PROFESSIONS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND THE MILITARY

SUBMITTED TO CANADIAN FORCES LEADERSHIP INSTITUTE

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31 March 2003

The Ambiguity of the Term ‘Professional’

There is no common understanding of the terms ‘profession’ and ‘professional’. In everyday usage, their meaning is confused and confusing. Members of virtually every occupation claim professional status and advertisements promise that jobs ranging from washing cars to neurosurgery will be done ‘professionally’. Even in a military context, the term ‘professional army’ does not necessarily mean the same thing as an army made up of professionals but usually refers to a full-time standing force made up of people who are paid for their military service

Consequently, any attempt to deal with issues surrounding professionalism is fraught with debate. Simply by changing the definition of professional, we can include or exclude various components of the military. Thus only military officers can be professionals (Huntington, 1957) or, contrarily, everyone including civilian contractors working with the military can be considered military professionals. This means that the resolution to some of the debates in the field will depend upon the definition of professional that is used.

It is obvious that by definition the term ‘professional’ lies at the heart of the CF Professional Development System. However, a lack of agreement concerning the definition of the terms ‘profession’ and ‘professional’ is an obstacle to the development of this system. Debates about issues such as whether non-commissioned members can be called professionals and about the role of the ‘warrior ethos’ in the CF create confusion in the minds of many CF members about their professional status. In this paper, I will take a broad approach in order to try to sort out some of the ambiguities inherent in this concept in order to enhance its utility for those concerned with improving military leadership.

According to Friedson (1986), we should not be surprised with the definitional confusion surrounding the term ‘professional’. The Oxford English Dictionary tells us that prior to the 16th century, the words ‘profess’ and ‘profession’ referred to a declaration, avowal, or expression of intention or purpose. The context of this usage related to clerical vows and to the training of clergy in the medieval university. The term eventually became more broadly applied to law, to some branches of medicine, and to the military. These occupations not only involved a high level of learning, but were also occupations that were typically filled by members of the upper classes (Friedson, 1986). The term thus became associated with high status occupations. Unfortunately, other usages also became common and as far back as the 16th century the word ‘professional’ could be used to refer to almost any occupation.

A concurrent usage distinguished between ‘professional’ and ‘amateur’. In this distinction, the connotation of the term changes from one of higher status to one of lower status. An amateur in this sense approaches an activity for higher motives, rather than for the crass economic motivation of the professional. Friedson illustrates this usage with a quote from the graduate program announcement in the 1877-78 *Johns Hopkins University Register*: “‘The Johns Hopkins University’ ... announced [that it] ‘provides advanced instruction, *not professional*, to properly qualified students in various departments of literature and science” (1986:23). In a second variation of this distinction, professional status is not always lower than amateur status if we think of the connotation of an amateurish job compared with a professional job. A third variation of the professional-amateur distinction can be seen in the context of those who do

something for a living (professionals) and those who do it only occasionally with no expectation of profit (amateurs)[1].

Given the number of different meanings that have been attached to the concept, it is no wonder that the term is so confusing and so difficult to use analytically. The term is so broad that it encompasses the different meanings involved in describing "professional" fingernail technicians, "professional" football players, "professional" robbers, "professional" lawyers, and "professional" politicians. After reviewing the usage of the term, Friedson, who is probably the leading academic authority in this area, concludes that: "All in all, I would argue that, as a concept capable of dealing with more than prestige and the fact of formal knowledge, with the way professionals can gain a living, and with the institutions that shape the way they gain a living, *profession* must be used in a specific historical and national sense. It is not a scientific concept generalizable to a wide variety of settings. Rather, to use Turner's epithet, it is a historically and nationally specific 'folk concept'"(1986:35).

This definitional confusion does not make it easy to conduct or to assess research on professionalism. If the choice of criteria and the degree to which one feels that these criteria must be met determine whether a particular occupation will be professional or not, consensus

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[1]Hackett has cleverly used the peculiarities of the term 'professional' to describe his own enlistment in the British Army: "I know one Oxford undergraduate who went on record in 1932 as saying that since a second world war was inevitable he would take a regular commission because he found it tidier to be killed as a professional than as an amateur. He was aware of the characteristic English argument that it was more elegant to be killed as an amateur, but he elected for the other option" (1983: 145).

will be difficult to achieve in all but the clearest cases. To try to bring a greater degree of clarity to the discussion, we can turn to the sociological research that has been done on professionalism.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PROFESSIONALISM

How do Sociologists Define Professionalism?

Sociology often has difficulty using terminology taken from the language of the broader society, because concepts in common use are not precise enough to be used in empirical research or in the development of theory. Thus it is important to define terms so that they can be used by social scientists. Sociologists have used a wide range of criteria to define professionalism. These criteria are more in the nature of ideal types than of rigid criteria that must be met if an occupation is to be called a profession. No profession can completely meet all of these criteria, so we should look at the elements of professionalism as being a matter of degree rather than as a 'yes' or 'no' decision. Among the characteristics that have been used to define professionalism are:

1. *Abstract, specialized knowledge.* Professionals have abstract, specialized knowledge of their field, based on formal education and interaction with colleagues. Education provides the credentials, skills, and training that allow professionals to have job opportunities and to assume positions of authority within organizations. Gross (1958) has pointed out that a broad range of

knowledge is important because the professional ‘produces’ an unstandardized product - that is, each case and each situation dealt with by a professional is to some extent unique. No two patients, legal problems, or battles are alike and professional experience and insight are required to deal with these unique circumstances. Because professionals must be prepared to deal with novel situations, they need a broad education that provides them problem-solving skills as well as technical skills. Professionals should also be committed to rationality (Parsons, 1939) which means that they have the responsibility to use the best methods, rather than just falling back on tradition or custom.

Professionalism requires a combination of intellectual and practical knowing (Wilensky, 1964). That is, a professional must have a grasp of both theory and practice. Further, this knowledge must be applied in a field that has sufficient depth that it is not easy to master and that requires long training. If the knowledge required to master the field is too narrow or too general, the public will not support the occupation’s claim to professional status.

2. *Autonomy*. Professionals are autonomous in that they can rely on their own judgment in selecting the relevant knowledge or the appropriate technique for dealing with a problem. Functionalists view professional autonomy as part of an exchange in which society allows the professions to maintain their own regulations and standards and in return provide expert service to society.

However, if professionals abuse their autonomy or fail to provide appropriate services society may withdraw from the bargain. This implies that there is a continual negotiation between a profession and the broader society - professional powers are not given in perpetuity[2].

3. *Self-regulation.* Part of the autonomy given to professionals is the right to self-regulation, although the degree to which various professions are allowed to regulate themselves varies widely. All professions have licensing, accreditation, and regulatory associations that set professional standards and that usually require members to adhere to a code of ethics as a form of public accountability. These standards are typically drafted and enforced by members of the profession. Usually, entry to the profession is controlled by other professionals.

4. *Authority.* Because of their authority, professionals expect compliance with their directions and advice. Their authority is based on mastery of the body of specialized knowledge and on their profession's autonomy: professionals do not expect the client to argue about the professional advice rendered.

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[2]There have been many examples of professions losing some of their autonomy after perceived abuses of authority. For example, some governments have imposed very strict criteria on sexual contact between doctors and patients after widely-publicized cases of abuse. Lay people were appointed to boards regulating the conduct of doctors and lawyers when these professions appeared to be protecting the interests of their members rather than the interests of the broader society.

5. *Altruism*. Ideally, professionals have concern for others. The term altruism implies some degree of self-sacrifice whereby professionals go beyond self-interest or personal comfort so that they can help a patient or client. As Hackett has succinctly stated: "There are occupations in which what is demanded of those who pursue them cannot be entirely regulated by contracts between men"(1983: 202).

   Professionals also have a responsibility to protect and to enhance their knowledge and to use it in the public interest. Professions have codes of ethics to guide their members' behaviour. A profession can be seen as a calling (something that one 'professes'), and its practitioners make up a moral community in a Durkheimian sense.

6. *High Status*. Many, but certainly not all, contemporary professionals are well-paid. However, while professionals may or may not be highly-paid, they do have high status. From a functionalist perspective, pay and prestige serve to ensure the continued attraction of the best and brightest people to professional careers while conflict theorists believe that professionals use their monopolistic control to ensure that they are well-paid. Research on occupational prestige shows that professions in the traditional fields of law, medicine, and academia are ranked at the top of the prestige ladder in all western countries.

While these are the ideal characteristics of professionals, we should not lose sight of the fact that

professions are not defined on the basis of a checklist based on these characteristics, but as the result of a process of social definition. Ultimately, clients, members of related professions, and the broader society determine whether an occupation achieves and retains professional status. Professionalization is always contested and even once the contest has been won, the process remains dynamic. This can be illustrated by a brief review of changes in the nature of the medical profession in the U.S over the past 60 years.

The Changing Medical Profession

Freidson (2001) has described the Golden Age of American Medicine, a period in the 1940s and 1950s in which doctors were about as close as any group of professionals has been to the ideal type. The role of government in medical matters was minimal, except for giving doctors a legislated monopoly over the practice of medicine. Doctors were exempted from anti-trust legislation and were given exclusivity and control over medical practice. Doctors used this legislation very effectively to keep some potential competitors out of the marketplace (midwives), to limit the practices of others (optometrists, chiropractors), and to subordinate others to doctors (nurses, pharmacists). Pharmaceutical and medical technology companies also had to be responsive to doctors who effectively controlled the distribution and use of their products. Doctors also had control over the operation of most hospitals, which depended on the medical profession to provide them with paying patients. Medical schools were almost exclusively staffed by doctors and they controlled entry to practice through the medical licensing process. As Freidson noted “During this Golden Age, physicians had virtually complete control

over the terms, conditions, and content of their work" (2001:84).

