

**Professionalism and the Military - Past, Present, and Future:
A Canadian Perspective**

by Allan English

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Introduction

This inquiry started out with two basic questions posed by the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute. The first was based on the assumption that the military is considered to be a profession which generally implies characteristics ranging from a mastery of a body of advanced knowledge through clear codes of conduct to self-regulation. The question was framed as: how should the notion of “profession” be understood and what are the implications for military leadership?

The second question was articulated as: who is part of the profession of arms and how does that answer inform how we approach leadership? The intent was to examine how this issue has been considered or resolved over the millennia. However, this second question has only been briefly addressed in the literature. Huntington argues that modern military forces contain many types of specialists, but only those who “manage violence” are true military professionals. Others, such as doctors, dentists, lawyers, pharmacists, etc, may have expertise that is necessary for the military force to achieve its objectives, but they are not competent to manage violence. As Huntington puts it, they belong to the officer corps in an administrative capacity, but are not part of the professional body of the officer corps.¹ Sarkesian and Connor outline some questions surrounding this issue that need to be examined in more detail, yet little research has been done into these questions.² It is clear, however, that until the first question has been dealt with in more detail and we know how professions are evolving and changing, the second question will remain moot. Accordingly, this paper focuses on the first question and examines how the concept of a profession, especially the military profession, has changed over time and what implications this has for military leaders.

A review of the literature has shown that the study of professions over the past 50 years has been incoherent and partitioned according to disciplinary approach. This paper will survey the various approaches to studying the professions in Western society, highlighting those approaches that are most relevant to the study of the profession of arms. Recent studies of professional development suggest that the concept of a profession changes over time based on the social, economic, and historical context we are looking at. Accordingly, there is agreement among scholars that a profession “is a distinct kind of work, but disagreement about what actually distinguishes it from

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, “Officership as a Profession,” in *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, Malham M. Wakin, ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 27-8.

² Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr, *The US Military into the Twenty-First Century* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 26-9.

other kinds of work.”³ Despite these disagreements, the following definition of professionalism is typical of those most commonly found in the literature:

professionalism is official recognition that the occupation uses in its work a complex body of formal knowledge and skill that commands abstract concepts or theories requires the exercise of a considerable amount of discretion.⁴

Although its origins extend well into the past, the real beginnings of military professionalism, as we understand it today, are to be found in the late 19th century. While the first professions, in the modern sense of the word, emerged in 12th century Europe when church and state authorities set standards to regulate the training and behaviour of practitioners, professions only appeared in the United States 700 years later with the formation and re-structuring of the legal and other professional associations at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries.⁵ Since the nature of the military as a profession today is a direct result of that era’s drive for increased professionalization, the focus of this paper will be on the profession of arms over the past 100 or so years.

Both now and in the past, the Canadian military has depended on American interpretations of military professionalism, due to a lack of sustained interest in this topic in Canadian academic and military circles. When the debate has taken place in this country, it has tended to be based on American scholarship. Since the Canadian Forces (CF) are required to have “seamless operational integration at short notice”⁶ with its allies, particularly the US, it is clear that Canadian military professionals must be aware of American concepts of the military profession. However, given the differences between the Canadian and American militaries,⁷ there is a requirement for Canadians to understand the differences, as well as the similarities, between the profession of arms in the two countries. Therefore, while this paper will examine the nature of

³ James Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession,” paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, MD, 19-21 October 2001 (dated June 2001), 1, 4.

⁴ Eliot Freidson, *Professionalism: The Third Logic* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001), 83.

⁵ Michael Burrage, “Introduction: The Professions in Sociology and History,” in Michel Burrage and Rolf Torstendahl, eds., *Professions in Theory and History* (London: Sage, 1990), 9-10, 17.

⁶ “Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020,” (June 1999), http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/cds/strategy2k/2020_e.doc, 10.

⁷ See Allan D. English, “Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective,” Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine Contract Report No. CR 2001-047, 10 May 2001, available at the Defence Research Reports web site

(<http://pubs.drdc-rddc.dnd.ca/pubdocs/pcow1e.html>), for a detailed discussion of this issue.

military professionalism from a Canadian perspective, this will entail discussing how concepts of the profession of arms in the US have affected the CF. The paper concludes that because of its unique culture and history, a multi-disciplinary Canadian approach to this topic is required to properly understand the Canadian profession of arms.

This study deals mainly with the military profession in the context of the army or land force because the vast majority of the literature is based on examples taken from this service. Many articles in the American professional military literature have titles referring to military, not just army, professionalism, but there is no detailed discussion of the differences between the services. Carl Builder has addressed the differences among the American services based on their organizational cultures, and his work makes it clear that their professional competencies are very different.⁸ Huntington also speaks of “specialists in the management of violence on sea, on land, and in the air...,”⁹ but, to date, no significant body of knowledge exists on the professional differences among these specialists. The same is true for much of the small Canadian literature on this subject.

Before examining the profession of arms in the modern world, a brief examination of the historical evolution of the relationship between war and society will be used to put the issue of the development of the military profession in modern times into context.

War and Society in the Pre-Modern World

War is old as human civilization and many commentators believe that the development of the first human settlements and war as an organized activity went hand in hand. Martin van Creveld goes so far as to posit that how and why people fight help to determine their political, economic and even social organization. John Keegan takes a different view of the causal relationship between war and society, focussing his analysis on the influence of culture on how and why people fight.¹⁰ However, despite their differences, both these analysts recognize that warfare and society are tightly entwined. Keegan argues that in human history societies have spawned six main forms of military organization: warrior, regular, mercenary, militia, conscript, and slave. All but the slave system have relevance today as models for Western states.¹¹

⁸ Carl H. Builder, *The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the US Air Force* (London: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 5-6.

⁹ Huntington, in Wakin, 28.

¹⁰ See Steven Metz, “A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Philosophy of 21st-Century Warfare,” *Parameters* (Winter 1994-95), 126-132 for a more detailed overview of modern views of the relationship between war and society.

¹¹ This assumption does not overlook the fact that virtual slave armies (often consisting of child soldiers) do exist in parts of the world. However, this type of army is not germane to this discussion. John A. Lynn in “The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West, 800-2000,” *The International History Review* 18, no. 3 (August 1996), 505-51 proposes a seven stage model of

Warrior societies, like the Huns, Mongols, Sikhs and Zulus, and like those based on the samurai and the Western knightly class, were built on a small class of men impelled to make war as a way of life by the risks, excitement and rewards of combat.¹² Yet this does not appear to be the type of warrior ethos that Western armed forces today wish to instill in their forces. The idealized warrior ethos more prevalent in the Western context today, O'Connell argues, is based on the *Iliad*. It was not only the foundation of the Greeks' religion, it also defined their conception of reality. This work, according to O'Connell has set the standard for Western social behaviour, including combat over the past 2,600 years. In the *Iliad* both armies are described in terms of groups of individuals not only trying to accomplish a group aim but also striving for personal glory and a chance to be remembered. There are certainly similarities here with Keegan's concept of a warrior ethos, but O'Connell emphasizes the heroic nature of the warrior and contends that the Homeric concept of war still dominates in the Western society with its demands for individual heroes and decisive results in virtually all conflict.¹³ The current debate in the Canadian press over the "making" of Billy Bishop as a hero and myth in the First World War is just one of many examples that this way of thinking of war that is still pervades Western notions of war.¹⁴

The regular standing army, Keegan's next category, first appeared in Sumer some 3,000 years ago, and is presented as an effective alternative to the warrior or feudal society. While usually reliable and efficient, the biggest drawback of regular armies is that they are expensive. Societies can be threatened by their own regular armies if they become overly ambitious or a state attempts to reduce relatively large regular forces after a long war, as happened in the Irish Free State in 1923.¹⁵ In some states, Latin America is replete with examples, the military have established a virtual veto over elected governments and do not hesitate to usurp power if they think their interests are threatened. Some proponents of conscription in the US argue that the professional regular armed forces of the US have become too powerful, and that while there may be little risk

"Western military style." It is not used here because his taxonomy is not well supported by the evidence and exceptions to the model seem to outnumber the cases that it explains.

¹² John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (Toronto: Vintage Books, 1994), 227.

¹³ Robert L. O'Connell, *Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989), 45-50.

¹⁴ See for example John MacLachlan Gray, "Billy's Battle," *The Globe and Mail* (20 April 2002), p. R3; and J.L. Granatstein, "Trashing an Unread Book," *National Post* (18 April 2002), np (on line version). Hugh Halliday, "VC or not VC: Bestowing a Battlefield Icon," in William A. March and Robert H. Thompson, eds., papers presented at the 2nd Air Force Historical Conference, held at Portage la Prairie, MB, 17-18 May 1996, (Winnipeg, MB: Office of Air Force Heritage & History), 31-45, details part of the process of how heroes and myths were created in the awarding of the Victoria Cross.

¹⁵ Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, 229-31.

of them overthrowing the government, their influence has become too pervasive in government circles.¹⁶

To avoid the costs and dangers of a standing army, some states have bought their military services from mercenaries. Mercenary forces are those who sell military service for money, including inducements such as land grants, citizenship, and favoured treatment. But Keegan blurs the line between mercenary and regular forces, describing regulars as “mercenaries who already enjoy citizenship...but choose military service as a means of subsistence”; in wealthy states they “may take on some of the attributes of a profession.”¹⁷ Keegan points out the risks Machiavelli identified of depending on mercenaries when citizens the Italian states of the 15th century had become too mercantile to fight “but were too mean to pay for a standing force.” If mercenaries are not properly paid they might leave at a critical time, take sides in internal politics or even overthrow the government.¹⁸ What is often overlooked in this debate is that mercenaries have been both cost effective and militarily effective in certain circumstances. For example, a number of commentators have pointed out that the success of the British Empire depended on both internal and foreign, often Irish, mercenaries to man its Imperial forces. Sierra Leone is also cited as a recent case where in the 1990s, the South African-based mercenary army, Executive Outcome, maintained stability and prevented atrocities by rebels in parts of that country, and when they left the country descended into chaos.¹⁹

An alternative to employing mercenaries to defend the state was the militia system. It had its origins in ancient Greece, according to Keegan, and it was based on the principle of the duty of military service for all fit male members of the property-owning classes. This limited the number and quality of those who could fight, but it was relatively inexpensive (citizens provided their own arms and equipment) and provided a reliable, loyal military force.²⁰

The system of conscription, in Keegan’s model, is similar to the militia system in that it depended on citizens to fill the ranks. Unlike the militia system, conscription was not restricted to certain classes, but, in theory, embraced all fit, male citizens. While providing the potential for large armed forces, its main drawbacks are high costs and the possible militarization of society, as happened to Revolutionary France and Imperial Germany. Nevertheless, Keegan claims that

¹⁶ See for example Thomas E. Ricks, “On American Soil: The Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and U.S. Society,” John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies Project on U.S. Post Cold-War Civil-Military Relations, Harvard Univ. (May 1996), <http://hdc-www.harvard.edu/cfia/olin/civmil.htm>, np.

¹⁷ Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, 228.

¹⁸ Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, 231.

¹⁹ Kevin Myers, “Mercenaries are Much Misunderstood Men” *The Electronic Telegraph* 18 February 2002 <http://pressoffice.telegraph.co.uk/> summarizes these issues nicely and provides references for further reading.

²⁰ Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, 228, 233.

in Continental Europe “the French idea that only the armed man enjoyed full citizenship” took root “and rapidly became transmuted into the belief that civic freedoms were both the right and the mark of those who bore arms.”²¹

We can see a recurring theme from this brief overview of the 5000 year recorded history of war. States consistently faced the problem of how to maintain armed forces that were effective, affordable and reliable.²² The problem could be viewed as a triangle where a state could have one or two of the sides, for example armed forces that were effective and reliable, but not all three sides at once.²³ Depending on their circumstances states chose among Keegan’s ways of organizing their military forces, or a combination thereof, to meet their needs. In the 21st century the regular, militia, conscript, and mercenary models appear to be the most relevant, although, as we shall see, many Western militaries encourage fostering the warrior ethos in whatever model they choose.

Armed Forces and Society in the Modern World

Social scientists have provided somewhat different ways of understanding the relationship between armed forces and society in the modern world from those just depicted. Political scientists have been particularly concerned with the exercise of power among institutions in the state.²⁴ Edmonds (1988) provides an extended literature review on recent approaches to studying the relationship between armed forces and society. His findings are summarized here to provide a brief overview of some of the main ways of conceptualizing the relationship between armed forces and modern societies currently in use in these academic communities. One of the key factors that appears in these approaches to defining the relationship between armed forces and their societies is the degree of professionalism (or lack of it) that the armed forces exhibit. A number of writers have worked towards an overarching theory of the relationship between armed forces and society with a strong focus on professionalism as a criterion for evaluating the nature of the armed forces.

The early work of writers like Huntington and Finer on theories of professionalism hypothesized that civilian control over armed services “was best served by maximizing professionalism” because it “recognized and encompassed” civilian control. Central to Huntington’s (1957) search for an answer to his question of whether or not American liberal ideals of democracy had been compromised by increases in the size of its peacetime armed forces was the concept of professionalism. Military professionalism, according to Huntington, was the key to civilian

²¹ Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, 228, 233-4.

²² Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, 234.

²³ I am grateful to Capt(N) A. Okros for drawing this analogy, in another context, to my attention.

²⁴ Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996), 157.

control over the armed forces. It was far preferable to use the device of professionalism in the armed forces as an objective method of control rather than by the subjective means of maximizing civilian authority over them, he argued. He believed that with professionalism the armed services themselves would promote military efficiency whilst recognizing their subservience to the state; this was, in his view, better than imposing civilian values and directives on them, which might impair their efficiency. Huntington's ideas were in tune with the "new conservatism" of post-Second World War America where the need for a large and efficient standing army was recognized. The concept of professionalism was embraced to assure that the US armed services would embrace both the highest standards of performance and an obligation to serve society. Finer (1962), one of Huntington's severest critics, noted that in certain circumstances the armed services of a state may be constitutionally required to intervene in government, as a measure of last resort and a matter of professional duty. On the other hand, research on Latin American militaries has shown that professionalism alone was not a guarantee of non-involvement in politics as "civilian government tended to be supreme until the military professionalized" and acquired the capacity to usurp civilian control of the state.²⁵ Huntington acknowledged that in some states the prevailing ideology was wholly incompatible with Western concepts of professionalism except in terms of the military being composed of paid experts. However, as we shall see, the universality of Huntington's theory of military professionalism has been challenged because certain ideal conditions, such as a balance between the requirements of the armed forces and the values of society, would have to prevail for it to apply in all cases.²⁶ Feaver notes that in his 1977 revision of *The Soldier and the State* Huntington does not discuss his earlier characteristics of professionalism, expertise, responsibility, and corporateness, but adopts "the Janowitz's vocabulary of "congruence/convergence."²⁷

Janowitz's (1960) study of the post-Second World War American armed services concluded that while there had been changes in the professional officer corps and the armed services' organizational structure, the American armed services had maintained their professional distinctiveness and integrity. Their professional ethic, he concluded, was adequate to maintain civilian political supremacy without compromising their professional autonomy.²⁸ Feaver suggests that for all their conceptual differences, Janowitz and Huntington use the same "values-based" mechanism, professionalism, to explain how civil control of military forces can best be maintained in the West.²⁹

Rappaport's analysis (1962) shares some similarities with van Creveld's, in that he postulates that the relationship between armed services and society is a determining influence on the type of society that emerges. Based on this assumption, he proposed three broad types of society: 1)

²⁵ Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 163-4, 177, note 41.

