions under the Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA). Other organizations, such as the EU or the OSCE, may also establish civilian police elements.

128. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCES

1. Within the mission area there may be other international military forces carrying out operations that could be either complimentary or at odds with the mandated PSO. For instance, there may be forces performing Chapter VII enforcement missions (no-fly zones, sanctions), or preparing to conduct extraction or non-combatant evacuation operations.

129. PRIVATE MILITARY/SECURITY COMPANIES

1. It is common to encounter private security companies operating in mission areas. Their scope of operation can be considerable. They may be present solely to protect selected, highly valued economic enterprises; to perform nation-wide security duties; to conduct comprehensive training or to provide professional advice. In some instances, these companies may be purely operating in a direct mercenary capacity.

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ANNEX A - KEY CHAPTERS OF THE UN CHARTER

CHAPTER VI**PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES**

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

CHAPTER VII

ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they remember.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems

arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

CHAPTER VIII

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.
4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.
2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Further details on the UN charters can be obtained from the following website:

<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>

ANNEX B - THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

Adapted from www.un.org/aboutun/chart.html




Figure 1-1 The United Nations System

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ANNEX C - KEY ORGANIZATIONS

C001. THE UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES

1. The UN is involved in all types of peace support operations and across a full range of humanitarian activities, both emergency relief and developmental. It is involved in conflict prevention, mitigation, provision of emergency relief, reconstruction, rehabilitation and long-term development.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

1. The primary mission of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) is to coordinate international humanitarian assistance (HA) efforts. The Secretary General created UN OCHA to mobilize and coordinate international disaster relief, provide advisory and technical assistance, and promote awareness and information exchange worldwide. UN OCHA also establishes and maintains contact with disaster management organizations and emergency services to mobilize specialized resources and services.

United Nations Children's Fund

1. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) was established in December 1946. It is the only UN organization devoted exclusively to children's issues. Its major function is to provide child health services. The overall objective is to reduce infant and child mortality and morbidity and promote child growth and development. The main UNICEF goal is to assist countries to develop and expand primary health care systems, maternal and child health services, sufficient and accessible water supplies, and adequate sanitation, health and nutrition programs.

2. UNICEF maintains emergency stockpiles of material. It is prepared to provide emergency assistance to mothers and children for medium-term restoration and long-term development post-disaster. UNICEF can also procure relief supplies on behalf of other UN agencies and relief organizations.

3. Web site: www.unicef.org

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

1. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was founded in 1950. Its main functions are to offer refugees international protection, seek lasting solutions to their problems and provide them with material assistance in the form of food, shelter, medical assistance, education and other social services. UNHCR's protection mission includes: protecting refugees against physical harm, protecting their basic human rights, and making sure that they are not forcibly returned to countries where they could face imprisonment, torture, or death. Initially, UNHCR's mandate was limited to people outside their country of origin. Over time, however, as part of its duty to ensure that voluntary repatriation schemes are sustainable, it has become involved in assisting and protecting returnees in their home countries. In many cases, UNHCR also assists internally displaced persons

2. The convention governing UNHCR's activities, the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, excludes people guilty of crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity. Also excluded from any UNHCR assistance are people who have committed serious non-political crimes outside the country in which refuge is sought, as well as those who are guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN.

3. Web site: www.unhcr.ch

World Food Programme

1. The World Food Programme (WFP), the world's leading international organization of this type, is the United Nations agency responsible for food aid. WFP's primary task is to furnish food in support of economic and social development projects in developing countries. In addition, substantial resources may be provided

to meet emergency food needs. For instance, the agency is responsible for mobilizing food and funds for transport for all large-scale refugee-feeding operations managed by UNHCR. WFP purchases and ships food needed in emergencies on behalf of donor governments, UN OCHA, or the affected countries. WFP staff may assist, when required, in coordinating the reception and utilization of food aid received from all sources. The WFP can be regarded as the de facto logistic arm of the UN in disaster situations. WFP is increasingly involved in projects using food aid to support demobilization of ex-combatants and de-mining of war zones. The WFP uses food aid to:

- a. save human lives in humanitarian crises;
 - b. assist the most vulnerable, especially women and children, when it is essential to meet their food needs in order to allow them to better realize their full human potential; and
 - c. help people suffering from hunger to achieve self-dependence, and equip their communities with vital infrastructure such as roads, schools and irrigation systems.
2. Web site: www.wfp.org

Food and Agriculture Organization

1. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was established in October 1945. Its mandate is to enhance nutrition levels, living standards, agricultural productivity and rural living conditions in developing countries. FAO assists agriculture recovery after natural disasters such as floods and fires. FAO also monitors factors that affect food production and alerts governments and donors to potential food shortages. Through its association with the WFP, FAO oversees the provision of food aid during shortages. Disaster relief assistance provided by FAO is coordinated by its Office for Special Relief Operations.

2. Web site: www.fao.org

United Nations Development Programme

1. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the United Nation's main technical co-operation and co-ordination program. UNDP's chief objective is to help countries help themselves achieve people-focussed sustainable development. It is active in poverty eradication, job creation, women's advancement and restoration of the environment. In addition, UNDP is increasingly providing assistance in organizing democratic elections and supporting post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction including the demobilization of former combatants, comprehensive mine action, and the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons.

2. UNDP's operations are decentralized. It funds projects in over 170 countries through a network of 132 local offices. At the national level, each UNDP office director is generally appointed the resident United Nations system co-ordinator for operational development activities. UNDP-funded activities are carried out in large part by the recipient countries themselves, in keeping with the principle of capacity development; but if needed, UN specialized agencies or non-governmental organizations will contribute services. These coordinators also represent the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator in those countries. UNDP representatives take active part on behalf of UN OCHA by directing relief committees in disaster-afflicted countries. They provide a channel for requests from governments on all disaster-related matters. They lead the UN team in assessing emergency disaster relief requirements and coordination of the international response, with staff assistance from UN OCHA. UNDP also undertakes disaster preparedness projects and may provide financial aid to emergency programs. It may further adapt development programs to the needs of rehabilitation and reconstruction after a disaster.

3. Web site: www.undp.org

World Health Organization

1. Created in 1948, the World Health Organization (WHO) is at the forefront of the global alliance in support of health for all. Its primary objective is the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health. WHO's mandate is to promote international technical co-operation in support of global health, to develop and manage programs for controlling and eliminating disease and, in general, to work to improve the quality of life of people the world over. The Organization's role is fourfold: (a) it provides world leadership in the field of health; (b) it sets world standards for health; (c) it co-operates with governments to strengthen national health programs; and (d) it develops and transfers appropriate technologies, information and health standards.
2. One of its functions is to furnish technical assistance and, in emergencies, aid requested or accepted by host governments. WHO is the authority for health and medical assistance during emergency relief operations? It is concerned with medical supply provision, communicable disease control and other public health issues, and technical advice related to equipment and supplies offered by donor governments. At the country level, WHO representatives assist the local authorities to assess requirements of personnel, equipment and supplies necessary to minimize health hazards to disaster victims.
3. Web site: www.who.org

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

1. In 1993 the General Assembly created the position of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the aim being to promote and protect the full exercise by all individuals of all civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, including the right to development. The High Commissioner is also responsible for all UN human rights activities, including the Commission on Human Rights.
2. The High Commissioner co-ordinates all activities in this sphere by organizations in the United Nations system, tries to prevent infringements on basic rights, investigates those that do occur and works with governments to remedy such situations.
3. Web site: www.unhchr.ch

International Monetary Fund

1. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), a Bretton Woods institution, was created to develop an effective monetary system in order to avoid a repetition of such economic crises as the Great Depression.
2. The IMF works closely with the World Bank. Its original mandate was to bring stability to currency exchange rates and discipline to the international monetary system, to promote international trade and capital flows, and to support high rates of sustainable economic growth. The IMF has become the central institution of the international monetary system. It oversees the economic policies of member states, provides economic and financial advice and gives short- and medium-term financial assistance to countries facing balance of payments problems and other difficulties.
3. The IMF is funded by the annual contributions of its members, prorated according to their gross domestic product and adjusted every five years. The sums held by the Fund are used to grant loans to members in financial difficulty. The IMF's other main function is to co-ordinate its members' efforts to achieve greater international co-operation in setting economic policy.
4. Web site: www.imf.org

World Bank

1. A product of the July 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement, the World Bank was set up to help with the postwar recovery of Europe. Afterwards, its focus shifted to providing loans and technical help, especially in developing nations. The Bank's main role is to help raise living standards and promote sustainable development in developing countries.

2. Today, the World Bank Group comprises four bodies: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the International Development Association (IDA) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

3. The Group offers loans, advice and a wide range of resources geared to the needs of over 100 developing countries or countries in transition. The Bank is the world's largest supplier of development aid, with some US\$20 billion in new loans every year. The Bank also plays a vital co-ordinating role with a host of other organizations, governments, multilateral agencies and private firms: it ensures that the sums lent are used as efficiently as possible with a view to helping the recipient countries' development programs take shape.

4. Funds from loans are used to support a wide variety of projects in such fields as energy, agriculture, transportation, the environment, health care and education, with the general objective being to improve living standards in the recipient countries. The main goal is to make the world's poorest countries less poor. To that end, the Bank pays special attention to the development of rural regions and the role of women in development. The Bank is funded by contributions from member states in the industrialized world and by borrowing in the commercial market.

5. Web site: www.worldbank.org

C002. OTHER INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

1. Three Red Cross organizations make up the International Red Cross (IRC) and Red Crescent Movement: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the individual national Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations. Each component of the movement is independent, although all act in accordance with the fundamental principles of the movement for unity of effort and cooperation. The seven fundamental principles of the movement are: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. The objective of the movement is to coordinate their entire range of humanitarian activities.

2. **International Committee of the Red Cross.** The ICRC is a Swiss Association created under Article 60 of the Swiss Civil Code. It is a private, independent organization exclusively composed of Swiss nationals. The ICRC's supreme policymaking body is called the Assembly. It is composed of from 15 to 25 members (Swiss citizens). ICRC field operations and administration is managed by its headquarters in Geneva and through delegations set up in areas of conflict and turmoil throughout the world. The ICRC's mission and activities are international, and not limited to nor oriented toward Switzerland. As an independent humanitarian organization and as the founding body of the Red Cross, the ICRC's role is primarily to maintain and disseminate the fundamental principles, to recognize national societies, to undertake the tasks incumbent upon it under the Geneva Conventions, and to ensure the protection of and assistance to military and civilian victims. The ICRC is essentially a promoter, custodian and monitor of international humanitarian law. It is also an important player in international relief and medical assistance.

3. **International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.** This league is an international federation of 149 national societies. The main functions of the league are to act as the permanent body of liaison, coordination, and study between the national societies; to bring relief by all available means to all disaster victims; to assist national societies in disaster relief preparedness and in the organization of their relief actions; to assist ICRC in the promotion and development of international humanitarian law; and to be the official representative of the member societies in the international field. The league also acts as the information centre for the Red Cross regarding situations caused by disasters and coordinates at the international level the assistance provided by the national societies.

4. **National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.** The National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are created by countries to provide for humanitarian relief within their own borders, though in some cases national societies may provide assistance in other, often neighbouring, countries.

5. Web sites: www.icrc.org , www.ifrc.org and www.redcross.ca.

International Organization for Migration

1. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was created to deal with the problem of displaced persons and refugees in Europe after World War II. The IOM has the following main functions: the handling of orderly and planned migration to meet specific needs of emigration and immigration countries, the processing and movement of displaced civilians, and other persons in need of international migration services to countries offering them resettlement opportunities, the transfer of qualified human resources to promote the socio-economic advancement of developing countries, and the provision of a forum to states, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations to exchange views and experiences on international migration issues. In all migration activities, IOM arranges for reliable transportation at reduced costs and seeks financial support for movement of migrants and refugees. IOM cooperates on migration assistance at the request or with the agreement of interested nations and in coordination with regional and international organizations, NGOs, PVOs and the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

2. IOM's key capabilities are as follows:

- a. To provide language training, orientation activities, medical examinations, and document processing for placement, reception and integration into the host country;
- b. To respond to emergencies through IOM's Emergency Response Unit for assessing complex emergency migration situations; and
- c. To maintain an emergency response roster of internal and external personnel for emergency operations or for urgent dispatch to the field.

3. Web site: www.iom.ch

C003. NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)

1. MSF was established in 1971 by doctors to offer emergency medical assistance wherever manmade or natural disasters occur, independently of all states, institutions, political, economic and religious influences.

2. MSF offers assistance to victims of natural or manmade disasters and armed conflict, irrespective of race, religion, creed or political affiliation. MSF operates with strict neutrality and impartiality, unhindered freedom in the exercise of its functions, respect for their professional code of ethics and complete independence from all political, economic or religious powers.

3. MSF's key capabilities include the following:

- a. To initiate field missions to cope with war, massive population movements, famine, or natural disasters;
- b. To send fact-finding teams to assess emergency needs;
- c. To deploy medical teams and logistics experts with specially designed, pre-packed equipment;
- d. To provide health facilities, feeding centres and sanitation, vaccinations, and epidemiological surveillance in refugee camps;
- e. To deliver customized kits for shelter, communications, water and waste processing, sanitation, food, and power supplies;

- f. To rehabilitate hospitals and dispensaries, establish rural health units, immunization programs, and sanitation facilities, and train local medical, paramedical and technical personnel; and
 - g. To provide quasi-permanent aid in countries where conflict, food shortages and population movements are recurring phenomena, or where the immediate emergencies have ended but rehabilitation needs are still massive.
4. Web site: www.msf.org

Oxfam

1. The Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (Oxfam) was founded in Oxford in 1942. Its humanitarian efforts reflect its belief that the world's material resources can, if equitably distributed, satisfy the basic needs of all people. Oxfam aims to relieve poverty, distress and suffering throughout the world and to educate the public about the nature, causes and effects of poverty. Oxfam's key capabilities include the following:

- a. To provide food, water, and shelter to people during natural disasters; and
 - b. To operate relief and development projects in agriculture, health and education.
2. Web site: www.oxfam.ca , www.oxfam.org.uk

Save the Children Fund (SCF)

1. SCF is the largest international voluntary agency for child health and welfare in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, the Caribbean, and throughout Canada. SCF works to ensure that children are the first to receive relief in time of distress and are protected against every form of exploitation. Emphasis is placed upon early childhood development, primary and non-formal education, and care for children in especially difficult circumstances, but not necessarily only those among the poorest.

2. The International "Save the Children Alliance" is a body that represents and coordinates the activities of 25 autonomous Save the Children organizations around the world. A SCF country program is coordinated by a Field Director. A network of regional offices provides technical support and advice to field offices.

3. SCF's key capabilities include the following:
- a. To provide emergency relief, including food, during major disasters and refugee migrations;
 - b. To establish food security, distribution, transport management and logistics;
 - c. To provide health care management, refugee health care and refugee health care management, health planning, epidemiology, "cold chain" management of vaccines, and nutritional surveillance;
 - d. To carry out community development by community-based rehabilitation, education, management of water resources, hydro-geological surveys, village-level maintenance of water facilities, water pump location and installation, and bridge and road building and repair; and
 - e. To maintain a fleet of vehicles for rapid response in Africa.
4. Web site: www.savethechildren.ca

Africare

1. Africare is dedicated to improving the quality of life in rural Africa in five principal areas: agriculture, water resource development, environmental management, health and emergency humanitarian aid. Africare

works in all the major regions of the continent to assist in human and economic development by developing water resources, increasing food production, delivering basic health services, protecting the environment and providing emergency assistance to refugees.

2. Africare's capabilities include the following:
 - a. To construct rural access roads, buildings, irrigation, dams, wells and health centres;
 - b. To support production cooperatives, vegetable gardening, forestry, livestock, and poultry raising;
 - c. To support fodder production and storage, and reforestation and soil conservation;
 - d. To supply blankets, high protein foods, cooking utensils, and agricultural equipment to refugees;
 - e. To supply oxen and animal traction equipment and farm equipment and supplies for long-term development;
 - f. To provide medicine and public health with family planning equipment;
 - g. To provide pharmaceutical supplies and medical equipment and supplies, village-based primary health care services, medical distribution systems, comprehensive health care plans, dispensaries and maternal child health centres, and village health teams training;
 - h. To meet short-term needs for potable water, medicine, health care, seeds, and tools; and
 - i. To assist small business with credit, technical, advisory, and managerial assistance.
3. Web site: www.africare.org

Catholic Relief Services

1. Catholic Relief Services was founded in 1943 by the Catholic bishops of the United States to assist the poor and disadvantaged outside the United States. Its first project was to provide aid to refugees in Europe during World War II. The agency's principal mission is to alleviate human suffering, encourage human development and foster charity and justice for poor and disadvantaged people around the world. Today CRS is active in countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean.
2. CRS serves as the overseas humanitarian and development agency of the US Catholic Conference. The policies and programs of the agency reflect and express the teachings of the Catholic Church — assisting people based on need, not creed, race or nationality.
3. CRS' key capabilities include the following:
 - a. To respond to victims of natural and man-made disasters, famine, epidemics, civil wars and unrest, and economic emergencies;
 - b. To provide assistance to the poor to alleviate their immediate needs;
 - c. To assist refugees and displaced people with emergency relief, repatriation, and rehabilitation as well as local reintegration and resettlement; and
 - d. To distribute lifesaving food and non-food emergency and medical supplies.
4. Web site: www.catholicrelief.org

Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere

1. Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE) was founded to aid victims of World War II in Europe and, soon after, Asia. CARE Canada, CARE USA, and CARE Deutschland joined together to create CARE International in 1982. CARE International is a confederation of 11 national CARE partners that addresses poverty and responds to emergencies worldwide.

2. CARE's purpose is to help the developing world's poor in their efforts to achieve social and economic well-being. It supports processes that create competence and lead to self-sustainment over time. CARE's task is to reach new standards of excellence in offering disaster relief, technical assistance, training, food, and other material resources and management in combinations appropriate to local needs and priorities. It also advocates public policies and programs that support these ends.

3. CARE's key capabilities include the following:

- a. To assist agriculture and environment efforts to plant trees, manage forests, irrigate land, start vegetable gardens, conserve soil, promote natural pesticides, build fish ponds, and lend on-site technical advice on improving production;
- b. To supply clean and plentiful water, nutritious food, immunizations, improved sanitation, AIDS prevention counselling, and health care for pregnant women and new mothers;
- c. To offer family planning and other reproductive health care services training, equipment, contraceptives and AIDS prevention; and
- d. To deliver emergency aid, clothing, clean water, medicine, tools and food.

4. Web site: www.care.org , www.care.ca

CHAPTER 2

NATURE OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

201. INTRODUCTION

1. Establishing a peace support operation (PSO) is one of the options available to the international community to assist in the resolution of a conflict. They are authorized in support of the political objectives of internationally recognized organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). PSOs include conflict prevention, peacemaking, traditional and complex peacekeeping and peace building. Related operations can be conducted concurrently, complementary or independently: humanitarian and enforcement operations.
2. While military means effectively contribute, military conquest is not the objective of a PSO. Unlike general war, military force is applied only in an impartial and even-handed manner. Overwhelming military forces, where present, serve more of a coercive vice combat function. Military forces create the secure environment that permits political negotiations to proceed and humanitarian assistance to be delivered. The military actions of the peacekeeping force (PKF) are based upon judgements of the degree of compliance or non-compliance of the parties with the recognized mandate and not against any bias or pre-determined designation.

202. DEFINING SUCCESS IN PSO

1. The mandate from the appropriate international authority should specify the desired political goals and may provide an outline of the supporting security tasks. The active participation of the parties, in the formulation and achievement of both the political and security end-state in-country will be essential. Success occurs as a capable state is slowly constructed. Military success derives from stabilizing the security situation sufficiently to allow this building process to proceed.
2. Progress towards the desired end-state will generally be related to the achievement of a number of pre-determined strategic objectives that will form elements of the mission campaign plan. The nature of PSO is such that these objectives will normally relate to the establishment of a secure, stable and self-sustaining environment for the local population. The achievement of the desired goals will be evaluated against identified measures of effectiveness, such as, increased compliance by the parties, the number of demobilized and retrained former combatants and the quality of local security.
3. The achievement of military objectives and the imposition of a secure environment do not guarantee the establishment of a self-sustaining peace. The re-establishment of the rule of law, good governance, reconciliation, reconstruction and development programs are all necessary. Security is the key element in the initial phase of a mission, but once a measure of public security has been re-established, primarily through the achievement of military and policing objectives, the mission's main effort should be switched to peace building. This transition, including funds and resources, better serves long-term stability.

203. FACTORS INFLUENCING SUCCESS IN PSO

1. There are a number of factors that will directly contribute to the success of a PSO mission:
 - a. **Professional Conduct.** The respect in which the PKF is held will be a direct consequence of its professional conduct and how it treats the parties and the local population. Through Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), or other special agreements the PKF enjoys certain immunities related to its duties. Notwithstanding this, its members must normally respect the laws and customs of the host nation and must be seen to be doing so. The PKF will also acknowledge the de-facto status and position of the parties to the conflict and will usually not act to change them, except as agreed to by all parties. Commanders should also ensure the same principles are recognised and

implemented amongst the different national, cultural and ethnic elements within the units and formations that make up the PKF.

- b. **Unity of Effort.** In a joint and multinational PSO of long duration, involving many civilian organizations and agencies, the military strategic objectives may be milestones along the way to achieving the political end-state or an element of that end-state. The PKF may be required to assist civilian agencies to further the development of the overall strategic objectives of the PSO. Coordination and negotiations between the military and other actors in theatre will be important in establishing and maintaining a unified approach.
- c. **Long Term Commitment.** The achievement of the political end-state in a PSO will require a patient, resolute and persistent pursuit of objectives. The deliverables of protracted development plans may seem to have little relevance to the military depending on the operational environment but military force does not resolve long-term disputes. The pursuit of short-term military success, at the expense of long-term social, economic and political gains should be resisted.
- d. **Legitimacy.** The legitimacy of the PSO and the wider perception of that legitimacy will increase support within the international community, contributing nations and the involved parties, including the civil community in the joint operations areas (JOA).
- e. **Rapid Deployment and Transition to Operational Effectiveness.** The sooner competent military forces arrive in theatre after a peace agreement is reached the better chance that the concerned parties will adhere to the accords. Once in theatre, forces must be ready to conduct operations as soon as possible.

SECTION II - PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

204. CONFLICT PREVENTION

1. The United Nations and many regional organizations are re-orientating their institutional cultures towards conflict prevention. Understandably, conflict prevention is less costly than full-scale intervention both in monetary and human security terms. Conducted in accordance with the principles of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, conflict prevention involves a range of preventive actions used to monitor and identify causes of conflict and timely action taken to prevent the occurrence, escalation or resumption of hostilities. These actions encompass preventive diplomacy, preventive disarmament, preventive peace building and preventive deployment.

2. Some military activities contribute to conflict prevention: early warning, surveillance, training and security sector reform, and preventive deployment. The United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP) was the first UN sponsored preventive deployment. This type of mission can deploy on both sides of a threatened border, on only one side or be geographically dispersed to deal with an internal threat in a state. Preventive deployments have the characteristics of either traditional or complex peacekeeping missions.

205. PEACEMAKING

1. Peacemaking refers to the activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a peaceful settlement. They can include provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation, such actions as diplomatic pressure, isolation, sanctions, partnership with funds and programmes or other operations. Peacemaking is accomplished primarily by diplomatic means; however, indirect or direct military support may be required.

206. PEACE BUILDING

1. Peace building involves actions that support political, economic, social and military measures aimed at strengthening political stability. It includes mechanisms to identify and support structures that promote peaceful conditions, reconciliation, a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic growth. Peace building occurs during conflict prevention, while a conflict progresses and is a key focus post-conflict. Often the peace building portion of the mission plan is under-resourced and the operation stalls. Peace building requires the commitment of humanitarian and development resources over the long-term.

2. Peace building is mainly undertaken by civil agencies in the mission area but some military involvement is necessary. When an operation is first established military forces may be best placed to carry out peace building tasks that demonstrate the immediate benefits of the presence of the PKF and the mission to the local population. Military participation can enhance local support for the mission and contribute to force protection. Advice should be sought from the development community to ensure that short-term military programs contribute to longer-term development strategies, are culturally integrated and sustainable. Peace building missions may be established separately.

207. TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (TPKO)

1. Traditional peacekeeping operations (TPKO) are characterized by their impartial conduct, the high level of consent of the parties to the dispute and the PKF's authorization to use force only in self-defence. They are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement so that diplomatic negotiations can seek a comprehensive political settlement. The high level of consent and compliance of the parties allows the PKF to be lightly armed and equipped. The primary military objective in traditional peacekeeping is the impartial occupation of a buffer zone (BZ) to separate the parties. Military observer or tactical units can be used to carry out this inter-positional function. Traditional missions are usually fielded to assist in the settlement of dispute between states. The occupation and control of inter-state borders requires less

interaction between the PKF and civil agencies in theatre. The military mission in traditional peacekeeping is therefore not as closely linked with the civil mission as in complex peacekeeping.

208. COMPLEX PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (CPKO)

1. Complex peacekeeping operations (CPKO) are characterized by their impartial conduct, the low or uncertain level of consent of the parties to the dispute and the PKF’s broader authorization to use force. These operations are often initiated after a peace accord has been signed and the parties have consented to the operation. The consent and compliance of the actors may be uneven and inconsistently observed throughout their chain of command. The PKF maintains its impartiality by applying the terms of the mandate equally to all parties. Commonly, these operations are launched in failed states or where intra-state conflict has weakened central authority and caused a humanitarian emergency.

2. The military objective of a CPKO is to stabilize the security situation. Initial operations will focus on providing sufficient security to permit the delivery of emergency humanitarian aid. Follow on activities will provide the security shield behind which international agencies and NGOs attempt to construct a capable state. The aim of a CPK operation will not be the defeat or destruction of an enemy, but rather to encourage, coerce or compel the parties to the conflict to abide by a peace agreement or the mandate. Adequate military forces are required so that the mission has a credible and coercive combat capability. While the more robust use of force must be an option, the operation will still use the minimum force necessary to accomplish its objectives. The scope of these missions can range from simply guaranteeing humanitarian access to full state transitional authority.




Figure 2-1 Peace Support and Related Operations

SECTION III - RELATED OPERATIONS

209. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

1. Enforcement actions are carried out under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are combat operations allowing for the use of all appropriate means necessary to achieve the political goals of the United Nations. They can precede a PSO, run concurrently or support the termination of one. An enforcement action may set the necessary conditions for the establishment of a peacekeeping mission. These operations are normally conducted by a coalition of willing states or a regional organization vice directly by the UN. The complete range of combat multipliers may not automatically be employed, but enforcement actions benefit in many cases from the parties to the dispute being clearly aware of the intervening force's capabilities, goals and objectives. The parties to the dispute then play a key role in the escalation/de-escalation of the use of force.
2. **Sanctions and Embargoes.** Sanctions and embargoes are implemented with varying degrees of military, economic and political actions. They are an attempt to pressure parties to reduce the level of hostilities in a conflict by imposing economic/trade restrictions or other limitations. Air and maritime elements are trained to execute and support these operations. Ground forces, especially when operating border checkpoints, also contribute. Close liaison may be required with customs authorities and border police.
3. **Humanitarian Intervention.** Humanitarian interventions are launched to gain humanitarian access to an at risk population when the responsible actors refuse to take action to alleviate human suffering or are incapable of doing so and where actors internal to a state are engaging in gross abuses of human rights. Intervention is a combat operation intended to provide protection to the at risk population and aid workers by imposing stable security conditions that permit humanitarian access. These operations can be precursors to complex peacekeeping operations.
4. **Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation.** If the situation in a country or mission area is uncertain and hostile, military forces may be used to evacuate designated persons - Canadian or select other nationals – in order to ensure their safety.
5. **Extraction Operation.** If the situation in a mission area deteriorates beyond the point that a PSO can make a useful contribution, it may be withdrawn. Depending on its structure and deployment the PKF may require a combat capable force to assist in its withdrawal.

210. HUMANITARIAN OPERATION

1. Humanitarian operations involve the use of military resources to assist in the alleviation of human suffering. They may be conducted independently or during a PSO. The prime responsibility for the provision of humanitarian aid and assistance rests with specialized civilian, national, international, government or non-government organizations and agencies. Military forces are often employed on humanitarian operations because of their rapid response capability, airlift assets, ability to co-ordinate and plan, unique skills and structure, and where entry/delivery points may be contested. In emergency relief, the military may participate in direct assistance, the face-to-face distribution of goods and services, and indirect assistance, one step removed from the population and involving such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel. Military forces can augment and complement the capabilities of humanitarian agencies.
2. The Canadian Forces Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) has been created in order to provide medical, engineering and logistical support during humanitarian emergencies. The DART may be employed as either a stand-alone unit or within a joint task force. Two key conditions must be met before any foreign deployment: first, the DART can only operate in a permissive environment; and secondly, the DART must receive the consent of the national government of the country in which it is going to deploy or, if that government has ceased to effectively exist, then it must receive the approval of the United Nations.

SECTION IV - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

211. GENERAL

1. Impartiality, consent, and the minimum use of force are the fundamental principles that guide military activities in peace support operations. The application of these principles requires the judgement of those responsible for the planning and execution of the PSO who will determine the weight and the importance of each principle in relation to the situation in the area of operation.

212. IMPARTIALITY

1. **The Nature of Impartiality.** From the UN's perspective, impartiality means adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and the guidance given in the Security Council mandate. An aid to understanding impartiality is to view it from two related perspectives: on the one hand as a guide to the conduct of the PKF, and on the other hand as a perception of the belligerent parties. The conduct of a PKF should always be impartial and even-handed; if force is used against a particular party, it should only be because of what that party is doing (or not doing) in relation to the mandate, rather than because of who they are. The use of force, even when applied in an even-handed and impartial manner, is unlikely to be perceived as such, especially by any party that persistently transgresses. An analogy can help to relate impartiality to the conduct of operations: the impartial status of a legal system is not compromised because it only punishes the guilty, though that may not be the perception of a persistent criminal.

2. **The Significance of Impartiality.** If impartiality is discarded or the PKF is perceived as being biased towards any of the parties to the conflict, it will have a negative effect upon their consent and make the conduct of the operation more difficult. A loss of trust and confidence by the local factions constrains the options available to the PKF. The perception of partiality and consequent loss of consent could lead to widespread non-compliance and escalation. The PKF could risk becoming a party when it is not structured or resourced to conduct combat operations.

3. **Impartiality and the Conduct of Operations.** PSO must be conducted impartially applying the mandate without favour or prejudice to any party. Accusations of partiality should be immediately addressed and actions taken to demonstrate and convey the impartiality of the PKF. Every effort should be made to promote the impartial status of the force.

4. **Impartiality versus Neutrality.** Impartiality must not be confused with neutrality. To do so limits both flexibility, and the potential to exercise initiative; it also promotes passivity and consequently limits the development of the mission. Impartiality, perhaps better described as principled impartiality, requires a degree of judgement against a set of principles, or the mandate, or both, while the notion of neutrality does not. The conduct of PSO will be impartial to the parties but never neutral in the execution of the mission.

5. **Impartiality and Transparency.** It is more difficult to challenge the impartial status of a mission if the parties are made aware of the operational mandate, mission, intentions and likely techniques to be used by the PKF. These place a premium on the requirement for an active information strategy, reinforced by the civil-military co-operation programme, and an effective liaison system. A failure to communicate will foster suspicion and may prevent the development of the trust and confidence upon which the long-term success of the operation depends.

213. CONSENT

1. **The Nature of Consent.** While there may be consent at the strategic level, (by virtue of national or party commitments to a peace agreement), at the tactical level there may be local groups who disagree violently with their leaders, and who may be hostile to the mission. This may result in non-compliance by rogue para-military elements of one or more of the parties, including (for example) attempts to restrict the freedom of movement of the PKF. In the aftermath of an inter-state conflict the degree of consent should be relatively clear cut and agreed in a peace plan by the disputing States. In the event of an intra-state conflict

or civil war, the warring factions may be difficult to differentiate from the general population, making judgements concerning consent highly problematic. Consent from the warring factions may be minimal and amount to nothing more than a temporary tolerance of the operation, while the rest of the population may be desperate for intervention and assistance. Should the level of consent be uncertain, and the potential for opposition exist, it would be prudent to deploy a force capable of enforcing compliance and developing consent from the outset.

2. **The Significance of Consent.** The promotion of co-operation and consent is fundamental to achieving the political end-state in all PSO. Without the active co-operation and consent of the parties and the indigenous population there cannot be a self-sustaining peace. The need to promote co-operation and consent and the long-term demands of peace will constrain military operations.
3. **Compliance, Justice and Consent.** Compliance may already exist; if not, it may need to be encouraged by inducements and rewards or encouraged by coercion. A clear communication of the requirements of the mandate and the principles underpinning the PSO, with an explanation of the rewards for compliance and penalties for non-compliance, may serve to rationalize PSO actions, refute accusations of partiality, establish credibility and improve consent. The enforcement of compliance may be a necessary precursor or adjunct to the promotion of co-operation and consent. Coercion is not an option for a lightly armed PKF force. In the conduct of PSO to bring an end to any fighting, commanders must negotiate with the leaders engaged in the fighting. However, peace with impunity and without justice is unlikely to promote reconciliation. Thus, to create a self-sustaining peace incrementally requires that commanders not only focus their activities on those involved in the fighting but also encourage co-operation and consent from the local population.
4. **The Consequences of a General Loss of Consent and Non-Compliance.** A mission might lose consent in various ways. A belligerent faction may simply decide to remove consent and compliance unilaterally. Credibility, linked to consent, may be lost if local parties question the PKF's ability to respond to breaches of the mandate, to enforce international laws and take action to control major abuses to basic human rights. An escalation of violence, sustained opposition to the PKF and a possible loss of control within the mission area may occur with the loss of consent. In such circumstances, force protection tasks may divert the PKF from accomplishing other mission essential tasks. Consent will need to be re-established if the operation is to progress towards the desired end-state.
5. **The Management of Consent.** In addition to the promotion of the co-operation of the local people, much of the conduct of a PKF will be designed to manipulate the threshold of consent, in order to create more operational space and greater freedom of action. This can best be achieved by the deployment of a PKF with sufficient capability to deter hostile actions or by the judicious application of force to demonstrate and reinforce credibility. When force is used, it will be necessary to have a keen feel for the impact that actions may have, not just on local consent, but also on the consent for the operation as a whole. When general consent is in doubt, its stabilisation and promotion should be a priority task, but when it is more certain it may be possible to use more robust methods in confined areas without affecting the overall level of consent and the accomplishment of the mission. At all levels, political leverage, sanctions and the threat of credible force or its judicious use, and/or other means may be sufficient to deter or persuade the parties and individuals to consent to an operation and comply with the wishes of the authorizing body.
6. **Transmission of Consent.** Experience has shown the need for continued effort, not only to expand areas of general consent but also to transmit consent up and down a party's chain of command. For example, if a JFC has secured the agreement of a leader to a particular course of action, he should try to ensure that the terms of that agreement are promptly and accurately passed to those party members facing his subordinate commanders, thereby limiting misinterpretation and non-compliance. Liaison officers with faction HQs can help monitor the passage of orders and agreements and, if necessary, assist with their transmission.
7. **Co-operative Ventures.** Consent will be further promoted if it can be shown to the parties that their status and authority will increase if they are successful in resolving their own disputes. If the people and parties can be made shareholders in the peace process, then their motivation to co-operate will be greatly increased. At the tactical level, this possibility can be pursued by creating incentive-based opportunities to

co-operate together in jointly carrying out certain tasks. Such action might be risky and difficult but deserves consideration.