While doctors still retain many of the ideal characteristics of professionals, the situation has changed considerably over the past 50 years. Doctors still have high prestige and are very highly-paid, but have lost much of their autonomy. The public have turned to alternative practitioners to fill many of their health care needs and specialties such as chiropractic and acupuncture have more secure and widely-recognized treatment roles. Increases in health care costs and the broader involvement of insurance companies in the United States have led to much greater control over treatment decisions. Similarly, in most other western countries government-funded medical care programs have also led to increased scrutiny and control over doctors' professional activities. The governments and insurers that now pay for most medical services have exerted greater control and the public, who pay for the services in either case, have largely supported restrictions on the professional freedoms of doctors. Also, because of the consumer movement, we now live in an environment in which the public expects to have more say in treatment decisions. While doctors still control entrance to the profession, a much higher proportion of the faculty in medical schools do not have medical degrees so students are receiving alternate perspectives.

This brief history of the evolution of the medical profession provides a good illustration that even in the case of the profession that probably best meets the ideal-typical criteria for professionalism, the nature and conditions of professionalism are constantly changing.

Theoretical Perspectives on Professionalism

While much of the sociological work on professionalism has focused on the characteristics of professionals, there have also been other perspectives. In this section, I will briefly look at four different approaches to professionalism: the structural functional approach; the power approach; the developmental approach; and the dynamic approach.

Structural Functionalism.

Most of the research on the characteristics of professions has been informed by this approach. Structural functionalists felt that the rights and privileges given by society to the professions helped to ensure that society received the best possible professional services. A major focus of their work was the search for criteria that differentiated professions from other occupations. This approach to the study of professions essentially came to a dead end in its search for criteria that differentiated professions from other occupations. Even the most traditional professions - law, medicine, clergy, university teaching, and the military - were so different from one another that it was futile to search for common elements that also excluded other occupations[3]. Despite this, their attempts to develop defining criteria have helped to generate an ideal type of professionalism that I will later use to compare the military to other occupational groups.

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[3]The vast majority of researchers talked only of law and medicine, as the other three professions only served to complicate the analysis even further.

The Developmental Approach

The developmental approach builds on the work of the structural functionalists by examining the development of professions over time (Wilensky, 1964). This approach does not simply look at the ideal characteristics of professions, but recognizes that the occupational terrain is contested and that occupations constantly battle to create or maintain their claims to professional status and the rewards that are believed to flow from designation as professionals. Nearly 40 years ago, Wilensky pointed out that the term "professionalization" was in danger of becoming meaningless, as some scholars felt that all occupations were professionalizing. Seeking to provide some academic coherence to the concept of professionalization, Wilensky looked at the history of 18 occupations (not all of which would be considered professions) and found a fairly good fit for a model of the sequence toward professionalism. The stages in this process were:

1. Full time service in the area of professional responsibility
2. Establishment of a training school
3. Formation of a professional association
4. Political efforts to get legal recognition and turf protection
5. Formal codes of ethics to ensure standards of practice and rules to protect clients.

Based on this analysis, Wilensky concluded that most occupations that aspired to professional status would not achieve that goal. Most did not meet a sufficient number of the criteria for

professionalism and were often trying to short-circuit the process by which established professions have achieved their position. For example, some of the aspiring professions were establishing professional associations before they had a knowledge base or university-based training.

The Power Approach to Professionalism

Sociologists George Ritzer (1977) and Magali Sarfatti Larson (1977) were among a group of researchers who developed a perspective on professionalization that was less positive about the role of professionals in our society than one that essentially said that professionals deserved their high pay and high status because of the valuable services they performed. The new approach focused on the power of professions, and its proponents felt that professions used their influence and status to solidify their social position, often at the expense of other social groups. Typical of those sharing this view is Randall Collins, who said that: "the rise of the professions in America, then, is an extension of the age-old struggles of self-interested groups using refinements of traditional tactics. They do not represent the technical needs of a new technocratic society" (1979:135). According to proponents of this approach, professionals are not necessarily altruistic servants of society, but are people who use their power and influence to maximize their own benefits.

According to MacDonald and Ritzer (1988) professions strive to carve out the area in which they wish to claim monopoly control, try to control as much as possible of work closely related to this

area without associating too closely with subordinate groups, and work to control battles for turf within the profession that might lead to splits that would reduce the power of the profession. Members of occupations hoping to attain or retain professional status develop ideologies that support their claim of exclusive jurisdiction over particular tasks. Sanders and Lyon have defined professions as: "those occupational groups that can successfully convince the public of the societal necessity of their skills and the 'rightness' of their authority. The maintenance of this authority rests upon control of access to and utilization of the 'essential' skills and upon codes of conduct which emphasize public service (1976:44)." Anybody with even a passing familiarity of the way in which doctors and lawyers have retained control over their areas of specialization will recognize the value of this approach to understanding how professions retain their power and prestige.

The Dynamic Approach to Professionalism

The most recent approach to professionalism has been developed by Andrew Abbott (1988) who takes a dynamic approach to professionalization. He sees an occupational world in which professions are competing within a larger system of professions for resources, people, and jurisdiction. Changes can occur in the external environment or within the profession that may precipitate changes in professions and some are better prepared to deal with change than others. Those that can alter their value systems, education and training systems, recruiting systems, or regulatory systems to respond to change will have a competitive advantage. Those professions that are not successful in this competitive environment will begin to lose their professional

legitimacy while those that do succeed will be able to expand their sphere of professional influence. For example, medicine successfully promoted a disease model of alcoholism that gave doctors the mandate to deal with this social problem. The loser in this fight was the clergy who had tried to claim that alcoholism was a moral vice that fell within their professional jurisdiction.

PROFESSIONALISM AND THE MILITARY

Is the Profession of Arms Really a Profession?

Some people have questioned whether members of the military are professionals, although this has not been a common view. Matthews (1994) has noted several of the reasons why some feel that the military is not a profession:

$ The military does not have a client like the other traditional professions who directly serve individuals.

$ Because military officers function only in large complex bureaucracies, they do not have the individual autonomy of other professionals.

$ Military skills involve killing people and some feel that this is not a suitable skill for someone called a professional.

$ Most military officers never use their skills at managing violence.

While the first two of these issues will be addressed in detail below, the last two objections have little merit. While military skills do include managing and using lethal violence, they do so only for reasons of national security and when these skills are demanded by the state. Thus the killing must be seen in its social context. While it is true that most never use these skills (or at least was true for western military forces throughout much of the Cold War), this should not be cause to reject the military's claim to professional status. Matthews observes that in fact the military provides societal security even when not directly involved in fighting wars. Further, he cites a 1962 West Point speech by General Douglas MacArthur's 1962 to demonstrate his view that this criticism lacks merit:

> [Being prepared for war] does not mean that you are warmongers. On the contrary, the soldier above all other people prays for peace, for he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war. Prevention is a major tenet of all professions, whether the aim is peace, health, or justice; those who practice it deserve respect.

Despite these objections, those few researchers who have considered the question[4] agree that military officers are professionals. Unlike many occupations, the military has not had to fight to have its professional status recognized, as it has traditionally been included with law, medicine,

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[4] Most sociological discussions of the military have either ignored the military or briefly noted that it is not like other professions and then moved on to a discussion of occupational groups like doctors and lawyers that are easier to analyze.

clergy, and university teachers as one of the original professions.

While a history of being considered a profession is important, we must realize that an occupation's status can change over time and that occupational claims of professionalism are constantly being challenged. Thus it is important to ask how the military rates on the criteria for professionalism considered in the previous section.

1. *Abstract, specialized knowledge.* There is no doubt that the military profession has a large body of specialized knowledge. Much, but not all, of this knowledge is created by the military, and all modern military forces dedicate a significant proportion of their resources to education and training. In fact, it would be difficult to find any other organization that devotes as much time and as many resources to the development and transmission of knowledge as the military.

   Unlike some occupations that aspire to professional status, the knowledge created and used by the military is far beyond the understanding of most citizens which further enhances the professional standing of the military. Compared with other professions, members of the profession of arms must have a high level of knowledge. For example, a fully-qualified fighter pilot (let alone a fighter squadron commander) has probably had as much technical education as a lawyer or family physician. However, this technical knowledge is only a beginning as moving up the military hierarchy requires deeper and broader skills. Few

processions require the skill sets of a senior officer who must be able to command joint and combined operations in the field, move to a job such as a UN tour where political skills are as important as technical ones, then be prepared to run the human resource department of an organization that in most countries is the largest government department. Senior members of the military have probably spent a greater proportion of their careers being trained and educated than members of any other profession. This education is progressive and continues as members move upward in the hierarchy[5].

The knowledge demands upon the military profession have become even greater since the end of the Cold War and the profession is struggling to adapt to this change (Snider and Watkins, 2000). Members of the profession of arms must be able to perform all the tasks that were part of their Cold War roles; to work effectively in peacekeeping and peace enforcement roles; and to carry out humanitarian and disaster relief. They may be called upon to carry out these tasks in virtually any part of the world so they must be prepared to understand the politics and cultures of countries around the globe. To cope with this diversity of potential tasks military professionals need an education that gives them a very high level of problem-solving skills. This means that a broad education in liberal

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[5] Since senior military members are responsible for other professionals, their knowledge is an important component of leadership. A U.S. Army study found that there was a strong link between competence and perceived leadership effectiveness (U.S. Army War College, 1971).

arts and science must be given to military professionals. Chilcoat has shown the diversity of training needed for someone who aspires to practice the strategic art:

> "From the business community.. strategists can learn methods for assuring organizational flexibility and quality of product. From psychologists and sociologists, strategists can develop sophisticated notions of how human societies function, allowing them to craft the most effective strategies possible for coercing enemy societies or repairing friendly ones. From cyberneticists, strategists can develop a better understanding of information systems, thus maximizing the effectiveness of their own while eroding that of opponents. And from moral philosophers, strategists can come to a better understanding of the ethical choices that form the foundation of their efforts" (1995: 14).

