

## **Introduction**

Over a span of several decades, developed states have evolved into information societies, noted for rapid and constant change as well as a phenomenal degree of both technological advancement and global integration. This has resulted in a great deal of turbulence and uncertainty, from which few organizations, be they public sector, private sector or non-profit, have been immune. It is commonly argued that to succeed in this new environment, organizations must be highly flexible and adaptable; in essence, they must be able to respond quickly to new opportunities and challenges as they arise. The resultant increase in organizational complexity has served to accentuate the need for strong, innovative leadership, the kind that can articulate a compelling vision and inspire all of the human resources within the organization to strive towards the attainment of that goal. Moreover, these leaders, armed with technical knowledge, maturity, self-awareness and vision, are effectively able to identify new opportunities and new ways of managing employees, financial resources and clients.

But while the need for organizational leadership is great, most organizations lack the identified talent needed to grow and prosper in this environment. The responses to this pervasive human resource problem have been varied. Some of the larger private sector companies in Canada have created organizational development and leadership units, which are devoted to developing distinct in-house leadership competency models that are then used to hire, train and promote employees who exhibit the desired leadership traits. However, most private sector companies lack the financial resources to be this proactive with respect to leadership development and rely, instead, on hiring consultants to offer training development programs or, alternatively, providing support for employees

to acquire leadership skills through specialized programs offered at universities and non-degree granting institutions. Then there are the many private sector companies that do not implement or encourage any executive development whatsoever, not because they do not value the benefits of such training but rather it is often impossible for senior executives to find the time to partake of these programs.<sup>1</sup>

Governments, too, have faced the daunting challenge of determining how best to identify and train those who will comprise the public service leadership cadre of the future. In this context, the challenge is particularly pronounced because of the well-documented impending human resources crisis. In 1997, the then Clerk of the Privy Council, Jocelyne Bourgon, wrote of a ‘quiet crisis’ in the public service. She noted that more than 30% of the executive group could retire by the year 2000, and the figure would rise to 70% five years thereafter. The problem was there were few people who seemed to be aware of the crisis; fewer still were actually attempting to do anything about it.<sup>2</sup> Sheila Fraser, in her first report as Auditor General, elaborated on the situation:

The public service faces a significant ‘human capital’ challenge – the need for enough skilled people to perform its work, given the demographic profile of the public service; a shift in the nature of work; an increasingly tight market for talent; and negative perceptions of the public service as a career choice.<sup>3</sup>

Like Bourgon before her, Fraser noted that by 2008 some 70% of public service executives would be eligible to retire without penalty. Moreover, reference was made to a survey conducted in 2001, which revealed that 40% of this group planned to retire within 5 years with another 35% to follow suit in a 6-10 year time frame. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that there is a paucity of younger civil service employees ready to

assume these positions, with only about half as many employees under the age of 35 in the public service as compared to the general workforce.

In response to these various challenges and other factors, the federal government has undertaken several initiatives aimed at further developing and promoting a professional public service with competent leadership – individuals who are able to effectively cope with and shape the underlying forces that are affecting the future prosperity of the country. In broad terms, the government has been actively engaged in a process of public sector renewal, which, in its current manifestation, is currently focused on recruitment, retention and learning.<sup>4</sup>

Whether it was the creation of the Canadian Centre for Management Development (CCMD), announced by Prime Minister Mulroney in 1988, the Public Service 2000 (PS 2000) initiative of 1989, the launch of La Relève in the mid-1990s, or the evolution of the Leadership Network in 1998, concerted efforts have been undertaken to provide the necessary support and training for public sector employees, particularly those senior civil servants who regularly must assume the role of expert manager, strategist and visionary leader.<sup>5</sup> The common element linking these civil service reforms has been the federal government's desire to nurture a world-class, highly professional public service that is able to cope with the various technological advances and informational challenges of an increasingly global and interdependent world.

It is important to note that while in many respects the challenges of technological innovation and globalization are shared across a variety of organizations, the choice and eventual outcome of a particular leadership response to cope with these forces will often be dependent on the culture and values unique to the organization in question. Clearly,

there is an important distinction between public sector and private sector organizations in this regard. As Paul Tellier, former Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet, noted:

Government shares with organizations in the private sector a need for top quality, effective management. The design and application of management techniques, however, must be tailored to the specific environment of the public sector. It is well understood that the world of public sector managers is different from that of their counterparts in the private sector.<sup>6</sup>

But this caveat is not sufficient: it is also critical to keep in mind that various organizational units within the federal public service may also need to employ different strategies. In short, the essence of good and effective leadership may be defined differently by different public sector organizations.

This is perhaps no more true than in the case of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF).<sup>7</sup> While its members are public servants, the military is unique in that its leaders are required to operate under the dramatically varying circumstances of peace, war and peacekeeping. Furthermore, the traits ascribed to the effective military leader will vary in each of these situations. Nonetheless, while a professional military leader might only ever spend a small proportion of his or her career engaged in combat, it is from this environment and other high intensity operations (including peacekeeping) that the most highly esteemed leaders typically emerge, or are selected, and held up within the organization as role models of leadership.

Increasingly, in light of the significant changes in the international order in the past two decades, the military has become cognizant of the need to re-examine its policies, training standards and educational programs. Any residual temptation to further engage in benign neglect with respect to modernizing the military education and training

regimes was quashed in the aftermath of the notorious Somalia incident of the early 1990s. As stated by Doug Young, the former Minister of National Defence, in his 1997 *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*: “a handful of...highly objectionable incidents...have called into question the Canadian military, its leadership, its discipline, its command and management, and even its honour.” He went on to argue that the Forces would be better able to adjust to new circumstances and challenges if there were improvements implemented in the selection and training of leaders:

The Canadian Forces must have the means to develop the effective and skilled leaders needed in the future. They need to ensure that the officer corps remains well-connected with Canadian society and the day-to-day reality of public concerns. They must also take full advantage of technology and the expertise available in civilian institutions of higher learning.<sup>8</sup>

Later that year, as a result of a recommendation in the abovementioned report, the Royal Military College (RMC) Board of Governors undertook a review of its academic programs with the aim of answering a couple of key questions, namely: “What are the new challenges shaping the nature of leadership required of the officer corps in the Canadian Forces and how should the military select, train and educate its leaders?”<sup>9</sup> Moreover, *Defence Strategy 2020*, a strategic framework and planning document that charts the path for the military well into the twenty-first century, clearly identifies the need to nurture decisive leadership as one of its long-term strategic objectives. The DND and the CF have recognized that they must “adapt to change in a rapidly evolving, complex and unpredictable world,”<sup>10</sup> and investments in personnel, education and training are all deemed to be essential.

The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the federal government's various reform efforts aimed at promoting professionalism and leadership development in the public service with the aim of extrapolating whether they serve to fulfill the specific needs of the DND and the CF. We will begin by considering the concept of career public service – in other words, the 'profession' of public service – which necessitates a discussion of the historical evolution of the merit system as well as some of the related traditional public service values. In the next section of the paper, we will outline several of the key issues that have impacted upon the public service since the mid-to-late 1980s, including the challenge of downsizing in government, the emergence of new public management and a corresponding series of 'new' public service values, and dealing with recruitment and retention problems in addition to the impending retirement crisis, before turning our attention to the various government responses to these challenges. In the final section of the paper, we will outline the relationship of the Canadian Forces to the federal bureaucracy and establish parallels between the personnel management challenges and responses in the public service as a whole to those in the military. It is our contention that while the public service and CF share commonalities with respect to the notion of professionalism and renewal efforts to promote leadership development, given the unique nature of missions performed by the military, the CF must work towards integrating the best practices of the public service into customized programs that will truly develop leadership rather than management skills.

### **From Patronage to Merit: The Evolution of a Professional Career Public Service**

The concept of a professional, non-partisan career public service has evolved and changed over time. Arguably it constitutes a cornerstone of our system of government,

and is central to ensuring the country's future prosperity. After all, Prime Minister Mulroney's major reform initiative, PS 2000, launched in 1989, was premised on the belief that "...a professional, career Public Service, capable of attracting and retaining Canadians of talent, commitment and imagination, is essential to Canada's national well-being."<sup>11</sup> A similar view prevails today. Mel Cappe, who currently heads the public service, stated: "I firmly believe that a professional, non-partisan and representative public service matters. It matters to the future competitiveness of Canada's economy and the quality of life of its citizens...."<sup>12</sup> As such, he is actively setting out to establish the federal government as the 'employer of choice'<sup>13</sup> for those talented young people being recruited into the public service as well as those existing employees who are the repository of years of invaluable expertise. Despite such pronouncements, recent administrative reforms have seriously emasculated the traditional notion of a career public service.

But what exactly constitutes the career public service? As Kenneth Kernaghan has advised, there is no universal agreement on this point.<sup>14</sup> One recent interpretation, which has been widely referenced both in government and academic literature, was offered by John Tait, Chair of the Task Force on Public Service Values in Ethics, in his 1996 report, *A Strong Foundation*. He wrote: "For us, a professional public service implies three things: a body of knowledge, skills and expertise that those outside the profession are unlikely to possess; a set of values and attitudes that determine the culture of the profession; and a set of standards for both of these."<sup>15</sup> But, contrary to historical notions of the public service bargain, in which civil servants would remain politically neutral and loyal to the government in power in return for security of tenure, Tait and his study team

argued a professional public service need not include a guarantee of lifetime employment. As will be discussed later in the paper, this is but one of many recent developments in the evolution of Canadian administrative values and culture that are leading to fissures in the foundations of the public service as an institution.

For his part, Kernaghan identified four principles that need to be present to achieve a career public service in an ideal sense:

1. Appointments to the public service are made with a view to preserving its political neutrality.
2. Appointments to, and within, the public service are based on merit, in the sense that the person appointed is the one who is best qualified.
3. As far as possible, appointments are made from within the public service.
4. Public servants are assured of assistance in selecting their career goals and the path to these goals.<sup>16</sup>

These principles are useful for providing an overall framework for understanding the context in which the idea of a professional, non-partisan career public service gradually emerged in Canada. At the heart of this development was the introduction of the merit principle.<sup>17</sup>

While the concept of merit has never been defined in law and is subject to varying interpretations, it is generally understood to imply that a candidate is fit to fill the particular job vacancy in question. As one former civil servant wrote, “Ultimately, merit appears as both a laudable goal and noble procedure within the public service – the deliberate, careful seeking out of that person most qualified to perform effectively the duties associated with a given position.”<sup>18</sup> However, this was not always the case. Patronage appointments to various civil service positions were the norm for the first several decades after Confederation. Individuals were hired to fill a position in either the Inside (those in Ottawa) or Outside (those elsewhere) Civil Service, as they were then



known, not based on any particular skills or qualifications that they brought to the position, but rather to reward either loyal service or generous financial contributions to the party in power.