214. MINIMUM USE OF FORCE

1. In PSO force should always be used with restraint; only the minimum necessary to accomplish a specific task should be employed. Authoritative limits on the circumstances in which, and the ways and means by which, force may be used may be established in the mandate as well as by international law, domestic law of the troop contributors and, in certain circumstances, Host Nation law. They will be reflected in the approved ROE. The mission's military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mandate.

2. **The Consequences of Using Force.** The consequences of using force reach far beyond the immediate tactical situation. ROE are authorizations to use force but the circumstances in each case will determine whether force as authorized by ROE will be used. Political considerations and the need to work with a wide range of civilian agencies will require that all military actions, and in particular the use of force, are restrained and balanced against the long-term requirements of the mission. The use of force may have an effect upon military activities and those of the other agencies in theatre.

3. **Management of the Consequences.** The management of the consequences from the use of force and the achievement of objectives is one of the most important considerations with which the JFC, together with the SRSG or HOM must deal. It affects every aspect of the mission and requires continual review to balance security and mission accomplishment. The JFC should make the final determination regarding force capability requirements after reviewing the mandate, situation and operational constraints.

4. **The Application of Force.** When used, force should be precise, appropriate, proportionate and designed to resolve and defuse a crisis and prevent further escalation. Collateral damage should be minimised and reasonable measures taken to avoid civilian casualties. Options other than the use of force should be considered and used if possible and appropriate. Only the minimum force necessary should be used but this does not exclude the use of force sufficient to overwhelm, should it be necessary to do so.

5. **Consent and the Use of Force.** In cases of clear breaches of the mandate, the flaunting of international law and the abuse of human rights, the use of force, if authorized by the ROE, may serve to enhance the credibility of the force and the consent for the operation nationally and internationally. It may be that force loses local consent but if this can be isolated, wider consent may be promoted. In certain circumstances, consent may serve to marginalize opposition and render it vulnerable to the use of force. If general consent for the operation can be promoted to such a degree that it reduces armed opposition to the status of maverick banditry, then the use of force, which is within the prescribed limits of the ROE, may further enhance consent. In such circumstances consent can thus facilitate, not hinder, the use of force.

6. **The Use of Force and Self-Defence.** Military forces should not confuse such wider authorization to use force as may be contained in ROE with the inherent right to use force in self-defence. The meaning of self-defence for these purposes is given in *Use of Force* (Revision One), B-GJ-005-501/FP-000. The sensitive issue for PKF is whether to intervene in response to human rights abuses directed at civilians 'on the ground'. The legal permission to do so should be contained in the authorized ROE. The rules of engagement must be formulated to support the operational concept and the force structure so that PKF are not placed in circumstances beyond their capability to respond.




Figure 2-2 Scale of the Use of Force in PSO and Related Operations

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CHAPTER 3
MISSION STRATEGY
SECTION I - GENERAL

301. GENERAL – MISSION STRATEGY

1. Most countries operate in the international environment based on a developed national strategy. A national strategy is the combination of diplomatic, economic and military measures focussed to promote a country's national interests. Similarly, the international community needs a comprehensive, encompassing strategy when it embarks on a peace support operation (PSO). The requirements of the strategy vary depending on the nature of the PSO being established. In traditional peacekeeping the strategy remains largely an impartial inter-positional force that permits negotiations between the parties to the conflict to proceed. A more sophisticated strategy is required in complex emergencies.
2. In traditional peacekeeping the disputing states provide the framework within which the peacekeeping force (PKF) will operate. State formation is a slow, incremental and continuous process. Western states have taken centuries to mature into their current format. Assisted states – where the intra-state conflict is occurring – tend to be very early in the state formation process. They can be ineffective governmentally, economically and socially – poor legitimacy in government, poor infrastructure and poor services for the population. This intricate interrelationship of state characteristics requires a sophisticated re-building strategy.
3. Complex peacekeeping missions seek to aid weak or failed states in building their capabilities. The overall mission strategy will be broadly based on the following key components:
 - a. **Security Sector Reform.** This line of civil activity addresses the need for an impartial and accountable legal system and for dealing with past abuses; in particular, creation of effective law enforcement, an open judicial system, fair laws, humane corrections systems, and formal and informal mechanisms for resolving grievances arising from conflict.
 - b. **Human Security.** This line of civil activity addresses fundamental social and economic needs; in particular provision of emergency relief, restoration of essential services to the population, laying the foundation for a viable economy, and initiation of an inclusive, sustainable development program. When the situation stabilizes, attention shifts from humanitarian relief to long-term social and economic development.
 - c. **Good Governance.** This line of civil activity addresses the need for legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions and participatory processes; in particular, establishing a representative constitutional structure, strengthening public sector management and administration, and ensuring active and open participation of civil society in the formulation of government and its policies.
 - d. **Security.** This line of activity addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular establishment of a safe and secure environment and development of legitimate and stable security institutions. Security encompasses the provision of collective and individual security, and is the precondition for achieving successful outcomes in the lines of civil activity.

SECTION II - SECURITY STRATEGY

302. SECURITY - GENERAL

1. The roles of the various actors in the implementation of the mission security strategy are described below:

- a. **The Role of the Assisted State's Civil Authority.** The civil authorities of the assisted state retain overall responsibility for the security situation. If appropriate the assisted state's police or security forces should be the lead elements for security issues. They must be assisted in any necessary reform as eventually the international mission will depart and complete national security responsibilities will transition back to the assisted state.
- b. **The Role of the International Police Forces.** The role of the international police must be clearly specified in the mandate especially if the force is to have "executive authority". In general, United Nations civilian police monitor local police forces to ensure they carry out their duties without discriminating against persons of any nationality or abusing human rights, train or assist in the training of local police, perform tasks related to elections and assist humanitarian agencies.
- c. **The Role of the International Military Forces.** The role of the international military forces will be to re-establish security in the mission area. The level and intensity of operations required to carry out this mandate will be dependent on the compliance of the parties to the dispute. Military forces will concentrate on the suppression of organized, well-armed, violent groups. The military's interrelationship with the police can be described as follows:
 - (1) **Restoration.** The military acts to restore law and order when the assisted state's law enforcement agencies have failed to or are unable to act and the threat is beyond the capabilities of the international police force to control. These tasks may also be undertaken when a security gap exists – For example, an international police presence has not yet been established;
 - (2) **Complementary.** The military undertakes specialized tasks which are beyond the capability of the police organizations, such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks; and
 - (3) **Supplementary.** The military replaces civil law enforcement agencies on routine tasks to free them for higher priority public security tasks that they can more appropriately perform.

303. UN CIVPOL - STRATEGY

1. **Pre-Mission Assessment.** A UN CIVPOL representative should be included in DPKO survey mission teams. The UN CIVPOL assessment will include the following:

- a. An assessment of the legal system triad: judicial, police organization and penal system
- b. An evaluation of the police culture.
- c. The organization of the mission itself.
- d. Structure and roles of the UN military force.
- e. UN CIVPOL specific considerations: risk, operational factors, organization, logistic requirements and personnel.

2. **Mission Phasing.** The UN CIVPOL mission is part of a larger peace process that is inherently dynamic in nature. Depending on the mandate, a typical UN CIVPOL mission will progress through the following phases:

- a. **Monitoring.** The initial focus of UN CIVPOL activity may be predominantly monitoring an existing but dysfunctional public security force. The basic skills required during this phase are to observe and report. The organizational structure will necessarily reflect the geographic deployment of indigenous police agencies.
- b. **Reform.** The next phase will normally require a transition to training and mentoring posture to reform the local police forces. This will require a UN CIVPOL organizational structure capable of accommodating the continuing monitoring mission as well as the new restructuring activities (for example, vetting, establishing training programs or an academy and mentoring).
- c. **Mentoring.** Over time, if reform is successful and police culture has been changed, the monitoring function will diminish and long-term mentoring and advising will normally become the major focus.
- d. **Transition.** There are three transition options that may occur when a UN mission is terminated. DPKO may end the peacekeeping operation but the UN CIVPOL mandate may continue. A second option is for UN CIVPOL to be phased out of the operation entirely, leaving residual bilateral and multilateral police assistance programs to carry on. Finally, a regional organization may assume oversight activities and coordination of the assistance provided by bilateral donors.

	External Security	Internal Security	
FAILING STATE			
Mission	National Defence	Counter-Insurgency	Domestic Order
State Agencies	Army, Navy, Air Force Military and foreign intelligence services	Army Internal intelligence services	Army, Police Internal intelligence services
Non-State Agencies	Private Military Companies	Private Military Companies	
COMPLEX PEACEKEEPING MISSION			
Mission	National Defence	Domestic Order	
State Agencies	Army, Navy, Air Force Military and foreign intelligence services	Army, Police Intelligence services	
Non-State Agencies	International Peacekeeping Force	International Peacekeeping Force, UN CIVPOL	
MATURE STATE			
Mission	National Defence	Domestic Order	
State Agencies	Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Special operation forces Military and foreign intelligence services	Police Intelligence services	
Non-State Agencies	None		

Table 3-1 Security Sector Template

304. MILITARY STRATEGY

- 1. The goal of military strategy will be to provide the appropriate security environment as required by the mission’s mandate. In traditional peacekeeping missions this will be rather straightforward. For complex

peacekeeping many more issues have to be considered in designing an appropriate strategy. A close, intimate link will have to be established with the international police force in theatre and several other areas – not part of normal conventional operations – will have to be considered. Combat capable forces are necessary to carry out those general military tasks common to both the PSO and warfighting environment: patrolling, observation, establishing defensive positions etc. (see Chapter 4 for a further description). Establishing a secure environment will be the prime goal of the security strategy. Some of the other issues that need consideration are described below.

- a. **Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR).** A properly designed DDR program can greatly enhance security in the mission area. It can be conducted in two broad phases: first, a general program to try to reduce the overall number of armed individuals in the assisted state; and second, a program to assist in the restructuring of the military force. An effective program does much to return coercive power to state institutions.
- b. **Security Sector Reform.** The aim of the military component of security sector reform is to have an accountable, properly structured and democratically based military force. In complex peacekeeping this normally involves building a new, unified armed forces and simultaneously rationalizing its equipment to reduce costs. Training takes on great significance in order to instil professional attitudes, encourage the observance of human rights, develop tactical competence and promote democratic values.
- c. **Control of Border Areas.** Hostile forces often attract support from outside the country, either from international organizations or from other countries willing to embarrass the authorities. All external support of personnel and material must cross either land or sea borders, and if there is an adjacent land frontier, hostile operations may be mounted across it from the sanctuary of foreign soil. All states have the machinery to impose some degree of frontier control and this may provide a suitable basis on which to build border security. Border operations generally take place away from urban areas, and the operating tactics for rural areas should generally be applied. Most of the problems that arise are influenced by local conditions.
- d. **Information Campaign.** The focus of complex peacekeeping is to compel or persuade the factions to abide by the terms of the ceasefire, peace agreement, or international sanctions or resolutions. An effective information campaign may be one of the most critical and acceptable means of achieving stated objectives within the constraints of the ROE. The applications of non-violent techniques such as civil-military activities, psychological operations (PSYOP), and public affairs may be more effective than the direct use of force to achieve the desired end state. Restraining the use of lethal combat power and conducting an effective information campaign can enhance both domestic and international perceptions of the legitimacy of the peace operation. Key to sustaining perceptions of impartiality is the concept of transparency of operations – the ability of the factions to monitor the actions of the PKF, but balanced against security and force protection needs. PSO are carried out under the glare of public scrutiny. Many organizations and systems, including the media, outside the control of the PKF process and disseminate information to national and international audiences. They all can produce strategic-level implications from tactical-level events. This is often referred to as "the CNN effect". A properly developed information campaign will be a key part of the security strategy in a complex PSO.

305. UNITY OF SECURITY EFFORT

1. The UN civilian police and the PKF are closely linked in safeguarding the peace process. While the PKF is responsible for re-establishing a stable and orderly environment only UN CIVPOL can nurture the capability and will among local authorities to maintain the rule of law in conformity with internationally accepted standards. Both components must work in a collaborative fashion. Unity of effort will be essential in information sharing, security planning for elections, enforcement of UN CIVPOL commissioner's sanctions on local police, inspections of public security facilities (for example, police stations, prisons), strategies for dealing with obstruction of the peace process and handling of civil disturbances, disturbances, which the local police have failed to address properly, hostage rescue, medical evacuation, and UN CIVPOL

evacuation. During campaign planning the extent that the UN CIVPOL and military contingents might share command and control, communications and logistics capabilities should be examined.

2. To conduct joint operations effectively the following items should be considered:
 - a. Where possible, establishing common areas of responsibility for both components.
 - b. Co-locating headquarters and operations centres.
 - c. Using liaison officers.
 - d. Developing contingency plans, especially for operations that could involve the use of force, such as cordon and search operations, movement of refugees or displaced persons, evacuation of the civilian police from troubled areas, and election security.
 - e. Conducting exercises to rehearse the most important plans involving the prospective use of force.
 - f. Holding regular meetings of key personnel to exchange information and coordinate combined actions.
 - g. Developing SOPs to co-ordinate tactical efforts in the field.
 - h. Familiarizing components with the other's Rules of Engagement.

306. SYNCHRONIZATION – OTHER MISSION ELEMENTS

1. **NGO Co-ordination and Liaison.** The proliferation of NGOs in humanitarian crises means that co-ordination and the harmonization of activities is complex and time consuming. In the early part of a crisis, and before the appointment of a UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator, NGOs generally form some kind of ad hoc network, umbrella group or consortium to co-ordinate their activities. As emergencies escalate and the number of NGOs and donor funding increase, there is a commensurate increase in the need for co-ordination, and accountability to donors. This has the potential to develop into competition for funding and other resources, which can distort relationships and cause friction. The need to counter-act such negative pressures places an emphasis on regular liaison and communication at all levels.
2. **Relationships with the Military.** Increasing incidents of shared operational experiences between NGOs and the military has enhanced mutual understanding and contributed to more positive and constructive relationships. While the military should accept that NGOs may be working to their own agenda, military and NGO objectives will often be mutually beneficial and therefore require harmonization and co-ordination, if only to delineate areas of responsibility and rationalize potential areas of friction. Effective co-operation will have a major impact on the success of a mission. In this context it is important to recognize that in many PSO local (indigenous) NGOs may be among the few functioning social institutions with the ability to reach people in a helpful and constructive way.
3. **Civil-Military Operations Centre.** The Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC), or an equivalent mission specific establishment, serves as a central point for combined humanitarian-security planning and coordination. The CMOC allows the military to keep the humanitarian community informed of the security situation and the availability, normally short term, of uncommitted military resources. It permits humanitarian agencies to integrate their plans with the security campaign and coordinate general or specific task protection for humanitarian operations.
4. Effective collaboration between CIVPOL and other mission elements, such as humanitarian relief and resettlement personnel, human rights monitors, and election supervisors is also essential for implementation of the mandate. For example, both CIVPOL and various human rights monitors representing international and non-governmental organizations will have an interest in inspecting penal facilities. This raises issues such as coordination of inspection programs and sharing of information. Many of the same

measures suggested above may also be valuable for promoting collaborative effort with these components as well.

SECTION III - COMBAT FUNCTIONS

307. GENERAL

1. The full employment of combat power may be required if the situation on the ground deteriorates during a PSO. The various combat functions need to be understood in the particular environment of PSO. The effective integration of combat power will affect the PKF's ability to coerce and whether it approaches operations from a deterrent or compellent stance. This integration has a direct bearing on the PKF's credibility.
2. In PSO coercion can be viewed as the threatened use of force to influence the behaviour of a party to the dispute. It may require the limited use of force to back up the threat. It is not war fighting but the force necessary for combat operations needs to be present for the threat to be perceived as valid. Deterrence involves preventing an action from happening and can be key in de-escalating confrontation. Compellence seeks to reverse an action that has already occurred. It would likely require offensive operations that might de-stabilize the situation more.
3. **Credibility.** For the PKF to be effective, it must be credible and perceived as such. The credibility of the operation is a reflection of the parties' assessment of the force's capability to accomplish the mission. Thus, often a PKF must be organized with an appropriate coercive structure at the start of the operation. Establishing credibility creates confidence in the operation, not just among the local parties but also with the international community. While the PKF should not appear to pose a direct threat to any of the parties if they remain compliant, there should be no doubt that it is fully capable of carrying out its responsibilities and is supported by the political resolve to do so.
4. The PKF must demonstrate its effectiveness immediately on deployment to the JOA. The PKF must be employed with a sound concept of operations and adequate ROE to guarantee mission success, even in the face of attempts by the parties either to gain an advantage or to undermine the mission. The force must respond with professional bearing and swift, effective, impartial actions to incidents. All personnel must consistently demonstrate the highest standards of discipline, control and professional behaviour, both on and off duty.

308. COMMAND

1. **Unity of Effort.** The complexity of PSO and the demands for continual military interaction with a large number of IGOs, NGOs, and PVOs will make co-ordination with their activities one of the most difficult challenges. Unity of effort recognises the need for a coherent approach to a common objective between the various military contingents and between the military and civilian components of an operation. Co-ordination with civilian agencies can only be achieved by dialogue and consensus and not by command. Unity of effort can best be achieved by the development of a multifunctional planning approach. The SRSG or HoM will have prime responsibility for co-ordination and the achievement of unity of effort. To achieve unity of effort at the strategic level requires close liaison between the authorizing political body and the key departments – DND, CIDA, and DFAIT. At the operational and tactical levels, close and early liaison between the military and civilian components of the operation is essential. Effective liaison at all levels and regular conferences and meetings involving all agencies and parties will be essential to achieving unity of effort.
2. **Civil-Military Co-operation and Liaison.** At the operational and tactical level the timely and effective harmonisation and co-ordination of military activities with those of the civilian agencies are essential for success. The Civil-Military Operation Centre (CMOC) serves as an interface for this coordination. It remains a command responsibility to ensure that the military campaign is synchronized with the civil lines of operation.
3. **Manoeuvrist Approach.** The multi-agency environment in which PSO are conducted and the complex nature of the challenges to be confronted, require commanders at all levels to place a premium on initiative and flexibility. While detailed orders will be required to cover some aspects of the mission the force

must be well balanced to exploit unexpected events. Successful peace building comes from recognizing and acting on opportunities in a timely manner. Within the constraints of the operational plan, understanding the commander's intent allows forces to adapt and move from one activity to another at short notice to further the mission's goals. This flexibility is vital to the successful conduct of PSO and a PKF must be capable of dealing with both constructive options and escalation.

309. FORCE PROTECTION

1. **Security.** Self-defence is an inherent right and force protection a command responsibility in all military operations. All military personnel involved in an operation must be trained and equipped in such a manner as to maximize their safety while carrying out their tasks. In its directive the PKF may also be given specific responsibilities for the protection of any civilian components of the operation. This will have to be taken into account when planning the size and composition of the force and when drawing up military orders and ROE. Whilst they cannot be forced to do so, civil agencies should be encouraged to make their personnel appropriately aware of the risks and dangers they may face. On occasion aid agencies may employ local civilians or expatriates as guards and escorts. These will require security screening. Precise responsibilities and operating procedures will require co-ordination with the activities of the PKF.

2. **Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence (NBCD).** Despite sustained efforts in the field of arms control, worldwide proliferation of NBC weapons and their associated means of delivery have continued. At the same time, the expanding global distribution of nuclear and chemical industries and materials opens up increasing possibilities of the release of toxic materials into the environment as the result of neglect, collateral damage or misuse. A risk is now recognised from deliberate or accidental release of low-level radiation, toxic industrial materials (TIM) and similar hazards by releases other than attacks (ROTA) which may influence PSO. Accordingly, PSO must be planned, conducted and supported against a background of a continued risk of ROTA, and of the employment of NBC weapons by opposing forces and terrorists. Chapter 16 of B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, *Canadian Forces Operations*, provides the basic concept of NBCD, while chapter 5 of the DCDS Direction for International Operations sets forth principles to assist commanders and staffs to plan for and conduct operations in which their forces may encounter the employment or threat of NBC weapons. Detailed NBCD information is available in B-GJ-005-311/FP-001, *CF NBCD Operations*. It provides the strategic concept, policies, operational guidance and NBC specific direction applicable on international contingency operations.

3. **Health Services.** Military health services are designed to provide health services to the forces and not the indigenous population, but in PSO they may also be required to support humanitarian operations and community relations projects. Living conditions in PSO may be very basic and could pose a considerable health and hygiene hazard. Environmental health and hygiene reconnaissance and monitoring are indispensable for troop health and welfare. Despite the very basic living conditions that often prevail in PSO, the expectations of servicemen and women, the public, media and parliament will be higher than might be expected for war. Levels of accessibility and care must conform, as closely as possible, to those expected in peace.

310. INFORMATION

1. **Public Affairs.** The aim of public affairs during a PSO is to assist in maintaining the support for the operation both internationally and locally.

- a. **International and National Support.** The in-theatre public affairs (PA) plan serves to support the mission's mandate and inform the international community on the role, mandate and tasks of the PKF. Nationally assigned PAOs keep their own specific nations informed. Information provided to Canadians will be accurate and up-to-date while respecting the principle of operational security. Canadian PA policy is derived from Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD) 2008 series and all personnel on a PSO should be aware of the directives and instructions concerning the provision of information and related subject areas.

- b. **Local Support.** One of the primary aims of PA in a PSO therefore will be to convey the concept of the mission and the meaning of the mandate to local audiences. The PKF's mission and concept of operations must be easily understood and obvious to all parties. The parties must be made aware of what the mandate demands of them and what will be the consequences of not complying. Likewise they should also be made aware of the advantages to be gained by compliance. Failure to achieve common understanding may lead to suspicion, mistrust or even hostility. Information should be gathered and communicated through open sources wherever possible. Informing the local population ensures that the operation is transparent, but this must be balanced against the need to ensure the security of the mission and its members. The requirements of force protection may render complete transparency inappropriate
2. **Intelligence.** The fundamental responsibility of the intelligence staff in PSO is to provide decision-makers at all levels of command with a complete understanding of the belligerents and of the operational environment, contributing to situational awareness and force protection. This includes a comprehensive understanding of the belligerents' desired end-states, interim objectives, strategies, tactics, strengths and weaknesses, and their capabilities and intentions. The staff must understand every facet of the belligerents' character, culture, social and ethnic background, traditions and history.
3. Intelligence staffs in PSO have three important roles, which are vital for the successful conduct of any operation:
- a. Identify the threat (to friendly forces and/or the campaign);
 - b. Assess the effectiveness of the campaign; and
 - c. Identify the compliance of the involved parties to the international agreement and/or instructions to the parties.
4. To ensure impartiality, information and intelligence about the parties involved in the crisis should not be exchanged with or released to any of the other parties. Human intelligence (HUMINT) and counter-intelligence (CI) are key capabilities in PSO. The main thrust of the CI effort is directly related to force protection. Linguists and interpreters form a necessary and integral part of these efforts. The use of locally recruited staff poses a potential CI threat. The difficulties of ensuring that appropriately trained linguists are available for HUMINT operations can be problematic. In any event, careful planning and sufficient lead times are essential for successful HUMINT operations.
5. During a PSO, frequent communication with Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) as well as other civil agencies is important. They will be sources of information. In general, NGOs rely on the military for security related information and at the same time want to retain an appearance of neutrality. Liaison with all parties operating in the area of operations is mutually beneficial and should be actively encouraged. Special co-ordinating meetings should be scheduled on a regular basis to ensure the right flow of information.

311. MANOEUVRE

1. **Freedom of Military Movement.** Freedom of movement is essential for the successful accomplishment of any PSO and should be covered by the mandate. The PKF should be free at all times to perform its duties throughout the designated mission area. Parties to the conflict will often try to impose local restrictions on freedom of movement. These restrictions must be resolutely and swiftly resolved through negotiations, and if these do not achieve success, more vigorous and resolute action including the use of force may be needed.

312. FIREPOWER

1. Firepower in a PSO is closely controlled by the use of rules of engagements. Some operations will require the broader application of firepower. Even so, it is crucial that firepower is not applied

indiscriminately as this detracts from the normalized, secure environment the PKF is trying to establish. Indiscriminate use may cause local sentiment to turn against the PKF and could be used by non-compliant parties to campaign against the PKF's presence. In complex operations a full range of platforms and coordination measures may be required. Non-lethal weaponry should be included in the PKF's inventory to provide a continuum of escalation options to the commander. Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) technologies should be used where possible to enhance detection capabilities and contribute to the more precise application of firepower.

313. SUSTAINMENT

1. Sustainment is a key function in a PSO. It is covered in detail in Chapter 8.

SECTION IV - SECURITY COMPONENT CONSIDERATIONS

314. MARITIME FORCES

1. In the conduct of PSO, fundamental activities such as defence, deterrence, protection, patrolling, surveillance, poise, sealift and amphibious tasks, remain extant, but the nature of PSO may require a particular restraint or emphasis in the application of these concepts. In the conduct of PSO, maritime forces possess a number of distinct attributes that contribute to a wide variety of particular functions and capabilities. These are described below.
 - a. **Mobility.** Mobility enables maritime forces to respond from over a very wide horizon, becoming selectively visible and offering a variety of coercive or inducement profiles.
 - b. **Versatility.** Warships can easily change their military posture, undertake several tasks concurrently and be rapidly available to escalate, if necessary. Furthermore, their mere presence in a region does not necessarily convey a particular intention or threat, although this could send the wrong message if not complemented by the appropriate diplomacy.
 - c. **Sustained Reach.** Maritime forces have integral logistic support. This gives individual maritime units the ability to operate for extended periods of time at considerable distance from shore support.
 - d. **Lift Capability.** Sealift allows amphibious and selected land and air forces to transit to, and poise, in theatre, and then enables maritime power to be brought to bear ashore either independently or in support of joint operations.
 - e. **Poise.** Once in theatre, maritime forces can remain on station for prolonged periods, either covertly or more openly. They provide options without the risks associated with deploying forces ashore.
 - f. **Leverage.** Through suitable positioning, maritime forces can provide leverage to influence political events and shape military operations ashore.
2. **Maritime Tasks.** The application of maritime power in PSO can include the following tasks:
 - a. The active monitoring of a sea area for any infringements of sanctions or embargoes and their enforcement.
 - b. Patrolling and monitoring a maritime cease-fire line or demilitarized zone and the enforcement of embargoes.
 - c. Supervising the cantonment of vessels.
 - d. The contribution of organic embarked and transported aircraft and helicopters to enforcement of a no-fly zone or in-theatre movement of forces, aid, refugees and casualties.
 - e. Contribution of amphibious forces to littoral operations and the maintenance of an amphibious capability in theatre to permit the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces, aid workers, and entitled civilians.
 - f. Provision of sea borne health care and other logistic and humanitarian resources.
 - g. Disaster relief operations and assistance to sea borne refugees.
 - h. Provision of a neutral platform for peace negotiations.
 - i. Mine countermeasures to provide access or contribute to a new peace.

3. Maritime forces may play a role in all phases of a PSO. Maritime considerations, which should be integral to the joint operational planning for a PSO include generic naval C3 and surveillance capabilities, and more specific naval capabilities: the ability to open and protect sea lanes for the deployment and sustainment or to project power ashore, either independently or in support of joint operations or to provide a sea-borne platform for a Joint Task Force HQ.

315. LAND FORCES

1. Land elements play an important role due to their close, day-to-day interface with the parties to the conflict and the indigenous population. This gives land forces a direct influence over conditions in the area of operations. This intimacy requires that soldiers be sensitive to the nature and ethos of the particular operation. The different combat arms bring unique skills to PSO.

- a. **Armour.** The use of tanks is generally not appropriate or practical in peacekeeping operations, although they may have a role in force protection. Balanced against the equipment and scale of opposition of local forces they can be an effective statement of political will in complex peacekeeping operations. Armoured reconnaissance elements are particularly useful, especially when the geographical area of responsibility is large. The fire power, mobility, protection and communications of armoured reconnaissance vehicles, and the training of reconnaissance troops, makes them suitable for such tasks as liaison, information gathering, control points, convoy security, quick reaction and clearing routes.
- b. **Artillery.** The deployment and use of guns, rockets and missiles are rarely appropriate in traditional peacekeeping. However, mortar locating radars and other artillery locating assets may prove useful for the documenting and apportioning of responsibility for attacks and other violations. In complex peacekeeping fire support may be required to support operations by firing mortar and artillery illumination, marker and, when appropriate high explosive (HE) ammunition as a demonstration of resolve to deter hostile acts and to encourage compliance. Indirect fire may be the only effective and timely response available to a commander due to the geographic dispersion characteristic of PSO. In operations designed to guarantee or deny movement, artillery, particularly air defence artillery, may be used to enforce no-fly/movement zones.
- c. **Infantry.** Infantry is the predominate component of the PSO force. Infantry are suited to hold positions, provide presence, observe, man checkpoints, conduct patrols, escort, gather information and intelligence and act as agents of any civil affairs programme. Armoured personnel vehicles enhance protection and employability for high-risk tasks.

316. AIR FORCES

1. The contribution of air power to PSO has varied with each operation; nevertheless, exploitation of the air remains a significant factor in PSO. From the earliest stages of a crisis air power can provide a deterrent, with implicit or explicit threat of escalation. Alternatively, it may prepare the environment for secure insertion of a ground force, and then complement other forces by its ability to be activated or suppressed rapidly in concert with progress on other military, humanitarian or diplomatic fronts. Finally, air power projection operations can be ended quickly, and without the problems of extraction in the face of intense media interest.

2. As with surface forces, the air commander must have a clear, achievable mission and a defined end-state. Moreover, as air assets and their command and control structures are often located outside the zone of conflict, there is potential for operational goals to diverge from those of forces enmeshed in the immediate situation. For instance, a strategy of enforcement from the air would be incompatible with a strategy of peacekeeping on the ground. Joint planning of air operations is therefore essential to ensure that they are fully integrated into and supportive of the overall PSO campaign plan. Air capabilities and operations in PSO may be grouped into five roles, described below.

- a. **Reconnaissance and Surveillance.** At the operational level, air assets can make a major contribution to diplomatic and other efforts to prevent or limit conflict. Operating from outside a

potential area of trouble, they can gather information without intruding into the area and risking exacerbating the situation. If PSO become necessary, air reconnaissance offers a highly mobile and responsive source of information that is independent of terrain and, to an extent, weather. Moreover, the reconnaissance may be overt or covert, air reconnaissance being ideal for the latter.

- b. **Strategic Airlift and Tactical Air Mobility.** Fixed-wing Air Transport (AT) aircraft are always a fundamental adjunct to PSO. They can move significant amounts of personnel and materiel quickly into theatre, and may be exploited to move food and emergency aid, conduct aero-medical, airborne and special operation forces (SOF) operations, or evacuate nationals, aid workers and others caught up in the dispute within the theatre. AT offers a high profile demonstration of national commitment that attracts major media coverage.
 - c. **Control of the Air.** Even a poorly equipped protagonist may be able to launch limited air attacks that achieve disproportionate political results. In contrast, any offensive air action by PSO forces beyond strict self-defence will be heavily constrained and counter-air operations are likely to be reactive. Control of the air is achieved through: protection of aircraft from attack by air or surface weapons; monitoring airspace to detect and confront unauthorised activities; imposition of an air blockade; and preparedness to attack all or part of any belligerent's air inventory where there is irrefutable evidence of non-compliance.
 - d. **Deterrence and Coercion.** Offensive air power can discourage disputants from using military force. This requires a clear and convincing political statement of intent, backed with the military capability to counter opposition effectively. Well-publicized preparations at home bases, rapid deployments to the area of unrest, and high visibility exercises, can all reinforce diplomacy and discourage conflict. If deterrence fails, offensive air operations can reduce the non-compliance's will and ability to fight by destroying key elements of military potential or other high value assets. Selection of targets will be crucial for this, and will usually require political sanction.
 - e. **Force Extraction.** Air power could help extract surface forces from a PSO when withdrawal is being opposed. However, this is a high-risk option that may require offensive and defensive air operations, in addition to rotary wing and AT operations. Night extraction might provide a further measure of protection.
3. **Helicopters.** Helicopters can perform a wide range of essential functions in PSO. Helicopter roles include:
- a. **Reconnaissance.** Helicopters can provide first class local information. Their low operating altitude gives excellent perspective, while their rapid response and forward deployment can yield timely data. The electro-optical systems fitted to armed and attack helicopters can provide detailed imagery from standoff distances that make them inconspicuous to those observed.
 - b. **Troop Movement.** Troop movement operations can range from SOF support through patrol deployment and convoy escort to airmobile operations.
 - c. **Logistic Support.** Utility and Transport Helicopters (UH/T) can re-supply almost any area, and carry out a wide range of logistic tasks, from liaison to troop movement, re-supply, engineer and signals support, to casualty evacuation. Where possible, the sole reliance on helicopters should be avoided as their scarcity, cost, and vulnerability will often make surface movement more appropriate over the longer term.
 - d. **Armed Action.** Combat aviation, in particular Attack Helicopter, can provide a flexible and responsive deterrent force. Their potential to support other helicopter operations, provide presence or over-watch and, if necessary, conduct precision fire at long range, can place heavy demands on their availability.
 - e. **Maritime Operations.** Maritime helicopters are configured specifically for the maritime environment, and can contribute significantly to surveillance and anti-surface force action in maritime CPKO and

blockade operations. In addition, maritime helicopters can contribute to land based operations in a utility role with minimal re-configuration.

