

Defining Effective Leadership in the Canadian Forces: A Content and Process Framework

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It is not the same to talk of bulls as to be in the bullring.
- Spanish proverb

The map is not the territory.
- Alfred Korzbyski

The Little Zen Companion

INTRODUCTION

1. In a previous discussion paper,¹ it was argued that objective understanding of the leadership construct is often confounded with one or more value positions and perceptual biases that represent different historical and cultural ideas about what actually constitutes acceptable or effective leadership. Hence, a case was presented for making a conceptual distinction between a generic, value-neutral, and context-free definition of leadership that could be applied broadly and a definition of good or effective leadership designed to serve the functional requirements and express the cultural values of a specific group or institution at a particular period in time. To satisfy the first requirement, leadership was generally defined as *directly or indirectly influencing others, by means of formal authority or personal attributes, to act in accordance with one's intent or a shared purpose*. For the particular purposes of CF leadership doctrine, it now remains to identify what a description of good or effective CF leadership might entail. For starters, this means understanding the broad social context of CF leadership and, within that context, the contribution of such leadership to organizational purpose.² Addressing this requirement will help us specify the core content of

¹ K.W.J. Wenek, *Defining Leadership*, (Kingston, ON: CF Leadership Institute), March 2003.

² Martin Chemers, *An Integrative Theory of Leadership* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum), 1997; Stephen J. Zaccaro & Richard J. Klimoski, "Preface" in S.J. Zaccaro & R.J. Klimoski (eds.) *The Nature of Organizational Leadership: Understanding the Performance Imperatives Confronting Today's Leaders* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 2001.

leadership, or what CF leaders are fundamentally responsible for, and what knowledge, skills, and other attributes they ought to possess to perform effectively. To complete the picture, we also have to understand the process side of leadership – how situational and other variables condition leader intent and behaviour, how leader authority and influence ought to be deployed to optimum effect, and how leader influence ultimately connects to organizational outcomes and societal values.

2. The doctrinal task is twofold: first, to construct a normative-content model of leadership that expresses the functional, or outcome, values of the CF; and second, to build a normative-process model of leadership that reflects the formal, or conduct, values of society and, by implication, the military profession. (In these contexts, the term *value* simply refers to an abstract quality or principle that is useful, important, desirable, or held in high regard.³) Together, the resulting normative-content model and normative-process model delineate a values-expressive framework for operationalizing effective leadership in the CF.

3. A distinguishing feature of this framework is the belief, supported by recent CF history, that a clear understanding of core leadership responsibilities within the CF and normative influence processes is of paramount importance in developing effective military leaders. As such, it differs from much of the literature on leadership models, which deals more centrally with leadership style. Leadership style is considered to have complementary status in the framework put forward here, essentially because the trust and confidence of followers in leaders are considered to depend less on interpersonal style, or the congruence between leader behaviour and the situational contingencies covered by a particular theory, and more on whether leaders do the substantive things that are fitting and right for them to do and do them in an appropriate way. *It is in this sense that effective leadership is fundamentally about the expression and preservation of values.* Part 1 of this paper explores the essential elements of CF institutional effectiveness and associated leader responsibilities and competencies. Part 2 of the paper treats the process side of leadership.

³ Arthur S. Reber, *Dictionary of Psychology* (Markham, ON: Penguin Books Canada), 1985.

PART 1 – THE CONTENT OF EFFECTIVE CF LEADERSHIP

Analytical Framework

4. Behaviours considered desirable, normative, and indicative of leader effectiveness are determined by the broader effectiveness requirements of the CF as an organization and a profession. It may be stating the obvious, but, to be effective, CF leaders must attend to and do the things that are critical to CF effectiveness; “leadership is at the service of collective effectiveness.”⁴ Collective effectiveness is, in turn, yoked to social purpose. The organizational and professional effectiveness requirements of the CF derive from the functional responsibilities assigned to the CF by the Government, general Government policy affecting departments and agencies under federal jurisdiction, normative standards of the military profession in a liberal democracy, and Canadian society’s expectations of the CF as a national institution.⁵ While the Government’s expectations are more or less explicitly indicated in legislation, policies, and Cabinet direction, societal expectations tend to be implicit. They also tend to be activated mostly when they are not met, but are no less important on that account in affecting trust and confidence in, and support for, the CF. Equally implicit are the normative requirements of the profession, generally shaped in the Canadian case by Western military history and heritage, and more particularly and in varying degrees by the British, French, and American military traditions and formal relationships with other military forces.

5. At the outset, then, we must establish a sound understanding of what we mean by CF effectiveness, because CF leadership roles exist in large measure to ensure the organizational and professional effectiveness of the CF as an institution. This includes aspects that address both the ends and means of performance. In other words, if the major dimensions of organizational effectiveness tell us *what* leaders should be striving to achieve, social and professional value systems mainly tell us *how* those ends may be permissibly pursued. Chief

⁴ Stephen J. Zaccaro & Richard J. Klimoski, “The Nature of Organizational Leadership: An Introduction” in Zaccaro & Klimoski, p. 7.

⁵ The term *institution* is used here in the sociological sense of an enduring social structure possessing a distinctive set of norms and values and designed to serve some broad role in social life.

among these social and professional value systems are the law (inclusive of national and international law and the law of armed conflict), fundamental Canadian values, and the values and ethos of military professionalism. Taken together, the major facets of organizational effectiveness and the major facets of professional effectiveness define military institutional effectiveness in the most complete sense.

6. From an understanding of organizational purposes and what makes an institution effective in social-utility terms, we can logically derive, in broad strokes, the functional responsibilities, or imperatives, of its leaders. At the macro level of analysis, these elements make up the essential content of leadership and are differentiated as direct and indirect leadership activities. As discussed elsewhere,⁶ direct leadership, which will be most evident at middle to lower levels of the hierarchy, involves *unmediated* influence processes and is characterized by the face-to-face leadership of individuals and units and the near-term execution of operations and implementation of policy. It will primarily be reflected in leader efforts to improve subordinate skills, motivation, task procedures, teamwork, and so on. Conversely, indirect leadership becomes more critical at the executive levels of the CF. Indirect leadership refers to *mediated* influence which affects behaviour or performance through environmental factors or slow-growth person attributes. Indirect leadership at the executive level presupposes a concern with the total operating environment, and, through changes to the organizational environment, with maintaining institutional effectiveness and integrity over the long term. The emphasis is on strategic analysis and planning and systems-capability development,⁷ with correspondingly less involvement in face-to-face leadership beyond immediate subordinate commanders and staff. More akin to environmental engineering, leadership influence at this level is typically engaged in such things as providing strategic direction, technology change, organizational structure, maintenance/change of institutional culture, regulatory policy, and so on.

⁶ Wenek, *Defining Leadership*.

⁷ As recognized in the 1969 Rowley Report, this is why occupationally specific technical skills figure prominently in the effectiveness of lower- to mid-level leaders but are superseded by the need for generic systems-analysis and systems-governance skills at the top rank levels. *Report of the Officer Development Board, Vol. 1* (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Headquarters), March 1969.

7. In the two-level configuration of leadership being advanced here, the direct and indirect imperatives associated with lower-level and upper-level leadership are respectively described as *leading people* and *leading the institution*. Although they represent two poles of a theoretical continuum, they should not be considered parts of a discontinuous function, but rather as overlapping levels of responsibility. In other words, *leadership is practised directly and indirectly at all levels*. The difference between lower and upper levels is only a matter of emphasis, and a change in emphasis from one level of responsibility to the other will be especially noticeable in the transitional middle of the rank/organizational hierarchy.

8. Once leader-role responsibilities are defined, the requirements for individual and cadre effectiveness can be determined. Typically, these include relevant domains of technical knowledge and expertise, conceptual skills, interpersonal and social skills, and other attributes. To the extent that leader responsibilities vary with organizational level, requisite leader competencies will also vary according to level, not only in kind but also in degree, reflecting differences in task scope and complexity between executive and lower-level leadership. Turning our attention to the human resource processes that underpin this effectiveness framework (i.e., selection, development, performance evaluation), validated attributes can be used to establish selection and development standards. Similarly, leader roles and responsibilities, at both the direct and indirect levels, are the primary drivers of performance assessment standards and training/development standards, which should also be differentiated by hierarchical level.

9. The major components of the leader-effectiveness analytical framework and their inter-relationships are depicted in Figure 1. It is not entirely coincidental that this representation bears a strong resemblance to Zaccaro's model for research on executive leadership,⁸ since both are reverse-engineered from the same general cause-effect principles of personnel psychology: that selection improves the chances of developmental success; that success in education and training is predictive of individual performance; and that individual performance contributes to organizational performance.

⁸ *The Nature of Executive Leadership* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association), 2001, p. 302.




Figure 1: Analytical framework for deriving the responsibilities and competencies of CF leaders.

Major Dimensions of Organizational Effectiveness

10. It must be understood at the outset of this discussion that criteria of organizational effectiveness are not entities to be discovered, like objects in space or laws of nature. Rather, criteria of effectiveness are collective statements about human preferences, values, and the relative importance of outcomes. They are made-up things. Such constructs are not completely arbitrary however. Negative feedback and other lessons of experience serve to correct or modify effectiveness criteria that fail to pass the tests of adequacy and relevance. For example, a military that doesn't take care of its people will lose their loyalty sooner or later; a military that doesn't behave professionally will lose the public's confidence. That said, organizations exhibit considerable variability in their choices of effectiveness criteria, in the priorities assigned to criteria, and in measuring criterion performance.

11. In general, effectiveness denotes goal attainment – which is different from, but also inclusive of, various output/input ratios, or efficiency measures. If organizations exist to

serve a purpose, then it follows that they should be evaluated in terms of how adequately or inadequately they serve that purpose, and organizational theory distinguishes accordingly between primary goals and secondary goals.⁹ Primary goals are those goals which are directly related to the basic purpose of an organization (e.g., the primary goal of the CF is the defence of Canada and Canadian interests). Secondary goals constitute those goals which either support the achievement of primary goals (e.g., maintaining the morale and commitment of people in the organization, anticipating and adapting to changes in the organization's environment, establishing an effective administrative régime) or broader societal objectives (e.g., maintaining the rule of law, protecting democratic and human rights). Both of these classes of secondary goals should arguably be considered necessary elements of CF effectiveness. Although primary goals are paramount, secondary goals require special attention since, in practice, private- and public-sector organizations have frequently acted as if organizational effectiveness were a one-dimensional construct, and have focussed on primary goals and the short term to the detriment of secondary goals and long-term organizational health and survivability.

12. In the profit-driven private sector, this bias has been evident in the longstanding adversarial relationship between productivity concerns and efforts to improve employee quality of working life. While it is generally accepted that the surplus value generated by national, industry, and corporate productivity underwrites job availability, real growth in wages, and improvements in living standards,¹⁰ an undue emphasis on productivity and its correlates (e.g., maximizing shareholder value, cost cutting) can result, as we have seen in a number of cases in recent years, in the flouting or distortion of other important social values (e.g., employee health and safety, fair labour practices, protection of the environment, work-life balance, ethical business practices, corporate citizenship).¹¹

⁹ B.J. Hodge & W. P. Anthony, *Organizational Theory: A Strategic Approach* 4th ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon), 1991.

¹⁰ R.E. Kopelman, *Managing Productivity in Organizations: A Practical People-Oriented Perspective* (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1986.

¹¹ Katherine Macklem, for example, has characterized shareholder value as a concept that got out of control, creating inflated and distorted stock values, undermining long-term strategic thinking, and steamrolling ethical considerations, *Maclean's*, July 1, 2002, pp. 52 & 55. Likewise, Henry Mintzberg, has assailed the misguided faith in crude economic indicators such as productivity: "A sizeable portion of American business is

13. Similarly, in the service-oriented public sector, an obsession with slashing costs and being ever more efficient can erode the very quality and effectiveness of services governments are elected to protect (e.g., health care, defence, education). As a result, governments and departments (including DND and the CF) have been exposed to some fairly strong criticisms for misapplying business or commercial models and methods to the regulatory sector and for getting swept up in a ‘cult of efficiency,’ namely, the elevation of efficiency from its status as a means-to-an-end to an end in itself, more important than other organizational or social values.¹² This is not a new criticism in the military milieu. The U.S. defence department’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, introduced after 1961 by then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and managed by his ‘whiz kid’ systems analysts, is often cited as the modern exemplar of rational efficiency gone too far when applied to fighting the war in Vietnam ‘by the numbers’ and as economically as possible.¹³

14. Even when the emphasis is on effectiveness, rather than efficiency, a restrictive conceptualization or focus can be harmful. For example, descriptions of CF effectiveness have for many years focussed almost exclusively on operational readiness and effectiveness, and quite rightly, secondary dimensions of effectiveness (e.g., social change, human resource policies, etc.) have been considered and judged in terms of their actual or anticipated impact on the CF’s ability to accomplish its operational mission – the CF’s *raison d’être*. But before and during the mid-1990s period of resource cuts and heightened operational demand, several supporting pillars of organizational effectiveness were either whittled down or were allowed to deteriorate to the point of neglect (e.g., medical services, pay and benefits,

now rotting from within . . . Thanks to “shareholder value” – no human values in this, just an obsession with short-term stock price – workers and managers get “downsized” regularly . . . But as the workers and managers depart, out goes commitment, out goes respect, out goes the social glue that binds people together in a healthy social system.” “Performance Anxiety: Productivity is a Time Bomb,” *The Globe and Mail*, June 13, 2002.

¹² “Efficiency must always be part of the conversation when resources are not infinite and citizens and governments have important choices to make among competing public goods. . . . [but] efficiency is only one part of a much larger public discussion between citizens and governments. Efficiency is not an end, but a means to achieve valued ends.” Janice Stein, *The Cult of Efficiency* (Toronto: Anansi), 2001, p. 6.

¹³ In *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute), 1981, Colonel Harry J. Summers Jr. contends that this was a reversal of the military principle of overwhelming force. While the analyst’s ‘just enough’ principle may accomplish the mission, it will do so at the risk of high casualty rates. Conversely, the traditional military principle of applying overwhelming force will usually accomplish the mission without serious losses, but will cost more in money and materiel.

military housing and community infrastructure, fairness in some areas of career administration), with predictable harmful effects on one or more aspects of operational capability – more operational stress, lower morale, reduced motivation to serve. These kinds of effects clearly demonstrate that an effectiveness model that is narrowly concerned with mission accomplishment is an inadequate one.

15. From time to time, there are reactions against the limiting perspective of one-dimensional or lopsided bottom-line effectiveness models. For example, *human capital* models may be advocated as a substitute for purely financial models of effectiveness.¹⁴ Or *corporate social responsibility* is promoted as a means for managing public reputation.¹⁵ But these efforts tend to be swing-of-the-pendulum phenomena, and as a result, are often equally one-dimensional in scope. Comprehensive and balanced models of organizational effectiveness are the exception rather than the rule. Two of these exceptions are considered in the discussion which follows – the competing values framework developed by Robert Quinn,¹⁶ and the balanced scorecard developed by Robert Kaplan and David Norton.¹⁷ The Public Service management framework¹⁸ and the DND/CF planning and reporting structure are subsequently reviewed in light of these models.

16. Competing values framework. The competing values framework represents the latent structure of 30 different criteria of organizational effectiveness originally collated by John Campbell in the early 1970s; his list included such variables as efficiency, quality, growth, turnover, motivation, control, information management, participation, productivity,

¹⁴ Mark Hollingsworth, “The New VIPs,” *The Globe and Mail*, November 1, 2002.

¹⁵ Björn Stigson, “Corporate Social Responsibility: A New Business Paradigm,” *Isuma: Canadian Journal of Policy Research*, Vol. 3. No. 2, Fall 2002.

¹⁶ Robert E. Quinn, *Beyond Rational Management : Mastering the Paradoxes and Competing Demands of High Performance* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1988.

¹⁷ Robert S. Kaplan & David P. Norton, *The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action* (Boston: Harvard Business School), 1996.

¹⁸ Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, *Results for Canadians: A Management Framework for the Government of Canada* (Ottawa: TBS), 2000.

accidents, morale, conflict/cohesion, planning, and training/development.¹⁹ The statistical reduction of this list (by multi-dimensional scaling of paired-comparison data) yielded two major dimensions: a Control-Flexibility dimension, and an Internal-External Focus dimension. As shown in Figure 2, the quadrants formed by these axes represent the four




Figure 2: Quinn’s competing values framework of organizational effectiveness.

major models of organizational theory and their relationships to each other. The Human Relations model in the upper left quadrant is focussed on the commitment of people in an organization and emphasizes such things as need satisfaction, morale, and social cohesion. The Open Systems model in the upper right quadrant is concerned with an organization’s interactions with its environment (Flexibility plus External Focus) and consequently views effectiveness in adaptability terms. The familiar Rational Goal model in the lower right quadrant reflects a concern for competitive position and measures effectiveness in terms of productivity and related measures. The Internal Process model in the lower left quadrant, which emphasizes control and internal stability, is epitomized by Weber’s machine

¹⁹ Summarized in Hodge & Anthony, *Organizational Theory*.

bureaucracy, a formalized hierarchy of clearly defined responsibilities and authorities in which decisions are based on impersonal rational considerations and people are advanced on objective merit. In addition to representing unique value orientations, each model also has two complements. For instance, the Rational Goal model shares an external focus with the Open Systems model and shares an emphasis on control with the Internal Process model.

17. These models represent ideal pure types, but real-world organizations embody aspects of all of them in varying degrees. Each model represents an organizational ‘good’, or what Quinn calls an organizational morality. Hence, to the extent that senior leaders distribute attention and resources appropriately across all value dimensions according to changing internal needs and external demands, overall effectiveness is likely to be maintained.

18. A defining characteristic of the competing values model of organizational effectiveness, however, is that it assumes contradiction and conflict to be recurring and natural features of organizational life. Underlying much of the dynamism of organizational life, various ‘goods’ compete for executive attention and resources. Choices have to be made, which, in constrained circumstances, pit one good against another:

A primary characteristic of managing, particularly at higher levels, is the confrontation of change, ambiguity, and contradiction. Managers spend much of their time living in fields of perceived tensions. They are constantly forced to make trade-offs, and they often find that there are no right answers. The higher one goes in an organization, the more exaggerated this phenomenon becomes. One-dimensional bromides (care for people, work harder, get control, be innovative) are simply half-truths representing single domains of action. What exists in reality are contradictory pressures, emanating from a variety of domains.²⁰

19. The competing values framework captures these tensions in its oppositional structure. For example, while an organization may want to exercise effective controls over its internal processes to ensure smooth functioning and timeliness of service, it also has to be adaptable to changing circumstances and must take risks in dealing with uncertainty; but we know that most bureaucracies are not very good at coping with change or risk. Similarly, organizations seek to maximize their operational effectiveness but also want to invest in and hold on to

²⁰ Robert E. Quinn, “Mastering Competing Values: An Integrated Approach to Management,” in D.A. Kolb, I.M. Rubin & J.S. Osland (eds.) *The Organizational Behavior Reader* 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall), 1991, p. 31.

their people; this is akin to the classical guns and butter dilemma of Economics 101, or, closer to home, the problem of stringently applying the universality of service policy. In short, each model of effectiveness has its opposite competing-value orientation.

20. According to Quinn, things often take a turn for the worse in organizations when any of these strengths, or criteria of goodness, become overvalued and are emphasized in a doctrinaire or blinkered way. “When this zealous pursuit of a single set of criteria takes place, a strange inversion can also result. Good things can mysteriously become bad things.”²¹ As illustrated by Figure 3, when values in the middle positive (unshaded) zone are too zealously pursued, they become self-defeating. Hence, excessive control turns into the iron grip of uncritical tradition, aggressive efforts to do more with less and reduce costs result in perpetual exertion and burnout, anxiety about external relations becomes political expediency, unconditional support for individual development fosters rampant careerism.




Figure 3: Positive and negative value zones.

²¹ Quinn, *Beyond Rational Management*, p. 69.