It was not until the Civil Service Act of 1918 that Canada could really claim to have a professional, non-partisan public service. There were several earlier attempts at implementing personnel reforms in the Canadian public service, notably with the passage of the Civil Service Acts of 1868, 1882 and 1908. However, these initiatives did not adequately address the concerns that had been raised regarding the incompetence and, as a corollary, inefficiency of a bureaucracy where appointments were based on a system of spoils.<sup>19</sup> According to the terms of the 1918 Act, the Civil Service Commission, which had been created ten years previously, was finally given responsibility for appointments to both the Inside and Outside Civil Service. This legislative change meant that, for the first time, most civil servants were appointed on the basis of merit. Ultimately, it was the public service classification exercise of 1919, inspired by the theories of scientific management that had gained ascendancy at the time, which facilitated the move to the merit system. With the assistance of an American accountancy firm, some 1700 different job types were identified. Each one included a detailed job description, a list of skill requirements, lines of promotion and levels of compensation. Armed with this information, the Civil Service Commission, charged with the responsibility of ensuring the ‘best qualified’ or ‘most capable’ individuals were hired, was able to implement a series of open, competitive examinations that were designed to test job-specific competencies.<sup>20</sup>

There were, however, some notable exceptions. First, the authority of the Civil Service Commission (renamed Public Service Commission in 1967) did not extend to those individuals hired by Crown Corporations, the armed forces or the RCMP. These exempt categories were not insignificant: in 1960, some 212,409 persons out of 344,362 employed by the federal government fell outside the ambit of the merit system.<sup>21</sup> Second, the prime minister, by virtue of the prerogative power associated with the position, has been able to appoint the upper echelons of the government's administration, including the various deputy ministers, ambassadors and the membership of numerous public boards and commissions. Consequently, a few thousand public sector employees who fall in these categories continue to receive their appointments, in whole or in part, as a result of political patronage. Finally, even after the merit system was firmly ensconced in Canada, there were a number of instances whereby some degree of preferential treatment has been accorded in the hiring and promotion of civil servants. For example, after each of the Great Wars returning veterans, both in recognition of the nation's gratitude for their military service and the disadvantaged position they had been placed in with respect to acquiring the necessary education and training, were favoured when hiring decisions were made.

More recently, the federal civil service has implemented other so-called 'affirmative action' programs to address linguistic, gender and diversity imbalances (visible minority groups, Aboriginals and the disabled) in the hope that a more representative bureaucracy could be created. The rationale for attempting to build a public service that is a microcosm of Canadian society is that it would become more responsive to the needs of all citizens, which would be reflected in terms of the policy

advice emanating from public servants as well as the delivery of services.<sup>22</sup> From the perspective of the federal government, in order to satisfy both domestic needs and the challenges and opportunities presented by globalization, the skills and talents of all Canadians must be maximized.<sup>23</sup>

Ministers and their deputies were initially quite reluctant to relinquish the power to make political appointments to the civil service because, according to the principle of individual ministerial responsibility, they were ultimately held accountable for the performance of their department. Naturally, they wanted to have the ability to appoint individuals who could be trusted to offer sound policy advice and loyally implement the policy decisions that had been made. Therefore, when these hiring decisions were finally taken away from the ministers, it was important to ensure the loyalty and impartiality of civil servants was retained. It was the emergence of the concepts of political neutrality and anonymity, which provided that guarantee. In exchange for anonymity and security of tenure in their appointment, bureaucrats were to faithfully and professionally serve the government in power.

To prevent the possibility of a 'politicized' civil servant, the Civil Service Act of 1908 expressly prohibited government employees from engaging in any form of partisan activity.<sup>24</sup> The underlying assumption was that to partake in such activities would potentially compromise the public servant's ability to remain neutral and loyal to his or her political master. Furthermore, if civil servants were to be expected to give their best advice and unquestioningly administer the policy decisions of the government, irrespective of the party in power, they had to be able to retain their anonymity.

Individual ministers and the government collectively would be held to account by the public; the actions of civil servants, therefore, would receive neither praise nor criticism.

These two concepts form the foundation of some of the key traditional public service values, namely providing service to Canada and Canadians and remaining loyal to the duly elected government. While there is no standardized list of the various traditional public service values, there are several key values that are generally identified. In addition to the two noted above, PS 2000 acknowledged the following: honesty and integrity, fiscal prudence, fairness and impartiality, professionalism and respect.<sup>25</sup>

Kenneth Kernaghan, a noted public administration scholar, argued that while there is a core of ‘traditional’ public sector values, including integrity, accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, representativeness, neutrality, fairness and equity, “the challenge for each government department or agency is to determine, from its own experience and unique requirements, the fundamental values for which it stands.”<sup>26</sup>

His research, which analyzed the value statements of several federal, provincial and territorial public organizations revealed that certain traditional values were given more importance than others. Integrity, accountability, fairness and equity were among the top five values cited by public organizations, while others, such as loyalty, efficiency, neutrality and representativeness, were not among the top twenty. This is a particularly noteworthy revelation since the concept of political neutrality is central to the harmonious interaction between politicians and civil servants and the quest for greater efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of government programs has been the overarching rationale for most, if not all, administrative reform. Is it the case that civil servants simply take it

for granted that they are loyal and non-partisan in the performance of their duties, or do they need to be reminded of the primacy of these values in our system of government?<sup>27</sup>

More recently, the Task Force on Public Service Values and Ethics segregated the core values of the public service into four overlapping and inter-related categories: democratic values, professional values, ethical values and people values.<sup>28</sup> Democratic values refer to anonymity and accountability, due process, loyalty, the rule of law and the public interest. Accountability is absolutely critical to the exercise of legitimate power in any democratic government. According to the principle of responsible government, which underpins our parliamentary democracy, ministers and the government are responsible to Parliament and, consequently, the Canadian public, while the public servants are accountable, either directly or indirectly, to ministers. The bureaucratic model upon which the Canadian civil service was built, necessitated formalized rules and procedures that were to be strictly adhered to and a clearly delineated hierarchy of authority so as to ensure that civil servants carried out their duties in the prescribed manner. Above all, civil servants were to serve the public interest; in doing so, they were to be fearless in providing advice to ministers and completely loyal in administering the decisions of the politicians.

Excellence, professional competence, continuous improvement, merit, effectiveness, economy, frankness, objectivity and impartiality in advice, and speaking truth to power were considered to be the ‘professional values’ of the public service. There were differentiated from the ‘new’ or ‘emerging professional values’ (quality, innovation, initiative, creativity, resourcefulness, service to clients, partnership, and teamwork), which will be addressed later in the paper. These traditional professional values need

little explanation; they constitute the gist of what is expected of a public servant. As Leonard White wrote in his seminal work: “Public administration is...the execution of the public business; the goal of administrative activity the most expeditious, economical, and complete achievement of public programs.”<sup>29</sup>

Under the umbrella of ethical values are, among others, the values of integrity, honesty, impartiality, probity, prudence, fairness, and equity. These ethical values are quite similar to the ones one would expect to find endorsed and promoted by any professional body. What makes these values unique in the context of the professional public service is that public servants must display complete integrity to uphold the public trust that has been placed in them as part of this institution. All of the actions of the public servant must elevate the common good above that of any private interest or advantage.

The final category of values, which have not received much attention in the literature, are dubbed ‘people values.’ These are values such as courage, moderation, decency, responsibility, reasonableness; they also include a host of values that should guide public servants in their interactions with others, be they co-workers, parliamentarians or citizens: respect, civility, tolerance, benevolence, courtesy, openness, collegiality, and caring. Like the ethical values, people values are not unique to the public sector. What makes them distinctive is the way in which these values intersect with democratic and professional values.

It was on the basis of these values that the notion of a professional, career public service evolved. In sum, according to this so-called traditional public service cosmology described above, as long as bureaucrats performed competently, respecting and

promoting the public service value system, they could expect to enjoy promotions and a life-long career in the federal bureaucracy. This tacit employment bargain between the politicians and the public servants prevailed without serious challenge until the late 1970s and early 1980s. But, then, a wholesale shift in the administrative paradigm occurred. Both a deteriorating economic climate and the introduction of a neo-liberal political ideology in Canada resulted in an inexorable transformation of the federal public service. A series of radical public sector reforms, which can be categorized broadly under the rubric of ‘new public management,’ are now firmly entrenched in Canada. Several new public service values have emerged; in some instances they complement the traditional values, while in others present challenges that the public service may not be adequately prepared to address.<sup>30</sup> And it is impossible to deny that, despite slick attempts to repackage the employment contract by advocating the notion of ‘employability,’<sup>31</sup> the career public service as historically construed is no more.

### **New Public Management: An Affront to the Career Public Service**

Fuelled by the wholesale adoption of the Keynesian approach to economic stabilization in the post-war period, there was a massive bourgeoning of the size of the Canadian state. As the size and scope of the state continued to expand into new social policy fields, there was an obvious need for an enhanced administrative apparatus to oversee these programs. This growth continued unabated until the late 1970s. Consequently, employment in the federal public service grew from some 120,557 employees in 1946 to a peak of 282,788 civil servants in 1977.<sup>32</sup> However, the government’s penchant for relying on deficit financing to provide programs and services to Canadian citizens became increasingly untenable. Between 1947 and 1972 federal

budgets fluctuated between surpluses and deficits (with almost a balanced net result), but beginning in 1975 the government experienced persistent and significant budgetary deficits. This led to an enormous accumulated public debt.<sup>33</sup>

Pressure was being applied to Prime Minister Trudeau to adopt measures that would begin to address what many critics felt had been demonstrated fiscal incompetence. In August 1978, upon his return from the G-7 meeting, the prime minister announced that \$2 billion would be slashed from government expenditures. This expenditure reduction resulted in a reduction of some 5 thousand civil service jobs. It was the first indication that the conventional understanding of the career public service was in jeopardy. The Clark government, which succeeded the Liberals briefly in 1979, implemented a hiring freeze, but was committed to ensuring that those civil servants with five years of continuous service would retain a permanent position.<sup>34</sup>

A full affront to the career public service was to occur a few short years later. During the 1984 election campaign, Brian Mulroney, who assumed leadership of the Progressive Conservative Party from Joe Clark, made it quite clear that he intended to shake-up the bureaucracy if he were to be elected prime minister. In his view, bureaucrats were lazy and inefficient; even more troublesome was his belief that the mandarins had become too closely aligned with the policies of the Liberals who had governed uninterrupted, except for the brief interregnum for nine months in 1979, since 1963. More importantly, Mulroney wholeheartedly embraced the neo-liberal political and economic agenda that was being implemented by Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the United States. His ambition was to roll back the size of the state; to achieve that goal he advocated privatization, deregulation and various forms of



alternative service delivery. Mulroney also intended to reduce the crushing federal deficit without raising taxes, which could only mean one thing: wholesale expenditure cuts.

This, in turn, would inevitably result in personnel reductions.