317. SPACE ASSETS

1. **Space.** Space capabilities are essential to PSO efforts largely in the area of force enhancement operations supporting air, ground and maritime forces. Space missions comprising force enhancement include the items listed below. Tying all these systems together in theatre requires the expertise provided by the forward-deployed space support teams.

- a. **Communications.** In many areas where PSO are likely to occur, existing communications infrastructure may not support the requirements of the PKF. They must have the capability to communicate among the assigned land, maritime, and air forces, as well as to the higher levels of command.
- b. **Navigation.** Global positioning systems (GPS) support PSO by providing highly accurate three-dimensional location capability, velocity determination and time reference. Such systems allow PKF to know their exact location, which they can then communicate to friendly forces to determine the best routes for movement. This is extremely important in areas where maps are out of date or nonexistent, physical landmarks are sparse, or local magnetic variations are unreliable. This aids in the surveying of various features, including minefields, borders, and buffer zones (BZs).
- c. **Weather.** Weather data is important to PSO. Timely and accurate weather information is essential for mission planning, route selection, communications, observation, and reporting.
- d. **Geomatic Services.** Geomatic Services assets can provide hard- and soft-copy maps, gravity values, sea surface topography measurements, hydrographical charts, and digital feature analysis.
- e. **Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).** Space systems provide a variety of ISR capabilities, which enhance a commander's situational awareness of the parties to a dispute and their compliance with agreements.

318. SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES

1. The characteristics of Special Operation Forces have many relevant applications in PSO, but their overt deployment in a politically charged environment can be highly emotive. Their ability to be deployed discreetly, at long range, with secure communications, makes SOFs capable of short notice liaison, reconnaissance and other tasks. They are also suited to civil-military co-operation tasks, community relations and community information activities, as well as the raising, training and reform of local security forces.

319. ENGINEERS

1. The demands for engineering skills from all services usually exceed supply. Engineers inevitably are required to build accommodation, carry out force protection tasks and conduct mobility and counter-mobility operations. Civil affairs and CIMIC programs may require engineer support for the construction or maintenance of civil infrastructure: shelters, waste disposal facilities and electrical power and water distribution systems. Engineer tasks can have a direct impact on the day-to-day lives of the local populace through their projects and these can have a spin-off effect on the credibility of the PKF. Engineers frequently provide initial supervision to mine action programs.

320. POLICE FORCES

1. **Military Police.** Military police are able to provide the JFC with a rapid investigation and management capability. This may include: war crimes response, the investigation of complaints and claims made against the PKF, the prevention of crime, including looting and black marketeering, the maintenance

and restoration of law and order (not just in a military context), the protection of designated high threat personnel and the control of routes, traffic, stragglers, refugees and other non-combatants. Policing tasks are and should be, primarily conducted by civil authorities or specified civilian policing elements of the PSO. However, military police may be required to, however, perform these functions in close co-operation with local police forces or UN police or when a security gap exists.

2. Canadian military police may deploy as a separate unit or be integrated into a coalition military police force. Military police deployed on a PSO will continue to perform the four basic functions of military policing – mobility support, security, detention and police operations – but the emphasis and priorities will be adjusted for local security conditions. For instance, depending on the mandate, there may be a need to carry out tasks related to the custody of civilian detainee or a full range of police operations.

3. The Task Force Provost Marshal (PM) is required to maintain close liaison with other military police elements, with international police organizations and with local police forces. The PM will co-ordinate information on the political alignment, degree of cooperation, capabilities and limitations, and most probable courses of action of the entity police forces in co-operation with the international police force and ensure this information is integrated into operational planning.

4. **Multinational Specialized Units.** Over the long term local police should have primary responsibility for all law enforcement issues. In the interim, and where this is not possible, the PKF has the responsibility for creating a secure environment. Multinational Specialized Units (MSUs) provide the JFC with police forces that have military status and the training, experience and capability to deal with this area of public security. MSU roles may include information gathering, investigations, criminal intelligence, counter terrorism, maintenance of law and order, and public security related matters. The aim should be for MSU and other PKF components to transfer law enforcement responsibilities to civilian police components of the PSO, and/or to local civilian police forces, at the earliest feasible point in the operation.

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CHAPTER 4

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION TASKS

SECTION I - GENERAL MILITARY TASKS

401. GENERAL

1. Peace support tasks span a continuum. In some peace support operations (PSO) only one or two military tasks might be carried out. Conversely, some PSO differ just in the integration of the tasks into the campaign plan but may include all the general military, humanitarian assistance and peace building tasks. In broad terms, there are some functions that are carried out in all operations.

- a. **Observing, monitoring, verifying and reporting any alleged violation of the governing agreements.** Agreements may include treaties, truces, cease-fires, arms control agreements, mandates or any other binding agreements between the disputing parties.
- b. **Investigating alleged cease-fire violations, boundary incidents and complaints.** This may include incidents, unauthorized troop movements, and construction or reinforcing of defensive positions. An investigation provides evidence regarding violations of the agreements and may involve negotiation or mediation, to include direct dialogue between the disputing parties.
- c. **Negotiating and mediating.** Military observers (MilObs) may undertake negotiations on behalf of the disputing parties to mediate low-level disputes. Reconciliation of differences at the lowest possible level often contributes to the overall success of the PSO.
- d. **Conducting regular liaison visits within the operational area.** Disputes thrive on rumours, uncertainty and prejudice. Therefore, liaison visits maintain personal contact and allow for a timely and routine exchange of information with disputing parties, the HN, local civilian officials, international agencies, the peacekeeping force (PKF) headquarters and other national contingents.
- e. **Maintaining up-to-date information on the disposition of disputing forces within the operational area.** This requires periodically visiting forward positions to observe and report on the disposition of forces of the disputing parties.
- f. **Managing Operational Information.** This requires the indexing of information and the creation of information sharing agreements with the partners in the theatre including other members of the coalition, Theatre, Canadian national and Mission higher HQs, NGOs, Inter-governmental and international organizations, and the host nation's government at all levels and its law enforcement agencies. A key component of information management will be security, or knowing what information can be shared with whom since confidentiality/impartiality is a major component of the effectiveness of many NGOs to whom trust building is key.

402. EARLY WARNING

1. The UN and regional organizations are developing early warning indicators that point to the likelihood of a conflict erupting. These assessments can be integrated into the military planning process and can provide useful coverage on countries not normally surveyed. Commanders may direct their staff to monitor particular areas in order to develop the information requirements for contingency planning. The results from analyzing the indicators contribute to conflict prevention.

403. SURVEILLANCE

1. Military assets may be used to carry out surveillance missions when early warning indicators point to a problem in a country or region. In the early stages of engagement, surveillance enhances conflict prevention by providing the means of attributing culpability.

404. OBSERVING AND REPORTING

1. Observing and reporting are the cornerstones of PSO. Observers (both MilObs or PKF observers) observe and report information on activities within their operational areas. Observers must provide timely and accurate reports on every situation or incident that develops in their operational area. Factual and impartial reporting constitutes the basis of all successful PSO and, when required, includes maps, field sketches, diagrams, video tapes, photographs, and references to specific agreements or instructions. Likewise, inaccurate and biased reporting can adversely affect the operational situation, thus damaging the image and credibility of the PK force. A thorough analysis of these reports by the force commander's staff is critical. Observation requires a complete understanding of the situation and the political and military implications resulting from the PSO actions.
2. Observation tasks commonly cover:
 - a. The status of military installations;
 - b. Activities within the operational area related to personnel or weapons;
 - c. Violations of international agreements;
 - d. Observance of buffer zone (BZ) and de-militarized zone (DMZ) restrictions; and
 - e. Observance of local agreements that were approved by the parties to the dispute.
3. Observers report any violations of agreements such as:
 - a. Movements of the disputing parties' forces (If unit identifications and other information of a sensitive nature are observed, the observation post (OP) commander will record the time of the sighting and send the report by secure means);
 - b. Shootings, hostile acts or threats made against the PK force or civilians;
 - c. Improvements to the defensive positions of the disputing parties; and
 - d. Over-flights by military or civilian aircraft when air movement in the BZ or area of separation (AOS) is restricted.

405. SEPARATION OF PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE

1. **Supervising disengagements and withdrawals.** As diplomatic activity ensues, agreement to establish a BZ may require the PKF to supervise the disengagement and withdrawal of hostile forces. Inter-positioning of the PKF between the disputing parties is generally a high priority to prevent a breakdown of the cease-fire and to help ensure an uneventful disengagement and withdrawal. The inherent risks associated with inter-positioning can be greatly reduced by timely deployment and implementation of well-conceived and detailed plans that are understood by all parties. PKF personnel may mediate disagreements in the positioning of the disputing parties' forces, verify troop and equipment dispositions and, if authorized, provide assistance to the civilian population in the BZ.
2. Inter-positioning places the PKF between the disputing parties in an effort to supervise the withdrawal of the disputing parties' forces and establish a BZ. This operation requires careful and accurate timing to reduce the inherent risks to the PKF. The PKF must be credible and completely impartial in order to interpose successfully. If possible, the PKF should take advantage of the lull in hostilities to interpose itself as the parties in the conflict disengage. If inter-positioning occurs after disengagement or withdrawal has begun, it should be accomplished quickly to prevent clashes that could lead to renewal of the conflict or a general breakdown in the cease-fire.
3. The possible sequence of separation may be as follows.

- a. **Agreement on the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL).** After a truce or cease-fire is in effect and the disputing parties reach agreement on the trace of an ADL, the PSO can begin.
- b. **PK Force Deployment along the ADL.** After having coordinated the PKF's deployment with the disputing parties and their forces, the PKF can deploy along the ADL between the belligerents as shown in Figure 4-1 and supervise the disengagement and withdrawal of the disputing forces behind their respective sides of the ADL. Inter-positioning should be carefully planned with the disputing forces.
 - (1) Where possible, the trace of the ADL should follow identifiable natural or man-made terrain features;
 - (2) The size and capabilities of the inter-positioning force must be sufficient to provide the disputing parties with the confidence that they can disengage and withdraw safely from their positions; and
 - (3) Localized disagreements or potential clashes should be promptly mediated at the lowest practical level to prevent a recurrence of conflict.

**PKF DEPLOYMENT AND
WITHDRAWAL OF THE BELLIGERENTS**




Figure 4-1 Deployment along an Armistice Demarcation Line and Withdrawal of Disputing Forces

WITHDRAWAL BEHIND LINE OF DEMARCATION




Figure 4-2 Withdrawal of Disputing Forces behind Lines of Demarcation

- c. **Withdrawal monitoring.** Once there is agreement on the formation of a BZ, lines of demarcation are established on each side of the ADL. The PKF then supervises the withdrawal of the disputing forces to positions behind their respective lines of demarcation, as shown in Figure 4-2, to prepare for the establishment of the BZ. The lines of demarcation are now the forward limits for the respective disputing forces.
- d. **Establishment of the BZ.** PK forces establish the BZ between the Lines of Demarcation and begin observation and patrol activities. In some UN missions, the BZ may be referred to as the area of separation (AOS). A BZ or AOS is normally only a zone or area from which the disputing forces have been excluded.
- (1) Observation Posts are established to provide visual coverage within the BZ. Patrols supplement the OPs by patrolling areas out of effective visual coverage of OPs.
 - (2) Access to the BZ will normally be restricted to the PKF or observer group. Special arrangements may be negotiated to allow restricted access to NGOs and/or local civilians, such as farmers or fishermen. Checkpoints, manned by peacekeepers, may be established to control access to the BZ.
- e. **Areas of Limitation (AOLs) Extension.** Subject to negotiated diplomatic agreements, the disputing parties may agree to extended areas of supervision called AOLs, as shown in Figure 4-3, where peacekeepers may inspect the strength and fortifications of the disputing parties. The usual arrangement is for the disputing parties to agree on equal numbers of small, lightly armed forces that may be maintained in the area immediately adjacent to the BZ.
- f. **Establishment of a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).** The BZ may eventually become a DMZ, following further diplomatic activity. In contrast to BZs, DMZs are not normally occupied by PK forces, but are observed and patrolled by observer groups. Lines of demarcation define the boundaries of a DMZ. These boundaries must be easily recognizable and, ideally, should not run counter to locally

accepted political and cultural divisions. The airspace over a DMZ is also demilitarized and is denied to aircraft of the disputing parties.

ESTABLISHMENT OF AREAS OF LIMITATION (AOL)




Figure 4-3 Establishment of Areas of Limitation

406. PATROLLING

1. Another essential element of most PSO is patrolling. Patrols gather information, investigate problems, supervise the implementation of a treaty or other agreement and establish a visible presence. The mere presence of a PKF patrol or the likelihood one may appear at any moment, helps deter violations of agreements.
2. Patrolling may be conducted on foot or by vehicle, naval vessel, aircraft, or helicopter. Patrolling must be overt and easily recognized by all sides. Patrolling may be confined to daylight hours in areas in which armed confrontations continue to occur. When limited visibility makes identification difficult, the opposing sides may be nervous and, therefore, apt to fire without hesitation. Even so, the mandate may require that patrols be dispatched under these conditions. Procedures and ground rules under which patrols operate must be clearly defined and known by all, including the parties to the dispute.
3. Patrols are normally conducted to:
 - a. Gather information and complement the reports of OP personnel, liaison officers (LOs), and other day-to-day observations. In large areas where the ground cannot be adequately covered by static OPs, patrols may be used, to ensure that possible breaches of the agreement are discovered;
 - b. Investigate reported activities that may violate the agreement;
 - c. Separate disputing parties in an actual or potential localized confrontation; and
 - d. Escort farmers, fishermen, or others who are on their way to and from work where the route passes close to a hostile party. Patrols may also escort dignitaries and visitors.

407. CHECKPOINTS

1. A checkpoint is a manned point used as a means of controlling movement and checking vehicles and pedestrians, in order to enforce control measures, orders and regulations. The peacekeeper's right to search is defined in the mandate and in the SOFA and/or SOMA. Checkpoints may be static or mobile and require the fullest measure of force protection considerations. Some checkpoints may be roadblocks.
2. Checkpoints are established to:
 - a. Show peacekeeping presence to all parties and to the population;
 - b. Survey and report activities;
 - c. Check and inspect persons and traffic into and out of the operational area;
 - d. Prevent infiltration and smuggling of weapons, ammunition and explosives into or out of the area;
 - e. Act as, or work with, an observation post; and
 - f. Block traffic.

408. DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT

1. The parties to the dispute may agree to demobilization or demilitarization of their forces. The PKF may bear the responsibility to report on the cantonment of weapons and the progress the parties make towards self-demobilization. The PKF itself may become involved in collecting weapons and supervising camps where belligerents are demobilized. The PKF must then be capable of disposing of the weapons appropriately and guarding weapon stockpiles until they can be destroyed. At the camps themselves, security may be required so that demobilized individuals feel secure enough to participate in the program. The PKF may take the first steps to train the parties in mine clearance techniques so that an adequate mine awareness and clearance program can be developed.
2. **Sequence of Disarmament and Demobilization.** Some of the main points in the disarmament and demobilization operations sequence are described below.
 - a. **Withdrawal and Assembly of Former Warring Factions.** Following a cease-fire or peace agreement, demobilization operations may require the co-ordinated disengagement and withdrawal of forces into prescribed assembly areas or cantonment sites. For security reasons such actions are best conducted simultaneously and tied to specific times and dates, throughout the whole JOA. Suitable reception arrangements and efficient administrative and logistic support plans are essential for success. Should the local authorities be incapable of performing these tasks, they may fall to the PKF.
 - b. **Disarming Former Warring Factions.** Successful disarmament is dependent on the confidence that the parties have in the demobilization process as a whole. Disarmament may need to be mutually phased and encouraged by a series of rewards. Besides collecting weapons from former combatants, disarmament may include the collection of war supplies from any stockpiles and depots or even weapons in transit. The safe custody and accurate accounting for weapons and material is essential. The destruction of weapons and other warlike materials must be planned in an ecologically sound and verifiable manner.
 - c. **Demobilization.** Having completed disarmament, the next step in the process is to select those individuals or units that are to be retained and trained and those considered surplus to military and other security (police) requirements and discharged. The future size and shape of a country's defence and security force should be the result of a comprehensive review that balances requirements with resources. Military personnel who wish to transfer to the police service will need comprehensive retraining.

- d. **Rehabilitation of Former Warring Factions.** Having selected those who can be trained for the national security force, support measures will need to be created for the dispersal and rehabilitation of the remaining personnel. This stage is principally the responsibility of the civil authorities and will be carried out in conjunction with the reconstitution of the other means of government and state control, and the provision of alternate forms of employment. Those being discharged will need education and training orientated towards civilian job skills. This will inevitably be an expensive and long-term aspiration that will be conditional upon the development of a viable state economy. In many cases, the military will include those who were responsible for the perpetration of human rights abuses and war crimes, even against their own people. Issues of culpability and justice may need to be addressed as part of the reconciliation process and as a precursor to recreating trust in the security and defence sector

409. MINE AND EXPLOSIVE CLEARANCE IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS

1. Explosive ordnance and mines pose a significant threat to all people, equipment and live stock during, and after the termination of a conflict, both at sea and on land. With the exception of mines in international waters, unexploded ordnance and minefields in combat zones are primarily the responsibility of the parties themselves. In theory, they remain part of the parties' obstacle plan should the PKF withdraw. If the PKF wishes to retain its impartial status it is obliged not to reveal the location of one party's minefields to the other, although it should try to ensure that they are discreetly and adequately marked in accordance with international law. Unless the mandate specifies otherwise, a PKF is not permitted to lift a party's unexploded ordnance or minefields, except when those munitions prevent the force from carrying out its mission, or offer a hazard along tracks and sea-lanes in use by international shipping or other non-involved parties.

2. While unexploded ordnance and mine clearance operations are primarily the responsibility of the party that laid them, the PKF can be employed to mark, isolate and clear mines and unexploded ordnance where they present a direct threat to life. The PKF may train local forces to do the same. They will generally seek to identify areas of hazard. This information will be produced on a master map that will be made available for dissemination to all elements of the operation. Non-military personnel who consider that they may be about to venture into an area at risk from mines and unexploded ordnance would be advised to check with local military units first. Within the UN, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is the focus for all mine related issues and mine clearance operations.

3. **Canada and Mine Clearance.** Canadian forces do not conduct humanitarian de-mining operations, but rather engage in mine clearance operations in support of military tasks, in particular, ensuring freedom of movement for Canadian and allied forces and enabling the completion of assigned missions.

410. NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION

1. **Introduction.** Negotiations take place when two parties with opposing views meet to resolve their differences. When a third party assists by acting between the opposed parties in an effort to bring them together, it is referred to as mediation. In practice, most mediation takes the form of negotiations between a mediator and one of the parties at a time, trying to find common ground. In the context of a PSO, negotiations will be conducted at many levels and between many parties, and issues will range from strategic level discussions in the UN Security Council to tactical level negotiations between UN officials, and military commanders and local leaders. Negotiations may concern political, humanitarian, and military activity. It is essential for those working to resolve the conflict to understand the scope of the negotiations that may be taking place and how their functions relate to wider efforts to achieve a negotiated solution.

2. **Tasks.** Negotiating objectives should be set at the highest level and implemented by everyone involved. Although there may be clear directions about what can be negotiated - with whom and by whom, to the heads of the military, civilian, and humanitarian elements working for the UN - it is important to note that many organizations will not be formally under control, and could conduct their own negotiations independently. The following negotiating tasks may be carried out at all levels:

- a. **Mediation.** Negotiators identify common ground on which the parties can discuss and agree.

- b. **Facilitation.** Negotiators provide practical assistance to their opposite numbers in the parties, for example, by passing messages, providing a hot line, or securing a venue for a meeting.
- c. **Communication.** Because negotiations can be affected directly by outside events, negotiators should stay in touch while negotiating and also pass on the results swiftly. If related military activity occurs while the negotiations are in progress or an agreement on a cease-fire is successful, it has to be communicated as rapidly as possible to all forces on the confrontation line.
- d. **Education.** Negotiators may have to teach parties how to negotiate and to make genuine concessions. The parties may be unable to see that there are alternatives open to them. Negotiators also will have to ensure that the parties understand the meaning of agreements that they reach, and the resulting obligations of the international community and the parties in implementing the agreements.
- e. **Information Policy Development.** Manipulation of information can have a serious impact on negotiations. This may be countered by actively seeking international support for negotiations and by presenting the facts as seen by negotiators to diplomatic contacts, who will report to their capitals, and the local and international media. The local media may be influenced by the parties and need to hear the negotiators' points of view. The international media will influence both international decision-makers and those elements of the local population who have access to it.
- f. **Identify Incentives and Disincentives.** Mediation and negotiation should be supported by a comprehensive range of incentives and disincentives to the parties, so that they can be encouraged to take positive steps and dissuaded from taking action that will be detrimental to the peace effort. These incentives and disincentives will vary according to circumstances. Identification of effective incentives and disincentives is vital in the preparatory stage of the negotiating strategy.

411. JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION

1. The Joint Military Commission (JMC), if established, can be a key command and staff link to coordinate the military factions' compliance operations. It may be a mechanism through which instructions are given, and through which procedures are established for supervision, monitoring, and verification of the actions of the factions. It can be the central body for parties to bring issues to the attention of the commander, or military complaints, questions or problems concerning the military aspects of the peace agreement that could not be solved at the lower levels. (For further details on the JMC see Annex B Chapter 7). Tasks associated with a JMC include the following:

- a. Performing direct liaison with all faction army and political leaders and exercising treaty interpretative authority over military matters.
- b. Interfacing with the UN/Coalition and national command structures when established.
- c. Monitoring subordinate forces' implementation operations to ensure unbiased application and compliance with the military aspects of the peace agreement by the parties.
- d. Serving as the command's primary communications and liaison link to the factions.
- e. Participating in policy development with higher levels of command.
- f. Advising the commander on political and military problems related to treaty compliance and their likely impact on military operations.
- g. Integrating and co-ordinating faction operations and JMC issues with J2 and J3 staff sections for information fusion and application to military operations.
- h. Developing and advising the commanders on specific courses of action to ensure compliance by the parties with the military aspects of the peace agreement.

- i. Assisting the commander in determining and implementing local cooperative measures and in resolving disputes between the parties.
- j. Co-ordinating operations of all liaison efforts with factional forces.
- k. Performing secretariat duties for JMC meetings.

412. CONTROL OF BORDER AREAS

1. Hostile forces often attract support from outside the country. All external support of men and material must cross either land or sea borders, and if there is an adjacent land frontier, hostile operations may be mounted across it from the sanctuary of foreign soil. Organized crime may also use border areas to infiltrate into a region. States usually have the machinery to impose some degree of frontier control but this may not be present in a post-conflict environment. Border control may have to be established to stabilize and maintain a secure environment.

2. **Land Borders.** Land borders are seldom clearly defined. It will seldom be possible to seal such frontiers entirely, either with a physical barrier or with troops. However, if hostile groups are to be denied the supplies and support, which they can obtain in the neighbouring territory then steps must be taken to control cross border movement on the main lines of communication. Tasks associated with land border control can include the following:

- a. Observing and patrolling the gaps between main lines of communication,
- b. Emplacing barriers to movement,
- c. Emplacing surveillance devices,
- d. Conducting interception operations in both rural and urban environments,
- e. Establishing and enforcing curfews, and
- f. Establishing and monitoring prohibited areas.

3. **Coastlines/Rivers.** The open sea beyond a coastline or a large river provides a near equivalent of a prohibited frontier zone on land, and comparatively simple controls within territorial waters can simplify the problem of identification. The degree of physical protection that is necessary depends on the ease with which landings can be made; a rugged shore with inaccessible cliffs and treacherous currents needs less protection than easily approached beaches with good exits. Physical protection of an indented coastline is difficult and use must be made of surveillance devices and reconnaissance. The key tasks associated with maritime border defence include the following:

- a. **Intelligence.** Local customs and coastguard services will have studied the problems of countering illegal entry by sea, and their experience may provide a useful basis for intelligence operations.
- b. **Surveillance.** Surveillance carried out by maritime aircraft and naval craft can be used to alert inshore and land intercept forces. Shore-based surveillance by helicopters, inshore vessels, land based radar and look-out stations should be deployed to cover all likely approaches.
- c. **Interception.** Interception of unidentified craft or of vessels whose mission or cargo is suspect can be made at sea or on land. Civil police, coastguards or their equivalent may need to be embarked in inshore craft, or accompany detachments on land for this purpose.
- d. **Command and Control.** Coastal defence should be under the command of one headquarters, it should include elements from naval forces, air forces, civil police including maritime police and those land forces given the tasks of surveillance and intercept. These elements can be mission forces and those from the assisted state. It may be necessary to co-ordinate not only with the assisted

government's military agencies but with also several different civil institutions such as port and river authorities, customs, coastguards, civil police in coastal areas and fishery authorities.

413. MILITARY CIVIL ASSISTANCE

1. The PKF may be the first mission element to deploy across the whole theatre and be able to deliver services post-conflict to a beleaguered population. The local population may expect to see some improvement in their well being to validate the legitimacy of the PSO mission. The PKF may therefore carry out "quick impact" humanitarian assistance tasks, but the goal of these tasks will be security oriented vice driven purely by humanitarian concerns. Any tasks performed need to be co-ordinated with other emergency relief or developmental programs. Tasks associated with these activities could include:

- a. Providing health care,
- b. Providing assistance for aerial supply efforts, and
- c. Restoring critical civil infrastructure.

SECTION II - HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TASKS

414. GENERAL

1. The military forces in a mission area may carry out humanitarian assistance tasks themselves or support the activities of humanitarian agencies in a variety of ways. The PKF's tasks may therefore cover the whole spectrum from the direct provision of aid to simply providing security. Military support can be generally classified as follows:

- a. **Direct Assistance.** This is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services. Often this activity takes place in humanitarian operations, the direct deliver of food aid for instance.
- b. **Indirect Assistance.** This is at least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel. This frequently happens when temporary surplus logistics capacity is diverted to humanitarian tasks.
- c. **Infrastructure Support.** This involves providing general services, such as road repair, airspace management and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the stricken population.
- d. **Security.** Protection to humanitarian assistance activities if required is detailed in the mandate.

415. REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDP)

1. Most complex emergencies involve the mass flow of refugees and internally displaced persons. This has a destabilizing effect by concentrating destitute individuals in areas with few basic services and limited infrastructure. Many states, especially fragile ones, do not possess the resources to address a large influx of needy individuals. The typical tasks to support refugees and IDPs are listed below.

- a. **Construct and Maintain Camps.** Where refugees and IDPs appear in large numbers they will overwhelm local resources. Assistance may be rendered by transporting temporary accommodations to a site and in some cases constructing the camp. Militaries have some expertise in providing services, such as water supply, on virgin sites.
- b. **Protect Refugees and IDPs.** Refugees and IDPs are particularly vulnerable to exploitation by criminal elements both in transit and while in the camps themselves. Security may be provided for the whole camp in general or in limited phases, like repatriation, when risk is significantly higher.
- c. **Support Return and Resettlement.** The return of refugees and IDPs to their places of origin can complete the cycle of a conflict. There may be a requirement to escort returnee convoys depending on the areas they must transit. Depending on the location and new composition of their former residential area an increased security presence may be required to effect returns.

416. PROTECTION FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

1. Humanitarian aid might not reach the needy through the interference of local actors. For humanitarian assistance to be delivered effectively, protection may have to be provided to the various elements in the delivery chain as described below.

- a. **Entry Points and Distribution Centres.** Security may have to be provided at the airports and seaports where aid enters the country. This could extend from direct physical security to control of the adjoining sea or airspace. Major aid distribution points may require close protection so they are not looted.
- b. **Aid in Transit.** Aid convoys might need protection depending on the areas they must transit to reach distribution points. These tasks will essentially be convoy escort and security duties.

- c. **Protection for Non-military Personnel.** In some instances the PKF may be mandated to protect, as required, UN, IGO and NGO personnel.

417. MINE AND EXPLOSIVE CLEARANCE – EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE

- 1. While unexploded ordnance and mine clearance operations are primarily the responsibility of the party that laid them, the PKF can be employed to mark, isolate and clear mines and unexploded ordnance where they present a direct threat to life.

SECTION III - PEACE BUILDING TASKS

418. RESTORATION OF CIVIL INFRASTRUCTURE

1. Civil agency development plans seek to improve infrastructure and revitalize economic life. These agencies have the expertise to design these efforts to contribute to a broad improvement of services provided by the state. Some infrastructure will have to be repaired or improved to permit the contingency plans of the PKF to be executed. Military resources will frequently be dedicated to the repair of these priority areas to guarantee operational flexibility. Co-ordination with the development plans of other agencies in theatre is required to avoid duplication of effort.

419. ELECTION SUPPORT

1. The PKF may be required to assist in the election of a new government, whether at the municipal or central government level. The assistance may be given at a number of levels, but it is likely to focus on the support given to a central coordinating authority, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), for whom the responsibility lies for ensuring that the elections are conducted under the agreed conditions.

2. **Tasks.** A summary of the likely tasks is as follows:

- a. **Information Campaign.** The military contingent is likely to play a central role in publicizing the elections, explaining eligibility to vote, how, where and when to vote. This may be done by leaflet, or by the use of local radio, or both. The key is for the troops involved to be seen to be acting in an impartial manner.
- b. **Maintenance of a Stable Environment.** A clear task for military forces in supporting elections is the maintenance of a secure and stable environment. This will be achieved in the first instance by patrols and by providing a visible deterrence to any form of aggression. However, the particular threat has to be assessed. If there is a possibility of voter intimidation then routes to polling stations should be identified and protected; the voting stations themselves should also be protected, along with those civilian workers involved in the management of the election.
- c. **Communications and Logistics Support.** It is possible that the central coordinating agency for the elections will require a means of communicating to be established, along with the operators to pass information to central control. There may also be a requirement for logistics support, such as transport both for civilian co-ordinators, voting slips and ballot boxes as well as rations and water.
- d. **Maintenance of Reserves.** Formed groups of soldiers should be ready to act as reserves at short notice. They have to be mobile, in sufficient strength and equipped to respond to the perceived level of threat, which could include internal security tasks.

3. **Contingency Planning.** More difficult to judge may be the consequences of the election results and the subsequent implementation of those results, particularly if these are likely to be controversial. Military forces should be prepared for public disorder in the aftermath of the announcement of the results. These could be anti government rioting or inter-factional activity that could degenerate into looting, chaos and anarchy. Special contingency planning may be necessary to support and protect isolated groups of troops during any disturbances of this kind.

420. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

1. Security sector reform can be key in constructing institutions in the assisted state that will allow it to stabilize. Key military tasks in this functional area include the following:

- a. **Training.** The aim of training for forces of the assisted state is to enhance democratic accountability and transparency. Education and training programs are designed to enhance the understanding of

human rights issues, promote democratization efforts and proper civil-military affairs. Training also focuses on producing tactically competent, professional forces. Security sector reform aims to produce a competent, sustainable security force that matches the national interests of the state.

- b. **Advisory Role.** Military advice to the assisted state can be critical in two key areas:
- (1) **Military Roles.** Advice is required on the appropriate roles and missions for the security forces. Depending on the regional environment, a national security assessment will have to be conducted to determine the required force structure to address external threats. Similarly, the societal threat faced will determine the need for an exclusively external orientation or whether there will also be a domestic role for the security forces.
 - (2) **Resource Rationalization.** Consolidating a newly established and integrated armed force post-conflict will likely merge different types of fleets of vehicles, small arms and weapons platforms into the new national inventory. Rationalizing this inventory, for instance, maintaining only one type of rifle and its associated ammunition, will greatly reduce maintenance and sustainment cost.

421. HUMANITARIAN DEMINING

1. Within the UN, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) of DPKO is the focus for all mine related and mine clearance operations. Demining programs established post-conflict are critical to re-claim agricultural and industrial properties and mitigate the daily threat of mines. Private civilian companies perform the bulk of these mine clearance programs.

2. **Canada and Demining.** Canadian forces will not enter minefields to conduct humanitarian demining, but may be engaged in the training of deminers, monitoring their activities or carrying out duties in mine action headquarters.

422. PUBLIC SECURITY ASSISTANCE

1. While the PKF focuses initially on halting violence by organized armed elements it may have a further role in public security assistance. This occurs for a number of reasons. First, local civil police forces that bear the primary responsibility may be dysfunctional. Second, if international police forces are being brought in, their deployment usually lags behind the military's, creating a security gap. Finally, until local civilian police have been trained and the principles of democratic policing are widely accepted the international police force may need continual support. The capabilities of criminal organizations post-conflict may require military participation in public security.

2. The PKF may assist in the re-establishment or maintenance of public order both by halting violence and by assisting police forces. The responsibility for public order rests primarily with the civil police. However, military assistance may be required if there has been a breakdown in the civil police structure or situations are beyond their capacity to control. Military assistance will have to be closely coordinated with the international police presence in theatre. Tasks that military forces have to be familiar with during the period of the security gap include the following:

- a. Performing "executive authority" police functions (arrest, investigations, etc.),
 - b. Performing judicial triad functions (police, judicial and penal),
 - c. Searching for and arresting war criminals.
3. Tasks that military forces may perform in support of international and local police forces can include:
- a. Providing ready reaction forces to support police actions,
 - b. Sharing and co-ordinating intelligence, particularly in dealing with organized crime,

- c. Accompanying local police on patrols,
 - d. Attending and sometimes protecting the scenes of crime, and
 - e. Conduct independent patrols and observing the presence or absence of local police.
4. **Crowd Confrontation Operations.** If there is neither an effective police force nor an equivalent civil structure present, there may be a military role for Crowd Confrontation Operations (CCO). These duties are normally assumed by the coalition or alliance Force MP or a Military Specialized Unit. In exceptional cases, CF tactical units may assume this role for CCO, subject to operational orders and national permission. There are six elements to CCO and they are defined and described as follows:
- a. **Crowd Monitoring.** Crowd Monitoring involves activities to study, predict, observe and report on potential and actual crowds;
 - b. **Crowd Avoidance.** Crowd Avoidance includes activities aimed to minimize contact with a crowd;
 - c. **Crowd Disengagement.** Crowd Disengagement consist of activities to separate a military force from a crowd, or to extract a specified person or persons from a crowd;
 - d. **Crowd Control.** Crowd Control involves activities to physically alter the action and behaviour of a crowd;
 - e. **Crowd Dispersal.** Crowd Dispersal includes activities to break up a crowd; and
 - f. **Crowd Manoeuvring.** Crowd Manoeuvring consists of activities to manage the movement of a crowd. It may encompass some or all of the other CCO activities.