More generally, dimensions of effectiveness are also inverted, and, in the resulting possible combinations, yield four models of *ineffectiveness* – the country club, the tumultuous anarchy, the sweat shop, and the frozen bureaucracy: “The major point here is that everything in the two outer circles is related. The more success is pursued around one set of positive values, the greater will be the pressure to take into account the opposite positive values. If these other values are ignored long enough, crisis and catastrophe will result.”²²

21. The explanatory power of this framework and its validity can be readily illustrated in the CF case by reference to the disastrous effects on military health services, member quality of life, and family support in the 1990s (human relations quadrant) that resulted from a desire to protect a diminishing operational capability and the associated aggressive pursuit of cost savings (rational goal quadrant). Likewise, an undue emphasis on stability and continuity (internal process quadrant) goes a long way to explaining the rigid conservatism which the CF demonstrated in handling mainstream social changes (external adaptability quadrant). As for the internal negative zone, it represents what happens when organizations fail to articulate or exercise one or more essential moralities.²³

22. What leadership responsibilities can be deduced from the competing values framework? At the macro level, it says that leaders have four major priorities – getting the primary mission accomplished, maintaining the commitment of the people in the organization, establishing internal order and cohesion, and adapting to external change. It is probably not coincidental that the first two responsibilities of this set approximate the two major dimensions of leader effectiveness identified some 50 years ago in the Ohio State and University of Michigan studies of leadership: Initiating Structure (or task orientation) and Consideration (or relations orientation). The latter two correspond to Schein’s organizational imperatives: internal integration, and external adaptation.²⁴

²² Ibid., p.72.

²³ For example, the lip service rendered by the CF during the Cold War era to the law of armed conflict and its attendant ethical and humanitarian conventions (fostered no doubt by a survivalist mindset) has to be viewed as a major contributing factor to several of the scandals of the past decade.

²⁴ Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* 2nd ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1992.

23. The major behavioural imperative, or competency, implicit in Quinn’s effectiveness framework is that leaders must learn to see the world in terms of its paradoxes and contradictions and balance the competing demands represented by each organizational morality. The ability to see organizational dynamics this way does not come naturally however: “It requires a dramatic change in outlook, a redefinition of one’s world view. It means transcending the rules of mechanistic logic used for solving well-defined problems and adopting a more comprehensive and flexible kind of logic.”²⁵ To this end, the framework encourages abandoning the *either/or* approach typical of rational management in favour of a more intuitive *both/and* approach.²⁶ As comprehensive as Quinn’s framework may be, it isn’t necessarily the definitive model of organizational effectiveness. His model is a product of the particular inputs from which it was derived – Campbell’s list of criteria. In theory, other models might elaborate additional key dimensions of effectiveness.

24. Balanced scorecard. One of the better known of these alternative models is the Balanced Scorecard (BSC). As described by Kaplan and Norton, this effort grew out of a sense that financial statements were not the last word on organizational effectiveness and were becoming increasingly inadequate in an interconnected global economy as the sole measure of organizational performance; hence “the Balanced Scorecard retains an emphasis on achieving financial objectives, but also includes the performance drivers of these financial objectives.”²⁷ The BSC was not derived from any particular theoretical position, but rather was consensually developed from a series of discussions on effectiveness held in the early 1990s with several dozen senior representatives from a variety of industries. Kaplan and Norton incorporated some of the work done by Analog Devices on measuring effectiveness, and refined the scorecard through feedback from follow-on trials in select companies.

²⁵ “Mastering Competing Values,” p. 31.

²⁶ *Beyond Rational Management*.

²⁷ Kaplan & Norton, *The Balanced Scorecard*, p. 2.

25. The BSC serves dual purposes: first, it is a measurement system for evaluating effectiveness; and, second, it is a management framework for aligning activities with an organization’s mission, vision, and strategy. As illustrated in Figure 4, the scorecard measures organizational performance in four areas simultaneously: financial, customers, internal business processes, and learning and growth.




Figure 4: Performance perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard.

26. In its general structure, the BSC roughly corresponds to Quinn’s competing values framework but without making any statements about antagonistic or complementary relationships of one performance dimension to any other. Performance facets in the BSC are also either narrower than the performance domains in Quinn’s model or else overlap with more than one of Quinn’s value/performance domains. Thus the Financial perspective, which retains a primary emphasis on costs, financial performance, and efficiency, may be subsumed in Quinn’s broader Rational Goal value set. The Learning and Growth perspective overlaps with the individual development facet of the Human Relations model and also with the organizational learning facet of the Open Systems model. The Customer perspective reflects

an external focus and overlaps with the Open Systems and Rational Goal models. Finally, the Internal Business perspective is similar to Michael Porter's *value-chain* concept which focuses on the relative contribution of every corporate activity to competitive advantage;²⁸ it thus combines the control values of the Internal Process model with efficiency elements of the Rational Goal model.

27. Although found to work well across a variety of organizations, the four dimensions of effectiveness in the BSC are not rigid but are intended as a template which can be modified to suit organizational circumstances and values. On the whole it seems to be more applicable to profit-dependent organizations, whereas Quinn's conceptually richer framework has general applicability and seems to be adaptable to many kinds of organizations. Like Quinn's framework, though, the BSC also expresses the same core idea – that organizational effectiveness is multi-dimensional.

28. Public Service management framework. Several similarities with the preceding models are evident in the effectiveness framework adopted by the Treasury Board for management in the Government of Canada.²⁹ There are also some important differences. As shown in Figure 5, this framework, like the BSC, declares a primary goal or *raison d'être* – namely, designing, funding, delivering, and evaluating government programs and services from the perspective of the citizen. The Citizen Focus – which emphasizes accessibility of services, equitable and responsive service to citizens, and the development of extra-governmental partnerships to improve service quality – corresponds to the Customer perspective in the BSC model and to one of the Rational-Goal facets in the competing values framework. Secondary supporting goals are summarily identified as Values, Results, and Responsible Spending.

²⁸ *Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance* (New York: Free Press), 1998.

²⁹ *Results for Canadians*.




Figure 5: Critical dimensions of effectiveness in the federal public service.

29. A unique feature of the TBS framework is the Values component, especially the way it is operationalized in terms of *core societal values* (respect for democracy, conformity to the rule of law, public accountability), *professional values* (impartial policy advice to Government, quality service delivery to Canadians), and *ethical/people values* (integrity, civility, fairness, participation, respect for diversity, etc.).³⁰ These are essentially mode-of-conduct, or instrumental, values and thus differ in kind from the other effectiveness values we have seen, which are primarily end-state, or outcome, values. Quinn’s framework contains a few elements of this set in the Human Relations value orientation, but the BSC is totally and unreservedly utilitarian and makes no reference to such values. Although the TBS Values domain is graphically depicted as a secondary and supporting goal of Citizen Focus and independent of the other two effectiveness criteria, the intent is that conduct values should permeate all aspects of public service activity: “Values are the compass. All policies and systems – as well as interactions among public servants, parliamentarians, and

³⁰ This part of the framework is based on the report of a task force on values and ethics chaired by the late John Tait, Q.C., *A Strong Foundation* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development), 1996.

citizens – must be aligned with them.”³¹ Obviously, the responsibility for ensuring this alignment, and thereby affirming societal and professional values, emerges as another leadership imperative, an imperative that will be executed differently at upper and lower levels of organizations.

30. The Results criterion of effectiveness puts the emphasis on outputs generated by public service programs and continual monitoring of performance. It generally corresponds to the Financial perspective of the BSC and, in the competing values framework, to both the Rational-Goal facet of productivity and the Internal Process facet of control. The Responsible Spending criterion, which is concerned with the efficient use of resources, overlaps with the same effectiveness dimensions. Surprisingly, the framework is silent on employee well-being and commitment, reflecting perhaps the deliberate shift in the Public Service from an employment contract based on mutual loyalty to a more transactional human resources strategy.³² In sum, this model adopts a qualitatively different kind of primary goal (service to citizens) compared to the BSC (financial performance), one that is other-serving rather than self-serving.³³ It introduces one novel effectiveness criterion – what might loosely be called Civics and Professionalism – and it omits a Human Relations dimension, but in other respects is similar to the other multi-dimensional models we have examined.

31. CF effectiveness framework. The annual reports of the Chief of the Defence Staff from the late 1990s through to the most recent place the highest priority on ensuring operational effectiveness. The reports routinely emphasize and call up conventional determinants of operational effectiveness – equipment, education and training, leadership, and, a more recent addition, conditions of service – but they also implicitly embody a broader concept of CF effectiveness. For example, they acknowledge the necessity of taking into

³¹ Ibid., p. 10.

³² This was exemplified in the adoption of an “employability strategy” following the PS downsizing in the mid 1990s. Rather than providing the traditional assurance of long-term employment security, the employability strategy emphasized the opportunity to acquire and develop transferable skills.

³³ Jane Jacobs’ functional distinction between the “Commercial” value system (organized around the production and distribution of goods and services) and the “Guardian” value system (organized around the regulation and administration of society) helps to explain this difference in kind. *Systems of Survival: A Dialogue on the Moral Foundations of Commerce and Politics* (New York: Vintage Books), 1994.

account, and adapting to, the strategic environment (the new security environment, defence relationships with allies and partners, the effects of technological change) and improving internal processes (modern management, communications). To some extent, acknowledgement of these responsibilities may simply indicate reactivity to the pressures of the moment, but it must also be noted that a broader approach to effectiveness has been formalized in the DND/CF *Planning, Reporting and Accountability Structure (PRAS) 2001*.³⁴

32. Like the BSC, the PRAS is both a management framework and a measurement framework. The PRAS ties achievement of the defence mission to five capability programs, which are in turn linked to a broad array of key results. At least four of the capability programs (Command and Control, Conduct Operations, Sustain Forces, and Generate Forces) and most of their associated key results relate directly to the primary military goals of preparing for, conducting, and supporting operations. The fifth capability program (Corporate Policy and Strategy) is much more varied and reflects other concerns. For example, key results pertaining to defence advice, defence policy, international security arrangements, and public affairs have an external focus and facilitate *adaptation to change* in the public and strategic environments. On the other hand, governance, administration, and in-house information programs are concerned with *internal co-ordination and management* processes. Another key result area signals a *human-capital* orientation in its emphasis on individual and organizational learning, leadership, ethical development, and performance improvement, as does the support-of-personnel key result in the Sustain Forces capability program. Finally, one key result area affirms an institutional responsibility to embody and affirm core *Canadian values*, but this self-limiting statement unfortunately leaves professional values and ethics suspended in ambiguity. The only other apparent weakness of the PRAS is the lack of balance reflected in the high dimensionality of mission focus relative to the limited dimensionality of people issues.

33. To summarize the discussion to this point, we may take it as axiomatic that organizational effectiveness is a multi-dimensional construct. Several models of organizational effectiveness, including the DND/CF PRAS, exhibit this kind of structure.

³⁴ Document available at http://vcds.dwan.dnd.ca/subjects/key_documents_e.asp.

Furthermore, the idea of effectiveness is typically expressed in the language of goals, objectives, outcomes, and preferred end-states. Usually, one category of goals or outcomes has special or primary status because it captures in a succinct way the *raison d'être* of an institution or organization (e.g., for businesses, profitability; for government departments generally, service to citizens; for the military, mission success). However, a number of supporting goals must also be satisfied to ensure the long-term health and sustainability of organizations. From the models and examples examined, these seem to be adequately encompassed in the broad goals of achieving internal integration, adapting to change, and maintaining the well-being and commitment of organizational members. Notwithstanding the difference in priorities between primary goals and supporting goals, an integrated perspective on organizational effectiveness requires acceptance of the inherent tensions among competing values and goals and warns of the dangers in cutting loose one set of values and sending them into free fall.

34. As observed, the means adopted to achieve desired ends are also important aspects of organizational effectiveness. Productivity and resource/procedural efficiency are the means of choice for achieving primary goals in many organizations; in the military, adequately preparing for operations and skillfully conducting operations are the routes to mission success. Although fidelity to the principle is often variable in practice, care of organizational members also figures prominently in some effectiveness models as the preferred means for gaining employee commitment and loyalty. It should be noted here that, in most organizations, interest in member well-being is premised on a prudential rationale; namely, satisfaction with work conditions engenders organizational commitment and its correlates, organizational citizenship behaviour and continuity of service (the latter, an especially important goal for a military that operates under an all-volunteer format). In the CF, however, member well-being has the status of an end in itself. Because of the CF's legal authority to compel members to perform any lawful duty at any time, the CF incurs a weighty ethical obligation to reciprocate such member liability and the associated personal costs of military service; these costs include not only disruptions to family life and some limitation of individual rights and freedoms but especially the risks and dire consequences of hazardous duty and being placed in harm's way. Special mention must be made too of

interpersonal, or mode-of-conduct, values, which affect all activities. With respect to the CF, reference to these latter values invites a discussion of professional effectiveness.

Major Dimensions of Professional Effectiveness

35. Within a more or less definable jurisdiction, the CF provides an essential defence-and-security service to society, which for many members constitutes a long-term commitment and way of life, although this is not an essential attribute of professional status.³⁵ Because the CF also lays claim to a specialized body of theoretical knowledge and applied skills, maintains a distinctive collective identity, and regulates its activities according to a set of principles and values summarily designated as the military ethic, it satisfies the conventional criteria of a profession. Accordingly, professional effectiveness may be conceptualized in terms of: the adequacy of defence services provided by the CF within its mandate; its success in maintaining professional expertise; the relative strength of its professional identity and culture; and the extent to which the conduct of members conforms to the principles espoused in the military ethic.

36. The CF is, of course, a bureaucratized and collectively practised profession, and so the adequacy of service provided to the nation is readily captured in the organizational construct of operational readiness and its intended outcome, mission success, which we have already discussed. Turning our attention to professional expertise, the very concept of expertise connotes pre-eminence, and thus entails more than learning and applying the content of current training programs. It also requires constant testing of the existing body of professional knowledge, the theoretical and practical exploration of new military concepts, and, ultimately, the renewal and advancement of operational doctrine. Without intellectual competence in the military domain, the profession's claim to privileged jurisdiction is

³⁵ Variation in members' vocational commitment has given rise to an institutional versus occupational distinction, with Moskos and Cotton exploring dominant trends and patterns of one kind versus the other. Charles C. Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization," *Armed Forces and Society*, 4, 1977; Charles C. Moskos, "Institutional/Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update," *Armed Forces and Society*, 12, 1986; Charles A. Cotton, "Institutional and Occupational Values in Canada's Army" *Armed Forces and Society*, 8, 1981. Segal and Lancaster, meanwhile, have drawn attention to the mixed value orientations (pragmatic professionalism) of military members. David Segal, "Measuring the Institutional/Occupational Thesis," *Armed Forces and Society*, 12, 1986; P.C. Lancaster, "Canadian Officer Corps Ethos," in *DPDS Officer Corps Study: Phase 1* (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters), 1989.

substantially weakened, notwithstanding a monopoly over practice. This professional requirement to achieve and maintain military advantage through intellectual inquiry can thus be viewed as a unique addition to the broader institutional-effectiveness construct.

37. Establishing a strong common identity and professional culture assists in building internal cohesion and in regulating the conduct of CF members. This is a challenge, however, in the face of the high degree of functional specialization and structural differentiation that exists in the CF, a limited requirement and capability for joint operations, the diverse backgrounds and characteristics of members, and the geographical dispersion of bases and units. Symbolic and structural efforts at unity have not been tremendously successful, and the socialization of new members still occurs primarily along Environmental and occupational lines, which tends to sharpen internal boundaries. Beyond visible, functional, and socio-demographic differences in the CF, however, the values and assumptions of the military ethos help shape a common social identity. The ethos shapes social and professional identity in at least two ways. First, across the broad spectrum of operations that the CF may be called upon to perform (i.e., everything from search and rescue through humanitarian aid and peace-support operations to fighting wars), the ethos binds together all military service in terms of the common mission of defending Canada's territory, interests, and way of life. Second, through its espousal of particular mode-of-conduct values, it provides guidance as to how members of the military ought to conduct themselves in performing their professional roles. As a normative structure, the ethos includes:

- *core societal values*, such as government based on democratic principles, the protection of individual rights and freedoms, social responsibility, and deference to the rule of law³⁶ in regulating human affairs;
- *universal ethical values*, such as honesty, fairness (justice, equity), and caring (compassion, benevolence); and

³⁶ The rule of law comprises: the Constitution, including the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; the common law; statutory law, including the Code of Service Discipline; the exercise of the Crown Prerogative; and international laws applicable to out-of-country operations. Director of Law/Training, "Discipline," in *CDS Guidance to Commanding Officers* (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters), 2001.

- *professional military values*, such as service to society, loyalty, competence, duty, obedience to authority, discipline, courage, and so on.³⁷

38. All military leaders have a responsibility to ensure that CF policies, systems, and activities are aligned with these core societal values (civic and legal), ethical values, and professional military values. Ensuring that operations and other activities are conducted in ways that are consistent with national and international norms of acceptable behaviour has institutional consequences. As observed by Day,³⁸ an organization's image and reputation are not necessarily or wholly dependent on conventional notions of success. This can be readily illustrated by reference to two different kinds of Canadian military disasters: Dieppe 1942 and Somalia 1992-93. The raid on Dieppe failed in its execution, did not achieve its primary military objectives, and resulted in catastrophic troop losses. Yet the individuals and units that took part in the action are remembered with high regard because they fought with determination and bravely (two participants were awarded the Victoria Cross) and generally conducted themselves professionally. Conversely, the Canadian Airborne Regiment actually achieved its military security objectives in Somalia under extremely arduous conditions, and was widely praised for its efforts in helping to rebuild a shattered civilian infrastructure. As acknowledged by the Commission of Inquiry, however, "the good works by the CF in Somalia have often been overlooked,"³⁹ primarily because of the shooting of Somali intruders at the Canadian compound in Belet Huen, the beating death of a Somali teenager in the custody of soldiers from 2 Commando, and the ensuing mishandling of these incidents. "As a result, a proud legacy was dishonoured."⁴⁰

³⁷ Ethical principles and values applicable to the CF are spelled out in Chief of Review Services, *Statement of Defence Ethics* (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters), 1997. The statement includes a hierarchy of three principles (Respect the dignity of all persons, Serve Canada before self, Obey and support lawful authority) and six obligations (Integrity, Loyalty, Courage, Honesty, Fairness, Responsibility).

³⁸ David Day "Assessment of Leadership Outcomes," in Zaccaro & Klimoski.

³⁹ Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair* Vol 1 (Ottawa: Public Works & Government Services), p. 282.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Executive Summary, p. ES-1.

39. As different as they might be, both episodes underscore the crucial importance of professional conduct, relative to accomplishments, in preserving the CF's public image and reputation as a national institution. Reputation is a fragile thing, and, once damaged, can be difficult to restore. Not only is a damaged reputation corrosive to member pride in the military, but it also weakens public trust and confidence, which underpin public support and professional autonomy. A poor organizational image is especially injurious to the ability of an all-volunteer-force like the CF to recruit both the quantity and quality of people it needs, and may also adversely affect attrition. Consequently, Day argues that one of the tasks of top leaders in an organization is to manage the organization's reputation and to align its identity with its desired public image. With respect to military forces in democratic societies, the central issue is balancing might and right, or achieving mission success while observing the requirements of law and national and cultural values, issues that Barnes discusses under the rubric of *military legitimacy*.⁴¹ "Legitimacy provides the moral authority underpinning the right to act, and its requirements are derived from values, constitutions, traditions, religion, culture, the law, and public perceptions."⁴² It embraces decisions made to deploy military forces and individual conduct in an operational theatre. It is measured by public trust and confidence in the military and is also reflected in the level of public support for the military.

40. Notwithstanding the effort and resources sometimes devoted to image management and polishing, the chief problem with outcomes like reputation, trust, confidence, and public support, is that they are not directly attainable. Reputation and public trust and confidence depend on more substantive things, for instance, demonstrating operational effectiveness, being a good employer, taking care of the housekeeping, being adaptable as an institution, and doing all these things in socially and professionally appropriate ways. Hence for the purposes of an institutional effectiveness model, this class of desired outcomes will be treated as dependent second-order effects, mediated by external perceptions of operational effectiveness and military legitimacy.

⁴¹ Rudolph C. Barnes Jr., *Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millenium* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass), 1996.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 53.

41. To sum up, our review of professional effectiveness demonstrates how the concept of professionalism reinforces and supplements several dimensions of organizational effectiveness. For example, the military's professional service to society is realized primarily through adequately preparing for operations and skillfully conducting operations. Moreover, the strengthening of professional expertise is a consequential imperative of operational effectiveness and jurisdictional privilege; it obliges individual leaders to pursue their own professional development and encourage it in others, and it obliges senior leaders to establish research and educational programs in support of advanced military doctrine and practice. What is distinctive among the dimensions of professional effectiveness is its regulatory value system and the legal and moral obligations it imposes on military leaders as stewards of the profession. Hence, in support of internal integration and cohesion, military leaders must make the military ethos a salient feature of member socialization and service. Additionally, to preserve the legitimacy of the CF and trust in the military as a public institution, leaders must ensure that culture-embedding mechanisms⁴³ are aligned with the values of the military ethos and that member conduct in all spheres of activity likewise conforms to these values; civic, legal, ethical, and professional values must govern all activities.