Mulroney won the 1984 election with a landslide majority and soon thereafter announced the Nielsen Task Force on Program Review. This initiative was designed to discover ways in which the government could deliver programs more efficiently and effectively. The underlying objective was to reduce the size of the public service by some 15,000 employees in a three-to-five year time frame. As it turned out, with few recommendations actually being implemented, the Nielsen Task Force was largely irrelevant. There was a significant reduction in the number of full-time indeterminate public service employees, but this mostly occurred as a result of attrition and limitations on recruitment. Nonetheless, as a result of conscious downsizing efforts since the early 1980s, there were more than 65,000 fewer public service employees in 1986 than in 1977.<sup>35</sup>

While it is arguable that the public service had not endured the anticipated devastation during the first Conservative mandate,<sup>36</sup> there was a discernable impact on the collective morale and psyche of bureaucrats. There was a palpable sense that public servants were neither valued nor respected and that the downsizing – or ‘rightsizing,’ as the government preferred to call it – agenda would continue apace. The simple fact was that the Conservative government was only moderately successful in reducing the annual deficits in the 1984-1988 period, and the little ground that was gained in the first term was squandered during the second mandate. As the bleak economic situation persisted,

Canadians began to increasingly regard public servants as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.<sup>37</sup>

Momentum was gaining, both within and outside government, to undertake a fundamental restructuring of the public service. Several influential books were published during the late 1980s and early 1990s, which challenged governments to reinvent themselves. In place of the old bureaucratic model, a system that emerged so as to ensure that efficiency and effectiveness would result in the pursuit of good government, it was suggested that governments should embrace managerialism. In other words, if governments were serious about wanting to improve the performance of their public sector organizations they needed to adopt private-sector management principles.<sup>38</sup> While careful to assert that governments cannot be run like a business, there was an underlying assumption that private sector management is inherently superior to public administration. As a result, these books suggested that the public servants should think of citizens as customers or clients, and the bureaucracy should be imbued with a new culture, one that emphasizes results, service, quality, value, flexibility, innovation, empowerment, risk taking, entrepreneurship and decentralization. The new mantra called for governments 'to do more with less.' Collectively, these broad reforms, aimed at creating a 'post-bureaucratic' paradigm, have come to be known as new public management.<sup>39</sup>

According to this new public sector management philosophy, governments should focus more energy on formulating policy ('steering') and less on the administering programs ('rowing'). It is not incumbent on governments to provide programs and direct service, but rather to encourage the private and non-profit sectors to make them available.

This might involve abandoning a policy field altogether, privatizing a publicly-owned corporation, establishing some type of partnership with either a private sector or non-profit organization, or contracting out for the provision of a specific program. To facilitate this reconceptualization of the appropriate role of government, departments needed to clearly articulate their core business lines and develop mission statements to provide direction. It was also believed that governments had to become more responsive to the needs and demands of the public. That being the case, governments should place more emphasis on quality; citizens should be viewed as customers or clients who should be satisfied with their interaction with the bureaucracy. The stifling rules and procedures associated with an unresponsive bureaucracy must be abandoned. Managers and the street-level bureaucrats must be empowered so that they can employ greater flexibility and innovation when they make decisions. In addition, accountability for process must be supplanted by a new emphasis on accountability for results.

Ironically, since taking the reins of power in 1993, the Liberal government under the leadership of Jean Chrétien has effectively pursued neo-liberal policies under the guise of new public management with a level of zeal that has surely left the Conservatives wondering how they lost their hegemony over this agenda. While many of the radical reforms for the public service were developed under the Mulroney administration, it was in effect the Liberal government that followed through with the implementation strategy. Significantly, Chrétien decided to retain the new drastically reduced departmental structure that he inherited from Prime Minister Kim Campbell. The 1993 cabinet and public service restructuring initiative resulted in the consolidation of a number of departments and agencies, along with a much smaller cabinet, and some

modest reform of the central agencies. This reform was particularly noteworthy because it accentuated the tenuousness of the executive group, many of whom lost their positions in the bureaucracy because of the consolidation. A total of 9 deputy minister and 53 assistant deputy minister positions were cut, as were numerous policy and evaluation staff. It provided another clear sign that the traditional understanding of the career public service was irrevocably damaged.<sup>40</sup>

Further evidence that the Liberals intended to aggressively pursue reductions in the civil service came about with the launch of Program Review in February 1994. Designed with clear deficit reduction targets in mind, this exercise was similarly conceived to fundamentally question the appropriate role of the federal government in the economy and society. Managers were asked to examine each of their programs, using a series of six questions or tests, to determine whether the federal government could either partially or fully withdraw from the policy realms being evaluated. Program Review proved to be extremely effective. The Liberals were able to translate massive expenditure cuts and a contraction of the civil service into a situation whereby annual deficits have been replaced with several years of successive budgetary surpluses.

While this achievement was as important as it was monumental, it did not come without cost.<sup>41</sup> As a result of the aggressive pursuit of public service reforms consistent with the principles of new public management, there have been some profound impacts on both the organization and values of the public service in Canada. First, as documented earlier, the public service has become significantly smaller and comprises a disproportionate number of older, predominantly knowledge-based employees. Over the years, many programs have either been eliminated or contracted out to the private and

non-profit sectors, and organizational hierarchies have been flattened in an effort to empower employees by providing them with greater flexibility and innovation in decision-making. Combined with hiring freezes for much of that time, the public service lost many clerical and operational positions, as well as scientists, policy analysts and other technical experts who will be needed to cope with the various emerging scientific and social issues.<sup>42</sup>

The shift to more highly skilled, knowledge-based employees in the public sector means that it will need to compete more intensively for the best and the brightest with the private sector; it will do so without the attendant perquisites that private sector employers can offer prospective employees.<sup>43</sup> Similarly, the public sector is losing much of its expertise to the private sector. Public servants are knowledge workers, who have developed the ability to deal with highly complex issues, forge strategic alliances with a variety of partners, balance competing objectives and create consensus. Private sector organizations find employees with this skill set to be particularly valuable. In the view of one commentator, the net result has been a ‘brain drain’ in the public sector.<sup>44</sup>

Second, those who have remained in the public service have done so with much less pride and commitment than has historically been the case. They have also been experiencing a great deal of stress over the workload increases attendant with the downsizing initiative and anxiety over what the future might hold. As one former Clerk of the Privy Council noted:

The debate surrounding the realignment of the role of government...has affected the public servant's sense of pride. It is easy to cross the line from the necessary debate about government priorities...programs and services to judgmental, and sometimes derogatory, comments about the people who provide these programs and services.<sup>45</sup>

When public sector jobs have been eliminated or contracted out and bureaucrats are constantly bombarded with messages that the private sector is more efficient and effective, it is easy to understand why civil servants have been questioning the value of their career choice.

Third, the emergence of the new public service values has led to some concerns and confusion throughout the public service. Many public servants do not believe that their leaders and managers have been living the values that they were preaching, some values were not well articulated, and insufficient attention has been devoted to exploring the ways in which the new values in many respects conflict with the old ones.<sup>46</sup> Admittedly, at times the traditional values themselves are at odds with each other. For example, the need for accountability has often compromised the quest for efficiency. Moreover, in some instances the new public service values complement or build upon the traditional values. The new emphasis on results is congruent with the traditional values of efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness in the delivery of public services. So, too, are the new values of innovation, flexibility and empowerment. And most public servants probably took some offence to the suggestion that governments needed to be more concerned with service; from their perspective, service to the public has always been their *raison d'être*.

However, these same values also pose somewhat of a threat to the traditional values. Kernaghan writes: “Efforts to implement public-service reforms frequently encounter tension between professional values (e.g., innovation), on the one hand, and democratic values (e.g., accountability) or ethical values (e.g., integrity), on the other.”<sup>47</sup> Although much could certainly be written on this matter – and more research is needed to

fully comprehend the implications – some of the troubling features of the new values are obvious.

If public servants are empowered and given the ability to be flexible and innovative in fulfilling their responsibilities, they might compromise the expectation that citizens have to be treated fairly, impartially and equitably. Increased discretion for public servants also means that they will become more influential and prominent within the political system. This raises questions about the extent to which public servants are able to remain politically neutral, a fundamental component of the development of a professional career public service. Finally, empowering public servants means that there will be more opportunities for making mistakes. In this context, what happens to the traditional notion of accountability, whereby ministers are held responsible for the actions of their bureaucrats?<sup>48</sup> Treating citizens as clients or customers only exacerbates the problem, as does the practice of contracting out. The culture and values of a private sector organization that has been awarded a government contract to provide a particular program or service will undoubtedly clash to some extent with those espoused in the public service. How is accountability ensured in such situations?<sup>49</sup>

Therefore, the advent of new public management in Canada deleteriously undermined the traditional notion of a professional, non-partisan career public service as a prerequisite of good government. Peters summed up the situation: “In the process of attempting to make government more efficient and effective it appears that some important public service values... have been denigrated.”<sup>50</sup> The federal government, however, has not been completely oblivious to the problems that have been festering in

the public service. On several occasions the government has sought to address some of the issues that have been highlighted with concrete reform initiatives.

### **Responding to the Challenges: Leadership Development and Public Sector Renewal**

Perhaps the most consistent theme that unifies the government and academic pronouncements on the topic of public sector leadership is the need to identify and develop individuals who can effectively manage change.<sup>51</sup> One of the government's first serious initiatives to prepare public sector managers, leaders and future leaders was the creation of the CCMD in 1989. Announced by Prime Minister Mulroney in April of 1988, CCMD was designed "as an institution dedicated to excellence in teaching and research into public sector management."<sup>52</sup> CCMD was itself an outgrowth of the Public Service Commission's Centre for Executive Development, which was thought to be too inward-looking and devoid of a suitable level of professionalism to provide effective management training for civil servants.<sup>53</sup>

A recent *Annual Report* of the CCMD indicated that its strategic priorities were, firstly, to build the intellectual capital of the public service in key areas, including learning and leadership, governance and public sector management, and secondly, ensure that this knowledge is transferred to public sector managers.<sup>54</sup> The CCMD has been actively pursuing this vision since its inception, through the provision of courses, executive briefings and regular publications on a variety of theoretical and practical issues related to public sector management. A common practice has been to appoint esteemed academics as senior fellows as well as to participate in the Executive Interchange program. Under the terms of this latter program, senior managers in the public service can spend up to two years working with another government or private



sector company. Following this model, 'business fellows' from leading private sector organizations are regularly invited to join the CCMD for a two-year secondment. CCMD ardently believes that this sort of cross-fertilization of executives allows both the public sector and private sector to glean important insights from each other about a myriad of management issues.

There has been some suggestion that the CCMD was in a state of decline in the 1990s: its research agenda was considered to be too academic, the number of staff at the Centre was reduced by more than 50%, and it had to rely on contracting out for most of its programs.<sup>55</sup> But CCMD continues to produce research of some relevance. A recent CCMD study based on interviews with more than 600 federal executives revealed that the top four ways to learn about leadership were as follows: 1) experiential learning; 2) observing leadership in action; 3) task forces and special assignments; and 4) informal mentoring and coaching. Formal learning programs, for example, management development programs or university courses, were not nearly as highly regarded.