Of course this increased burden has not only fallen upon senior leaders. Former Marine Corps Commandant, General Charles Krulak spoke of the challenges facing his men and women when he described the 'three-block war': "'One moment they will be feeding refugees and providing other humanitarian relief. A few hours later (conducting peacekeeping operations) Marines will be separating fighting warlords and their followers... Later that day, they may well be engaged in mid-intensity, highly lethal conflict - and all this will have taken place withing three city blocks'. In short, so-called normal military operations have become ambiguous shape-shifting exercises characterized by an inter-mingling of civil, political, humanitarian, and combat dimensions"(Wenek, 2000:7) .

While many people had hoped that there would be a major peace dividend after the end of the Cold War, in fact the taskings of most western military forces

have increased. Thus not only must military personnel have a high level of knowledge and skills, but they must be prepared to use these skills frequently in ever-changing circumstances.

Members of the military control the distribution of the knowledge since they make up the majority of instructional staff at most educational and training institutions. The credentials that certify levels of competence within the profession are also controlled by military members. While military members do not have a monopoly on the knowledge, they do have a monopoly on its application.

2. *Autonomy*. The nature of the military profession does not allow for independent professionals - “military practice is group practice” (Hackett, 1983: 215). However, all professionals are increasingly being employed in large-scale bureaucracies so one must broaden one’s view of the nature of autonomy. In the military, everyone within the chain of command is a military professional so the system does collectively exercise professional judgment concerning the application of military force. The military are under civilian control, but this usually means that civilians give the military operational parameters and do not try to manage the military implementation of the operation[6]. While it is true that

[6]Although micro-management often does occur. In the 2003 Gulf War, small armies of lawyers are approving all bombing targets and press reports suggest that the Secretary of Defense

the military does not get to choose its missions, other professions also may have little control over the nature of their activities. For example, doctors don't control health care budgets or the nature of the diseases that are prevalent in their society.

Because the profession is completely embedded in a hierarchical bureaucracy, military professionals probably exercise more control over the selection, training, and discipline of members of the profession than any other profession. Members of the military control recruitment[7], personnel assessments and promotion, assignment to training schools such as staff college, and many other personnel-related matters.

Specialist professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and chaplains within the military have a degree of autonomy for decision-making within their areas of expertise, but may sometimes be placed in a difficult conflict of roles because they are also part of the military hierarchy. This can create strains when there is a

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has had extensive personal input into the operation. However, the same reports also suggest that senior military commanders rejected Secretary Rumsfeld's proposal to use only a small light force of 70,000 and compromised at a force level somewhat less than would have been mandated under the Powell Doctrine, but far larger than that proposed by the political leadership. While assessment of the accuracy of these reports will await analysis of the historical record, the scenario is typical of the interaction between civilian and military officials. Ultimately, of course, the will of the civilian leadership will prevail.

[7]On occasion, there is outside intervention in selection. Initiatives to employ women more equitably within the CF were imposed upon the military and the profession was opened up to gays and lesbians only when it became obvious that the courts would order this integration. In some circumstances the military have been able to resist this outside direction. For example, General Colin Powell was able to force President Clinton to back down on his plans to allow

conflict between military goals and professional standards.

3. *Self-regulation.* The usual model of self-regulation is the one that applies to professions that license, accredit, and regulate independent professionals. This model does not directly apply to military professionals but, in effect, the military organization does regulate the qualifications and conduct of its members and controls the entry to the profession. Just as doctors and lawyers are certified by their professional bodies, so military members are given the legal right to practice by their organizations. Huntington has said that the "commission is to the officer what his license is to a doctor" (1957: 16). This certification differentiates the professional from the lay person.

While most other professions have disciplinary power, the military is unique in that is has its own justice system with a range of powers that are far greater than those of other professional associations. Also, many professions have been forced to involve lay people in some of these decisions to a greater degree than military. In some cases, the military even has control over the non-occupational behaviour of its members. Finally, the military is also responsible for a code of ethics for its members.

4. *Authority.* Depending on how one defines the term 'client', one may feel the

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homosexuals into the U.S. military.

military does or does not have authority over clients. The conventional view is that the state is the client. At this level, in democratic societies the principle of civilian control means that the military does not have the ultimate authority over their actions, though their professional expertise means that their views must be seriously considered by their political masters. However, in an operational setting the military often has the right to use non-negotiable force, so it does have supreme authority over 'clients' in that context.

5. *Altruism*. The military is fundamentally an altruistic profession. Members of the profession of arms are subject to the principle of unlimited liability and no other profession demands this level of potential sacrifice. Further, the professional knowledge of the military is used to protect the interests of the public, not those of the individual member. Even in operations short of major war, military operations routinely demand much of the military member in terms of risk of death and physical and psychological discomfort. Also, throughout their careers military members must be available twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week[8]. Unlike some members of more highly-paid professions, the relatively modest salaries paid by the military are strong proof that military professionals are not motivated by financial gain.

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[8]Christmas dinner in a tent in Afghanistan is an indicator of altruism that would be eagerly avoided by members of most other professions.

While we normally think of the duties that military professionals owe to their society, their obligations are far broader. Wenek (2002) has discussed the 'complexity of military obligation' which refers to the moral obligations that military people have to those they work for (government and society), those they work with (superiors, subordinates, and peers), as well as to those who might be affected by military operations (civilians, people they are protecting, enemy soldiers).

The military has a professional ethos that supports altruism and that provides guidelines for the lethal power that has been given to members of the military profession. This ethos is "the internalized values and unwritten norms arising from the [military's] professional nature that enable its members to fight honorably, to risk and even give their lives for the nation, and to support national and international conventions on the moral and ethical conduct of military operations" (Watkins and Cohen, 2002: 78). A retired naval officer makes a very aarticulate statement of what the military ethos means to the individual member of the profession of arms in a letter to his son:

> "The naval profession is much like the ministry. You dedicate your life to a purpose. You wear the garb of an organized profession. Your life is governed by rules laid down by the organization. You renounce your pursuit of wealth. In a large measure you surrender your citizenship; renounce politics; and work for the highest good of the organization. In the final analysis your aims and objects are quite as moral as any minister's because you are not seeking your own good, but the ultimate good of your country. You train the men under you to be good

> and useful citizens, and, like the minister, what you say must conform to the rules of the organization" (Janowitz, 1960: 115).

The professional military ethos often differs from civilian values. For example, Snider, Nagl, and Pfaff (1999) have concluded that the postmodern values of relativism and individualism are not compatible with military professionalism. This means that the military socialization process must counteract influences from the civilian society.

6. *High Status*. The military is typically not given high status in western democratic societies nor are members of the military highly-paid, even at senior levels. Janowitz reports that as far back as 1955, military officers ranked below most professionals (including public school teachers) in occupational prestige[9]. NCMs rank even lower on the prestige scale.

Huntington, Janowitz, and the Military Profession

Perhaps the most widely-cited work on the military profession has been Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* (1957). Huntington has no doubt about the professional status of the military and his book begins with the statement "The modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man" (1957:7).

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[9]I have not been able to find any recent occupational prestige studies, but it would be interesting to see if the status of military personnel has changed after a decade in which the military have been highly visible in peacekeeping and humanitarian and disaster relief, as well as

According to Huntington, the profession of officership[10] was a product of the 19th century. Officers began to develop techniques, values, and standards during the Napoleonic Wars. Officership was limited to the aristocracy in European countries and both commissions and promotions were often obtained by purchase. One of the rationales advanced for this practice was that only those of high birth could possess the skill and judgment required to be successful in battle (Hackett, 1983). Once the trend toward a professional officer corps started, it spread very rapidly, as countries without professional officers found themselves on the losing end of battles and wars. Prussia was the model for the change, which began when the Prussians opened entry to the officer corps in 1808 (Hackett, 1983). The great success of the Prussian army, particularly their victory over the French in 1870, helped to overcome stubborn resistance to professionalization in countries like England and France. By 1900, most military forces had professional officers as membership in the aristocracy was replaced as the prerequisite for officership by education, training, and competence (Huntington, 1957).

While there will be some overlap with the previous section of this paper, I will review how Huntington reached the conclusion that military officers are professionals. His work has been very influential and some of his conclusions are worth considering in some detail. The criteria for professionalism that Huntington uses are: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness:

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in wars in the Gulf and with NATO actions in the former Yugoslavia.

[10]Huntington stated very explicitly that only officers were professional soldiers. The question of whether other ranks can be considered as professionals will be discussed later in this paper.

1. *Expertise.* Huntington makes clear that he is not just talking about learning a skill or craft, but rather to professional knowledge that is written and that has a history which must be understood by competent professionals. Professional knowledge has a history, and some knowledge of that history is essential to professional competence. He also asserts that in addition to mastery of their field of specialization (which encompasses both theory and practice), professionals must also have an understanding of the broader society. Specifically, he says that military officers must have knowledge of disciplines ranging from the liberal arts disciplines of history, politics, economics, sociology, and psychology to sciences including chemistry, physics, and biology. This broader education is also necessary if the officer is to develop judgment, imagination, and analytical skills (1957:14).