Institutional Effectiveness and Derived Leader Roles/Responsibilities

42. Table 1 provides a summary comparison of the previously reviewed models of organizational effectiveness in terms of broad value types (i.e., outcome values and mode-of-conduct values) and more specific value dimensions. Quinn's competing values framework serves as the comparison baseline. Value gaps or deficiencies are indicated by blank cells. The top row of highlighted cells in the array of end-state values represent *primary* organizational value dimensions or goals; the remaining cells represent *secondary* or *supporting* value dimensions. Finally, it should be noted again that the TBS framework is unique in its emphasis on conduct values.

⁴³ Schein distinguishes between primary and secondary embedding mechanisms. Primary mechanisms are *revelatory actions*, such as: what leaders pay attention to and measure; how leaders react to critical incidents and crises; where and how leaders allocate resources; and how leaders recruit, socialize, reward, promote, and sanction members. Secondary mechanisms are largely *symbolic expressions* and include but are not limited to the following: organizational systems and procedures; history and heritage; ceremonies and rituals; and formal statements of organizational beliefs and values. *Organizational Culture and Leadership*.

Table 1: Comparison of organizational-effectiveness frameworks by value dimensions.

<i>Value Type</i>	<i>Competing Values Framework</i>	<i>Balanced Scorecard</i>	<i>TBS Management Framework</i>	<i>DND/CF PRAS</i>	<i>Emergent CF Effectiveness Framework</i>
<i>End-state (Outcome)</i>	Rational Goal	Financial	Citizen Focus	C2, Conduct Ops, Generate, Sustain	Mission Success
	Open Systems	Customer	Results	Corporate Policy & Strategy	External Adaptability
	Human Relations	Learning & Growth			Member Well-being & Commitment
	Internal Process	Business Process	Responsible Spending		Internal Integration
<i>Instrumental (Conduct)</i>			Civic, Legal, Ethical, & Professional Values		Civic, Legal, Ethical, & Professional Values

43. The emergent CF effectiveness framework shown in the column on the far right includes four broad criteria of effectiveness, or desired outcomes, that apply to the CF as an organization and a profession: the primary goal of mission success via operational readiness; and the secondary goals of member well-being and commitment, internal integration, and external adaptability. This model also asserts that these objectives must be pursued in accordance with a definable set of values in order to satisfy societal expectations and standards. *By this means, the proposed CF effectiveness framework marries a conventional pragmatic value system and its informing vision of social utility to the military professional’s moral value system and its vision of duty with honour.* Finally and consequently, all members of the CF, but senior leaders especially, must concern themselves with the reputation of the CF and the attendant trust, confidence, and support reflected back to the CF. These are second-order outcomes, which are largely dependent on the perceived effectiveness and legitimacy of CF operations and performance. Figure 6 depicts this integrative model.




Figure 6: Major elements of CF effectiveness.

44. The dimensions of effectiveness in Figure 6 are broad abstract objectives, however, and to properly define effective leadership, we need to describe leader roles and responsibilities at a somewhat finer level of detail, but short of specifying discrete tasks.⁴⁴ There are both top-down and bottom-up ways of proceeding. A convenient starting point is Quinn’s set of leader roles, which he derived rationally from his organizational effectiveness framework. He identifies eight leader roles, two for each effectiveness domain:

- Rational Goal domain – Leader roles are *producer* and *director*. In the producer role, the leader is expected to exemplify competence and commitment, take responsibility, be energetic, and maintain high personal productivity. As a director, the leader clarifies and defines problems, sets or maintains direction through goals and objectives, gives instructions, assigns tasks and resources, and evaluates subordinate performance.

⁴⁴ Yukl identifies four levels of detail: broad categories, such as Initiating Structure; middle-range categories, such as Planning, Directing; narrow categories, such as defining job responsibilities, assigning work; and incidents, such as instructing section heads to carry out a monthly weapons inspection. Gary Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations* 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall), 2002.

- Human Relations domain – Leader roles are *facilitator* and *mentor*. As a facilitator, the leader must foster teamwork, manage interpersonal conflict, and build cohesion and morale. As a mentor, the leader develops people through socialization, training, coaching, and career-development activities.
- Internal Process domain – Leader roles are *monitor* and *co-ordinator*. In the monitor role, the leader must continually assess the status of his operating unit, ensures rule compliance, reviews reports, carries out inspections, and keeps a handle on the flow of communications. As a co-ordinator, the leader organizes and schedules tasks, establishes routine procedures, and generally ensures a common understanding of goals and activities.
- Open Systems domain – Leader roles are *broker* and *innovator*. As a broker, the leader is concerned with maintaining legitimacy in the external environment and acquiring resources, and must be persuasive and influential in performing liaison, spokesperson, and political roles. As innovator, the leader must monitor the environment, identify trends, anticipate the future, project and orchestrate adaptive changes, and ultimately facilitate organizational learning.

45. Other taxonomies have been developed through bottom-up empirical studies. Typically, lists of manager and leader behaviours are identified by observation and analysis, and are subsequently aggregated to a manageable size and intelligible structure through statistical analysis or judgmental classification. One of the better known is Yukl's list, which is derived from the Managerial Practices Survey and describes 14 practices deemed necessary to be effective. His military-leader version⁴⁵ consists of the following 12:

- Taking initiative for making difficult decisions and dealing with problems.
- Planning and organizing activities to accomplish a mission effectively.
- Procuring/allocating resources, supplies and equipment needed for an operation.
- Communicating clear objectives, standards, and role expectations to subordinates.
- Inspiring commitment by explaining why an activity is important, building achievement motivation, leading by example, sharing risks and hardships.
- Empowering subordinates to perform their responsibilities by delegating authority, expressing confidence, and showing trust.

⁴⁵ Gary Yukl, "Leadership Competencies Required for the New Army and Approaches for Developing Them," in James Hunt, George Dodge, & Leonard Wong (eds.), *Out-of-the-Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations* (Stamford, CT: JAI Press), 1999.

- Preparing for an operation by conducting intensive training and rehearsals under realistic conditions.
- Developing subordinate skills and confidence by providing constructive feedback, coaching and mentoring.
- Keeping people informed in a timely way about events/decisions that affect them.
- Developing teamwork and identification with the unit.
- Acting supportive and showing genuine concern for the needs and concerns of subordinates.
- Developing networks of contacts to obtain information, resources, assistance, and organizational support for innovations.

Yukl's managerial-practices taxonomy includes two other responsibilities, which could justifiably be included in the military leader list: *Monitoring* – observing and checking performance, evaluating individual and group performance, analyzing trends; and *Recognizing and rewarding* – providing praise or tangible rewards for performance, expressing appreciation for efforts and achievements.

46. Interestingly, not all of these practices are classified by Yukl as leadership behaviours in the strictest sense of the term (recall that his research program is a broad inquiry into managerial functions, or what the military would call command). Slightly more than half of the practices line up with Mintzberg's *leader role*.⁴⁶ This mixing illustrates how the boundary between 'leadership defined as *influence*' and 'leadership defined as *being in charge*' gets blurred by organizational realities and the association of different concepts with the meaning of leadership. (For example, it is arguably the case that planning and organizing have very little to do with the *interpersonal influence* conceptualization of leadership, but they are intrinsic to the function of *initiating structure*, which has been a core construct of leadership theory for over 50 years.) As illustrated by the comparison of the sample of taxonomies in Table 2, the distinction between interpersonal-influence roles and authority-based roles becomes even fuzzier when more theories and elements enter the discussion.

⁴⁶ See Table 5-3 in *Leadership in Organizations* 2nd ed., p. 95.

47. Comparisons in Table 2 are made relative to Quinn's four dimensions of organizational effectiveness (left-hand column) and the broad categories of representative leader roles associated with this framework. At a slightly more detailed level of analysis, we shift right to Mintzberg's managerial roles, noting that leadership is narrowly construed in his structure, and that human relations roles are relatively meagre. External adaptability roles are well represented, however, and prefigure a current emphasis on initiating and leading change. Yukl's middle-range categories of military-leader practices (1999), as described above, are comparatively much stronger on human relations roles. At the same level of detail, leadership practices identified in existing CF manuals (1973) correspond reasonably well to the Yukl structure; a salient feature is the discipline role. Roles associated with external adaptation are relatively weak, however, with only minor direct-leadership behaviours identified. A major inconsistency in the CF manuals is that the leader roles covered in the text do not map onto the ten "principles of leadership"⁴⁷ listed as general guides to action; one would expect to find a closer correspondence between principles and practices. Finally, the most recent Yukl taxonomy of managerial behaviours (2002) is both more detailed than previous lists and now reflects a latent structure that goes beyond the traditional emphasis on Task-oriented behaviour and Relations-oriented behaviour to include a contemporary interest in Change-oriented behaviour.

⁴⁷ The principles are identified "as the outcome of long and intensive analysis of leadership behaviour over the history of military organization," and may be paraphrased as follows: Achieve professional competence; Know yourself and seek self improvement; Seek and accept responsibility; Lead by example; Make sound and timely decisions; Clarify your intent; Know your people and promote their welfare; Keep your people informed; Develop leadership potential in your subordinates; and Train your people as a team.

Table 2: Approximate equivalencies across leadership/managerial role and behaviour taxonomies.

Roles (Quinn, 1988)	Roles (Mintzberg, 1973)	Practices (Yukl, 1999)	Practices (CFPs 131(1) & (2))	Behaviours (Yukl, 2002)
Rational Goal				Task Oriented
Producer	Disturbance handler	Dealing with problems decisively	Problem solving & decision making	Problem solving Operational planning
Director	Leader, director	Planning & organizing Inspiring commitment	Planning & organizing Motivating Giving orders	Directing/co-ordinating activity Assigning work to people
Internal Process				
Coordinator	Resource allocator	Communicating clear objectives Procuring & allocating resources		Clarifying objectives Explaining rules, policies, SOPs Work organization
Monitor	Monitor Disseminator	<i>Monitoring*</i>	Supervising Disciplining Evaluating performance	Monitoring indicators Emphasizing standards
Human Relations				Relations Oriented
Facilitator	Negotiator	Developing teamwork & unit identity Keeping people informed Concern for subordinate needs	Handling problems & complaints Giving information Setting an example	Builds team identity Keeps people informed Leads by example Resolves conflicts Consults when affected Provides support Socializes
Mentor		Developing subordinate skills Conducting intensive training Empowering subordinates <i>Recognizing & rewarding*</i>	Instructing Rewarding Counselling	Provides coaching/mentoring Expresses confidence Recognizes achievements Celebrates progress
External Adaptability				Change Oriented
Broker	Liaison Figurehead	Developing contacts	Securing information Representing subordinates	Builds coalitions
Innovator	Entrepreneur			Gets ideas for improvement Envisages new possibilities Encourages new perspectives Supports innovation Experiments Explains need for change Facilitates learning

* From managerial practices (1989)

48. If we accept the four first-order outcomes shown in the model of CF institutional effectiveness in Figure 6 as general core leader responsibilities, we can flesh out a more detailed structure of CF leader roles and responsibilities by: (1) integrating relevant material from efforts such as those in Table 2; (2) including any unique responsibilities under law⁴⁸ and military professionalism; and (3) adding any other responsibility that may have been identified as a role deficiency in the past, or as a role requirement for the future. In recognition of the qualitative distinction previously made between leadership at lower and upper levels of the CF, appropriate differences in roles and responsibilities are also identified in this structure. The provisional results of this exercise are shown in Table 3. This is the generic *what* of military leadership in the CF, all of which is subject to the requirement of consistency with the conduct values of the military ethos.

49. It must be understood that the CF leadership responsibilities laid out in Table 3 have been derived in a top-down fashion from theoretical considerations and general research findings. As a test of their validity, they should be compared to the current Officer General Specifications (Provisional) and NCM General Specifications (Provisional). Both documents are detailed and comprehensive empirically derived statements of common military tasks and the knowledge and skills required for effective performance of those tasks; they are also organized by progressive developmental periods.

50. The OGS specifies five major skill domains or functions: Leadership and Command; Operations and War-fighting; Communications; Defence Management; and General Service Requirements. Under the Leadership and Command function, there are eight roles or task clusters, each with an associated sub-set of 3-16 tasks. The task clusters include: leadership, military ethos, well-being of subordinates, assessment, feedback, command, discipline, and personnel management and administration (military and civilian).

⁴⁸ See, for example, *Queen's Regulations & Orders* 4.01, 4.02, and 5.01

Table 3: CF leader roles and responsibilities differentiated by effectiveness dimensions and leadership levels.

Effectiveness Dimensions	Levels of Leadership	
	Leading People	Leading the Institution
Mission Success	<p>Achieve competence & pursue self-improvement. Solve problems; make decisions. Clarify objectives & intent. Plan & organize; assign tasks. Direct; motivate by persuasion, example, & sharing risks/hardships. Secure & manage task resources. Train individuals & teams under demanding & realistic conditions. Build teamwork & cohesion.</p>	<p>Establish strategic direction & goals. Create necessary operational capabilities (force structure, equipment, command & control). Exercise professional judgment wrt military advice & use of force. Reconcile competing obligations, set priorities, & allocate resources. Develop the leadership cadre. Support intellectual inquiry & develop advanced doctrine.</p>
Internal Integration	<p>Structure & co-ordinate; establish standards & routines; stabilize. Socialize new members into military values/conduct system, history, & traditions. Keep superiors informed of activities & developments. Keep subordinates informed; explain events & decisions. Reinforce military ethos; maintain order & discipline; establish professional group norms. Understand & follow policies & procedures. Monitor; inspect; correct; evaluate.</p>	<p>Manage meaning; use media & symbolism to maintain cohesion & morale. Develop & maintain professional identity; align culture with ethos; preserve heritage. Develop & maintain military justice system & policies. Develop & maintain effective information & administrative systems. Develop & maintain audit & evaluation systems.</p>
Member Well-being & Commitment	<p>Mentor; educate; develop. Establish climate of respect for individual rights & diversity. Treat fairly; respond to complaints; represent interests. Resolve interpersonal conflicts. Consult subordinates on matters that affect them. Monitor morale & ensure subordinate well-being. Recognize & reward.</p>	<p>Accommodate personal needs in development/career system. Establish an ethical culture. Enable individual & collective mechanisms of voice. Ensure fair complaint resolution. Honour social contract; maintain strong QOL & member-support systems. Establish recognition/reward systems.</p>
External Adaptability	<p>Maintain situational awareness; keep current; seek information. Establish & liaise with contacts. Anticipate the future. Support innovation; experiment. Learn from experience.</p>	<p>Master civil-military relations. Gather & analyze intelligence; define threats & challenges. Develop external networks & collaborative relationships. Initiate & lead change. Foster organizational learning. Conduct routine external reporting.</p>

51. The NCMGS is structured a little differently, in that some of the task clusters in the OGS subsumed under the rubric of Leadership and Command are listed as distinct skill domains or functions. In any case, there are 18 skill domains: Leadership in Peace and War; Military Ethos; Well-being of Subordinates; Assessment and Feedback; Legal Aspects of Discipline; Drill and Ceremonial; Personnel Management and Administration; Doctrine and Technology; Planning; Conduct of Operations/Activities; Training; Communications; Legislative and Regulatory Framework; Policy Framework and Organizational Structure; Resource Management; Basic Military Requirements; National and International Awareness; and Security. Eleven tasks are specified in the Leadership set: lead subordinates, develop subordinates, enforce good order and discipline, provide advice to commanders, recommend corrective measures, coach junior officers, acknowledge subordinate achievements, develop mental stamina of subordinates, develop physical fitness of subordinates, enforce General Safety programs, and familiarize new superiors to the organization.

52. Whether leadership is narrowly construed, as in the NCMGS, or more broadly construed, as in the OGS, all leadership task clusters are contained in Table 3. In several respects, the roles and responsibilities listed in Table 3 constitute a more comprehensive set than those in the OGS and NCMGS. First, several leadership roles in Table 3 include aspects of other General Specification skill domains (e.g., conduct of operations, strategic planning, communications, resource management). Second, the General Specifications do not fully reflect the External Adaptability responsibilities shown under the Leading People role. Third, the OGS does not mention many of the institutional leadership roles associated with developing and maintaining large organizational systems and sub-systems, one of the defining skill sets of executive leadership under stratified systems theory; knowledge of such systems is all that is required under the OGS. For these reasons, Table 3 may be the preferred way of describing leadership roles and responsibilities in leadership doctrine.

Requisite Leader Competencies

53. With reference to the general logic being followed, Figure 1 suggests that once leader roles and responsibilities essential to CF effectiveness have been identified, it should be possible to infer the leader characteristics necessary for effectively discharging those

responsibilities. Typically, such characteristics have been generically labeled as knowledge, skills, abilities, and other attributes, or KSAOs, but there is a contemporary tilt in favour of the term *competencies*. Although one might intuitively equate competency with skill or proficiency in a cognitive, behavioural, or social task, the term is defined and used variably and inconsistently.⁴⁹ One broad characterization that has received professional acceptance defines a competency as “an *underlying characteristic* of an individual that is *causally related to criterion-referenced effective and/or superior performance* in a job or situation.”⁵⁰ Along the same lines, Canadian industrial/organizational psychologists have identified three features of competencies: (1) they are KSAOs that underlie effective performance; (2) they are measurable; and (3) they can distinguish between superior performers and others.⁵¹

54. Spencer and Spencer organize competencies into five categories:

- **Motives** – Vocational needs, wants, goals that influence the direction, level, and persistence of effort.
- **Traits** – Relatively enduring psychological dispositions and physical characteristics.
- **Self-concept** – A person’s set of beliefs about, and image of, oneself.
- **Knowledge** – Declarative (know-what) and procedural (know-how) information related to a specific domain of human interest or activity.
- **Skill** – Proficiency in the performance of a physical, mental, or social task.

They further differentiate between proximal and relatively malleable determinants of performance (i.e., knowledge and skills) and more distal and relatively stable determinants of performance (i.e., motives, traits, self-concept). Knowledge and skills are competencies that

⁴⁹ Shaun Newsome, Arla L. Day, & Victor M. Catano, “Leader Assessment, Evaluation and Development,” report prepared for CF Leadership Institute, 2002; S.E. Abraham, L.A. Karns, K. Shaw & M.A. Mena, “Managerial Competencies and the Managerial Performance Appraisal Process,” *Journal of Management Development*, 20(10), 2001.

⁵⁰ Lyle M. Spencer & Signe M. Spencer, *Competence at Work : Models for Superior Performance* (New York: John Wiley & Sons), 1993.

⁵¹ Newsome, et al.

can be readily acquired or improved through some combination of short- to medium-term training, education, or experience; they are commonly used in the assignment of skilled personnel to jobs, and are invariably the focus of development programs for people who lack some portion of the competencies required for a position or role. Competencies which are either predictive of knowledge and skill acquisition (e.g., general intelligence, academic aptitude), or which are less amenable to quick or economical change through developmental interventions (e.g., innate abilities, personality traits, general socialization, certain physical attributes and abilities, aspects of mental and physical health), tend to be used in entry-level selection procedures.

55. One of the first decisions to be made in identifying competencies is the level of generality-specificity required. For example, governing a country is a competency; so is sharpening a lawnmower blade. Something in between these extremes of scope is typically more useful, sufficiently detailed to provide the kind of discrimination required in human resource applications but not so detailed or so numerous as to be unwieldy. The second decision concerns the strategy to be used in identifying competencies.

56. In the age of too much information too readily available, the Internet offers a number of sites with competency profiles available for sale or adaptation. There are drawbacks to using ready-mades however. If we accept the proposition that the meaning and dimensionality of organizational effectiveness will vary in accordance with the nature of the organization and its cultural context, then the competencies or traits which consistently, or commonly, relate to leader effectiveness will tend to be few in number. This is the great lesson of research on leadership traits; the accumulated evidence of hundreds of studies points to only a handful of traits (intelligence, dominance, self-confidence, energy, task-relevant knowledge) which consistently show a positive correlation with leadership effectiveness.⁵² No doubt, some competencies for a family of jobs or functions will be generalizable, but to yield maximum utility, *key competencies must be identified from the performance requirements and culture of the organization in which they will be used.* For

⁵² Bernard M. Bass, *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications* 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press), 1990.

example, leadership roles in the military overlap to some degree with leadership roles in the Public Service, but militarily unique roles and their underlying competencies are more likely to be critical to military effectiveness; hence it is important that competency analyses of military leaders rely on data from military samples. As David McClelland, one of the early advocates of competency testing, noted: “competencies identified by the competency process are context sensitive.”⁵³ Occupational analysis (OA) methods used in the CF exhibit this methodological sensitivity.