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CHAPTER 5
CONDUCT OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
SECTION I - PHASES OF OPERATIONS

501. CF OPERATION - PHASES

1. CF operations are normally conducted in the phases listed below. Flexibility is required within each phase for changes in the mandate, the nature of the operational environment and other activities. It may prove necessary to deploy a number of Canadian Task Forces as part of a UN or NATO operation all under a Canadian National Commander (CNC). These task forces may be joint in nature and will include a National Command Element (NCE) and a National Support Element (NSE), which coordinate the reception, staging, and onward movement of personnel and material as well as the sustainment of the force. This whole process is further described in B-GG-005-004/AF-000, *CF Operations* and Environmental doctrine publications. This chapter focuses on activities during the employment phase of PSO.

- a. **Warning.** During this phase, NDHQ/COS J3 is the primary agency for control and co-ordination. The warning phase is where the strategic and initial operational planning takes place for the mission. This phase ends with the issuing of the operation order to the TFC to mount the operation.
 - b. **Preparation.** The preparation phase covers the following activities prior to departure, including reconnaissance, planning, liaison, assembly, administration and training. Training for PSO is covered in Chapter 9.
 - c. **Deployment.** The deployment phase covers the activities prior to the departure of a PSO force from its home base and ends with its arrival in the designated theatre of operations.
 - d. **Employment.** The employment phase begins with the arrival of a force in theatre and covers its reception, move to base camp, preparatory measures, its tactical deployment forward into the operational area of responsibility, and the subsequent conduct of operations. Establishing a force's security and self-sufficiency is the prime planning consideration in the early stages of an operation. If taking over from another contingent, the force's tactical deployment forward may be conducted as a relief in place.
 - e. **Redeployment.** Any redeployment phase starts with a cessation or handing over of operational tasks. The nature of any redeployment may vary from extraction, to planned withdrawal, routine rotation or force draw down. When appropriate, redeployment covers the transfer of operational and administrative activities to relieving troops, international relief agencies or civilian authorities. Post-operational activities embrace all after-action activity, including post operational reports, the submission of lessons learned information and national administration.
2. Regardless of the nature of the PSO or related operation that is planned, it is an inherent requirement of operational planning to consider all necessary branches and sequels during the planning process. For instance, when planning for a CPKO the requirement to develop branch plans for non-combatant evacuations, extraction or combat search and rescue must be given due consideration. Similarly, during the employment phase branch plans may have to be developed to respond to non-compliant element.

SECTION II - EMPLOYMENT – INITIAL PHASE

502. RAPID DEPLOYMENT

1. The rapid projection of forces into a mission area after a cease-fire or peace accord has been set greatly contributes to both local stability and to the credibility of the international community's resolve. The UN considers the first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord to be the most critical to establishing a stable peace. Canada has strongly supported initiatives to have forces available for immediate deployment in support of UN operations. This capability is more easily accomplished if equipment and force structures are designed with force projection as a key consideration. Strategic lift resources are essential to affect timely entry into theatre.

2. The UN seeks to deploy forces for traditional peacekeeping missions within 30 days and for complex ones within 90. Many regional organizations are developing rapid reaction forces in order to respond quickly to emergencies. The Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) is an example of such a formation.

503. THEATRE ACTIVATION PROCESS

1. Each time the CF deploys in a new theatre, a Theatre Activation Team (TAT) will deploy with a view to act as the initial National Command Element (NCE). The theatre activation process will take place within the first three strategic phases of a CF operation in either a permissive or semi-permissive environment. The TAT will conduct theatre activation for a period not to exceed two months. Upon "handover" to a permanent NCE, the TAT will redeploy to Canada and reconstitute.

2. The CF Joint Operations Group (CF JOG), as the principal formation responsible for theatre activation, will plan for, assemble, prepare and deploy as well as redeploy and reconstitute the TAT. The CF JOG maintains an advanced HQ of experienced staff officers at high readiness to deploy abroad that can perform the TAT role in support of a designated Canadian National Commander (CNC).

3. The TAT will deploy in the following sequence:

- a. **The Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (LRT).** This team acts as both a reconnaissance and advance party for the TAT main body. The LRT is at 48 hours NTM upon recall or warning. This team will seek information not otherwise available, will contribute to the planning process and will confirm lines of communication and the location and support requirements for a TAT as the initial NCE. The LRT composition should include, as a minimum basis, the following staff officer functions: J2, J3, J4, J6, J7, J9, comptroller and combat engineering;
- b. **The TAT Main Body.** This team will be prepared to deploy five days after the LRT. They will establish command and control almost immediately upon arrival in theatre. The TAT main body will prepare the theatre for the follow on forces, will complete the campaign plan and will function as the initial NCE within 96 hours of arrival. They also establish liaison with other government departments, host nations, NGOs, coalition/mission partners and a Combined Joint Task Force as applicable; and
- c. **The Joint Signal Regiment element.** This team will provide the requisite strategic and operational level communications and first line support to the TAT. CIS support to the HQ will be phased into theatre in a graduated manner commencing with narrow band, low capacity access and ending with full DISAP service. This signal element will establish both the strategic rear link and internal HQ CIS within 96 hours of arrival of the TAT Main Body.

504. SURGE

1. Supplementary troops may be required to deploy at the front end of the mission to ensure the PKF can be properly and quickly established. These troops are often logistic or engineer specialists who resolve sustainment and accommodation issues so that the PKF proper can concentrate on operations.

2. In difficult complex emergencies there may be a requirement for a surge of combat elements as part of the initial period of deployment. The surge would ensure the mission is strong enough to stabilize the conflict and would be drawn down as the situation de-escalates.

505. PRE-POSITIONING

1. Equipment and personnel may be pre-positioned near a crisis situation to permit a faster response if early warning indicators demonstrate that action may be necessary. Stockpiles of logistic material may be established to facilitate theatre sustainment. The UN currently maintains operational stock, "start-up kits", in Brindisi, Italy. Other UN agencies maintain supplies in order to respond to humanitarian emergencies. Bi-lateral equipment depots, such as those in Africa, may be established to assist regional organizations.

SECTION III - MILITARY OBSERVER MISSION

506. GENERAL

1. Military observer missions are typically deployed to monitor compliance with a cease-fire or a peace accord. Before the end of the Cold War, many traditional peacekeeping missions were purely observer missions. In complex peacekeeping, military observers may serve solely in their usual observation function, serve in an advisory capacity to a regional organization leading a mission or they may be fulfilling their observer function but be accompanied by a strong security element – like in the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). They represent the low end of the operations spectrum; they employ few military resources and perform best in a benign environment. Their success is completely reliant on the consent and compliance of the parties to the agreement. While the political objective is to have impartial, independent observers of the agreement there is no particular military end-state. For UN-led missions, observers are called UN military observers (UNMOs); in general, for coalition-lead missions they are known just as military observers (MilObs).

507. EMPLOYMENT

1. Observation missions are typically small reflecting their political aims and, frequently under-resourced to cover the assigned geographic area. They are often established utilizing resources from adjacent UN operations. They may be conducted independently or as part of other PSO. They carry out their function by observing and reporting. There are three main task assigned to observer mission: border or buffer zone control; monitoring cease-fires, truce or armistices; and supervising the withdrawal of forces.

2. Military observers (MilObs) perform observer duties under the control of, and report to, the observer group chief of staff or Chief Military Observer (normally also the force commander) designated by the sponsoring organization. When detailed as MilObs, Canadian personnel do not normally report to the local CNC. MilObs are unarmed and observe, record, and report on the implementation and violation of a formal agreement. They serve as members of an observer group and carry out tasks such as vehicle patrols in sensitive areas, local negotiations between rival forces, and special investigations. Their presence is often sufficient to deter violations of the Agreement. By providing accurate, up-to-date, and impartial reports, MilObs help reduce the number of claims and counterclaims by the disputing parties. The MilObs rely strongly for defence on their impartial status and execution of assigned duties.

3. **Administrative Support.** The Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) is the DND executive agent for the administration of personnel support to UN Headquarters in New York; multilateral observer missions; and PSO for which a TFC is not assigned responsibility. CFSU (O) is responsible for administrative support of Canadian Military Observers. When a UN Canadian Contingent is deployed in the JOA, the National Command Element (NCE) is usually responsible for administrative support of Canadian multinational staff.

SECTION IV - TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING

508. GENERAL

1. Traditional peacekeeping operations (TPKO) support diplomatic efforts to establish or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. Canada has participated in and supported most UN-sponsored TPKO; for example, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO). Canada has also participated in non-UN sponsored TPKO such as the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai.

2. TPKO take place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement among the parties to a dispute, the sponsoring organization, and potential force-contributing nations. Before TPKO begin, a credible truce or cease-fire must be in effect, and the parties to the dispute must consent to the operation. The PKF conducts its operations in an open and highly conspicuous manner. The PKF's main function is to establish a presence, normally inter-positional, which inhibits hostile contact by the disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process. TPKO support continuing diplomatic efforts to achieve long-term political settlements by reducing the level of violence and impartially reporting on the activities of the disputing parties. Agreements specify which nations' forces are acceptable, as well as the size and type of forces each will contribute. Canada may participate in TPKO as a lead nation, as a contingent, or by providing military observers. A major challenge for a PKF is to effectively deal with situations of extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant. The objective of these operations is to fulfill a mandate, in many cases, reduce or eliminate violence, facilitate the implementation of an agreement, and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

509. EMPLOYMENT

1. The normal military objective on traditional peacekeeping missions is occupation of an interpositional buffer zone to separate the parties to the dispute, patrol, and observe and report on compliance with or violations of agreements. To perform their mission successfully, peacekeepers must have freedom of movement, open access to all sectors in their operational area, and the ability to carry out their tasks freely. Key tasks include:

- a. Active patrolling;
- b. Rapid responses to alleged or actual violations of agreements and other incidents;
- c. Effective operation of checkpoints;
- d. Close liaison with all parties to the dispute; and
- e. Constant vigilance throughout the operational area.

2. Although tactical competence is crucial, traditional missions do not have operational warfighting objectives. The operational level goal is the presence of an impartial inter-positional security force that permits negotiations to proceed. The presence of competent military forces is intended to calm the situation. The force in traditional peacekeeping is lightly armed and equipped and so structured that they can do little beyond observation and reporting on the activities of the opposing parties. The parties to the dispute must seriously desire peace for the mission to be successful. To maintain the consent of the parties to a dispute and guarantee the agreement, the PKF must act openly, impartially, and use force only in self-defence. The key to successful PKO is well-led, trained and disciplined forces able to apply their skills under highly restrictive ROE.

510. FORCE COMPOSITION

1. The force size and mix will vary depending on the mission, mandate and threat in the operational area. Traditional PKO are characterized by forces that are smaller and more lightly equipped than those that conduct complex PKO, but are still capable of self-defence. Contingents should be self-sufficient until logistics re-supply channels can be established, and, in some cases, contract logistics may be employed as an economy of force measure. National contingents on these operations are often based on infantry battalions or composite battle groups. Environmental components may be employed in the following manner:

- a. **Land Forces.** Land forces may supervise and assist in the separation of the opposing sides and the establishment of a buffer zone (BZ) or demilitarized zone (DMZ). The PKF controls and surveys the line of demarcation, which facilitates the disengagement and withdrawal of forces, discourages infiltration confrontations, and assists in resolving local disputes. The presence of the PKF helps reassure each party to the dispute that other parties are not violating the agreements. Land operations may involve observation and monitoring of military and paramilitary units within a specified area. This helps ensure that authorized units of the disputing parties are not increased above the strength levels stipulated in the agreement, existing fortifications are neither reinforced nor enlarged, no increase of arms and supplies occurs apart from those agreed to, and no side violates the BZ or DMZ. Depending on the level of threat, infantry armoured and artillery units are capable of changing their mission focus to support TPKO after proper training to maximize their inherent characteristics of mobility, communications, self-protection capability, and training. MP elements, particularly in their signature as a police force, rather than a combat force, can help defuse situations. An analysis of the mandate, mission and threat will be used to determine the composition of the PKF land force.
- b. **Air Forces.** Air assets include both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Air operations provide the speed, range, and flexibility to rapidly cover large areas. In TPKO, air assets can meet a wide range of operational requirements and perform economy of force roles. Air assets are especially useful where the terrain is difficult to navigate or contains mines and unexploded ordnance. In response to rapidly developing situations, air operations can be highly effective in gathering information regarding violations of cease-fire and arms-limitation agreements, as well as in the rapid transport of personnel and equipment. Information gathered by air assets can help commanders and staffs assess situations, reduce risk and enhance the operational effectiveness of the PKF. The use of air assets can increase the probability of detecting violations and can be a deterrent to major violations. The increased probability of detection provided through air operations encourages confidence among the parties to the dispute and fosters compliance with agreements.
- c. **Maritime Forces.** Naval support provides a secure environment ashore through credible, combat ready forces before, during and after the operation. Naval assets may include supporting sealift, surface forces, submarine forces, amphibious forces or individual observers. Naval forces establish both a psychological and stabilizing effect by their physical presence. To be effective, naval forces require free access to the territorial waters around the countries involved in the dispute. Additionally, naval forces can provide harbour movement control and port security to safeguard vessels, harbours, waterfront facilities and cargo. Maritime forces may also conduct operations on inland waterways.

511. GEOGRAPHICAL DEPLOYMENT

1. A PKF may be employed in one of two ways: each national contingent may be allocated to a specific operational area, or the national contingents may rotate among the operational areas.

- a. **Assignment to a Specific Operational Area.**
 - (1) **Advantage.** Each national contingent develops in depth knowledge of the terrain and community in its specific operational area. This results in continuity in collecting and

processing information. Additionally, useful relationships are developed with the local authorities of the host government, police, and leadership of the parties to a dispute. Peacekeepers become attuned to the normal activities in the area and consequently can quickly detect changes from normal routines. Peacekeepers become well acquainted with the local forces and are able to recognize and prohibit military personnel of the opposing forces from passing through checkpoints. Additionally, the transfer of information records for an operational area and its installations is easier when the relieving unit is of the same nationality.

- (2) **Disadvantage.** National contingents may become overly familiar with the people in the area due to habitual contact, and as a result may liberally interpret agreements and PKF policies in their operational area. This may lead to a perception of partiality and compromise mission accomplishment. If actual or perceived inequities exist, the parties to the dispute may request an exchange of PKF. An additional risk is that the force may become complacent in its tactical mission execution after remaining in the same area over time.

b. **Rotation among Operational Areas.**

- (1) **Advantage.** Each contingent obtains a working knowledge of more than one area. This gives to the commanders a better understanding of the overall situation. It helps to avoid becoming routine-minded and to keep a high operational and readiness level. The potential for peacekeepers to become overly familiar with parties to the dispute is also reduced. Such familiarity might lead to perceptions of partiality. This potential, however, could be reduced through command controls and emphasis.
- (2) **Disadvantage.** A national contingent may not have sufficient time to acquire any depth of knowledge of the area or community. Important background information gathered by a national contingent may not be effectively passed to succeeding national contingents due to language differences and different ways of operating. Rotation may also disrupt logistics operations and HUMINT collection efforts. With each rotation of national contingents, even slight differences in how the peacekeepers operate may cause distress for the local populace.

SECTION V - COMPLEX PEACEKEEPING

512. GENERAL

1. Canadian military forces will not conduct a complex peacekeeping operation (CPKO) unilaterally but as a part of a multinational effort. The UN, a regional organization, or other coalitions or alliances may sponsor CPKO. Any large-scale missions in which Canada participates will likely be led by a foreign nation or alliance. Although Canadian contribution of forces may be small comparative to some countries, our contribution demonstrates support and enhances the legitimacy of the operation.

2. The goal of CPKO is to implement the provisions of an international mandate designed to maintain or restore peace and order in accordance with a peace agreement. The PKF can use force or the threat of force to compel compliance with the agreement. The force must possess credible combat power to terminate fighting, restore order, and create an environment conducive to resolving the dispute if required. Combat operations may be required, but there may be some restrictions on weapons and targeting, depending on the mandate, ROE and tactical situation. CPKO may be fielded to assist in resolving inter-state conflicts, intra-state conflicts or even intra-state conflict with external actors. In fact, the regional nature of the conflict often makes their resolution extremely difficult. The consent of one or more belligerent parties may be weak or uncertain so the PKF must be structured for the worst-case scenario. These operations are established to deal with complex emergencies, gross violations of human rights or genocide. CPKO can range from general security assistance for humanitarian assistance to transitional civil administration.

513. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND COMPLEX PEACEKEEPING

1. The differences between traditional and complex peacekeeping missions are outlined below.
 - a. Impartiality remains key to attaining success in CPKO. The transition to peace is easier if the focus remains on establishing the conditions for peace in an impartial manner. Specific attention must be paid to creating conditions for achieving consent of the belligerents toward the desired political end state.
 - b. The ROE are likely to be more restrictive than in war, but less restrictive than in traditional peacekeeping. Inserting forces to stop combat may be the essential first step in setting the conditions for peace, but military operations in and of themselves cannot be the basis of a lasting peace.
 - c. The PKF must have a credible capability to respond with combat operations if the mandate is challenged. The PKF must be able to coerce if necessary to make the political embrace of peace more attractive than continuance of the conflict.
 - d. Human security issues will characterize the area of operations. This will pose special problems for threat identification, collateral damage, civilian casualties and dislocated civilians. Military forces can be expected to participate in a wide variety of human security issues. Close coordination and liaison is required with the civil agencies in theatre. The interpositional nature of traditional missions demands much less interaction with the civil element.
 - e. If the threat of force fails, the PKF may have to engage in offensive actions. However, commanders must be aware that inappropriate use of force could worsen the overall situation. One of the centres of gravity of the operation will be "the good will of the people." Inappropriate use of force could possibly undercut international and Canadian domestic support and the legitimacy of the force in the eyes of the populace and others in the operational area. Situations may develop where the use of non-lethal force is appropriate. In these instances, the use of deadly force may not be justified but the use of non-lethal assets may allow for an appropriate response.
 - f. **Geographic Dispersion.** Traditional missions may cover large geographic areas but tend to deploy in a linear fashion within a BZ or DMZ. In complex missions the PKF is normally deployed

countrywide placing greater obstacles in the way of command and control and the conduct of operations.

- g. **Reserves.** In traditional peacekeeping reserves tend to be contained to small tactical units and are only employed in the local area. In complex peacekeeping much larger and combat capable reserves are required. They require a full range of combat capabilities and the means to be manoeuvred throughout the operational area.

514. EMPLOYMENT

1. The full range of tasks described in Chapter 4 can be part of the mandate in complex peacekeeping. Besides carrying out typical peacekeeping tasks the PKF must be able to plan and execute combat operations. Well-led, trained and disciplined forces that can conduct operations under ROE that are less restrictive than those of traditional missions but more restrictive than those in effect during a war are essential. The PKF remains impartial and still employs the minimum force necessary to accomplish a task. Stabilizing the security situation in a complex emergency removes violence as the prime political tool and allows the international community to encourage the belligerent parties to explore other paths to political power. The ultimate mission objective is often the reconstruction of a stable state.

2. Generally, the capabilities of land, air, and maritime forces discussed in Section IV above will apply to CPKO as well. However, in some scenarios it is possible that aerospace and/or maritime forces may be able to meet mission objectives without the introduction of significant land forces being necessary. Aerospace and/or maritime forces may be able to coerce an adversary, enforce sanctions, and/ or deny the use of territory (for example, buffer or exclusion zones) through a combination of presence, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), humanitarian airlift or sealift, punitive strikes, and air force psychological operations. Land contingents in complex emergencies may be best based on brigade groups possessing the full spectrum of combat capabilities.

3. **Enforcement of the Mandate.** Once established the PKF implements the provisions of the mandate. Some of the tasks a PK force may conduct in complex peacekeeping include:

- a. Separation of belligerent parties;
- b. Support of political mediation;
- c. Establishment of a demilitarized zone;
- d. Maintaining separation of belligerent parties;
- e. Disarming and demobilization of belligerent parties;
- f. Protection of humanitarian assistance;
- g. Public security assistance; and
- h. Assistance to refugees and IDPs.

4. Depending on the threat and the level of cooperation by the belligerents, the PKF conducts operations to force the belligerents to disengage and withdraw. This may involve show of force, demonstrations, or force-on-force combat operations with synchronized air, land, maritime, and SOF actions. The PKF commander stays attuned to the willingness or desire of the belligerent parties to be separated. The objective is to establish a BZ or DMZ between the belligerents. As the belligerent forces disengage and withdraw, lines of demarcation will be marked to identify the forward limits of the belligerent forces. The resulting space between these lines of demarcation constitutes a BZ. If the belligerent parties show no inclination to consent to the formation of a BZ, the PKF may have to establish one using combat action. In doing so, the PKF commander considers the belligerent forces' dispositions and territorial advantages or

disadvantages, as well as historical or cultural considerations. After the situation has stabilized, belligerent parties may demonstrate animosity toward each other and perhaps the PKF.

5. The PKF commander will seek to thoroughly understand the political aims of the operation and the cause and effect relationship of all actions on the resolution of the conflict. Military actions may involve monitoring the compliance of belligerent parties with agreements, provisions of a mandate, or other constraints, restraints, or provisions regarding their activities. Establishment of joint military commissions as in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia or mixed military working groups may assist in such efforts.

6. Negotiations may eventually transform the BZ into a DMZ, as stipulated in a formal agreement. DMZs are created to neutralize certain areas from military occupation and activity. Generally, a DMZ is in an area claimed by two or more sides in the conflict and where control by one could constitute a direct threat to the others. The boundaries of a DMZ are defined by lines of demarcation. These boundaries must be easily recognizable and, ideally, should not run counter to locally accepted political or cultural divisions. The airspace over a DMZ is also demilitarized and is denied to the aircraft of the belligerents.

7. Security operations such as screening, combat and reconnaissance patrolling, cordon and search, and establishing checkpoints and roadblocks to control movement into and within the BZ or DMZ may be conducted to maintain the separation of belligerent parties. Actions of the PKF may include:

- a. Forcible suppression of violence by belligerent parties;
- b. Disarmament and incarceration of belligerent parties;
- c. Support to indigenous authorities in maintaining law and order; and
- d. Deterrence of violence through credible threats.

8. The mandate may require the PKF to disarm or demobilize the belligerent parties. These tasks are complex, difficult and often dangerous. The PKF should demonstrate a clear resolve and intent to disarm or demobilize designated belligerent parties according to the agreement. If these actions are taken prematurely, without adequate preparation and involvement of the parties, the situation may destabilize, leading to a re-emergence of violence. In addition to collecting weapons from combatants, disarming may include:

- a. Seizing ammunition stocks;
- b. Collection and possibly the destruction of stockpiles of weapons, munitions and supplies;
- c. Closing weapons and ammunition factories; and
- d. Measures to prevent re-supply.

9. Other demobilization activities might include:

- a. The movement of forces to garrisons;
- b. The stand down of military readiness; and
- c. Demobilization and the return of troops to civilian life.

SECTION VI - TRANSITION OPERATIONS

515. GENERAL

1. As an operation progresses its success will be measured by the achievement of selected milestones. These milestones will be determined by criteria developed from within the measures of effectiveness of the mission. The end-state of any specific stage will be tied to the achievement of the selected criteria. Transition points occur during an operation when a milestone is passed that permits an adjustment to the security stance of the mission. Time limits are not effective milestones. While they place bounds on an operation they do not contribute to the effective implementation of tasks on the ground. In fact, they may contribute to belligerent non-compliance as the continued presence and credibility of the mission may be placed in doubt.
2. Transition operations not only refer to the transfer of command, missions and tasks from one element of the PKF to another but also transfer of responsibilities to other forces or civilian organizations. These transfers should be identified and planned in advance. They will be executed upon the completion of a milestone or the arrival at a decision point. A transition operation may be required due to a change in the political situation, political guidance or operational environment.
3. Transition operations result from an escalation or de-escalation of activity as well as a change in political emphasis or military main effort. They can include a changeover of HQs, a relief in place of one force element to another or the transfer of responsibilities to a different organization.

516. TRANSITION OPERATIONS

1. **Transition in Traditional Peacekeeping.** Normally the only effective transition that can occur in traditional peacekeeping is withdrawal. Combining a traditional stance with enforcement actions has proven unwise. Transition from traditional to either enforcement or a complex operation would involve the consolidation of the existing contingents into secure areas and the early introduction of robust reserves to strengthen their self-defence capacity until the lodgement of the new mission can be undertaken.
2. **Transition in Complex Peacekeeping.** Complex peacekeeping operations are often follow-ons to enforcement actions. If the first operation to deploy into an area a complex PKF may possess a surge element, which will allow it to rapidly, establish itself and its credibility. As the situation merits the surge is withdrawn. If significant improvement in the theatre security situation is obtained the force can be drawn down and may eventually assume a traditional PKF stance. Conversely, if escalation occurs beyond its means the deployment of additional military resources will permit the establishment of an enforcement operation.
3. **Transition from Military to Civilian Control.** Transitions may involve the transfer of certain or most responsibilities to local government and civil agencies as the requirement for a military presence diminishes. This may occur at the termination of a PSO or earlier if responsible agencies have been created. A significant military objective is to transfer security responsibilities to competent host nation agencies. Proper training and reform of the assisted state's security services is important to allow the eventual full transition of security responsibility.
4. **Transition from Peacekeeping to Peace Building.** Once the security objectives of a peacekeeping mission have been met military and police forces may be withdrawn. There may be a continuing requirement for reform of the security sector or there may remain peace building and humanitarian assistance issues to address. The DPKO mission may be terminated and a peace-building mission established. Proper co-ordination will be necessary to ensure programs are transferred effectively between the missions.

SECTION VII - RELATED OPERATIONS

517. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

1. Sanctions, embargos and no-fly zones are frequently imposed concurrently with PSO operations. The military forces carrying out these operations may not be under the command or control of the PSO force commander. Close liaison and co-ordination is required between these activities and the PKF.
2. Humanitarian intervention can establish the conditions for successful peacekeeping operation. Many of the same tasks performed in a CPKO would be carried out during a humanitarian intervention. Though the presence of overwhelming force may be necessary it may be best applied in the same restrained manner as in a PSO.
3. Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) often precede either a humanitarian intervention or a CPKO. The presence of a competent force prepared to conduct a NEO in a non-permissive environment can contribute to conflict prevention and the de-escalation of a dispute.
4. Extraction operations can assist in the withdrawal of a PKF when the local political leaders and population have turned decidedly hostile and there is little prospect for the mission to succeed.

518. HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

1. Humanitarian operations involve the use of military resources to either deliver or assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid. They are mounted as independent operations. They can be either bi-lateral activities or co-ordinated under the general guidance of a designated UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator. They may be conducted concurrently with a PSO. Greater use of military resources often occurs when there is a hostile, high-risk environment. In this situation, full force protection measures are taken. In permissive environments, a more benign stance may be adopted and a more singular focus just on the delivery of the aid.

SECTION VIII - WITHDRAWAL/REDEPLOYMENT

519. WITHDRAWAL

1. **Withdrawal.** The decision to withdraw a PKF completely, or a nation deciding to do so unilaterally, will be based upon a political assessment that recognizes that the parties to the dispute are not truly willing to push for a peaceful settlement. The decision may be conditioned by the loss of the International Community's resolve to remain committed to the operation founded upon the following factors: a lack of compliance; a loss of consent; insufficient commitment to or progress with civil projects; or unacceptable casualties among members of aid agencies and the PKF. These issues are often present when a conflict has not reached a culmination point before a mission is inserted.
2. Withdrawal will always be a branch plan of a PSO and as such requires proper planning. It should be based upon a contingency plan written early in the campaign and reviewed throughout. It must address both a permissive and non-permissive environment and clearly state the Force Commander's conditions for TOA of formations back to national command.
3. The plan should take into account the need to protect or evacuate designated civilian, NGO and PVO personnel as it is executed. This will require detailed liaison and a high degree of co-ordination, as many civil agencies will try to ride out a crisis and remain in theatre after the military departure.
4. It is possible that one or more of the factions, as well as the local populace, could resist, or even attempt to prevent, the withdrawal of the PKF. Civil unrest must be planned for, as must the eventuality and consequences of a mass exodus of civilians at the same time as the PKF.
5. A withdrawal plan must state the policy for the disposal of the civil and military infrastructure and equipment in theatre. It must make clear what is to be handed over to other organizations, which is to be extracted as part of the withdrawal and which is to be destroyed before the operation is complete.
6. Internal and external reserve forces need to be identified and given their missions early. Their commanders and planners must conduct reconnaissance and liaison and back brief their plans at the earliest opportunity. These reserves may require a different structure, capabilities, command arrangements and ROE than those of the PKF. This will be the case if an extraction operation is required.

520. REDEPLOYMENT

1. **Redeployment.** Redeployment of the main military force should signal the achievement of the military end-state. The planning and execution of any redeployment operation is as important as that required for deployment.
2. The acknowledgement of success expedites the pace of the operation and can create pressure to TOA forces back to national command too early. If not properly controlled and co-ordinated, this can result in unwarranted competition for routes, infrastructure and departure facilities (ports, airfields). For these reasons, the JFC requirement for unity of effort at all levels of his PKF is as important as ever. Casualties incurred at this stage of an operation are unjustifiable.
3. It should not be assumed during planning that all forces will redeploy to their home countries or original deployment bases. There may be a need to base them elsewhere in the region to maintain stability or to release them for other missions. Whatever their destination there will be stringent administrative, logistic and environmental criteria to be met before personnel and equipment leave the JOA. This places significant demands on real estate management in the form of staging and marshalling areas.
4. Depending on the mission, it may be necessary that the PKF to leave established structures that will facilitate the future operations of the humanitarian agencies or the host government. Planning for this should be just as thorough as for preceding phases. Preliminary redeployment planning should be part of the

overall planning for the operation. A smooth, well-planned, well-orchestrated redeployment will ensure that the PKF leaves a lasting favourable impression and more importantly, ensures that the civilian elements of the mission can work successfully towards the achievement of a lasting and self-sustaining peace.

5. Redeployment requires that the PKF HQ co-ordinates not only the routes, infrastructure and departure facilities but also the management of environmental issues, for example for the return of bases and training areas to the Host Nation. Environmental issues will require a policy and possibly specific funding.

521. MISSION CLOSEOUT TEAM

1. With the cessation of operations in any overseas mission there is a tremendous amount of effort and co-ordination required to closeout a mission. It is essential that closeout activities be conducted in a deliberate, efficient, effective and controlled manner. Mission closeout is a co-ordinated activity involving the TF in theatre, the NDHQ J Staff desk officers and the Mission Closeout Team (MCT) from Canada.

2. The role of the MCT is to assist the TF in conducting the closeout and to execute the functions of strategic interest during a mission closeout. The initiation of mission closeout planning would be the reconnaissance by the command element of the MCT and select J Staff officers to theatre. In consultation with the TFC and his staff, the reconnaissance would result in the mission closeout plan and the drafting and issuing of the strategic order for mission closeout. The co-ordinated planning of a mission closeout should be initiated early, even though a decision may not have been made on the final cease operations date, as some activities, such as letting of contracts, (movements, engineering services) and preparation and conditioning of stores require significant lead time for implementation.

3. MCT Capabilities may change dependent on the nature and maturity of the specific theatre being closed. The size of the MCT is entirely dependent on the size and complexity of the mission. The smallest and simplest form of mission requires little staff control and it may be possible to "double-hat" the team leaders as the staff. In a more complex mission a more complete control agency may be required.

4. Normally the MCT will be under the OPCOM of the TFC for the duration of the time the TFC is in theatre. Any remaining personnel will be subsumed by the CO of MCT should the TFC re-deploy (that is, TF rear party).

CHAPTER 6

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

SECTION I - GENERAL

601. INTRODUCTION

1. Most peace support operations (PSO) will be contingency operations with responses developed through the crisis action planning process. Planning must confirm that the operational environment matches the nature of the proposed mission: preventive deployment, traditional peacekeeping, complex peacekeeping or enforcement. The threat posed in the theatre, the disputants' combat power and their probability of compliance with the settlement, all have a direct relationship to the force structure requirements and the degree of robustness of the rules of engagement (ROE).
2. Military action is not an end in itself, but rather a complement to diplomatic, economic and humanitarian endeavours, which together contribute to the political objectives of the mission. The military provides the security shield that permits the other elements to proceed with their tasks safely. The military commander must take into account the many agencies that may be involved when formulating military lines of operation within the mission plan.
3. This Chapter outlines the planning considerations that bear on the conduct of PSO. Details of planning at the operational and strategic levels are contained in B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, *The CF Operational Planning Process*.

602. LEVELS OF PLANNING

1. **Strategic Level.** The strategic level includes the national political authorities and the subordinate national and international military NDHQ/J Staff. As the principal military adviser to the Government, the CDS provides the link between national policies and objectives and military strategy and plans. The CDS is responsible for strategic-level planning, in both the deliberate and crisis action-planning environments. The DCDS and the J Staff at NDHQ assist the CDS in the application of military strategy and the development of strategic plans. The three Environmental commands and the CF Joint Operations Group provide the CDS with environmental, operational and technical advice in the operational planning process. For PSOs, planning at this level focuses on potential Canadian military response options and strategic mobility.
2. **Operational Level.** This is the level where campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. The process used is the CF OPP. The CF Joint Operations Group (CF JOG) and/or the task force commander (TFC) and staff plan at this level. There are occasions when operational-level planning is conducted by the NDHQ J staff. The number and size of forces or the echelon of headquarters involved do not define the operational level. Regardless of its size, a military force tasked to achieve a strategic objective is being employed at the operational level. Although NATO or the UN may have already undertaken and examined some part of their own planning process, a clearly defined military end-state, operational objectives and centres of gravity will also have to be determined by the Canadian TF commander. The end-state will be related to the security situation in theatre and the number of troops available to maintain stability. Changing circumstances in country can affect achievement of the end-state.
3. **Tactical Level.** The tactical level of conflict is the level at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units. This manual does not address tactical-level planning activities for PSO.

