

**For Bully and Biscuits: Charges of Mutiny in the
43rd Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force,
November and December 1917.**

**Using the Model of the “Moral Economy”
to Explain Acts of Protest**

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Craig Leslie Mantle, M.A., B.Sc.

Parchment Consulting Services
parchmentconsulting@yahoo.ca

Writing nearly 50 years after the conclusion of the First World War, E.G. Black, who enlisted in the 41st Battery of the Canadian Field Artillery in 1916, recalled with fond memory that food was “the most important subject on a soldier’s mind.” In his humble estimation, although others certainly harboured differing opinions, the pleasure of a simple meal of bully beef and biscuits far outweighed that of “quarters or leaves or even the rum issue.”¹ On rare occasions, when fresh vegetables, eggs or berries replaced traditional hardtack, Black and his companions deemed these delicacies to be the highlights of a bland yet otherwise satisfying fare. Aside from meeting his physical needs and offering a brief respite from the difficulties of the day, the time allotted for meals, however short, provided him with an opportunity to associate with his peers on a more personal and intimate level. Like other group activities such as training, fighting and occasionally leave, the consumption of food in a communal setting furnished the participants with a common experience that not only reinforced their connection to one another, but which also, through fellowship, imparted a degree of both psychological well-being and emotional security. Such an elevated position did food occupy in the life of the common soldier that some forcefully voiced their objections when this most basic of all necessities suffered from a want of either quantity or quality. Given the innumerable difficulties of campaigning in both France and Belgium, complaints on this score were indeed far from rare. In a few instances, however, their criticisms precipitated an even more uncomfortable situation than that induced by mere hunger alone.

In late-November 1917, a few weeks after the conclusion of the costly battle for Passchendaele, military authorities brought to trial five Privates from the 43rd Battalion, Cameron Highlanders of Canada, Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF),² on charges of

mutiny and willful disobedience for they, while on active service, collectively disobeyed a direct and lawful command. Already under punishment for offences committed at an earlier date, each individual had refused to parade when ordered to do so for, in his opinion, those responsible for his well-being had failed to provide him with an adequate amount of care; the soldiers had apparently received no food for some time and their superiors had prevented them from enjoying a highly anticipated meal by ordering that an additional parade be held over their regularly scheduled supper hour, thus delaying their much-needed provisions yet again. Responding to what they perceived to be unfair treatment, the men elected not to parade in order to communicate their dissatisfaction with the present circumstances and, more significantly, to draw attention to their legitimate and reasonable grievances.

This episode is almost unique within the historical record of the CEF as it is one of the very few examples of collective action having been taken by soldiers against their leaders while billeted in the field.³ Owing to its distinctive nature and the fact that a form of maltreatment encouraged mass insubordination, this incident is particularly well suited to assess the overall ability of the “Moral Economy” to adequately explain acts of military protest in a Canadian context. In essence, this theory contends that the frequency (and in some cases the violence) of dissent within the CEF increased when individuals in positions of responsibility failed to meet the varied and reasonable expectations of their charges or did not respect the ingrained and cherished values of their subordinates. To be sure, a leader could encourage an act of protest by neglecting to provide the necessities of life, by treating his soldiers in an abusive and disrespectful manner or by failing to lead competently either on or off of the battlefield.⁴

Before continuing, a few comments must be made concerning the resources that were consulted during the preparation of this study. In any legal proceeding where numerous witnesses offer testimony concerning particular events, the evidence that they render is oftentimes contradictory and inconsistent. Since two court-martial transcripts provided the majority of documentation for this discussion – unlike larger mutinies, military authorities convened no formal court of inquiry to investigate this incident – many of the details regarding the precise sequence of events and exact verbal exchanges are somewhat confused. Because much of the testimony is brief and succinct, sometimes consisting of only a paragraph or two, additional questions naturally arise to which answers are largely absent. In many instances, unofficial sources, of which there were few to rely upon, provided only circumstantial or anecdotal evidence that did not speak directly to the incident at hand. The combination of these factors ultimately made the development of a truly certain and accurate analysis quite difficult. With this being said, however, the purpose of this study is not to recreate the precise sequence of events, but rather to determine why five soldiers rebelled.