These results are consistent with those of an earlier study by the Institute of Public Administration of Canada. The federal, provincial and municipal civil servants who participated in this survey and subsequent national seminar eschewed formal university training programs for senior executives. Savoie summarized the prevailing view:

...formal training appears to offer little promise for anyone aspiring to the senior executive ranks. The lack of time available to take formal training courses was considered an important factor. But other factors were also mentioned. Managers have more than one set of needs. Thus 'one size' – or one formal course – does not fit all. Managers have been in the trenches...and they inevitably find at least part of a formal and lengthy course irrelevant to their work and their learning needs. It was felt that formal teaching...must attempt to standardize learning and cannot possibly deal with individual needs.<sup>56</sup>

Instead, these executives discussed their preference for action learning; they want to learn by doing and update their knowledge base through networking – in other words, by sharing experiences with other managers. The participants were unanimous in their agreement that executive development programs aimed at making senior executives into leaders were essential. However, an in-house executive development program, perhaps complemented by an external program, was the preferred model since it would enable the organization to tailor the curriculum so as to help promote its own distinct corporate culture.<sup>57</sup>

In December 1989, shortly after establishing the CCMD, Prime Minister Mulroney announced a new major public service reform initiative – PS 2000. Ostensibly launched to promote the efficiency and professionalism of the public service so that it would continue to serve the needs of Canadians into the new millennium, PS 2000 was unmistakably influenced in its design by the principles of new public management. The reform was intended to foster a consultative, client-oriented culture in the public service with the overriding objective of providing improved service to Canadians. All of the key elements of new public management were to be found in the White Paper: the document was replete with terms like service, client-oriented, consultation, partnership, flexibility, decentralization, delegation, empowerment, and results-oriented accountability.

Paul Tellier, Clerk of the Privy Council at the time, described the objective of PS 2000 in the following manner:

In order to manage the public service successfully in the 1990s and for the twenty-first century, it is essential that we have the right institutions and the right structures, including the tools to recruit the right people, to motivate and reward those people, and to groom them to become the leaders of tomorrow.<sup>58</sup>

With this in mind, it is not surprising that PS 2000 also identified the need to promote and support training and development within the public service, and address the problem of under-representation of women and minority groups within the public service, especially in the management (men comprised 85% of this group) and professional categories.

One crucial step that the government made in this regard was to amend the Public Service Employment Act so that members of the Canadian Forces, RCMP and CSIS could no longer compete with public servants in closed job competitions. This put an end to a practice that led to what has been called the “khaki parachute” problem. There was a widespread belief that because members of these three groups – typically men – had years of training and career development, it was extremely difficult for female public servants to have a fair opportunity for advancement. Lewis, however, intimated that the termination of this practice was unfortunate because members of the military “...have the flexibility, adaptability, initiative and caring that current management thinking and PS 2000 promote.”<sup>59</sup>

Some of the more innovative programs aimed at recruiting the next generation of public servants that were developed around this time were the Management Trainee Program (MTP) and the Accelerated Economist Training Program. In the first instance, approximately 100 talented young men and women, both new recruits and junior officers already employed in the government, were identified and selected through a competitive process to begin a 5-year program of rotating work assignments and training. At the end of the program, these individuals were to receive middle management positions within the public service and eventually would be perceived as prospective senior executives.<sup>60</sup> The premise behind the Accelerated Economist Training Program is much the same. Up

to 8 graduates with Masters degrees in public administration or economics are recruited to serve in a two year apprenticeship during which time they are taught how economic and public policy is developed and managed. The expectation is that once the program is completed these participants would receive intermediate appointments in the civil service as policy analysts.<sup>61</sup>

Despite the many notable changes that were made to the organization of the public service as a result of PS 2000, on the whole it must be viewed as somewhat of a failure. One civil servant involved with the process was quite critical of the undertaking, noting that the training and development recommendations had no corresponding dedication of funds or time to make them work, many of other the recommendations were extremely vague, and in several cases the recommendations were in conflict with the interests of employees or failed to adequately address their concerns. In the end, he concluded: “Public Service 2000 is an initiative created by management for management. Employees will remain on the sidelines....”<sup>62</sup> It is not difficult to appreciate the disconnection public servants experienced with respect to PS 2000; after all, the government embarked on a renewal exercise that was designed to involve civil servants more directly in decision-making, and yet it began by excluding them from the process. A further irony is palpable: at the same time the government was touting members of the public service as its greatest asset, it was adopting measures to ensure a significant downsizing of the bureaucracy.

The next major vision for renewing the public service was identified by the Clerk of the Privy Council in the *Fourth Annual Report to the Prime Minister on the Public Service of Canada*. Jocelyne Bourgon outlined the elements of the quiet crisis that

afflicted the public service and stated that attention would be directed to “reinventing the way we serve” and “ensuring a modern and vibrant institution to meet the needs of Canada and Canadians now and in the future.”<sup>63</sup> The language used leaves little doubt that this more recent effort was an attempt to build on the limited successes of PS 2000. Specifically, Bourgon wrote of La Relève (leadership, action, renewal, energy, learning, expertise, values, excellence), which was the term given “for our challenge, our commitment, and our duty to develop and pass on a vibrant institution staffed by highly qualified and committed professionals.” The Clerk was careful to note that this challenge was the responsibility of all public servants; commitment was required from all levels of the organization, not merely executives or ‘high flyers.’ If the government intended to avoid the pitfalls of PS 2000 it needed to ensure that there was input, commitment and buy-in at all levels of the public service.

With this challenge outlined, every federal department and central agency along with six major functional communities and several regional councils developed specific 3-year action plans for implementing La Relève in a wide range of areas, including but not limited to recruitment and staffing, learning and training, development programs, culture, values and vision, and performance measurement and accountability. A list of departmental initiatives that were either proposed or under way were identified for each area, along with a time line for implementation. For example, in terms of learning and training, DND had completed a policy framework and managers guide on continuous learning and was in the process of developing value-based generic competencies as well as management competencies. As far as development programs were concerned, the department planned to resume recruitment to both the MTP and the Career Assignment

Program (CAP), which is a developed program targeted to high potential middle managers.

When these reviews were examined collectively, some key themes were clearly discernable:

- strategic human resource planning is an essential element of business planning...;
- a comprehensive recruitment and retention strategy is required;
- workplace health needs urgent attention;
- pride in the public service needs to be addressed, and employee contributions need to be better recognized;
- compensation is a major issue;
- women continue to be under-represented in the Executive group;
- all equity groups are under-represented at all levels;
- a learning culture needs to be developed, and corporate management development programs need to be aligned and improved to create a continuum for leadership development.<sup>64</sup>

This was considered to be the first step in the process of renewing the public service.

Progress was to be reviewed regularly and the government's course of action would continue to evolve as it made adjustments based on the lessons learned.

In her next annual report, Bourgon noted that while the symptoms of the crisis remained, under the auspices of La Relève, public servants were taking action and promoting reform throughout the bureaucracy. Three key ongoing challenges were articulated: transforming the public service into a borderless institution; promoting a continuous learning culture within public service; and detecting, supporting and developing leadership at all levels of the organization.

A borderless institution was defined as one in which artificial departmental silos were broken down and replaced with a spirit of teamwork, co-operation and the free exchange of people, ideas and information:

This [borderless institution] does not mean it has organizations without structure, without legislative frameworks or without accountability.

Rather, it is an institution committed to recognizing the barriers to the flow of ideas and information with and among public sector organizations. Some of the barriers are physical, others are built into our information systems, but most are cultural. The cultural barriers are the most difficult to overcome.<sup>65</sup>

A commitment to training and development was identified an essential component of the continuous learning organization. But it is not sufficient in itself. A learning organization avoids repeating past mistakes; it generates new ideas; and it disseminates knowledge. Bourgon's successor, Mel Cappe, noted that the public service has not yet created this transformation; he stressed that the public service still needs to capitalize on the formal and informal learning opportunities that are available, technological advancements that can enhance learning and training, and better incorporate knowledge of best practice in the public and private sectors.<sup>66</sup>

Understanding the importance of leadership and ensuring that the public sector is able to promote effective values-based leadership is another key component of realizing La Relève. Leadership, as defined by both Bourgon and Cappe, is not confined to managers and the executive group. Leaders can emerge from anywhere within the public service. More importantly, the public service must consciously make an effort to nurture leaders at all levels of the organization. Keeping in mind that cultural barriers to civil service reform are some of the most difficult to overcome, it is not surprising Cappe called for a specific type of leader: "We need leaders who do more than create a cultural change – we need leaders who create a culture of change."<sup>67</sup> To be effective, leaders must "have a sense of direction, they are the servants of their followers, share power with others, foster inclusiveness, value and support their people, lead by example, and have the ability and willingness to learn continually coupled with a capacity for honest self

assessment.”<sup>68</sup> Furthermore, values-based leadership demonstrates a respect for the rule of law and democratic institutions and, above all, it upholds the public interest.

One significant reform to come out of La Relève, was the addition of the Accelerated Executive Development Program (AEXDP) in 1997. The program was developed for those who have been identified as potential deputy ministers or assistant deputy ministers and complemented the MTP and CAP discussed earlier. These are all special development programs, but all public managers participate in formal government-wide training programs at three points in their career – at the supervisory, middle manager and executive levels. Each of these individual formal learning programs has evolved quite considerably over time. Generally there has been a move to ‘action learning,’ whereby formal classroom instruction is complemented by practical application in the workplace and a period of reflection to analyze the experience; individual learning is tied in more directly with organizational learning; and formal learning experiences are linked with informal ones.<sup>69</sup>

It is obviously too soon to make a final pronouncement on the effectiveness of La Relève. This does not mean that the sceptics and critics have not expressed their concerns. Lindquist and Paquet offered their assessment: “At worst, La Relève...might be viewed as more a high-profile, self-education effort for public-service executives but having little material impact on the day-to-day working environment of most public servants.”<sup>70</sup> Their view is that the fanfare associated with this reform cannot mask the reality that there were years of neglect and inattention to the morale and needs of public servants. But further developments in the public sector have provided reason for optimism.



Perhaps the most significant event was the formation of a new agency, The Leadership Network, in June 1998. Instead of relying exclusively on rhetoric and good intentions, the creation of this new horizontal organization was a concrete demonstration of the federal government's institutional commitment to ensure the continued momentum of La Relève. Reporting to the Committee of Senior Officials (the Deputy Minister community), and working in close partnership with departments and agencies, regions, the Public Service Commission, Treasury Board Secretariat and CCMD, The Leadership Network has been given a mandate "to promote, develop and support networks of leaders at all levels throughout the Public Service of Canada, and to assist them in the ongoing challenge of La Relève."<sup>71</sup> There are three components to The Leadership Network: 1) Leadership Network Development, charged with the responsibility of reaching out to all public servants to inform and promote dialogue; 2) La Relève Action Support Team, which will facilitate the ongoing implementation of this renewal effort; and 3) the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) Corporate Secretariat. This latter unit will provide a variety of supports to the ADMs, who have collective responsibility for ensuring that the needed renewal is achieved.