SECTION II - STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

603. GENERAL

1. **The Staff Levels.** To understand the scope of PSO activities Canada may become involved in, it is necessary to understand the Canadian planning process for an international operation. There are five staff organizations involved in the Canadian planning system:

- a. External political bodies such as UN NY (key element UN SC) or NATO (key element North Atlantic Council (NAC));
- b. Canadian agencies associated with the external body. This would include the Canadian Permanent Mission in New York (PRMNY) or the Canadian Delegation to NATO. In either case, the applicable Canadian Permanent Representative and Military Advisor have prime roles;
- c. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) as the lead department in the Government of Canada for peacekeeping, including an internal section that provides a link to the Department of National Defence (DND);
- d. NDHQ/Assistant Deputy Minister Policy (ADM Pol)/Director General International Security Policy (DGIS Pol), responsible for handling the staffing to the point of Government approval; and
- e. NDHQ/COS J3 staff translates strategic policy and planning guidance, and operational requirements into an OPLAN or an Op O for the CDS appointed TFC.

604. THE UN APPROVAL PROCESS

1. The UN approval of a mandate is a strategic level process, which overlaps with the operational level planning. In general terms, a requirement is identified and staff level discussions are initiated between Government of Canada and UN counterparts. The UN Technical Report/Strategic Estimate outlines definitive strategic and operational requirements. Potential mission requirements need to be assessed by all stakeholders early in the warning phase. The majority of PSO planning activities are carried out in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (see Annex A for a outline of the division of responsibilities between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs). The process by which the Canadian Government decides to participate in a mission is generally as follows:

- a. **UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG).** The UN appoints a UN SRSG and the PRMNY, advises the Canadian Government of an impending UN request. DND preliminary planning begins when the Military Advisor has knowledge that an informal request is forthcoming.
- b. **UN Technical Reconnaissance.** The Canadian planning begins in earnest when the UNNY requests through PRMNY, to DFAIT and NDHQ/Director of Peacekeeping Policy (DPK Pol), that Canada participate in a UN technical reconnaissance (recce).
- c. **Consultation Phase.** On completion of the initial recce and during the UN consultation phase, PRMNY seeks direction from DFAIT and keeps both DND and DFAIT abreast of activities related to the potential operation. Canadian staffing begins and DFAIT, CIDA, DND, appropriate NGOs, other government departments (OGDs) and agencies, should assemble to discuss the scope of activities and a division of responsibilities among stakeholders to achieve the mission and serve Canadian national interests.
- d. **UN Informal Request.** After the UN SRSG Technical Report is presented to the UN SC, the UN makes an informal request to member states asking them to identify what resources they would be willing to contribute. The informal request is staffed from PRMNY to DFAIT, which co-ordinates a national response with appropriate OGDs and agencies (DND, CIDA, Solicitor General for RCMP/Canadian police requests). NDHQ/COS J3 staff conducts crisis action planning, including an

assessment of tasks, to determine courses of action (COAs). Efforts are made to complete the contingency plan based on the informal request from the UN. The formal request will then be for those national capabilities Canada has determined it is able to provide.

- e. **Informal Advice to the UN.** Canada participates in the bilateral and multilateral discussions at the UN to determine possible UN COAs and makes recommendations on the content of the UNSC resolution.
 - f. **UN Formal Request.** The UNSC adopts a resolution to establish a UN force. The UN issues a formal request to those countries that responded favourably to the informal request for assistance. In Canada, this request is staffed from the UN through PRMNY to DFAIT. Approval from the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defence is sought for small operations. In complex emergencies, Cabinet approval will usually be sought, particularly if OGDs and other agencies are involved. This process would involve the Solicitor General for the RCMP, CIDA as the lead Canadian agency for development or humanitarian assistance, as well as NGOs. Individual and collective training for a military operation begins when the formal request is received.
 - g. **Formal Acceptance.** Following formal acceptance by the Canadian Government, CF deployment is authorized.
2. The approval process demands continued interaction between key players: the Military Advisor in New York, DFAIT peacekeeping staff, NDHQ/DGIS Pol staff, COS J3 Plans and Ops, J2/DG Int, J4 Log and J8 Fin. For requests for humanitarian assistance from developed countries, DFAIT/Regional Security and Peacekeeping Division act as liaison with DND.

605. NATO APPROVAL PROCESS

1. NATO's consideration of a PSO will normally be based on a request from the UN and with a mandate staffed through normal UN channels. In NATO, these missions, unlike Article 5 obligations under the Washington Treaty, are voluntary efforts. Many stakeholders within the Canadian Government who are involved in the UN approval process also authorize national resources for NATO operations. In planning for participation in a NATO PSO the process followed by the Government of Canada involves consultation with NATO members through the NATO Military Committee (MC), the Defence Planning Committee (DPC), the North Atlantic Council (NAC - ambassadorial level) and the Strategic Commanders (SCs) (SACEUR and SACLAN) to determine NATO's best COA and the force levels and capabilities required to achieve the mission. The Canadian ambassador to NATO as well as the Canadian Military Representative (CAMILREP NATO) and National Military Representatives (NMR) at SHAPE and SACLAN will be involved in the development of the Canadian position based on the recommended size, composition, operational concept, command structure as well as the anticipated time lines for the execution of the mission.
2. **Political Control.** The overall political control of NATO participation in a PSO will be the responsibility of the NAC. Ideally, the NAC Initiating Directive for a PSO should both define the strategic objectives that constitute a clear political end-state and allot organizations, resources and responsibilities for the achievement of those objectives and the end-state. When reaching this decision the NAC will consult contributing states and relevant Intergovernmental Organizations.
3. **Preliminary Planning Considerations.** The Alliance aim at the earliest stage of planning will be to establish the legitimacy of the operation; its nature; freedoms, constraints and restraints; strategic objectives and timelines; and the projected end-state.
4. The NAC, with advice from the MC, may need to give advice to the authorizing international body on the formulation of its mandate, which should contain the strategic objectives and political end state. Planning will take place in a crisis management environment. The results of early planning will indicate the broad nature of the mission, possible Alliance objectives, resource requirements and the likely outcome of a NATO commitment. This analysis is fundamental to the NAC decision. It should also identify strategic options and their associated advantages and disadvantages; this will allow potential force contributors to consider their position.

5. As part of this iterative process, the NAC and MC will consider the preliminary conclusions in order to agree to the strategic objectives and political end-state and to provide high-level strategic guidance to a SC. This guidance should define Alliance strategic objectives in order to allow the SCs to conduct all necessary contingency planning. In addition to an Alliance end-state that is compatible with that identified by the mandating authority, the NAC will also identify those conditions that would lead NATO to consider terminating its part in a PSO. These conditions may be judged against:

- a. A loss of the International Community's resolve to remain committed to the operation caused by: a loss of consent, a lack of compliance, or insufficient commitment to or progress with civil projects.
- b. Unacceptable casualties among members of humanitarian agencies or the PKF.

6. **Initiating Directive.** At the earliest opportunity, the NAC will issue an Initiating Directive through the MC to the nominated SC. It is this directive that provides the framework for the development of the military OPLAN. The SRSG or Head of Mission (HoM) is rarely in a position to produce his civilian mission plan in time to inform the development of the military OPLAN. In these circumstances, the SC, or JFC should offer maximum assistance to the SRSG or HoM.

7. **Planning Force Structure and Composition.** Following the political direction to develop a plan, the SCs will first develop a Concept of Operations (CONOPS), which can include an initial Statement of Requirements (SOR). After NAC approval of the CONOPS the SCs will develop an OPLAN that will have a detailed SOR. This process will be iterative, because a matching between forces provided by nations and the CONOPS/OPLAN requirements will have to take place.

8. While an initial troops-to-task assessment may result from the reconnaissance and mission analysis, it is during the concept development stage that identification of the required military capabilities, numbers, generic grouping and the command structure, (joint) support forces and facilities is completed. This information becomes the JFC's SOR. It is used as the basis of the NATO force generation process through which PKF contributions will be sought from member nations. High-level political contact should also be made to determine the desirability and likely extent of non-NATO nations' participation in the operation.

9. As in other military operations, the final force structure depends on a number of factors, including the size of the operational area, the nature and expected duration of the mission, lines of communications, terrain, weather, threat, and logistical requirements. The PKF must be a task-organized, multinational organization. The SC will closely monitor the final grouping of national contingents into formations, thereby avoiding unwanted or uneven organizational structures. The SC will also decide as to the final division of the joint operations area (JOA) into areas of operation, thereby avoiding unwanted combinations of formations with parties in the conflict, as well as taking into account national preferences for certain areas of operation.

10. **Force Contributions.** Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) should be involved in the planning, preparation and decision-making procedures in operations to which they contribute. The type of personnel (professional, conscripts, or reserve) and units (standing or reserve) to be deployed are decisions left exclusively to contributing nations. However, implicit within a nation's offer to support a PSO is the understanding that resources will be made available promptly. This includes the ultimate national responsibility for the necessary logistic support. Once contributed, resources should not be withdrawn or reallocated by nations without suitable notice being given to the NAC through the chain of command.

11. Any political, legal or military limitations on contributions to the PKF should be stated early so planners may account for them. Political restrictions should be minimised to allow commanders maximum flexibility within the terms of the directive. It is also essential that military contributions contain the required capabilities and meet the necessary standards of training and readiness for the tasks and organizational structure prescribed by the mission directive.

12. **NATO Messages to Nations.** At the same time NATO plans are being prepared and finalised, SHAPE or SACLANT will issue a number of messages to TCNs as part of the NATO approval process.

- a. **Activation Warning (ACTWARN).** The ACTWARN is issued to NDHQ/COS J3, which notifies DFAIT through DGIS Pol. The ACTWARN does three things:
 - (1) Informs nations and NATO agencies of the possibility of implementing an OPLAN, as the situation requires;
 - (2) Requests providing nations to increase readiness of selected forces in the plan; and
 - (3) Requests additional forces and capabilities depending on the specific situation.
- b. **Force Preparation (FORCEPREP).** Nations respond to an ACTWARN with a FORCEPREP that states a nation's intent to provide forces and associated details.
- c. **Activation Request (ACTREQ).** The ACTREQ by SCs is the *formal request* to the NAC/DPC to activate an OPLAN, specifying forces required to carry out the mission based upon national FORCEPREP and the specific OPLAN.
- d. **Activation Order (ACTORD).** When final approval and authority to deploy forces and implement the OPLAN is received from the NAC, an ACTORD is issued to NDHQ/COS J3. The actual deployment of forces becomes a national responsibility. Once CF elements are operationally ready in theatre, Canada will give TOA of its forces to the SC, normally OPCON, who will in turn delegate authority to the NATO TFC, normally OPCON.

606. PARTICIPATION GUIDELINES

1. Certain characteristics in the purpose, design and operational conduct of a mission enhance its prospects for success. First and foremost, these missions should address genuine threats to international peace and security or emerging humanitarian tragedies. Durable, comprehensive multi-disciplinary campaign plans must be developed to secure realistic and achievable solutions.
2. As a starting point for evaluation Canada uses the participation guidelines first outlined in the 1994 Defence White Paper. The importance of each specific guideline varies with the nature of the proposed mission. Political and military decision-makers responding to requests for Canadian peacekeepers apply these guidelines flexibly and consider many other factors. The key guidelines are described below:
 - a. **Threat to International Security.** Before accepting a peace support mission, Canada must determine the existence of a threat to international security. Whereas the threat from a conflict involving two or more sovereign states is clear the destabilizing effect of an intra-state conflict is more difficult to evaluate. Intervention may be considered if a humanitarian emergency exists: genocide, ethnic cleansing or other gross violations of human rights. Resource limitations, both for the UN and Canada, dictate that operations should be undertaken only after determining that a crisis poses a serious threat.
 - b. **Clear and Enforceable Mandate.** Mandates for UN authorized operations are prepared by the Secretary General and approved by the Security Council through a UN SC resolution. The resolution provides the legal authority for the PSO. It establishes the scope and purpose of the operation, which should be clearly worded, defined, understood and agreed. A mandate must be appropriate to the situation and be based on the worst-case prospects. The force must have the means, in terms of both resources and political will, to secure compliance with the mandate particularly if the consent of the parties could deteriorate rapidly.
 - c. **Agreement to Canadian Participation.** With the exception of enforcement actions and operations to defend NATO member states, in missions that involve Canadian personnel, Canada's participation has to be accepted by all parties to the conflict.
 - d. **Command and Control and Concept of Operations.** Large and diverse military forces, civilian police forces and various humanitarian and non-governmental agencies are all involved in complex

PSO. The mission must therefore have an appropriate command, control and co-ordination structure and a clearly defined concept of operations to ensure all elements are synchronized in the mission area.

- e. **Force Composition, Size and Equipment.** Canada prefers to participate in UN-sponsored operations, although it has participated in non-UN operations. The structure of the peacekeeping force must enable it to implement the mission's mandate realistically. The size, composition and equipment must be appropriate to the CONOPs and mission objectives and as a minimum permit credible responses to potential non-compliant parties in the mission area. Forces should not be structured and committed in a traditional peacekeeping stance if coercive measures may be required that would place the force at risk.
- f. **Funding Arrangement and Logistics Concept.** If a PSO is to be conducted effectively and successfully, it must have an appropriate funding arrangement and logistics support.
- g. **Single Identifiable Authority.** Before agreeing to participate in a PSO, the Canadian Government insists on the existence of a single and identifiable authority able to sustain it, both politically and materially. This authority has usually been the UN. During non-UN PSO, one or several states may act as the guarantor.
- h. **Clear ROE.** ROE are essential for guiding a commander's actions and delineating the options for the use of force. The ROE must be clear, appropriate to the mission, and designed to remove any legal or semantic ambiguity that could lead a commander to violate the mission's mandate or objectives inadvertently.
- i. **Interference with Other Missions.** The Canadian government will examine whether or not it can or will participate in a PSO by determining if other missions will be jeopardised. Based on the advice of DFAIT and DND, the government will determine whether or not to commit Canadian resources and where these resources will be deployed. The lead department is DFAIT.
- j. **Acceptable Level of Risk to CF Personnel.** Peace support operations present a level of risk to participating personnel. The risks to CF personnel are weighed against the objectives and benefits of a particular mission. In some instances the risk may become so high that Canada will reconsider its support of or participation in a particular mission especially where a mission has been under-resourced or the concept of operations has proven to be inappropriate. For some operations to be credible there may be a requirement to accept casualties on behalf of the mission.

SECTION III - CANADIAN RESPONSE OPTIONS

607. GENERAL

1. When a threat to international security occurs, Canada has a variety of response options. These responses could be diplomatic, political, economic or military. Military response options are embedded in the appropriate Force Planning Scenarios (FPS). The FPS that relate to international security are as follows: Scenario 3 – International Humanitarian Assistance; Scenario 6 – Peace Support Operation (Traditional); Scenario 9 – Peace Support Operation (Complex); and Scenario 11 – Collective Defence.

608. MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS

1. The military response option selected will be based on the scenario and the best COA selected from the operational planning process. A preliminary range of responses may be activated early in the planning process: increased intelligence collection, pre-staging of assets, and pre-deployment training. The military contribution must be tactically self-sufficient, sustainable at the operational and strategic level and compatible with the force projection capabilities of the Alliance or coalition.

2. **Specific Peacetime Commitments.** Considering financial constraints, Canada has to be selective in its military commitments. The Canadian Forces has to retain the capability to make a significant and responsible contribution to international peace and stability. In addition, the CF will maintain the following specific peacetime commitments to NATO:

- a. One ship to serve with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic;
- b. One ship to serve, on an occasional basis, with the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean;
- c. Aircrews and other personnel to serve in the NATO Airborne Early Warning system; and
- d. Approximately 200 personnel to serve in various headquarters;

3. **Tactical Self-Sufficient Units.** The CF lacks the capability to achieve operational goals by itself in international situations. This is unlikely to change. The capability to conduct operations requires more than just combat capabilities. Enabling capabilities, such as effective command & control, as well as responsive logistics, are central to an effective overall military capability. Therefore, the fundamental asset that the CF contributes to international operations is tactically self-sufficient units (TSSU). They must be capable of being integrated into combined or joint task forces.

4. TSSUs embody a collection of tactical capabilities and must be supported by - and have the ability to be supported by - a wide range of tactical, operational and strategic enabling capabilities. They vary in size, dependant on the operation, but must be capable of participating in medium intensity operations. TSSUs must have an adequate combat capability including suitable self-defence and reasonable offensive capability. Examples of TSSUs include a naval task group (TG), a composite battle group or a wing of aircraft.

5. CF TSSUs must have the capability to provide the deployed logistic and other support required in the conduct of operations. The overall force design must ensure that these TSSUs are linked to those nationally based support structures that sustain them. This harmonization is essential to ensure that operational support requirements are developed as part of the overall Canadian Forces support concept. A key competency within this capability is that of timely mission planning and theatre reconnaissance and activation. TSSUs are flexible in their organization and structure - this is particularly true in the case of support structures, which are shaped by a range of inter-related planning factors. The TSSUs operate within the framework of a Canadian Task Force organization.

6. **Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG).** In the mid-1990s many nations undertook initiatives to establish a rapid-reaction capability for the UN. The Secretary-

General officially opened the Planning Element of SHIRBRIG on 2 September 1997. The objective of this organization is to provide the UN with a quickly deployable force at the outset of a mission requiring immediate UN presence. The parameters for using this force include two critical prerequisites: first deployment is normally limited to the initial six-month rotation; and second, the formation will be used only for operations authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, including Humanitarian Operations.

Establishment of the brigade is overseen by a steering committee that consists of military, policy and foreign affairs representatives from participating nations. This committee is responsible for the operation of the Planning Element (PLANELM) which is established in Copenhagen Denmark. Current participating countries include Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania and Sweden. Some countries such as Belgium, the Czech Republic and Ireland provide representatives to the Steering Committee. Furthermore, any other UN member can offer support when the SHIRBRIG is drawn. As a generic model, SHIRBRIG, when deployed, contains mobile headquarters and communication facilities with three or more infantry battalions, and one or more reconnaissance units.

609. POLICE RESPONSE OPTIONS

1. The RCMP's Civilian Police Peacekeeping Operations manages the effective and timely participation of Canadian civilian police in international peacekeeping activities. These services are provided in accordance with Canada's foreign policy requirements and are undertaken on a cost recovery basis through an administrative agreement between the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Solicitor General of Canada and the RCMP and requesting agencies such as the United Nations (UN). The RCMP partners with nineteen Canadian Police Forces, both provincial and municipal, who contribute their personnel to various peacekeeping missions.

SECTION IV - OPERATIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

610. MISSION ANALYSIS

1. There are factors particular to PSO that need to be considered both within mission analysis and within the broader operational planning process. PSO missions may be subject to frequent political change indicating that plan review will be required on a more frequent basis and, similarly, a wider range of branches and sequels will be required in the campaign plan. The factors in this section are not specific to any one level of command.
2. **Parties to the conflict.** A commander needs to make an accurate and thorough assessment of the parties and the dynamics of their conflict. When there are multiple parties to a conflict and they are disorganized and undisciplined, such an assessment may prove far from straightforward. As far as possible, this assessment needs to cover the complete range of military, paramilitary and civilian groups in the conflict. Careful analysis of the political and military aspirations, motives, organizations, strength, weapons, equipment, doctrine, leadership, training, discipline and general attitudes of each group is required. This analysis should lead to an overall view of the parties, their strengths, weaknesses, intentions and potential centres of gravity. Their past record of honouring agreements and cease-fires and therefore the probability of their consent and compliance could be a critical element in this assessment.
3. **Centre of Gravity Analysis.** In operations at all levels there are normally at least two centres of gravity: the adversary's and the friendly forces'. There may be more than two centres of gravity in a PSO as there will be one for each political entity in the mission area. Centre of gravity analysis in complex PSO should not merely focus on the application of military force. While used to seek lines of operations that will provide leverage in ensuring continuing compliance with the mandate, those selected must have a direct relation to the political entities structural characteristics.
4. **Operational Environment.** The operational environment of any PSO includes tangible and intangible aspects. The former includes topography, lines of communication, climate, general living conditions, ethnic distribution, languages, religion, customs and the general level of consent and respect for human rights. The national infrastructure of the area, or lack thereof, and the potential influence of neighbouring areas, should also be taken into account. Intangible elements of the operational environment include the local population's culture, psyche and attitude, as well as their perceptions of the conflict, both locally and internationally. The potential for sudden and unexpected escalations in the level of conflict, and the degree of control of the leadership over the military, paramilitary, criminal and other elements of the population would also need to be assessed. These intangible elements are likely to exert a significant influence on the conduct of military operations and the general approach that could be adopted. An effective assessment of the operational environment, conducted jointly, with input from humanitarian agencies such as human rights monitors, provides a detailed picture of the general history of the region, the origins and nature of the current conflict, and potential reactions to any intervention.
5. **Unique Security Threats.** The focus of military forces in a PSO is to maintain a stable security environment. Unlike during conventional operation, security threats may be more subtle and diverse in a PSO. Below is a short list of some of the unique security conditions that may require attention:
 - a. **Aid/Assistance.** The provision of aid and assistance itself might foster a security threat. If humanitarian agencies have been purchasing access with aid, local warlords may be ill disposed if this source of revenue is cut off when a mission is launched;
 - b. **Trans-national Threats.** There are two key trans-national threats that must be considered when planning a PSO. The first is that external support of non-compliant parties will have to be identified and monitored. Often warlords are supported by Diaspora funding or sponsored by regional actors. Continued access to this outside support can affect compliance. The second is international crime. Criminal elements may exploit the weak government structures post-conflict and continue to destabilize the society. Military forces will have to work closely with other elements of the security services, particularly police criminal intelligence organizations.

- c. **Refugees and IDPs.** Security issues are important when considering refugees and IDPs. Armed elements may use refugee camps as secure bases of operation or for recruitment and therefore need to be excluded from them. Criminal elements tend to prey off refugees since they are especially vulnerable. The local population may become disgruntled if the standard of living of the refugees exceeds their own. Finally, heightened security will be necessary for returnee programs.
 - d. **Small Arms.** The maximum number of SA weapons possible should be removed from the general population so that disputes are not resolved by resorting to violence. There may be reluctance for elements to turn in their weapons particularly if they are key to political and economic control.
 - e. **Economic.** Non-compliant parties may use armed force to continue to exploit economic conditions. For instance, they may conduct impromptu roadblocks or collect indirect taxes in other ways. Other economic practices, such as the smuggling of diamonds, may serve to fund armed activity. The lack of employment opportunities or poorly conducted re-integration programs may lead ex-combatants to resort to banditry.
 - f. **Local Media.** Often the local media has been used to flame ethnic hatred in failed states and may be used to disseminate inaccurate accounts of the roles and task of the PKF. The nature and content of local media will have to be monitored and an information campaign developed to ensure the mission's objectives are transparent to the locals.
 - g. **Corruption.** The practice of corruption may be pervasive in the mission area and may hamper the construction of viable and accountable government institutions. It may influence the capability of executing plans that require local participation.
 - h. **Mercenaries.** In many failed states mercenaries are frequently employed in both government and private service. Their motivations can have a direct influence on removing them from the theatre once a peace agreement is set. If driven by monetary concerns, they may be bought off or simply released from service. If their service has religious or ethnic tones, their disbandment may be more difficult.
6. **Resources.** Planners should take account of the availability of local resources and Host Nation support and make full use of these where it will not deprive the local population. J9 staff can assist with the identification and availability of local resources.
7. **Other Agencies.** At all levels commanders should make a careful assessment of other agencies operating within their area of responsibility. This may include diplomatic and military representatives and forces from other political authorities. Planning should take account of the identity, role, interests, intentions and methods of operation of these other forces and agencies, and the need for co-ordination to achieve unity of effort. The J9 Staff will be key in co-ordinating information on NGOs, IGO and other agencies.
8. **Health Risks.** PSOs are conducted in inhospitable and difficult environments often with poor medical facilities. Health risks must be properly assessed and mitigated. SOPs must be particularly clear when operating in countries with significant problems with AIDs and infectious diseases.
9. **The Influence of the International Media.** Due to global coverage, speed of transmission and the humanitarian nature of the complex emergencies, the international media can have a great influence on their establishment and conduct.
10. **Command.** The complex political and multi-agency nature of PSO creates unusual problems of command. The conduct of PSO is likely to be politically highly charged, and strategic and operational level considerations may have a considerable and disproportionate effect, even at the lowest tactical level. There could be a tendency for the operational and tactical levels of command to overlap as individual incidents assume a high profile in political terms. Each national contingent is likely to have separate national command arrangements which could affect many aspects of the operation, particularly if sudden and unexpected escalations of violence occur which place new demands upon the military force.

11. **Information Management.** The close interweaving of National Strategic and Operational Issues and Force Operational and tactical considerations make peace support operations demanding in the information management context. Not only must the contingent maintain many links to higher headquarters and collaborating agencies and forces on the ground, but the political nature of most peace support operations produces in national and international political spheres a much higher interest in the actions of the force in reaction to the situation. This may include National direction to do more or less than is specifically outlined in the mandate of the mission based on National sensitivities and aims. The management of the information produced, sent to and received from military, political and aid organizations is critical. It must be shared within different communities of interest with different notions of what constitutes sensitive information and what constitutes important and timely information. Furthermore, in many respects these communities of interest overlap only a little, if at all. Quite often the military is relied upon to be a source as well as a safeguarded of information between many parties. This trust-based relationship is essential to the “success peace support operations” and is impossible without a sound and robust information management policy and infrastructure.

12. **Assessment of Tasks.** Having analysed the mission within the context of the mission plan and the operational directive, and having identified the specified and implied tasks, a subordinate commander's next step will be to identify and assess those tasks that have to be carried out to achieve the mission. In the conduct of PSO, preconceptions may have to be abandoned. For instance, the activities of other agencies may have a higher priority and importance than military ones. Close political-military co-ordination in defining tasks, specific and implied, should ensure consistency and coherence between tactical activity and the strategic intentions of the mandating authority. Having identified the necessary objectives and tasks, a commander should then prioritize them in terms of importance and specify his centre of gravity and main effort as appropriate. Awareness is necessary of those joint tasks that may be carried out concurrently or that can only be carried out sequentially with military activities. At this stage, a subordinate commander is able to select and prioritize the techniques most appropriate to accomplish the tasks and objectives.

611. OTHER ELEMENT OF OPERATIONAL PLANNING

1. **The Concept of Operations (CONOPs).** The concept of operations represents the logical culmination of the previous planning stages that is the analysis of the mission, followed by a detailed consideration of all factors, tasks, techniques and procedures and available resources. A subordinate commander's concept of operations will be a reflection of the mission plan and will also identify lines of operations, designate objectives and main effort, and allocate the task organization and resources to accomplish these tasks.

2. **Resource Allocation.** Having assessed the required tasks and the techniques to accomplish them, a commander's next step is to allocate available resources to those tasks. Before, where appropriate, negotiation must occur with NGOs and other civilian agencies to determine the tasks and conditions that require mutual co-operation and to ensure synchronization between military activities and those of the civilian organizations. This calculation should be done for each line of operation and phase of the operation, and determines which activities may be done concurrently, and which (owing to the requirement to concentrate resources) will need to be undertaken sequentially. This process provides a general overview of what is feasible and sets prudent limits on a commander's aspirations. A commander's “troops to task” calculation thus determines the overall design of the concept of operations. This assessment is normally assisted by J4.

3. **Grouping and Missions.** A PSO commander then allots his resources and allocates missions to each subordinate element of his force. In articulating missions to subordinates, a commander should take full account of the wider ramifications of the mission. Each subordinate grouping should be structured, equipped and trained to conduct given tasks. In a multinational command and multi-agency operation this process should allow for the diverse capabilities of different national contingents and agencies. If possible, groups should be flexible, self-contained and able to fulfil their own security requirements.

4. **Reserves.** The complex and generally volatile nature of PSO requires the creation of reserves, at each level of command, to allow for the unexpected. As well as demonstrating resolve, possible reserve tasks may include preventive deployment, reinforcement, and the protected extraction of the force in the

event that the operation becomes untenable and a decision to withdraw is taken. Reserve deployments that might cross national contingent boundaries should be agreed to and rehearsed. They may need national approval and contingency plans should be prepared accordingly.

5. **Public Affairs Planning for PSO.** PA planning for PSO follows the CF OPP. Strategic PA planning is conducted by J5PA, which establishes, for every mission, a PA COA, CONOPs, National PA Guidance (PAG) for the Wng O and develops a PA Annex to contingency operation plans (CONPLAN) and Operation Order (Op O). The operational level is responsible for developing and executing the Operational Communications Plan (OCP). The Senior PAO at an NCE/TFHQ, executes the OCP parts of which may devolve to PAOs deployed with Canadian formations and units within the mission. The J5PA, through J5PA Coord and PA Ops Desk Officers in the PA Coordination Centre, provides strategic tech-net support, through the NCE/TFHQ PAO, on a daily basis to PAOs deployed on PSO.

612. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. ROE are directions for operational commanders that set out the circumstances and limitations under which armed force may be applied to achieve military objectives for the furtherance of coalition government policy. ROE are thus issued as a set of parameters to inform commanders of the limits of constraint imposed or of the freedom permitted when carrying out their assigned tasks. ROE are designed to ensure that the application of force is appropriately controlled. ROE are not intended to be used to assign specific tasks or as a means of issuing tactical instruction. In passing orders, subordinate commanders at any level must always act within the ROE received but they are not bound to use the full extent of the permissions granted. ROE are determined for each specific operation based upon the objectives of the mission. They are formulated by the military in accordance with principles of international and domestic law and are subsequently approved by the political leadership. Before the ROE are issued to the force, they are distributed to the participating states for endorsement.

2. A number of ROE systems have been developed by different organizations. In fact, Canadian forces may not always operate under the Canadian system of ROE. Canada may issue supplementary national ROE for a particular operation, in which case national ROE and self-defence provisions take precedence. However, these supplementary ROE can only be more restrictive. For alliance, UN or coalition operations, the following ROE systems may apply:

- a. **UN Operations.** The UN does not have a standardised use of force doctrine or ROE architecture; rather, it relies on an ad hoc approach. Normally, UN headquarter staff, including the military advisor and the Department of Peacekeeping operations formulate the mission ROE;
- b. **NATO and CANUS.** These alliances have specific environmental ROE to which Canada has agreed to comply during combined operations with these alliances; and
- c. **Coalition Operations.** For a coalition operation where there is no standard reference for ROE, the force may operate under the same ROE or each country may operate under its own national ROE. In the latter case, every effort should be made to avoid contradictory ROE.

3. ROE issued to Canadian forces must receive approval by the CDS before implementation. However, if no ROE have been issued, the Canadian TFC shall submit a ROE Request through the chain of command for CDS approval. In some circumstance, NDHQ J-Staff may develop them. If an ROE issue cannot be resolved to Canada's satisfaction, the CDS may consider taking the following actions:

- a. Supplementing the Mission ROE with Canadian ROE for Canadian personnel;
- b. Restricting Canadian personnel from complying with designated ROE; and
- c. Withdrawing Canadian personnel.

4. ROE usually begin with general principles and remarks concerning their structure and applicability. In all cases, the principles of proportionality and military necessity are set forth. Following these broad

general principles is guidance specifically related to the operation. Where applicable, a distinction is made between the rules for land, air and naval forces. A selection of agreed authorizations has to be provided to the commander. He may use all, some, or none of the authorities as he deems appropriate. ROE can be tailored to the nature and purpose of the operation and the available assets. The order will also contain a procedure for a commander to request changes to the applicable ROE if deemed necessary because of changed circumstances or modified views.

5. The ROE do not limit the inherent right of self-defence. When self-defence does not apply, the right to use force for mission accomplishment must be based on the ROE. In any event, under all circumstances, the principles of necessity and proportionality apply. One must be aware that the ROE are usually formulated in a general way and, as a consequence, do not provide solutions to every problem. The individual remains personally responsible for his actions. *Use of Force*, B-GG-005-004/AF-005, offers more detail on ROEs.

SECTION V - INFORMATION CAMPAIGN

613. GENERAL

1. An Information Campaign may be a key contributor to success in a PSO for the following reasons:
 - a. Those opposed to the peace settlement, hoping to influence world public opinion, will often conduct an information campaign targeted against the PKF, the UN or the coalition. Avoiding risk, they will posture for the press, attempting to cause reactions through the resulting media reports, aimed at affecting strategic and operational-level decision-making of the PKF and the international community that supports it. Public perception can put political pressure on nations to modify their participation in the PSO and can strike at a PSO's centre of gravity - fracturing the coalition of the multinational forces assembled for the operation. A properly constructed Information Campaign can protect this important centre of gravity.
 - b. Technological and military prowess are not requirements for a non-compliant parties to conduct an effective information campaign. They will seek to integrate all elements of their power and capabilities to target the PKF. They will operate under their own cultural norms and may not be constrained by Western practices. A counter to these efforts must be developed.
 - c. A consistent message can be delivered from the diverse, multitude of agencies that will be operating in the mission area – UN agencies, NGOs, and others – enhancing legitimacy.
 - d. Often in PSO there is a competition to establish legitimacy. This effort is often waged by the PKF through psychological operations, public affairs and civil-military affairs. Through the non-lethal capabilities of the Information Campaign, the legitimacy of the mission and the assisted state can be supported and that of opponents challenged. It can influence faction decision-makers to encourage compliance and generate popular support for the peace agreement.

614. PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASPECTS

1. **Provision of Information.** Policies with regard to the provision of information will be governed by the lead agency or nation. Conflicts with existing Canadian regulations will be resolved ahead of time if possible through the NDHQ J5PA staff. The guiding principle will always be that the provision of information will be accurate and timely, commensurate with security of operations.
2. **Public Affairs.** PSO are carried out under the full glare of public scrutiny. PA staffs support the commander by working to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in the force and its conduct of PSO. As reports of PSO are widely visible to national and international publics, PA becomes a critical component of PSO. Media reports contribute to the legitimacy of an operation and the achievement of its political and diplomatic goals. The media can play an important role as part of broader efforts aimed at peace building. Longer-term peace building can be supported by more balanced and objective reporting and by development of a free and independent media. The potential peace-building role for media would be to:
 - a. Counter misconceptions of the 'enemy' and help reduce the level of rumour in society;
 - b. Build confidence amongst warring parties, build consensus and allow 'face saving';
 - c. Facilitate communication between conflicting parties and provide an outlet for emotional expression;
 - d. Analyze the conflict and educate on the process of conflict resolution; and
 - e. Propose options and solutions to the conflict and influence the balance of power in a conflict.