Huntington also addresses the nature of the knowledge base of the military professional. In addition to the specialized skills required to perform their combat roles military officers have a core skill in the management of violence[11]: "The skill of an officer is.....an extraordinarily complex intellectual skill requiring comprehensive study and training. It must be remembered that the peculiar skill of the officer is the management of violence not the act of violence itself" (1957:13). The officer's professional competence can be judged according to the

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[11]Hackett feels that a more precise statement of the function of the profession of arms is "the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem" (1983:9).

degree to which this skill has been mastered: "The larger and more complex the organizations of violence which an officer is capable of directing, and the greater the number of situations and conditions under which he can be employed, the higher is his professional competence" (1957:11).

2. *Responsibility to society*. To Huntington, social responsibility is the hallmark of the professional. He goes farther than most commentators by insisting that an occupation is not a profession unless the service performed is essential to the functioning of society. As an example, he says that a research chemist would not be a professional despite his or her intellectual skills because the research chemist's work is not essential. He also adds a moral component by noting his view that a person who uses his or her skills for antisocial purposes ceases to be a professional. Thus a code of ethics and extensive rules, regulations, traditions, and customs articulate what constitutes ethical practice. Needless to say, financial reward cannot be the main focus of the professional.

3. *Corporateness*. According to Huntington "the members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen. This collective sense has its origins in the lengthy discipline and training necessary for professional competence, the common bond of work, and the sharing of a unique social responsibility"(1957:10). Few, if any, professions would rank as high as the military on this dimension as the structure of the

> military necessarily involves a very closely-knit organization. Members of the military train together, are often deployed together for long periods of time, and may live together at their home units. These factors, along with their uniform, visibly separate the professional military person from other members of their society.

In Huntington's view, the highest military virtues are loyalty and obedience. While this applies throughout the military chain of command, he places a particular emphasis on the principle of absolute obedience by military leaders to civilian authority. To Huntington: "Civilian control in the objective sense is the maximizing of military professionalism. More precisely, it is that distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer corps" (1957: 83). The role of the military officer is not to question civilian policy but to carry it out as efficiently and effectively as possible.

This view of the need for absolute obedience to civilian authority has been widely-debated. Many disagree with Huntington's view that civilian control was assured through isolation of the military from political and diplomatic matters while the military had control over military operations. While most military professionals would agree with Huntington that civilian control is essential, most would probably not agree with his assertion that a professional military officer will not question civilian policy, but carry it out as efficiently and effectively as possible. In fact, most would probably not even feel it was possible to do so. There is so much overlap between

the military and political realms that military leaders cannot avoid political involvement. However, the bottom line is that the military must always defer to civilian leadership.

Huntington's views are most frequently contrasted with those of Morris Janowitz (1960) who felt that the isolation of the military was the wrong strategy and who insisted that the military would continually have to change to adapt to new social realities. Even in the 1950s it was clear to Janowitz that it was becoming increasingly difficult to separate military and civilian affairs and that military leaders were routinely involved in discussions of broad national security and foreign policy issues. He felt that the military would have to make changes in its basic values and become better-integrated into civilian society if it was going to adequately respond to social concerns. For Janowitz the military officer "is sensitive to the political and social impact of the military establishment on international security affairs. He is subject to civilian control, not only because of the 'rule of law' and tradition, but also because of self-imposed professional standards and *meaningful integration with civilian values* (Italics mine)(1960:420).

As an example of the need to incorporate civilian political concerns into military planning, Janowitz uses the example that in a nuclear era, the military would have to abandon its goal of a decisive victory in order to create a system of stable international relations. We can look at a similar example in the 2003 Gulf War where the military has had to deal with severe restraints on its use of force in order to prevent civilian casualties. From a strictly military perspective, this is not the best strategy to use, but if the political goal is to create a democratic state in Iraq that is sympathetic to the west, limitation of casualties is an absolute necessity. More broadly,

Janowitz felt that adaptation to social change is a measure of professionalism (1974). However, it is important that military leaders know where to draw the line between responsible and irresponsible advocacy in order to maintain the principle of effective civilian control.

Subsequent events have continued to provide support for Janowitz' views, and the need for soldier-statesmen is now widely recognized. The increasing complexity of modern warfare and military operations other than war makes it impossible to separate the military from politics and not just in national security debates. For example, the need to negotiate with politicians on matters such as resources supports the view that military "professionalism inherently has a political component" (Snider, Nagl, and Pfaff, 1999:13). Even in warfighting and in the broad range of military operations other than war, the prevalence of multinational operations means that political skills are a prerequisite to senior leadership.

The legacy of Huntington often carries on in the military in the form of a reluctance to address issues surrounding civil/military relationships and the role of the soldier-statesman. For example, Wenek (2002) cites research showing that many people in the military, including some senior leaders, do not fully understand the degree to which the ability of commanders to make decisions about matters such as taskings, personnel policies, and budgets are circumscribed by government policy. This is unfortunate, because unrealistic expectations on the part of CF members has led to a loss of faith in senior commanders who are blamed for matters they cannot control. Also, failure to address the issue explicitly means that members of the CF have little guidance on the appropriate role for military members in the development of national security

policy. It also means that the necessary expansion of the profession's knowledge base and in leadership and management systems has not taken place (Janowitz, 1960).

Professionalism: The Bottom Line

The research discussed thus far makes it clear that professionalism is a difficult concept to define. Given the work that has been reviewed in this paper, it is hard to escape Freidson's conclusion that:

> The future of profession lies in embracing the concept as an intrinsically ambiguous, multifaceted folk concept, of which no single definition and no attempt at isolating its essence will ever be generally persuasive. Given the nature of the concept, such a theory is developed by recognizing that there is no single, truly explanatory characteristic - including such a recent candidate as 'power' - that can join together all occupations called professions beyond the actual fact of coming to be called professions (1983: 32-33).

Given this conclusion, how should the CF address the issue of professionalism? Does it make a difference whether or not we consider members of the CF to be professionals? Why not just avoid the debate by avoiding the term 'professional'?

There are several reasons why I would argue that the term 'professional' should not only be used, but should be embraced by the CF. First, there is reasonable consensus that there is a profession of arms. While it is clear that the military is a profession, it is also clear that it is a profession like no other. It is a profession that cannot be practiced by individuals outside the military organization; that imposes the burden of unlimited liability upon its members; that has a

collective client; that involves a bureaucracy that has absolute authority by rank; and that has the over-riding constraint of civilian control. However, there is some debate about what constitutes this profession. For example, Watkins and Snider quote the response they received from a U.S. Army officer to a general's criticism of a lack of professionalism of junior officers: "How can I be a professional without a profession?"(Watkins and Snider, 2002: 545). While I would like to see more than just anecdotal research on this issue, I would guess that many military personnel would have difficulty defining the military profession. This means that any military force must first decide how it wishes to define the profession of arms. Next, the values and principles must be taught to each member of the force, both in the classroom and in the field, and senior managers should regularly assess the degree to which professional standards are being met.

Second, people in the military will continue to use the term whether or not it is part of the organization's lexicon. Professionalism is an issue in the broader society and is also part of the international military discourse.

Third, using the term 'professional' and giving it an explicit definition has implications for the way the organization interacts with its members. For example, it is not usually appropriate to closely supervise professionals (who after all, are the experts at what they do), but rather to coordinate their work by creating an environment of trust up and down the chain of command. The need for direct supervision is reduced if members adhere to an ethical code that is part of the system of internal governance. This conflicts directly with the hierarchical approach that is typical of large organizations. Whether or not members of the organization are considered as

professionals will make a difference in how they are trained, educated and deployed.

Factors Affecting Military Professionalism

It would be relatively easy to create a "laundry list" of some of the factors affecting military professionalism. However, such a list would inevitably be incomplete and the items on the list would change frequently. Thus it would be more useful to provide a framework that can be used to systematically identify factors and to easily document changes in them. Snider, Nagel and Pfaff (1999) have developed such a framework in their work on the U.S. Army which can easily be adapted for use in other military organizations.

Snider, Nagl, and Pfaff have created a matrix illustrating some of the factors affecting military professionalism. While I won't go through the entire matrix, I will look at their analysis of two of the cells to illustrate that it might be a useful way to look at military professionalism and to show that it could easily be utilized by the Canadian Forces.

FIGURE 1
FACTORS AFFECTING MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

COMPONENTS

Level of Analysis	**Military Technical**	**Ethical**	**Political**
Society	Land mine ban MOOTW missions	Post-modern or egoist ethic	Casualty averse, interventionists
Military Institution	RMA, resources, recruiting, and declining professionalism	The Professional Military Ethic, and force protection	Powell Doctrine[12] and force protection
Individual Soldier	Individual skill, retention	Individual values	Individual politics, civil-military 'gap'

Source: Snider, Nagl, and Pfaff, 1999: 3

The top left box includes some of the societal issues that currently impact on military professionalism. Two of these are the ban on land mines and the governmental and public demand for military operations other than war. Public sentiment against land mines represents an intrusion into the manner in which military forces fight their battles by insisting that the use of land mines be restricted. This has led to a change in traditional military tactics to replace mines with other defensive measures.