²⁶ Edmonds, *Armed Services and Society*, 79-80.

²⁷ Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 163, 176, note 39.

²⁸ Edmonds, *Armed Services and Society*, 81.

²⁹ Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 165.

praetorian states, the most prevalent, where the armed services exist to defend those persons in power; 2) the civil and military polity where, with internal political stability assured, the primary function of the armed forces is defence against external threats (many Western nations fall into this category); and 3) the nation-in-arms where the dominant function of the armed services is public duty, with Israel as the clearest example of this category.

Abrahamsson (1972) building on Finer's work has provided the most detailed critique of professionalism as a basis for contemporary civil-military relationships. He argued that like all organizations, armed services are concerned with growth, improvement and their own survival. A professional military, as a well-organized and conservation institution, is likely to be effective in resisting civilian direction or looking after its own interests. He contended that they should be seen for what they really were, not disinterested professionals, but a politicized, highly active interest group that held strong political views. Abrahamsson's critique of Janowitz's and earlier writers' work highlighted the fact that even though professional armed forces might declare their disinterest in civil affairs, they were, nevertheless, often "politicized, highly active and motivated" interest groups possessing strong political views and prepared to compete with civilian groups in the political arena.³⁰ Recent struggles over US defence budget allocations where the US military has defied the Secretary of Defense's orders to cut certain weapons systems by appealing for Congressional support demonstrate that the late Carl Builder's assessment that the "most powerful institutions in the American national security arena are...the Army, Navy, and Air Force - not the Department of Defense or Congress or even their commander-in-chief, the president," still appears to be accurate.³¹

Perlmutter's (1977) work builds on that of the authors mentioned above. He challenges the idea of a clear distinction between the armed services and other state institutions, emphasizing that in the modern state there is a wide area of overlap between the two, but that the degree of overlap varies according to "ideologies, orientations and organizational structures." His "fusionist" model holds that all states are to some degree praetorian as professional military officers are drawn into national policy making even in "advanced" western states. For Perlmutter, the key to the interaction between armed services and the state is the fact that modern armed services are characterized by their corporate professionalism. As a corporate entity they work to maintain themselves in existence and to protect their exclusivity. Perlmutter devised three broad categories of armed services: 1) the professional corporate found mostly in western liberal democracies; 2) the praetorian found in those states where civilian authority is weak; and 3) the revolutionary found where there is a strong ideological component which encompasses the whole of society.³²

³⁰ Martin Edmonds, *Armed Services and Society* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 80-2; and Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 169.

³¹ Vernon Loeb, "Weapon Systems Die Hard, Especially on Capitol Hill," *Washington Post* (6 May 2002), p. A04; and Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1989), 3.

³² Edmonds, *Armed Services and Society*, 81-5.

Welch and Smith (1974), according to Edmonds, have arrived at a general, comprehensive theory of armed services, by which most of the states of the world were placed in a matrix to explain what type of system each state had and to give an indication of how each might alter its position in the matrix. The matrix was based on four variables: 1) extent of popular participation in decision making; 2) strength of civil institutions; 3) political strength of armed services; and 4) degree of overlap between civil and military institutions. The theory has its shortcomings, however, because of the authors' preoccupation with praetorian military regimes, less advanced industrial states, and communist political systems.³³

These other views of the relationship between modern societies and armed forces notwithstanding, Huntington's ideas continue to dominate much of the debate on this topic, in Canada as well as elsewhere.³⁴ His supporters claim that many of his ideas are as valid today as they were when they were written. Noting that *The Soldier and the State* "put the issue of civil-military relations on the map," Robert Kaplan explains that the book was inspired by President Truman's firing of General Douglas MacArthur in 1951 during the Korean War. MacArthur's "political generalship," according to Huntington, "undermined the idea of a professional military." And a professional military, in Huntington's view, is the only way to keep the threat of a military take over in liberal democracies at bay. For him "the modern officer is a professional, whose job is the management of violence and whose client is the state," and whose advice is "strictly professional" based at all times on the "national interest."³⁵ While this may appear to be a valid theoretical construct, one challenge might be what is and who defines the national interest. Recent US military operations have shown that this is interpreted differently by the different US services often giving advice to promote the capabilities, and therefore the budget share, of their own service.

One of the greatest weaknesses of Huntington's work is his methodology. While few would argue with his view that people, events, beliefs and institutions do not fit into "neat logical categories," and therefore scholars are forced to generalize if they wish to derive "lessons for broader application," most historians would take issue with generalizations that are not supported by the facts. Kaplan tells us that Huntington was a political scientist who was comfortable

³³ Edmonds, *Armed Services and Society*, 90-1.

³⁴ The essence of Huntington's views on professionalism was endorsed by senior Department of National Defence leaders at a 1999 conference on the profession of arms in Canada.. See General Maurice Baril, "Keynote Address: The State of the Profession of Arms in the Canadian Forces," presented at Conference of Defence Associations Institute XVth Annual Seminar, 1999 - The Profession of Arms in Canada: Past, Present and Future <http://www.cdai.ca/english-frame.htm>.

³⁵ Robert D. Kaplan, "Looking the World in the Eye," *The Atlantic Monthly* 280, no. 5 (December 2001), 70, 72-4.

producing *The Soldier and the State* as “a book of relentless empirical generalizations.”³⁶ If one accepts that “empirical” here refers to making generalizations based on observation or experience not rigorous research,³⁷ then those scholars who have recently taken issue with Huntington’s generalizations appear to have a point.

In “The Long Shadow of *The Soldier and the State*” Coffman gives examples of how a lack of historical data can lead to some of the faulty assumptions that have dominated the debate of military professionalism. Historians have found that, contrary to Huntington’s assumptions, in the late 19th century there “was no great gap between [American officers] and the propertied middle class” and that the “drive for military professionalism” was no different than that found in the civilian professions at the time.” In fact rather than epitomizing a civil-military gap, the officer corps of the late 19th century American army shared many characteristics with urban reformers in America - they were Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, middle class, educated, and believed in “character, fair play, progress, the betterment of mankind, and the democratic mission of their nation.”³⁸ Furthermore, in the decades 1880-1920 military leaders “maintained close social and intellectual ties with America’s business, professional, and political elites and shared their outlook.”³⁹ Historical studies have shown that Huntington’s model does not correspond to “the realities of American life” and in some ways were almost a “literary construct.” American army officers were not “polarized ideologically” from their contemporaries, but “shared the values of the middle class from which they came.”⁴⁰ This raises the question of how Huntington arrived at his conclusions.

Huntington’s approach to issues of military professionalism, according to Kaplan, can be best understood by Huntington’s education, experience and national culture. He is described as “someone who combines liberal ideals with a deeply conservative understanding of history and foreign policy.” In his framework, liberalism is a highly idealistic “ideology of individualism, free markets, liberty, and the rule of law,” whereas he believes that conservatism is not an ideology but a practical way of constraining the almost unbounded idealism of liberalism. “Real conservatism cannot aspire to lofty principles, because its task is to defend what already exists,” he asserts. This paradigm led Huntington to conclude that conservatism was the only proper mind set for the military profession. In fact, he believes that liberal values, based on individualism, can “undermine a professional officer corps.” Huntington, however, does not see the military professional as a reactionary; he acknowledges that the professionalization of 19th century European militaries promoted a meritocracy in the officer corps and challenged “the

³⁶ Kaplan, “Looking the World in the Eye,” 72.

³⁷ *Oxford English Dictionary*, 6th ed. (1980), 339.

³⁸ Edward M. Coffman, “The Long Shadow of *The Soldier and the State*,” *The Journal of Military History* 55 (January 1991), 76-77.

³⁹ American historian James Abrahamson cited in Coffman, “The Long Shadow of *The Soldier and the State*,” 78.

⁴⁰ Coffman, “The Long Shadow of *The Soldier and the State*,” 69, 81.

aristocratic basis of society.” He argued that the civil-military dynamic was very different in 19th century America because an isolated officer corps developed an aristocratic ethos. But as we have seen this view has been challenged by historians.⁴¹

Perhaps a better and more widely applicable characterization of Huntington’s views on militaries in the 20th century can be found in his book *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968): “‘In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle class world, he is a participant and an arbiter; as the mass society looms...he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order.’”⁴² Yet many of Huntington’s from ideas from his earlier work, *The Soldier and the State*, underlie the current debate about the place of the US military in its society. The debate has polarized between those who believe that the US military should maintain what they believe to have been its traditional isolation from the liberal society, thus maintaining its warrior ethos, and those who believe that the military should more closely resemble the society it defends.⁴³ This phenomenon is neither new nor restricted to the US. In late 19th century France, “right-wing and conservative groups” saw the discipline and hierarchical authority of the army as a proper model for civilian society.⁴⁴ Therefore, the issue of the relationship between armed forces and society is likely to be an integral part of any debate on the military profession’s place in society.

The Professions and Society

A professionalized military has been advocated in the Western world, particularly in the US, as a way of maintaining civilian control over a force that could potentially usurp the power of the state and dominate the society it is supposed to serve, as we have seen. Accordingly, before looking at the military as a profession, the more general issue of what constitutes a profession will be examined to better understand what is meant by the concept of a military profession.

Much new scholarly work on professions has been written since the two most influential studies of the military as a profession, Huntington’s *Soldier and the State* and Janowitz’s *The Professional Soldier*, were written over 40 years ago. Yet, as Burk noted, the implications of this new literature for military professionalism has not yet been fully explored. He goes on to explain that this is an important issue because to “call an occupation ‘professional’ is usually a positive normative judgment about the work being done and, since we think that professional work is a social good, whatever we call professional work also reveals something about what we believe is

⁴¹ Coffman, “The Long Shadow of *The Soldier and the State*,” 71, 73, 82.

⁴² Huntington cited in Kaplan, “Looking the World in the Eye,” 78.

⁴³ See for example Williamson Murray, “Military Culture Does Matter,” *Strategic Review* 27, no. 2 (Spring 1999), 32-40; and Don M. Snider, “An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture,” *Orbis* 43, no. 1 (Winter 1999), 15-26. This debate is discussed in a Canadian context in English, “Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective.”

⁴⁴ Stephen Wilson, “For a Socio-Historical Approach to the Study of Western Military Culture,” *Armed Forces and Society* 6, no. 4 (Summer 1980), 544.

required for the well-being of society.” Burk argues that the key characteristics of a profession are expertise (mastery of abstract knowledge), control over a jurisdiction to apply expert knowledge, and the legitimacy ascribed to that profession by others.⁴⁵ His views are summarized here because they are one of the few recent treatments of the military profession in the context of the new work being done on the professions and because they capture many of the perspectives on professions that predominate in the militaries of Canada and the US.

In pre-20th century Britain professions were those ““occupations suitable for a gentleman,”” and the status of professions often depended more on the prestige of the persons who worked in them than the work itself.⁴⁶ This interpretation has been challenged by Freidson who argues that the prestige of the professions is due less to the social origins of their members than to their service to society’s elites.⁴⁷ Either logic could be applied to the profession of arms in Europe, which, although held in low esteem because of the social class of those in the ranks and the nature of soldiering, was considered to be respectable in some ways because most of the officer corps was composed of sons of the nobility who defended the interests of society’s elites in uniform. However, by the 20th century a profession’s status depended more on the work done than on social standing of the worker. To ensure that the quality of a professional work remained high, people in certain relatively high status occupations organized into associations that trained and tested their members. They also, through mechanisms that varied in time and place, protected their right to practice in a certain domain by excluding outsiders who they considered unqualified. Intrinsic to this concept was the idea of service, in other words professionals were doing important work in society and put the needs of their clients above their own needs. By the mid-20th century many scholars accepted the idea that professions enjoyed high status because they met important social needs and had risen above the self-serving motives of those, like merchants and businessmen, in non-professional occupations⁴⁸

This ideal was captured in texts widely used in courses on military ethics and professionalism at Canadian military colleges and American military academies. In one representative essay Barzun sketches an outline of history of professions as groups with a monopoly on certain skills for a “distinct practical purpose.” He reminds us that because of this focus on practical outcomes, professions are vulnerable institutions, because, while the role of professions in society may be eternal, a particular profession may disappear or change radically over time, for example the priest-physician and barber-surgeon. Barzun observes that the “tendency of an egalitarian age to turn every occupation into a profession” has complicated the subject of professional ethics. He uses the example of the “profession” of journalism to illustrate this point: there is no body of peers to tell if practitioners are competent, the “professional” has a distant relationship with his/her clients, and there are no specific professional credentials required to become a journalist.

⁴⁵ Burk, “Expertise...,” 1.

⁴⁶ British sociologist T.H. Marshall cited in Burk, “Expertise...,” 5.

⁴⁷ Freidson, *Professionalism*, 103.

⁴⁸ Burk, “Expertise...,” 5-6, 9.

This trend is paralleled by the gradual demoting of professions to the level of ordinary trades and businesses. His message for professions is that their one hope for survival is the recovery of their mental and moral force. It is not enough to have codes of conduct that are policed by professional oversight bodies; professions must also exercise “moral and intellectual leadership” that communicates the message that ethical behaviour is “desirable, widely practiced, approved and admired.”⁴⁹ Or as Lerner puts it: all professions need to “recapture the sense of vocation or calling.”⁵⁰ Barzun’s essay was written in 1978 and Lerner’s in 1975, but the points they made then are still highly relevant today.

The most widespread concept of officership as a profession, used in courses on military ethics and professionalism even today, is Huntington’s, using his three defining characteristics of a profession: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.⁵¹ In this model expertise is specialized knowledge acquired only by prolonged education and experience. Essential to maintaining this expertise is continual study and practice of the profession. The professional also has a responsibility to practice his/her profession in the service of society; the profession therefore holds certain moral principles in dealing with laypersons. Finally, professionals share a sense of unity among themselves and separateness from those who are not members of their profession partly because of the lengthy training necessary to achieve professional competence. However, as was noted in the introduction, only those who “manage violence” are true military professionals in Huntington’s view. Others, such as doctors, dentists, lawyers, pharmacists, etc., may have expertise that is necessary for the military force to achieve its objectives, but they are not competent to manage violence. As Huntington puts it, they belong to the officer corps in an administrative capacity, but are not part of the professional body of the officer corps.⁵² This is understandable because most of these specialists are trained in their own professional schools (e.g., medical schools) and serve only a small part of their career in the military, usually returning to practice their profession in a civilian setting.

The issue of who actually is a member of the profession of arms is problematic for modern armed services. Militaries will always have experts from other disciplines in their ranks, but in the end they must focus on their primary purpose - preparing their personnel to employ violence in the service of the society. What then is the best preparation for entry into the military profession. A committee advising the MND as suggested that: “A suitable formal education has become as much of a touchstone of military professionalism as charisma, honour, dedication, courage and a 'strong right arm.' Although the essence of war-fighting is today the same as it was

⁴⁹ Jacques Barzun, “The Professions Under Siege,” in Malham M. Wakin, ed., *War, Morality, and the Military Profession* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 124-5, 128, 130, 132.

⁵⁰ Max Lerner, “The Shame of the Professions ” in Wakin, 138.

⁵¹ Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique,” 158.