THE MUTINY AND THE TRIALS

On 26 October 1917, as part of a larger Canadian attack launched by elements of the 3rd and 4th Divisions, the 43rd Battalion advanced up the western slope of Passchendaele Ridge after the conclusion of a four-day artillery barrage intended to soften German positions. Although moving swiftly through the mud and meeting with early success, their assault soon floundered on a piece of sharply rising terrain known as the Bellevue Spur; later in the day, Lieutenant Robert Shankland won the Victoria Cross for stoically defending this outcrop thereby saving the Battalion's gains.⁵ After many

tenuous hours, the Highlanders finally consolidated their position and awaited relief. With their strength now reduced by approximately 70 percent, the 43rd retired from the line and, in a few days hence, marched to the French village of Westrethem where reinforcements joined them in due course.⁶ So depleted were their ranks that one new arrival, A.C. West, remarked with astonishment that while he had received “a very warm reception” from a few of the remaining survivors, the Battalion itself was now “so small.”⁷

Nearly one month after the costly assault on the Ridge, a number of soldiers found themselves incarcerated in a makeshift guardroom located somewhere in the village.⁸ At an earlier date, military authorities had summarily awarded varying terms of Field Punishment Number One (FP1) to Privates A.W. Bonang, C. Clergy, S.H. Cuff, H.J. Primmitt, W.J. Graham and C. Moar for being absent without leave. The first four men had absented themselves on the same day and for approximately the same length of time, thus suggesting that they had acted in unison, while each of the remaining two soldiers had committed their offences individually. Specific details concerning their transgressions are presented in **Appendix 1**. The nature of the punishment imposed upon all included confinement in a specially segregated area, a restricted diet that did not include the daily nose of rum and an exhausting schedule of both manual labour and numerous drills in full marching order; the most humiliating and painful aspect of their daily routine included being tied to a post or cartwheel for several hours.⁹

At 3:45 in the afternoon of 25 November, the Provost Corporal of the 43rd Battalion, C. McPerry,¹⁰ entered the guardroom and directed the six prisoners who were present, most of whom had just returned from a full day of work, to prepare themselves

for yet another hour of pack drill. Incensed by this order and speaking on behalf of the larger group, Private Bonang immediately exclaimed that neither he nor his fellow prisoners would parade until they had received a full and proper meal. Four additional soldiers concurred with these insubordinate sentiments; only Private Moar acted as instructed, a decision that ultimately saved him from further punishment.¹¹ After the Battalion Adjutant and other senior officers received word of this episode, two Field General Courts-Martial were convened on 9 December, the first to judge the alleged ringleader and the second to try the remaining four participants collectively, an arrangement to which they did not object.¹² Three charges were leveled against Bonang for his role in this incident, the most serious of which included “causing a mutiny” since he voiced his opinion first. His actions also warranted charges of “endeavouring to persuade persons . . . to join in a mutiny” and “wilful defiance [of] a lawful command.”¹³ The other four soldiers were similarly indicted with joining in a mutiny and disobedience.¹⁴ Considering themselves to be correct and justified in refusing McPerry’s order, each man pleaded not guilty to all of the charges brought against him.