The second factor, the new emphasis on military operations other than war, has had a much more dramatic impact on military forces. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been seemingly endless demands for military participation in peacekeeping missions. This has placed a great

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[12]The changing nature of the factors affecting military professionalism is demonstrated by the fact that in 1999, Snider and his colleagues saw the Powell Doctrine as a major constraint on the U.S. Army. However, in the first days of the 2003 Gulf War many military analysts are criticizing the government in which General Powell now plays a major role for ignoring the

stress on human and financial resources during a period when military budgets in most western countries have been significantly cut. While this societal factor has had a huge impact on military operations, it appears to have had much less impact on the military profession. For example, Wenek reports the results of a survey of senior CF officers which found that "the emergent post-Cold War activities associated with contributing to or maintaining international peace and security do not seem to have registered as a core responsibility for the CF, despite what the Canadian public may think" (n.d., 13)[13]. This suggests that there is a gap between the missions conducted by the CF and senior officers' perceptions on the role of the CF.

The next box down in the military-technical column presents several internal factors that have an effect on military professionalism. A major effectiveness issue that is faced by military leaders is the match between commitments and capabilities and the ensuing problems of 'ops tempo'. If military leaders cannot obtain sufficient resources to meet commitments, professionalism will be affected. Also, the Revolution in Military Affairs has increased demands for technically sophisticated equipment and enhanced training. If this is not done, a military force's professionalism will decline relative to other countries.

This matrix can be used as a relatively simple way of identifying issues that have an impact on professionalism in the CF and can help to guide subsequent action. For example, referring to another cell in the matrix, if the broader public culture has values that differ in significant ways

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Powell Doctrine by sending too few troops for the initial invasion of Iraq.

[13]There is also research showing that U.S. military personnel share these attitudes toward

from those of the military, and if recruits are increasingly heterogeneous the job of socializing them into a professional military culture will be more difficult. However, the military must do the research that is necessary to ensure that differences between public and military values are necessary ones[14].

Professionalism and the Strategic Art

Chilcoat (1995) has argued that it is necessary to take an integrated approach to the military, economic, diplomatic, and informational realms. The integration of these fields is called *strategic art*, which Chilcoat defines as "the skilful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources to promote and defend the national interests (1995:iii). While the military is subordinate to civilian leadership, both military and political leaders must work together and each must have some understanding of the other's field.

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military operations other than war.

[14]Snider, Nagl, and Pfaff have suggested that postmodern values such as moral relativism and individualism are not compatible with professional military values. Many military professionals were surprised at the U.S. Army's recent recruiting campaign focusing on 'An Army of One'. This campaign was obviously designed to appeal to the individualistic values of potential recruits and not to the collective values of serving members of the Army. According to one of the Army's press releases concerning the new recruiting message:"the phrase **An Army of One** articulates the strength of the U.S. Army in words that resonate with today's prospective recruits... Because today's youth live in a ME, NOW culture, An Army of One infiltrates that self-focused mindset and shows the personal benefits of being a Soldier and the rewards of serving in their nation's military force".

According to Chilcoat, revolutionary changes in military affairs, technology, systems of information and communication[15] as well as changes in the global political situation have merged "the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war into a single, integrated universe in which action at the bottom often has instant and dramatic impact at all levels" (1995:1). These changes mean that military tactics, operations, and strategy must be combined with the economic and diplomatic tools of national security[16]. Examples such as the war on terrorism and the complexities of working with the different parties involved in military operations other than war show that security cannot be achieved without understanding and cooperation among a wide variety of organizations. For the military, the need to practice the strategic art means that leaders not only be trained in traditional military skills, but also have an understanding of politics and economics and have the skills to work cooperatively with people from a wide variety of different external organizations and with people from different political and cultural backgrounds. While Chilcoat recognizes that the need to be proficient in strategic art is greatest for the senior

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[15] Two distinctly different types of communication systems are having a significant impact on the military. One is the public communications system in which immediate news broadcasts from anywhere in the world, the Internet, and personal communication by cell phone mean that external communications cannot be controlled by the military. The impact of this global communication network on the military cannot be underestimated. For example, a U.S. military planner was quoted as saying the U.S. military was reluctant to cut off electricity in Baghdad in the Iraq invasion because:"Do you want to see pictures on CNN of the baby who died because power to the incubator was cut off?" (Atkinson and Ricks, 2003: A01). The second communication system is the information technology that gives commanders a digital battlefield where the location of forces can be pinpointed in real time.

[16]It would, of course, be helpful if Canada had a national security strategy to provide guidance for the agencies, including the Canadian Forces, which will be involved in implementing such a strategy. It is very difficult to develop the necessary clarity of vision within the military if the civilian leadership has no coherent national security policy. Such clarity would also help to ensure that national security was adequately funded, which is crucial to the

leadership, it is apparent that the same principles apply throughout the organization. Even a very junior NCM can be in a situation where he or she is involved in complex multinational negotiations - often in the harsh light of the international media - in the course of routine peacekeeping or peace enforcement activities. Thus professional training in strategic art is required at all levels of the organization and career development programs should be designed to recognize the need for experiential learning in this area.

Are NCMs Part of the Profession of Arms?

While there is little debate about the professional status of military officers, there is a great difference of opinion about the professional status of non-commissioned members. While the draft CF Profession of Arms manual clearly gives them professional status, many analysts do not agree. Huntington is one who does not feel NCMs can be considered professionals:

> "The enlisted men subordinate to the officer corps are a part of the organizational bureaucracy but not of the professional bureaucracy. The enlisted personnel have neither the intellectual skills nor the professional responsibility of the officer. They are specialists in the *application* of violence not the *management* of violence (italics mine). Their vocation is a trade not a profession. This fundamental difference between the officer corps and the enlisted corps is reflect in the sharp line which is universally drawn between the two in all the military forces of the world. If there were not this cleavage, there could be a single military hierarchy extending from the lowest enlisted man to the highest officer. But the differing character of the two vocations makes the organizational hierarchy discontinuous. The ranks which exist in the enlisted corps do not constitute a professional hierarchy. ... The difference between the officer and enlisted vocations precludes any general progression from one to the other" (1957: 17-18).

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development of a professional military.

Huntington adds that if the term ‘professional’ is applied to enlisted personnel, it implies someone who is employed in an occupation full time rather than as a person who “pursues a ‘higher calling’ in the service of society” (1957: 8). The latter connotation only applies to officers. Huntington considers the officer’s commission as the certification of professional status. By definition, NCMs are non-commissioned, so they lack this professional certification.

While there is merit to Huntington’s argument, his views were shaped in part by the time and place he was writing. Huntington insisted that NCMs cannot be professionals because they just followed orders. If this view of NCMs was ever true it is true no longer. In the 1950s in most armies, including that of the United States, the officer corps were career members of the military while the bulk of the enlisted personnel were conscripts who served for only a short period of time and whose primary role was to simply follow orders. This situation has changed dramatically and most western countries now have all-volunteer armies in which enlisted personnel typically serve long careers.

As Janowitz (1960) pointed out over 40 years ago, the increased technical and operational complexities of modern warfare mean that everyone must work as a team in which each member plays a vital role. The level of knowledge demanded of enlisted personnel is much higher now, and enlisted personnel are both better-trained and better-educated. The nature of military operations has also changed dramatically and non-commissioned members are now placed in situations where they have much more autonomy than was the case in traditional military contexts and which call for a high degree of teamwork and initiative from people of all ranks.

Among other things, this means that rigid discipline can no longer be relied on as a leadership strategy. Instead, the military must ensure that subordinates have high morale and can use their initiative. This involves a team management approach rather than one that uses authoritarian leadership. A good example of this are special forces teams where on some missions NCMs will often play a leadership role even when officers are part of the team because of their experience and specialty knowledge). This means that the professional qualities of the individual more important than the formal rank (Janowitz, 1960). Huntington's distinction between those who manage violence and those who apply violence does not fit many aspects of modern military operations.

What is the case for and against considering NCMs professionals? Let us look at the 6 elements that define professional status:

$ *Abstract, specialized knowledge*. Most officers have degrees and most NCMs do not, so at least at the level of a broad understanding of liberal arts and sciences officers are much better-educated than NCMs. This breadth of knowledge has long been held as a fundamental part of professionalism. While NCMs may have a very high level of specialized training, they are more likely to be knowledgeable about the application of violence than the management of violence (Huntington, 1957). However, it should be noted that today's NCMs are much better-educated than their predecessors and the education gap between officers and NCMs is less than it was in the past.

$ *Autonomy*. Neither officers nor NCMs have the same type of autonomy as the other traditional professionals. Because of the hierarchical nature of the military organization, NCMs have less autonomy within the military than officers. However, the nature of contemporary military operations has given more autonomy to NCMs than they had in the past.

$ *Self-regulation*. NCMs have an input into the selection, training, and performance standards of the profession, but have less input than officers.

$ *Authority*. Again, the hierarchical nature of the military means that officers have more authority than NCMs. In operational contexts, NCMs do have a degree of authority which is delegated to them by their officers.

$ *Altruism*. NCMs are at least as likely to face danger or die as officers and they make the same personal sacrifices in terms of 24/7 availability, so there is very little difference in their level of altruism.

$ *High status*. The military is generally not a high status profession, and NCMs have lower status than officers.

This assessment leaves us with an ambiguous result in that NCMs are closer to being

professionals than Huntington claimed, but they rank lower on most dimensions of professionalism than officers. At worst, NCMs would constitute what Etzioni (1969) has called a "semi-profession", as they training emphasizes technical skill rather than theoretical study.. However, I noted earlier that the categorization of an occupation as a profession is to some extent arbitrary. Thus we should not hesitate to apply a broad and inclusive definition of professional will best serve the interests of the CF. Probably the most fruitful course of action would be to recognize that the profession of arms is a true profession and that it is as much an organizational attribute as it is an attribute of individuals. Arguing about who is and is not a professional is not a productive exercise because there is no 'right' answer. The best course of action would seem to be to look at those criteria for professionalism that are relevant to the CF and try to make each member of the organization as professional as possible. Thus one can think of a continuum of professionalism and strive to move everyone up that continuum. Formal recognition of NCMs as professionals would be a significant step toward ensuring that they are professionals[17].