⁵² Samuel P. Huntington, “Officership as a Profession,” in *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, Malham M. Wakin, ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 23-34.

in ancient times...It is no longer sufficient for Canadian Forces officers to know which civil or military solutions to apply to problems, it is necessary that they thoroughly understand the nature of the solutions they aspire to use and to be able to adapt or improvise solutions to suit particular circumstances. To do that, they must learn those basic skills of critical evaluation and analysis that will allow them to tackle any problem that may come along. Put simply, they must acquire the thinking skills that a liberal arts education affords as the basis for whatever technical learning they need also acquire.”⁵³ This rationale suggests an approach not dissimilar from those used by other professions in training their apprentices for service to society. As Freidson has pointed out, professions require their trainees to be taught the first principles of their work formally in schools because as practitioners they may be required to exercise extensive “discretionary judgment” which demands more of “a firm grounding in basic theory and concepts to guide discretionary judgment than to gain practice” in what otherwise would be a selection from a number of practices established by custom or tradition.⁵⁴ But those studying the professions have questioned the motives of professionals for acquiring and applying their knowledge.

Since the 1970s scholars have adopted a more sceptical approach in their study of the professions. The idea that professions compete with each other and with occupations for resources and power in society has found currency. In other words, a profession’s status in society is held to be no longer just a measure of the perceived utility of that profession to society, but also an indication how successful, or unsuccessful, it has been in competing for society’s scarce resources.⁵⁵

One of the most important criteria a society uses in judging its professions’ utility is proof that they can actually solve the problems that it confront society. Burk calls this legitimacy. This concept is illustrated by the fact that over the past 200 years the profession in America with the highest prestige has moved from the clergy, next to lawyers, and most recently to medical doctors. This shift has been explained by changes in society where the supreme authority on how to judge what was good for society went from God to science. Since by the late 19th century “science was believed to be *the* source of reliable knowledge about the world and claims to expertise were more readily recognized if they were obviously grounded in science,” those professions that based their practice in science (rather than theology or jurisprudence) have gained the highest status in the last one hundred or so years.⁵⁶ Recent studies in the history of science have shown that in the acquisition of knowledge scientists are not guided by logic and objectivity alone, but also from such non-rational factors as rhetoric, propaganda, and personal

⁵³ “Second Interim Report of the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces,” nd [July 1999], can be found at http://www.dnd.ca/menu/press/Reports/monitor_com/eng/leader_e.htm, chapter 5, “observations,” np.

⁵⁴ Freidson, *Professionalism*, 95.

⁵⁵ Burk, “Expertise...,” 6-7.

⁵⁶ Burk, “Expertise...,” 7-9. Quote from 19.

prejudice. In other words, science should not be considered the guardian of rationality in society, but merely one major form of its cultural expression.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, “the institutionalization of the scientific vision of truth transformed” the way all disciplines presented and talked about their expertise.⁵⁸

Burk hypothesizes that sociologists have not study the military extensively because it did not match the science-based archetype, often depicted as medicine, for a “legitimate profession.”⁵⁹ Yet, the military has been seen as a legitimate domain for inquiry as recent studies into professionals, like psychologists and architects who solve “messy but crucially important problems,” have shown that they tend to rely on experience and intuition as opposed to “rationally applying theoretical knowledge.”⁶⁰ These new insights have changed some scholars’ views on what constitutes a “legitimate profession,” as we shall see. In the competition for legitimacy in society professional groups have employed many strategies to gain and maintain status, including redefining the nature of professional tasks and having laws passed that barred competitors from practising in a certain field.⁶¹

An example of this professional competition in a Canadian context occurred when the young Canadian Psychological Association convinced the Royal Canadian Air Force in the Second World War that psychologists’ methods of aircrew selection were more effective than those used by medical doctors. Using a combination of lobbying, science, and perhaps most importantly practical results, psychologists gained control of aircrew selection for the Canadian part of British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, “which trained 130,000 aircrew of virtually every Allied nationality” in this country during that war. While the powerful medical profession fought back, the efficacy of the psychologists’ methods won them the prestige and resources associated with the huge Canadian aircrew training effort in that war. On the other hand, despite some efforts by Canadian psychologists to make inroads into the field of treating psychological casualties during the war, the medical profession maintained its near monopoly in this area.⁶²

⁵⁷ See for example William Broad and Nicholas Wade, *Betrayers of the Truth* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).

⁵⁸ Magali Sarfatti Larson, “In the Matter of Experts and Professionals, or how Impossible it is to Leave Nothing Unsaid,” in Torstendahl and Burrage, eds. *The Formation of Professions* (London: Sage Publications, 1990), 32.

⁵⁹ Burk, “Expertise...,” 11-12.

⁶⁰ Lennart G. Svensson, “Knowledge as a Professional Resource: Case Studies of Architects and Psychologists at Work,” in Torstendahl and Burrage, eds. *The Formation of Professions*, 62.

⁶¹ Burk, “Expertise...,” 8-9.

⁶² Allan D. English, *The Cream of the Crop: Canadian Aircrew 1939-1945* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1996), 5, 30-40, 61-102. See also Terry Copp and

The ongoing controversy over Gulf War Syndrome demonstrates that these issues of professional rivalry and jurisdiction are still with us. A fierce competition for legitimacy (and therefore resources) among many experts: psychiatrists and psychologists of every stripe, toxicologists, immunologists, environmental health experts is still ongoing. And this is no trivial matter, considering that since 1994 the US Department of Defense has spent \$100 million on Gulf War health research and more is forthcoming.⁶³ The stakes are high and the professions have risen to the challenge.

Competition among the professions has detracted from their claim to be serving the public good, however. The ideal of public service was an significant part of earlier definitions of professions, according to Burk, because the idea that professionals were “social trustees” organized to serve public good and not their own interests was an important criterion used to distinguish professions from occupations. One of the reasons that merchants and plumbers were not viewed as professionals is that they put their own, usually monetary, interests above those of their clients or society, whereas doctors and lawyers were presumed to subordinate their personal, especially pecuniary, interests to those of their clients and society as a whole. But recent definitions, based on research that has found examples of professionals and their associations acting in less than altruistic ways, have put less emphasis on public service and more on expert knowledge. Burk calls these new professionals “knowledge experts” because they serve and owe their allegiance to whoever is paying them without much regard for the public good.⁶⁴ One can see parallels to the mercenary military model or perhaps even some regular military forces in this definition, as we shall see in more detail later. Nevertheless, some commentators today still hold that an important characteristic of the professions is their “commitment to restrain self-interest” and to use their “special knowledge and skills” for the “common good.”⁶⁵

Burk defines a profession as “a relatively ‘high status’ occupation whose members apply abstract knowledge to solve problems in a particular field of endeavor.” He elaborates by describing three critical elements in his notion of a profession: 1) high status 2) applied abstract knowledge as source of expertise 3) field of endeavor or jurisdiction for problem solving.⁶⁶

He goes on to link high status to the idea of legitimacy. Burk tells us that a key indicator of legitimacy for a profession in any society is proof that it can actually solve the problems that

Bill McAndrew, *Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1990).

⁶³ See Allan English, “Historical and Contemporary Interpretations of Combat Stress Reaction,” prepared for the Board of Inquiry - Croatia and presented at the 1999 Conference on Defence Ethics, Ottawa, ON, 2 November 1999, published on the Board of Inquiry - Croatia website <http://www.dnd.ca/boi/engraph/study_e.asp>.

⁶⁴ Burk, “Expertise...,” 10-11.

⁶⁵ Neil Hamilton, “The Academic Profession’s Leadership Role in Shared Governance,” *Liberal Education* (Summer 2000), 2 of 6 (internet version).

⁶⁶ Burk, “Expertise...,” 5.

society considers important. However, he argues that a new source of strain for professions today is society's increased skepticism of the "legitimacy of expert knowledge based on science and the ideal of objectivity."⁶⁷ A recent example of this phenomenon in a military context is the Gulf War Syndrome example cited above. Whereas at one time such a problem would have been seen as a legitimate problem for the medical profession, that profession's inability to deal with the problem in a way that satisfies large segments of society has led to many other disciplines, some professions and some not, challenging what was once medical hegemony in areas related to health.

Burk gives the example of integrating women into the military as another example of non-experts questioning the exercise of professional authority more boldly. When some in Western militaries tried to exclude women from various occupations based on established or customary standards of physique or performance, they were challenged by those who asserted that these standards were "not based on universal, objective truths" but on "social constructions of gender that can be modified without compromising military effectiveness."⁶⁸ The differing approaches to this issue taken by various armed forces suggest that there is an important element of cultural influence on the decisions taken by each service.⁶⁹ However, without a general belief in what constitutes legitimate, truthful and objective knowledge, it is difficult to sustain an ethic of professional service, according to Burk.⁷⁰

Professional jurisdiction, as defined by boundaries where expert knowledge can legitimately be applied, is another important concept in Burk's model. He notes that sometimes the jurisdiction is "an actual place like a hospital, court room or battlefield and sometimes it is an aspect of life."⁷¹ Burk argues that professional practice is strong when his key characteristics of a profession, expertise, jurisdiction and legitimacy, are present, that is "when the application of expertise within a particular jurisdiction is uncontested and thought in general to be legitimate."⁷²

But these views on professions are not held universally. A challenge to what has been called the "Anglo-American" paradigm of professions used by Burk, is that it is based largely on studies of lawyers and doctors in 19th century and 20th century Britain and America and that the real picture

⁶⁷ Burk, "Expertise...", 22-3.

⁶⁸ Burk, "Expertise...", 24.

⁶⁹ See Mimi Finch, "Women in the Military," 246-55, and Cynthia H. Enloe, "Women, Men and Soldiering after the Cold War," 256-65, in J. Eric Fredland, et al., *Professionals on the Front Line* (Washington: Brassey's, 1996) for some perspectives on women in the modern military.

⁷⁰ Burk, "Expertise...", 24.

⁷¹ Burk, "Expertise...", 19-20.

⁷² Burk, "Expertise...", 23-5.

of what constitutes a profession is considerably more complicated than the one that has emerged so far in the literature.⁷³

Randall Collins provides a sociologist's perspective on the study of the professions. He describes the "first round" (in the 1930s and early 1950s) of sociological enquiry into the professions as focussed on the theme of professions versus bureaucracies, exploring expert versus line authority based on a paradigm current in the field of organizational studies at that time. This first round was followed by the "classic" period of professionalization theory in sociology culminating with Harold Wilensky's 1964 article "The Professionalization of Everyone?" Wilensky concluded that not all occupations inevitably become professions (a field of work whose practitioners had gained control of their own training, admission to practice and evaluation of standards of performance) despite the practice of referring to many occupations as professions. In the classic period, professionalism was conceptualized as a matter of power where the formation of a self-regulating community to effect strategies to gain power was portrayed as key to success.⁷⁴

The second upsurge of research on the professions occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, according to Collins. It inspired a revisionist wave of scholarship that depicted professions as being partly responsible for the stratification of society. Instead of being "extolled as altruistic and liberalizing" and "social trustees" who put public interest above personal gain, professions were now characterized "as part of the structure of privilege." Medicine and other high-status professions were depicted as "successful monopolies reaping the benefits of their market controls in the form of high incomes." The "older functionalist and idealizing view of professions" fell rapidly into disfavour; and the new "conflict view" was "accepted readily because it fitted mood of the times."⁷⁵

A post-revisionist sociology of professions started to emerge in the 1980s, and one of its major themes involved capturing the historical and cultural variation in the professions. A weakness of the classic approach to the sociology of the professions is an underlying belief that there is a single, ideal model of a profession which can be used to typify all professions everywhere. This model has received a great deal of criticism and there are now two principal models upon which sociologists are basing their research into the professions. The Anglo-American model "stresses the freedom of self-employed practitioners to control working conditions" while the Continental model "stresses elite administrators possessing offices by virtue of academic credentials." These two models share at least two characteristics - "both are idealized and ideologically defined" (and therefore should not necessarily be taken at face value) and "both refer to occupations which organize themselves 'horizontally' as communities with a certain style of life, code of ethics, self-conscious identity and boundaries to outsiders." Collins notes that there are variations

⁷³ Rolf Torstendahl, "Introduction: Promotion and Strategies of Knowledge-based Groups," in Torstendahl and Burrage, eds. *The Formation of Professions*, 1.

⁷⁴ Randall Collins, "Changing Concepts in the Sociology of the Professions," in Torstendahl and Burrage, eds. *The Formation of Professions*, 12-13.

⁷⁵ Collins, "Changing Concepts in the Sociology of the Professions," 13-14.

on these two models that can “lie anywhere along the continuum, and may involve mixtures of both types.”⁷⁶

This analysis leads Collins to propose the following definition for professions: “socially idealized occupations organized as closed associational communities.”⁷⁷ What is crucial in this concept of professions is not the mere existence of knowledge but how it is socially organized, in other words how it is controlled and rationed. The premise here is that professions create a demand for their particular brand of knowledge and then regulate its availability to keep their wages high. This raises the questions of how this manipulation of knowledge affects the social structure and who will (or should) control knowledge in a society.⁷⁸ Control may be harder to exercise, however, in what some have dubbed the information age, where an unprecedented amount of information is available through many media, but especially the internet.

Sociologists studying the professions in the past two decades have concluded that the character of the professions is different in every country and that character has varied over time in response to social change. For example, the way in which professional knowledge is imparted differs according to the culture and educational system of each nation: in Britain it has usually been imparted through apprentices imitating the work of their masters in a professional work setting, in France attendance at certain prestigious schools (like Polytechnique) is the accepted method, in Germany professional knowledge is imparted by attendance at certain specialist schools (like a *Technische Hochschule*), and in the US getting a high quality education in one of any of a number of institutions gave one entrée into the professional world.⁷⁹ Freidson has observed that despite their differences these “tertiary educational institutions” are designed to provide their graduates not only with the required professional skills and knowledge, but also with a general advanced education that contributes to increasing the graduates’ “cultural sophistication” and to introducing them to the elite strata of society.⁸⁰

Until fairly recently, our understanding of the role of professions in society has been based on Anglo-American concepts of the professions found in the literature. These models of the professions, reflecting a limited historical experience, have a number of deficiencies. Perhaps the most important, in the military context, is presenting the professions in terms of those occupations that possess certain fairly well defined characteristics. The Anglo-American concepts also minimize the effect of the state on the professions. For armed forces, however, this may not be appropriate. The state has always had a significant influence on the profession of arms, from providing its resources to granting commissions to its officers, often in the name of the head of state, as is the case in Canada. In the Continental model, professions were often much

⁷⁶ Collins, “Changing Concepts in the Sociology of the Professions,” 15, 17.

⁷⁷ Collins, “Changing Concepts in the Sociology of the Professions,” 17-18.

⁷⁸ Collins, “Changing Concepts in the Sociology of the Professions,” 18, 22.

⁷⁹ Torstendahl, “Introduction...,” 5-6.

⁸⁰ Freidson, *Professionalism*, 86, 96.

more closely aligned with the state than in the Anglo-American world, and have even been described as a way the state could infuse specialized knowledge into civil society.⁸¹ Green goes even further and suggests that one reason for developing centralized educational systems, including some professional schools, in 19th century France, the UK and the US was the “need to provide the state with trained administrators, engineers, and military personnel; to spread national cultures and inculcate popular ideologies of nationhood; and so to forge the political and cultural unity of burgeoning nation states, and cement the cultural hegemony of their dominant classes.”⁸² The history of the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) supports this assertion,⁸³ and so the Continental model may be more applicable to the study of the Canadian profession of arms than the Anglo-American model now in use.