SECTION VI - LEGAL ISSUES AND DIRECTIVES

615. LEGAL ISSUES

1. **Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).** After the mandate, the SOFA is the second key document that defines the legal authority and responsibilities of a PSO. The SOFA may be a treaty or an international agreement, depending on the degree of accord obtained. It establishes the detailed legal status of a PKF. UN and sponsoring nations (on behalf of participating countries) will normally negotiate the SOFA with the nation(s) where the PSO is conducted, as well as with the nation(s) that provides part of its (their) territory for use as Lines of Communication (LOC) or Staging Areas. These negotiations will normally also involve close co-ordination between Task Force Commanders (TFC), DND, DFAIT and COS J3. Authority to negotiate and conclude international agreements is held at the national level.
2. The SOFA is an agreement that details the rights, privileges, immunities and the nature of services to be provided to the force. However, individual states may negotiate memoranda of understanding with the host nation on specific items not covered in the Agreement. SOFAs are rarely amended. Unlike a mandate, a SOFA is not renewed, as it is a standing agreement. Complex Peacekeeping Operations (CPKO) may not include a SOFA. Any proposed SOFA affecting Canadian forces must be reviewed by NDHQ legal staff to ascertain consistency with Canadian law and policy.
3. Each SOFA is different. The subjects that may be covered include:
 - a. Control and authority over force areas and premises;
 - b. Displaying of flags, banners, symbols etc.;
 - c. Wearing of uniforms;
 - d. Authority to carry weapons;
 - e. Freedom of movement in the area of operations;
 - f. Freedom of peacekeeping action in the area of operations;
 - g. Identification of personnel, vehicles, buildings, positions etc.;
 - h. Economic and financial regulations;
 - i. Use of host nation support such as communications, water, electricity, sewerage, airports, ports, etc.;
 - j. Immunity from search, seizure or inspection of force documents, personnel, vehicles, buildings or areas;
 - k. Co-operation and liaison channels between the force and local authorities;
 - l. Employment of civil labour; and
 - m. Claim and dispute settlement.
4. A key subject is legal jurisdiction. PKF members are usually subject to national disciplinary action for violations of local law. The PKF therefore usually enjoys a form of immunity, which consequently brings with it the responsibility of respecting and abiding by local laws and customs.
5. **The Law of Armed Conflict.** The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is the body of international law that governs the conduct of hostilities during an armed conflict; though not party to the conflict the spirit and principles of the LOAC will be applied by the PKF. Individual civilians along with the civilian population must never be purposefully targeted unless they have taken a direct part in the hostilities. When military force is

used, every effort should be taken to minimise the risk of civilian casualties. B-GG-005-027/AF-020, *Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level*, offers more detail.

6. **Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).** These arrangements may be reached between Canada, the UN or NATO and the host nation. Such memoranda are primarily concerned with administrative matters such as the use of airports for rotation, national visitors, rest & recreational (R&R) activities, etc. MOU do not have the same legal status as SOFAs and are not regarded as treaties.

7. **National Law.** Concerning discipline and disciplinary action, PKF members are subject to their respective national or military law, which is administered by the national authority. CF personnel continue to be subject to the Code of Service Discipline.

8. **The National Defence Act.** This Act gives the Minister of National Defence authority to manage and direct all matters relating to national defence and the CF. This National Defence mandate is further defined in the Government's defence policy. Additional elaboration is provided in documents submitted to Parliament seeking spending authority, and parliamentary approval of the Estimates implies agreement that they are within the mandate of National Defence. The National Defence Act also permits the Governor in Council to place units or members of the Regular and Reserve components of the Canadian Forces on active service beyond Canada. The National Defence Act is therefore the legal authority by virtue of which the Canadian Government commits forces to PSO.

9. **Crown Prerogative.** In addition to powers given under the NDA, the executive government has an additional level of authority known as the Crown Prerogative. The Crown Prerogative consists of those powers still exercisable by the Crown under the common law, not pursuant to statute. For example, the Crown continues to exercise the power to deploy forces outside of Canadian territory. When using the Crown Prerogative, the federal cabinet, acting as the Governor-in-Council, may deploy the CF for a variety of purposes. Although constitutional practice indicates that government decisions to deploy forces outside of Canada will be submitted to Parliament for discussion, Parliamentary consent is not required by law.

616. OTHER DIRECTIVES AND REGULATIONS

1. **Force Commanders' Directives and Regulations.** Commanders' directives are also referred to as force standing operating procedures (SOPs) or force standing orders. Upon receipt of UN or NATO regulations, the force commander prepares more detailed regulations and operating procedures that are issued to the force. All key members of the force must be completely familiar with them, since all operations will be conducted in accordance with them. These regulations cover such subjects as:

- a. General provisions (for example, regulations, definitions, instructions, amendments, etc.),
- b. International character (for example, uniform, insignia, privileges, immunities, etc.),
- c. Authority of the force commander (for example, command authority, chain of command, delegation, discipline and military police),
- d. General administrative, executive and financial arrangements (for example, authority of the UN Sec Gen and the force commander, UNHQ, finance and accounting, personnel, food, accommodation, amenities, transportation, supplies, equipment, communications, maintenance, medical, dental, sanitary, contracts and public information services),
- e. Rights and duties of the members of the force (for example, respect for local law, conduct, legal protection, information handling, honours and awards, jurisdiction, customs duties, foreign exchange regulations, identity cards, driving, pay, overseas service allowances, service-related death, injury or illness, dependants, leave and promotions, etc.), and
- f. Applicable international conventions (for example, observance of international conventions applicable to military personnel).

2. **Contingent Commander's Terms of Reference.** When a Canadian National Commander or TFC has been selected, formal TOR are issued by the CDS. The TOR provide necessary guidance in respect of national command and the relationship between the TFC and the Force Commander (FC). The guidance provided in the TOR is further amplified by the DCDS Directives for International Operations.

3. **DCDS Directives for International Operations (DCDS 02/01, Rev 1).** This directive outlines matters of national concern, primarily operations and administration. The purpose of this document is to provide guidance and direction to Force Generators, Force Employers and TFCs so they may effectively carry out their respective duties in the warning, preparation, deployment, employment and redeployment phases of international operations. All Canadian members of a force must be familiar with these orders.

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ANNEX A - DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY

DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN THE UN DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND THE UN DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Department of Political Affairs	Dept of Peacekeeping Operations	Comments
Assists the Secretary-General in the discharge of his responsibilities under the Charter relating to the maintenance and restoration of peace and security, including preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace building.	Serves as the operational arm of the Secretary-General for all United Nations field operations, in particular the management and direction of peacekeeping operations.	The term "all field operations" is accurate only insofar as administrative and logistical support is concerned. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations' substantive responsibility is limited to peacekeeping operations.
Advises on and supports electoral assistance matters and co-ordinates appropriate response to Member States' requests of such assistance.		As the focal point for electoral assistance, the Department of Political Affairs makes a substantive contribution to the electoral components of peacekeeping operations.
Monitor, analyze and assess political developments throughout the world, identify potential or actual conflicts in whose resolution the United Nations could play a useful role, provide early warning to the Secretary-General and recommend and execute political action. Direct and manage special political missions including those authorized by the General Assembly.	Responsible for the day-to-day executive direction of peacekeeping operations, with emphasis on political and operational aspects. Co-ordinates and integrates inputs from other departments, agencies and programs. (In the case of a multidisciplinary peacekeeping operation, it chairs the task force comprising the entities contributing to it.)	Officers from the Department of Political Affairs cover several countries or a region, maintaining up-to-date information as well as keeping track of a broad range of political, social and other variables that have a bearing on the genesis or resolution of conflicts. This is a permanent task that is performed prior to, during and after a peacekeeping operation. By contrast, officers from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Office of Operations function as project officers for a peacekeeping operation and their involvement ends with the operation's termination.
Support the Secretary-General in the political aspects of his relations with Member States and regional organizations.		This is a broad task, which entails significant co-ordinating functions. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations provides inputs relating to its responsibilities, for example, a peacekeeping operation or relations with a troop contributor.
Plan and participate in fact-finding, peacemaking and other	Leads the planning process for a peacekeeping operation by	

Department of Political Affairs	Dept of Peacekeeping Operations	Comments
missions to areas of actual or potential conflict where the Secretary-General's preventive and peacemaking efforts may be needed or are already engaged.	providing the overall framework, developing options for courses of action, leading reconnaissance missions to the field and coordinating and integrating inputs from within the department and from other entities into a comprehensive plan for approval by the Security Council.	
Provide political guidance and support to special representatives and other senior officials appointed by the Secretary-General to assist his preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-building efforts.	Provides guidance and support to the chiefs of peacekeeping operations (Special Representative, Force Commander or Chief Military Observer).	
Maintain and expand links with other United Nations offices and departments and other relevant institutes and experts.	Coordinates and integrates inputs from other departments, agencies and programs that are active in the mission area of a peacekeeping operation.	Each department works with other entities in carrying out its respective mandate (see paragraph directly above).
Liaise, consult and negotiate with Member States at Headquarters or in their capitals.	Supports the operation vis-à-vis the parties to the conflict and other interested parties, the members of the Security Council and the contributors.	Each department deals with Member States on the matters for which it is responsible.
Maintain and develop cooperation with the secretariats of regional organizations and arrangements through joint meetings, consultations, liaison and attendance at meetings held by them.	Maintains contact with regional organizations on peacekeeping matters, particularly when they are active in a theatre where the United Nations has a peacekeeping operation. Responsible for programs to enhance African peacekeeping capacity.	
Maintain contact with non-governmental organizations and academic institutions worldwide and participate in seminars and academic meetings relating to the mandate of the Department.	Responds to requests by such organizations for information relating to peacekeeping.	
Prepare reports related to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace building to the General Assembly and the Security Council, and contribute to reports on some peacekeeping operations.	Prepare reports on peacekeeping operations to the Security Council.	Each department reports on matters in its respective sphere of responsibility.

ANNEX B - FRAMEWORK FOR MULTINATIONAL PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

A COMPARISON

CRITERIA	UN	NATO	COALITIONS
Description of multinational organization	International organization with aim to achieve cooperation in solving problems in areas of international peace and security, economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian action as well as encouraging respect for human rights and freedoms	Defensive alliance based on political and military cooperation among independent member countries of Europe and North America. Members committed to safeguarding freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on principles of democracy, individual liberty and rule of law. Alliance underpinned by shared defence planning and military cooperation as well as cooperation in economic, scientific, environmental fields responsible. Members committed to defence of one another.	Ad hoc, generally temporary grouping with both political and military focus
Status of members	Voluntary membership of sovereign member states who accept obligations of UN Charter	Multinational, inter-governmental association of free and independent countries	Temporary cooperation by sovereign nations sharing common specific goals and interests
Permanent staff employed by multilateral organization	UN Secretariat staff (civilian) and limited number of seconded military staff provided by member states	International Staff (civilian) and seconded International Military Staffs provided by member countries	None
Decision making body for PSOs	UN Security Council, operating under Chaps 6, 7, or 8 of the UN Charter	North Atlantic Council (NAC), based on unanimous decisions after discussion and consultation among member nations. Conducts PSOs with mandate provided by either the OSCE or the UN	Political leadership of participating nations. May operate under UN mandate
Foundational document	UN Charter - international legal document, ratified in national laws by member states as part of accession process	North Atlantic Treaty - binding commitment for common defence of NATO AOR	Temporary agreement of participating nations
Financial basis for PSOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN Peacekeeping budget, financed by member state assessments • Mission budget voted by UN General 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Common funding is limited to the minimum military requirements in support of the military aspects of the PSO: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ costs eligible for 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participating nations normally pay own costs and could be required to contribute to common costs such as coalition HQs

CRITERIA	UN	NATO	COALITIONS
	<p>Assembly for each PKO</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Troop contributing nations (partially) reimbursed for national troops, equipment and logistics sustainment • Some voluntary contributions by member states 	<p>common funding under the Military Budget include O&M costs of designated theatre HQ elements; and</p> <p>➤ costs eligible for common funding under NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) include repair or upgrade of critical strategic theatre infrastructure, strategic communication requirements and initial facilities and CIS equipment for the theatre HQ elements.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Within the PSO, primarily nations absorb all costs associated with their participation in a NATO led operation under the principle “costs lie where they fall”. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lead nation may financially and logistically support less-capable participants • Voluntary trust fund may be established to financially assist less-capable participants
Headquarters structure for planning and conducting military operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political HQ - UN NY • Field Mission HQs for each UN PKO - 15(TBC) <p>(UN Military Staff Committee not involved in planning and conduct of PSOs - DPKO has limited military staff capability)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political HQ - NATO • Military Strategic HQs - SHAPE and ACLANT • Regional HQs - 7 • Sub-RHQs - 11 • PSO HQs - SFOR and KFOR <p>(Integrated military command structure)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ad hoc Coalition HQ, normally based on lead nation C2 structure
Logistics infrastructure to support PSOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN Logistics Base Brindisi, IT • UN-owned major equipments including vehicle fleets, communications equipment, and accommodation equipment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization (NAMSO) • 7 NATO pipeline systems • Extensive logistics support infrastructure across NATO AOR - airfield and port facilities, storage depots, communications, etc. 	
Common logistics doctrine, policy and procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN Operational Support Manual • UN Survey Mission Handbook • UN Field Administration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MC 319 • MC 327/1 • NATO Log Handbook Chap 5 • AJP-04 series 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ABCA* Coalition Logistics Handbook • Several logistics QSTAGs •

CRITERIA	UN	NATO	COALITIONS
applicable to PSOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Manual COE Manual 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AJP-05 Numerous logistics STANAGs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * (American, UK, Canada, and Australian armies cooperative initiate)
Rules of Engagement (ROEs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Template ROEs developed by UN Secretariat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MC 362 <i>NATO Rules of Engagement</i> contains templates for ROEs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ROE normally developed by coalition LN
Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Based on document <i>Draft Model UN SOFA</i> template 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NATO SOFAs already in existence except for out of area operations (tbc) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SOFA normally developed by LN
Division of Logistics responsibilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UN responsible for planning and conducting logistics support to PSOs. Troop contributors responsible for providing trained, equipped contingents with organic unit level logistics capability. Troop contributors may negotiate (via COE MOU) to provide up to 15 categories of logistics sustainment to their contingents. Troop contributors responsible for providing purely national reqrs to their contingents UN responsible for arranging or funding strategic deployment/re-deployments of national contingents UN responsible for providing camp infrastructure in mission area - tented accn for initial six months, with improved standard thereafter 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Member countries and NATO have a collective responsibility for logistics support of NATO's multinational operations Member countries must ensure, individually or by cooperative arrangements, the provision of logistics resources to support their forces allocated to NATO during peace, crisis and conflict Strategic deployments/re-deployments a national responsibility Provision of camp infrastructure is a national responsibility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coalition lead nation coordinates logistics support Participating nations responsible for own logistics support unless otherwise detailed by lead nation Level of logistics integration will be mission-specific
Public Affairs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The function is called Public Information (PI) The responsible senior is the Civilian Public Information Officer (CPIO) and there will also be a Senior Military Public Information Officer (MPIO) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Same The responsible is the Chief Public Information Officer (CPIO) who may be civilian or military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The function (if led by the US or Canada is called Public Affairs (PAff)) The responsible senior is the Chief Public Affairs Officer (CPAO) who will likely be a military officer

CRITERIA	UN	NATO	COALITIONS
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The CPIO is responsible to the SRSG and the MPIO is responsible to the Force Commander • The CPIO is responsible for UN PI policy • The MPIO is responsible for co-ordinating UN PI policy with PIOs in subordinate military formations • The CPIO is responsible for a PI staff that is commensurate with the size of the mission • The MPIO is the Force Commander's PI advisor but may also have a PI staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The CPIO is responsible to the theatre commander • The CPIO is responsible for NATO PI policy • The CPIO is responsible for co-ordinating NATO PI policy with subordinate formations • Same • The CPIO is the theatre commander's PI advisor and will likely have a PI staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The CPAO is responsible to the coalition commander • The CPAO is responsible for coalition PAff policy • The CPAO is responsible for co-ordinating coalition PAff policy with subordinate formations • Same • The CPAO is the coalition command PAff advisor and will likely have a PAff staff

CHAPTER 7
COMMAND AND CONTROL
SECTION I - GENERAL

701. INTRODUCTION

1. The command and control over the military components of a PSO has always been a challenge. Even when established by a security alliance, the headquarters for military forces in a PSO are usually ad hoc organizations. PSO security forces are composed of many national contingents with different equipment, doctrine and often operating language. While serving under the UN, military personnel remain members of their national armed services; however, operational authority is transferred to the United Nations. Effective command and control is essential for the successful accomplishment of the military tasks and objectives in a PSO.
2. The design of the field force and the headquarters in PSO are often constrained by other factors than just military effectiveness. Normally, negotiations are carried out with parties in the assisted state as to the acceptability and appropriate neutrality of countries willing to participate in the mission. Additionally, in the HQ and the field force the UN requires that an equitable geographic representation be designed into the structure. These concerns have less bearing on regionally led coalition operations.
3. The United Nations has the capability to conduct traditional peacekeeping and observer missions and to mount advisor missions to regional organizations conducting complex peacekeeping. In general, complex peacekeeping must be conducted by "coalitions" of the willing with appropriate command and control structures and the capabilities to carry out the tasks assigned in the UNSC mandate.

702. STAFF AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

1. In any multinational force, several potential problem areas must be overcome to ensure effective command and control, including:
 - a. Cultural and political differences;
 - b. Language differences;
 - c. Various levels of training and experience;
 - d. Different staff and operating procedures; and
 - e. The lack of continuity due to the turnover of personnel.
2. Developing simple and concise staff and standard operating procedures can ease these problems. In addition, emphasis on service to the UN or coalition over national interests can foster the development of a cohesive and efficient multinational staff. Properly scheduled rotations ensure continuity among the staff.

703. INTERPRETERS

1. **General.** Language difficulties can arise at any stage in the conduct of PSO both with elements of the assisted state and within the international mission itself. In coalitions these language difficulties can be exacerbated by differences in doctrine, training, military culture and capability. These problems can be overcome by employing interpreters who may be military personnel or local nationals. The latter may be locally employed or provided as part of the Host Nation Support (HNS).
2. **Military Interpreters.** Military interpreters will be required. The PKF should have a number of military interpreters on strength who can:

- a. Assess the abilities, employ, deploy and monitor the performance of any local interpreters.
 - b. Replace local staff when security, military or political considerations require interpretation of sensitive information.
 - c. Deal with a military vocabulary beyond the scope of the local interpreters.
3. **Use of Local Interpreters.** Before employing local nationals as interpreters it will be necessary to assess their capabilities and possibly their political affiliation. Employing local people as interpreters has security implications both for information and for the physical security of the persons involved. In any operation, knowledge of the political/cultural/religious affiliation of individual local interpreters could be of vital importance in certain situations.

704. CO-ORDINATING MECHANISMS

1. There are a variety of co-ordinating mechanisms that can be used during peace support operation. These mechanisms assist in command and control, co-ordination and synchronization.
2. **Joint Commissions.** Joint commissions have been used recently in peace operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, Somalia, Angola, El Salvador, Namibia, and Bosnia. In a broad sense, peace support operations have sought to create the opportunity for the parties to negotiate a peace settlement or more recently to implement a peace settlement. The terms of that settlement should provide mechanisms to help initiate and sustain the peace process; well-crafted peace settlements will be a guideline toward a deeper resolution of the conflict. Joint commissions have been a useful structure and process in the implementation of peace settlements. The terms of the peace agreement that establish the joint commissions will determine its roles and tasks (see Annex B for more details).
3. **Civil-Military Co-operation Centres.** These centres are usually established and managed by the PKF. It is a co-ordination mechanism that allows the PKF to liaise, co-ordinate and cooperate with UN agencies, NGOs and other actors in order to synchronize joint plans and operations. It can also serve as a useful information exchange venue.
4. **On Site Operation Centres (OSOCs).** The Humanitarian Co-ordinator or the UN lead agency in a mission area normally establishes this centre. The aim of the OSOC is to co-ordinate humanitarian assistance in theatre.
5. **Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centre (HACC).** This is a temporary centre established to assist with interagency coordination and planning. A humanitarian assistance coordination centre operates during the early planning and coordination stages of humanitarian operations by providing the link between task force commanders and government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and international and regional organizations.

705. UNITED NATIONS CHAIN OF COMMAND – STRATEGIC LEVEL

1. The chain of command for UN-led PSO at the strategic level can be described as follows:
 - a. **Security Council.** The Security Council is responsible for the overall political direction of the PSO. It authorizes the mandate of the mission.
 - b. **Secretary-General.** The Secretary-General is responsible for executive direction and control of the missions. Member States transfer “Operational Authority” over their military forces to the United Nations. This authority is vested in the Secretary-General who exercises it on behalf of the Security Council.
 - c. **Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.** On behalf of the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary-General directs and controls UN peacekeeping operations; formulates policies for peacekeeping operations and operational guidelines based on Security Council mandates; prepares

reports of the Sec Gen to the SC on each peacekeeping operation; and advises the Sec Gen on all matters related to the planning, establishment and conduct of UN peacekeeping operations.

- d. **Head of Mission.** The Head of Mission (HoM) is responsible through the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, for implementation of the mission mandate. The HoM exercises “Operational Authority” in the field on behalf of the Secretary-General.

2. **The Department of Peacekeeping Operations.** The Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as shown in Figure 7-1, is the operational arm of the Secretary-General for all UN field operations. It is responsible for the daily supervision of peacekeeping operations and leads and co-ordinates the planning process in establishing missions. The Office of Operations is responsible for the day-to-day executive direction to peacekeeping operations in the field and fulfils the Secretary-General’s reporting obligations on peacekeeping to the Security Council. The Situation Centre maintains 24/7 communications with field operations: collating information, acting as a point of contact during silent hours, taking urgent action as required and providing crisis management capabilities. During times of crisis it can be used as a Joint Operation Centre (JOC) serving all UN agencies. The Military Division provides technical military advice and professional military input to the direction of current missions, undertakes force generation, manages contingent rotation, produces military component plans and provides training and doctrine. The Civilian Police Division performs similar functions for UN CIVPOL aspects of missions.




Figure 7-1 Department of Peacekeeping Operation

SECTION II - UN-LED MISSIONS

706. FORCE HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION

1. Each force HQ will be task tailored for the assigned mission. The structure will vary depending on the broad overall mission objectives. Observer missions differ from traditional peacekeeping which differ from complex peacekeeping. An example of a UN force HQ organization is provided in Figure 7-2. The force HQ is usually located close to both the area of operations and the political centres of the belligerents. The nation in which it is located is termed the host or assisted nation. The headquarters is usually kept as small as possible to limit expense.




Figure 7-2 Generic HQ Structure for UN-Led PSO

2. **Head of Mission.** The HoM is responsible for the exercise of “Operational Authority” in the mission area. Depending on the nature of the mission the HoM may be a Special Representative of the Secretary General, a Force Commander or a Chief Military Observer.

3. **Special Representative Of The UN Secretary General.** It is normal practice for the UN Sec Gen to appoint a SRSG, with the concurrence of the UN SC, to deal, on the UN Sec Gen's behalf, with the parties to a conflict where the UN has become involved. The SRSG will usually act as a facilitator for mediation when requested by the involved parties. Additionally, he will conduct fact-finding, submit regular reports of political developments and, in general, act as the representative of the UN Sec Gen on the ground. Frequently, it is the practice to appoint the SRSG as both the special representative and the HoM. The SRSG reports to the UN Sec Gen and, when appointed as the HoM, exercises control over all components of the mission on behalf of the UN Sec Gen. Where a Force Commander has been appointed as the HoM, it is UN practice to assign a political advisor to the Force Commander's staff.

4. **Force Commander.** The force commander is the senior military officer in a PSO. He is usually responsible to the Head of Mission, who in turn reports to the head of the sponsoring organization. The force

commander is appointed by the sponsoring organization with the consent of the UN SC and the concurrence of the parties, host nation and sometimes the contributing nations. Force commanders are usually selected from nations that contribute the major portion of the force or regularly contribute to PSOs. The force commander exercises "Operational Control" over all military personnel, including military observers, in the mission. The Force Commander may delegate "Operational Control" of military observers to a Chief Military Observer. The Force Commander organizes a chain of command in the field as follows:

- a. **For Military Units/Contingents.** Deputy Force Commander, Sector Commander(s), National Contingent Commanders, Battalion Commanders and Company Commanders;
 - b. **For Military Observers.** Chief Military Observer, Deputy Chief Military Observer, Sector Commanders/Senior Military Observers, Military Observer Team Leaders and military observers.
 - c. **Chief Military Observer.** The Chief Military Observer when head of the military component reports directly to the HoM and exercises "Operational Control" over all military observers.
5. **The Force Commander's Personal Staff.** The Force Commander's personal staff usually consists of military officers or civil servants who act as assistants or advisers to the Force Commander for specific functions. This staff may consist of any of the following: a military executive assistant; a personal aide; the UN adviser; a legal adviser; a civilian and military public information officer (MPIO); a translator; liaison officers exchanged with the belligerent, national contingents and possibly other civilian authorities; and a political advisor.
6. **The Military Staff.** The military staff is composed of officers from the nations contributing to the force. The Joint (J) Staff System used in multinational operations is usually divided into operations and administration branches under nine different J sections.
- a. **Chief of Staff (COS).** The COS (who may also be referred to as the chief military observer, deputy force commander or the deputy chief of staff.) directs the force HQ staff on behalf of the commander. The COS plays a critical role in ensuring efficient supervision and co-ordination of staff effort. There may be a deputy chief of staff to assist the COS (DCOS) in larger HQs.
 - b. **Operations Staff.** The operations staff may be headed by the COS or an Operations Officer with the following sections: information (J2); operations (J3) including Sea, Land and Air; engineer (J3 Engr); observer groups; military and civilian security (J3 MP); plans (J5); communications (J6); training (J7); and CIMIC (J9).
 - c. **Administration Staff.** The administration staff may be headed by the DCOS or an Administration Officer and divided under the personnel and the logistic staff. They normally conduct the following support functions: personnel administration & services (J1); health (J4 HSS); supply (J4 Log); maintenance (J4 Maint); transport (J4 Mov); and finance (J8).
7. **The Civilian Staff.** In UN operations, the civilian staff may be provided from the UN Secretariat in New York but will also include locally hired staff and UN Field mission staff. They also provide specialist administrative support to the force. In non-UN operations, this civilian specialist administrative support is provided by elements of the civil service of a contributing nation or is contracted to a private concern.
8. **Chief Administrative Officer (CAO).** In UN operations, a CAO is usually appointed as the senior logistics official in the PSO and is responsible to the HOM for the overall administration of the force for budgetary and financial administration. The CAO is also responsible for civilian staff matters and for implementing civilian and administrative directives.
9. **Civilian Staff Responsibilities.** The civilian staff is responsible for administrative matters common to all national contingents. These are:
- a. Host nation or supplemental transport requirements;
 - b. The provision of a civilian communications rear link from force HQ to UN New York;

- c. Local contracts and procurement;
- d. Provision of services (for example, accommodation, rations, amenities, maintenance, administrative transport and communications);
- e. Claims procedures;
- f. Provision of legal advice; and
- g. Budgetary control and financial matters.

10. **Public Information Staff.** On UN missions public information staffs are usually organized as follows:

- a. **Civilian PI Function.** A senior civilian in charge of the Public Information function will assist the SRSG. The Civilian Public Information Officer (CPIO) will be responsible for all UN PI policy and activities that, depending on the size and nature of the mission, could include media liaison, media monitoring, media registration, magazine publishing, radio tape recording and television videography. The CPIO may also have detached field offices manned by PIOs responsible for implementing UN PI policy and conducting UN PI activities in areas of strategic importance to the operation. The CPIO will also conduct daily news conferences in a Press Information Centre.
- b. **Military PI Function.** The Force Commander will have a Military Public Information Officer (MPIO) as advisor on his personal staff. The MPIO will liaise with the CPIO as well as be the military spokesperson on CPIO-led news conferences and, depending on the size of the mission, may have a mandate as the UN Force PIO responsible for coordinating UN PI policy with all military formations involved in the mission. Senior Canadian PAffOs could be assigned as MPIO or as a mission spokesperson within a Public Information Centre (PIC) or sub-PIC.

11. **UN CIVPOL Commissioner.** The Commissioner is the senior police officer in a PSO. He is responsible to the head of mission, who in turn reports to the head of the sponsoring organization. The Commissioner is appointed by the sponsoring organization with the consent of the UN SC and the concurrence of the parties, host nation and sometimes the contributing nations. He supervises all aspects of the police mission: both internal aspects – training and development of the UN force, and external – the monitoring, reform and training of local police forces. A UN CIVPOL mission will be broadly organized as follows:

- a. **Deputy Commissioner—Operations.** Reports to and supports the commissioner in the management of the organization. Responsible for operations in theatre, including restructuring and training of local police, with a focus on the rule of law, respect for human dignity and rights to life and equality before the law, tactical policy and planning relative to mandate responsibilities. Conducts liaison with local police, militia, and mission partners.
- b. **Regional Commanders.** Report to the Deputy Commissioner-Operations. They are responsible for the efficient and effective management of a region. They issue directions to and monitor the Station Commanders performance of their duties. Conducts liaison with the military and other UN components in the region, local police and other agencies.
- c. **Station Commander.** Reports to the Regional Commander. Responsible for the competent management of a multi-national staffed police station. Establishes clear guidelines for the receipt of complaints, inquiries and so on. Issues clear and binding standing orders on all investigations, inquiries with prompt appropriate follow up, preservation of crime scenes, evidence and protection of witnesses in accordance with international standards and the Commissioner's Directives. Reviews operational files and gives individual guidance and counsel, as required. Ensures strict adherence to record keeping and reporting. Develops community-policing strategies. Establishes close cooperative relationships with other civilian and law enforcement agencies. Provides for continuous

in-service training for all monitors emphasizing human rights, cross cultural sensitivity, and gender awareness.

- d. **Liaison Officer.** Under the general direction of the Deputy Commissioner- Operations. Facilitates and manages the gathering, release and exchange of appropriate information between UN CIVPOL and the military contingent, UN, other international partners, the local police, and other authorities.
- e. **Contingent Commander.** The contingent commander is appointed by their government as the highest-ranking officer of that nation’s contingent. Consequently, they look after the welfare and concerns of the contingent monitors. Although contingent commanders will also have assigned functions within the CIVPOL organization, in this particular capacity they are not considered to be within the chain of command of the UN CIVPOL organization.

707. FORCE ORGANIZATION

1. National contingents may provide specialist military personnel, or combat arms, combat support and combat service support units. They may merge with other contingents or mission’s civilian personnel to form composite observer, support or service support organizations. Operational authority is exercised by the force commander over all operational and logistics matters, excepting those of a purely national character (see Annex A for more details on command and control terminology). The force commander and staff deal directly with formation or unit commanders, who in turn command their organization.

2. The force’s organization will vary with the nature of the mission being conducted. Even though each mission is uniquely organized there are four basic field structures.

- a. Observer mission (see Figure 7-3),
- b. Observer “protected” missions (see Figure 7-4),
- c. Traditional peacekeeping missions (see Figure 7-5), and
- d. Advisory missions to regional-led PSO.




Figure 7-3 Structure of a Generic Observer Mission




Figure 7-4 Structure of an Observer Mission with a Protection Element

708. TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY – UN MISSIONS

1. Once in theatre, national contingents are transferred under the operational authority of the UN designated commander. Generally, this takes place when national military personnel and units arrive in the mission area; however, the exact time will be negotiated in advance.
2. The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) retains full command of a Canadian contingent. The Senior Canadian Officer, who is appointed Canadian National Commander (CNC), exercises Operational Command. The Canadian TF Commander will most likely be in the UN chain of command.




Figure 7-5 Generic Organization for a Traditional Peacekeeping Mission

SECTION III - COALITION-LED MISSIONS

709. INTRODUCTION

1. Any military operation that involves the forces of more than one nation acting together to accomplish a single mission is referred to as a combined operation. Allied, coalition and UN mandated operations are all considered to be combined operations. For the purposes of this manual, the term coalition will be used to mean those missions established by organizations other than the UN. See Figure 7-6.

710. STRUCTURE OF A COALITION OPERATION

1. Depending on the scope of the mission, land, sea and air components, logistics and communications support may all be included in a coalition operation. Nations will contribute to the coalition force headquarters (CFHQ) staff and operational components in accordance with alliance agreements or as agreed at meetings of troop contributing nations (TCNs). The Coalition Force Commander (CFC) is usually an officer of the nation contributing the largest number of forces to the operation.




Figure 7-6 Organization of a Coalition Force for a PSO

711. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. With the exception of single ship deployments, when one or more elements of the CF operate as part of a coalition force a TF will be established. If elements of two or more Environments of the CF are involved the TFC will be considered a JTFC.

2. In a peace support operation, C2 of the TF would normally be executed by the Task Force Commander. Forces generated will normally be assigned OPCOM to the Canadian TFC. These operations may be of such scope and complexity as to require the establishment of Component Commanders.

3. The TFC's duties and responsibilities will be as stipulated in the Terms of Reference (TOR) issued to him by the CDS. These duties will be dependant on the organization of the coalition force. The TOR will also delegate OPCOM over Canadian forces assigned to the coalition operation to the TFC while the CDS

will retain full command authority. Normally, the TFC will retain OPCOM but will transfer OPCON of the Canadian force to the Coalition FC.

4. **Logistics.** Generally, in coalition combined operations administrative and logistics support remains a national responsibility. In some instances mutual support arrangements are agreed between TCNs and HNS agreements are made.

5. When the TFC is functioning as an operational level commander, the entire TF will normally be assigned OPCON to the CFC:

- a. The TFC exercises OPCOM of the TF and conducts missions as assigned by the CFC.
- b. The HQ must have the capability to plan, organize and conduct major operations including re-deployment planning and emergency withdrawal operations. This scenario may require that the TFHQ be augmented.