This approach to recognizing NCMs as part of the profession of arms is supported by an examination of the changing role of NCMs in the military. Historically, the status of the soldier began to change after the French Revolution (Corbett, 2000). The mental shift that resulted from

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[17]While this might seem like circular reasoning, but recall that an important part of achieving professional status is to convince others to accord you that status. For example, formally recognizing NCMs as professionals might help to break down some of the caste-like barriers between officers and NCMs. Depending upon one's perspective, this may or may not be a good thing but it should be recognized that this has already occurred in a functional sense in many parts of the CF and it is likely that status will have even less importance in the future.

the French Revolution allowed French military strategists to provide more freedom of action to their soldiers. The French *tirailleur* worked as a member of a team, not as a cog in a large machine and these new tactics contributed a great deal to the success of the French military. Steadily, the role of the enlisted person changed and two decades ago General Sir John Hackett, the author of The Profession of Arms, felt it was time "for a re-examination of the pattern of distribution of responsibilities between officers and N.C.O.s . It probably still takes too little account of the results of rising standards of living, education and general information amongst people almost everywhere in the Western world" (1983:197). While Hackett does not address the issue of whether or not NCMs should be considered professionals, the context of these comments suggests that he would not be unsympathetic to their case, especially considering the changes that have taken place in the role of NCMs over the past two decades.

Several factors have altered the role of the NCM in today's military. It might be argued that the experience of military operations other than war has led to a transformation in the role of the soldier as dramatic as did the French Revolution. Much of the action in peacekeeping and peace enforcement takes place at the section and squad levels and NCMs have been given a very high level of responsibility. The nature of many contemporary military operations is such that commanders can no longer command by *direction*, but must command by *influence* (Corbett, 2000). That is, the commander provides explicit guidance and direction and focusses on results[18]. Direct control of the process is often not possible. While recognizing that NCOs have

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[18]It is obvious that in this situation, professionalism is important. If a subordinate is held accountable for results, and does not have direct supervision, the subordinate must have

always been at the heart of an effective military unit, Horn (2002) has observed that their expertise and impact has traditionally been at the tactical level. However, they have been given new responsibilities at the strategic and political levels. Thus even NCMs need to be educated in disciplines such as international relations in order to perform their jobs effectively.

Another change in the role of NCMs has been driven by the combination of budget cuts and increased operational demands that have affected most of the western world's military forces. The pressure to do more with less has meant that jobs traditionally done by officers are now done by NCOs. For example, on some Canadian ships, NCOs now hold the duties of weapons directors which used to be assigned only to officers. Related to this is the fact that the skill levels of NCMs have been upgraded to deal with new technologies and many are doing jobs that would rank much higher on the continuum of professionalism than would more traditional roles. Horn (2002) has suggested that this trend to increasing the responsibilities of NCMs should continue in the future and that the CF should explicitly try to replace junior officers with experienced NCMs in a variety of tasks. Where this has been done, the results have been very positive.

Failing to recognize NCMs as professionals would be denying the fact that the role of the military has changed dramatically and could have quite negative consequences for the CF. The changes in the role of the NCM described earlier require them to have a higher level of skill and knowledge. For example, the new realities of military operations other than war mean that the

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internalized the requirement to accomplish the goals by appropriate means and must know that he or she will be held accountable for how the mission is accomplished. In other words, they must have internalized the professional ethos. Without this professional knowledge and

world they work in is so complex that training is not enough - NCMs also need professional education. This issue has been recognized by Horn: “Undeniably, senior NCOs, in the same manner as officers, must be taught how to think and use abstract concepts to assist in the resolution of the practical problems they may face. They must expand their knowledge and acquire a broader outlook, as well as develop greater socio-political skills. Furthermore, they must become comfortable with ambiguity and change. Critical thinking and innovation must become their guiding light, instead of the traditional heavy reliance on written procedures given in technical publications and uni-dimensional experience. To achieve this, education must be aggressively pursued” (Horn, 2002).

Military Professionalism: An Individual or an Organizational Attribute?

By definition, military professionals cannot exist outside the organization since their work can only be done in the company of others - the military is both a profession and a complex bureaucratic organization (Abbott, 2002)[19]. Harries-Jenkins refers to professionals in organizations like the military as *ascriptive professionals* who he defines as: “work practitioner(s), whose task commitment is performed in a monopolistic organization which

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accountability, ethical violations will inevitably result.

[19]This is not a new issue. According to Rodney Stark (1998) the Prussian military was one of the first examples of a modern bureaucratic organization, although Maurice of Orange had begun to bureaucratize his army in the early 17th century (Van Doorn, 1965). Officers were largely excluded from the early reforms and only completely became part of the bureaucratic structure after Field Marshal von Moltke took command of the Prussian army in 1857 and developed both a General Staff and an organizational structure that divided the army in standard sized divisions. These innovations required a new organizational form to coordinate their

determines his status, evaluates his ability according to organizational requirements, and delineates, through a process of selection and designation, the precise area within which he will carry out his activities" (1970:55). As this definition suggests, much of the behaviour of ascriptive professionals is circumscribed by the organization.

In a general sense, professionalism is not compatible with a hierarchical bureaucratic structure. Professionals are supposed to be experts who work autonomously and their decisions are supposed to be based on professional knowledge and ethics, not on orders from supervisors. Further, professional knowledge is an individual property which "cannot be transferred from one person to another by decree" (Etzioni, 1969:x) as bureaucratic authority can be transferred. However, in a bureaucratic organization authority is attached to the formal position rather than to the specific abilities and knowledge of the incumbent. Without hierarchy and the attendant power of those in higher ranks, no organization can function in a coordinated manner. This means that professional organizations will inevitably face strains between professional knowledge and the need for bureaucratic order. The military can at least partly resolve this problem by trying to ensure that the degree of professionalism increases as one moves up the hierarchy so there is a conjunction between professional and bureaucratic authority[20]. This is facilitated by ensuring the primacy of rank over office. That is, while an individual's bureaucratic authority stems from their office, in the military the functions assigned to an

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relatively independent activities.

[20]This need to match professional knowledge with rank is the reason why the military is unique in the amount of professional education and training provided to its members and in the fact that intensive this education and training continues throughout the members' careers.

individual are based upon their rank and this rank is held independently of their office. Professions also differ from bureaucratic organizations in that professionals have a formal responsibility to society which is usually reinforced by standards and by ethical codes. Bureaucracies have no such obligations (Van Doorn, 1965).

Professionals also owe their loyalties to their fellow professionals rather than to an employing organization (Van Doorn, 1965). To some degree this difference is (ideally at least) minimized in the military. Compared with some organizations that employ professionals and that require them to report to non-professionals, the military is structured in a manner that might be considered collegial. Most military personnel report to fellow members of the profession of arms. At lower levels the supervisor is also typically a member of the individual's technical specialty, so the professional practices of self-regulation including mentoring and accountability to other professionals are followed in the military organization.

While the fact that military professionals work in a bureaucratic organization may seem to be only of academic interest, Harries-Jenkins (1970) has extended the analysis to provide some important insights into some of the dysfunctional consequences of this situation. According to Harries-Jenkins, there is a tendency for military professionals[21] to over-emphasize the importance of the bureaucratic structure in order to protect the organization from outside influence from the civil power. This can mean that commitment to the bureaucracy replaces

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[21] In his analysis, Harries-Jenkins spoke generically of ascriptive professionals, but I will narrow the focus to the military.

commitment to the profession. "[Bureaucratic] practices become sacrosanct. The rules are regarded as the embodiment of rational practice, and the individual who refuses to demonstrate uncritical loyalty to the organization, is rejected as a deviant ..... The excessive institutional commitment, subsumed as a characteristic of the custodial model of organizational behaviour, induces a pattern of conservatism which, in rejecting changes in professional norms and standards, is indicative of a low level of group professionalization"(Harries-Jenkins,1970: 100, 107). According to Harries-Jenkins, the professionalism of individuals is set aside in order to protect the professional autonomy of the organization. This can have a negative impact on the performance of both individuals and organization.

Ideally, professionals will act on the basis of current knowledge and will behave ethically in the service of their clients. Harries-Jenkins' analysis helps to explain why military leaders often fail to meet this ideal. Military history is full of examples of a refusal to adapt to change, a refusal which often has come at great cost to soldiers. Winston Churchill describes an all too familiar scenario that occurred when he was serving with the 21st Lancers at Omdurman in the Sudan:

> Everyone expected that we were going to make a charge. That was the one idea that had been in all minds since we had started from Cairo. Of course there would be a charge. In those days, before the Boer War, British cavalry had been taught little else. Here was clearly the occasion of a charge. But against what body of enemy, over what ground, in which direction or with what purpose, were matters hidden from the rank and file" (quoted in Hackett, 1983: 123).

After a disastrous charge which cost the regiment nearly one-quarter of their strength, the leaders "remembered for the first time that we had carbines" (Churchill, quoted in Hackett, 1983: 126). After the soldiers dismounted, their use of these weapons against a much larger, but ill-equipped force quickly led to victory. Proof that old habits die hard can be found in the fact that nearly two decades later, Field Marshals French and Haig, British Commanders-in-Chief in World War

I, both thought that cavalry should be used even when it was clearly obvious that they had no role in the trench warfare of the day. Clearly, the leaders of the British Army preferred to rely on tradition rather than making a professional assessment of appropriate military tactics.