Before we can make this decision we have to understand the historical context in which the profession of arms evolved more fully, because, like other professions, it is “unintelligible without reference to [its] historical development.”⁸⁴ Therefore, a brief review of the evolution of warfare will allow us to better understand the nature of military professionalism today.

The Historical Development of the Military Profession

From the earliest recorded times people have wrestled with some of the same issues that confront today’s societies when dealing with the relationship between those who bear arms and civil society. This was a crucial question for much of human history, because until the commercial revolution of the 17th century, dominant states usually achieved their status through war.⁸⁵ But before the modern era of professions beginning in the 19th century, the concept of a military profession was very different from what it is today. Therefore, while we need to be cautious in drawing analogies between pre-modern and modern professional soldiers, there were some similarities that are still used by commentators today as examples of what the military profession should be like in the 20th century.

The first recorded examples of what might be recognized as military professionals occurred in what O’Connell called tyrant states or dictatorships, beginning with the Sargon who ruled the Akkadian Empire around 2,300 BC. These states were based on absolute rule, rigid hierarchies, and force as their principle means of expansion and cohesion. Because mercenaries were deemed to be too fickle and expensive for large-scale use, Sargon depended on a small warrior class living off the state, who might be characterized as “expert professionals” using today’s

⁸¹ Larson, “In the Matter of Experts and Professionals...,” 44.

⁸² A. Green cited in Freidson, *Professionalism*, 85.

⁸³ Thirteen of the first 18 graduates of RMC (who started their courses in 1876) “had careers that were primarily civilian.” See Richard A. Preston, *Canada’s RMC* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1969), for the full story. Quote from p. 75.

⁸⁴ Burrage, “Introduction: The Professions in Sociology and History,” 18.

⁸⁵ O’Connell, *Of Arms and Men*, 34.

taxonomy. The bulk of the army, conscripts in Keegan's model, lacked aggressiveness and loyalty to the state and consisted of bowmen who "provided lethality without hand-to-hand combat" in Sargon's army. Therefore, decisive manoeuvres were executed by those with the most at stake, the ruler and his retainers, who were armed for close combat and who were often mounted on chariots to terrorize the weakly motivated and to bring opposing leaders into range for a duel on foot. This was a powerful and intimidating organism, but it was brittle and vulnerable to collapse if the leader was killed.⁸⁶ One can see here parallels to modern dictatorships where tyrants surround themselves with elite, often mechanized forces, as their power base and then raise large, less effective conscript armies to give bulk to their armed forces.⁸⁷

Another way of providing a military service to society is found in the Mesopotamian city states known as Sumer around 3,000-4,000 BC. These states were engaged in constant intramural warfare, similar to ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy, and one of the earliest records of how they waged war dates to this period in the epic of one of their leaders - Gilgamesh. He led what appears to be a warrior caste in his society that had some of the characteristics of a regular army. He used a very modern, some might say transformational, leadership style that would be recognized in the profession of arms today. Gilgamesh consulted his warriors, ruling by consent and not demanding blind obedience. This permitted the Sumerians to use a full-fledged phalanx in 2,500 BC, some 2,000 yrs before the Greeks. Yet the phalanx was only effective if it could be manoeuvred to close with the enemy to engage in hand-to-hand combat. The discipline and co-operation required for this was only possible with highly motivated troops; therefore, the phalanx was a way of war limited to those societies whose culture and government were congruent with this type of fighting, according to O'Connell, and it could be used in Sumerian society because Gilgamesh's men had a stake in their society.⁸⁸

Massed heavy infantry (hoplites) formed in phalanxes were re-introduced on the battlefield by the Greeks between 675-650 BC. However, while the Greek phalanx depended on the social solidarity of city-state, unlike the Sumerians, the Greek hoplites were essentially a middle- and upper-middle-class militia where membership in the militia was defined by the wealth required to acquire the expensive hoplite armament that each individual provided for himself. Thus, participation in the state's wars, marked by the possession of hoplite armament, showed that its owner was eligible for full political participation in the city-state.⁸⁹ O'Connell reminds us that the Greeks were also a maritime people who developed naval forces that, like their armies, were "suited to their own political, sociological and psychological paradigms." Unlike civil society, where slaves were essential to the functioning of the economy, Greek naval warfare, like land

⁸⁶ O'Connell, *Of Arms and Men*, 38-9.

⁸⁷ O'Connell *Of Arms and Men*, 280, uses the example of Hitler as the apotheosis of this form of organizing for war.

⁸⁸ O'Connell, *Of Arms and Men*, 35-7.

⁸⁹ O'Connell, *Of Arms and Men*, 50-1.

warfare, was based on citizens organized into what might be called martial boat clubs to row their warships.⁹⁰ But not all states, especially as they expanded, could maintain the militia or citizen-soldier model of the military.

Another martial state admired by many modern commentators as a model for today's military forces is Rome. Starting off as imitators of the Greek warrior tradition of the citizen militia, the Roman military evolved into a professional force after losing hundreds of thousands of its citizens in the Punic Wars against Carthage. The genius of Rome, according to O'Connell, was to share its citizenship with those it had conquered, if they could earn it, by serving the Roman state. This treatment of the conquered produced a pool of manpower that the Romans used to create a long-service regular army. The professionalization of the Roman legions also depended upon incessant training and combat where they developed the expertise and corporateness that would be recognized by professional soldiers today. This was made possible by heavy investment in an army where recruitment was highly selective, "pay was good, and medical treatment, housing and hygiene were on a level not again exceeded until the 19th century, if then." Just as important, soldiers were motivated by the reward of full Roman citizenship and land after their service. As successful as this system was in the creation of the Roman Empire, Rome's military disintegration in the 4th century can be partially explained by a lack of financial and manpower resources in the Empire to maintain such large and expensive regular forces in the field.⁹¹

The antithesis of the modern professional military with Roman attributes is found in a type of fighting that profoundly transformed warfare around the end of the 7th century BC. According to Keegan, the rise of horse people, known as the Scythians, from Central Asia was one of most significant events in military history because it introduced a type of warfare antithetical to the Western Homeric view of war as an honourable contest between roughly equal adversaries. The Scythians were harbingers of a repetitive cycle of raiding and conquest that was to afflict what Keegan describes as the outer edge of civilization (the Middle East, India, China, and Eastern Europe) for 2000 years. Territoriality as it was understood in Europe was foreign to the horse people. War, for them, was the process by which they won wealth to sustain an unchanging way of life, and the horse and human ruthlessness together transformed war making for the first time into "a thing in itself." We can thenceforth speak of militarism, Keegan argues, as an aspect of societies in which the mere ability to make war, readily and profitably, became a reason in itself for doing so.⁹² The modern analogue to the Scythians may be found in various "rogue" states, such as Iraq, North Korea, Libya and various "militias" in the Third World, as well as some terrorist groups, "liberation armies" and drug cartels.

The lesson that might be taken for modern military professionals from some ancient armies is that there are advantages and disadvantages to every way of organizing war fighting in a society.

⁹⁰ O'Connell, *Of Arms and Men*, 54, 57.

⁹¹ O'Connell, *Of Arms and Men*, 77-9, 80-2.

⁹² Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, 177-81.

Enthusiastic amateur citizen soldiers, drawn from the classes that most strongly supported the state, as with the Greeks, can only provide relatively small numbers of efficient fighters. When the Romans expanded their citizen armies to fight the invading Hannibal, they were routed by more proficient fighters. Yet, as the Roman Army became more professional it became more isolated from civil society, with the Praetorian Guard eventually supplanting the Senate in the selection of Emperors. This large professional military apparatus eventually bankrupted the Roman Empire and its forces, diluted by foreign auxiliaries of dubious quality, degenerated into a force that was unable to protect the Empire from its enemies.

Since pre-modern societies were vastly different from modern states with really no conception of professions in today's sense, it is difficult to categorize even regular soldiers of the pre-modern period as professionals. Some ancient warriors were regular soldiers whose full time occupation was bearing arms; they were also clearly expert in their field and would have some sort of corporate body. However, not all of these warriors embraced the principle of serving a state or the public good. Their loyalty was often to individual leaders and they were motivated largely by self-interest. While not professionals in the classic sense, there may be some parallels to today's "expert" professionals, simply doing their job for whoever paid them rather than as a social trustee rendering self-sacrificial service to country⁹³

Many modern concepts about the nature of armed forces and which model provides the best service to society have their origins in the Renaissance. The Italian writer and political functionary Machiavelli introduced the modern era in the development of political thought, especially in the domain of the relationship between armed forces and society. He was one of the first to recognize the link between changes in military organization and the revolutionary developments in the social and political sphere in his time. He advocated a citizen's conscript army as the basis of a republic to minimize the influence of elites and to overcome the unreliability of mercenary bands hired by the state. This concept was different from the Greek city-states' citizen army where service was voluntary and based on the ability to afford the arms and equipment necessary to be a member of the military force. Machiavelli's fundamental thesis was that military forces must be composed of inhabitants of the state the army was expected to defend because patriotic enthusiasm could only be expected of an army composed of men fighting for their native land. In addition, the defence of the state was not a task that should be assigned to a special, privileged group, but it should be the concern of all those living in the same society. Machiavelli went on to assert that because the life of the state depends on the excellence of the army, political institutions must be organized to create favourable preconditions for military organization.⁹⁴

Machiavelli's idea of a citizen conscript army as the bulwark of a republic still finds favour in many segments of American society today. Adherents to this point of view claim that citizens

⁹³ Burk, "Expertise...", 17.

⁹⁴ See Felix Gilbert, "Machiavelli," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), 11-31, for a detailed explanation of Machiavelli's views.

owe an obligation of military service to the republic in return for the freedoms and other benefits they receive from it.⁹⁵ Like Machiavelli, who believed that the classical (Greek and Roman) world was a “perfect” model upon which to build new European states, a number of American commentators today employ the Greek city-states and the Roman republic as the epitome of the republican form of government. The martial successes of the Greeks and Romans are offered as examples of how the citizens’ army was superior to any other; however, the eventual collapse of the Greek and Roman Empires was usually overlooked by Renaissance writers and their imitators today. O’Connell also argues that Machiavelli missed the significance of firearms entirely on the way war was waged and by whom.

At the end of the 15th century the convergence of technology and capitalism created a flourishing European small arms industry that supplied a growing demand for these weapons by mercenaries. Firearms were particularly well suited to the mercenary mentality, because they reduced the need for hand-to-hand combat and its attendant risks to life and limb. A similar situation occurred in the development of artillery. Until the end of the 16th century artillerists provided their highly specialized services for armies not as soldiers but members of a guild, disdainful of military discipline and jealously guarding their craft’s secrets. It is no coincidence, O’Connell says, that Italian word for mercenary, *condottiere*, meant literally “contractors” and that mercenary bands were known as “companies,” for they were corporate entities dedicated to making a profit. But history has shown that rampant capitalism and war did not mix well.⁹⁶ Examples of present day armies like Indonesia and China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) confirm this lesson. And even though there is evidence that the PLA’s officer corps is becoming more professionalized based on an increase of expertise there are serious obstacles to increased professionalization. The PLA’s “expanding participation in the economy, both legal and illegal,” and “widespread corruption” within its ranks is eroding the ethic of professionalism in the Chinese officer corps.⁹⁷ While the older style of a mercenary army still exists in various forms today, at the end of the 15th century a new way of organizing for war, the precursor of today’s armed forces, appeared as weapons, societies and armed forces changed.

The era of modern armies began with Charles VII’s invasion of Italy in 1494 because for the first time in modern history a large permanent army (of 30,000) was raised based on regular pay from the royal treasury and commanded by office-holders (*officiers*) appointed by the ruler. However, it was Maurice of Nassau who was the “father of modern military organization.” He introduced the concept of “officership” stressing education in military art and science over a reliance on “knightly virtues,” the beginning of the modern military profession. Gustavus Adolphus carried Maurician-style reforms a quantum leap farther in scale and scope. He built on

⁹⁵ See for example, Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Military Ethos and ‘Don’t ask, Don’t tell.’” *The Providence Journal* (31 December 1999), <http://www.projo.com/report/pjb/stories/02989651.htm>.

⁹⁶ O’Connell, *Of Arms and Men*, 111-13, 144.

⁹⁷ James C. Mulvenon, *Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), 69-75.

the foundation of a national conscript force to create a long-service army of career soldiers paid from a central treasury, led by an educated regular officer corps, and imbued with rigorous discipline. In the 18th century, European armies rediscovered, from their Roman models, the importance of good administration to the effectiveness of their armies. This provided the basic underpinnings of discipline, regular pay, food, and supplies that characterized the operations of most European field armies during the dynastic wars of that century. In turn, good administration formed the foundation for the development of educated regular officers, promotion by merit instead of class, and the idea selfless service to the state. Good administration also allowed armies to improve the care of their troops, resulting in the improved cohesion, self-confidence, a disciplined ruthlessness and iron will that more than gunpowder shattered the warrior concept of battle. These developments, not technology, Jack English contends, were the most important military innovations imposed by the rulers of those societies on their military forces in the early evolution of modern European armies.⁹⁸

In the history of warfare, officers have possessed many of the characteristics of professionals as described in the modern literature. At least until the end of the Napoleonic wars, their expertise, jurisdiction and legitimacy in the field of war was virtually undisputed. And their cohesion as a corporate body was acknowledged as European officers were recognized as members of an international corps transcending national boundaries. However, they would not qualify as a profession in Burk's definition because they did not always belong to a high status occupation and the amount of abstract knowledge they applied was small compared to their practical knowledge. This changed at the end of the 19th century when the art of war became much more abstract as disciplines such as administration, logistics, not to mention the technical aspects of military engineering and ordnance, assumed vital roles in warfare. While it is true that ancient warriors like Alexander the Great depended on logistics and the technology of siege engines, the Industrial Revolution and the social revolutions of the late 18th and early 19th centuries transformed war beyond Alexander's comprehension. At the same time the rise of the professions in civil society gave new impetus for the officer corps to emulate their colleagues of equal social status in the professions in order to maintain their place in a changing world. In fact officer corps of absolutist monarchies and Napoleon have been described as the best example of how expertise could be organized differently from the guild model that prevailed until the 19th century. For example, Napoleon used two elite schools for state engineers, Ecole Polytechnique and Ponts et Chaussées, to bestow security and instant authority upon its graduates who acted as agents of the state. His legacy survives to this day in France and has some parallels with the role of Canada's RMC in our society.⁹⁹

The Military as a Profession in the Modern World

The real beginnings of military professionalism, as we understand it today, are to be found in the 19th century. Although its roots run deeper into the past, the growth of a distinct military

⁹⁸ See John A. English, *Marching Through Chaos: The Descent of Armies in Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 29-48 for a detailed description of this process.

⁹⁹ Larson, "In the Matter of Experts and Professionals..." 27.

profession in the modern sense occurred at the same time as the growth of other professions at the end of the 19th century. During that era the profession of arms was one of many new professions that emerged in Western societies. For example, Cooper found that in the US military in the late 19th century the hierarchical and bureaucratic structure of the army “and efforts within the institution to emphasize professional specialization resembled similar developments in” the civilian world.¹⁰⁰ The idea that war fighting required a specialized body of knowledge or theories is relatively new, dating from the late 18th century, but it is now almost universally accepted.¹⁰¹ Like the other new professions, it sought to make its expertise "scientific" and the exclusive preserve of practitioners of the profession - the military officer.¹⁰²

The introduction of widespread conscription in Continental Europe at the end of the 19th century made the armies of these countries into the “symbol of the nation” for the first time, and they played an increasingly important role in “the rituals of popular nationalism.” This phenomenon gave the profession of arms greater prestige in its drive to gain recognition and legitimacy as a high status occupation. Over the past 100 or so years, the status of the military profession has varied, reaching an apogee in 19th and early 20th century Germany¹⁰³ and reaching one of its nadirs in the post-Vietnam War US Army.