57. Generally speaking, the emphasis in competency modeling is on the things superior performers do more often and with greater effect than average performers. The objective is to identify *differentiating competencies*, consistent with the notion that a development and career-progression template derived from superior performers (e.g., one standard deviation above the mean) will enhance the overall performance of the organization. However, modeling can also be used to identify the *threshold competencies* necessary to perform satisfactorily.⁵⁴ Threshold competencies are more likely to be used in selection (if the competencies are not readily trainable) or otherwise in the design of individual training and education programs.

58. Newsome *et al.* briefly mention three approaches to competency profiling: (1) using Behavioural Event Interviews⁵⁵ with contrasting superior and average criterion samples to elicit behaviours that differentiate high performers from average performers; (2) using key organizational objectives to identify competencies; and (3) using organizational values and norms to identify competencies. Spencer and Spencer treat the design of competency studies in greater detail and describe other approaches, and their advantages and disadvantages – for example, panels of experts, surveys, computerized expert systems, task/function analysis, and direct observation. Because competency modeling tends to be done with less technical rigor

⁵³ Cited in “Introduction,” in Spencer & Spencer, *Competence at Work*, p. 8.

⁵⁴ Spencer & Spencer.

⁵⁵ A method derived from Flanagan’s Critical Incident Technique. Subjects are asked to describe the most critical situations encountered on their jobs, and questions are used to probe relevant personality traits, cognitive style, skills, and other competencies. *Ibid.*

than traditional job/occupational analyses,⁵⁶ they also stress the importance of validating the competency model through concurrent cross-validation studies or predictive criterion-referenced studies.

59. What can we say about leadership competencies? One of the most general leader-competency frameworks suggests that leader skills can be adequately described by a three-skill taxonomy: *technical skills* – concerned with things and reflecting declarative and procedural knowledge related to the performance of key functions; *interpersonal skills* – concerned with people and reflecting knowledge of human behaviour and interactional dynamics; and *conceptual skills* – concerned with ideas and involving analysis, logical thinking, concept formation, and the ability to deal with abstract relationships and models.⁵⁷ Katz and Kahn⁵⁸ proposed that, for lower-level leaders who are engaged in the daily operations of the organization, technical proficiency is extremely important; interpersonal skills are also important because of the requirement for a lot of face-to-face interaction with subordinates, but conceptual skills are relatively unimportant. The pattern for senior leaders is somewhat different, with technical skills declining in importance and conceptual skills increasing in importance. Zaccaro's theoretical and empirical review of executive requirements⁵⁹ supports the cognitive-complexity thesis, but concludes that social interactions at the executive level also increase in behavioural complexity, so that interpersonal skills take on relatively greater importance with increasing organizational rank. Figure 7 depicts this modified skill-differentiation framework.

⁵⁶ Newsome, *et al.*, "Leader Assessment, Evaluation and Development."

⁵⁷ Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations* 5th ed.

⁵⁸ D. Katz & R.L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations* (New York: John Wiley), 1966. This opinion is also expressed in the 1969 Rowley Report on officer development.

⁵⁹ *Executive Leadership*.




Figure 7: Relative importance of different kinds of skills according to organizational level.

60. While this framework is conceptually helpful, it is not sufficiently detailed to have any practical applications. Table 4, however, affords a more detailed summary of leadership/managerial competencies compiled by various researchers in recent years.⁶⁰ Zaccaro's categories of requisite executive characteristics anchor the comparisons. Although there are a number of correspondences in the lists of competencies shown in Table 4, there is also considerable variability in content, and not all of it is attributable to the use of different terms (e.g., dominance, assertiveness) to describe similar constructs. This may explain why, after reviewing various lists of attributes which, according to several of today's prominent leadership theorists, leaders do or should possess, Boyett and Boyett concluded: "For all of their lists of must-have traits and characteristics, there is much disagreement among our gurus about their real value and necessity. The really necessary attributes, say our gurus, might be some of the traits we listed above, none of them, all of them some of the time, none of them most of the time, and so on."⁶¹

⁶⁰ Sources: Public Service executive competencies, Public Service Commission, 1999; Gardner's leader attributes, in J.H. Boyett & J.T. Boyett, *The Guru Guide: The Best Ideas of the Top Management Thinkers* (New York: John Wiley & Sons), 1998; and Tett, et al. leadership competencies, in Newsome, et al., "Leader Assessment, Evaluation and Development."

⁶¹ *The Guru Guide*, p. 10.

Table 4: Approximate equivalencies across leadership/managerial competency taxonomies.

Executive Characteristics (Zaccaro, 1996)	Public Service EX competencies (PSC, 1999)	Managerial Skills & Traits (Yuki, 1999)	Leader Attributes (Gardner, 1990)	Leadership Competencies (Tett, et al., 2000)	Managerial Competencies (Spencer & Spencer, 1993)
Cognitive Capacities & Skills					
Intelligence Analytical reasoning skills Synthesis & mental modeling Metacognitive skills Verbal/writing skills Creativity	Cognitive capacity Creativity Visioning Action management Organizational awareness	Analytical ability Logical thinking Concept formation Judgement Problem-solving skills Creativity	Intelligence & judgement Planning & setting priorities	Problem awareness Short-term planning Strategic planning Creative thinking Monitoring	Analytical Thinking : sees implications of situations : analyzes issues systematically : anticipates obstacles Conceptual Thinking : sees non-obvious patterns : notices discrepancies : rapidly identifies key issues
Social Capacities & Skills					
Social reasoning skills Behavioural flexibility Negotiation/persuasion skills Conflict-management skills	Teamwork Partnering Interpersonal relations Communication	Empathy Social sensitivity Understanding of behaviour Communications skills Persuasion skills	Skill in dealing with people Understanding of followers Capacity to motivate	Motivating by authority Motivating by persuasion Team building Listening Oral communication Public presentation Developing self & others Tolerance Cultural appreciation Directing Decision delegation Co-ordinating Goal-setting	Impact & Influence : uses data or information : appeals to reason or logic : uses examples Teamwork & Co-operation : improves morale, resolves conflicts : involves others, solicits input : gives credit or recognition Developing Others : gives constructive feedback : reassures after difficulties : coaches, suggests, explains : gives developmental assignments Interpersonal Understanding : knows others' attitudes & needs : reads non-verbal behaviour : understands motivation Team Leadership : communicates high standards : stands up for group, gets resources Relationship Building
Personality					
Openness Curiosity Self-discipline Flexibility Risk propensity Internal locus of control	Stamina/stress resistance Ethics and values Stable personality Behavioural flexibility	Openness to experience Integrity, character, courage Emotional maturity Confidence & composure Flexibility & self-monitoring High energy & stress tolerance	Courage, resolution Trustworthiness Confidence Dominance, assertiveness Flexibility Physical vitality & stamina	Compassion Co-operation Sociability Politeness Political astuteness Assertiveness Seeking input Dependability Initiative Urgency Decisiveness	Initiative : seizes opportunities : handles crises swiftly : pushes envelope of authority : shows tenacity & persistence Self-confidence : confident in abilities & judgment : enjoys challenging tasks : questions/challenges superiors : accepts responsibility for failure Assertiveness : sets limits : sets standards, demands quality : confronts performance problems Information Seeking : gathers information systematically : curious, asks diagnostic questions
Motivation					
Need for achievement Socialized power motive Self-efficacy	Self-confidence	Socialized power motive	Need to achieve Willingness to accept responsibility	Task focus	Achievement Orientation : sets goals : measures progress & performance : improves efficiency/effectiveness
Expertise & Knowledge					
Knowledge of environment Functional expertise Social expertise	Domain knowledge	Technical proficiency	Task competence	Occupational acumen Productivity	Organizational Awareness Technical Background

61. The skepticism that pervades this opinion reflects the simple truth that possession of these competencies is no guarantee that leadership will occur or that it will be effective. In any given situation for any given group, only one or two of these competencies might apply. The point of view of different constituencies is also important. For example, in discussing combat effectiveness, Beaumont and Snyder remarked that some of the survey research conducted in support of Stouffer's *The American Soldier* de-emphasized the importance ascribed in that study to cohesion as a causal factor: "It was found that officer and enlisted views of war . . . differed widely. Most relevant to combat effectiveness were high ratings given [by enlisted ranks] to courage and coolness (twice as important as all other rated characteristics), followed by attention to men and demonstrated competency."⁶² The importance of courage and tactical competence to combat soldiers is supported by other expert opinion,⁶³ and serves to uphold the principle of situational specificity. While this suggests that certain competencies should be emphasized more than others for certain modal environments (e.g., operational, staff, technical, etc.), any requirement to prepare and develop leaders for a broad array of leadership roles and task environments would justify identifying an equally broad array of leadership competencies. In this respect, the OGS and NCMGS seem to do the job of satisfactorily identifying *common threshold* competencies. To the extent that environmental and occupational specifications capture *functionally specific threshold* leadership competencies, the result will be a leadership competency model that is both appropriately integrated and differentiated.

62. Summary. The essential content of effective CF leadership is, in principle, derivable from a multi-dimensional model of CF effectiveness. Figure 6 attempts to capture all important dimensions of CF effectiveness and is considered an appropriate conceptual foundation for organizing and explaining leader roles and responsibilities. Consistent with this framework, the idea of role differentiation by organizational level, various empirical studies on leadership/managerial roles, legal and professional considerations, and the

⁶² Roger A. Beaumont & William P. Snyder, "Combat Effectiveness: Paradigms and Paradoxes," in Sam C. Sarkesian (ed.), *Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications), 1980.

⁶³ S.L.A. Marshall, "Leaders and Leadership" and "Mainsprings of Leadership," in R.L. Taylor and W.E. Rosenbach (eds.), *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), 1984.

leadership content of General Specifications, the responsibilities in Table 3 are proposed for inclusion in CF leadership doctrine. Current occupational analysis methods constitute a comprehensive and rigorous methodology for identifying requisite *threshold competencies* (knowledge and skills) related to direct leadership, but because OA results are also affected by sample composition, there may be a case for conducting a dedicated analysis of strategic leadership at the executive level. Studies to identify *differentiating competencies*, at both direct and strategic leadership levels, for use in assessing leaders and making consequential assignment and promotion decisions are other possible undertakings. The only disadvantage of the present Task Inventory/CODAP method is that it yields task information, as the name indicates. It is not very good at yielding or clustering competency information, especially the soft-type competencies, such as personality attributes.

PART 2 – PROCESSES OF EFFECTIVE CF LEADERSHIP

Analytical Framework

63. Because of the qualitative differences in the functions and targets of influence between upper-level and lower-level leadership, leadership processes will be structurally similar to some degree but will also differ in important respects. As outlined in Table 3, leaders at lower levels of the organization are directly involved with people – mobilizing their knowledge, skill, and motivation. Leadership in this context is primarily about influencing and altering human behaviour and performance in a direct way, or what is generically called *supervisory leadership*. The immediate focus of leadership attention at upper levels of the organization is complex systems and the organization as a whole – their performance and long-term viability. Leadership influence at this level operates indirectly, and is primarily about monitoring and improving system and sub-system performance, achieving systems integration, and adapting them to internal and external perturbations, or what is generally called *change leadership*.

64. Somewhat different processes apply to these different roles, but in general, the theoretical task is to develop a normative model of leader behaviour that links sources of leader authority and influence to their effects on people and systems and thereby to intended organizational outcomes. The applicable derivational framework is shown in Figure 8, with normative theories of supervisory leadership and normative theories of change leadership serving as the key inputs for a general process model. In the discussion which follows, the review and analysis of the elements of a normative CF model that would apply to leading people is undertaken first, followed by a parallel analysis of elements of a normative CF model that would apply to strategic leadership of the institution and its major systems.




Figure 8: Analytical framework for deriving a normative CF model of leader influence behaviour.

Leading People: Task Cycle Theory

65. In their discussion of leadership as an influence process, Wilson, O’Hare, and Shipper⁶⁴ use the everyday meaning of *process* as a sequence of steps, or a course of action, as a way of operationalizing how leaders exert influence and how subordinates or followers learn to anticipate leader influence behaviours. The generic process involved is what they call the task cycle: “Organization behavior is made up of a series of tasks. Tasks are iterated and the sum of those iterations totals up to the work of the unit or individual. . . . This perspective of task iteration led to the notion of the task cycle, in that repeated performance of a task involves repeating a process – a systematic series of actions directed to some end.”⁶⁵

To CF members, the task cycle is generally known as task procedure. Figure 9 illustrates the basic elements.

⁶⁴ Clark L. Wilson, Donald O’Hare, & Frank Shipper, “Task Cycle Theory: The Processes of Influence,” in K.E. Clark & M.B. Clark (eds.) *Measures of Leadership* (Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership), 1990.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 185.




Figure 9: Simplified generic task cycle.

66. Tasks are typically assigned by superiors – as a role set, through terms of reference for a position, or through real-time directives and requests. They may also be triggered by some environmental event that demands a response, may be prompted by detecting some variance or deviation from the norm in an organizational unit or the operating environment, may be set in motion by a leader when opportunity knocks, or may be initiated by a leader to improve performance, subordinates’ circumstances, or operating conditions and capabilities. In other words, the locus of control over tasks may be either external or internal. When a leader demonstrates a pattern of external control, we typically label this a custodial leadership style (Quinn’s monitor and co-ordinator roles). When a leader exhibits a pattern of internal control over tasks, we tend to think of the leader as ‘a mover and a shaker’ (Quinn’s innovator and broker roles).

67. Tasks are undertaken to achieve some stated or implied purpose, objective, goal, or mission. Clear, routine, well practised tasks typically elicit automatic standard reactions and drills, whereas ambiguous, complex, or novel tasks customarily engage a sequence of

controlled thought and action. Leaders in training, and all apprentice problem-solvers for that matter, are taught to spend some time – time permitting – in structuring the problem before leaping into action. The diagnostic step (assessment, estimate, or appreciation of the situation) is supposed to take into account relevant factors in the situation and the characteristics of the followers or other people who will be involved in the task. The resulting plan or intent is put into effect by directing or influencing others to undertake certain actions. Again, due to situational contingencies (time pressure, task complexity, etc.) or follower contingencies (demoralized, inexperienced, etc.), the leader may have to show some behavioural flexibility in how authority and influence are exercised. Action monitoring by the leader and other feedback loops provide opportunities to make necessary adjustments in influence behaviour (extra encouragement, pressure tactics) or to the situational assessment and plan. Before or after a particular task is completed, others arise to start the cycle again.⁶⁶ Table 3 suggests that multi-tasking is the norm for CF leaders.

68. The significance of this cycle is that “each task is fully equivalent to a learning trial.”⁶⁷ Leaders, for instance, learn about followers and others they attempt to influence. They learn, for example, about the capabilities of their followers and how they interact and perform, and so they develop expectations about how they are likely to respond to particular conditions and the leader’s behaviour – all of which is raw input for the leader to modify or adjust his influence behaviour in the future. Similarly, followers develop expectations about the leader – what behaviours she is likely to exhibit in different situations and how they can adapt to her. They also learn about her competencies, motives, and values, and how much trust and confidence she merits. After many iterations, interaction patterns will tend to stabilize, so that flexible leaders, who possess a relatively broad behavioural repertoire, may

⁶⁶ In Figure 10-1 in *Executive Leadership*, Zaccaro outlines an equivalent tri-level process model of leader performance. The *diagnostic* phase (Boundary Spanning & Direction Setting) includes: (1) scanning, analysis, and engagement of the operating environment; (2) evaluation of internal capabilities and requirements; and (3) formation of strategies, goals, and tasks. The follow-on *action* phase (Operational Management) involves: (1) implementation of strategies, goals, and tasks; (2) changes in policy, functions, or resources and tasks; and (3) changes in culture, empowerment, or collective motivation, leading to the desired outcome or result.

⁶⁷ Wilson, O’Hare, & Shipper, “Task Cycle Theory,” p. 189.

play different roles (e.g., mentor, innovator, commander) and exhibit different behaviours or influence patterns with different people (as described by leader-member exchange theory⁶⁸).

Leading People: The Field of Action

69. Task cycles are executed in a conceptual field of action made up of the leader, followers, and the situation. This field of action is the backdrop for current CF leadership doctrine and is the major organizing principle for some treatments of leadership theory and practice.⁶⁹ As represented by Figure 10, the leader, whether appointed or emergent, functions *within* a group of subordinates or followers, and all are *in* the same objective situation, though they might, and sometimes do, perceive it differently. Leadership theories




Figure 10: The leader-follower-situation dynamic.

assume that the inter-relationships of the leader, followers, and situation are dynamic, with a variety of forces reinforcing, thwarting, or neutralizing the leader's intent. Thus, in a

⁶⁸ G.B. Graen & M. Uhl-Bien, "Relationship-based Approach to Leadership: Development of Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) Theory of Leadership Over 25 Years," *Leadership Quarterly*, 6, 1995.

⁶⁹ See, for example, Richard L. Hughes, Robert L. Ginnett, & Gordon J. Curphy, *Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience* (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1993.

figurative sense, the leader's general task could be described as an alignment problem – lining up follower intentions and situational conditions with the leader's explicit or implicit intent in order to maximize the chances of a successful outcome. This is analogous to Fiedler's notion of creating situational favourability or situational control.⁷⁰

70. Leadership theories converge and diverge in terms of whether they give more or less attention to leader, follower, or situational variables. Different theories emphasize different contingencies. The primary focus of Situational Leadership theory,⁷¹ for example, is on subordinates and their readiness to undertake a task. Charismatic and transformational leadership theories,⁷² meanwhile, are primarily, but not exclusively, concerned with the attributes and behaviour of the leader. Other theories are broader in scope and take two or all three clusters of factors into account.

71. According to the contingency family of theories, leader effectiveness depends on the leader's ability to adapt her behaviour to the requirements of a given situation and/or the characteristics of the followers. Hence, any of several key factors should be considered by the leader in deciding how best to proceed with a plan, including subordinate maturity, the nature of the task, leader-member relations, obstacles and enabling conditions, and so on. All contingency theories (e.g., Fiedler's leader-match, House's path-goal theory, Hersey and Blanchard's situational leadership theory, the Vroom-Jago normative decision model) emphasize the leader's *diagnostic skills*, and most (Fiedler's is the exception) require some *behavioural flexibility* on the part of the leader. Several theories (e.g., trait approaches, Fiedler's leader-match, transformational leadership) attach greater significance to underlying

⁷⁰ Fred E. Fiedler & Martin M. Chemers, *Improving Leadership Effectiveness: The Leader-Match Concept* 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons), 1984.

⁷¹ Paul Hersey & Kenneth H. Blanchard, *Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources* 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall) 1988.

⁷² B.M. Bass, *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations* (New York: Free Press), 1985; W. Bennis & B. Nanus, *Leaders: The Strategies for Taking Charge* (New York: Harper & Row), 1985; J.M. Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper & Row), 1978; J.A. Conger & R.N. Kanungo, *Charismatic Leadership in Organizations* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications), 1998; J.M. Kouzes & B.Z. Posner, *The Leadership Challenge: How to Get Extraordinary Things Done in Organizations* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1987; N.M. Tichy & M.A. Devanna, *The Transformational Leader* (New York: John Wiley), 1986.

consistencies in leader behaviour. Such consistency may be a function of personality, habit, attitude to leadership, or intensity of purpose and commitment.

72. Regardless of similarities and differences in focus across leadership theories, all are concerned with the processes of leader influence and how it can be used to maximum effect. Because leadership is an influence process, and because power is the capacity to influence, an understanding of power is indispensable to the study of leadership. Without power, leadership is not possible,⁷³ and yet the concept of power is not well understood. According to the original 1959 French and Raven typology, there are two classes and five basic kinds of social or organizational power, although subsequent researchers have identified additional kinds. The two classes are *position power*, which is based on attributes of the position one occupies, and *personal power*, which is based on individual attributes. Position power typically encompasses the following five kinds of power:

- **Legitimate power** is the capacity to impose a sense of obligation or responsibility on another, and may be based on law, other formal authority such as terms of reference for a specific role or position, and/or social norms and stabilized expectations for a role or position. The legitimate authority of commanders and other superiors in the CF is a central feature of military organization under the *National Defence Act*, and is reflected in the importance attached to maintaining the integrity of the chain of command, and the rites and symbols of individual commissioning, promotion, and change of command.
- **Reward power** is the capacity to provide others with things they desire or value. Rewards may be tangible, symbolic, or social, such as, praise and recognition. In the CF, the power to distribute tangible rewards increases with rank and centrality of authority.
- **Coercive power** is the capacity to take away rewards and privileges or administer sanctions and punishments. Coercive influence may be moderate, as in the use of pressure tactics or warnings, or severe. Powers of punishment in the CF are substantial but are, in the main, restricted to those in command appointments.