Another problem related to the triumph of bureaucratic concerns over professional concerns has been manifested in numerous cases where military professionalism has broken down. One of the reports that resulted from the many problems identified in assessment of problems of the U.S. Army in Vietnam is typical of many similar reports and commissions in different countries[22]:

> "The existing climate [within the officer corps] includes persistent and rather ubiquitous overtones of: selfish behavior that places personal success ahead of the good of the service; looking upward to please superiors instead of looking downward to fulfill the legitimate needs of subordinates; preoccupation with the attainment of trivial short-term objectives even through dishonest practices that injure the long-term fabric of the organization; incomplete communications between junior and seniors which leave the senior uninformed and the junior feeling unimportant; and inadequate technical or managerial competence to perform effectively the assigned duties" (U.S. Army War College, 1970: 13).

These problems reflect an organizational system that inadvertently encouraged a fixation on the demands of the bureaucracy rather than on the obligations of professionalism. A personnel system that gave officers 6-month command tours to 'punch their tickets' for promotion; an emphasis on inappropriate effectiveness measures such as body counts; and an institutional failure to ensure that professional military values were taught and practiced throughout the army were some of the factors that led to low levels of professionalism. Erik Riker-Coleman (1997)

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[22]Often the motivation for reviewing professionalism has been a crisis created by a breakdown in professionalism. Vietnam and Somalia were wake-up calls for the U.S. and Canadian forces and both led to renewed calls for increased professionalism.

provides an example of the last point by citing a study which showed that as early as 1967, senior leaders in the U.S. Army knew that their training in the law of war was inadequate when researcher found that many junior officers believed that torturing and even killing prisoners was acceptable in some circumstances. Despite this knowledge, little was done until the massacre at My Lai raised the issue again in a very public manner. More recent research has suggested that the problem may not have changed much in recent years and that goals of bureaucratic efficiency are emphasized more than the goal of professionalism. Snider and Watkins (2000) have been critical of the U.S. Army for continuing to move away from decision-making based on professionalism to decision-making based on bureaucratic criteria. As examples, they cite practices borrowed from the business world such as operations research, goals of efficiency, outsourcing, re-engineering, and the payment of bonuses. Snider and Watkins conclude that the Army is using corporate human resource practices, but then continues to ask why its soldiers are behaving more like employees that like members of the profession of arms[23]. This issue was raised by Moskos over two decades ago. Moskos concluded that the U.S. military had shifted from an institutional orientation to an occupational orientation. That is, instead of seeing their work as a professional calling, a significant number of military members saw their work as a job.

There is also evidence that similar problems may be prevalent in the Canadian Forces. In their analysis of command and control in the Canadian Forces, Sharpe and English (2002) concluded

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[23]This is not, of course, a new issue. Many observers have blamed some of the U.S. military's problems on the way in which Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara and his team of 'whiz kids' enthusiastically brought to the military techniques they had practiced at Ford and other large U.S. corporations.

that most of the reforms of the past 40 years have been focused on efficiency, which they do not feel is an appropriate guiding principle for change in the military:

> "..when management tools and practices dominate the organization they have a corrosive effect on the profession of arms. Having the capability to engage in combat is not a business activity, and in many ways it requires measures of effectiveness fundamentally different from 'efficiency' as defined by the marketplace (Sharpe and English, 2002: xiii).

The issue of the dual nature of military professionalism is an important one as it suggests that the military cannot raise the level of professionalism unless it addresses both the organization and its individual members. Bill Wild (cited in Sharpe and English, 2002: 57) has provided an example of a mismatch between individual and organizational professional standards that clearly illustrates how it is impossible for an individual to follow his or her professional military values because of constraints imposed by the bureaucracy. Most CF members would likely agree that looking after members who are injured on duty is a fundamental part of the professional military ethos. However, the CF principle of universality of service means that those who are injured will be released. As Wild notes, it will be difficult to convince CF members to adopt a vocational ethos when they feel the organization simply treats it as a job. Similarly, Sharpe and English (2002) have concluded that the combination of a centralization of authority in National Defence Headquarters, and a decentralized system of accountability is a major cause of the lack of trust between junior and senior ranks in the Canadian Forces. This problem cannot be fixed by changing individuals - the command and control structure of the organization must be changed so that it supports and encourages professionalism. At the same time, organizational changes alone will not be sufficient to ensure a renewal of professionalism. This can only happen if each member of a military force is a professional and is not permitted to avoid individual

responsibility by using the organization as an excuse for unprofessional behaviour.

The Military in the System of Professions

Earlier in this paper, I briefly discussed the work of Andrew Abbott and his analysis of the competition among professions for resources, people, and jurisdiction. Snider and Watkins (2000) have applied Abbott's approach to the U.S. Army. They feel there is constant competition among the different branches of the American military[24], which in earlier times was better-regulated by "law, policy and culture" than is currently the case (2000:12). In addition to the stresses of internal competition, in recent times the military has had to respond to constant changes in the external environment. The end of the Cold War resulted in dramatic shifts in roles and missions. The workload increased as the number of deployments climbed and until recently there were concurrent reductions in budgets and personnel. The broadening of the term 'national security' to include such issues as combatting terrorism, fighting illicit drugs, providing humanitarian assistance, deploying on peacekeeping missions, and ensuring borders are controlled has changed the environment and has introduced a variety of partners and possible competitors ranging from the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the State Department, to the United Nations, contractors providing logistical support, allies and wide range of Non-Governmental Organizations.

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[24]This competition sometimes seems odd to foreign eyes. For example, one commentator on Marine Corps aviation said "I can see why the Army needs an air force, and I can see why the

While the environment has changed dramatically, Snider and Watkins do not feel that there have been corresponding changes within the military to deal with these new challenges. They feel that a 'can-do' attitude encouraged the U.S. Army led to accept an expansion in its mandate but that it has not been successful in negotiating an expansion in its resources. To deal with the resulting resource shortage the Army has adopted business methods that have undermined its professional identity. Snider and Watkins question whether the Army can "continue to separate its organizational decisions from professional considerations?" (2002:13) and whether it should continue to rely on traditional notions of professionalism. Alternately, the Army could "reconceive of itself as existing in a 'system of professions', competing fiercely within such a system on the basis of its jurisdiction over Army-specific expert knowledge and work" (2002:14). They conclude that the Army needs to renegotiate the boundaries of its professional knowledge and its jurisdiction first with its members and then with the broader society. At the same time it must ensure that the professional and organizational support systems reflect the change.

What are the implications of this for the Canadian scene? To some degree, the Canadian Forces have been affected by the same changes as the U.S. military. The end of the Cold War led to extremely harsh budget cuts at the same time as the operational demands upon the military increased dramatically. (op tempo). Ironically, more resources were given to the military for potential action during the Cold War than were given for actual missions during the post-Cold War period. As in the U.S., the cuts meant a greatly-increased emphasis on efficiency. This

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Navy needs an air force, but I really don't understand why the Navy's army needs an air force".

efficiency was needed to mitigate the impact of the budget cuts on operations and operational capability (Sharpe and English, 2002). Thus Snider and Watkin's advice to focus on a renewal of military professionalism applies here and there is ample evidence[25] that this has been recognized by the senior leadership of the CF.

In addition to pointing toward the need for a renewal of professionalism in the military, Abbott's approach also highlights the fact that the new security environment is much more complex than it was during the Cold War. For example, in peacekeeping operations military personnel interact with the full range of those involved with the "security field" - that is, the complex of organizations and agencies involved in peacekeeping and in the restoration of government[26]. The following quote from U.S. Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni could have come from many of his Canadian counterparts:

> I have trained and established police forces, judiciary committees and judges, and prison systems; I have resettled refugees in massive numbers twice; I've negotiated with warlords, tribal leaders, and clan elders; I have distributed food, provided medical assistance, worried about well-baby care, and put in place obstetrical clinics; I've run refugee camps and I've managed newspapers and run radio stations to counter misinformation attempts" (cited in Matthews, 2002:4).

The complexity of the military's roles and tasks again highlight the need for skills far more

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[25]Wenek, n.d. has listed many of the inquiries and reports that have focused on professionalism in the Canadian Forces.

[26] During the early 1990s, many of those opposed to the military suggested that military training was not necessary for peacekeeping duties and demanded further reductions in force levels. This might have been a threat to the military's exclusive control over these activities, until the brutality of some of the operations showed that a combat capability was necessary in order to do the job effectively. At the same time, there has been an increased reliance on other partners such as civilian police and NGOs.

complex than those of the tradition soldier-warrior. Each military officer has to have specialist knowledge, but also general knowledge that will enable him or her to undertake a variety of tasks. While it is necessary to add the skills of politician, diplomat, and intellectual to the traditional role of warfighter, the burden this places on individuals as they move through the military ranks will become very heavy.

Professionalism and Diversity

The draft CF Profession of Arms manual places a strong emphasis on the professional need to be able to manage diversity. However, many of the objections to diversity from within the CF are based on 'professional' standards. Opponents argue that increasing the diversity of the military will reduce the ability to accomplish its professional goals by diminishing the group cohesion that is believed to be such vital a part of unit effectiveness. What is the evidence on this question?