One of the most important forces for professionalization in 19th century armies was what Jack English called the “greatest military innovation” of that era - “the organizational institution of the general staff.” Originally devised to help commanders control armies that had grown too big for even geniuses like Napoleon to direct individually, the general staff system also enabled armies to study war using analytical and critical techniques found in other professions. Institutions of higher learning, like Germany’s *Kriegsakademie* and its sister war colleges which were eventually emulated in all other major Western nations, began a tradition of professional military education that gave armies the schools they needed to make their expertise "scientific" and the exclusive jurisdiction of practitioners of the profession of arms - the military officer.¹⁰⁴

Despite these characteristic marks of a profession, as Burk has noted, scholars in the first half 20th century usually excluded the military in their studies of the professions. Some Anglo-American scholars justified this lacuna explicitly with the following rationalization. Unless the expertise claimed by a particular occupation was actually applied, that occupation was not counted as a profession, and since it was hoped that the service the military was trained to render to society would never be performed, it could not be numbered among the professions. Others

¹⁰⁰ Coffman, “The Long Shadow of *The Soldier and the State*,” 76.

¹⁰¹ David Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada’s Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1996), 32-3.

¹⁰² Shy, “Jomini,” in Paret, 160.

¹⁰³ Wilson, “For a Socio-Historical Approach...,” 540-1.

¹⁰⁴ John A. English, *Marching Through Chaos*, 50-1; and John Shy, “Jomini,” in Paret, 160.

said that the military was not a profession because it was controlled by the state, and, therefore lacked professional autonomy. This view would have seemed quite strange to Continental sociologists, as we have seen. And even if the American public considered the military as a profession, although not a high status one (below school teacher), this public consensus was unnoticed by most social scientists. Burk concludes that the rejection of the military as a valid area for study of the professions tells us more about the “social thought” of certain academics at any given time than about the military as a profession.¹⁰⁵

Large scale social science studies of the American military began after the Second World War because, for the first time in its history, the US maintained a substantial standing military force in peace. This raised new questions about civil-military relations in the US, particularly how to control this potential threat to the republic, which many thought could only be done by ensuring a professional military, that, based on the accepted model of professions of that time, would subordinate its self-interest to serve society as other professions did.¹⁰⁶ Two scholars, Huntington and Janowitz, have come to dominate American thinking about the military profession in the US, and by extension much of the Western world. One of the main reasons for their influence was that they were the first to examine the professional aspect of the military in some detail, using prevailing social science theories.

Until fairly recently, Huntington’s concepts of the military have provided the foundation for much of the debate within the US military community and those academics closely associated with it. For example Snider et al. use Huntington’s concepts of expertise, service to society (responsibility), and corporateness in portraying the American officer corps as the leaders of the profession who are responsible for creating a consensus about “what it means to be an officer” today based on their mastery of a profession that is committed to serve the nation.¹⁰⁷ They diverge from Huntington’s model of the military officer as a disinterested professional in the service of the state, however, when they argue that “military institutions retain their legitimacy and standing as a profession only by their successful interaction” in society’s political processes. They contend that, since “after three decades without conscription,” few Americans really understand their military, it is the duty of senior officers to engage in the political process to publicly articulate the military’s ethos and needs.¹⁰⁸

Sarkesian and O’Connor give book length treatment to this idea that “the concept of military professionalism must be philosophically broadened...to encompass a more prominent political dimension.” But they still accept many of Huntington’s basic premises, arguing that “the military

¹⁰⁵ Burk, “Expertise...,” 11-12.

¹⁰⁶ Burk, “Expertise...,” 10-11.

¹⁰⁷ Don M. Snider, et al., *Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 9, 28, 35, 37, 39.

¹⁰⁸ Snider, et al., *Army Professionalism...*, 13-14.

profession and the officer corps [are] virtually synonymous.” Their six characteristics of the military profession are rooted firmly in Huntington’s expertise, responsibility, and corporateness trilogy. Acknowledging that the work of Huntington and Janowitz “still provide fundamental themes of military professionalism,” they offer some elaborations to those basic themes.¹⁰⁹ Noting that Huntington “reiterated his major themes” 31 years after the publication of *The Soldier and the State*, they describe his model of a politically neutral military, isolated from society and focussed on its prime *raison d’etre* (victory in war) as the “traditional approach to military professionalism.” Janowitz’s sociological approach, focussing on “attitudes and values, the political-social system within the military, the socioeconomic characteristics of military professionals, and the impact these have on military professionalism,” is characterized by the “‘absolutist-pragmatist’ categories and the constabulary view of military professionalism,” according to Sarkesian and O’Connor. They observe, however, that Janowitz advocated maintaining some distance between the military and civil society, but that this distance was smaller than the one suggested by Huntington.

The next major theoretical addition to the field of military professionalism was made by Charles Moskos, like Janowitz a sociologist, who added the perspective of the military profession as a “calling” (or vocation) versus an occupation (or job) to the debate. His vocational perspective was based on his view of military service as something more than just a job. Moskos began to argue in the late 1970s that both perspectives could be found in the US military but that “the military profession was moving away from its traditional institutional principles of social organization to embrace occupational or market-based principles of organization.”¹¹⁰ More recent sociological studies have found that the Canadian military may be even more occupationally oriented than the US military and that Canada may be leading a more general trend among Western militaries.¹¹¹

Yet parts of the American approach to military professionalism, as summarized above, appear contradictory. On one hand, frequent appeals are made to what “the Founding Fathers” intended the republic to be like. As Sarkesian and O’Connor put it, “The suspicion of large standing armies is deeply rooted in the American psyche.”¹¹² And Peter Maslowski reminds us that many so-called military virtues are, in fact, antithetical to the characteristic values of American society as espoused by the founders of the American republic. He quotes Samuel Adams to argue that “maxims and rules of the army, are essentially different from the genius of a free people, and the

¹⁰⁹ Sarkesian and Connor, *The US Military into the Twenty-First Century*, ix-xi, 19, 21, 24.

¹¹⁰ Sarkesian and Connor, *The US Military into the Twenty-First Century*, 24-5. Quote from Burk, “Expertise...,” 17.

¹¹¹ J. Soeters and R. Recht, “Culture and Discipline in Military Academies: An International Comparison,” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 26, no. 2 (Winter 1998), 169-89.

¹¹² Sarkesian and Connor, *The US Military into the Twenty-First Century*, ix.

laws of a free government.”¹¹³ Yet, the post-Second World War generation of American commentators, who grew up with the draft, extol the virtues of conscription in ways that “the Founding Fathers” would have found very difficult to understand. An early essay in the post-Vietnam debate on the role of the American military in society by Donald Atwell Zoll is representative of this view of the role of the military profession in American society, taking the position that military service is “the ultimate manifestation of citizenship.” He goes on to liken the American military to a reservoir of national values that, even if “neglected by the country,” may at some time in the future be drawn upon to reinvigorate an American national culture in “moral disarray.” Zoll claimed that by the early 1980s American culture no longer had a pervasive ethical base to provide the social cohesion necessary “to preserve society from the encroachment of militant, volatile, and anti-civilized alien creeds.” Blaming “rampant pluralism,”¹¹⁴ he declared that too many contending belief systems had undermined the “stable core of elemental philosophical agreement” that Americans had once possessed and therefore its moral consensus was evaporating. Zoll’s explanation of the decline of post-Vietnam American national culture has been echoed by many writers since.¹¹⁵ This view is challenged by those like Maslowski who claim that by the early 19th century that the characteristic values of American society were well established, and that society was capitalistic, unrestrained, and individualistic, where civilians pursued happiness through the accumulation of private wealth. These are the true values of entrepreneurial America, according to these commentators.¹¹⁶ Despite their differences, a common theme running through this debate is that the nature of American, and therefore Western (if not global), society is changing profoundly. This change has important implications for the nature of military professionalism.

¹¹³ Peter Maslowski, “Army Values and American Values,” *Military Review* 70, no. 4 (April 1990), 11.

¹¹⁴ The *Oxford English Dictionary*, 6th ed. (1980), 850, defines pluralism as a “form of society in which members of minority groups maintain independent traditions.”

¹¹⁵ Donald A. Zoll, “A Crisis in Self-Image: The Role of the Military in American Culture,” *Parameters* 12, no. 4 (December 1982), 27, 31. See for example, William S. Lind, et al. in Ricks, “On American Soil,” np.

¹¹⁶ Maslowski, “Army Values and American Values,” 12-14.

Burk is one of the first writers to offer a fundamental departure from the work of Huntington and Janowitz based on concepts of changes in the nature of professionalism in this century. He claims that Huntington's presumption that there is a clearly delineated military sphere of activity "independent of the social and political sphere is dubious at best," because there "is no real distinction between the ends and means of war." Burk declares that "Huntington's confidence in the value of military professionalism is uncritical" because he "ignores the possibility that professionals," like any group may act in ways contrary to the "public good."¹¹⁷ Two comments seem apropos here. First of all, Burk's assumption that there is a clearly identified "public good" mirrors Huntington's "uncritical" view of military professionalism. Secondly, given the time Huntington wrote *The Soldier and the State*, the assumptions he made about professions and society should not surprise us.

Next Burk turns his attention to Janowitz. He claims that Janowitz's model is more helpful than Huntington's because "it anticipates change in the character of the military profession," which Huntington's model did not. Burk tells us that Janowitz recognized the need to change practice in the profession of arms to adapt to the changing nature of war, but that he did not fully explore how this change would engender conflict both within and outside the military for control of professional jurisdiction. He also criticizes Janowitz for not thoroughly exploring the tensions between the "bureaucratic and professional cultures" found in the military. More seriously, according to Burk, Janowitz failed to resolve the problems his theory poses for military professionalism due to the increasingly blurred boundaries between military and political spheres in modern conflict. Burk wonders how the military profession can be reformed to ensure that its expertise is applied in the service of state because in "a constabulary force, military officers were inevitably 'politicized' as they prepared for their new roles..."¹¹⁸ Two issues stand out in Burk's criticism of Janowitz at this point. First, Burk's use of the "bureaucratic and professional cultures" dichotomy harks back to the "first round" of sociological enquiry into the professions described above and may not be appropriate for professions in the 21st century. Second, his assertion that military officers are "inevitably 'politicized'" by training for a constabulary role has certainly not been the Canadian experience, as we shall see. And even in the US there is evidence that the "politicization" of the American officer corps began in the late 20th century, but well before the American military began to be involved in constabulary actions on any significant scale.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Burk, "Expertise...", 14.

¹¹⁸ Burk, "Expertise...", 15.

¹¹⁹ The Triangle Institute for Security Studies project on the gap between the military and civilian society has described an increased politicization of the American officer corps as 67% of officers identify themselves as Republicans and 22% as Independents, compared to Janowitz's 1954 survey of Pentagon staff officers, which found that just over 20% of this group identified themselves as conservative. Ricks, "On American Soil," np.

Huntington's and Janowitz's models were based "in part on the logic of the functionalist theory of professions that prevailed at mid-century" where, as we have seen, professionals were seen as social trustees who applied their expertise "competently, objectively, and impartially to meet the needs of the client and improve public welfare." The revisionist model of the professions that began to prevail among sociologists in the 1960s and 1970s, which viewed professions as interest groups competing with other interest groups in society for resources and prestige, was the next to impact on the work of military sociologists. Burk contends that many theoretical approaches to the development of the military profession are now used. He argues that today the military profession is like any other "expert" profession that is simply doing its job for some "organized authority" rather than acting as a social trustee profession "rendering self-sacrificial service to the country."¹²⁰ Snider et al. concur with Burk's assessment, but offer a return to the older models of professional service, as we have seen, to counter this trend.

Burk hypothesizes that the military as a profession gained strength from the late 19th century until about the middle of the 20th century, and that from the 1950s on it has decreased in strength. He attributes the strengthening of the profession of arms to a convergence of expertise, jurisdiction and legitimacy and its weakening to an "unraveling of these factors."¹²¹

The story of the increase in the power of the profession of arms is fairly well known as the military followed the example of civilian occupations struggling for power during the rise of professionalism in the US at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. As science became accepted as the principal "source of reliable knowledge about the world" the military emphasized the scientific aspects of its vocation by establishing professional journals, building a professional military education system capped by degree granting war colleges, and sending an increasing number of officers to pursue post-graduate education in what Burk claims were "fields ancillary to or supportive of military science." By the end of the 20th century, Burk tells us that the US "Army's claim to expert knowledge in the management of violence, certified by science, was a foundation for its professional identity."¹²² However, this viewpoint has been challenged by a leading US Air Force (USAF) educator, who discovered that the vast majority of post-graduate degrees held by USAF officers were in business-related fields and had only "tangential relationships to the art of war." While more research needs to be done to confirm that these figures apply to the American officer corps in general, it should not be surprising to find this behaviour in an officer corps with fairly ruthless "up or out" career policies that motivate officers to be prepared for a second career outside the military at any time during their service.¹²³

¹²⁰ Burk, "Expertise...", 16-17.

¹²¹ Burk, "Expertise...", 17.

¹²² Burk, "Expertise...", 17-20.

¹²³ Dennis M. Drew, "Educating Air Force officers: Observations after 20 years at Air University," *Airpower Journal* 11, no. 2 (Summer 1997) [citations from online version at <<http://132.60.140.12/airchronicles/apj/sum97/sum97.html>>], 3. See Allan English, "Putting the

Burk sees the American military's hard won professionalism unravelling after the Second World War with technology and competition among the services "homogenizing" war by "undermining the clear connection of the three major services with a particular environment of warfare," thereby creating "an impetus for 'joint' military operations." Another key factor was, with the rise of weapons of mass destruction, a view that war was too serious a business to be left to the generals, and that the field of national security, which was populated by a number of other professions, was now impinging on what had been almost a uniquely military jurisdiction. Furthermore, as "new techniques of rational planning" were introduced within the US Department of Defense the claims of Army and other service professionals to jurisdiction in the arena of national security based on professional military judgement or expertise were eroded.¹²⁴

While Burk's theories may be appealing to Canadians studying military professionalism, because his evidence comes only from the US military, his conclusions can really only be applied to it. Burk's hypothesis that the military profession has weakened because war has changed rests on at least one assumption that is contradicted by the Canadian example. He claims that "the military does not possess same level of abstract knowledge about how to conduct peacekeeping missions...than it has for waging war."¹²⁵ This is consistent with opinions voiced by other American commentators who believe that too much peacekeeping has weakened US Army combat skills. Yet the Canadian Army has clearly demonstrated that it does have a level of abstract knowledge second to none about peacekeeping operations. And that peacekeeping duties have not dulled its combat skills, if reports from the recent fighting in Afghanistan are accurate.¹²⁶ In fact Burk's description of "peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions" as "multi-professional workplace" for the US Army¹²⁷ resonates in this country. One could argue that the expertise to work across professional boundaries and a respect for the capacity of others is one professional attribute that the Canadian Army already possesses.