6. When the TFC is not functioning as an operational level commander, the TF elements are normally assigned OPCON to the CFC:

- a. The TFC becomes the Canadian national commander (CNC). The CNC's roles will be to provide administrative support to the CF elements and to coordinate the employment of the CF elements with the coalition force headquarters (CFHQ). Other duties and responsibilities will include liaison with other Canadian government agencies in-theatre that may include Canadian consuls, ambassadors, Chargé d'affaires, Canadian Forces Attachés (CFA), CF staff in NATO posts and Canadian NGOs. On occasion the TFC may be further tasked with an allied or UN command role.
- b. Only those HQ elements necessary for this limited role will deploy. They will not have the capability to plan, organize and conduct major operations with the exception of re-deployment planning and emergency withdrawal operations. The HQ will be designed to expand its capabilities, if required.

712. ROE FOR COALITION OPERATIONS

1. ROE for coalition operations will be reviewed and approved for use by Canadian forces in accordance with CF doctrine. For more detail see Chapter 2 of B-GJ-005-501/FP-010, *The Use of Force in CF Operations*.

SECTION IV - CANADIAN ORGANIZATION

713. CANADIAN CONTINGENT ORGANIZATION

1. **National Command Element (NCE).** The primary role of a contingent headquarters is to co-ordinate all matters of a national nature. Its primary tasks are the co-ordination of national support, the maintenance of a national rear link and the dissemination of national policy.
2. **National Support Element (NSE).** The NSE is that portion of the Canadian contingent that provides support to the Canadian contribution. It is usually commanded by the contingent commander's senior CSS staff officer. It remains under national control, and where required by Canadian standards, provides support beyond levels provided by the UN or NATO. The primary functions for which the NSE is responsible include:
 - a. Pay and allowances;
 - b. Welfare;
 - c. Canadian-specific supply matters; and
 - d. National rear link.
3. **Canadian National Commander (CNC).** The senior officer from within the contingent is appointed by the CDS to serve as commander, Canadian contingent. This officer may, or may not be, the commanding officer of the major force component or unit deployed. This appointment may be held in addition to another force appointment. The DCDS, as the commander of a command for deployed PKF, issues the commander, Canadian contingent, with specific terms of reference outlining the duties, responsibilities and channels of communication.
4. **Field Organization.** The field organization is tailored according to mission requirements for a given task. It may be based on formed units or sub-units, composite units or sub-units, and groups of individual observers and specialists. Although under OPCON of the force commander, elements are employed using their established chain of command. Groups of observers or specialists are usually employed individually on tasks and are under multinational control.
5. **Canadian PA Function in a PSO.** The Canadian National Commander (CNC) will have a PA advisor on his personal staff for national PA matters. Canadian PAOs may also be assigned to a PIC as Canadian PA liaison or in an operational headquarters as a PA spokesperson. Generally, Canadian PAOs will deploy as a member of a formed Canadian unit and conduct national PA activities. The Canadian PAO assigned to an NCE/TFHQ will normally be the senior in-theatre PAO responsible for coordinating Canadian national PA policy and activities and maintaining a liaison with UN or coalition PA/PI staff.

714. COMMUNICATIONS

1. Once a PSO contingent is deployed, NDHQ/DCDS performs the functions of an operational or strategic headquarters depending on the size of the TF deployed. Direct liaison with parent Environmental staffs is normally only authorized on matters such as manning and rotation. The requirements for communication systems in a UN-led PSO are outlined below:
 - a. **Force Rear Link.** Communications between PKF HQ and the sponsoring organization are manned by the sponsoring organization's Office of Field Operational and External Support Activities (OFOESA) personnel under the CAO.
 - b. **Force Operations Net.** Force communications between PKF HQ and subordinate stations can be transmitted either by a secure or non-secure radio and/or by line systems manned by a military signal unit. While communications is an OFOESA responsibility, national or composite signal units may be established. Military signals units usually deploy their own national equipment and may be

required, for technical or language reasons, to man the system at both ends. In UN-sponsored operations, mission communications between mission HQ and field stations are usually transmitted by a non-secure radio and line manned by the observers or civilian personnel. OFOESA personnel man and maintain the communications at mission HQ and possibly down to observation post level.

- c. **Contingent/Unit Operations Net.** The forward operations link is a contingent responsibility. Observer and humanitarian missions are issued communications equipment that will be operated by the detachments or be manned by civilian operators.
- d. **National Rear Link.** This communications link is a national responsibility and is dependent on the size of the contingent. It may be a computer, telephone or facsimile self-operated system or a more sophisticated system operated by a national signals detachment. Secure communications must be established when possible.

ANNEX A - COMMAND AND CONTROL TERMINOLOGY

A001. CANADIAN TERMINOLOGY

1. The following terminology is applied when Canadian forces participate as a task force in a regional or coalition led peace support operation.
2. **Command.** The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces. The CDS exercises command over the CF. Commanders exercise command over their own forces at all levels, under the authority of the CDS, as do subordinate commanders over their own units. Command is further defined in terms of three levels: full, operational and tactical command.
 - a. **Full Command.** The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. The term command, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. It follows that no alliance or coalition commander has full command over the forces that are assigned to him, as nations, in assigning forces to an alliance or coalition, assign only operational command (OPCOM) or operational control (OPCON). The term "full command" is equivalent to "command" as defined in QR&Os. It applies at all levels of command, from the CDS down to the unit commander. TFCs cannot assume full command of units or components over which they exercise authority; rather, they are delegated OPCOM of those assets. Within the TF, subordinate commanders continue to exercise command in accordance with regulations and Environmental doctrine.
 - b. **Operational Command (OPCOM).** The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate OPCON and/or tactical control (TACON) as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. OPCOM may also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander. In the CF, a commander assigned OPCOM may delegate that authority. While OPCOM allows the commander to assign separate employment to components of assigned units, it cannot be used to disrupt the basic organization of a unit to the extent that it cannot readily be given a new task or be redeployed. The commander will normally exercise OPCOM through commanders of subordinate components of a TF.
 - c. **Tactical Command (TACOM).** The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. It is narrower in scope than OPCOM but includes the authority to delegate or retain TACON.
3. **Control.** That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directions. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated. This term is defined specifically under operational, tactical, administrative and technical control.
 - a. **Operational Control (OPCON).** The authority delegated to a commander to direct assigned forces to accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign TACON of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. Units are placed under commanders' OPCON so that commanders may benefit from the immediate employment of these units in their support, without further reference to a senior authority and without the need to establish a forward agency.
 - b. **Tactical Control (TACON).** The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

- c. **Administrative Control.** The direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect of administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.
- d. **Technical Control.** The control applied to administrative or technical procedures and exercised by virtue of professional or technical jurisdiction. It parallels command channels but is restricted to control within certain specialized areas. Operational commanders may override this type of control if its application is seen to jeopardize the mission.

A002. UNITED NATIONS TERMINOLOGY

1. The following terminology is used in UN-led missions.

- a. **United Nations Operational Authority.** The authority transferred by the Member State to the United Nations to use the operational capabilities of their national military contingents, units and/or military personnel to undertake mandated missions or tasks. Operational authority over such persons is vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. United Nations "Operational Authority" involves the full authority to issue operational directives within the limits of:

- (1) a specific mandate of the Security Council;
- (2) an agreed period of time, with the stipulation that an earlier withdrawal of a contingent would require the contributing country to provide adequate prior notification; and
- (3) a specific geographical area (the mission area as a whole).

It does not include any responsibility for certain personnel matters of the individual members of military contingents, such as pay and allowances and promotions. These functions remain a national responsibility. In regards to disciplinary matters, while the discipline of military personnel remains the responsibility of the troop-contributing countries, the UN is responsible for the good conduct of all military personnel.

- b. **United Nations Operational Control (UN OPCON).** The authority granted to a military commander, in UN peace support operations, to direct forces assigned so that the commander can accomplish specific tasks or missions which are usually limited by function, time or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned and/or military personnel, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units/personnel. UN OPCON includes the authority to assign separate tasks to sub-units of a contingent, as required by operational necessity, within the mission area of responsibility, in consultation with the Contingent Commander and as approved by the United Nations Headquarters. It does not include responsibility for personnel administration.
- c. **United Nations Tactical Control (UN TACCON).** The detailed and local direction and control of movement or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. As required by operational necessity, the Force Commander may delegate UN TACCON to subordinate Sector or Unit Commanders.
- d. **United Nations Logistic Support (UN LOGSUPT).** The logistics support of the units and personnel place under the "Operational Authority" of the UN and UN OPCON of the Chief of the Military Component of a mission is a joint responsibility of the troop-contributing government and the UN. Logistics support includes supply, maintenance, transportation and medical support. These functions are mutually co-ordinated and performed by the UN and troop contributing government(s), which may vary from mission to mission, and are included in mission specific Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

- e. **Administrative Control (ADMCON).** The authority over subordinate or other organizations, within national contingents, in respect to administrative matters. Administrative Control is a national responsibility given to the national contingent commander in PSO.

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ANNEX B - JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS

B001. OBJECTIVES OF JOINT COMMISSIONS

1. Peace support operations require substantial interaction between military commanders and belligerent military or political leaders to resolve conflict or to secure co-operation. Many modern peace accords include the forum of a Joint Military Commission (JMC). The nature of the JMC will be dictated by the peace agreement and the conflict environment. It may be a directive mechanism or a negotiating one. It may serve as a forum through which the factions can co-ordinate their compliance with the treaty and through which instructions can be issued to the factions and disputes arbitrated. Its authority comes from the leaders of the parties to the dispute who signed the treaty establishing the body and empowering it to make decisions. A Joint Military Commission serves three main functions: translate political agreements into actions on the ground, act as a dispute resolution mechanism and assist in peace building.

- a. **Translate Political Agreements Into Actions On The Ground.** There will be gaps in the peace settlement document (for example, treaty) that are not sufficiently covered-- often deliberately in order to gain agreement-- that the political and military mission will have to resolve with the parties in order to implement the treaty. This is a double-edged sword: it may allow the gaps to be filled in at the next level of decision-making when the momentum and other aspects of closing the deal on the treaty so dictate. On the other hand, it means that the negotiation that must take place at the commission level needs to have the political and military mission members well conversant with the context of the compromise forged at the peace treaty level. In other cases, there will be questions of interpretations that the treaty does not answer, which the commission must answer for implementation. Other aspects of translating agreement into action that will arise are problems in implementation due to resources, events not predicted, and terrain considerations. These will need to be solved at the commission level.
- b. **Act As A Dispute Resolution Mechanism.** Joint commissions are a way for the parties to resolve disputes that come up over the course of time. Joint military commissions should not be used for purely civil matters, and any decision to use that forum for non-military issues needs to be carefully coordinated with political authorities at the highest level. Lack of alternate institutions might require non-military issues to be raised through the joint military commission channels, but they should be properly referred to G-5 and joint civil commission channels for action. Concerns can be raised in the commissions and may well cut across the strictly military aspects of the agreement such as:
 - (1) Facilitating delivery of humanitarian assistance;
 - (2) Movement of displaced persons;
 - (3) Violations by civilians in the zone of separation;
 - (4) Human rights allegations (someone tries to detain a person as a human rights offender).
- c. **Assist in Peace Building.** Peace building includes efforts to identify and support structures that will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. The JMC instruction may include disarming, restoration of order, custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

B002. KEY CONCEPTS

1. **Commissions System.** The commission system needs to be included in the treaty as it frequently serves as the basis of authority for implementing the military aspects of the agreement. It is important that the political and military leadership of the mission are privy to the processes of the peace treaty negotiations

so they understand the context in which agreement was reached on the provisions. Separate commissions may need to be established at each echelon of command in the mission area.

2. **Coordination is Critical.** Consistency of coordination, procedures and approaches within all levels of commissions is a major task. Equally important is the political-military-humanitarian coordination that needs to take place horizontally at each level and from top to bottom.

3. **Lowest Level Resolution.** All who have worked with joint commissions stress the importance of trying to resolve as much as possible at the lowest level.

4. **Anticipation.** Anticipate that you will need to provide everything to get the system working.

- a. You insure that logistics cannot be used as an excuse by a party not to attend a meeting.
- b. You need to determine where parties may need assistance in executing agreements reached, for example, can they communicate in a timely fashion with their subordinate units?
- c. Traffic flow, security and provisions for the media are examples of the details that need to be rehearsed.
- d. Office space for each party at the commission meeting is useful, as it allows for their own consultations, private meetings with mission leaders, follow up efforts, and waiting areas before the start of the meeting.

5. **Role.** Your role in the commission: convener/ third party / negotiator.

- a. The most effective joint commissions are ones where the agreement establishing the commission places the mission as a participant vice observer and the chair of the commission.
- b. Each operation is unique and what role you play will vary. In some instances you are not negotiating with the other parties because what is required to be done is clear and specific. Even in those instances, you may combine aspects of the various roles described below to achieve your objectives.

6. **Preparation.** Preparation for each meeting cannot be overemphasized.

- a. Rehearsals are mandatory to ensure all details have been considered and addressed.
- b. The level of formality may vary depending on the level of the joint commission meeting.
- c. Informal meetings and other meetings away from the table of the formal meeting are as important as the formal meetings.

7. **Cultural Context.** Understanding how the parties solve problems is important so that your suggestions are appropriate. Understand how each side validates the decisions it makes. It may take time to ratify and to agreements in their communities. If needed, the provision of assets, as well as the time, will help ensure that agreements will be implemented.

8. **Dynamic Process.** The process is dynamic and flexibility of approach must be maintained.

- a. Patience is required.
- b. Understanding the other parties' fears, needs and expectations is critical; understanding does not mean agreement.
- c. For success in this role it is critical to be seen as impartial, credible and trustworthy.
- d. Over time a series of negotiated agreements can provide the framework for the resolution of the conflict.

- e. A relationship with individuals is what implements those agreements. For that to happen there must be trust as you are asking them to do things that they would not ordinarily do.
9. **Innovative Proposals.** Develop the capacity to make innovative proposals.
- a. At different times you will need to develop the capacity to make innovative proposals. You want the parties to do this so your role may be more in helping them to see how they can do this.
 - b. This ability will be achieved through discussions in private channels, off the record, away from the table of formal meetings.
 - c. Move carefully here so that you are sure before you put forward a proposal as it will have legitimacy and it affects the other parties' perceptions of you.
 - d. The goal is to have concrete action agreed to by all parties with a deadline. Offering directives or deciding for the parties is not what you are seeking to accomplish.
 - e. An impasse may develop where issues must be referred up the structure, over to the political side, and the mission may need to contact other influential actors to assist in resolving the stalemate. The people presented to you as the leaders may not in fact be the key community leaders; they may simply be the ones with weapons.
10. **Graduated Responses to Non-Compliance.**
- a. Graduated responses to non-compliance need to have been thought through beforehand, developed and agreed upon at the senior political-military level.
 - b. These responses must be applied in a consistent way across all contingents in the task force/mission and coordinated with all.
 - c. Examples of graduated responses include
 - (1) Obtain name, rank, position of refusing authority; relay to higher headquarters.
 - (2) Elevate negotiation to next level.
 - (3) Call in mediator.
 - (4) Shows of force with helicopters and/or demonstrations of combat capability, for example, arriving at informal meetings with tank platoons as escorts.
 - d. The use of force should be at the end of a long list of other actions. Its use needs to be coordinated with the top political and military leaders in the mission.
 - e. Your actions should not be a surprise to the other party.
 - (1) Inform them ahead of time through the commission system.
 - (2) Do not say things you do not mean or do not have the authority to execute without approval.
 - (3) Once you decide that you must use force, resolve is key. Immediately afterwards use the commission system to deal with the situation.
11. **Media Aspects.** The JMC operations and decisions require appropriate media coverage. This coverage should support the legitimacy and the authority of the JMC. It should aim to reinforce the nature of JMC decisions, obligations of local groups and individuals to comply with these decisions and the consequences of non-compliance.

12. **Liaison Officers.** As soon as practicable after a peace agreement or accord is concluded, liaison and observer teams should be deployed to monitor and report on activity at critical locations. Liaison officers from the JMC, particularly if fluent in the local language and with experience in theatre, can greatly facilitate the implementation of the JMC tasks.

ANNEX C - NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION

C001. INTRODUCTION

1. Negotiations take place when two parties with opposing views meet to resolve their differences. When a third party assists by acting between the opposed parties in an effort to bring them together, it is referred to as mediation. In practice, most mediation takes the form of negotiations between a mediator and one of the parties at a time, trying to find common ground.
2. In the context of a PSO, negotiations will be conducted at many levels and between many parties, and issues will range from strategic level discussions in the UN Security Council to tactical level negotiations between UN officials, military commanders and local leaders. Negotiations may concern political, humanitarian and military activity.

C002. CHARACTERISTICS

1. In the inter-communal violence associated with a complex emergency, most negotiations will be between members of the international community and one of the parties at a time. These meetings often will concern relations between elements of the mission and one of the parties. Three broad types of negotiations may be taking place at every level, of which only one is actually between the parties:
 - a. Negotiations between elements of the international community on external or internal theatre related problems;
 - b. Negotiations between elements of the international community and one or more of the parties. For example, on the scope and nature of the international community's intervention or assistance in the crisis, or with an assisted government and other parties to a dispute concerning, which military contingents are acceptable, and at a lower level between NGO officials and the local authorities on the implementation of a program; and
 - c. Negotiations between the parties, assisted by members of the international community; these also take place at every level and may be conducted through mechanisms mandated in the peace agreement.

C003. NEGOTIATING ISSUES

1. **General Points.** Within each type of negotiation in the context of PSO, there are three broad areas that may be the subject of negotiations.
 - a. **Political Issues.** In a crisis that results from a conflict between two or more parties, the immediate priority may be to provide humanitarian assistance or achieve a ceasefire, but the most important negotiations will be aimed at achieving an overall political agreement between the parties. Successful political negotiations provide the framework and direction within which humanitarian and military activities take place. Once agreement has been reached to take action, the countries or organizations involved have to negotiate with the host government and other parties to agree to the terms of deployment and create a viable situation on the ground, for example by reaching a political accord that could lead to a ceasefire.
 - b. **Humanitarian Issues.** Representatives of humanitarian agencies may need to negotiate with a host government, or with local military or police units for access to assess humanitarian needs. Once the humanitarian agency has the supplies, it may have to negotiate with the parties on a case-by-case basis for access to supply relief to the target population. No matter what agreement may have been reached beforehand, actual distribution can take a great deal of negotiation as convoys can be halted locally on the whim of a local militia commander.
 - c. **Military Issues.** Military representatives may be involved in negotiating ceasefires that can take three stages: first getting the parties to reach an internal political agreement that they want a

ceasefire, then achieving a military agreement on how to conduct the ceasefire, and finally negotiating a workable implementation of the agreement on the ground. Having deployed, military units will negotiate with the parties for freedom of movement to monitor and enforce political or military agreements, such as ceasefires or demilitarization. Agreements made at a higher level may need to be renegotiated on a case-by-case basis, for instance: to establish observation posts; to cross confrontation lines in order to hold meetings or re-supply units; or to monitor troop deployments once a separation of forces from a confrontation line has been agreed, following a ceasefire or demilitarization of a zone. Military units deployed to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance will have to negotiate on a case-by-case basis for freedom of movement to escort convoys.

2. **Negotiating Teams.** Although commanders will want to be fully involved in all negotiations that are central to the success of their mission, there may be scope for establishing a negotiating team to deal with routine matters and allow the commander to step in, either to add weight when negotiations are in danger of failing, or to finalize agreements. Because negotiating can be very time consuming and operational areas are spread out, dedicated negotiating teams should cover specific areas; negotiators who are divided between several different locations while dealing with different problems may be less successful. Negotiating teams may include several people with different expertise, but large delegations should be avoided, and other experts are best to join a lead negotiator as necessary.

3. **Coordinated Objectives.** Political, humanitarian and military negotiators from different organizations or elements of a UN mission may talk to the same leaders of the parties. If they are going to have any success in their negotiations, individually or collectively, they need to be coordinated. This can be achieved by providing clear direction from the highest level on what objectives should be sought from negotiations and where it is possible to compromise. In addition, there needs to be regular liaison between the agencies and individuals engaged in negotiations at each level so that they are aware of progress or problems.

C004. NEGOTIATION STANDPOINTS

1. There are no fixed principles for negotiation. A few of essential features are outlined below.
 - a. **Impartiality.** If parties believe a negotiator is no longer impartial, their trust, cooperation and openhearted relationship will be lost and negotiations probably will be unsuccessful.
 - b. **Long-Term View.** Negotiators should recognize that it takes time to change from opposing positions to common ground and to establish a culture of negotiations in which the parties become used to meeting and solving small problems together in preparation for handling crises and tackling larger problems. A short-term negotiating success, won by conceding an apparently small point, may be damaging and set a long-term precedent; for example, paying tolls to get emergency aid through a hostile checkpoint may solve an immediate crisis, but also could set a precedent that results in all convoys having to pay increasingly extortionate tolls in future.
 - c. **Flexibility.** Flexible and lateral approaches are vital for the identification of common ground between the parties, development of incentives and disincentives, and finding ways to overcome the many barriers in conducting successful negotiations.
 - d. **Cultural Awareness.** Negotiations are often conducted in unfamiliar languages between parties that follow idiosyncratic customs for greeting and meeting, and hold values that are peculiar to their culture. When negotiators themselves also have different cultural backgrounds, the possibilities for misunderstanding are great. It is above all the responsibility of the negotiators to understand the culture of the people they are talking to, so that they can better craft the message they are trying to deliver.

C005. TASKS

1. Negotiating objectives should be set at the highest level and implemented by everyone involved. The following negotiating tasks may be carried out at all levels:

- a. **Mediation.** Negotiators identify common ground on which the parties can discuss and agree.
- b. **Facilitation.** Negotiators provide practical assistance to their opposite numbers in the parties, for example, by passing messages, providing a hot line, or securing venues for meetings.
- c. **Communication.** Because negotiations can be affected directly by outside events, negotiators should stay in touch while negotiating and also pass on the results swiftly. If related military activity occurs while the negotiations are in progress or an agreement on a ceasefire is successful, it has to be communicated as rapidly as possible to all forces on the confrontation line.
- d. **Education.** Negotiators may have to teach parties how to negotiate and to make genuine concessions. The parties may be unable to see that there are alternatives open to them. Negotiators also will have to ensure that the parties understand the meaning of agreements that they reach, and the resulting obligations of the international community and the parties in implementing the agreements.
- e. **Information Policy Development.** Manipulation of information can have a serious impact on negotiations. This may be countered by actively seeking international support for negotiations and by presenting the facts as seen by negotiators to diplomatic contacts who will report to their capitals, and the local and international media. The local media may be influenced by the parties and need to hear the negotiators' points of view. The international media will influence both international decision-makers and those elements of the local population who have access to it.
- f. **Identify Incentives and Disincentives.** Mediation and negotiation should be supported by a comprehensive range of incentives and disincentives, so that the parties can be encouraged to take positive steps and dissuaded from taking action that will be detrimental to the peace effort. These incentives and disincentives will vary according to circumstances. Identification of effective incentives and disincentives is vital in the preparatory stage of the negotiating strategy.

C006. LOCATION

1. The parties usually dictate the venue for negotiations, particularly if negotiators have taken the initiative to go to the parties. In face-to-face negotiations, the selection of a venue may be very difficult, with each party perceiving advantages and disadvantages in each proposal and refusing to agree. The following factors should be considered when selecting a venue:

- a. **Security.** The venue should be physically secure, with protection provided by the host authorities or the UN if it is on UN controlled territory.
- b. **Accessibility.** Time should not be wasted getting to remote venues unless this promotes either secrecy or a positive approach to the negotiations.
- c. **Communications.** As already mentioned, communications are vital. If necessary, the negotiating team should provide communications facilities that also can be used by the parties to liaise with their authorities.
- d. **Comfort.** During protracted negotiations, a basic level of comfort may be useful to facilitate a successful outcome. There should be rooms for each delegation, large and small meeting rooms, facilities for providing food and drinks, and overnight accommodations if required.

C007. OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES

1. Military commanders will need to be aware of the complications created by certain features of a negotiation and will need to address and scrutinize the following issues before and during the process of any negotiations that occur.

- a. The identification of decision makers at the negotiations.
- b. The use and exploitation of the media during and after the negotiations.
- c. The security of decision makers.
- d. The use of two track negotiations.
- e. Communications and mobility.
- f. Maintaining secrecy and confidentiality.
- g. The political recognition of parties to the negotiation.
- h. The use of joint commissions.
- i. The use of interpreters and translators.

C008. NEGOTIATIONS AND MEDIATION - PHASES

1. Negotiations and mediations in all forums are conducted in three phases.

- a. Phase 1 – preparation for negotiation/mediation.
- b. Phase 2 – Conduct of the negotiation/mediation.
- c. Phase 3 – Follow-up of the negotiation/mediation.

2. Greater detail on negotiation and mediation is available in Chapter 19 of the Peace Support Training Centre's manual Peace Support Operations Field Book.

C009. SUMMARY

1. Negotiations are not always successful. Agreements of all parties may or may not occur. The mediator should remember to remain neutral and avoid being used by either party. He should expect some of the adversaries to negotiate in bad faith. They may attempt to twist the issues to prolong negotiations while they continue to violate peace agreements. Negotiations and mediation are time consuming and often frustrating; however, they prevent unnecessary loss of life and offer the best long-term prospects for a final peaceful settlement. It is vital to remain impartial and courteous at all times.

CHAPTER 8
LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS
SECTION I - GENERAL

801. INTRODUCTION

1. Canada normally participates in PSOs within some form of multinational framework, whether it is an intergovernmental organization such as the UN, an alliance like NATO, or a coalition such as the Australian-led INTERFET force in East Timor. As a result, the planning of logistics support for a PSO is constrained by the framework in which our forces will operate and these conditions must be assessed and dealt with during all phases of an operation. These are outlined and discussed in this chapter.
2. Detailed logistics policy and procedures pertaining to international contingency operations of all types are contained in *DCDS 02/00 DCDS Direction for International Operations, Chapter 13*.

802. LOGISTICS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS - GENERAL

1. **Multinational Framework.** Understanding the nature of the multinational framework for a specific PSO is critical to the logistics planning effort. The division of responsibilities between participating nations and the lead organization for planning, co-ordinating, funding, and providing logistics support varies significantly depending on whether it is the UN, NATO, or a coalition lead nation in charge of the PSO. While Canada is ultimately responsible for providing or arranging logistics support for its forces engaged in PSOs, logistics planning from the start of the planning process must be co-ordinated with the lead organization or nation. The logistics capabilities of the lead organization or nation can vary enormously, and this can affect national logistics plans. A brief comparison of the three frameworks is summarised in Annex A of Chapter 6.
2. There are well-established doctrines and procedures for the planning and conduct of logistics support to PSOs conducted by the UN or NATO. In both, logistics comprise the full range of supply, finance, transport, maintenance, movements, civil engineering and medical functions. In the case of the UN, both CIS support and theatre-level airlift are also considered as logistics functions. To ensure that Canadian logistics planning is synchronized with the lead organization or nation, CF logistics planners must participate in the logistics planning of these organizations at key entry points and must remain knowledgeable of evolving logistics plans. In ad hoc coalitions where there is no existing institutional basis upon which to build a logistics support plan following the direction of a capable lead nation is even more important. In order to integrate logistics planning efforts, CF logistics planners must become familiar with the systems of the other nations serving on a mission. In this regard, Canada has established national mutual support logistics MOUs to facilitate bilateral support with several countries and is actively negotiating others. These MOUs were utilised to obtain support in both Bosnia (SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR) from the UK, and in East Timor from both Australia and New Zealand (INTERFET). They are key tools in logistics planning for PSOs.
3. **Force Projection.** For Canada, PSOs involve force projection as forward support bases are no longer maintained and forces are not forward-based outside of the country. Deployment, employment and re-deployment are supported from the Canadian national sustainment base. The support/sustainment base may not necessarily be the mounting base. Force projection calls for strategic lift, deployable command and control, communications, and a logistics sustainment capability. Logistics planning for PSOs must, therefore, consider the realities associated with the necessities of deploying and re-deploying the force and sustaining it in distant, austere theatres during operation. The establishment of the CF Joint Support Group (CF JSG) as part of the CF Joint Operations Group (CF JOG) should enhance the deployable logistics capability in Canada.
4. **Multinational Force Composition.** The general composition of the military component of the peacekeeping force (PKF) and its logistic support capabilities are important factors in logistic planning. Within the mission area many non-military elements such as UN civil police, de-mining programme

organizations, UN agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may also require support or otherwise have an impact upon logistics operations.

5. **Scenario-specific Logistics Planning.** The operational scenario, including terrain, climate, mission, tasks, size and location of the theatre of operations, existence of a functioning host nation, availability and capacity of ports of debarkation, transportation and other economic infrastructure, accommodation, and the state of the local economy, are all factors that must be taken into consideration during the development of the logistics support plan. Logistics planners must be proactive in seeking out the required information from the lead organization's logistics planning staffs.

6. **CF Task Force Structure.** The structure of CF task forces selected for PSOs is tailored for the specific operation and is composed of units and sub-units drawn from various force generators. Logistics planners must be directly involved from the start in the force structuring efforts at the national, Environment Chief of Staff (ECS), and formation/unit level. Logistics input to the operational planning process at the NDHQ JSAT is essential. The integral unit level Combat Service Support (CSS) elements are normally augmented, and the CF contingent's National Support Element (NSE) is structured to meet the specific needs of the mission and the contingent to be supported. The NSE is a hybrid structure, providing a mix of formation level and operational level logistics support to the contingent. The planning work often involves determining the logistics structure, spare parts scales, maintenance plans, theatre level stocks and all other facets of logistics sustainment services.

7. **Theatre Activation.** Theatre activation arrangements are critical activities undertaken during the planning, deployment and early employment phase of new PSOs that establish the wide array of support arrangements required to establish a national contingent. The bulk of the theatre activation is logistical in nature, and the efficiency of logistics planners critical during theatre activation. Theatre activation arrangements are planned and conducted at both the strategic level at NDHQ and at the operational level in-theatre in co-operation with the lead organization or nation and the host nation. One of the characteristics of PSOs is that national contingents are allocated specific, fixed areas of responsibility in which the contingent conducts operations for lengthy periods. Locations for support camps are assigned in co-operation with the lead organization or nation, often in consultation with the host nation. It is normal practice to avoid taking up serviceable local accommodation so as not to deny scarce facilities to the local population. As a result, considerable effort goes into bedding-down contingents in newly built camps. Bedding-down increasingly involves a significant surge effort by CF engineers and logisticians to deliver the necessary accommodation, clear routes, arrange connection to utilities and establish camp support services of all types.

8. **Multinational Logistics.** Throughout the past several years, much discussion of multinational logistics co-operation in support of PSOs has taken place, and modest initial efforts to establish a more integrated multinational logistics footprint have begun. Canada has taken part in some contingent-level logistics integration of some logistics functions with other nations in Bosnia (SFOR) and Eritrea (UNMEE). NATO is promoting similar efforts in Kosovo (KFOR). The trend is clearly towards greater multinational logistics co-operation during future PSOs.

9. **Contractor Support.** Contractor support is now typical in PSOs and will likely increase over time. Canadian Contractor Augmentation Capability (CanCAP) was the CF's initial foray into theatre contractor support. The use of contractors is constrained by the security risk in theatre. Once security is well established contractors can replace combat service support elements permitting the PKF to transition to lower manning levels. In exceptional circumstances, if a capability is unavailable in the CF, a contractor may be deployed at the start of a mission but only if the security situation permits. The use of contractor support must be considered in the planning phase of a mission.

SECTION II - UN LOGISTICS

803. INTRODUCTION

1. Canada continues to be an active participant in UN peace support operations. Familiarity with UN logistics procedures will remain critical to Canada's successful participation in these missions.
2. The UN is responsible for logistics support of its field missions. Missions are funded from the UN Peacekeeping Operation budget, which is raised by annual assessments levied on all Member States by the UN General Assembly. Each mission is assigned a specific budget voted upon by the General Assembly. Prohibited from establishing its own forces, the UN requests Member States to contribute troop contingents, staff officers, military observers and UN Civilian Police (UN CIVPOL) to specific field missions. The UN pays troop contributors a standard monthly reimbursement fee for the employment of national troop contingents and individual personnel. It also pays leasing fees to nations on a monthly basis for national major equipment deployed, and may reimburse contributors who elect to provide some elements of logistical self-sustainment to their own contingents.

804. UN FIELD MISSION LOGISTICS SUPPORT SYSTEM

1. The UN develops a field mission logistics support system from scratch in each new mission area. The logistics support system is organized by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) assisted by other departments. Logistics planning is co-ordinated with operations planning within DPKO in a systematic mission planning process documented in *The UN Survey Mission Handbook*. A series of surveys, the UN term for reconnaissance, are conducted to the mission area to determine operational and logistics requirements, which are used as a basis to form an initial financial and administrative estimate. The estimate is used to initiate the budget planning process for the mission. The information from the surveys is also used to develop operational and logistics support concepts. Once in-theatre, an ad-hoc UN field mission headquarters is established in the mission area. A field mission logistics support structure is established, which is composed of a mixture of capabilities provided by national military logistics units, UN International Civil Servants, UN Field Service support personnel, Host Nation Support (HNS), and contracted goods and services. As it may take several weeks or even months for the UN field logistics system to be fully established, troop contingents are expected to arrive in the mission area self-sufficient for many categories of logistics sustainment for a specified period, usually 60 to 90 days. The UN provides guidance pertaining to the requirements for initial self-sufficiency.
2. The UN is likely to acquire local infrastructure, vehicles and equipment for use by some less well-resourced troop contingents, staff officers, military observers and civilian police. In general terms, the intent of the logistics system created for each mission is to provide adequate support to the PKF at a reasonable cost. However, it is not structured to sustain high intensity combat operations due to a number of reasons. First, the UN does not have the appropriate military staffs in DPKO to provide the necessary strategic level campaign planning to direct large combat operations or strategic sustainment. Secondly, the UN has almost no permanent logistics infrastructure to sustain high intensity operations on a systematic basis; it lacks sufficient operational stocks, and it has no CSS forces, with the exception of occasional use of some national CSS troops. CF logistics planners must ensure that national logistics plans compensate for these characteristics of the UN system.
3. **Field Mission Headquarters.** The UN field mission headquarters is delegated considerable authority from the UN Secretariat to manage the logistics support of the mission, including significant local procurement authority. Logistics staff responsibilities in a typical UN field mission headquarters are split between the civilian and military staff. The civilian Chief Administration Officer (CAO), who is delegated financial authority within a tightly centralized UN financial management system, oversees the budget, financial operations, local procurement and property control. On the military side, the Chief Logistics Officer (CLO) is responsible for military logistics staff functions and oversees any force level military logistics units serving with the mission. In recent years, some UN missions have implemented an Integrated Support Services concept. A Chief of Integrated Support Services, who is jointly responsible with the Chief of Staff

for the operation of the mission logistics system, closely co-ordinates the activities of the civilian and military logistics staffs. Canada will normally be offered a proportionate number of the mission HQ logistics staff positions when a CF troop contingent is deployed.