Most public sector organizations seem to have taken the advisement that the time and resources devoted to the training and development of civil servants needs to be bolstered. However, despite notable improvements – for example, Statistics Canada has made a commitment to invest over 3% of its annual budget allocation for training (compared with 1% in the early 1990s) and to provide an average of 6 training days per employee per year, while Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) has been working to provide each employee with 5 personal development days each year<sup>72</sup> – the

amount of time and money devoted to public service employee training is still considerably less than what is spent by leading private sector organizations. Even with the increased awareness of the need to invest in public sector employees to augment competitiveness, we suspect this disparity will prevail for some time.

Some of the more progressive public organizations that are strongly committed to learning have implemented programs whereby each civil servant's learning needs are assessed and reviewed annually. An individualized learning plan is developed and various training courses are taken as appropriate.<sup>73</sup> These may be in-house programs offered by the department itself or another public service organization or external courses developed by colleges, universities or private training centres. Solicitor General Canada, for example, provides several in-house learning opportunities, but it is also partnering with Health Canada to access the numerous career management and learning programs that are available in this much larger department. This inter-departmental collaboration is exactly the type of development the Clerk had in mind when she spoke of a continuous learning organization and borderless institution.

Numerous other learning and training arrangements have been undertaken, but it is interesting to note that there has been no uniformity in the types of responses that have been outlined. This reflects the reality of cultural differences within the various public sector organizations and that the needs of no two departments are identical. Notwithstanding the diversity of departmental learning and training plans, there were some recurring elements. One of the most commonly cited actions by departments was the development of competency profiles for staff; this included executive or management competencies as well as those for other employees in the organization. There was also a

heavy reliance on the creation of career plans and the provision of career counselling, the identification and use of mentors, and a greater reliance on rotational and interchange assignments so that employees could develop a broader knowledge base and new skills both within the department and across the public sector more generally. A few departments mentioned the desire to engage in cross training with other public sector organizations and partnership agreements with universities, while others wanted to incorporate or expand upon their use of the 360 degree feedback process.<sup>74</sup>

Within the realm of training and development there has been an emergence of best practice. First, the top leaders, not the human resources department, should manage learning because they will be better able to link it with the overall strategic directions of the organization. Second, organizations should endeavour to provide development programs internally, rather than by sending employees to generic executive development programs at universities and private training centres, so that they can be customized to better reflect their unique culture, values and needs. However, the actual delivery of the customized program may be contracted out. Experiential learning, active learning and action learning are replacing traditional classroom-based programs. The course content of leadership development programs has also evolved. Rather than focusing on the traditional skills, like strategic planning, these programs are devoting more attention to imparting people management, or ‘soft’ skills. Finally, public sector managers as opposed to professional teachers or trainers are increasingly delivering these programs.<sup>75</sup>

Having outlined the training programs and initiatives that have been undertaken to develop a competent and effective cadre of public servants, capable of coping with the challenges of managing change in a time of increasing ambiguity, complexity and global

interconnectedness, the next section of the paper will outline the relationship of the DND and the CF to the federal bureaucracy and establish parallels between the personnel challenges and responses in the public service as a whole to those in the military. The leadership challenges of the public sector are great to be sure, but they assume an even greater intricacy when viewed from the perspective of the military establishment.

### **DND and the Canadian Forces: A Unique Relationship with the Federal Bureaucracy**

As noted above, cultures and needs differ greatly from department to department in the Canadian public service. Perhaps nowhere is this statement more valid than when applied to the Canadian military. In organizational terms, the CF forms a distinct and unique arm of DND and the federal bureaucracy, one with its own mission, hierarchy, heritage, discipline system, specialized infrastructure and equipment. Formally, the CF is held accountable to the Canadian public through the Minister of National Defence, who relies on advice and support both from the Deputy Minister (DM) and the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS).

Both the DM and the CDS are appointed by governor-in-council. The former is responsible for formulating advice for the Minister on policy matters and management concerns; in addition, this individual manages the day-to-day operations of the department on behalf of the Minister. The CDS implements government decisions involving the CF, issues orders and instructions and is responsible to the Minister for the ability and readiness of the CF to fulfill its commitments.

DND, therefore, is organized in such a way that there is a duality of civilian and military control. In some instances, civilian employees at DND do report to the CDS but

it is important to recognize that they are not in the military chain of command. Similarly, the DM can issue directives but not orders to military personnel performing administrative tasks under his or her authority.

Unlike any other department or agency, military personnel can be called upon to die for the country, an aspect of the service creed that is taught early on as a central tenet of the military ethos. The obverse of this is that, under specified conditions, circumstances and rules of engagement, its members are permitted to use lethal force in order to defend Canada.

The military performs unique missions. Not surprisingly, these missions necessarily call for special professional and leadership skills rarely, if ever, employed by other members of the public service. Still, as will be detailed below, there are many parallels and commonalities in both the nature of challenges faced by the public service and the military, and the approaches each is taking to address the strategic imperative of organizational renewal.

### **The Profession of Arms and the Definition of Leadership in the Military**

The study of professionalism and leadership in the military has been the subject of literary writings for centuries. The lessons illustrated and centrality of the themes, most of which have a timeless, cross-cultural application, mean that Sun-Tzu, Thucydides and Clausewitz still have a popularity and relevancy today. Writers, researchers and practitioners – the latter successful military officers – have tried to ‘capture in a bottle’ the essential qualities of the successful leader. A review of these qualities shows that some have remained constant, while others have evolved as the innate conditions of military life, missions, societal conditions, and the nature of war have changed. In the

relatively modern context of 1862, Antoine de Jomini wrote: “The most essential qualities for a general will always be as follows: – a high moral courage, capacity of great resolution; secondly, a physical courage which takes no account of danger. His scientific or military acquirements are secondary to the above-mentioned characteristics.”<sup>76</sup>

The public service and military share some important values and professional ideals, chiefly the concepts of loyalty and service to Canada and Canadians, as well as competence, fairness and integrity. In the military, great emphasis has always been placed on leaders having what are referred to earlier in this paper as ‘people values’ – courage, decency, responsibility, and reasonableness. Some values are less important within the military context, where execution of an operational mission on occasion assumes a primacy and other values are sacrificed – service to clients, democratic values, and economic efficiency are examples. As well, military personnel such as pilots and infantry may see their professional esteem or leadership talents tied to some degree to their natural talents, technical proficiency and eye-hand co-ordination necessary to the performance of their duties.

Certain characteristics have, on a consistent basis, been seen as desirable in the military leader. They are distinctly ‘human’ traits, and include physical courage, calm under fire, confidence and cheerfulness. In the Second World War, Canada’s General Crerar listed moral strength, determination and physical fitness as highly necessary in the leader, and higher education and general knowledge as essential, while leaving no doubt as to the prime function of the military leader: “...the highest responsibility of an officer in the Army, whether Non-Commissioned, Warrant, or Commissioned is effectively to lead and command his men in battle.”<sup>77</sup>

Despite the availability of classic military leadership texts, as well as more modern pedagogical examples and trends, the military historically has never been particularly devoted to formal education or professional and leadership development programs.<sup>78</sup> It has been reflected in the quality of some of the formal offerings provided. As with examples from the public service, like the now defunct Centre for Executive Development noted above, the CF in the past has had its share of development programs that have failed because they did not bring a suitable level of professionalism or rigour to the curricula, such as the former National Defence College.<sup>79</sup>

Since 1945, the battlefield environment – on land, at sea, and in the air – has become increasingly technologically sophisticated, what has more recently been termed the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs,’ with the chief and most relevant advancements being made in weapons and surveillance systems, and C<sub>4</sub>I. In turn, the people needed to operate this equipment must be bright, skilled and resourceful. As with the public service, the military needs an increasing proportion of its workforce who will be highly-skilled, knowledge-based employees. But it is not just about technology: as Majoor points out with respect to the CF, an infantry sergeant deployed today on a peacekeeping or enforcement mission must bring with him or her an understanding of civil-military relationships, propaganda and counter-propaganda skills, negotiation and police techniques, cultural and historic sensitivities, and skill in dealing with the media. In addition to conventional warfighting skills, the same leader must also be able to deal with suicide bombers, guerrilla and infiltration techniques.<sup>80</sup> And with regular force levels significantly lower than they were ten years ago, more is being asked of fewer people.

This increasingly lengthy list of skills a CF leader must have at his or her disposal has been added to by external, global conditions. While the military does perform internal security and disaster relief operations, the CF has, since 1945, been most visibly employed on foreign missions, in peacekeeping, conflict resolution, or warfighting scenarios.

In the post-Cold War era, the CF may increasingly be called upon to operate on missions that are not defined as war but otherwise bear every semblance of armed conflict, as in the recent case of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry deployment to Afghanistan. With NATO boasting of an increased membership and willingness to commit itself outside traditional treaty theatres and geographic spheres of operations, the potential for Canadian personnel to be in harm's way increases. With it come leadership challenges. Looking back at his time in Bosnia, Brigadier-General Charles Lemieux wrote: "Conditioned by an environment [the Cold War] where all possible contingencies and their generally agreed responses had been rehearsed in detail, they [officers and NCOs] had been plunged into chaotic operations which traditional doctrines had not foreseen."<sup>81</sup> This created the need, says the Special Advisor on Professional Development to the CDS, for "a military ethos that retains the concept of the soldier as a 'warrior', complemented by a view of the soldier as a 'diplomat and scholar.'"<sup>82</sup>

Not surprisingly then, Pigeau and McCann discovered in their research at least 90 characteristics that were deemed desirable to a good modern commander.<sup>83</sup> Recently, *Officership 2020*, the CF blueprint for the future officer corps, emphasized several broad



characteristics deemed desirable, including sound leadership, high standards of professionalism, critical thinking and the willingness to embrace and manage change.<sup>84</sup>

It is worth concluding this section by establishing the distinction, in the military context, between leadership and authority. A strictly defined and visible hierarchy, coupled with command appointments and a Code of Service Discipline contained in the *National Defence Act*, mean that leadership *roles* in the military and their concomitant authority are never ambiguous, but are clearly assigned, be it to officers, warrant officers or NCOs, and widely promulgated. In the military, one does not need to ask who has authority, because rank and responsibility (and with it certain assumptions of professionalism) are worn on the sleeve or epaulettes. Legal authority is assigned, and there are inherent characteristics to command positions, quite regardless of the person who fills that appointment.<sup>85</sup> While himself subject to established hierarchy and discipline, the captain of a warship at sea exercises near-absolute authority over the ship and its ship's company. This is due not to his leadership skills *per se*, but because of the authority inherent in his appointment in command of the vessel. But how he or she commands the vessel, his or her level of professionalism and leadership skills, will ultimately determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the ship. In common with public servants then, the respect, loyalty and commitment of the lower ranking military personnel towards superior officers will be enhanced if they are thought to 'lead by example.'