Unlike those writers who see a return to older models of professional service as the way to deal with change in the profession of arms, Burk looks to the future. He identifies the "public's declining confidence in science as a reliable form of practical knowledge" as a key challenge for all science-based professions. To deal with this phenomenon he argues that "military

'Professional' Back in Military Education," *Vanguard* issue 4 (1999), 10-12, for a discussion of these issues in a Canadian context.

¹²⁴ Burk, "Expertise...", 20-2.

¹²⁵ Burk, "Expertise...", 25-6.

¹²⁶ Five Canadian snipers were recently recommended for Bronze Stars by the US Army because of their outstanding performance on operations. "The splendid quality of the Canadian snipers has been acknowledged for weeks and was documented in prominent newspaper photographs and stories." See "Shooting Stars," *National Post* (24 April 2002), <http://www.NationalPost.com/commentary/story.html?f=/stories/20020424/15115.html>.

¹²⁷ Burk, "Expertise...", 28.

professionals today must work harder to define and defend the domain within which they work and to overcome public skepticism about the value of their expertise.”¹²⁸ While this approach in some respects is based on the old paradigm of professions, his next proposition is more radical.

A new challenge to the more traditional professions, including the profession of arms, is the rise of what Burk calls “expert” professions that “only serve the interests of organizational authorities and market forces.” He says that “the market itself” has become the new competitor to science as society’s yardstick for judging what is “true, objective and useful knowledge,” with those professionals who can cloak their expertise in a marketable form, like economists and clinical psychologists, rising to the top. Asserting that the “triumph of market cannot be ignored because it arises from society itself,” Burk advocates the adoption of “the language of the market” by the profession of arms to enhance its professional legitimacy. He acknowledges that because the triumph of the market is not complete, this language may not always be appropriate, and in these cases the “military should patiently explain both to itself and to the public why that language is sometimes inappropriate and why we might sometimes want to act on alternate forms of knowledge to pursue a social good.”¹²⁹

However, the use of market-based language poses significant risks for Western militaries. It could be argued that this will induce a materialist ethos into these armed forces, and, as we have seen, this ethos has had a corrupting effect on some modern Asian armed forces. They are not effective fighting forces, in the Western sense, because a generation or more of military officers, sometimes assuming the guise of warlords, has had self-enrichment as their primary mission. Neither can these organizations be seen as professional military forces because the principles of self-interest and the principles of self-sacrifice are not compatible, and the business ethos can have a corrosive effect on military organizations. However, in Asia, the warlord is a businessman who uses military force as a means of enterprise and who combines the military mission with the doctrine of self-enrichment. Warlords arise when the central regime loses credibility, and power devolves to regional forces. Since the military is the most organized social force, it naturally fills any power vacuum. Some Asian societies, particularly Indonesia and China are particularly vulnerable to this threat.¹³⁰

The Indonesian case is instructive. During the 32-year rule of President Suharto, there was little distinction between the government and the military. As a former general and one who believed that the army’s role in Indonesia’s struggle for independence entitled it to special privileges, Suharto appointed military officers as “cabinet ministers, supreme court judges, governors, and directors of state-owned companies.” Military officers were involved in every level of government from the highest offices to village administration. Suharto’s successor, President Wahid, declared that “The military has been politicized, not to serve the state and the people, but

¹²⁸ Burk, “Expertise...,” 3, 28.

¹²⁹ Burk, “Expertise...,” 29-32.

¹³⁰ “Business has a Corrosive Effect on any Military Organisation,” *Defence Systems Daily* (7 September 1999) <http://defence-data.com/current/page5191.htm>.

to serve the power-holders...The military has been used by individuals to further their own interests and this must stop.” Currently the Indonesian military depends on private ventures to supply about 75 percent of the defence budget. Interestingly, the smaller, less politically connected Indonesian navy and air force are more “professional” in the Western sense of the word and more committed to reform in the armed forces than the army.¹³¹

The Canadian analogy to this situation is arguably less dramatic but the introduction of a business ethos in the Department of National Defence (DND) has had a negative impact on the profession of arms in Canada. The influence of management-based reforms on the CF over the past four decades has been severely criticized because their underlying measure of effectiveness - efficiency - is essentially incompatible with military, and most other public service, organizations. Even in the private sector some of these processes, particularly re-engineering, have not met the expectations of their proponents. And leading management theorists have now realized, as the Glassco Commission did 40 years ago, that attempting to apply “the business style of management” to government organizations is counterproductive because it “creates the wrong priorities.” That is not to say that certain management tools, like business planning, cannot be used in the military, but that they are not useful as guiding principles for change.

Another critical impact of the imposition of management theories and procedures, such as business planning, on virtually every aspect of the CF has been their detrimental effect on morale. This is not to suggest that management tools and practices have no place in the CF - they do. But when management tools and practices dominate the organization they have a detrimental effect on the profession of arms. Having the capability to engage in combat is not a business activity, and in many ways it requires measures of effectiveness fundamentally different from “efficiency” as defined by the marketplace.¹³²

The use of a market-based ethos has also been challenged by other professionals. Hamilton argues that the essence of the original learned professions, ministry, law, medicine and the professoriate was to contribute to society’s well being through the cultivation of reason and the creation and dissemination of knowledge. This implied establishing a transformational, not just a transactional, relationship with its clients because the economic model of measuring the “efficiency” of professional activities underlying the transactional model would undermine the ethical foundations of the professions.¹³³ This has a particular resonance in a military context, for as we have seen, mercenaries are rarely willing to die for a transactional payment of money. Moreover,

¹³¹ Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Indonesian Military Wages Battle of Wills,” *Washington Post Online* (5 November 2000), A33.

¹³² For a detailed analysis of these issues see G.E. (Joe) Sharpe and Allan English, “Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War Command and Control in the Canadian Forces,” report prepared for the DCDS Group, NDHQ, 28 June 2001, (Winnipeg, MB: Canadian Forces Training Material Production Centre, 2002), especially 23-4.

¹³³ Hamilton, “The Academic Profession’s Leadership Role in Shared Governance,” 1, 2 of 6.

many serving and former military officers still see the “concept of service,” in the sense of providing a useful and necessary function for society, as “central” to the profession of arms.¹³⁴

Burk’s views seem to be based on the widely-held assumption that American market-based values are universally held in the global village. But Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations* offers another view of the future world. He concedes that small, highly educated but insulated transnational elites might exhibit some sort of “global culture,” but that for the majority of the world’s population local “culture consciousness is getting stronger not weaker” and that this culture consciousness will be the source of much future conflict. Just because “the world is modernizing does not mean it is Westernizing.”¹³⁵ This offers a counterpoint to much of the writing on the military profession today. American commentators, as exemplified by Burk, use the American experience to generalize about the profession of arms when there is a great deal of evidence to show that its characteristics will vary from place to place as well as from time to time. While some theoretical constructs may be transferable, others will not be.

The Profession of Arms in Canada

Similar to many Western armed forces the CF leadership believes that some of its members, particularly the officers, practice a profession, and therefore they promote the idea that a military career is not just a job, but a vocation or a way of life. Members of the CF are expected to possess military virtues and to rely on them to perform beyond what is expected of those in civil society. Some in Canada believe that the CF should serve “as a symbol of all that is best in the national character.” However, the Somalia Commission concluded that military professionalism in Canada has been undermined by “a shift toward ‘civilianization.’” This has resulted in the infusion of occupational, versus the traditional vocational, values in the CF. The influence of technology, which has forced increased specialization and civilian skills onto Western armed services, plus the reorganization of the CF in the 1960s and 1970s, have exacerbated this trend. The Somalia Commission, citing Cotton, argued that “military service as a calling or vocation, made legitimate by broadly based national values, had given way to” a perception that those in the military were performing civilian type jobs for rewards specified under contracts often seen in the business sector. This has led to reduced standards of accountability among senior officers, who are now unwilling to accept responsibility when things go wrong in their command.¹³⁶

One of Canada’s leading military historians, Stephen Harris, has analyzed the Canadian military in terms of Huntington’s professional characteristics of expertise, corporateness, and responsibility. Focussing on the period 1860-1939, he concluded that the Canadian permanent force “had little in common with the professional armies emerging in Europe, in the United

¹³⁴ Snider et al., *Army Professionalism...*, 39.

¹³⁵ Kaplan, “Looking the World in the Eye,” 70, 81.

¹³⁶ Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia [hereafter Somalia Commission], *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1997), Vol. 1, 81-2.

Kingdom, and in the United States.” Lacking a professional infrastructure and with commissions often bestowed for political patronage rather than merit, the Canadian military was bereft of most of the basic prerequisites to form a professional body. And unlike Huntington’s portrayal of an isolated American officer corps, the Canadian officer of the period Harris describes was predominantly a civilian in uniform serving in the part-time citizen militia - amateurs in the true sense of the word. Even in the two great wars of the 20th century, the vast majority of Canadian officers were civilians in uniform “for the duration only” of hostilities. However, these amateur soldiers acquitted themselves well compared to their regular force colleagues, who, Harris argues, lacked professional competence. This lack of professional competence was demonstrated in the Second World War by the fact that the performance of regular force officers in command of brigades and other higher formations was often worse than that of their amateur “for the duration only” colleagues. The Cold War ushered in a period where, for the first time in Canadian history, regular force officers dominated the military establishment. This led to the introduction of “the trappings of professionalism,” such as the principle of merit for promotion and “a formal system of professional military education.” But even as the military became more professional in many ways after Second World War, with its own permanent Staff Colleges and a National Defence College, Harris argues that the unification of the CF in 1968 caused “the armed forces’ status as a distinct profession” to disappear. With what he characterizes as decisions of a professional nature, such as equipment procurement, now being made by civilian bureaucrats on the basis of regional economic benefits and not military merit, he contends that Canadian military professionalism has been gravely eroded. Harris concludes that maintaining a professional military in Canada will always be difficult because of society’s indifference to the military, Canada’s geographic isolation, its small population and its dependence on the great powers “as a defender of last resort.”¹³⁷

Another major civilianizing effect on the CF is ironically its only military college, RMC, which is the preferred entry level school for officers for the profession of arms in Canada. A key role of professional schools is to teach the latest professional knowledge and to engage in “research and scholarship designed to codify what is already know” as well as extend the boundaries of professional knowledge as part of the work of expanding a profession’s expertise and legitimizing its jurisdiction.¹³⁸ Yet throughout its 125 year history RMC has been primarily a school first for training military engineers and more recently for educating professional engineers. It has in effect been largely a school educating the majority of its students for a profession other than the profession of arms.¹³⁹ A review of theses and research projects at RMC recently show that while there is some shift towards topics directly related to the military profession, the majority of

¹³⁷ Stephen J. Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army 1860-1939* (Toronto, Univ. of Toronto Press, 1988), 210-1, 215-20.

¹³⁸ Freidson, *Professionalism*, 97.

¹³⁹ See Richard A. Preston, *To Serve Canada: A History of the Royal Military College Since the Second World War* (Ottawa: Univ. of Ottawa Press, 1991); and Preston, *Canada’s RMC* for a detailed account of this story.

research being done at RMC is in the field of engineering. Until RMC's primary focus becomes the profession of arms, it cannot properly be described as the CF's professional school.

This brief sketch of the Canadian military shows how different it was from Huntington's description of the American military of the same era. From the late 19th and up to the middle of the 20th century most Canadian officers were amateurs who were an integral part of society, unlike Huntington's portrayal of the isolated American professional officer at that time. In Canada, there was no equivalent of the professional renaissance that the US army experienced in this period; therefore, it can be concluded that the Canadian and American armies had very different historical formative experiences prior to the Cold War.

The Canadian Army generally followed the "this is a profession because it is suitable for gentlemen" model, articulated by Burk earlier in this paper, until the mid-20th century. RMC's concept of the military as a profession because the officer corps was populated by professional engineers had little impact on the Army until the 1950s when the regular force supplanted the militia as the main component of the Army. As late as 1952, the *Junior Officers' Guide* advised young subalterns not to be too concerned with the technical details of their occupation because it would make them look too much like tradesmen. This began to change in the late 1950s when leadership practices based on the "science of management" were introduced as a replacement for the old ideal that officers were gentlemen who instinctively knew how to lead because good leaders were born not made.¹⁴⁰ If Canadian officers were seen to be professionals in any sense up to this time it was due to their holding the same social status as their professional colleagues. However, their lack of expertise, particularly in the sense of abstract knowledge, marginalized any claims they might make for professional status. The well documented anti-intellectualism, which persists to this day in some quarters of the CF, of many officers precluded them from joining the ranks of the professionals until increased educational standards permitted them to raise their occupation's status by acquiring expertise based on education in abstract knowledge.

With the creation of large regular military forces during the Cold War, the profession of arms in Canada began to resemble the professional corporate body seen in other armed forces in the Western world.¹⁴¹ And like other professions in Canada the CF started to control the "education, training, and socialization of its members" with its own institutions, including schools and colleges. There are some notable differences, nonetheless. While the CF does not have a standard ethical code, like some other professions, officers "freely enter into a moral and legal contract that imposes professional duties and standards" based on the texts of their commissions and oaths. The

¹⁴⁰ Stephen J. Harris, "Tracking Development of Canadian Leadership and Practice," presentation at Conference on Leadership in the Armies of Tomorrow and the Future 6-7 February 2002, Fort Frontenac, Kingston, ON.

¹⁴¹ Much of this section is based on the section on professionalism in English, "Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective."

Oath of Allegiance is the Canadian service person's "code of moral obligation."¹⁴² However, unlike other professions in Canadian society, the military can be called upon to ensure the very survival of the nation. In executing this function, as well as other military roles, members of the military can be called upon to lay down their lives - sometimes expressed as the concept of unlimited liability. Another distinction between the military professional and other professionals is that military leaders have the right to sacrifice the lives of their subordinates in order to achieve military objectives.

Many things have impacted upon the professionalism of the Canadian officers corps in the Cold War period. Perhaps the most significant event, according to Bland, was the fusion of the military staff of Canadian Forces Headquarters with the public service staff of the Department of National Defence in 1972 to create National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). This had a significant effect on the professionalism of the officer corps because it "blurred and then distorted the chain of command and accountability in the armed forces." The new roles that some senior officers played in NDHQ after 1972 left them confused about their true role as military professionals. Some accepted that "they had a responsibility to protect the minister and the government from criticism which is a short step to acting in a partisan political manner," Bland claims. He also argues that a consequence of this role confusion was that "civil control of the armed forces was compromised, military advice was buried in efforts to forge bureaucratic collegiality, and some officers in the headquarters lost touch with the operational and human needs of the Canadian Forces." Only recently has the Canadian public become aware of these problems, leading a number of commentators to claim that the "Erosion of the military ethos allowed a culture of personal careerism and bureaucratic self-interest to thrive" among some senior officers.¹⁴³ This has made them prone to "deep moral and legal failings," in the words of the Somalia Commissioners, leading to reduced standards of accountability among senior officers, who are now unwilling to accept responsibility when things go wrong in their command.¹⁴⁴

One of the key points to emerge from the "Somalia debacle," Oliver maintains, was "the need for an enhanced professional capacity, both within the defence department and the government more generally, to differentiate between valuable opinions" and those with little or no merit. Describing as "swirling" and "unfocussed" the post-Somalia debate on reform of the CF, Oliver claims that DND, "desperate for good press," sometimes embraced change that was not necessarily wise. He reminds us that as a profession the CF needs the capacity and confidence "to both explain the nature of the evolving profession of arms in a clear-headed, sensible way to fellow Canadians and, where necessary, the courage to defend vigorously professional prerogatives and sound

¹⁴² Somalia Commission, Vol. 1, 80, 83.