In the early phases of each court-martial, both of which took place in the field,¹⁵ the prosecution endeavoured to build a strong and convincing case against the mutineers by calling forth and examining a number of individuals who witnessed their disobedience. Not surprisingly, much of this testimony centered on the soldiers’ insubordination and illustrated how they had refused an entirely legal order. Rather than offer evidence regarding the root cause of the mutiny, the prosecution attempted to establish the singular and indisputable fact that every man had rebelled. Indeed, as

Canadian historian Desmond Morton has observed, “the aim of military law [during the First World War] was not to seek justice but to uphold discipline.”¹⁶

Appearing first at both trials, Corporal McPerry, who knew “nothing about the feeding of the prisoners,” related that he entered the guardroom at precisely 3:45 in the afternoon and told those present, in a voice loud enough so all could hear, to “get ready ... and fall in for pack drill.” According to McPerry, Private Bonang, in response to his order, asked his companions generally and aloud: “What about that boys? Are you going to do that?” Then, facing each in turn, he questioned them individually as to whether or not they would participate. Only Moar, who was standing away from the others, opted to obey and he soon proceeded outside after assembling his equipment; unfortunately, no testimony was offered at either court-martial to explain why he pursued this particular course.¹⁷ With an air of confident satisfaction, Bonang supposedly related to the Corporal that the men’s answer “buggers your pack drill.” To ensure that the soldiers had both understood and refused his command, the latter asked all of them if they intended to parade and each of the five replied in the negative. Aside from noting that none of the prisoners (except Moar) made any effort to prepare themselves for the drill, McPerry told the court that if the men “had changed their minds and decided to obey my order they could have called me or spoken to the sentry” who was standing just outside the guardroom door. Once he had issued his order, McPerry apparently left the guardroom and remained outside until after 4:00 p.m., the appointed hour at which the parade was scheduled to begin. His testimony also confirmed that the men had had a sufficient amount of time, about ten minutes or so, “to get ready, fall in and be proved before the parade started.”¹⁸

To strengthen its case, the prosecution then called Corporal H.R. Smith¹⁹ who was in charge of the regimental guard at Westrehem on 25 November. Being present in the guardroom at the time of the incident, his testimony corroborated the majority of the facts related by McPerry, such as the prisoners' inactivity once the order had been issued, and also confirmed the clear nature of the directive given by the Provost Corporal.²⁰ In his estimation, there could have been no misunderstanding as to what was required. More importantly, however, Smith alluded to some of the reasons that accounted for the soldiers' disobedience. He recalled that when McPerry ordered the prisoners to quickly prepare themselves for one hour of pack drill, the accused replied that "they would not go ... until they had had their supper." From his perspective, they "seemed quite positive they were not going on parade." He also related that the drill would overlap the prisoners' regular supper hour that commenced daily at 4:30 p.m. This fact suggested that, in part, the soldiers disobeyed the order to parade because their provisions would be postponed or skipped altogether. The prospect of missing yet another meal did not encourage compliance, especially given their tired and hungry condition. Despite having been in charge of the prisoners for only fifteen minutes, from approximately 3:30 p.m. to 3:45 p.m., Smith testified that no one had complained to him about the amount of food that he had received up to this point.²¹

Echoing earlier testimony regarding the sequence of events and the nature of the verbal exchanges, the third and final witness for the prosecution, Private Moar, the only soldier who complied with McPerry's order,²² offered additional insight into the origin of the mutiny by describing the actual quantity of food that the prisoners had received. He recalled that on 25 November:

... we had biscuits and bully for breakfast and a couple of tins of bully for dinner. We only had two tins for both meals. I had [one-half of] a biscuit myself. ... I cannot say where the food came from on this occasion. I did not see any of the accused get any. If they had wanted it I can suggest no reason why they shouldn't have it. There was a grab for the food.²³

In tacitly supporting the actions of his companions, Moar's statements indicated that other individuals had appropriated the majority of the provisions that were intended for the prisoners, many of whom were now on trial. The records of the 43rd Battalion reveal that at least four other soldiers were confined in the regimental guardroom at Westreham at the time of the mutiny; each had been sentenced to a term of FP1 for being absent without leave. Specific details concerning their offences are offered in **Appendix 2**. Judging by both the dates and the times that they left and returned to the Battalion, these soldiers do not appear to have been absent together. While the seizure of the food cannot be attributed to these individuals with absolute certainty – the testimony offered by Moar is too imprecise to properly identify the perpetrators – it seems likely, owing to their presence, that they were somehow involved. Indeed, being subjected to the same regimen as the mutineers, they too would have undoubtedly been hungry. By taking control of most of the provisions that were delivered to the guardroom, these men satisfied their personal needs but in so doing allowed some of their fellow soldiers to go without.²⁴