4. **Contingent NSEs.** CF contingents are integrated into the overall UN logistics support system for their particular mission. The contingent National Support Element (NSE) remains under national command and co-operates with the field mission headquarters to co-ordinate the provision of logistics sustainment support to the CF contingent. Support will be provided by a variety of sources as previously described. General logistics procedures are outlined in the *UN Operational Support Manual*, while mission-specific procedures are documented in the mission *Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)*. For all new UN missions, a mission specific Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) MOU will be negotiated between NDHQ and UN NY.

5. **Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) System.** In July 1996, the UN introduced a new system for reimbursing nations for the provision of troops and major equipment to UN missions. Commonly referred to as the COE system, it is a proven, multi-faceted arrangement involving the negotiation of a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between each troop contributor and the UN. The COE MOU includes annexes detailing the size and structure of the contingent; the major equipment and self-sustainment provided, performance standards, level of reimbursement (in US dollars), and other details of the national contribution. The MOU will confirm which of 15 logistics self-sustainment categories will be performed by the contingent for the duration of the mission. It is critical that the Canadian contingent commander and his logistics staff be provided with a copy of this MOU, ideally, the initial contingent commander would be represented during the negotiation of the COE MOU in order to be familiar with the details. The COE MOU system also calls for arrival verifications of major equipment and periodic inspections of maintenance and sustainment standards by the Force Commander's logistics staff in order to validate the UN reimbursements. The importance of the COE MOU cannot be overstated as this document provides a clear record of logistics responsibilities between the UN and Canada, and serves as the basis for UN reimbursements.

6. A UN publication entitled *Policies and Procedures Concerning Reimbursement and Control of Contingent Owned Equipment of Troop Contributing Countries Participating in Peacekeeping Missions* provides a detailed overview of the COE system, including rates, standards, and various other details. From a Canadian perspective, the Canadian Ambassador to the UN will normally be instructed by DFAIT to sign the COE MOU on behalf of Canada, along with a senior representative from the UN Secretariat.

7. Of particular interest to Canada in conducting COE MOU negotiations with the UN is the troop ceiling for each mission imposed by the UN Security Council. Established in an effort to balance operational requirements against a maximum desirable funding envelope, the troop ceiling will generally dictate the number of troops and equipment that troop contributors can provide to a mission. Notwithstanding an imposed troop ceiling, Canada on occasion will choose to provide additional troops and equipment beyond the numbers agreed to in the COE MOU. It is critical that CF planners appreciate that any additional troops and equipment will not be entitled to reimbursement or other support of any kind from the UN and that troops beyond the UN-imposed cap may not necessarily be accorded UN status. This has significant ramifications if not clearly understood prior to mission commencement. The COE MOU can be modified to document that additional troops (above those authorized in the UN troop ceiling) are accorded UN legal status.

8. **UN Responsibilities.** Notwithstanding arrangements agreed to in the COE MOU, the UN will be responsible for providing POL, water and fresh rations, and other common supplies and services to contingents in every mission. Traditionally, the UN provides a fleet of vehicles to be used by UN staffs, including UNMOs, UNCIVPOL, and UN military officers assigned to the mission HQ. The strategic transportation of troops and equipment to and from the mission area is a UN responsibility with the UN chartering the necessary sealift and airlift. In the case of the CF, national assets or CF-chartered lift will be employed and reimbursement sought from the UN. This procedure must be negotiated with the UN Secretariat in advance using a Letter of Assist (LOA). The UN will pay for troop contingent rotations up to twice per year and once per year for individuals not assigned to a contingent (such as UNMOs and staff officers). Reimbursement rates for CF-chartered strategic lift must be comparable with charter rates available to the UN on the open market. The J4 Logistics staff is responsible for negotiating the detailed

strategic transportation arrangements through PRMNY with DPKO. Inland transportation of troops and equipment is also subject to reimbursement and is negotiated as part of the COE MOU.

9. **Letter of Assist (LOA).** As referred to above, the UN may employ a LOA in some situations. It is a contractual form letter used by the UN to procure materiel and services from troop contributing nations and other member states. The LOA must be negotiated prior to the provision of the required materiel or services. They may be originated at the field mission HQ or at UN NY. National supplies and services provided to the UN by a national contingent or distributed from the nation without prior UN approval will not be accepted for reimbursement by the UN. As a result, it is critical that the contingent or NDHQ, as appropriate, ensures that the UN initiates a LOA whenever such support is requested. It is also prudent to confirm that the UN has actually obligated funds to pay for the requested supplies or services once delivered; otherwise the reimbursement could be delayed for an extended period.

805. UN FINANCIAL

1. Article 17 of the UN Charter stipulates that the expenses of the Organization (read UN) shall be borne by the members as apportioned by the General Assembly. The assessed share, that is, each member state's individual contribution, is determined through a complex funding formula based upon the capacity to pay. This funding concept applies to the Regular budget that covers items such as staff salaries at various UN international locations. In addition, a slight variation of the assessed share system is used to determine the peacekeeping assessment. The UN creates a separate budget for each individual peacekeeping mission. DFAIT pays the contributions due to both budgets on behalf of the Government of Canada. Included within the DND funding envelope is a modest amount for incremental international peacekeeping costs; it is anticipated that DND will absorb all associated peacekeeping costs to this level. If the cost to DND of peacekeeping activities exceeds this level additional funding may be sought from Treasury Board.

2. The UN is responsible for costs associated with preparatory work, deployment and redeployment, rotation, facilities, feeding, fuel, plus provision of equipment, supplies and services. It is also responsible for compassionate travel and for death, disability, medical treatment and medical evacuation claims. The UN may request the assistance of a troop-contributing country to provide some of this support through the UN COE. The UN reimburses claims presented for vehicle preparation (winterization, painting and repainting) and use of operational ammunition. Unlike a NATO or coalition PSO in which the nation could be responsible for most if not all expenses, costs for Canadian participation in UN peace support operations are reduced through cost avoidance or cost recovery. Cost avoidance occurs when it is unnecessary to expend Canadian funds, for instance, when the UN pays for the fuel and rations. Cost recovery is the process whereby claims are submitted to recover expenses incurred as negotiated and described in a MOU or LOA. Both methodologies reduce the net cost to Canada.

3. Revenue is received from the UN for troop costs, death and disability, LOAs, COE and miscellaneous claims. Troop costs are paid based upon an established formula for the personnel provided. An additional amount is paid as a specialist allowance and to compensate for the use of uniforms and personal weapons. As the DND is already funded for salaries, all amounts received for troop costs are returned to the Receiver General. Likewise, as death and disability claims are primarily for pensions, most revenue received in their settlement is also deposited with the Receiver General. Other revenue received is credited to the DND if it is to reimburse for specific out-of-pocket expenses incurred such as strategic airlift, medical evacuation, consumables, spare parts and the like.

806. UN PERSONNEL ISSUES

1. **National Considerations.** The planning of personnel support to PSO begins in conjunction with the operational planning. Once the CONOPs and requirements are determined, the personnel support plan is developed. It ensures the provision and maintenance of effective manpower in the area of operations. The type, intensity and tempo of operations combined with environmental conditions will have effects on the individuals and groups involved. This must be anticipated and mitigated to ensure their continued effectiveness. Provision of services and morale activities, such as R&R, are scheduled and scaled based on

the OPLAN and situation. Personnel support will always be required to enhance operational effectiveness but balanced against key operational factors.

2. **UN Missions.** In most missions there will be a Chief Military Personnel Officer (CMPO) and staff with whom the Contingent G1 will liaise. The CMPO organization will be responsible for all personnel issues, strength returns, casualty issues, travel, medal presentations and ceremonies, Force Welfare and Boards of Inquiry. The UN is responsible for making all travel arrangements. For a formed Contingent, this is normally negotiated through an LOA. However, for UN Military Observers (UNMOs) or Force Headquarters Staff Officers who are usually deployed for a period of one year and who rotate individually, the UN will either make the arrangements or will request the troop contributing country to do so and to seek reimbursement for same.

3. For all military members included under the UN funding umbrella of a particular peacekeeping mission, the UN is responsible for providing rations and quarters. In the case of Contingent members, this is normally provided by the troop-contributing nation and reimbursed by the UN through the COE system. UN Military Observers (UNMOs) are generally deployed on an individual basis and the UN pays them a Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA). The MSA, which includes a portion for accommodation, meals and incidentals, is determined for each individual mission and may differ within the mission area to account for differing cost of living: urban versus rural. If the UN is not in a position to provide R&Q for Force HQ staff officers, usually only in the initial period of a deployment, it may pay MSA to staff officers. If it provides accommodation it may only pay the meal and incidental portion.

4. Those Contingent members under the UN funding umbrella will receive the UN daily allowance. Also, for each full six-month period served, such members will receive the UN recreational leave allowance. Troop strength reports submitted through the G1 are used to compile figures for the UN per diem. A separate submission is necessary to claim the UN recreational leave allowance. The funds in payment of these UN benefits are issued to the Comptroller via cheque or bank transfer for onward credit to the pay of the applicable Contingent members. A member in receipt of MSA is not eligible for either the UN per diem or UN recreational leave allowance.

5. The welfare of personnel in theatre is of primary concern for all PSO. The UN provides some welfare facilities and amenities; however, the majority are provided by Canada whether or not reimbursement is obtained under the welfare category of the self-sustainment Annex of the COE MOU. Welfare would include Home Leave Travel Allowance (HLTA), phone calls, gym and sports equipment, reading materials, TV/VCR/DVD/stereo equipment and excursions within the mission area.

SECTION III - NATO LOGISTICS

807. INTRODUCTION

1. During the Cold War, NATO logistics were based on the policy that NATO Nations were responsible for the provision of their own logistics support. In 1991, NATO adopted a new Alliance Strategic Concept establishing a broader approach to security, including decisions made a year later to support PSOs under the political authority of either the UN or the OSCE. In response to NATO's enhanced mission spectrum, and in an effort to optimize effectiveness of reduced national logistics support forces, NATO logistic and support concepts have since evolved significantly. Some of the most important differences, which can be expected to have an impact on national plans for logistics support of future NATO PSOs are:

- a. The requirement for additional logistics and communications support needed to deploy and conduct PSOs that are geographically distant from NATO's area of responsibility which contains its extensive permanent Alliance logistics support infrastructure;
- b. The need to integrate, when necessary, non-NATO forces into the PSO force structure; and
- c. The need to maximize efficiency and cost effectiveness by implementing, when appropriate, logistics co-operation measures with other participating nations.

2. In light of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept (MC400/1), CJTF doctrine (MC 389), NATO Force Structures (MC317), and a NATO military concept for PSOs (MC 327/1), the fundamentals of NATO logistics were reviewed. Following this review a revised NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics (MC319/1) was developed. In essence, this review emphasised that nations and NATO authorities henceforth have a collective responsibility for logistic support of NATO's multinational operations. Long-standing defence plans for NATO territory were in existence and robust national logistic force structures, extensively supported through HNS arrangements, and common-funded infrastructure, were developed and continuously refined. Nations were allocated specific theatre Lines of Communications (LOCs) and logistics support areas. This left NATO with little responsibility for logistic support, except for relatively minor co-ordination responsibilities and management of some common-funded infrastructure and support agencies. With the risk now omnidirectional and logistic responsibility shared, NATO was required to develop a logistic support concept and appropriate organizations to facilitate execution of these new shared responsibilities and tasks.

808. NATO LOGISTICS DOCTRINE

1. The successful planning, execution and support of NATO military operations requires a clearly understood doctrine, and this is especially important when operations are to be conducted by Allied, multinational or coalition forces. Allied Joint Publication-01 (AJP-01) provides the 'capstone' doctrine for the planning, execution and support of Allied Joint Operations. Although AJP-01 is intended primarily for NATO forces, the doctrine could be applied, with adaptations where necessary and agreed to by participating nations, for operations under the umbrella of the European Union (EU), or a coalition of NATO and non-NATO nations within the framework of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). No distinctions are drawn within the document between solely NATO operations and non-Article 5 PSOs conducted by Allied forces and CJTF operations.

2. *Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine (AJP-04(A))*, one of the most significant accomplishments in the evolution of NATO logistics, contains the approved NATO Logistics Doctrine emphasising multinational support, particularly for operations such as PSOs. IFOR and SFOR created a groundswell within the NATO policy and logistics communities to develop joint and combined logistic doctrine for NATO, expanding beyond simply national self-support policies. With all nations having downsized their Combat Service Support (CSS) forces, NATO had to accept some level of multinational logistics co-operation in order to support PSOs.

3. The most significant aspects of AJP-04(A) doctrine for logistics planning for PSOs are:

- a. NATO authorities will have a lead role in co-ordination of multinational logistics but only in functional areas where it makes sense and creates efficiencies, that is, Movements & Transportation, Medical, Allied-Joint Support, Host Nation Support (HNS), Central Contracting and Infrastructure Engineering. Canada may be expected to deploy personnel with the appropriate expertise to staff these functional co-ordination cells in-theatre. Our national logistics plans will also have to take into consideration the need for such staff and for co-ordination with NATO authorities and other participating nations. Canada's interests will be looked after only if we are pro-active in this area;
 - b. The publication identifies alternate methods, known as "modes," for conducting logistics support of NATO operations, including Role Specialization (RS), Lead Nation (LN), national logistics, National Support Elements (NSEs), and Multinational Integrated Logistics Units (MILUs). Logistics support enablers such as HNS, Mutual Support Arrangements (MSAs), contracting, and Third Party Logistics Support Services (TPLSS) underpin these modes. Detailed doctrine and policy for these modes and enablers is being developed in a subsidiary publication known as *Modes of Multinational Logistics Support (AJP-4.9)*;
 - c. As part of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept (MC 389), a logistic command and control structure known as the Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC) and its associated doctrine has been developed, as outlined in *Multinational Joint Logistics Centre Doctrine (AJP-4.6)*. NATO nations have agreed to implement the MJLC concept and core MJLC structures are being established at NATO Regional Commands (RC) North and South, and at SACLANT. Nations will be tasked to provide augmentees to these MJLCs. National logistics plans for any future NATO PSO must take into consideration the co-ordination of logistics support activities with the MJLC. This could also involve making force contributions to MILUs, or national stand-alone contributions, which will operate under the MJLC. AJP-04(A) contains a matrix of logistics materiel and services suitable for provision through multinational co-operation. In fact, NATO nations are being asked to make future force goal commitments to MILUs, as part of the NATO Defence Planning Process; and
 - d. NATO may have to co-ordinate logistics activities with numerous other organizations operating in-theatre during future PSOs. These organizations could include the UN and its agencies, the EU, OSCE, NGOs and PfP countries. Logistics planners must be aware of this possible requirement and the consequent need for co-ordination between nations and NATO.
4. **Logistics Planning.** NATO logistics planning commences at NATO HQ with a decision from the North Atlantic Council (NAC), a permanent civilian political body of which Canada is a member, to participate in an operation. The NAC will then direct the NATO Military Committee (MC) to develop plans and options for that operation. The MC will then task the International Military Staff (IMS), and in particular the Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) to develop detailed plans. Within the CJPS are found the normal staff planning functions including a Logistics Planning Section. The CJPS will develop the broad planning guidelines and design the theatre framework for the operation. This 'high level' guidance will then be given to one of the Major NATO Commands (SACEUR or SACLANT) who may in turn assign one of its RCs the responsibility to develop the detailed planning, usually under the auspices of its integral Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) HQ. The Multi-National Logistics Centre (MJLC), which is embedded within the CJTF structure, will be responsible for developing and co-ordinating logistics support on behalf of the CJTF commander.
5. **Operational Level Logistics Planning.** The CJTF, in conjunction with the nations contributing forces, will develop the mission specific planning details for a given operation. These will incorporate NATO operational and administrative doctrine, the specific planning guidance from the CJPS, and additional details developed during the planning process. The CJTF will proceed through an operational planning process looking at the operational factors, such as threat, geography, climate, infrastructure, own forces and timings. If the situation allows, in-theatre recces will be conducted. During this planning, national officers within the NATO structure will involve the nations who will be contributing forces through co-ordination conferences, attendance on recces, or planning involvement. The resultant NATO OPLAN will provide nations with specific details such as operational areas, Concept of Support, theatre logistic plans and materiel stocking policies.

6. Logistics support to NATO operations is ultimately a national responsibility. This includes both provision and payment for the necessary support. NATO will normally only pay for support provided to actual NATO HQs and specific common-user infrastructure such as Main Supply Routes (MSRs) and Ports of Disembarkation (PODs). The CJTF will provide specific guidance on this regard. Notwithstanding this national responsibility, NATO has recognised that there is a collective responsibility as well as efficiencies that can be gained by the use of co-operative logistics arrangements. These could involve either military or civilian participation. Accordingly, where and when appropriate, NATO will initiate or incorporate co-operative logistic arrangements that Nations may utilise or 'buy into'. Examples of these include the IFOR Theatre Support Agreement, the IFOR Food Contract and the KFOR RSN fuel system. Specific theatre agreements will be developed, or existing NATO agreements (such as STANAGs) will be utilised for this purpose. Furthermore, within operational sectors, specific nations also may be requested to act as a 'Lead Nation' or 'Role Specialization Nation' responsible for co-ordinating logistic support within that sector.

7. In addition to any NATO theatre agreements, individual nations may also initiate special or activate pre-existing bi-lateral support agreements (MOUs). These will detail specific support agreements that are beneficial to each party and indicate the services to be provided, costs and dispute mechanisms. An IFOR example of this is the Nordic Countries (Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland) Support Group.

8. For future PSOs, NATO will activate one of the cadre CJTF/MJLCs and deploy it into theatre as the NATO operational HQ. Additionally, MILUs may be established to provide common support, materiel and/or logistics support and services. Functional co-ordination cells will be established within the MJLC as required. Nations will contribute augmentation staff as required. A NATO contracting cell will establish common procurement contracts for material and services that nations may choose to utilise. The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) may establish Third Party Logistics Support Service (TPLSS) arrangements. CF Logistics planners must be involved in NATO logistics planning from the start in order to be integrated into the overall NATO logistics planning effort.

809. NATO FINANCIAL

1. The NATO Alliance is supported by a system of common civil and military funding provided by members on a cost-sharing basis. NATO common funding is an essential element of the members' commitment to share roles, risks, responsibilities, costs and benefits. By combining their funds together, members enhance their ability to realise their essential national security objectives. As well, the pooling of funds increases the member's operational flexibility and responsiveness by not requiring every partner to have all defensive/offensive military systems required for self-preservation. They can concentrate on those aspects that are not covered by other partner nations or commonly procured NATO systems. Common funding is thus a concrete sign of a member's pledge to the Alliance.

2. NATO common-funded budgets have evolved over time in support of various programs. Funding for these budgets comes from cost shares that are negotiated and unanimously agreed to by all NATO nations. Cost shares were initially calculated based upon various cost sharing arrangements, GDP and ability to pay. The Civil Budget supports the activities, programs and operating costs of NATO Headquarters in Brussels, less the military component. Canada's contributions are paid by DFAIT. There are two other main budgets, the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) and the Military Budget (includes the NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) Operation and Support Budget, and the upgrade costs for the NAEW Modernization Program). Contributions to the Military Budget (Operations and Maintenance) and NSIP (Capital) are paid by DND.

3. For a PSO, common funding from Military Budget and NSIP is limited to minimum military requirements in support of the military aspects of the operation as follows:

- a. Costs eligible for common funding under the Military Budget include O&M costs of designated theatre HQ elements; and

- b. Costs eligible for common funding under the NSIP include repair or upgrade of critical strategic theatre infrastructure, strategic communications requirements as well as initial facilities and CIS equipment for the theatre HQ elements.

4. NATO has a guiding principle that has come into acceptance in recent years. This is the guideline that “costs lie where they fall”. Therefore, within a PSO, each troop-contributing nation (TCN) providing a force will thus be responsible to pay all costs associated with their participation, except for any expenses that fall under the NATO Common Funding umbrella. Basically, each TCN pays for deployment, sustainment (including communications, fuel, engineering, rations, quarters and logistics) and redeployment for troops, while some theatre HQ and limited other requirements are paid from NATO’s common funding.

810. NATO PERSONNEL

1. As with NATO financial arrangements, personnel issues are largely the responsibility of troop contributing countries. However, the mission headquarters would have a personnel section to provide policy direction on common personnel issues within the mission area. Otherwise, each troop contributing country would be responsible for all other personnel issues ranging from casualty evacuation to individual travel. CF Personnel posted to a NATO HQ will normally utilise the personnel procedures developed for that HQ.

SECTION IV - COALITION LOGISTICS

811. COALITION LOGISTICS

1. **Ad hoc Nature of Coalitions.** In ad hoc coalitions there is no pre-existing multinational institution or existing arrangements upon which to plan and conduct logistics support for a PSO. Coalitions are generally reliant upon a framework structure provided by a large and capable lead nation. A coalition HQ is normally created by adding multinational liaison officers or integrating staff to a designated lead nation military HQ. Lead nation logistics staffs, normally in consultation with the national HQs of coalition partners develop logistics plans when there is sufficient time available prior to deployment. If not, much of the logistics planning responsibility will be delegated to the lead nation deployable HQ and ad hoc planning will take place right in the theatre of operations. Logistics planning will take place concurrently at both the strategic and operational levels.

2. **National Responsibilities.** The participating nations are responsible for preparing and equipping their contingents with the necessary organic logistics capabilities. This includes the deployment of a National Support Element (NSE) to support unit or formation-level logistics capabilities. Each nation will establish a national logistics chain. If capable, the lead nation may decide to provide some categories of logistics support to coalition partners. This could include strategic lift assistance, support for common user materiel and services or even the provision of operational equipment such as vehicles, accommodations stores and weapons systems. In some missions, such as East Timor (INTERFET), non-participating nations may decide to contribute to a coalition trust fund instead of contributing troops.

3. As with NATO, it is ultimately a national responsibility to provide or arrange for the logistics support of a national contingent contributed to a coalition PSO. During the planning phase, attempts may need to be made to obtain some assistance from the coalition lead nation or to arrange co-operative support with other coalition partners; however, this should be considered as an exception rather than the rule. Funding and logistically supporting CF contingents operating within coalitions remains a national responsibility.

4. **Coalition Financial Arrangements.** Coalition financial arrangements are usually similar to those of NATO in that each troop contributing country is responsible for all costs associated with the deployment, employment and redeployment of troops and equipment. The lead nation may provide additional support. If the lead nation is in the geographical vicinity of the PSO, this assistance could be similar to that which is provided under a typical HNS arrangement. Alternately, the lead nation may provide logistics, headquarters or other common use assistance to the participating countries. A PSO may be sanctioned but not funded by the UN or there may not have been sufficient time to enact the UN budgetary process. It is possible that a trust fund is established for a coalition PSO. By so doing, a country unable to contribute troops may send funds or equipment in lieu. These funds and equipment are used to provide assistance to less-capable nations willing to participate in the coalition but unable to afford the expense.

5. **Coalition Personnel Issues.** As with NATO personnel, Coalition personnel issues are largely the responsibility of troop-contributing countries. However, the Lead Nation might establish a personnel section to provide policy direction on common personnel issues within the mission area. Otherwise, each troop contributing country is responsible for personnel issues ranging from casualty evacuation to individual travel.

812. TRANSITION TO UN RESPONSIBILITY

1. In some cases, coalitions may carry out enforcement operations and then transition to a UN-led mission when the conditions are appropriate. An example is found in East Timor where Australian-led INTERFET was replaced by UNTAET. The responsibility for the logistics system is transferred to UN control and the logistics support arrangements will be adjusted to meet UN requirements and procedures. UN-controlled contracts and arrangements will be established. Transitional periods must be carefully planned and efficiently implemented to prevent disruption. Both NDHQ and CF task force logistics staffs must be involved closely with the transition planning so that logistics support continues seamlessly.

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CHAPTER 9

EXERCISES AND TRAINING

901. GENERAL

1. DCDS Direction for International Operations 02/01, Rev 1, Chapter 4, outlines the individual training requirements for peace support operations (PSO). Units, formations and unique agencies, like the Peace Support Training Centre, deliver training.
2. Special attention needs to be paid to the required shift in psychological orientation for individuals trained for combat to the very different environment in which the use of force is more restrained. Education and training for PSO should involve participants from other government departments, international organizations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) where possible.
3. Rules of Engagement (ROE) differences within a multi-national force may reduce operational effectiveness. Common or harmonized ROE should be co-ordinated as early as possible. As a minimum, understanding how each nation will apply force in support of the mandate, the mission or in self-defence will be critical. ROE differences should be addressed in training.
4. The Canadian Forces (CF) maintains the view that the best core training to meet the diverse demands of PSO is general-purpose military training with emphasis on basic combat and occupational skills. It is demonstrated proficiency in this respect which establishes Canadian military credibility and reputation among warring or belligerent factions and which reduces the risk to CF personnel during confrontational situations and periods of increased hostility.
5. Members of a peacekeeping force and planning staff need to be aware of tasks and functions unique to PSO. These unique items include but are not limited to the following:
 - a. The roles, functions, capabilities and limitations of the other actors, IOs and NGOs, assisting in the campaign in the mission area;
 - b. The negotiating skills necessary to both interact with mission partners and the former warring factions. In particular, the skills to contribute and manage a Joint Military Commission efforts to implement the military component of a peace accord;
 - c. The role, function and typical tasks of members of the mission's security sector actors. Special emphasis is required for the unique relationship required between military and police forces and the police tasks that the military force may need to assume or assist in;
 - d. The coordination mechanisms and the procedures required to promote unity of effort amongst the diverse actors in the mission area;
 - e. A broader understanding of the different nature of the security threats that develop in a PSO environment;
 - f. The objectives of disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration programs (DDR) in the overall security campaign; and
 - g. The requirements to reform the assisted nation's military by making it effective, relevant and accountable.

902. EXERCISES

1. Exercise training for PSO should be conducted at all levels, with a focus on joint exercise activities when possible. Environmental Chiefs of Staff (ECS), as force generators, are responsible for the training of formed and composite units. The responsible command may further delegate responsibility for pre-

deployment training to subordinate area or formation commands. A confirmatory exercise must be conducted before the deployment of a Canadian Task Force. The Task Force has to be declared "Operational Ready" to the DCDS by the force generator prior to being deployed.

2. Formations earmarked to take part in PSO should design their exercises with a focus on tactical training and functional interoperability requirements. Exercise objectives should include co-operation with IGOs and NGOs as part of their CIMIC training.

3. At the strategic level, higher-level seminars and CPX with PSO scenarios should be scheduled annually and include crisis management procedures and decision-making processes. The training and exercising of designated headquarters and possible CCs must cover planning, deployment, sustainment, execution and redeployment. It is also quite possible that a training and preparation programme, including FTXs, CAXs, CPXs high level seminars or live firing exercises will be conducted in-theatre.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	Air-to-Air Refuelling	CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
ACTORD	Activation Order	CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
ACTREQ	Activation Request	CIS	Command and Information Systems
ACTWARN	Activation Warning	CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
ADL	Armistice Demarcation Line	CJPS	Combined Joint Planning Staff
ADM	Assistant Deputy Minister	CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
ADMCON	Administrative Control	CLO	Chief Logistic Officer
AJP	Allied Joint Publication	CMCC	Civil-Military Cooperation Centre
AOL	Area of Limitation	CMO	Civil-Military Operation
AOR	Area of Operations	CMPO	Chief Military Personnel Officer
AOS	Area of Separation	CNC	Canadian National Commander
APIC	Allied Press Information Centre (NATO)	COA	Course of Action
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations	COE	Contingent Owned Equipment
AT	Air Transport	CONOPS	Concept of Operations
AU	African Union	CONPLAN	Contingency Plan
BZ	Buffer Zone	COS	Chief of Staff
C2	Command and Control	CPA	Canadian Police Arrangement
CAMILREP	Canadian Military Representative	CPAO	Chief Public Affairs Officer (Coalition)
CanCAP	Canadian Contractor Augmentation Program	CPG	Commander's Planning Guidance
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer	CPIC	Combined (or coalition) Press Information Centre (Coalition)
CAX	Computer Assisted Exercise	CPIO	Chief Public Information Officer (NATO) (or Civilian Public Information Officer in the UN)
CC	Canadian Contingent	CPKO	Complex Peacekeeping Operation
CCO	Crowd Confrontation Operation	CPX	Command Post Exercise
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff	CRO	Crisis Response Operation
CF JOG	Canadian Forces Joint Operation Group	CSS	Combat Service Support
CF JSG	Canadian Forces Joint Support Group	D NATO Pol	Department NATO Policy
CF OPP	Canadian Forces Operation Planning Process	DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
CF	Canadian Forces	DCDS	Deputy Chief of Defence Staff
CFA	Canadian Forces Attaché	DCOS	Deputy Chief of Staff
CFC	Coalition Force Commander	DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration
CFHQ	Coalition Force HQ		
CFSU (O)	CF Support Unit Ottawa		
CI	Counter-intelligence		

DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade	IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
DGIS Pol	Director General International Security Policy	ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
DMZ	De-militarized Zone	IDP	Internally Displaced Person
DND	Department of National Defence	IFOR	NATO Implementation Force
DPA	Department of Political Affairs	IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
DPC	Defence Planning Committee	IGO	Inter-Governmental Organization
DPK Pol	Director Peacekeeping Policy	IMF	International Monetary Fund
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations	IMS	International Military Staff
ECHO	European Humanitarian Aid Office	IMTF	Integrated Mission Task Force
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
ECS	Environmental Chief of Staff	IO	International Organization
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal	IOM	International Organization for Migration
ERC	Emergency Relief Co-ordinator	ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
EU	European Union	JFC	Joint Force Commander
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization	JHQ	Joint Headquarters
FARP	Forward Arming and Refuelling Point	JMC	Joint Military Commission
FC	Force Commander	JOA	Joint Operations Area
FOB	Forward Operation Base	KFOR	Kosovo Force
FORCEPREP	Force Preparation	LN	Lead Nation
FPS	Force Planning Scenario	LO	Liaison Officer
FTX	Field Training Exercise	LOA	Letter of Assistance
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
GPS	Global Positioning System	LOC	Lines of Communication
HA	Humanitarian Assistance	LRT	Liaison and Reconnaissance Team
HACC	Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination Centre	MBT	Main Battle Tank
HCHR	High Commissioner for Human Rights	MC	Military Committee
HCR	High Commissioner for Refugees	MCT	Mission Close-out Team
HNS	Host Nation Support	MilObs	Military Observers
HoM	Head of Mission	MILU	Multinational Integrated Logistics Unit
HQ	Headquarters	MJLC	Multinational Joint Logistics Centre
HUMINT	Human Intelligence	MOOTW	Military Operation Other than War
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee	MOU	Memorandum of Understanding

MPIO	Military Public Information Officer (UN)	OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
MSA	Mission Subsistence Allowance	OSOC	On Site Operation Centre
MSF	Médecins sans Frontières	PA	Public Affair
MSR	Main Supply Route	PAff	Public Affairs (U.S./Coalition)
MSU	Multinational Specialized Unit	PAG	Public Affairs Guidance
NA5 CRO	Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation	PAO	Public Affairs Officer
NAC	North Atlantic Council	PfP	Partnership for Peace
NAEW	NATO Airborne Early Warning	PI	Public Information (UN, NATO)
NAMSA	NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency	PIC	Press Information Centre (UN)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	PIO	Public Information Officer
NBCD	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence	PKF	Peacekeeping Force
NCE	National Command Element	PLANELM	Planning Element
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters	POD	Port of Disembarkation
NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation	Pol	Policy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization	POW	Prisoner of War
NMR	National Military Representative	PRMNY	Permanent Mission in New York
NSE	National Support Element	PSO	Peace Support Operation
NSIP	NATO Security Investment Programme	PSYOP	Psychological Operations
OAS	Organization of American States	PVO	Private Voluntary Organization (US)
OAU	Organization of African Unity	R&R	Rest and Relaxation
OCHA	Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs	RC	Regional Command
OCP	Operational Communication Plan	RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development	RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
OFOESA	Office of Field Operational and External Activities	ROE	Rules of Engagement
OGD	Other Government Departments	RS	Role Specialization
OOTW	Operation Other than War	SACEUR	Supreme Allied Command Europe
Op O	Operation Order	SACLANT	Supreme Allied Command Atlantic
OP	Observation Post	SADC	South African Development Community
OPCOM	Operational Command	SC	Strategic Command(er)
OPCON	Operational Control	SFOR	NATO Stabilization Force
OPLAN	Operation Plan	SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe
ORBAT TOA	Order of Battle Transfer of Authority	SHIRBRIG	Stand-By High Readiness Brigade
		SOFA	Status of Force Agreement
		SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement

SOP	Standing Operating Procedures	WHO	World Health Organization
SOR	Statement of Requirement	Wng O	Warning Order
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General		
SSR	Security Sector Reform		
STANAG	Standardization Agreements		
TACOM	Tactical Command		
TACON	Tactical Control		
TAT	Theatre Activation Team		
TCN	Troop Contributing Nations		
TF	Task Force		
TFC	Task Force Commander		
TG	Task Group		
TIM	Toxic Industrial Material		
TOA	Transfer of Authority		
TOR	Terms of Reference		
TPKO	Traditional Peacekeeping Operation		
TPLSS	Third Party Logistics Support Service		
TSSU	Tactically Self-Sufficient Unit		
UK	United Kingdom		
UN CIVPOL	UN Civilian Police		
UN GA	United Nations General Assembly		
UN LOGSUPT	UN Logistics Support		
UN OPCON	UN Operational Control		
UN SC	United Nations Security Council		
UN Sec Gen	United Nations Secretary General		
UN TACCON	UN Tactical Control		
UN	United Nations		
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme		
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees		
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund		
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service		
UNMO	United Nations Military Observers		
US AID	United States International Development Agency		
WFP	World Food Programme		

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