⁷³ James MacGregor Burns, "Leadership and Followership," in R.L. Taylor & W.E. Rosenbach (eds.) *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), 1984; Edwin P. Hollander, "Leadership and Power," in G.Lindzey & E. Aronson (eds.) *Handbook of Social Psychology* Vol. 2, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House), 1985.

- **Information power**⁷⁴ is the capacity to access and distribute important information, which is typically a function of where one is located in the organizational network. Organizational centrality is a determinant of information power in the CF, and thus staff officers who work closely with key appointments also acquire considerable information power.
- **Ecological power** refers to situational “control over the physical environment, technology, and organization of the work”⁷⁵ and thus creates the potential for indirect influence over others. As previously noted, indirect influence of this kind is distributed across rank levels in the CF, but the authority to make major changes in organizational structure, technology, and both the physical and cultural environments is greater at senior levels of leadership.

73. Personal power includes expertise, referent power, and connection power:

- **Expert power** is the capacity to provide another with needed information, knowledge, or advice. Expert power derives from unique knowledge, skill, or experience and gives rise to the technical-proficiency model of leadership that distinguishes professional armed forces from other forms of military organization. The extensive investments made in training and education in the CF attest to the high value placed on operational expertise and proficiency. As a corporate body of knowledge and skill, expertise also confers considerable power and influence potential on those specialists who are able to manage an organization’s strategic contingencies⁷⁶ (e.g., lawyers when human-rights challenges imperil operational capability or culture, human resource specialists when force strength falls below authorized manning levels).
- **Referent power** is the capacity to provide another with feelings of personal acceptance, approval, efficacy, or worth. Referent power is based on the personal esteem of followers for a leader and a desire to identify with or emulate him/her. Qualities which increase referent power include friendliness and respect, sensitivity to and concern for others, authenticity, character and integrity, and exemplary principled behaviour.
- **Connection power** refers to the capacity to access information, resources, and opportunities. It is like information power in one aspect but should be understood as a broader property of *personal* networks and relationships, and so, unlike information power, is completely portable. Contacts and ties with other military

⁷⁴ Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations* 5th ed.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 153.

⁷⁶ G.R. Salancik & J. Pfeffer, “Who Gets Power and How They Hold on to It: A Strategic Contingency Model of Power,” *Organizational Dynamics*, 5, 1977.

professionals, influential figures, or sources of valued expertise represent several forms of connection power, or what is sometimes described as *social capital*;⁷⁷ as noted earlier, theories of executive effectiveness advocate establishing broad external connections with increasing rank and responsibility.

The distinction between position and personal power is an important one in that the CF confers considerable position power on novice leaders, but also recognizes that personal competencies are critical to effective leadership. *Learning how to use position power effectively and building personal power are the essence of leader development.* In what follows, several representative theories are briefly examined to see what they can tell us about situational, follower, and leader factors and the processes of power and influence.

74. Situational focus. A distinctive feature of Fiedler's leader-match theory is his belief that leaders have preferred and distinctive leadership orientations⁷⁸ that prevent them from altering their behaviour easily. Hence, leaders are maximally effective when they are matched to situations that are consistent with their leadership motivation (assessed by the Least Preferred Co-worker (LPC) scale); low-LPC leaders are characterized as task oriented and high-LPC leaders as relationship oriented. Which kind of leadership is more appropriate in a given situation is a function of what Fiedler calls *situational control*, which itself is dependent on leader-member relations, task structure, and leader position power; the higher or more favourable all three are, the greater the situational control. Application of the theory is essentially a three-step process: (1) the leader identifies his preferred or dominant leadership orientation; (2) each situation is analyzed in terms of situational control; and (3) the leader with the appropriate style for that situation is either matched to the assignment, or else the leader in place must restructure the situation to achieve a better fit with his orientation.

⁷⁷ Daniel J. Brass & David Krackhardt, "The Social Capital of Twenty-first Century Leaders," in Hunt, Dodge, & Wong, *Out-of-the-Box Leadership*. "Just as human capital refers to the skills and abilities that may be potentially beneficial to individuals, social capital refers to social relationships that can potentially confer benefits to individuals and groups." Daniel J. Brass, "Social Capital and Organizational Leadership," in Zaccaro & Klimoski, *The Nature of Organizational Leadership*, p. 133.

⁷⁸ Role motivation has been a longstanding area of inquiry for John B. Miner. See, for example, his "Twenty years of research on role motivation theory of managerial effectiveness," *Personnel Psychology*, 31, 1978, and *Role Motivation Theories*, (New York: Routledge), 1993.

75. Apart from the fact that leader orientation is not a black-and-white issue (many leaders exhibit a high need for achievement, but they are not commonly unconcerned by, or indifferent to, relationships with their subordinates), one of the noteworthy, but often overlooked, features of Fiedler's theorizing is the idea of improving situational favourability by enhancing position power and task structure. Both stratagems are characteristic of CF practice and enable people with limited experience to assume leadership positions relatively quickly and still function effectively.

76. Position power is enhanced by giving substantial legitimate authority to military leaders (legal and symbolic aspects of military rank and command), as well as reward power (control over development, promotion, and assignment decisions) and coercive power (statutory provisions concerning the *Code of Service Discipline* and powers of punishment):

Position power is important, not only as a source of influence but also because it can be used to enhance a leader's personal power. Control over information complements expert power based on technical skill by giving the leader an advantage in solving important problems . . . Reward power facilitates development of a deeper exchange relationship with subordinates, and when used skillfully it enhances a leader's referent power. The authority to make decisions and upward influence to get them approved enables a leader to demonstrate expertise in problem solving, and it also facilitates development of stronger exchange relationships with subordinates. Some coercive power is necessary to buttress legitimate and expert power when a leader needs to influence compliance with rules and procedures that are unpopular but necessary to do the work and avoid serious accidents. Likewise, coercive power is needed by a leader to restrain or banish rebels and criminals who would otherwise disrupt operations, steal resources, harm other members, and cause the leader to appear weak and incompetent.⁷⁹

The corollary to the authority contingency in Fiedler's theory is reflected in one of the propositions of leadership-substitutes theory,⁸⁰ which states that low position power can neutralize leader effectiveness.

77. CF practices also exploit those features of Fiedler's model that are concerned with task structure. Roles and procedures tend to be highly formalized, and tasks are carefully specified and standardized, practices which increase situational control for the leader. As we

⁷⁹ Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations* 5th ed , p. 158.

⁸⁰ Kerr & J.M. Jermier, "Substitutes for Leadership: Their Meaning and Measurement," *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, 22, 375-403, 1978.

have previously seen, these ideas and their potential applications are summarily captured in the concept of indirect leadership, which proposes that leaders can influence subordinate psychology and behaviour by altering their social and operating environments and how they are perceived.⁸¹ While unit leaders exercise varying degrees of control over local protocols and unit climate, internal processes and the task environment are key levers for senior leaders who control and shape the major systems and sub-systems of the CF and who also influence professional identity and culture. Leaders at all levels also have the ability to influence how situations are interpreted and thereby create a common orientation, which is probably why describing the situation is the lead item in operational and administrative orders.

78. Consistent with the idea of improving situational control, leader-substitutes theory⁸² proposes that a number of situational features may stand in for, and by extension support or enhance, leader actions. For example, the intensive training and education of military members reduces the leadership burden of closely directing and supervising performance, while professional military socialization and its ideals of duty and service to country are assumed to have a normative regulatory effect on behaviour.⁸³ Job enrichment and task design⁸⁴ exploit substitution effects by enhancing the meaningfulness and sense of responsibility in work. At the team level of analysis, reference groups and organizationally congruent group norms, moderated by peer cohesion, have long been understood as key shapers of, and influences on, socially desirable behaviour.⁸⁵ Peer-support networks also

⁸¹ Robert T. Lord & Karen J. Maher, *Leadership and Information Processing: Linking Perceptions and Performance* (Boston: Unwin Hyman), 1991.

⁸² S. Kerr & J.M. Jermier, "Substitutes for Leadership: Their Meaning and Measurement"; J.P. Howell & P.W. Dorfman, "Substitutes for Leadership: Test of a Construct," 24, 714-728, 1981; J.P. Howell, D.E. Bowen, P.W. Dorfman, S. Kerr, & P.M. Podsakoff, "Substitutes for Leadership: Effective Alternatives to Ineffective Leadership," *Organizational Dynamics*, 19, 21-38, 1990.

⁸³ Bernard Bass, *Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impact* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum), 1998.

⁸⁴ See, for example, the Hackman and Oldham job characteristics model in J.R. Hackman & G.R. Oldham, *Work Redesign* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley), 1980.

⁸⁵ Serge Moscovici, "Social Influence and Conformity," in Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson (eds.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology Vol. II* 3rd ed. (New York: Random House), 1985; Eleanor Singer, "Reference Groups and Social Evaluations," in Morris Rosenberg & Ralph H. Turner (eds.), *Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives* (New York: Basic Books), 1981.

substitute for or enhance leader consideration and support. At the organizational level of analysis, a high degree of formalization, such as the development of detailed standard operating procedures (SOPs) or other immediate-action drills, will often substitute for leader direction in routine scenarios. Moreover, Bass has suggested that super-ordinate goals, codes of conduct, and ceremony and tradition can enhance an organizational culture that pursues transformational objectives.⁸⁶ Table 5 summarizes some of the major situational variables that may substitute for or enhance leader influence.

Table 5: Substitutes for directive and supportive leadership⁸⁷

<i>Substitute</i>	<i>Leader Behaviour</i>	
	<i>Directive</i>	<i>Supportive</i>
<u>Subordinate characteristics</u>		
1. Experience, knowledge, ability, training	Substitute	--
2. Professional orientation	Substitute	Substitute
<u>Task characteristics</u>		
1. Unambiguous or routine tasks	Substitute	--
2. Intrinsically satisfying tasks	--	Substitute
<u>Group characteristics</u>		
1. Organizationally congruent norms	Substitute	--
2. Cohesion, peer support	Substitute	Substitute
<u>Organizational characteristics</u>		
1. Formalization (rules, procedures)	Substitute	--
2. Super-ordinate goals	Substitute	--
3. Ceremony and tradition	--	Substitute
4. Codes of conduct	Substitute	--

In recognition of the fact that many individual, task, group, and organizational characteristics have the potential to support leader intent and influence, Kerr has advocated the systematic creation and exploitation of substitutes for hierarchical leadership.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Bass, *Transformational Leadership*.

⁸⁷ Adapted from Kerr & Jermier, 1978, and Bass, 1998.

⁸⁸ Steven Kerr, "Substitutes for Leadership: Some Implications for Organizational Design," *Organization and Administrative Sciences*, 8(1), 1977.

79. Subordinate/follower focus. Subordinates and followers are not impassive beings, but are active and reactive participants in organizations, whose motivational states and other attributes are subject to change. With respect to motivation, Yukl distinguishes three kinds of responses to leader direction and influence: commitment, compliance, and resistance. The differentiating components are public behaviour and private attitude:

- **Commitment** means behavioural conformity plus attitudinal support;⁸⁹ behaviour and attitude are congruent. Committed followers identify with and internalize leadership's goals or organizational norms of duty (e.g., the Hercules crews who kept the supply lines open in Kigali, the 2 PPCLI defensive actions at Kapyong and the Medak Pocket, the helicopter and ship's crews who regularly venture out in high seas and extreme weather to pluck people from the water or the decks of sinking vessels) and will maintain effort in pursuit of those goals without promise of reward or threat of punishment, and even in the absence of the leader.
- **Compliance** refers to behavioural conformity combined with attitudinal neutrality, reluctance, or opposition; behaviour and attitude are more or less incongruent. Compliant subordinates may pursue leadership's goals only to the extent that their behaviour and performance are closely monitored and controlled (e.g., Iraqi conscripts in the Persian Gulf War); behaviour and performance are contingent on rewards or threat of punishment, strong cultural norms of obedience to authority, or attachment to and influence of the primary group.
- **Resistance** refers to delaying, avoidant, or non-compliant behaviour coupled with attitudinal opposition; behaviour and attitude are congruent but negatively so. Resistant or oppositional subordinates either refuse to pursue leadership's goals or pursue antithetical goals (e.g., GIs who engaged in mutiny and fraggings in the Vietnam War) and cannot be controlled by organizational norms, promise of reward, or threat of punishment.

80. Commitment is ultimately what most leaders want from their subordinates since it delivers certain advantages which compliance may not: commitment often translates into extra effort and persistence and, hence, enhanced performance; it fosters self discipline and correspondingly diminishes the requirement for imposed discipline; and committed subordinates usually require little or no direction and supervision and, consequently, can be

⁸⁹ Technically speaking, commitment refers to any persistent attachment. It can have more than one focus (e.g., organization, team, profession, occupation, task, etc.) and has several components (i.e., *affective* commitment, based on valued congruence and identification; *continuance* commitment, involving cost-benefit considerations; and *normative* commitment, deriving from a felt obligation). John P. Meyer & Natalie J. Allen, *Commitment in the Workplace: Theory, Research, and Application* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications) 1997.

reliably given extra responsibility and authority. In some circumstances, leaders may have to settle for compliance. Both kinds of response are legitimized in leadership theory, even though some theories are oriented to building commitment.

81. One such approach is the Hersey and Blanchard Situational Leadership model,⁹⁰ which focuses on Subordinate Readiness, an indicator of performance potential based on four high-low combinations of *ability* to perform the task and *willingness* to perform. Application of the model is a simple three-step process: (1) the leader identifies the task or performance domain of concern; (2) the leader assesses subordinate readiness with respect to that task or performance domain; and (3) the leader adopts the leadership style (Telling, Selling, Participating, or Delegating) which is best suited to the individual's or group's readiness level. If subordinates lack the ability to perform the task, part of the leader's job is to provide the necessary instruction, coaching, or guidance. If subordinates lack the motivation or confidence to perform, the leader's job is to build those capabilities. Over the long term, moreover, the thrust of leadership under the Hersey and Blanchard model is to develop high levels of ability, confidence, and commitment in their subordinates (Quinn's mentor role) so that they may be assigned broader responsibilities and increased authority to think and act independently.⁹¹

82. Transformational and charismatic theories of leadership are concerned with developing follower commitment to an even greater degree. Various formulations of these theories have relatively little to say about follower characteristics though. They are more concerned with attributes of the leader and, to some extent, the conditions that facilitate transformational effects, and so this family of theories will be addressed in the following section. On the other hand, leadership-substitutes theory takes several follower contingencies into account, such as ability, motivation, discipline, and morale. One of the theory's implications is that systemic approaches to developing the knowledge, skills, and

⁹⁰ *Management of Organizational Behavior*.

⁹¹ C.P. Neck & C.C. Manz have coined the term *the self-led soldier* to describe followers who have developed "strategies for self-management as well as for managing the natural motivational value of the task and the patterns in one's thinking." "In Search of the Self-Led Soldier: Army Leadership in the Twenty-First Century," in Hunt, Dodge, & Wong, *Out-of-the-Box Leadership*.

experience of followers strengthens, or may even obviate the requirement for, directive leadership. Similarly, socializing members to accept and identify with espoused cultural norms supports the regulatory function of leadership, while the development of a strong sense of group identity and cohesion builds professional commitment over the long term, strengthens self-discipline, and minimizes the need for supportive leadership. It is important to acknowledge here that these effects are all a function of indirect leadership at the unit and institutional levels – the relatively slower but progressive socialization and development of followers, which produces long-lasting changes in their capabilities.

83. Leader focus. The long search for the defining traits of leaders, which characterized leadership research in its beginnings, was influenced by hereditarian ideas about social eminence. However, the accumulated evidence of hundreds of studies intended to identify those traits which would differentiate leaders from non-leaders yielded only a handful of characteristics which consistently showed a positive correlation with leader effectiveness – intelligence, dominance, self-confidence, energy, and task-relevant expertise, for example.⁹² The fact that the observed relationships were not strong suggested that there might be multiple paths to leader effectiveness.

84. Nonetheless, a more recent ‘second look’ at trait research provides evidence that, rather than possessing some critical discrete trait or group of traits, effective leaders may be people who are highly competent in reading the needs of their constituencies and who can adjust their behaviours to respond effectively to those needs.⁹³ In other words, the abilities of primary importance for leader effectiveness may be social perceptiveness and response flexibility – fairly broad and general behaviours representing *diagnostic skill* and *behavioural flexibility* respectively. This idea, which powerfully integrates person-based and contingency concepts, is, as we have seen, convergent with the demand characteristics of task cycle theory and situational approaches to leadership.

⁹² Bass, , *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*.

⁹³ D.A. Kenny & S.J. Zaccaro, “An Estimate of Variance Due to Traits in Leadership,” *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 68, 1983; S.J. Zaccaro, R.J. Foti, & D.A. Kenny, “Self- Monitoring and Trait-Based Variance in Leadership: An Investigation of Leader Flexibility across Multiple Group Situations,” *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 76, 1991.

85. Daniel Goleman's concept of emotional intelligence (EI)⁹⁴ is related to, but broader than, the social perceptiveness construct. Comprising self-awareness, empathy, self-control, and non-verbal as well as verbal communications skills, EI is hypothesized to predict social adjustment and interpersonal effectiveness. In this respect, the concept is related to earlier ideas about socialized power motive and social skills, and several of the EI attributes are included in the competency frameworks summarized in Table 4. The importance of the EI construct to leader effectiveness is supported by research conducted by McCall, Lombardo, and others at the Center for Creative Leadership on why the careers of managers and executives derail. As summarized by Yukl, differences in emotional stability and interpersonal skills, among other things, differentiated to some degree between successful and derailed managers. Derailed managers were more likely to have big egos, demonstrate moodiness and angry outbursts, and to be abrasive toward others or act in a bullying manner. In any case, Goleman's ideas not only support the necessity of emotional control and empathy in leaders, but also underscore the importance of flexible behaviour, not in the Jekyll-and-Hyde sense of a radical personality transformation, but in the ordinary sense of making situationally appropriate adjustments in attentiveness, language, tone, and expressive behaviour – skills that most people learn from early childhood on.

86. Behavioural competencies, more than diagnostic ones, are the focus of transformational leadership theory, originally formulated by James MacGregor Burns in his discussion of the banality of post-1960s political leadership. According to his sense of this qualitatively different kind of leadership, what is transformed by certain leaders is the social consciousness and purpose of followers, and Burns equates this awakening to a change from conventional to principled moral awareness and reasoning, consistent with Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Daniel Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence: Why it Can Matter More than IQ* (New York: Bantam Books), 1997; Daniel Goleman, Annie McKee, & Richard E. Boyatzis, *Primal Leadership: Realizing the Power of Emotional Intelligence* (Harvard Business School Press), 2002.

⁹⁵ According to Kohlberg, the development of moral reasoning occurs in a sequence of three major cognitive levels: an initial egocentric level (Pre-conventional morality), characteristic of children, in which moral reasoning and motives are concerned with reward and punishment outcomes; a socially oriented level (Conventional morality), arising in adolescence, in which social approval, social sanctions, and concepts of law and order influence moral reasoning; and a principle-centred level (Post-conventional morality), in which morality is based on social-contract ideas and impersonal and universal principles, such as truth, justice, caring.

At the highest stage of moral development persons are guided by near-universal ethical principles of justice such as equality of human rights and respect for individual dignity. This stage sets the stage for rare and creative leadership.⁹⁶

The leader's fundamental act is to induce people to be aware or conscious of what they feel – to feel their true needs so strongly, to define their values so meaningfully, that they can be moved to purposeful action . . . Transformational leadership is more concerned with *end-values* . . . Transforming leaders 'raise' their followers up through levels of morality though insufficient attention to means can corrupt the ends.⁹⁷

87. Transformational leadership is premised on the notion that leaders must sometimes pursue programs of radical change to ensure important social values are fully realized or safeguarded. Transformational leaders tend, then, to be more concerned with challenging and going beyond the status quo; they have a long-term perspective and motivate their subordinates with idealized goals. Acceptance of leader influence occurs either through strong personal identification with the leader, social identification with the leader's group, or internalization of the values articulated or symbolized by the leader.

88. Among the key influence competencies of transformational leaders, Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus cite the management of attention through *vision* and the management of meaning through *communication*.⁹⁸ Such leaders are able to formulate and articulate with conviction and credibility not only a clear and challenging image of the future (e.g., Martin Luther King's "I have a dream . . ." speech) but one which taps into and energizes the emotions and aspirations of their followers. As such, transformational leaders: (1) are high in referent power (self-assured, determined, and exemplary of what is valued); (2) are intellectually stimulating (change followers' problem awareness, problem-solving, or imagination); and (3) provide individualized consideration to their subordinates (have a

His research suggests that most adults operate at the Conventional level of moral reasoning. "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization," in D.A. Goslin (ed.) *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally), 1969; "Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach," in T. Lickona (ed.) *Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research, and Social Issues* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston), 1976.