While social cohesion has been seen as an important factor in the success of military units, Segal (2001) has cited several studies illustrating that social cohesion can also have negative effects on performance. For example, in Vietnam some units had cohesive subcultures focussed on the use of drugs and alcohol[27]. These subcultures are emergent groups that cannot necessarily be controlled by the larger organization. This research leads us to two conclusions. First, it is

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[27]Testimony and videos at the Somalia Inquiry showed that the subculture of at least some components of the Canadian Airborne Regiment were incompatible with the professional

important to instill a professional ethos from the beginning of military training to help to ensure that emergent subcultures support. Second, we should revisit the relationship between cohesion and military effectiveness. Some preliminary research in this area has already been done. Segal argues that what is important is *task cohesion*, which is cohesion based on shared efforts to achieve a common goal. The available research[28] shows that gender integration has a positive impact on this type of cohesion. Segal and Bourg (2002) also conclude that there is no empirical evidence that diversity reduces cohesion or that cohesive groups are more effective. The evidence that cohesion is related to group effectiveness is limited and is qualified by three factors (Segal and Bourg (2002):

$ Success may produce cohesion, rather than cohesion producing success

$ Task cohesion, rather than social cohesion, is related to success and it is unlikely that task cohesion is affected by diversity

$ Vertical cohesion (another term for leadership) affects both group cohesion and performance, so can overcome any possible effects of diversity on both of these variables.

While the limited evidence that is available suggests that diversity may not conflict with the professional goals of the military organization, Segal and Bourg (2002) also present an argument that clearly shows the advantages of diversity. They note first, that the military can only be

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values of the Canadian Forces.

[28]Unfortunately, none of this research was conducted on combat units.

successful if it has the support of the broader society. "A modern military divergent from its own populace in a democratic society will face continued problems of recruitment, retention, and legitimacy. Military effectiveness is well served by an Army supported by its wider society" (2002:505). This supports the need for diversity in the military, so that the military better reflects the more egalitarian values and practices of the broader society. Diversity also means a broader range of skills within units. Pro-diversity practices will also help in recruitment and retention, a critical need during a time when the impending retirements of the baby boom generation will likely create a shortage of high-quality recruits. Thus an important component of professional military leadership is to be able to manage diversity.

Professionalism and the Warrior Ethos

Some people have expressed concern about the impact of the military warrior ethos on military professionalism. Emphasis on the warrior ethos does present risks. Perhaps the most obvious of these is that it can lead to excess. The videotapes of the hazing done by the Airborne regiment provided a graphic example of this excess, especially when these were viewed in the context of the beating death in Somalia that eventually led to the demise of the regiment. The warrior ethos can also lead to feelings of exclusion on the part of those who do not actually have combat roles or those in combat jobs who do not fit the traditional warrior image. It can also isolate the military from the rest of society. The military is always at risk of being marginalized, particularly in Canada where the number of personnel is very small and where bases are not located in major population areas. Most of the good things done by the military are invisible to

the public, and negative images such as a female combat arms officer tied to a tree and the Airborne videos did little to help the public identify with the military or to generate public support for military funding. On the other hand, activities that many of the military's 'warriors' do not consider as part of their core such as fighting floods and involvement in peacekeeping operations have helped to restore public confidence in the CF. Finally, the warrior ethos does not reflect the diversity of roles each member of the CF must take on over the course of a career. Does a person who moves from an operational job to the Privy Council office and then to a senior position at the Staff College cease to be a valued member of the CF because he or she had to take on military duties as a diplomat or a scholar? An over-emphasis on the warrior role can mean that other important roles are devalued and are not well understood.

On the other hand, a lack of concern with the warrior ethos can also have negative consequences. Earlier in this paper I discussed the problems that an over-emphasis on bureaucratic matters can create for military forces. The military is not just another employer. Military professionals have the responsibility of managing and using violence and face the obligation of unlimited liability. These duties and obligations can get lost if at least some elements of the warrior ethos are not maintained. The warrior ethos can also provide a way of overcoming some of the value differences that exist among people in different jobs, in different components of the CF, and at different rank levels and to help build a strong and cohesive military force.

How can these conflicting views of the warrior ethos be balanced? Perhaps this can be done by using the warrior ethos as a metaphor that helps to provide a vision for the CF, but which is not

used in a way that would lead to some of the negative consequences that have occurred in the past. If used judiciously the warrior metaphor can be used to enhance all aspects of military doctrine, training, and operations. We know that the military does not just consist of people acting like civilians who happen to be wearing uniforms and we need to make sure the difference between civilians and military is at the core of all the military does. Thus a pilot doesn't go to Maple Flag to punch his or her warrior ticket, but rather to learn combat skills in a realistic environment. Leadership and management principles are taught in a military context, not in the context of civilian organizations. If the warrior concept is broadened so that it is inclusive and is used to motivate people and to keep them aware that they are military professionals and not members of a civilian occupation, it should prove to be a useful tool.

This issue is addressed in the draft CF Profession of Arms manual. While the term 'warrior ethos' is replaced by 'fighting spirit' the following quote from the manual seems consistent with the view taken in this paper:

> "It must be emphasized that this spirit is not a quality restricted to those directly involved in operations. Indeed, fighting spirit, because it is a state of mind, applies across all occupations of the Canadian Forces. It is what motivates Canadian Forces members to approach their own particular tasks and responsibilities with a competitive desire and commitment to excellence, while acknowledging the fundamental purpose of the profession of arms" (Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003:17).

RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

There has been ample recognition of the importance of professionalism in the military. However, given the importance of the topic, there has been surprisingly little research on professionalism in Canada or the United States[29]. The review of issues related to military professionalism can be used to suggest several areas where further research would be helpful.

Impact of Profession of Arms Manual

The release of the new Profession of Arms Manual will be a major step in the renewal of professionalism in the CF. However, it will only have an impact if it forms the basis for action. A research project could be designed that would assess the impact of the manual on the CF and its personnel. This research would involve three steps:

$ Review the manual to determine the explicit and implicit goals and objectives and to explicitly define the various dimensions of professionalism required by the CF.

$ Develop a logic model that depicts: a) program components or activities leading to; b) tangible outputs represented by specific measures that can be counted and described. Essentially, this means identifying the specific measures that have been put in place to accomplish the goals and objectives.

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[29] I have seen little indication of research on military professionalism in other countries. I don't know if this reflects an absence of research or the process through which material was

- Measure the short-term, intermediate, and long-term outcomes that reflect the goals and objectives. Did the activities (such as changes to training) accomplish the goals?

The NCM as Professional

One part of the Profession of Arms manual that will probably be the subject of some debate is the inclusion of NCMs as part of the profession of arms. As I have noted earlier, I support this inclusion and feel that it will act as an impetus for the increased professionalization of NCMs. However, it would useful to use surveys and focus groups to determine what the current feeling is about this issue within the CF and to see where support for inclusion is greatest and weakest. If CF wants to do this, it needs data to determine the best way to do it.

Assessment and Continued Monitoring of Professionalism in the CF

In their review of U.S. Army professionalism, Snider and Watkins (2000) concluded that the Army was becoming more and more bureaucratized and that many of its members saw themselves as employees rather than as members of the profession of arms. This was reinforced by the institution, which had implemented bureaucratic management systems and which had become so centralized that the decision-making powers of many of its members had been eroded. External fiscal restraints and the 'do more with less' philosophy have also sustained this process.

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collected for this project.

It is likely that similar problems exist in the Canadian military.

To deal with professionalism issues this broad, it would be helpful to introduce an ongoing benchmarking program which could look at trends in the CF over time and which could compare military professionalism in the CF that of other military forces. There is no absolute standard of military professionalism and this benchmarking process would be valuable in that it would provide CF leadership with an assessment of where the CF stood relative to other military forces and would identify trends within the CF. The process should involve a multi-dimensional assessment that would incorporate a wide spectrum of individual and institutional measures. While a great deal of thought would have to be given to the measures to be used in this benchmarking, the criteria proposed by Harries-Jenkins (1970) would provide a good start (See Appendix I).

The Professional Ethos in the CF

Watkins and Cohen interviewed U.S. Army officers about professionalism. Many didn't consider themselves professionals and many of those who did focused on the dimension of looking after people rather than on the unique dimension of the profession of arms which is killing people. Some felt that you weren't a professional military person until at least the LCol. rank. This suggested that the notion of the military profession wasn't being well-communicated (which is a recommendation from my paper). Military needs to set out the objectives of the profession (or standards or whatever) - this may be what is in the profession of arms handbook.

Similar research is needed to assess the current state of professionalism in the CF. There are a myriad of possible questions that might be asked in such a study. Have there been changes since the Cotton research in the 1970s? How do current views of professionalism within the CF affect internal relationships as well as relationships with the broader society? For example, if the warrior ethos prevails, what message does that send to CF members who do not fit the traditional warrior image or who are in support jobs? If the professional ethos is more focused on the bureaucratic demands of the organization, what impact will this have on the war-fighting capabilities of the CF? If the army, navy, and air force each develop a separate ethos, what impact will this have on joint operations? What factors affect the degree of trust among members of the CF?

APPENDIX I

The Elements of Professionalization

1. Structural element -military have had a high degree of control over non-occupational behaviour (this also true to some degree of other professions, but probably most prevalent in the military).
    - a) Specialization: the exclusive nature of group activity
    - b) Centralization: the locus of the authority-sanctions mechanism
    - c) Standardization: the control of non-occupational behaviour

2. Contextual element
    - a) Spatio-temporal dimension
    - b) Size of the occupational group
    - c) Resources of the occupational group
    - d) Group relationships

3. Activity element
    - a) The goals of the occupational group
    - b) The role of individual members

4. Educational elements
    - a) Occupational intelligence requirements
    - b) Basis of systematic theory
    - c) Institutionalized educational process
    - d) Length of training
    - e) Cost of training

5. Ideological element
    - a) Personality involvement
    - b) Sense of group identity
    - c) Group culture
    - d) Status
    - e) Socialization process

6. Behavioural element
    - a) Code of conduct
    - b) Evaluation of merit

Source: Harries-Jenkins (1970:58-59).

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