### **The Challenges**

The CF faces a major recruitment and retention challenge, one that is similar in many respects to the public service's 'human capital' challenge detailed at the outset of

this paper. In the 2002 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, the situation in the CF was summarized thus: “The Canadian Forces needs to fill shortages in most of its military occupations. Over 3,000 positions are vacant...Currently, there are not enough trained and effective personnel in the Canadian Forces to meet occupational demands.”<sup>86</sup> It went on to stress that personnel shortages in the military are more difficult to correct than in other organizations because new employees are normally only brought in at the lower or entry level. As an example on the subject of retention, the report notes that attrition in the combat arms occupations has been concentrated within the first three years of service, when 72 percent of non-commissioned infantry members leave the CF.<sup>87</sup>

As noted elsewhere, Canada is an aging population, meaning that a smaller demographic pool is available from which to recruit.<sup>88</sup> With a relatively low unemployment rate in mainstream society, plus higher compensation, more incentives, individual freedoms and superior living conditions outside the military, the CF (as with the public service) is not necessarily an attractive employment option for many young people. This is one challenge.

A second is recognizing the need to inculcate leadership at all levels. As discussed earlier, Bourgon and Cappe have stated the need for the public service to identify and nurture leadership at all levels of the organization. This need has similarly been identified within the DND, where it is a necessity borne not only of good public or human resources policy, but also of the evolving nature of war. As Majoor points out, greater technologies and capabilities mean that leadership responsibilities are cascading down to lower levels of troops, traditionally those who would have been simply ‘followers.’<sup>89</sup> New technologies are quite literally ‘empowering’ sailors, soldiers and air force personnel as

never before. Modern weaponry, surveillance and communications suites allow junior people in the field to view or impact the battlefield environment on a massive scale once reserved for far more senior leaders directing much larger units.

This is coupled with an evolving warfighting doctrine, which has assumed a primacy since the end of the Cold War. The Canadian army (along with most Western militaries), supported by the air force and navy, is committed to the concept of developing and executing manoeuvre warfare. Manoeuvre warfare aims to dislocate and disrupt the enemy into catastrophic collapse, rather than through ‘head-to-head’ attrition warfare. Manoeuvre warfare aims to disrupt command and control, and so is ideally suited to the capabilities of technologically-superior nations with stand-off weaponry within their inventory.

A key concept at the heart of manoeuvre warfare is a style of command called “directive control,”<sup>90</sup> where (junior officers and/or NCOs) leaders of small units are given the freedom to respond to evolving tactical situations and battlefield environments. Directive control necessarily emphasizes command (leadership) over control (management). A leader must display creativity and courage in decision-making, and clearly for this to happen collectively and for victory to be achieved, leadership has to be first developed, and then exported and maintained in a greater proportion of CF members than ever before.

A third challenge is reversing the decline in the stature of the CF. This necessarily affects the quality of followers and leaders who choose the military as a career. In marketing terms, the CF ‘brand’ reached perhaps its nadir during the 1990s. Next year (2003) will mark the ten-year anniversary of the murder by Canadian soldiers of Somali

teen Shidane Arone. Few incidents in recent history have so hurt the public estimation of the CF, and in particular its supposed leadership ideals, as this murder and the subsequent controversial and truncated inquiry. As one commentator noted: “We often heard during the Somali inquiry that the classic ideal of a military officer was based on the principle of service. An officer places the interests of his soldiers ahead of his own. And we saw how this ideal was eroded and subverted and turned on its head, time and time again, in our armed forces.”<sup>91</sup> There can be no question that this incident seriously damaged the professional standing of the CF, and so impacted recruitment externally and morale internally. In retrospect, the one slender redeeming aspect to this otherwise sordid and shameful period in the history of the CF, is that it apparently formed part of the catalyst for change, for the program of renewal that began at roughly the time of the inquiry, and which continues today.

Finally, it should be noted that the CF, despite unification, is not a homogenous service, but rather three distinct branches – army, navy and air force – which are further broken down by internal divisions and loyalties such as those of the regimental system. Overarching all this is the civilian component to the DND and the National Defence Headquarters. According to some critics, this system of internecine rivalries as well as a ‘headquarters mentality’ has presented an obstacle to military education, command and leadership development.<sup>92</sup>

### **Responding to the Challenges: Leadership Development for the Military**

Recognition of these challenges, and an awareness of the changing nature of the tasks uniformed personnel are called upon to perform, resulted in several important initiatives to reform leadership and professional development in the CF. In March, 1997,

then Minister of Defence, Doug Young, submitted his *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*. In it, he ordered an overhaul of leadership and management of officer professional development, and he created the Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.<sup>93</sup>

As a result of this report, a number of initiatives were launched. The report called for a review of the curricula and quality of instruction at the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College (CFCSC) to reflect 21<sup>st</sup> century military operations, with an emphasis on leadership and management, and the creation of new three- and six-month courses for colonel/captain (navy) and general rank officers respectively, with a focus on leadership.<sup>94</sup> The RMC was also ordered to carry out a review of its programs.

As noted earlier in this paper, DND released *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020* (or *Strategy 2020*) in 1999, which provides a strategic framework and planning overview for the military as a whole. The report also identified the need to support decisive leadership development. In keeping with the vision in this document, and against the continuing backdrop of major cuts in personnel numbers, an increase in operational tempo, and the Somali inquiry, in February 1999 then CDS, General J.M.G. Baril, created the Office of the Special Advisor on Officer Professional Development (later the term 'Officer' was removed) to define the professional development requirements of the CF leadership of the future, and come up with a plan for making it happen.<sup>95</sup>

The result, after a period of research and consultation, was the release in February, 2001 of *Canadian Officership in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Strategic Guidance for the*

*CF Officer Corps and the Officer Professional Development System, or Officership 2020.*

The report outlined the increasing complexity of future conflict and the capability gap the CF needed to bridge in order to meet those future challenges. The Minister of National Defence at the time, Art Eggleton, noted in the introduction to this document that *Officership 2020* was ‘the next step’ to achieving the *Strategy 2020* objective of developing decisive leaders.<sup>96</sup>

*Officership 2020* is one part of a package of leadership or professional initiatives launched or announced within the past three years. Others include *NCM Corps 2020*, to address leadership and professionalism among non-commissioned ranks, the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI), the Professional Development Oversight Committee, the establishment of a formal governance structure, planned centres of excellence, and the Canadian Defence Academy (opened in April, 2002 with a mandate to oversee RMC, CFCSC and the CFLI). Of note, the Canadian Defence Academy will provide professional development and education for both officers and Non-commissioned Members, thus ensuring that leadership development takes place at more junior or lesser ranks as well as within the officer corps.

The true test will be how these various initiatives are implemented, and the quality of leader they produce, circa 2020. While the public service has some useful practices to share, not all would work for the military. Included among the latter are private sector cross-fertilization programs and executive placement of business fellows, an initiative of the CCMD described previously. The CF has travelled a similar road before. From the late 1960s to mid-1990s, CF professional programs tended towards incorporating civilian business education models, the result being, according to one critic,

“bureaucratic management processes that ultimately eclipsed traditional ideals of leadership...Or put another way, if there was a realization that higher education was necessary, now the ‘coveted’ MBA and MPA became the new icon and panacea for future military educational needs....”<sup>97</sup>

Part of the failure to cross-pollinate business programs to the CF may be explained by the growing academic body of literature that supports the thesis that management as an activity is quite different from leadership and command. Dr. Bill McAndrew sums it up as follows:

Concepts of leadership and management co-exist, but uneasily...Traditional concepts of officership and relatively recent management practices have contradictory norms. Government, armies and societies in general have not been notably successful in harmonizing them. They may be essentially irreconcilable. Consider their fundamental difference...One is concerned with end results, bottom lines and the premises of economic analysis; the other with the complex human dynamics of persuading individuals to do things that rationally they would not ordinarily do.<sup>98</sup>

The passage is preceded by the quote: “Managers loaded soldiers onto landing craft for Normandy. Leaders led them off.”

Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Bradley observes that management and leadership are parallel to the modern concepts of ‘transactional leadership’ and ‘transformational leadership.’ These two terms have emerged only in the past 25 years. They are defined as follows: the transactional leader identifies goals and objectives, standards of performance and monitors followers to ensure satisfactory performance. This is akin to management. The transformational leader, on the other hand, relies on the intrinsic motivation of the followers; there is a strong moral component as the leader presents a compelling vision

and asks followers to transcend their own interests for the sake of the unit. This is leadership.<sup>99</sup>

In his research, Bradley found that the majority of content in formal leadership courses offered by the CF constituted transactional or management training. He believes that this must change, so that “our officers and NCOs learn as much about influencing the actions of subordinates as they do about controlling subordinates.”<sup>100</sup> Bradley notes that this has already begun to happen, as transformational leadership as a concept is highlighted in *Strategic Vision 2020*.

Despite increasing technologies that assist the CF to perform or manage military missions, it is likely that leadership will always be essentially an endeavour characterized by human skills. Pigeau and McCann have written: “Command is a uniquely human behaviour...In principle, command is a behaviour that any military person – regardless of rank – can demonstrate as long as 1) he or she is being creative, and 2) this creativity is in the service of a mission.”<sup>101</sup>

Bradley cites Rost, who described management as an authority relationship, where leadership on the other hand is an influence relationship.<sup>102</sup> As already discussed, the authority relationship in the military is guaranteed, highly visible through the organizational structure and norms that are omnipresent. Clearly, then, the military must focus on developing transformational leadership programs.

## **Conclusions**

As the Canadian military and the public service plan for the future, one is struck by the strong commonalities at work. They share many needs. Both are embracing strategic solutions to effect change, embarking on a program of long-overdue renewal,



where recruitment, retention, conditions, compensation, professionalism and issues of organizational self-esteem are to be addressed. Intelligent and skilled personnel are needed. Both have also recognized and taken steps to create and develop a continuous learning culture, and a continuum for leadership development.

As both a best practice and necessity, both organizations have made it a priority to support and develop leadership at all levels. Like the public service, the military has launched a package of new initiatives to address concerns about professionalism and leadership. In the military context this is especially important, given the commitment to integrating new technologies and the doctrine of manoeuvre warfare.

Recruitment and retention should be top priorities. Engineering and technicians are in particularly high demand in the military, areas that usually command high salaries in the private sector. Higher educational standards on entry are necessary, but at the same time recruitment and retention programs must address the reality that the post-baby boom generation may define 'loyalty' and 'job satisfaction' differently from previous generations that followed military careers. These recruitment and retention initiatives must themselves be characterized by leadership qualities such as creativity, innovation, accountability and adaptability.

Finally, if the military performed no other functions than those that demand traditional transactional leadership or management skills, then generic, off-the-shelf leadership and development programs that emphasize management rather than inspirational, transformational leadership might suffice. Clearly, however, that is not the case. Given the unique nature of missions performed by the military, in a warfighting scenario within the doctrine of manoeuvre warfare, special programs must be created that

develop transformational leadership skills compatible with the range of present and potential future requirements. These programs must emphasize the sometimes stressful circumstances in which the military operates, and be able to reach and capture the attention of the most junior officer or NCO, to the most senior. Solutions underway or planned within the public service might not dovetail precisely with military needs, but best practices and models likely could provide valuable input into the leadership programs newly underway in the military. As with the public service, these programs should either be developed internally or, at the very least, in conjunction with external institutions so as to account for the unique military culture and specific leadership competencies required for the CF to carry out its missions. To do otherwise will prevent the military from developing, throughout all levels of the organization, the types of leaders needed to cope with the new realities of a dramatically altered global landscape.