⁹⁶ *Leadership*, p. 42.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 426.

⁹⁸ *Leaders: The Strategies for Taking Charge*, (New York: Harper & Row), 1985.

developmental or mentoring orientation).⁹⁹ Leader attributes identified by other researchers in this area include: unconventional behaviour, self-sacrifice and personal risk taking, power sharing, and showing confidence in and encouraging followers.¹⁰⁰

89. Burns claimed that conventional political leadership of the post-1960s era could be characterized as an economic transaction based on rational self-interest – “jobs for votes, or subsidies for campaign contributions” – in short, an auction of favours for voter support. This idea was later assimilated to organizational leadership, which also came to be regarded as an exchange of benefits for services provided. Granted, this judgment does characterize many employment contracts, and also a variety of control-oriented motivational techniques – such as organizational behaviour modification, performance-based compensation, management by objectives – whose primary rewards are extrinsic. On the other hand, most organizational leadership theories say very little about the motivational basis of behaviour, and leader-follower social relations are often intrinsically rewarding without necessarily being transformational. This and the observation that leaders engage in a mix and variety of economic and social exchanges with their subordinates suggest that the distinction between transactional and transformational leaders may be too sharply drawn. Yukl is of the opinion that a leader is more likely to assume a transformational role, or transformational leadership is more likely to emerge, when a group or organization is in crisis (e.g., Churchill’s ascendancy during the Second World War) or when a group or organization loses its bearings and is uncertain about its future (e.g., the CF in the mid-1990s).¹⁰¹

90. Unfortunately, the broad appeal of transformational theory has resulted in the dilution of Burns’ ideas, so that the moral end-state which informs his version has been replaced by any goal or objective.¹⁰² Another example of the commodification of transformational

⁹⁹ Bass, *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations*.

¹⁰⁰ Yukl, *Leadership in Organization* 5th ed.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² Joseph Rost refers to the “sanitization” of Burns’ concept of transformation: “Moral transformation . . . became performance beyond expectations, excellence, and charisma.” *Leadership for the Twenty-first Century* (Westport, CT: Praeger), 1991, p. 31. Similarly, Yukl makes the point that “in contrast to Burns, the newer

leadership is the belief that inspiration is simply a matter of learning the right ‘techniques.’ This has resulted in the proliferation of too many disjointed and truly boring ‘vision statements’ and much fashionable and contrived enthusiasm for change. Some theorists, meanwhile, are of the opinion that transformational leadership and its cousin, charismatic leadership, are not appropriate descriptions of all leader-initiated change. While many leader-initiated changes may transform the organization, they often have nothing to do with altering the moral consciousness of organizational members. Hence, the kind of transformational process that may be more useful to the CF is one that embeds its moral vision “in the culture of the organization by influencing others to internalize it and empowering them to implement it.”¹⁰³ In other words, *military socialization and culture should retain a consistent focus on developing in members an understanding of, and commitment to, duty with honour*; this would truly be a transformational undertaking.

91. Comprehensive contingency theories. Whereas the preceding models and theories devote particular attention to either situational, follower, or leader variables, a few theories attempt to deal with the full range of contingencies. Path-goal theory¹⁰⁴ is one of the most comprehensive and complex of these. Four leadership behaviours are proposed (directive, participative, supportive, and achievement-oriented), and both subordinate characteristics (such as locus of control, ability and experience, self-efficacy) and situational variables (such as task structure, the work group, the authority system) are considered in determining which kind of behaviour or influence tactic will work best. Because of the larger array of variables, the contingencies are more complex than those in other theories, but each combination is assumed to be tractable under at least one of the four classes of leader behaviour. Basically, the theory proposes that leader behaviour will be seen as effective to the extent that subordinates believe it directly contributes to their satisfaction or is instrumental in their

theories emphasize pragmatic task objectives more than the moral elevation of followers or social reform.” *Leadership in Organizations* 5th ed., p. 241.

¹⁰³ Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations* 5th ed , p. 250.

¹⁰⁴ R.J. House & T.R. Mitchell, “Path-Goal Theory of Leadership,” *Journal of Contemporary Business*, 3, 1974.

performance;¹⁰⁵ conversely, behaviour which creates dissatisfaction or is unhelpful in getting the job done (e.g., lack of direction in ambiguous situations, too much direction when subordinates are confident in their abilities and know what they are doing) will be viewed as ineffective. Not surprisingly, situationally appropriate influence processes are similar to those we have already seen – expert guidance when the task is ill-defined and subordinates lack the skills to complete it themselves, persuasive or achievement-oriented behaviour when motivation is lacking, supportive behaviour when the task is stressful, and so on.

92. Yukl's multiple-linkage model¹⁰⁶ is the most comprehensive of the contingency leadership theories and depicts the inter-relationships of four sets of variables: leader influence behaviours; individual and group characteristics that are subject to leader influence and that contribute to individual/group performance; organizational effectiveness criteria that are partially determined by individual/group performance and partially by other factors; and situational variables that either neutralize leader influence, substitute for leader influence, or moderate the relationship between individual/group action and organizational outcomes. Leader influence is posited to *directly* affect six individual and group characteristics (i.e., subordinate commitment, role clarity and ability, work procedures, co-operation, resources and support, and external co-ordination). Leaders are effective to the extent that they correct deficiencies which, if unattended, would impair performance. In this regard, the model is less rigidly prescriptive than other contingency theories:

The model does not imply that there is only one optimal pattern of . . . behavior in any given situation. Leaders usually have some choice among intervening variables in need of improvement and different patterns of behavior are usually possible to correct a particular deficiency. The overall pattern of leadership behavior by the designated leader and other group members is more important than any single action.¹⁰⁷

Leaders are ineffective if they fail to recognize the need to correct deficiencies, if they recognize the requirement but fail to act, or if their efforts to correct deficiencies are inept.

¹⁰⁵ Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations* 5th ed.

¹⁰⁶ *Leadership in Organizations* 2nd ed., 1989.

¹⁰⁷ *Leadership in Organizations* 5th ed., 2002, p. 224.

93. Yukl's model is sufficiently broad to incorporate Fiedler's ideas about enhancing situational favourability and some of the premises of leader-substitutes theory in that leader influence is also posited to affect individual and group performance *indirectly* through attempted changes to situational factors that constrain or neutralize leader behaviour, that stand in for or enhance leader behaviour, or that moderate the individual/group performance-outcome relationship. On the whole, it proposes a "systems perspective" of leadership.

94. Integrative issues. What, then, do these theories have in common and how do they differ? Consistent with Zaccaro's findings concerning generalized leadership 'traits', the major contingency theories reflect three basic assumptions: (1) that leaders can and will accurately assess the key contingencies in a task or problem situation; (2) with the exception of Fiedler's theory, that leaders can exhibit a reasonable degree of behavioural flexibility; and (3) that effectiveness is optimized when leader behaviour is appropriate to subordinate and situational contingencies.¹⁰⁸ The theories differ primarily in the number and kinds of contingency variables they take into account and, to a lesser degree, in the influence processes they prescribe, but there are similarities here too.

95. Because the influence behaviours prescribed by most leadership theories are relatively few in number and not fully representative of people's experiences, several researchers have conducted empirical studies to determine how people actually use power to influence others. In one of the earliest of these studies, Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson¹⁰⁹ identified some 58 different tactics used in exercising downward, lateral, and upward influence, which were statistically reduced to eight categories of tactics, namely:

- *Assertiveness/Pressure/Legitimizing Tactics* (repeated reminding or checking, ordering, setting deadlines, expressing displeasure, rebuking, invoking rules);
- *Ingratiation* (acting friendly or demonstrating competence before making a request, making the target feel important or special);

¹⁰⁸ Hughes, Ginnett, & Curphy, *Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience*.

¹⁰⁹ David Kipnis, Stuart M. Schmidt, & Ian Wilkinson, "Intraorganizational Influence Tactics: Explorations in Getting One's Way." *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 65, 1980.

- *Rational Persuasion/Apprising* (providing supporting information, using logic and explaining reasons, writing a detailed plan, demonstrating benefits);
- *Sanctions* (threatening unsatisfactory performance evaluation, withholding benefits);
- *Exchange/Collaboration/Personal Appeals* (offering support for compliance, compromising, offering to assist in implementation, calling on favours);
- *Upward Appeal* (obtaining support of superior, referring the other person to a superior);
- *Blocking* (threatening to withdraw support, foot-dragging, ignoring); and
- *Coalition Building* (obtaining co-worker or subordinate support, holding a formal conference to present a request).

96. As might be expected, the use of different tactics tends to vary according to the status of the target (superior, co-worker, subordinate) and the reason for influence (getting assistance or resources, assigning tasks, obtaining personal benefits, improving performance, initiating change). As a rule, Rationality tactics are used more often to initiate change, Rationality and Assertiveness to influence performance, Assertiveness to assign tasks, and Ingratiation to obtain support or assistance. Kipnis, et al. concluded from their results that organizational behaviour was much more complex than theory and textbooks would have us believe and that the conventional picture of leaders influencing subordinates was too restricted: “everyone is influencing everyone else in organizations, regardless of job title.”¹¹⁰ This somewhat mundane observation also highlights the fact that most, if not all, leadership theories deal exclusively with downward influence and are silent on the subject of lateral and upward influence – key features that distinguish leadership from the directional limitations of formal authority and command.

97. Subsequent work by other researchers indicates that successful managers make greater use of informal influence tactics than formal pressure, and use several influence

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 451.

tactics rather than relying on one approach.¹¹¹ Other research identifies Rational Persuasion and Consultation as the most frequently used tactics regardless of the target of influence, and expands the list of tactics to include *Inspirational Appeals* (appealing to organizational values, arousing emotions) and *Consultation* (soliciting opinions and advice, requesting participation in planning or developing).¹¹² The dominant use and relative effectiveness of the more useful influence tactics are summarized in Table 6. What the findings from this line of research collectively suggest is that leadership training beyond the supervisory level might be more productively spent on the appropriate and skillful use of influence tactics – downward, lateral, and upward – rather than on leadership theories of narrower scope and application.

Table 6: Dominant use and utility of influence tactics.¹¹³

Influence Tactic	Direction of Use	Effectiveness
Rational Persuasion	Up, down, & lateral	High
Inspirational Appeals	Down	High
Consultation	Down & lateral	High
Collaboration	Down & lateral	High
Apprising	Down & lateral	Moderate
Ingratiation	Down & lateral	Moderate
Exchange	Down & lateral	Moderate
Personal Appeals	Lateral	Moderate

98. This last point raises the question as to whether individuals can actually be trained or developed to become effective leaders. The consensus seems to be that leadership, as the exercise of influence, is a trainable skill set, and that influence skills can be developed like any other skill – playing hockey, driving a car. In other words, leadership skills are acquired according to a sequence of developmental stages which is true of many skill domains. In

¹¹¹ L. Dosier, T. Case, & B. Keys, “How Managers Influence Subordinates: An Empirical Study of Downward Influence Tactics,” *Leadership and Organizational Development Journal*, 9(5), 1988.

¹¹² Gary Yukl & Cecilia M. Falbe, “Influence Tactics and Objectives in Upward, Downward, and Lateral Influence Attempts,” *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 75(2), 1990.

¹¹³ Abridged from Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations* 5th ed.

brief, these stages are: (1) the acquisition of foundation knowledge in the general principles of the skill (declarative-knowledge phase), (2) behavioural development and tuning of the skill under conditions of supervised practice and performance feedback (proceduralization phase), and (3) skill consolidation through extensive follow-on practice (automation phase).¹¹⁴ The implications for leadership training are as follows:

- Adequate conceptualization of leadership concepts and principles is an essential first step but is only a first step. Leadership training under the general assumptions of most theories is about expanding the *behavioural* repertoire of leaders – making them more deliberate, analytical, and flexible, while, at the same time, making them less reactive and less reliant on habitual ways of doing things. Hence exposure to theory provides a foundation for systematic skill development.
- Individuals exposed to leadership theory will not become skilled or even semi-skilled leaders if they do not have an opportunity to *practise* leadership behaviours under controlled conditions and receive feedback on their performance (e.g., as is the case with hockey practice or driver training).
- Leadership skills acquired in training will not transfer to the operational setting if conditions in the operational setting are dissimilar from those in leadership training, or if the principles and behaviours taught during training are not supported by the culture of the operational setting (i.e., consistency between training doctrine and operational practice are essential for the *positive transfer of training*).
- Leaders may not consolidate skills or become proficient in performing them in the operational setting without opportunities for practice and consistent *mentoring and feedback*.

As recapped by Hughes, Ginnett, and Curphy, “Leaders can learn new behaviors, but it may take practice to develop ease and competence in performing them in new situations.”¹¹⁵

99. There is, finally, the question of how religiously leaders must adhere to the behavioural prescriptions of the various theories and models to be effective. As we have seen, Yukl’s multiple-linkage model is considerably more flexible than other theories; the

¹¹⁴ C.D. Wickens, *Engineering Psychology and Human Performance* (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company), 1984.

¹¹⁵ *Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience*.

important thing is to identify any performance deficiency and pursue a pattern of improvement. Moreover, the behavioural complexity model developed by Hooijberg, Bullis, and Hunt¹¹⁶ suggests an interesting qualifying condition which generally mitigates the importance of prescriptive rules. Consistent with mainstream contingency theories and the broad traits identified in secondary analyses of trait research, their model proposes that military leaders are engaged in multiple kinds of interpersonal relationships and consequently must be capable not only of performing a variety of roles (q.v., the leader roles defined by Quinn and others) but also of adopting the most situationally appropriate roles. These combined abilities are labelled *behavioural complexity*: “Behavioral complexity refers to the portfolio of leadership roles managers can perform and the ability of managers to vary the performance of these leadership roles depending on the situation.”¹¹⁷ While being careful to distance themselves from “an extreme form of situationalism,” the authors do claim that the more expansive the leader’s role repertoire is and the more able she is to vary performance, the more effective she will generally be.

100. Behavioural complexity itself is viewed as dependent on three other competencies. One is a kind of cognitive capacity which they call *systems thinking*, defined as “(1) the discipline for seeing the structures that underlie complex situations; (2) discerning high from low leverage change; and (3) a framework for seeing internal relationships rather than things, and for seeing patterns of change rather than static snapshots.”¹¹⁸ The other constituent competencies of behavioural complexity are *self-efficacy*, beliefs about one’s ability to effectively perform the leadership roles expected of one, and *self-monitoring*, the ability to gauge the effects of one’s behaviour on others and to make appropriate adjustments to increase the acceptability of the messages being sent. The relationships of these variables are schematically portrayed in Figure 11.

¹¹⁶ Robert Hooijberg, R. Craig Bullis, & James G. Hunt, “Behavioral Complexity and the Development of Military Leadership for the Twenty-first Century,” in Hunt, Dodge, & Wong, *Out-of-the-Box Leadership*.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 119.




Figure 11: Moderator effect of integrity on relationship between behaviour and effectiveness.

101. Up to this point, their model is very similar to those of other theorists and researchers. What sets it apart is the role played by leader *integrity*¹¹⁹ in moderating the relationship between a leader’s ability to demonstrate situationally appropriate behavioural flexibility and the effectiveness of influence behaviour. In plain terms, no matter how skilled a leader may be in engaging in the theoretically right form of influence behaviour, it is unlikely to be optimally effective if the leader is perceived as manipulative or otherwise lacking in integrity. On the other hand, high-integrity leaders will not only be more effective if they act in a situationally appropriate way, but any behavioural deviations from what is normative will likely be attributed to situational factors rather than inadequacies of the leader.

102. The latter phenomenon bears a strong resemblance to Hollander’s notion of *idiosyncrasy credit*, a term he used to describe “the [leader’s] earned status among followers and the leader’s related latitude for innovation.”¹²⁰ According to Hollander, newcomers to a

¹¹⁹ Moral uprightness, wholeness, consistency between behaviour and moral principles and values.

¹²⁰ “Leadership and Power,” in Lindzey & Aronson, *Handbook of Social Psychology*.

group typically have little credibility and must ‘put some time in’ and prove themselves to be accepted. Over time, credits are earned by reliably adding to the group’s effectiveness (competence) and complying with group expectations (socialization). To the extent that a leader demonstrates valued task competencies and performs in accordance with role expectations, he will build up a fund of trust, which may subsequently be used to bankroll change initiatives or unconventional behaviour. The noteworthy inference here is that stylistic flaws will be overlooked in a leader who otherwise has earned the trust of subordinates by demonstrating competence, consideration, and character.

103. As outlined earlier, functional competence is relatively easy to acquire. Occupational competencies and leadership cognitive/behavioural skills are highly trainable, and the CF individual training system is designed to make this kind of transformation in a matter of months. The mechanics of interpersonal skills are also trainable, but competence is not attainable without a prior base of adequate social adjustment and a modicum of empathy. Character, like personality generally, develops slowly and is harder to modify once firmed up. The fact that the CF tends to recruit young adults, whose education and social and moral development are not yet complete, affords opportunities for professional socialization and character development, especially skills in principled moral reasoning. But, in any developmental effort, the usual caveats apply about the lengthy investments that must be made in this kind of education to be effective, the counter-productive effects of inconsistencies between cultural precept and cultural practice, and the distorting power of situational contingencies.¹²¹

104. In sum, it is important to view theories of leadership influence, and contingency theories in particular, as heuristic aids. Doing leadership is not like doing foot drill. The theories are not deterministic models, and people in leadership roles will not fall flat on their faces if they bend or violate one or more influence rules of thumb. That said, there are practical advantages to exhibiting *some* behavioural flexibility and not taking the same

¹²¹ For an overview of some of the issues related to character development, see K.W.J. Wenek, “Psychological Perspectives on Ethical Development,” paper presented at the Annual Conference on Ethics in Defence, NDHQ Ottawa, 24-25 October 1996.

approach in every situation or treating every person’s issues in an identical manner. Circumstances and people vary, and this means that leader influence behaviour should be sensitive and adaptable to important differences. Civic, legal, ethical, and professional values remain constant however, as does the requirement to adhere to them.

Leading the Institution: Change Cycle Theory

105. The strategic-leadership analog to the task cycle is the change cycle. It also consists of a sequence of analytical, influence, and scrutinizing actions that translate an initial felt need for change and a consequential intention or strategy into a program of activities directed toward desired outcomes. As shown in Figure 12, the impetus for collective or institutional change is varied; change may occur as a reaction to events, as part of a periodic revitalization program, or as an intrinsic element of an organizational culture of continuous improvement.




Figure 12: Simplified generic change cycle.

Reactive change is precipitated by variances in system performance, internal crises, and catastrophic failures. In strong cultures, which are especially resistant to change, it may take

a disaster to initiate change; “a scandal that cannot be hidden, avoided, or denied”¹²² will usually blow away cultural myths and force an examination of taken-for-granted assumptions and associated organizational practices (e.g., the attacks of 9/11 revealed weaknesses in American security agencies which are now in the process of being overhauled). From time to time, organizations may also engage in planned change to renew capabilities or to facilitate adaptation to continuing pressures or trends (e.g., technology-replacement programs). More recently, many organizations have indicated interest in making continuous change and improvement part of their operating philosophy. This particular orientation entails establishing a *learning culture*, one characterized by: active search for new ideas and information; openness to experience; acceptance of internal criticism (e.g., ‘Disagreement is not disrespect’ ‘Voice is not insubordination’); improved methods of acquiring knowledge, both declarative and procedural (e.g., primary and secondary research, experimentation, benchmarking, lessons-learned centres); and better ways of distributing knowledge through the organization (e.g., conferences, communities of practice,¹²³ journals, best-practices exchanges).

106. Broadly speaking, the objects of organizational change break out into four categories: (1) changes in technology and operating arrangements (e.g., widespread adoption of PCs and corresponding reductions in support staff; the general switch to an open-office concept); (2) changes in individual attitudes, values, and skills (e.g., acceptance of minorities; broadly based ethics training); (3) changes in organizational structure and design (e.g., end-to-end process vs. functional, flat vs. multi-level hierarchy, distributed authority vs. centralized, outsourcing vs. total self-reliance); and (4) changes in organizational culture, the collective assumptions, values, and behaviours that give an organization its character. Whatever the nature of the change, the basic leadership activities in the change cycle are diagnosis, strategy development, implementation, and monitoring and adjustment.