Later, while commenting upon the findings of the two courts-martial, the Acting Officer Commanding of the 43rd Battalion, Major W.K. Chandler, recorded that:

The prisoner's [sic] statements that they were without food had been previously investigated and evidence was on hand at the trial to show that they had been supplied with 24 hours [Field Punishment] rations the night before. This evidence however was objected to by the Court as immaterial.²⁵

Unfortunately, the evidence to which he referred is unknown as no documentation to this effect was included in either court-martial proceeding. In addition to clearly illustrating the court's desire to explore the singular issue of disobedience, these comments lend considerable weight to Moar's testimony regarding the presence of food in the guardroom, although its distribution still remains somewhat of a mystery.

In turn, each man eventually offered a few words in defence of his actions. As might be expected, Bonang contradicted much of the testimony offered against him when given the opportunity to defend himself once the prosecution had concluded its evidence. According to his recollection of events, he simply stated in response to McPerry's order that: "It cannot be done." In due course, he also denied asking the other prisoners if they too would refuse to participate and asserted quite plainly that the other men had acted entirely on their own accord without any direction from him. To further demonstrate his innocence, he refuted all claims that he had used insolent expressions toward his jailor.²⁶ Finally, in an attempt to reassure the court of his character and perhaps to gain a degree of sympathy, Bonang recounted his record of military service that, much to his credit, dated from August 1914.²⁷

Hoping to gain both compassion and leniency, all of the prisoners attributed their disobedience to the lack of food. At his trial, Bonang also stated that he "had been working hard at the transport lines and had had no meals for 24 hours" and as such "I was feeling too weak for want of food to go on parade."²⁸ Other soldiers, such as Private Graham, claimed that: "If I had got some food I would have gone on pack drill."²⁹ The assertions made by the accused with respect to their diet are quite consistent with the general experiences of other soldiers who were subjected to the same form of punishment

during the war. Consequently, their claims must not be hastily dismissed. As Julian Putkowski observes in his study of the phenomenon of mutiny within the British Army, “most who underwent field punishment recall hunger, degradation and the brutality of the guards.”³⁰

Although each prisoner insisted that his actions resulted from the prolonged absence of provisions, a claim that Moar corroborated, a few suggested in the hope of demonstrating further justification for their imprudence that McPerry had employed an inappropriate tone when ordering them to parade. Private Primmitt asserted that his jailor “said he would give us two minutes to *get the hell* out on pack drill.”³¹ Likewise, Private Clergy, who at the moment the order was issued “was rather weak from want of food,” echoed his companion’s remarks for he too did not believe that “the way the order was given was proper.”³²

Through their testimony, many of the soldiers also suggested that the inability to bring their complaints before a higher authority encouraged their protest since no one could “get any satisfaction.”³³ The lack of provisions seems to have prompted the men to attempt to speak with the Orderly Officer who, in their estimation, could have rectified this apparent oversight; none of the soldiers, however, claimed explicitly at their trial that they wished to speak with him on the matter of food.³⁴ While this officer had called at the guardroom early in the morning of 25 November when all of the men, except Moar, were out on fatigue as part of their punishment, it does not appear that any prisoner met with him throughout the remainder of the day.³⁵ Thus, when confronted with McPerry’s order and the prospect of missing yet another meal, the soldiers demanded an audience since the opportunity to have their concerns heard had been lost through no fault of their

own. As elsewhere in the trials, different witnesses offered conflicting testimony regarding the true response of the Provost Corporal to this request. Although McPerry told the court that he intended to allow the men to see the Orderly Officer later in the day, thereby implying that the drill would come first at the expense of their meal, Smith noted that this request was in fact refused. On the other hand, Primmitt was apparently told that he could bring forth his complaint in the morning.³⁶ Regardless of McPerry's actual response, none of the above solutions would have proven satisfactory since their grievances could not have been immediately rectified.