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<sup>1</sup> See for example, Peter Larson and Robert Mingie. *Leadership for a Changing World: Developing Executive Capability*. (Ottawa: Conference Board of Canada/CCMD), Report 95-92, 1992; and Peter E. Larson. "Current Practices in Executive Development in the Canadian Private Sector" in *Canadian Public Administration*. 33, 3, Fall 1990, 340-347.

<sup>2</sup> Canada. Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet. *Fourth Annual Report to the Prime Minister on the Public Service of Canada*, 1997, chapter 6, p.2.

<sup>3</sup> Canada. Office of the Auditor General. *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons*, 2001, chapter 2, p.1.

<sup>4</sup> Mel Cappe, Clerk of the Privy Council, outlined these priorities shortly after taking up his appointment. See for example, Mel Cappe. "Make the Investment: Make a Difference" *Notes for an Address by the Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet to the Association of Professional Executives*, Ottawa, Ontario, June 9, 1999. Public sector renewal or administrative reform, however, is not a new phenomenon. A study of administrative reform in the federal government from 1962-1991 revealed that there tended to be a new push for reform every three to five years. See A.W. Johnson. *Reflections on Administrative Reform in the Government of Canada, 1962-1991*. (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada), 1992.

<sup>5</sup> The Ontario provincial government has also been grappling with leadership issues and, in 1997, created the Centre for Leadership in the Cabinet Office. The challenge of nurturing talent and leadership has similarly pre-occupied American public sector practitioners and scholars. See for example, John Dingwall. "Leadership Development and Performance in the Ontario Public Service: An Interview with Linda Stevens" in *Canadian Government Executive*. 3, 2002, 6-10; and Patricia Ingraham, Sally Selden and Donald Moynihan. "People and Performance: Challenges for the Future Public Service – the Report from the Wye River Conference" in *Public Administration Review*. 60, 1, January/February 2000, 54-60.

<sup>6</sup> Paul M. Tellier. "Public Service 2000: The Renewal of the Public Service" in *Canadian Public Administration*. 33, 2, Summer 1990, p.129.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, the article by Ira Lewis. "Public Service 2000 and Cultural Change in the Department of National Defence" in *Canadian Public Administration*. 37, 2, Summer 1994, 249-266, which examined the challenges inherent in the application of PS 2000 to DND.

<sup>8</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence. *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, 1997, "Introduction" and "Military Leadership." Available online at [www.dnd.ca/eng/min/reports/pm/mnd.60.html#TOC](http://www.dnd.ca/eng/min/reports/pm/mnd.60.html#TOC).

<sup>9</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence. *Report of the Board of Governor's Study Group Review of the Undergraduate Programs at RMC*, 1997, "Introduction." Available online at [www.dnd.ca/menu/press/Reports/rmc/eng/doc\\_e.htm](http://www.dnd.ca/menu/press/Reports/rmc/eng/doc_e.htm).

<sup>10</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence. *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*, 1999. Available online at [www.vcds.dnd.ca/cds/strategy2k/intro\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/cds/strategy2k/intro_e.asp).

<sup>11</sup> Canada. *Public Service 2000: The Renewal of the Public Service of Canada*. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), 1990, p. 63.

<sup>12</sup> Cappe, *Notes for an Address*, 1999, p.1.

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<sup>13</sup> Many public service leaders have questioned the relevance and appropriateness of this term; it was thought to be a hackneyed private sector concept that did not resonate in the public sector. See Canada. Association of Professional Executives of the Public Service of Canada (APEX). *Survey of Leaders of the Public Service of Canada on Their Vision of the Development of the Public Service*, Final Report, July 2000, pp.5-6.

<sup>14</sup> Kenneth Kernaghan. "Career Public Service 2000: Road to Renewal or Impractical Vision?" in *Canadian Public Administration*. 34, 4, Winter 1991, 551-572.

<sup>15</sup> Canada. *A Strong Foundation: Report of the Task Force on Public Service Values and Ethics*. (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development), 2000 [1996], p. 23.

<sup>16</sup> Kernaghan, "Career Public Service 2000," 1991, p. 553. This is essentially what Evert Lindquist and Gilles Paquet, "Government Restructuring and the Federal Public Service: The Search for a New Cosmology" in Evert Lindquist, Editor. *Government Restructuring and Career Public Services*. (Toronto: IPAC), 2000, 71-111, have referred to as the "traditional cosmology" of the career public service.

<sup>17</sup> The merit principle is no less important to the civil service today. A recently released government document states: "Merit is the bedrock of a competent, non-partisan and representative Public Service...." See Canada. Public Service Commission. *Merit – A Competent, Non-Partisan and Representative Public Service*, February 2002. Available online at [www.pse-cfp.gc.ca/ee/merit/index\\_e.htm](http://www.pse-cfp.gc.ca/ee/merit/index_e.htm).

<sup>18</sup> Robert B. Best. "The Meaning of 'Merit' in Canadian Public Administration" in Robert F. Adie and Paul G. Thomas. *Canadian Public Administration: Problematical Perspectives*. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc.), 1990 [1987], p.55.

<sup>19</sup> The shortcomings of these earlier civil service reforms are well documented in O.P. Dwivedi and James Iain Gow. *From Bureaucracy to New Public Management: The Administrative Culture of the Government of Canada*. (Toronto: Broadview Press), 1999, chapter 3; Best, "The Meaning of 'Merit,'" 1990; and J.E. Hodgetts. *The Canadian Public Service: A Physiology of Government, 1867-1970*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 1976 [1973], chapter 12.

<sup>20</sup> It should be noted that notions of what constitutes "merit" have changed over time from determining the "best qualified" amongst the pool of applicants to "individual merit," whereby an individual's qualifications are measured against a given standard, to determinations of whether a public servant has the "competency" to do a job.

<sup>21</sup> Dwivedi and Gow, *From Bureaucracy*, 1999, p.85.

<sup>22</sup> For an overview of the issue of the perceived benefits associated with a representative bureaucracy, see Canada, *Merit*, 2002; and Kenneth Kernaghan and David Siegel. *Public Administration in Canada: A Text*. (Scarborough: ITP Nelson), 1999, chapter 24. For a current assessment of how the federal government has fared in this regard, see Douglas Booker and Sally Luce. *The Road Ahead: Recruitment and Retention Challenges for the Public Service*. (Ottawa: Public Service Commission of Canada), February 2002.

<sup>23</sup> A Task Force was established in April 1999 to examine the issue of visible minorities in the federal public service. See Canada. Task Force on the Participation of Visible Minorities in the Federal Public Service. *Embracing Change in the Federal Public Service*, March 2000.

<sup>24</sup> However, there was some latitude given to civil servants under the Public Service Employment Act of 1967. This legislation allowed civil servants to attend political meetings and to make political donations. As a result of a Charter case in the early 1990s, there are now virtually no restrictions on the political activity of public service employees.

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- <sup>25</sup> Canada, *Public Service 2000*, 1990, p.13. For a detailed discussion of administrative culture and values in Canada, see Dwivedi and Gow, *From Bureaucracy*, 1999.
- <sup>26</sup> Kenneth Kernaghan. "The Emerging Public Service Culture: Values, Ethics and Reforms" in *Canadian Public Administration*. 37, 4, Winter 1994, p.617.
- <sup>27</sup> Elsewhere, Kernaghan argues that for this very reason the public service requires a clear code of conduct. See Kenneth Kernaghan. "Towards a Public-Service Code of Conduct – and Beyond" in *Canadian Public Administration*. 40, 1, Spring 1997, 40-54.
- <sup>28</sup> Canada, *A Strong Foundation*, 2000.
- <sup>29</sup> Leonard White. *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall), 1926. Reproduced in part in Jay M. Shafritz and Albert C. Hyde. *Classics of Public Administration*. (Texas: Harcourt Brace College Publishers), 1997 [1978], p.46.
- <sup>30</sup> There is considerable disagreement in the literature on this point.
- <sup>31</sup> Tait argued that while the government did not have a responsibility to provide life-time employment to civil servants, as an employer it should make sure that they are acquiring and developing the skills necessary to retain their 'employability.' A move to the principle of employability rather than employment means that public servants are encouraged to view their work as impermanent, which seriously weakens loyalty and commitment to the institution. See Canada, *A Strong Foundation*, 2000, chapter 3.
- <sup>32</sup> Dwivedi and Gow, *From Bureaucracy*, p.90
- <sup>33</sup> The public debt peaked at \$583.2 billion in the 1996-97 fiscal year, and currently stands at \$547.4 billion. Debt reduction has been possible because the government has realized fiscal surpluses since 1997-98. A good source to consult for an in-depth examination of the reasons for the growth in the size and scope of the state in general and the specific application of fiscal policy in Canada, see John Strick. *The Public Sector in Canada: Programs, Finance and Policy*. (Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing), 1999, chapters 5 and 17.
- <sup>34</sup> Lindquist and Paquet, "Government Restructuring," 2000, p.79.
- <sup>35</sup> Dwivedi and Gow, *From Bureaucracy*, p.90.
- <sup>36</sup> Lindquist and Paquet, "Government Restructuring," 2000, p.81.
- <sup>37</sup> Canadians have been increasingly losing confidence and trust in their political leaders and the professionals who carry out their policies. See for example, David Zussman. "Do Citizens Trust Their Government?" in *Canadian Public Administration*. 40, 2, Summer 1997, 234-254. But this is not a problem unique to Canada. See Joseph S. Nye Jr. "New Models of Public Leadership" in Frances Hesselbein, Marshall Goldsmith et al, Editors. *Leading Beyond the Walls*. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1999, 279-287.
- <sup>38</sup> See for example, David Osborne and Ted Gaebler. *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector*. (Reading: Addison-Wesley), 1992; Michael Barzelay. *Breaking Through Bureaucracy: A New Vision for Managing Government*. (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1992; Timothy Plumptre. *Beyond the Bottom Line: Management in Government*. (Halifax: IRPP), 1991 [1988].
- <sup>39</sup> For a discussion of the application of New Public Management in the Canadian context, see Kenneth Kernaghan, Brian Marson and Sanford Borins. *The New Public Organization*. (Toronto: IPAC), 2000; Dwivedi and Gow, *From Bureaucracy*, 1999, chapter 5; Mohamed Charih and Arthur Daniels, Editors. *New Public Management and Public Administration in Canada*. (Toronto: IPAC), 1997; Peter Aucoin, *The*

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*New Public Management: Canada in Comparative Perspective*. (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy), 1995; Donald Savoie. "What is Wrong with the New Public Management?" in *Canadian Public Administration*. 38, 1, Spring 1995, 112-121; and Sanford Borins. "The New Public Management is Here to Stay" in *Canadian Public Administration*. 38, 1, Spring 1995, 122-132.