¹²² Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, p. 326.

¹²³ Communities of practice are “networks of individuals who work together in an organization, sharing information and knowledge on a regular basis. Such individuals may be but are not necessarily part of formal teams or units, but often do collaborate on particular projects . . .” The Conference Board, “Leveraging Intellectual Capital,” *HR Executive Review*, 5(3), 1997, p. 16.

107. Diagnostic phase. The diagnostic phase typically requires two analyses: an assessment of the operating environment and what it suggests in terms of threats and opportunities; and an analysis of organizational capabilities and what gaps or deficiencies are indicated with respect to the demands of environmental adaptation.¹²⁴ Not infrequently, organizational leaders short-circuit this step and adopt popular programs without adequate problem definition, identification of their requirements, and/or consideration of the appropriateness of the proposed solution. This is how business fads get started and why the probability of solving the wrong problem tends to be high.¹²⁵ An empirical study of decision practices in North American service companies supports the view that organizational problem solving is an exercise in bounded rationality. Of the 78 companies examined, 40% simply copied the practices of others and another 30% adopted off-the-shelf solutions; only 15% looked for new solutions, while only 7% conducted local field trials.¹²⁶

108. Strategy development. Strategy development is subject to four principal contingencies: the technical *quality* required in the change outcome, the relative importance of change *acceptance* among organizational members who must live with the consequences of the change, *time* constraints, and the level of tolerable *risk*. The technical quality of a change strategy is the extent to which one solution more than another will significantly affect the intended outcome, whereas acceptance refers to attitudinal support for, or commitment to, the change among those directly affected. These two factors were identified by Norman Maier in research on problem-solving and creativity,¹²⁷ and helped define a simple typology of decision problems (Figure 13), each with an optimal approach for arriving at a decision or choice of strategy.

¹²⁴ Zaccaro, *Models and Theories of Executive Leadership*.

¹²⁵ In reviewing the business fads that had come and gone over several decades, John Byrne observed that fads can be helpful in getting managers to think about different ways of doing their jobs but that the current “bewildering array of fads poses far more serious diversions and distractions from the complex task of running a company. Too many modern managers are like compulsive dieters: trying the latest craze for a few days and then moving on.” Reprint of “Business Fads: What’s In – and Out,” *Business Week*, 20 January 1986, p. 8.

¹²⁶ Paul C. Nutt, “Types of Organizational Decision Processes,” *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 29, 1984.

¹²⁷ *Psychology in Industrial Organizations* 4th ed., (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin), 1973.

109. In situations where neither the technical quality of the outcome nor acceptance by affected stakeholders is important (extremely rare), the choice of change strategy may be delegated or left to chance. When acceptance is more important than the quality of the outcome (e.g., clothing and equipment trials typically attach considerable weight to user acceptability), stakeholders' participation is critical and the leader's role is to find a

		Technical-Quality Requirement	
		Low	High
Acceptance Requirement	High	A/Q <i>Mediate a participative consensus</i>	(Q A)/0 <i>Consult experts, consult stakeholders, sell solution</i>
	Low	0/(Q A) <i>Delegate</i>	Q/A <i>Consult experts, sell solution</i>

Figure 13: Choice of strategy as a function of quality and acceptance requirements.

consensus among them. In *any* situation where the technical-quality requirement of the change strategy is high (e.g., revision of discriminatory personnel policies), expert advice is mandatory, as well as a technical risk assessment (e.g., scientific, financial, legal, human resource). When acceptance is also important (e.g., design of new CF terms of service had both a high technical-quality component and a high acceptance component), stakeholders should be consulted and their ideas and concerns carefully considered, but the leader must retain decision authority to protect technical quality. In both choice situations where quality is important, the leader must also persuade organizational stakeholders of the validity of

change. Such is the theory,¹²⁸ but not always organizational practice. Some organizations treat every change situation as a consensus problem, which slows down change; others handle changes as tell-and-sell problems, which is not always best for acceptance.

110. The issue of risk management warrants a brief mention since it deals with the conjoined problems of making decisions in ambiguous scenarios and coping with the uncertainty of outcomes. Apart from the fact that people cannot deal with risks they fail to perceive, research indicates that people do not necessarily respond rationally to risks they are aware of (e.g., smoking behaviour). Even when risks are identified, judgmental biases can affect the perceived degree of risk and decision makers can sometimes be highly confident about faulty risk assessments (e.g., ‘If we raise compulsory retirement age to 60, our units will be filled with 60-year old corporals and leading seamen’).¹²⁹ The way in which problem or situational information is framed also alters risk perception. In addition to these cognitive pitfalls, group processes can contribute to groupthink,¹³⁰ risky shift behaviour,¹³¹ or an irrational escalation of commitment to a chosen course of action.¹³²

111. Awareness of these kinds of cognitive and behavioural traps is important because increasingly decisions about strategies to be adopted or actions to be taken occur in an environment where information is excessive, complex, variably reliable, and not always interpretable. Ogilvie and Fabian highlight the choice dilemma posed by such conditions in citing the two different decision orientations that are pitted against each other in the movie *Crimson Tide*. On one hand, the XO of the submarine is disposed to defer action and engage

¹²⁸ A more complex elaboration of normative decision theory, the latest version requiring a software aid, can be found in Victor H. Vroom & Arthur G. Jago, *The New Leadership: Managing Participation in Organizations* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall), 1988.

¹²⁹ Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky (eds.), *Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 1982.

¹³⁰ Groupthink refers to the tendency of people who have worked together for a long time to suppress critical dissent in order to avoid conflict.

¹³¹ Risky shift reflects the willingness of people in groups to make riskier decisions than they would otherwise make as individuals.

¹³² Max Bazerman, *Judgment in Managerial Decision Making* 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley), 1990.

in continuing analysis to achieve near certainty in the threat assessment; on the other hand, the Captain is disposed to an audacious course of action in order to control a bad situation that is lurching toward catastrophe. The risk-management problem portrayed in this nuclear-capable rogue-faction scenario generalizes to other choice situations in which decision information is incomplete or ambiguous and the consequences of any decision, even indecision, are grave. For example, while defence policy and capability requirements are undergoing lengthy review, the Standing Committee on National Security and Defence has portrayed the CF in recent reports as being at the breaking point with respect to the insupportable tensions between its resource base and its capabilities.

112. Notwithstanding the difficulties of recognizing the need for systems or organizational change and choosing an appropriate change strategy, most of the problems occur in the implementation phase as various forms of resistance to change. Niccolo Machiavelli, who was no slouch in the theory and practice of change, held the opinion that “It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.”¹³³ There are numerous reasons why this is so. Among those relevant to change in the CF, institutional inertia, or the belief that deviation from the present course is unnecessary (‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.’ ‘Isn’t what we’re doing good enough?’), is not uncommon. While complacency is somewhat understandable in a large complex bureaucracy such as the CF, one expert also believes that it is the #1 reason for the failure of change efforts.¹³⁴

113. A strong hierarchy of authority and deference to authority in the military also give some individuals and groups considerable power to prevent or thwart change:

Ambiguity about the nature of the environment and how it is changing provides an opportunity for top executives to interpret events in a biased manner, to magnify the importance of their expertise, and to justify their policies. Control over distribution of information about how well the organization is performing allows top executives to exaggerate the success of past decisions and cover up mistakes. The power of top management can also be used to deny others the resources and

¹³³ *The Prince*, translated by Luigi Ricci (London: Oxford University Press), [1532]1960, p. 24.

¹³⁴ John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press), 1996.

opportunity needed to demonstrate their superior expertise. Critics and potential rivals can be silenced, co-opted, or expelled from the organization.¹³⁵

114. By far, the most extensively discussed obstacle to successful change is an organization's culture in use – its existing pattern of assumptions, beliefs, attitudes, values and ways of doing things. Change often threatens cultural beliefs and values (e.g., the belief that 'Combat is a young man's game' reflects both age and gender stereotypes). Closed-mindedness and prejudicial attitudes arising out of a sense of distinctiveness or superiority (e.g., 'The military is not the public service.' 'The private sector has nothing to teach us.') are especially difficult to overcome. These examples explain why some theorists have referred to culture as 'the 800-pound gorilla that impairs performance and stifles change.'¹³⁶ It does so in terms of how the organization shapes and maintains *identity* (insular vs. cosmopolitan), how *power* is distributed (too centralized/*laissez faire* vs. a healthy tension between control and autonomy), how *conflict* is resolved (criticism as disloyalty vs. criticism as healthy debate), and how the organization *learns* (open-minded vs. closed-minded).

115. Generally speaking, the older and more established an organization is, the harder it will be to institute change. In later stages of organizational life, culture is so deeply embedded in its structure and processes and in the assumptions of senior members, that it functions below the threshold of awareness.¹³⁷ This is why Jay Lorsch refers to the core beliefs of established culture as "the invisible barrier to change."¹³⁸ Deeply held beliefs about the essential nature of an organization can produce strategic myopia, which simply means that senior leaders interpret events in terms of their tacit assumptions and miss the significance of changing conditions, or else resist change because they believe what has worked in the past, like a well-tried football play, will continue to work in the future.

¹³⁵ Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 5th ed., p. 351.

¹³⁶ Richard Pascale, Mark Milleman, & Linda Gioja, "Changing the Way We Change," *Harvard Business Review*, November-December 1997.

¹³⁷ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*.

¹³⁸ "Managing the Invisible Barrier to Strategic Change," paper given at a conference hosted by the Program in Corporate Culture, Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh, 15 October 1984.

116. It may be true that revolutions start in the minds of people, but leaders also require specific competencies to implement change and thereby ensure adaptation: competencies such as – managing innovation through constant questioning of the status quo, managing the future by means of a strategic vision and strategic goals, managing continuous improvement through measurement and empowerment. Hence changing the self-awareness and behaviour of individual leaders is seen by some as the key to cultural change.¹³⁹ It follows that developmental self-assessment and peer assessment on change competencies may be crucial first steps in preparing senior leaders for the role and responsibility of leading change.

Leading the Institution: The Field of Action

117. The field of action for change leadership at the system or organizational level is a conceptually bulkier space than the situational context of direct leadership. It is also more complex in that internal and external environments are involved. As suggested by Figure 14, the environment for a system change is, at a minimum, the entire organization, while that for broadly based institutional change usually extends beyond organizational boundaries.




Figure 14: The leader-organization-environment dynamic.

¹³⁹ Kim S. Cameron & Robert E. Quinn, *Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture: Based on the Competing Values Framework* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Longman), 1998.

In internal-system change, the leader's general change objective may be described as improving *congruence among the organization's working parts*: these latter consist of the tasks of the organization, the people who perform the tasks, the formal characteristics of the organization (structure, processes, technology, etc.), and the informal characteristics of the organization (patterns of communication, culture, authority structure, etc.).¹⁴⁰ Changes to an organizational system may also require accommodation of external factors (e.g., human resource policies with human rights implications). In this latter scenario, the leader's generic objective is to maintain or improve the *organization-environment fit* with respect to any number of relevant factors: technological, legal, political, economic, demographic, ecological (i.e., associations and linkages), and socio-cultural.¹⁴¹

118. Change processes. Most theories and prescriptions for leading organizational change either implicitly or explicitly make reference to Kurt Lewin's three sequential processes of unfreezing, changing, and refreezing. Unfreezing refers to the development of a common recognition and understanding of the need for change. As such, systems monitoring, performance measurement, and other diagnostics are indispensable for detecting out-of-tolerance variances. Not establishing or using these capabilities is like flying in zero-ceiling conditions with no instruments (e.g., dismantling recruiting- and attrition-analysis staffs during the NDHQ downsizing). The change phase involves considering and choosing among alternative courses of action and implementing the change effort. Here, problems of incomplete search or inadequate attention to relevant contingencies can result in a less than satisfactory solution. Refreezing refers to stabilizing and institutionalizing the change. This last stage can be an especially tricky and vulnerable one. "Until new behaviors are rooted in social norms and shared values, they are always subject to degradation as soon as the pressures associated with a change effort are removed."¹⁴² In NDHQ, which is subject to the same relapse tendencies as any other large established organization, the difficulty of

¹⁴⁰ David A. Nadler, "Managing Organizational Change: An Integrative Perspective," *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 17(2), 1981.

¹⁴¹ Richard H. Hall, *Organizations: Structures, Processes, and Outcomes* 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall), 1991.

¹⁴² Kotter, *Leading Change*.

institutionalizing change is compounded by other cultural factors. The people who must implement policies and programs are often not the people who develop them. Continuity in senior appointments is relatively rare, which creates a bias for investing in the short term (on the other hand, formal long-term guidance, such as that contained in *Defence Strategy 2020*, may counter some of these tendencies). Moreover, lack of continuity and the associated weakening of corporate memory also mean that, in lengthy change efforts, alterations and even reversals of direction are possible long before the original change effort is completed.

119. Kotter's recommended eight-stage approach for creating major change¹⁴³ expands on the three basic processes of unfreezing, changing, and refreezing. Each stage is designed to counteract a particular and common reason for change failure:

Unfreezing

- Establish a sense of urgency by identifying problems, crises, opportunities.
- Create a guiding coalition with sufficient power and a strong team sense.
- Develop a vision/objective and strategy to guide the change.
- Communicate the change vision/objective constantly using all means available.

Changing

- Enable broad based action, eliminating obstacles, changing structures, encouraging risk-taking and non-traditional ideas.
- Generate short-term successes, recognizing intermediate-goal attainment.
- Consolidate gains and inject more change, modifying related structures and policies, selecting supporters and sidelining opponents, introducing more ideas.

Refreezing

- Embed changes in the culture, by reinforcing desired practices and developing appropriate leader-succession plans.

120. Implementation tactics. Various implementation tactics used to lead change play the same part as influence tactics used to lead people. They harness one or more sources of power and employ contingency-appropriate patterns of behaviour to increase the probability of having their intended effect; hence, behavioural flexibility is also a requisite leader competency at this level of activity. In general, implementation tactics fall under one of three approaches: empirical-rational, normative-re-educative, and force-coercive.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

121. **Empirical-rational** approaches to the implementation of change are primarily based on expert and information power. While they can be time consuming,¹⁴⁴ their purpose is to convince others of the necessity of change; hence, closing information gaps, logical persuasion, demonstration projects, expert testimonials, and other means of building understanding or securing credence are the principal tactics:

- *Performance measurement and feedback* – These methods use comparisons against standards or expectations (e.g., deviations outside tolerable limits) and may be longitudinal or cross-sectional and internal or external (recent DMEP analyses of CF attrition rates made use of historical, cross-sectional, internal, and external comparisons). Objective performance-measurement and feedback data indicating gross variations are intended to generate dissatisfaction with the status quo and thus energize action. They are also useful in highlighting specific problem areas otherwise masked by aggregate data, and may be helpful in suggesting potential solutions when used with a causal model.
- *Survey feedback* – Survey feedback methods work much like objective performance measurement and feedback, the major difference being that they collect information on soft attributes, such as opinions (e.g., 1998 Philips Group survey on CF leadership), attitudes (e.g., Quality of Life policies and programs), values (e.g., survey of ethical values), experiences (e.g., operational stress and casualty support), and behavioural intentions (e.g., intention to leave the CF).
- *Demonstration projects* – Small experiments or trial programs are conducted to test or validate the utility of a technology, policy, or practice (e.g., base DelegAAT program). A successful trial is expected to facilitate diffusion throughout the organization, but if adoption is voluntary, the willingness to try the new approach will depend on the existence of some pressing motive or need.
- *Organizational learning* – All efforts in organizational learning have in common: continual intelligence gathering from relevant sectors of the environment, analysis of trends, review of results and systematic involvement by senior leaders, and the appropriate use of such knowledge in strategy development or modification. Applicable to both operational and non-operational responsibility areas, the U.S. Army's After Action Review process is often cited as an exemplar of organizational learning in operational garb.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ John P. Kotter & Leonard A. Schlesinger, "Choosing Strategies for Change," *Harvard Business Review* 57(2), 1979.

¹⁴⁵ Gordon R. Sullivan & Michael V. Harper, *Hope is Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America's Army* (New York: Times Books), 1996; Peter Kasurak, "Is the Mouse Dead? Thoughts on Reforming the Department of National Defence," paper presented at the Air Force's Advisory Group, NDHQ Ottawa, 12 April 1999; Pascale, et al., "Changing the Way We Change."

A former commander of the National Training Center has described its value this way: “The After Action Review has democratized the army. It has instilled a discipline of relentlessly questioning everything we do. Above all, it has resocialized three generations of officers to move away from a command-and-control style of leadership to one that takes advantage of distributed intelligence. It has taught us never to become too wedded to our script for combat and to remain versatile enough to exploit the broken plays that inevitably develop in the confusion of battle.”¹⁴⁶

122. **Normative-re-educative** tactics are based on referent and connection power. They tend to be even more demanding of time and resources than rational-empirical approaches, but are held out to be especially useful in building attitudinal commitment, facilitating adjustment to change, and overcoming resistance.¹⁴⁷ Inspirational appeals, participation, power sharing, coalition formation, and consensus building are the most common tactics:

- *Inspirational leadership* – Inspirational leadership is the generic brand of transformational leadership, employing many of the same behavioural elements (vision, enthusiasm, slogans, encouragement) but more pragmatic in its orientation and seldom, if ever, concerned with moral elevation. A compelling vision of the future or a clear long-term strategic objective is the centerpiece, the function of which is to focus attention and manage meaning. “Vision plays a key role in producing useful change by helping to direct, align, and inspire actions on the part of large numbers of people.”¹⁴⁸ Repetition of the change theme is often a feature of successful inspirational efforts. Kotter identifies “undercommunicating the vision by a factor of 10 (or 100 or even 1,000)” as a major failing, with three alternative patterns being more typical: (1) senior management develops the vision but then sends out only a few symbolic communications to kick off the change effort; (2) top executives work the crowd effectively but subordinate leaders remain uninvolved and silent – change is something *being done to* the organization; or (3) there is lots of effort all round but the behaviour of some key individuals is reactionary or inconsistent with the stated intent.
- *Participation* – The hallmark of participation is giving the people involved in implementing a change or those who will otherwise be affected by the change a role in decision making.¹⁴⁹ Vroom and his colleagues differentiate among three

¹⁴⁶ Brigadier General William S. Wallace, quoted in Pascale, et al., “Changing the Way We Change,” p. 136.

¹⁴⁷ Kotter & Schlesinger, “Choosing Strategies for Change.”

¹⁴⁸ Kotter, *Leading Change*, p. 7.

¹⁴⁹ Vroom & Jago, *Managing Participation in Organizations*.

kinds of participative processes: obtaining ideas and suggestions from participants (consultation); facilitating group or collective decision making (consensus building); and assigning others decision authority (delegation). Theory and research indicate that participation in change decisions results in increased satisfaction, better quality decisions when creative ideas are being sought, greater support for decisions, and professional development.

- *Brokerage politics* – Politics is unavoidable in organizations because power is distributed differentially and sometimes people in positions of power use it to advance or protect what they perceive as the best interests of a particular group or constituency. Change agents confronted with resisters may have to engage in negotiation and bargaining to achieve the desired outcomes. Tactics for dealing with powerful resisters tend to follow this kind of script: conduct a preliminary “power audit”¹⁵⁰ to identify supporters and resisters; build a coalition of supporters; consult extensively with resisters to clarify their objections; make personal and indirect appeals through coalition allies to resisters; and negotiate from strength but be prepared to make acceptable compromises.

123. **Force-coercive** change tactics are based on legitimate, ecological, reward, and punishment power. Although often quick, inexpensive, and effective in the short-term,¹⁵¹ they also create resentment and may result in ‘counter-revolutionary’ activities later on. The kinds of controlling tactics typical of force-coercive measures involve unilateral action, authoritative edict, or contingent reward and punishment.

- *Directed change* – In a strong ‘orders culture’ such as the CF’s, saying it or writing it is often sufficient to make ‘it’ happen (NDHQ may be the exception). While this is true at the level of initial behavioural compliance, it is less true at the level of attitudes. The irksome aspects of directed change can sometimes be offset by making appeals to important societal values (e.g., fairness) or professional values (e.g., duty, obedience). Nevertheless, without at least some acceptance of change by subordinates, change efforts are subject to the subtle sabotage of withheld enthusiasm and not-so-subtle attempts to reverse changes when senior leaders move on to new responsibilities.
- *Contingent reward and punishment* – There is a ‘tough love’ variation on contingent reward and punishment that Schein likens to the kind of cultural reprogramming and re-education practised in some totalitarian regimes. Here, the key to change “is first to prevent exit and then to escalate the disconfirming

¹⁵⁰ Thomas S. Bateman, “Organizational Change and the Politics of Success,” *Group and Organization Studies*, 5(2), 1980.