¹⁴³ Douglas L. Bland, "Canada's Officer Corps: New Times, New Ideas," Conference of Defence Associations Institute XVth Annual Seminar, 1999 - The Profession of Arms in Canada: Past, Present and Future <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/english-frame.htm>, np.

¹⁴⁴ Somalia Commission, "Executive Summary," 50, Vol. 1, 81-2.

policy against those wolves who, in sheep's clothing, would reform the profession to death."¹⁴⁵ But in the end, like it or not, military leaders in democracies must be prepared to do the bidding of a civilian leadership that often knows little about the profession of arms.¹⁴⁶

From a theoretical point of view, the officer corps has generally been identified as the group that should lead change in military organizations because officers are responsible for conceptualizing and leading change in a service culture.¹⁴⁷ In the Canadian context, the non-commissioned members (NCMs) may also belong to this group of leaders. Unlike some armed forces, Canada's senior NCMs constitute a group that makes the military a career and exhibit many of the characteristics of professionals. Bercuson describes the most senior of them in the army, the Regimental Sergeants Major, as "guardians of the regimental memory" since they often serve in one regiment throughout their careers. Because of this permanence, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are able to ensure that officers' commands are carried out. To maintain this arrangement, Bercuson endorsed a "Victorian" separation between officers and NCOs as necessary for good order and discipline to prevail in the army.¹⁴⁸ Bercuson contends that in democracies officers, as professionals, have a special responsibility to ensure that the soldiers in their charge conduct themselves in accordance with the rules, values, and customs of a democracy.¹⁴⁹ In Huntington's model NCOs have "neither the intellectual skills nor the professional responsibility of the officer." As practitioners of a trade, not a profession, they are specialists in the application, but not the management, of violence. Huntington's interpretation may be dated given both the recent advances in NCO education and the increased responsibility thrust on NCOs by decentralized operations such as peace support.¹⁵⁰ Clearly more research is required in this area.

Perhaps the greatest difference between the profession of arms in Canada and US is the difference between the *raison d'être* of military forces in each country. The CF's mission is described as: "to defend Canada and Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace and security."¹⁵¹ American commentators are virtually unanimous in asserting that its military forces exist primarily to achieve victory in war even though the military may be getting mixed messages from its political leaders that sound more like Sir John Hackett's advice that a military professional's function is the "ordered application of force in the resolution of a social

¹⁴⁵ Dean F. Oliver, "Canadian Military Professional Development: The Way Ahead?" Conference of Defence Associations Institute XVth Annual Seminar, 1999 - The Profession of Arms in Canada: Past, Present and Future <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/english-frame.htm>, np.

¹⁴⁶ Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 37.

¹⁴⁷ Charles B. Breslin, "Organizational Culture and the Military," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2000), 12.

¹⁴⁸ Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 35, 62-3.

¹⁴⁹ Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 37.

¹⁵⁰ Snider, "An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture," 24-5.

¹⁵¹ "Strategy 2020," The Defence Mission, np.

problem.”¹⁵² The American professional literature generally supports the assumption that peacekeeping and other similar missions (often referred to as Military Operations Other than War) are corroding the US Army’s “norms of professional behavior.”¹⁵³ In stark contrast to this American self-perception, the Canadian military’s expertise in United Nations peacekeeping has often been used to define its place in the world and to distinguish it from the armed forces of the US.¹⁵⁴ Peacekeeping has had an important influence on Canada’s military culture beginning with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) after the Suez crisis in 1956. Forty years later, 100,000 Canadian troops had participated in more than 30 peacekeeping (both UN and non-UN) operations. Despite widespread public support for peacekeeping,¹⁵⁵ some in the CF saw peacekeeping as a diversion from “the big show” in Germany with NATO and a drain on scarce resources, peacekeeping nevertheless became so integral to the Canadian army in the public mind that Canadians tended to forget that armies exist to fight wars.¹⁵⁶

Studying the Professions - Sociology, Political Science, and History

It is striking to observe when looking back at how the military profession has been studied in Canada in the past three decades how little has changed in the perception of the challenges facing the profession. A paper that was part of a 1971 Canadian Defence Education Establishment study of professional development in the Canadian military stated that “the world finds itself in the midst of the most intensive period of change in its history” and that the “diversity and scope of change” were “extremely difficult to comprehend.”¹⁵⁷ The statement, written over 30 years ago,

¹⁵² Sarkesian and Connor, *The US Military into the Twenty-First Century*, ix-x, 24; Hackett cited in Sarkesian and Connor, 19; and Snider et al., *Army Professionalism...*, 18.

¹⁵³ Snider et al., *Army Professionalism...*, 2, 21

¹⁵⁴ J.L. Granatstein, “The American Influence on the Canadian Military,” in B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock, eds., *Canada’s Defence* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993), 132, 134, 137.

¹⁵⁵ In 1943, 73% of Canadians supported a postwar peacekeeping force even if it meant Canadian servicemen might be killed serving in it. Cited in Alex Morrison and Suzanne M. Plain, “The Canadian UN Policy: An Historical Assessment,” in Hans-Georg Ehrhart and David G. Haglund, eds., *The “New Peacekeeping” and European Security* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), 167. Twenty years later 75% of Canadians supported Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping forces. Cited in John Paul and Jerome Lauglicht, *In Your Opinion: Leaders’ and Voters’ Attitudes on Defence and Disarmament* (Clarkson, ON: Canadian Peace Research Institute, 1963), 16. I am grateful to Jonathan Eacott of my History 876 graduate seminar for drawing these figures to my attention.

¹⁵⁶ Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 58-60.

¹⁵⁷ L. Motiuk, “The Officer Corps, the Armed Forces, and the Future,” in “Papers from Contributors to the Study of Professionalism in the Canadian Forces” Canadian Defence Education Establishments, (Ottawa, 1971). Copy in Canadian Forces College Information Resource Centre, p. K-3.

that “the lack of a clearly defined threat...[and] rapid societal and technological change” may make it difficult “to define future roles and missions” of the CF “except in a very general way” would not be out of place in current defence documents.¹⁵⁸ For example, “Strategy 2020” states that: “While Canada faces no direct conventional military threat, the world is becoming increasingly complex and unpredictable.”¹⁵⁹ And “Military Assessment 2000” declares that “[o]ne of the more striking yet difficult aspects of the past decade, has been the rapid and persistent pace of change...Such uncertainty renders the task of prescribing adequate levels and forms of military capability for the immediate and longer-term future a challenging one.”¹⁶⁰

While some studies today characterize the Cold War era as a relatively stable period for defence establishments, those living in that era saw themselves perceived change as “constant and unrelenting.”¹⁶¹ The factors they saw as contributing to the uncertainty in those times were quite similar to the ones we cite today as making our world an uncertain place in which to live. Then, as now, economics, religion, race and ethnicity were seen as “numerous,” “lasting,” and “widespread” sources of conflict whose forms would vary from urban unrest to small guerilla actions to conventional war. Even the sentiment that the chances of all-out nuclear war were remote but that it was conceivable that “tactical nuclear weapons might be used in a limited war situation” resonate today.¹⁶²

The future of the profession of arms in Canada, as perceived by those writing 30 years ago, was not too different from the future as we see it today. They predicted that the CF would have problems attracting and retaining “suitably qualified personnel for Armed Forces of future”¹⁶³ and that a “burgeoning information technology”¹⁶⁴ would change the way the CF was organized and led. Suggestions that traditional CF recruitment practices should be modified to allow for entry at levels other than lowest levels of the officer corps have been resurrected again.¹⁶⁵ And the

¹⁵⁸ L. Motiuk, “The Officer Corps, the Armed Forces, and the Future,” p. K-1.

¹⁵⁹ “Strategy for 2020,” “Introduction,” np.

¹⁶⁰ “Military Assessment 2000,” Strategic Trends- Background, Director of Defence Analysis, http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/dda/milassess/intro_e.asp, np.

¹⁶¹ L. Motiuk, “The Officer Corps, the Armed Forces, and the Future,” p. K-18.

¹⁶² L. Motiuk, “The Officer Corps, the Armed Forces, and the Future,” p. K-9. The new US “Nuclear Posture Review,” reported in the press in March 2002, provides a “comprehensive blueprint for developing and deploying” tactical nuclear weapons to be used against certain adversaries. See Michael R. Gordon, “Pentagon's New Nuclear Targets in Terror Age,” in *The International Herald Tribune Online* (11 March 2002) <http://www.iht.com/articles/50800.htm>.

¹⁶³ L. Motiuk, “The Officer Corps, the Armed Forces, and the Future,” p. K-1.

¹⁶⁴ L. Motiuk, “The Officer Corps, the Armed Forces, and the Future,” p. K-13-14.

¹⁶⁵ L. Motiuk, “The Officer Corps, the Armed Forces, and the Future,” p. K-26.

observation that it may be inappropriate for “one group of employees [to] command, while others obey” is also found in current statements about future CF leadership.¹⁶⁶

This example shows that even generations, that some today believe lived in an era of relative stability, felt overwhelmed to a certain extent by the nature and pace of change in their environment. Consequently, a key attribute for the military professionals is the ability to be comfortable with ambiguity and change rather than by trying to embrace any specific type of change personified by the various “revolutions” supposedly underway today (like the Revolutions in Military Affairs, in Business Affairs, in Strategic Affairs, *ad nauseam*).

Given the persistent nature of the challenges that face the military profession, it is somewhat disappointing to examine the ability of academic disciplines to help it meet these challenges. A recent article in the *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* argues that military sociology is lacking a core based on central issues and theory. In it, Guy Siebold argues that a core must be identified and researched so that military sociology can make a coherent contribution to the study of, among other things, military professionalism. He notes that the field of military sociology really came into prominence, at least in the US, with a series of books written about the American military by Stouffer (1949-50), Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1960) and Moskos (1970). However, Siebold argues that American sociologists have acted more in roles such as policy analysts, journalists or scholars in other disciplines or areas of sociology, which has led to the current lack of focus in military sociology.¹⁶⁷ The central theme that sociology should address in its study of the profession of arms, according to Siebold, is “a sociological theory of the military ethos – what the military profession stands for at a given time, with associated casual explanations and impacts.”¹⁶⁸ The article concludes with an appeal for research co-operation with other sub-fields of sociology and with “general sociology.”¹⁶⁹ What is missing from this analysis of the way ahead for military sociology is its neglect of inter-disciplinary co-operation. This could lead to the adoption of some dubious theories as models for coping with change in the profession of arms, as was noted earlier concerning Huntington’s apparently incorrect assumptions about the isolation of the 19th century US Army officer corps from society.

A leading American political scientist, Peter Feaver, suggests that most of the research on military professionalism, done by both political scientists and sociologists “operating within the sociological school” is not particularly relevant to his discipline. He claims that the chief focus of political science in the US is on the “institutional control” of armed forces by society in contrast to sociologists’ interest in the degree of integration of civil and military institutions. Feaver argues that the issue civilian control of armed forces is the most appropriate topic for the discipline of

¹⁶⁶ L. Motiuk, “The Officer Corps, the Armed Forces, and the Future,” p. K-18.

¹⁶⁷ Guy L. Siebold, “Core Issues and Theory in Military Sociology,” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 29, no. 1 (Summer 2001), 1-2 (online version).

¹⁶⁸ Siebold, “Core Issues and Theory in Military Sociology,” 6 (online version).

¹⁶⁹ Siebold, “Core Issues and Theory in Military Sociology,” 9 (online version).

political science to examine, and that political scientists should not focus on military professionalism as a topic of study *per se*. From this perspective, the nature of military professionalism is peripheral - one of many control mechanisms society can use to regulate the actions of its military forces. Even though Huntington, as a political scientist, dealt with some issues of civilian control, in Feaver's opinion, by overemphasizing the role of professionalism as an internal control mechanism he ignored equally important internal and external mechanisms. While some political scientists might see the study of professionalism in the military contributing to the identification of changes in "the military craft" and suitable for examining the "attitudes and perspectives" of military professionals, they believe that the excessive attention given to this dimension of the larger issues of civilian control has only served to misdirect the research effort. Feaver suggests that a new approach to studying civilian control of the military should "separate various factors that scholars have grouped together under the umbrella concept of professionalism - size and complexity of the organization, homogeneity of viewpoint, and values - and identify their independent or collinear effects on the problem of civilian control." This new suggested approach serves to highlight the fact that different disciplines frame questions related to military professionalism differently based on their research methodologies and interests. Another new approach to the study of these issues is also presented by Feaver. He suggests that any new theories should be deductively derived because Huntington's approach will continue to remain "viable as long as there is no deductively superior alternative." In fact, Feaver claims that Huntington's model will remain impervious to attack, despite "the wealth of empirical studies, many apparently disconfirming his key assertions or predictions," because of its strong deductive logical foundations. Once an equally appealing alternative model is presented Feaver believes it then may be possible to test all models against the historical record.¹⁷⁰

Feaver's views find some support among those who specialize in the discipline of history. Few in academe would quarrel with Huntington's assertion that to "think seriously" people need to reduce the apparent chaos inherent in any mass of data into "simplified pictures of reality called concepts, theories, models, paradigms."¹⁷¹ Historians would contend, however, that these simplifications must be based on facts. Too often wonderful models that seem intuitively obvious (to use a hackneyed phrase) are simply not supported by the facts. Only fairly recently have historians started to delve into aspects of military history that look at soldiers in the context of their society. What we are finding is that their beliefs, attitudes and values are not always those ascribed to them by some theoreticians, as we have seen.

As early as 1980, British historian Stephen Wilson suggested what he called a "socio-historical" approach to studying military culture. He described modern historians' work as focussed on "the causes and consequences of wars"¹⁷² while the narrative history of campaigns was left to "nonacademic specialists" catering to popular demand. Wilson argued that a proper understanding of military culture would have to be based on sound historical data because of the differences in

¹⁷⁰ Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 157, 165-7, 169-70.

¹⁷¹ Huntington cited in Kaplan, "Looking the World in the Eye," 81.

¹⁷² Alfred Vagts (1937) cited in Wilson, "For a Socio-Historical Approach...", 527.

military culture found among nations at different times in their history. For example, the French officer corps of the 1890s was much more Catholic and aristocratic than it had been in previous decades. This led to conflict with and mistrust of a largely anticlerical and bourgeois civilian elite. Wilson also points to the fact that the French Army “earned general and lasting opprobrium among the working people for its role in suppressing popular insurrection” and its employment in some civilian police functions in the 19th century. Furthermore, in France and some other European countries, different from the Anglo-American experience, police forces trace their origins to the armies of their nations, leading to some notable cultural differences that have not been fully explored.¹⁷³

Some sociologists have criticized history as a field that fragments the study of a topic into particular case studies without providing sufficient analysis or theoretical constructs to give us broader insights into topics. They advocate historical sociology as the methodology to be used in studying the professions.¹⁷⁴ On the other hand, the eminent historian, E.P. Thompson, cautions us against relying too heavily on the work of those investigating past events but not trained in historical methodology in his description of the work of someone writing a dissertation in the Department of Social Anthropology at Oxford University. The author, according to Thompson, had “little understanding of social context, few criteria for distinguishing between sound and corrupt evidence” and his examples were “a jumble of irrelevant material and contradictory interpretations.”¹⁷⁵ These comments suggest that multi-disciplinary partnerships, exploiting the strengths of various disciplines, are called for in studying topics as complex as military professionalism.