<sup>40</sup> Lindquist and Paquet, "Government Restructuring," 2000, p.88.

<sup>41</sup> Savoie, "What is Wrong," 1995, has perhaps levelled the greatest criticism towards New Public Management.

<sup>42</sup> Patricia Ingraham, B. Guy Peters and Donald Moynihan. "Public Employment and the Future of the Public Service" in B. Guy Peters and Donald Savoie, Editors. *Governance in the Twenty-First Century: Revitalizing the Public Service*. (Montreal: CCMD/McGill-Queens University Press), 2000, 385-422.

<sup>43</sup> Booker and Luce, *The Road Ahead*, 2002; Canada, *Report of the Auditor General*, 2001, chapter 2.

<sup>44</sup> B. Guy Peters. "The Future of Reform" in B. Guy Peters and Donald Savoie. *Governance in the Twenty-First Century: Revitalizing the Public Service*. (Montreal: CCMD/McGill-Queen's University Press), 2000, p.431.

<sup>45</sup> Canada, *Fourth Annual Report to the Prime Minister*, 1997, chapter 6, p.2.

<sup>46</sup> Canada, *A Strong Foundation*, 2000, pp.1-2.

<sup>47</sup> Kenneth Kernaghan. "Shaking the Foundation: New versus Traditional Public Service Values" in Mohamed Charih and Arthur Daniels, Editors. *New Public Management and Public Administration in Canada*. (Toronto: IPAC), 1997, 47-64.

<sup>48</sup> On several occasions, including the infamous Al-Mashat affair of 1990, the government has publicly blamed civil servants for administrative decisions, a disturbing trend that has jeopardized the principle of ministerial responsibility and public service anonymity.

<sup>49</sup> There is disagreement on these points. For example, Borins, "The New Public Management," 1995, p.126 argues "by promoting specificity of goals and by reducing anonymity, the new public management is strengthening accountability." See also, Canada, *A Strong Foundation*, 2000; Savoie, "What is Wrong," 1995; and Kernaghan, "The Emerging Public Service," 1994.

<sup>50</sup> Peters, "The Future of Reform," 2000, p.427.

<sup>51</sup> OECD. *Public Sector Leadership for the Twentieth Century*. (Paris: OECD), 2001; Mel Cappe. "The Leadership Challenge in a Modern Public Service" *Notes for an Address by the Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet at the Assistant Deputy Ministers' Forum*. Ottawa, Ontario, October 2001; Gilles Paquet and Lise Pigeon. "In Search of a New Covenant" in Evert Lindquist, Editor. *Government Restructuring and Career Public Services*. (Toronto: IPAC), 2000, 475-498; Canada, *A Strong Foundation*, 2000, chapter 6; Steven Rosell. *Changing Frames: Leadership and Governance in the Information Age – Report of the Roundtable on Renewing Governance*, 2000. Available online at [www.viewpointlearning.com/changingframes/changingframes.pdf](http://www.viewpointlearning.com/changingframes/changingframes.pdf); Nye Jr., "New Models," 1999; Ole Ingstrup and Paul Crookall. *The Three Pillars of Public Management: Secrets of Sustained Success*. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press), 1998, chapter 4; Lorette Goulet. "First You Must Believe" in Canadian Centre for Management Development. *The Dewar Series: Perspectives on Public Management – Strategic Leadership for Public Sector Renewal*. (Ottawa: CCMD), 1996, 33-40; Michael Keating. "The Australian Experience in Public Sector Renewal and Strategic Leadership" in Canadian Centre for Management Development. *The Dewar Series: Perspectives on Public Management – Strategic Leadership for Public Sector Renewal*. (Ottawa: CCMD), 1996, 55-67; Larson and Mingie, *Leadership*, 1992.

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- <sup>52</sup> Canadian Centre for Management Development, *CCMD – An Overview*, (Ottawa: CCMD), 1989, p.2.
- <sup>53</sup> Dwivedi and Gow, *From Bureaucracy*, 1999, p.138.
- <sup>54</sup> Canadian Centre for Management Development, *Annual Report*, (Ottawa: CCMD), July 2000, p.3.
- <sup>55</sup> Dwivedi and Gow, *From Bureaucracy*, 1999, p.140.
- <sup>56</sup> Donald Savoie. “Developing Leaders for the Public Sector: Discussion Summary” in *Canadian Public Administration*. 33, 3, Fall 1990, p.274. See also, Alex Lowy and Becky Taylor. “Executive Development in Canadian Municipalities: Current and Future Perspectives” in *Canadian Public Administration*. 33, 3, Fall 1990, 306-321; Claude Allard, Donald Evans and Kevin Malone. “Executive Development in the Provincial Public Sector” in *Canadian Public Administration*. 33, 3, Fall 1990, 322-327; and Arthur Stevenson. “Survey of Executive Development: Results” in *Canadian Public Administration*. 33, 3, Fall 1990, 328-339.
- <sup>57</sup> Savoie, “Developing Leaders,” 1990, argued that universities had a key role to play in providing training for public sector leaders. In his view, there were many opportunities for collaboration with universities to complement in-house training and development programs. See also, Sanford Borins. “The Role of Universities in Public Administration Education” in *Canadian Public Administration*. 33, 3, Fall 1990, 348-365, who maintained the government should dedicate resources to encourage academic research into areas of interest in public management, and give individuals more flexibility to choose among the government, university and private executive programs to find the most suitable one for their specific needs.
- <sup>58</sup> Tellier, “Public Service 2000,” 1990, p.126.
- <sup>59</sup> Lewis, “Public Service 2000,” 1994, p.263.
- <sup>60</sup> See Canada. Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to Cabinet. *Public Service 2000: A Report on Progress*. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), 1992, chapter 7.
- <sup>61</sup> More recently, Jocelyne Bourgon claimed that neither of these programs was living up to expectations; departments have reduced their demand for management trainees and the participants have lamented that their assignments have not been sufficiently challenging. See Canada, *Fourth Annual Report*, 1997, chapter 6, p.9. This trend has clearly been reversed. During the *La Relève* planning exercise most departments specified an intention to participate more fully in the MDP, CAP and AEXDP. See Canada, *La Relève: A Commitment*, 1997.
- <sup>62</sup> Robert McIntosh. “Public Service 2000: The Employee Perspective” in *Canadian Public Administration*, 34, 3, Autumn 1991, p.511.
- <sup>63</sup> Canada, *Fourth Annual Report*, 1997, chapter 6.
- <sup>64</sup> Canada. Privy Council Office. *La Relève: A Commitment to Action*, 1997, p.3. See also, Canada. Privy Council Office. *First Progress Report on La Relève: A Commitment to Action – Overview*, March 1998; and Canada. Privy Council Office. *First Progress Report on La Relève: A Commitment to Action – Detailed Reports*, March 1998.
- <sup>65</sup> Canada. Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet. *Fifth Annual Report to the Prime Minister on the Public Service of Canada*. (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada), 1998, p.2.
- <sup>66</sup> Canada. Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet. *Ninth Annual Report to the Prime Minister on the Public Service of Canada*. (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada), 2002, p.8.

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<sup>67</sup> Cappe, Mel. “The Leadership Challenge in a Modern Public Service” *Notes for an Address by the Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet at the Assistant Deputy Ministers’ Forum*. Ottawa, Ontario, October 2001, p.7.

<sup>68</sup> Canada, *First Progress Report – Overview*, 1998, p.45. See also, Cappe, “The Leadership Challenge,” 2001; Cappe, “Make the Investment,” 1999; Canada, *Fifth Annual Report*, 1998.

<sup>69</sup> Kernaghan, Marson and Borins, *The New Public Organization*, 2000, pp.212-214.

<sup>70</sup> Lindquist and Paquet, “Government Restructuring,” 2000, p.94.

<sup>71</sup> Peter Harrison. “Renewal in the Public Service of Canada: Sustaining the Momentum with The Leadership Network,” 2002. Available online at [www.leadership.gc.ca/static/info/tln-1rl/tln\\_momentum\\_e.shtml](http://www.leadership.gc.ca/static/info/tln-1rl/tln_momentum_e.shtml).

<sup>72</sup> Canada, *La Relève: A Commitment*, 1997, p. 70, 76; Canada. Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to Cabinet. *Public Service 2000: A Report on Progress*. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), 1992, p.56.

<sup>73</sup> Some of the public service organizations that have chosen to implement learning plans/training plans/personal development programs include Canadian Heritage, CIDA, Environment Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, and Solicitor General Canada. See Canada, *La Relève: A Commitment*, 1997.

<sup>74</sup> Canada, *La Relève: A Commitment*, 1997.

<sup>75</sup> Kernaghan, Marson and Borins, *The New Public Organization*, 2000, p.222.

<sup>76</sup> Antoine de Jomini. *The Art of War*. (New York: Lippincott), 1862. Quoted in Dr. Hal Klepak. “Some Reflections of Generalship Through the Ages” in Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, Editors. *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership*. (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing), 2001, p.19.

<sup>77</sup> Geoffrey Hayes. “The Development of the Canadian Army Officer Corps, 1939-1945”, A Paper Presented to the Canadian Historical Association. Quoted in Dr. Bill McAndrew. “Canadian Officership: An Overview” in Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, Editors. *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership*. (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing), 2001, p.45.

<sup>78</sup> See much of Dr. Ronald G. Haycock. “The Labours of Athena and the Muses: Historical and Contemporary Aspects of Canadian Military Education” in *Canadian Military Journal*. 2, 2, Summer 2001, 5-20. DND, however, has been making efforts to increasingly take advantage of the leadership development programs offered by the federal civil service under the auspices of La Relève.

<sup>79</sup> For a scathing criticism of the NDC, see Appendix 1 to John A. English. *Lament for an Army: The Decline of Canadian Military Professionalism*. (Concord: Irwin Publishing) 1998.

<sup>80</sup> Sergeant Arthur Majoor. “Changing Structures for Tomorrow’s Leaders” in *The Army Doctrine & Training Bulletin*. 3, 2, Summer 2000, p.26.

<sup>81</sup> Brigadier-General Charles Lemieux. “Articulating the Vision of the Canadian Officer Corps of 2020: Understanding the Leadership and Ethical Challenges” in *Canadian Military Journal*. 3, 1, Spring 2002, p.3.

<sup>82</sup> Lemieux, “Articulating the Vision,” 2002, p.16.



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- <sup>83</sup> Dr. Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann. "What is a Commander" in Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, Editors. *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership*. (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing), 2001, p.81.
- <sup>84</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canadian Officership in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (Officership 2020), Strategic Guidance for the Canadian Forces Officer Corps and the Officer Professional Development System*, 2001, p.6-7.
- <sup>85</sup> Pigeau and McCann, "What is a Commander," 2001, p.87.
- <sup>86</sup> Canada. Office of the Auditor General. Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons – 2002, 2002. Chapter 5, p.1.
- <sup>87</sup> Canada, *Report of the Auditor General*, 2002, p.3.
- <sup>88</sup> Majoor, "Changing Structures," 2000, p.26.
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