¹⁵¹ Kotter & Schlesinger, “Choosing Strategies for Change.”

forces while providing psychological safety” through recognition and reward of new behaviours.¹⁵² As a last resort, the intransigent can be transferred or let go.

124. As a concluding comment on change-implementation tactics, it should be noted that the probabilities of success for these approaches are uneven. One large-scale empirical study of change tactics in 91 organizations¹⁵³ indicated that a combination of demonstration-project, performance feedback, and contingent-reward tactics worked best, achieving a 100% success rate across 18 organizations. Inspirational appeals coupled with participative tactics also had a high success rate, at 84%, and rational persuasion with expert support worked well in 73% of the cases. Change by edict had the lowest success rate at 43%.

125. Mastering change. Continuous improvement is increasingly being touted as the strategy of choice for coping with change because the world itself is in a state of constant accelerated change. The relatively placid environment of 25 years ago has given way to a turbulent field, and in today’s Fast World, we are told, big entities do not necessarily eat small ones; the fast eat the slow.¹⁵⁴ Sullivan and Harper¹⁵⁵ invoke a similar perspective in explaining the reasons for the transformation of the U.S. Army: a disorderly global environment, rapidly emerging technologies, the shorter shelf-life of individual skills, new tasks and greater accountability, and strong fiscal pressures. In this environment, “we must change the way we change” and strategic leaders must be more anticipatory and deliberative:

It is possible to create your own future – to break down outmoded structures and create organizations that can thrive in tomorrow’s uncertainty. It is a process grounded in values, shaped by vision, guided by a strategy that is rooted in the critical processes of an organization, focused by deliberate action, and matured through structured learning.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵² Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, p. 328.

¹⁵³ Paul C. Nutt, “Tactics of Implementation,” *Academy of Management Journal*, 29(2), 1986.

¹⁵⁴ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Anchor Books), 2000.

¹⁵⁵ *Hope is Not a Method*.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. xx – xxi.

126. Continuous improvement has been designated as the foundation for strategic change across DND and the CF, based on eight key components: vision, leadership, policy, priority setting and business planning, standards and performance measurement, risk management, evaluation and audit, and accountability and reporting.¹⁵⁷ While these elements make good sense, they can more readily be appreciated by relating them to two general conditions for continuous improvement: the requirement to become a *learning organization*; and the capability to engage in “*organizational morphing*.”

127. The Conference Board defines a learning organization as “an organization that is able to adapt to change and move forward by acquiring new knowledge, skills, or behaviors (learn), and thereby transform itself. In successful learning organizations, knowledge is shared, the company culture supports learning, employees are encouraged to think critically and to take risks with new ideas, and all individuals are valued for their contributions to the organization.”¹⁵⁸ In a similar vein, Kasurak observes: “A learning organization is capable of examining its performance objectively against its goals and environment and adjusts so that its performance improves – ideally, improves so much that it becomes the dominant organization in its field and maintains its position over time.”¹⁵⁹ In this kind of organization, intellectual capital is acknowledged as the source of adaptive and competitive advantage. Intellectual capital consists of human capital (the knowledge, skills, and competencies individuals possess), structural capital (the structures, information systems, and procedures that constitute an organization’s internal processes for managing knowledge and information), and social capital (relationships with internal and external stakeholders and the resulting access to information, resources, and influence).¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ VCDS presentation to Defence Management Committee, Edmonton, 26 June 2001. The DGSC statement on continuous improvement and DMC presentation are at http://vcds.mil.ca/dgsc/imp/tem1_e.asp?sec=1.

¹⁵⁸ “Leveraging Intellectual Capital,” *HR Executive Review* 5(3), 1997.

¹⁵⁹ “Is the Mouse Dead?”

¹⁶⁰ The Conference Board, “Leveraging Intellectual Capital.” See also Brass & Krackhardt, “The Social Capital of Twenty-First Century Leaders.”

128. Organizational morphing is a term that was coined to describe “the process of continuously reconfiguring resources in novel ways to change the shape, structure, and focus of the organization”¹⁶¹ (think of a Transformer toy on steroids). The idea evolved from a consideration of some of the limitations of the After Action Review (AAR) process. While the people who invented the morphing concept believe the AAR process adequately addresses the first-order learning question “Was the objective achieved?” and the second-order learning question “Is there a better way to achieve the objective?” the AAR is not designed to see into the enveloping organizational environment (like fish that are oblivious to water), which tends to be treated as a given and a static entity. In military practice, morphing refers to the ability to tailor the structure and composition of military forces on a contingent basis to satisfy the variable demands of a greatly expanded spectrum of operations (war and numerous operations other than war).¹⁶²

129. At the higher levels of organizational design, the capability to morph points to the kind of 21st century organization suggested by Kotter: non-bureaucratic, fewer levels, many performance information systems, wide dissemination of information and knowledge, distributed leadership training, externally oriented, open and candid, more risk tolerant, quick to make decisions, empowering.¹⁶³ In similar language and using similar concepts, Heifetz and Laurie suggest that in a world where no single authority “no clear expertise, no single sage, no established procedure will suffice” to meet the challenges of change, the leader’s key task is to develop and mobilize a distributed capability for adaptive work.¹⁶⁴ At a minimum, within a traditional hierarchy, this means greater use of *delegation*: “If delegation is the norm, each leader can create subordinate leaders. . . . Delegation is a good first step in

¹⁶¹ W.S. Sherman, M.A. Hitt, S.M. DeMarie, & B.W. Keats, “Organizational Morphing: The Challenges of Leading Perpetually Changing Organizations in the Twenty-First Century,” in Hunt, Dodge, & Wong, *Out-of-the-Box Leadership*.

¹⁶² Thomas L. McNaugher, “The Army and Operations Other than War: Expanding Professional Jurisdiction,” in Lloyd J. Matthews (ed.) *The Future of the Army Profession* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill), 2002.

¹⁶³ *Leading Change*.

¹⁶⁴ Ronald Heifetz & Donald Laurie, “Mobilizing Adaptive Work: Beyond Visionary Leadership,” in Jay Conger, Gretchen Spreitzer, & Edward Lawler III (eds.), *The Leader’s Change Handbook: An Essential Guide to Setting Direction and Taking Action* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1999.

creating space for leadership to emerge . . .”¹⁶⁵ A broader approach, consistent with the basic idea and function of a profession, is to foster a *sense of community* anchored in a common purpose and shared values: “If people feel part of the corporate community, if they feel safe and cared for, if they are passionate about the mission and values and believe that others are living by them, they will generally give good service to the whole. . . . Effective leaders today use the tools of community building to create an environment in which many leaders can emerge.”¹⁶⁶ Likewise, in extolling the merits of professional military cohesion, Cook observes: “There is no substitute for the fundamental mind-set that members of the profession, regardless of rank, are colleagues, engaged in a common enterprise that matters deeply to them. If that mind-set is present, then each member feels a loyalty to the other, grounded in his or her professional identity.”¹⁶⁷ At an advanced stage of organizational development, the ultimate expression of distributed leadership capability may be the culture of an *open society*: “Once we have gotten good at defining and communicating vision and values, liberation of many potential leaders is the next critical step As the complexity of any organization reaches beyond the grasp of direct leadership, the leader’s central role becomes that of contributing to the corporate culture and corporate institutions that make freedom work and that create a freer society within the organization.”¹⁶⁸

130. This line of development does not necessarily spell the end of ‘heroic’ command-based leadership at the executive level, but Beer argues that is unlikely to be the dominant model in adaptive organizations. In its place, he envisages an action-learning approach, characterized as learning by doing and based on a process of broad inquiry, dialogue across functions and between organizational levels, constructive debate, and mutual influence. In this alternative model of distributed leadership, executive leadership is about leading the

¹⁶⁵ Gifford Pinchot, “Creating Organizations with Many Leaders,” in Frances Hesselbein, Marshall Goldsmith, & Richard Beckhard (eds.), *The Leader of the Future: New Visions, Strategies, and Practices for the Next Era* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1996, pp. 26-27.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹⁶⁷ Martin L. Cook, “Army Professionalism: Service to What Ends?” in Matthews (ed.), *The Future of the Army Profession*.

¹⁶⁸ Pinchot, “Creating Organizations with Many Leaders,” pp. 38-39.

process of collective learning and creating the conditions for everyone's talent to emerge and contribute to organizational purpose.¹⁶⁹ Delegation, professional cohesion, and the culture of an open society are the primary tools for creating these conditions.

¹⁶⁹ Michael Beer, "Leading Learning and Learning to Lead," in Conger, Spreitzer, & Lawler (eds.).

A VALUES-BASED MODEL OF EFFECTIVE CF LEADERSHIP

Drawing the Map

131. Assembling a comprehensive model of effective CF leadership requires an integration of several of the models discussed in Parts 1 and 2 of this paper, but basically requires adapting and adding to Yukl's Multiple-Linkage Model. In his words, the Multiple Linkage Model "provides an integrating conceptual framework that encompasses each of the important sets of variables relevant for leadership effectiveness;" it "combines less comprehensive models" and includes "power and traits in addition to leader behavior, intervening variables, situational variables, and end-result variables"¹⁷⁰ and hence provides an appropriate start point. The proposed CF leadership process model in Figure 15 adapts and extends Yukl's Multiple-Linkage Model in the following ways:

- In the central process which links leader behaviour to organizational results, it incorporates the key behavioural phases of task-cycle and change-cycle theories, namely, *diagnostics*, *flexibility* in influence and change processes, and *monitoring* (follow-up) and adjusting behaviour through feedback loops.
- It acknowledges the qualitative differences between senior-level leadership and lower-level leadership by distinguishing between *direct influence* processes (leading people) and *indirect influence* processes (leading the institution). Direct influence processes have an immediate effect on the intervening variables of individual/group functioning and change, for which representative examples are listed. Indirect influence works through collective and institutional changes in the social-psychological and structural environments and systems of the CF (illustrative examples listed) and secondarily affects individual and group behaviour, performance, and satisfaction.
- In lieu of Yukl's Results place-holder, the model defines CF institutional effectiveness in terms of relevant *first-order outcomes* or values (mission success, internal integration, etc.) and relevant *second-order outcomes* or values (CF reputation, trust and confidence, etc.).
- By incorporating certain concepts of military professionalism, this model reinforces a values-based philosophy of leadership. It also extends the values-based philosophy in moral terms: (1) by requiring all actions to conform to *civic, legal, ethical, and professional values*; and (2) by accentuating *leader integrity* as a critical moderator of leader influence.

¹⁷⁰ *Leadership in Organizations* 2nd ed., p. 268.




Figure 15: Values-based multiple-linkage process model of effective CF leadership.

132. As a process model, Figure 15 illustrates the generic steps and sequence of events that are involved in the exercise of leadership. We begin somewhere off the left-hand edge of the figure with the CF's mission and goals and consequential leader responsibilities and tasks. As a result of superior direction, opportunity, or leader initiative, the initial phase of the leader task cycle or change cycle is engaged – assessing requirements and capabilities through either a localized/tactical situational estimate or a broader/strategic environmental scan and analysis. The ability to perform this function effectively depends on the leader's analytical competencies (e.g., general intelligence, functional expertise, systems thinking, etc.). Concurrently, situational factors, such as time limitations or restrictive policies, may constrain or neutralize some aspect of this activity phase, producing, for instance, a 'satisficing' back-of-the-envelope appreciation rather than a thorough analysis, or early elimination of some viable decision alternatives because of restrictions imposed by a central agency or policy.

133. The product of the diagnostic phase might be a high-level strategy, a plan, or a short statement of the leader's aim – all, nevertheless, expressions of leader/commander *intent*. Intent is put into action through any of several change strategies, influence behaviours, and tactics. At this stage of the process, the ability to demonstrate appropriate situational flexibility will depend on other leader competencies (e.g., a sufficiently broad repertoire of leader roles, self-monitoring, flexibility), while the discretion to do so might be over-ridden or modified by situational or environmental demand characteristics (e.g., urgency). Influence attempts become influence through the position power and personal power available to the leader; personal integrity plays a moderating role, either augmenting or weakening influence.

134. Influence may affect others (not just subordinates, but peers, superiors, and other people outside the chain of command or the CF) directly or indirectly. As noted, direct influence works as a result of proximity between the leader and the influence target and has an immediate effect, either altering individual or group perceptions, understanding, knowledge, skill, effort or other constituents of conduct, performance, and morale or satisfaction. Indirect influence works at a distance and results in alterations to slow-changing people attributes (e.g., attitudes and values) or changes to the contextual enablers of

behaviour, performance, and satisfaction. Various leadership substitutes (e.g., experience, high skill levels, a professional attitude, smart technology, etc.) may obviate the need for leader direction or influence in some circumstance. On the other hand, one of the ways institutional leaders make the leadership challenge a little easier for subordinate leaders is by developing organizational capabilities and making the deliberate kinds of change that create leadership substitutes and supports. One of the first principles of protecting systems against catastrophic failure is to double-bank critical elements; leadership substitutes represent this kind of operating insurance.

135. As direction and influence are translated into action and change, the third phase of the task or change cycle should kick in. Even under concepts of empowerment and delegation, leaders are still accountable for their areas of responsibility, and hence incur a duty of monitoring activity against expectations, legal and ethical norms, and performance standards – and taking corrective action if required. Monitoring involves day-to-day performance measurement based on sometimes crude indicators. On a regular basis, however, the performance of individuals and systems must also be formally and systematically evaluated or audited.

136. If plans go as intended, and people and systems respond to leaders appropriately, the desired results will probably be achieved. However, any number of uncontrollable factors (e.g., goal difficulty or complexity, resource dependencies, other obstacles) can limit or block success. To the extent that the CF is successful in carrying out its defence mission, functions smoothly, takes care of its people and maintains their commitment, and is able to adapt to and overcome challenges and obstacles, it will add to its image and reputation as a national institution, while preserving the trust, confidence, and support of the Canadian public.

137. At this point, it seems important to mention that Figure 15 is only a conceptual map. It is not the territory.

Defining Effective CF Leadership

138. Current U.S. Army doctrine defines leadership as “influencing people – by providing purpose, direction, and motivation – while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.”¹⁷¹ What this definition may lack in some aspects of comprehensiveness, it makes up for in clarity and succinctness. On the issue of effective CF leadership, is it possible to be comprehensive, concise, and clear at the same time? Perhaps a picture will help. Figure 16 attempts to portray the value concepts and their inter-relationships that underpin effective CF leadership.




Figure 16: CF model of values-based leadership.

In conventional and functional terms, Figure 16 states that CF leaders are effective to the extent that they competently discharge the responsibilities associated with first-order outcome values. In moral terms, leaders are effective if they also uphold the civic, legal,

¹⁷¹ COL John P. Lewis, LTC Cranson A. Butler, LTC Timothy Challans, LTC Donald M. Craig, & LTC Jonathan J. Smidt, “United States Army Leadership Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century,” in Carol McCann & Ross Pigeau (eds.) *The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience* (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers), 2000.

ethical, and professional values that are part of the military ethos. Leader integrity is the essential link between these value frameworks. With special reference to officer professionalism, Simons argues that this is the source of an officer's power:

Whether he or she can *consistently* make the 'right' decisions determines whether or not others will consistently follow. Soldiers expect officers to be the authority on what is the right thing to do – tactically, doctrinally, legally, morally. Whenever officers can prove soldiers correct about this, they lead. . . . Their survival in the system depends on their moral expertise, their maintaining control over the jurisdiction of deciding what is or is not the appropriate thing to do, and their being able to prove the legitimacy of their decision-making to subordinates (and civilian authorities) . . .¹⁷²

Under a philosophy of distributed leadership capability, these observations may be applied equally to all designated and emergent leaders in the CF, regardless of status, rank, or appointment.

139. As discussed previously in the context of commitment and professional cohesion, a common understanding and internalization of CF values provides every leader and member with a personal compass, not only enhancing their capacity for self-direction and self-regulation but also greatly reducing the necessity for their superiors to engage in procedurally oriented command and to exercise tight controls. Principles of mission-oriented command (*Auftragstaktik*), arising out of the military necessity for speed, for initiative and independent adaptive action at the lowest level, and for intelligent co-operation between subordinate levels, and based on a shared appreciation of the commander's intent, have been understood for a long time.¹⁷³ The kinds of command qualities cited in the 1936 edition of the German Army's *Truppenführung* – judgment, superior knowledge and experience, moral excellence, self-control, courage, mutual confidence, discipline – have equal or even greater validity today.¹⁷⁴ To be compatible with contemporary CF *mission-command* doctrine,¹⁷⁵ then, the

¹⁷² Anna Simons, "Backbone vs. Box: The Choice between Principled and Prescriptive Leadership," in Matthews (ed.), *The Future of the Army Profession*, p. 383.

¹⁷³ Martin van Creveld, *Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press), 1982; John T. Nelsen II, "Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Combat Leadership," in Lloyd J. Matthews & Dale E. Brown (eds.), *The Challenge of Military Leadership* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey), 1989.

¹⁷⁴ Extracts from *Truppenführung* quoted in van Creveld.

unavoidable implication is that CF *leadership* philosophy should articulate and reinforce the kind of institutional intent expressed in Figure 16. Values such as these constitute the ‘backbone’ of principle-based leadership and internalized control.¹⁷⁶

140. Relevant theories, concepts, and principles of leadership lead us to conclude that any definition of good or effective CF leadership ought to be culturally and organizationally appropriate. In other words, any definition of good or effective leadership in the CF should incorporate and affirm the civic, legal, and moral values of Canadian society and the functional values of the Canadian Forces, as well as the values of the profession of arms. With these criteria in mind, the effectiveness of CF leadership should be assessed with reference to the following principles:

- Effective leaders develop the necessary technical, interpersonal, and conceptual competencies that will better enable them to carry out their responsibilities.
- Effective leaders are proficient in the task cycle and its variants; they exhibit strong diagnostic skills, are capable of conveying intent flexibly, are skilled in a broad range of influence tactics, and monitor and evaluate the performance of subordinates and units for which they are responsible to ensure conformity with standards, plans, and their commander’s intent.
- Effective senior leaders are proficient in the change cycle; they demonstrate strong systems thinking and analytical skills, flexibly adapt change strategies and implementation tactics to relevant contingencies, and monitor and evaluate the systems for which they are responsible to ensure they perform in accordance with Government and DND/CF standards, functional requirements, and strategic CF direction.
- Effective leaders understand the broad dimensions of CF effectiveness, the inter-relationships among these dimensions, and their specific responsibilities related to each dimension; they endeavour, through direct and indirect influence processes and by discharging their responsibilities competently and with integrity, to

¹⁷⁵ The draft of *Canadian Forces Doctrine* (B-GJ-005-000/AF-000) (Ottawa: NDHQ/DCDS) sets out the CF philosophy of command in terms of four principles: “every commander must ensure that subordinates understand his or her intentions, their own missions, and the political, strategic, operational and tactical milieu in which they will operate; subordinates must be provided with sufficient resources to achieve their missions; commanders must use the minimum degree of control appropriate so as not to unnecessarily limit the subordinate’s freedom of action; and subordinates must decide for themselves how best to achieve their assigned missions.”

¹⁷⁶ Simons, “Backbone vs. Box”

contribute to mission success, the well-being and commitment of members, internal stability and cohesion (internal integration), and the continuous improvement of CF capabilities (external adaptability).

- Effective leaders understand their responsibility for maintaining military legitimacy and its consequential effects on the reputation of the CF and public trust, confidence, and support; they exercise their authority and influence with integrity and ensure that all conduct, activities, and outcomes for which they are accountable are consistent with civic, legal, ethical, and professional values.

141. Provisionally then, we might define effective CF leadership as follows: *Influencing others to accomplish the mission lawfully, ethically, and professionally, while ensuring member well-being and commitment, building an efficient and cohesive team, and improving the CF as an organization.* While this definition comprehensively reflects the outcome and conduct values of the CF, one of its obvious problems is that it is also wordy and somewhat repetitious. The following variation is considered more economical and practical: *Directing, motivating, and enabling others to accomplish the mission ethically and professionally, while working to improve the CF as an organization.* This shorter version gives more weight to describing the formal/personal and the direct/indirect aspects of leading (i.e., "directing, motivating, and enabling"), while making outcome values – other than mission success – implicit. For instance, the duty to obey and uphold lawful authority is embedded in the DND/CF *Statement of Defence Ethics* and hence is covered by the requirement for ethical conduct. It is also demonstrably the case that member well-being, team-building and cohesion, and external adaptability are major dimensions of CF effectiveness and hence are implicitly addressed in the leader's general responsibility for making the CF a better organization.