Other sociologists, while noting the tendency of historians “to study a particular profession over a specified time period” and their reluctance to conduct “inter-professional or cross-cultural comparisons,” have acknowledged the challenges that history has made to conventional sociology. In particular, they accept that generalizations derived from one study of the professions in a modern Western state cannot necessarily be applied to another state, as some sociologists are in the habit of doing. Burrage argues that both history and sociology need to work on more cross-cultural studies of the professions and that a strategic re-assessment of the professions is required.¹⁷⁶

One contribution that history can make to this endeavour is to create a solid historical database for those who are building models. Another contribution may come from those who are practicing the “new military history,” seeking to broaden the discipline’s frontiers by exploring “the military experience and the larger society,” because they are also capable of analysis that can lead to broad

¹⁷³ Wilson, “For a Socio-Historical Approach...,” 530, 536-7, 542-3.

¹⁷⁴ Collins, “Changing Concepts in the Sociology of the Professions,” 22

¹⁷⁵ E.P. Thompson, *Customs in Common* (London: Merlin Press, 1991), 407.

¹⁷⁶ Burrage, “Introduction: The Professions in Sociology and History,” 9, 20.

interpretations of the historical record that we can apply to other situations.¹⁷⁷ However, we must be very cautious about borrowing models from other countries or especially models that were built on data from outside the Canadian military culture.

The Future Evolution of the Professions - Implications for the Military

Perceptions of rapid change in society have led to a great deal of speculation about how the professions are changing and evolving. In fact the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council has allocated substantial funding to promote research into how “expansion of knowledge in all fields, the proliferation of communications technologies, and the globalization of markets for goods [and] services” are driving “new ways of thinking and taking action [that] are bringing fundamental changes to our society.”¹⁷⁸ This has direct implications for the Canadian military in two key ways. First of all the CF are composed of many different professions - traditional professions (such as law, medicine, and engineering) and what have been termed “virtual” professions (such as logistics and information management), besides the core profession of arms. Therefore, the CF need to understand not only how the core profession of arms might change, but also how change in other professions might affect their role in the CF. Very little has been published on this issue to date. Second, these professions have an influence on how the CF itself evolves and changes. For example, the effect of some professions, notably medicine and law, on the CF chain of command has been discussed elsewhere.¹⁷⁹ Consequently, the CF must understand how the change in the professions might change the way in which they influence change in the CF.

Not all the issues related to change in the professions has been adequately researched let alone published. However, some insights into these issues were revealed at a recent Queen’s University and Canadian Defence Academy Workshop on work and learning in the professions. This section is based on the some of the ideas discussed at this Workshop.¹⁸⁰

There was general consensus among workshop participants that the professions in Canada, and most of the Western world, have undergone dramatic change in the recent past. An emerging trend seems to be that the professions are no longer discrete; there are new functions and activities in the workplace that are creating new professions. Michael Bloom of the Conference Board of Canada noted that the older guild model of the professions was being challenged by new “virtual” professions. He said that the guild professions (like medicine and law) were typical of many of

¹⁷⁷ Marc Milner, “Introduction,” in Marc Milner, ed. *Canadian Military History: Selected Readings* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman), 1993, 2.

¹⁷⁸ Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, “Initiative on the New Economy,” http://www.sshrc.ca/english/programinfo/grantsguide/ine_about.html.

¹⁷⁹ Sharpe and English, “Principles for Change...,” 61-2.

¹⁸⁰ The material presented here is based on the author’s notes at the Workshop. Formal proceedings and will be published later this year.

the older service professions today. They are characterized by difficult entry, one-time competence checks, self-regulation, and a legal responsibility for the actions of their practitioners. Bloom argued that the guild professions need to change their gatekeeper or entry systems because they are not very responsive to outside change. On the other hand, the new “virtual” professions, while they are not yet clearly defined, are very good at responding to change. They create products as well as services, they have no formal accreditation process and are growing rapidly. An example of the new virtual profession is in the financial services sector. It used to be dominated by the profession described as “banking” and it was seen as a rather conservative, stable profession. This sector is now fluid and in constant flux, and there is no single profession that can claim to be providing financial services. Instead we see many different service providers with a multitude of areas of expertise from insurance to stock derivatives. The expertise in this area is resident in the individuals rather than in a database or professional literature, and because the expertise required to be successful in this field is constantly changing, those practising in this field are constantly modifying their skills and competencies to meet the needs of their clients. As recent business scandals have shown, a major challenge for the future will be how to regulate the virtual professions while accommodating their ability to provide value added and innovation to the economy. Some examples in the military are in the logistics occupation where “the revolution in business affairs” has affected how support is provided to military forces.¹⁸¹

The nature of the profession of arms has undergone many significant changes in the last 100 years, some of which have been characterized as a RMA. In fact, it could be argued that the profession of arms has exhibited some of the characteristics of virtual professions since the First World War¹⁸² and that the successful adaptation to changes in the nature of conflict by military professions requires the same innovation skills seen in today’s virtual professions. Key competencies for professionals of the future will include the ability to work effectively as teams; being able to go beyond just performing a particular job or function (the “how”) to articulating why things are done a certain way; being able to deal with information streams as opposed to discrete chunks of information; and possessing inter-cultural nimbleness, the ability to bridge culture gaps in performing professional work. The CF has identified many of these competencies and set goals to impart them to CF members in its recent statements on professional military education.¹⁸³ The challenge will be in meeting the goals.

¹⁸¹ See for example Norman Williams, "Revolution in Military Logistics," *Military Technology* 21, no. 11 (November 1997), 50-3.

¹⁸² See Michael Howard, “Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914,” in Paret, 510-26, for an account of innovation in doctrinal development in that war that refutes the myth that this was a static war in intellectual as well as geographical terms.

¹⁸³ See for example, VAdm G.L. Garnett, VCDS, “Foreward,” *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020): Strategic Guidance for the CF Officer Corps and the OPD System* dated 8 Mar 2001.

These new trends in professions suggest that perhaps we should think less about how professions are constituted as discrete entities and more about how expert knowledge is used and how it will affect society and the military profession.¹⁸⁴

Conclusions

The profession of arms is one of many professions whose nature is rapidly changing at the beginning of the 21st century. Yet scholarly attention to this transformation has been fragmented and divided by disciplinary approach. This paper has surveyed a number of approaches to studying the professions in Western society, focussing on those aspects of these approaches that are most relevant to the study of the profession of arms.

A recurring problem in the 5000 year recorded history of war has been how societies could raise and maintain armed forces that were effective, affordable and reliable. The metaphor of the triangle was used to show that a society could have one or two of the sides, for example armed forces that were effective and reliable, but not all three sides at once. Depending on their circumstances states chose different ways of organizing their military forces with each way having both advantages and disadvantages. In modern times the concept of the professional military has been used as way of ensuring that the armed forces of democratic societies are both effective and reliable. But studies of the evolution of the professions suggest that the concept of a profession changes over time based on the social, economic, and historical context we are looking at. Accordingly, there is some agreement among scholars that a profession is a discrete type of work, but there is disagreement about how to differentiate it from other kinds of work. This suggests that previous concepts of the military profession, based on older conceptual frameworks, need to be re-evaluated in the light of the latest scholarship on the subject of professions.

Before the era of modern professions at the end of the 19th century, one must be very cautious in trying to draw exact analogies with modern ideas of a profession. Nevertheless, some general comparisons can be made. The first recorded examples of what might be recognized as military professionals occurred over 4000 years ago when the Akkadian Empire field armies based on a small, expert, and cohesive warrior class supported by the state. The model most cited in the literature, however, is that of the Roman legionaries who gradually became more professionalized starting in the 3rd century BC. The fall of the Roman by the 4th century AD signalled the demise of anything resembling professional military forces until the 15th century when a number of factors, including the emergence of the nation state, government bureaucracies and technology, led to the re-emergence of armies with professional characteristics. This trend towards professionalization culminated at the end of the 19th century as the military imitated other new emerging professions, like medicine, in becoming increasingly focussed on the “scientific” aspects of its craft and on the establishment of formal institutions of professional education that were part of an increasingly rigorous program of instruction. The military profession has had its ups and downs maintaining its jurisdiction and legitimacy in the intervening 100 years, with the Americans seeing the Vietnam War as one of the low points of its military profession and

¹⁸⁴ Larson, “In the Matter of Experts and Professionals...,” 25.

Canadians exhibiting similar feelings about its profession of arms in the 1980s and 1990s, climaxing with the publication of the Somalia Commission's findings in 1997. However, many would suggest that the corner has been turned in Canada with increased emphasis on professional military education at the end of the 20th century.

An alternative to the military professional, since at least the Greek city states of the 7th century BC, was the citizen-soldier, who, while perhaps not as expert as the professional soldier, has been depicted as more effective in war because of his intrinsic loyalty to his state. Machiavelli is probably the most widely read writer to advocate this alternative that is still held to be valid by some modern American commentators. But Machiavelli's concept of the citizen-soldier was different from the Greek city-states' citizen army where service was voluntary and based on the ability of the wealthy to afford the arms and equipment necessary to be a member of the military force. In his model all classes of society were expected to be represented in armies funded by the state, a model held up as worthy of emulation by those in the US who believe that the draft served valuable social as well as military purposes.

To put Machiavelli's model in context, we should recall that he was suggesting a replacement for a different type of professional than the one epitomized by the Roman legionary or the modern Canadian soldier. In the 15th century Italy, *condottiere* (literally "contractors") formed into mercenary bands known as "companies," were corporate entities dedicated to making a profit from their military activities. Modern examples of military forces with a significant profit motive in their ethos in countries like China and Indonesia have shown that this sort of military organization does not serve the state well because one of its prime aims is to make money, and when this aim conflicts with national interests problems can arise.

In the 20th century scholars have produced many different views of the professions. These views vary over time and among cultures and have been influenced by not only the opinions of the individuals doing the research, but also the times in which they lived. These different lenses have also been applied to the profession of arms with varying degrees of success. Two types of model have been depicted as marking the boundaries in the debate on professions in the most recent Western literature. The Anglo-American model focusses on self-employed practitioners who have a significant degree of control over their working conditions, while the Continental model depicts professionals more often as elite members of society ensconced in state bureaucracies by virtue of academic credentials. While there are many variations on these archetypes, they share the characteristics of creating ideal and "ideologically defined" models of professions and both depict professions as "horizontally" organized groups who have a "self-conscious identity," ethical codes, standards of entry and practice, and enjoy a relatively high standard of living.

The Anglo-American concept of the professions dominates debates about the profession of arms in Western militaries, but it has its deficiencies. This model is primarily based on occupations that serve a market need. This can, as we have seen, have a perverse effect on a military ethos that is based on self-sacrifice and not profit. In addition, Anglo-American models of the professions, reflecting historical experience in civilian society, tend to minimize the effect of the state on the professions. However, the state has always had a significant influence on the profession of arms; therefore, it may be appropriate for those studying the profession of arms in Canada to consider

the Continental model of the professions which appears to take into account the role of the state better than the model now in use. This may be difficult to do, however, because many of the basic concepts upon which our understanding of the military is founded are derived from research conducted in the US after 1945, and firmly rooted in the Anglo-American model of the profession.

A sustained interest in the study of the military profession only began after the Second World War, particularly the US, in the context of civil military relations in those Western nations that had to deal with large peacetime standing military forces for the first time. Much of the Western literature on military professionalism is suffused with the ideas and vocabulary of Samuel Huntington. His model, though dominant in the literature on military professionalism, has been criticized by a number of writers. Morris Janowitz is the other scholar whose ideas are at the root of the current models of military professionalism, although recently some of his key tenets have been attacked as well.

James Burk reiterates earlier critiques of Huntington that point out that his model of a profession is very simplistic because it assumes that all professions will act in the “public good.” Burk also criticizes Janowitz for not thoroughly exploring the tensions between the “bureaucratic and professional cultures” found in the military and not recognizing the increasingly blurred boundaries between military and political spheres in modern conflict. Burk sees a serious problem arising for the US military as he claims that it must inevitably be politicized by its new “constabulary” roles.

Another weakness in Huntington’s and Janowitz’s models is their reliance on the functionalist model of the professions. New interpretations of the professions no longer see them as special entities applying their expertise “competently, objectively, and impartially to meet the needs of the client and improve public welfare,” but characterize them as among the many interest groups competing for prestige and scarce resources to improve their position in society. As the military profession becomes more like an expert profession, that simply does its job for an organization rather than acting as a social trustee, it will inevitably change, according to most commentators. Some, like Snider, argue that the military must resist such change by falling back on its old values. Others, like Burk, say that to maintain its privileged position in society in competition with other professions, the military must increasingly use the language and logic of the market to maintain its jurisdiction and legitimacy as a profession.

These perspectives on military professionalism pose serious problems for those studying the Canadian profession of arms because its historical experience is in many ways different from the American military experience. First of all, there is no evidence that the Canadian military has been politicized by its long history of peacekeeping and other “constabulary” missions. In fact, it appears that despite its involvement in these types of missions, the CF officer corps is far less politicized than the American officer corps. Secondly, there is ample evidence that the business and market-based imperatives that have been imposed on the CF over the past 30 years have had a deleterious effect on them. The ethos of Western military forces eschews a market driven focus because we know that the business ethos can actually have a corrosive effect on the military ethos of self-sacrifice and service before personal gain. Thirdly, the pre-1939 Canadian military “had

little in common with the professional armies emerging in Europe, in the United Kingdom, and in the United States.” The officer corps of the army was dominated numerically by the citizen soldiers of the militia and the permanent force had few of the professional characteristics of other Western officer corps. It could be argued that since the Cold War and the numerical and leadership domination of the regular force officer, the Canadian military has begun to take on a more professional hue. But Stephen Harris argues that since the unification of the CF in 1968 the CF has lost much of its “status as a distinct profession.” As more and more decisions are made by civilian bureaucrats who often disregard professional advice, it is possible that the profession of arms has lost much of its jurisdiction and legitimacy as a profession in this country. On the other hand, with the advent of new professional development programs for all ranks, but especially for senior officers, at the end of the 20th century, it may be that renewed professional expertise will allow to Canadian military profession to re-assert its jurisdiction and legitimacy in our society. In any event, as long as students of Canadian military professionalism continue to base their inquiries on American interpretations of the profession of arms, they will never completely understand the nuances of the subject because of its unique historical and cultural dimensions. The stated policy of “seamless operational integration at short notice” notwithstanding, there is a requirement for Canadians to understand the differences as well as the similarities between the profession of arms in the two countries.

The perception of many of the problems facing the military profession in Canada has not varied significantly in 30 years. The dominant feature in the perceptions in our past and now is a feeling of being engulfed in uncontrollable and sometimes incomprehensible change. Most commentators, have criticized the inability of isolated academic disciplines to adequately account for or explain this change in the study of the relationship of the professions to society. Each discipline has its preferred approaches, methodologies and assumptions, and individually they have not provided the answers society has demanded. For a topic as complex and multifaceted as the professions, especially the profession of arms, it seems clear that a multi-disciplinary approach will be more productive in providing the practical solutions that society requires from those occupations it recognizes as high status professions. Furthermore, what many believe to be key competencies for professionals of the future, the ability to work effectively in teams, to explain not just how but why things are done a certain way, to deal with vast quantities of information, and to understand cultural differences, will be essential skills for those studying the professions in the 21st century.