While the absence of food undoubtedly prompted the prisoners' desire to speak with the Orderly Officer, Bonang testified that he wanted to see him because McPerry was in fact drunk at the time that he ordered the men to prepare themselves for the upcoming parade.³⁷ This inflammatory assertion, however, seems designed to gain currency with the court by discrediting the Corporal upon whom the prosecution depended heavily as a witness. In reviewing both courts-martial, Major Chandler noted that: "The accusations of the prisoners to the effect that ... McPerry was drunk are groundless. This N.C.O. reported to the Adjutant a short time after the incident in the Guard Room, and was sober then."³⁸ In addition, Smith testified that he did not notice anything unusual about McPerry³⁹ who, in his own defence, stated that even though some soldiers claimed to have seen him enter an *estaminet* that was conveniently located across from the guardroom, he had "had nothing to drink that afternoon."⁴⁰

THE OPERATION OF THE “MORAL ECONOMY”

The testimony offered by all of the accused and other key witnesses clearly reveals the operation of the “Moral Economy” in this particular example of mutiny. Although a single independent case study cannot confirm the absolute validity of this theory, nor can it verify that the ideas encapsulated by this general concept were present throughout the entire CEF and that they consistently influenced the behaviour of most soldiers both during and immediately after the war, many of the model’s key principles are indeed reinforced. Only by analyzing additional examples of mutiny will the ability of the “Moral Economy” to accurately explain acts of protest within the CEF be known with more certainty.⁴¹

As is evident from their testimony, the prisoners desired proper treatment or, more precisely, an appropriate amount of food, from those individuals responsible for their care. Indeed, soldiers frequently insisted that their immediate superiors behave in a fair and respectful manner when dealing with them. When such was not forthcoming, the likelihood of disobedience, in whatever form, increased significantly.⁴² Rather than precipitating the mutiny itself, the absence of food on 25 November seems to have acted as a catalyst that brought previous maltreatment to the fore, which, incidentally, also revolved around the lack of provisions. At their courts-martial, many prisoners testified that they had not received nourishment for *some time* and were consequently very weak. Their hunger and exhaustion combined to add further importance to supper on this particular day. Faced with the bleak prospect of missing yet another meal, these soldiers believed that they could suffer the conditions no longer and ultimately mutinied in order to voice their displeasure at the less-than-adequate treatment that they had received.

From their perspective, engaging in an illegal act served as a means of communicating their dissatisfaction and their reasonable grievances to those in positions of responsibility. Although they willingly endured many of the privations associated with Field Punishment, these individuals disobeyed a legal order only after the conditions under which they lived could be tolerated no longer.

In addition, the prisoners did not desire anything more beyond that which was absolutely necessary for their general well-being and comfort; they endeavoured to rectify only the specific circumstance that did not meet their expectations of fair and reasonable treatment. Significantly, they did not protest against the harshness of Field Punishment itself, but only acted against those conditions that unnecessarily exposed them to excessive harm. To be sure, restraint is a key component of “Moral Economy” theory.⁴³ Judging from the lack of recorded complaints on other matters relating to their punishment – like other soldiers, they undoubtedly “grouched” amongst themselves about the circumstances to which they were exposed but did not press the issue with their superiors – the men seemed willing, on the whole, to carry out their term of isolation, deprivation and physical exertion. That they desired little else than the rectification of their single grievance is clearly reflected in the testimony of Private Graham who stated in his defence that if his hunger had been satiated, he would have followed the initial order to parade.⁴⁴ While statements such as these may have been given to the court in an attempt to win sympathy and to curry favour, they must also be considered as a sincere expression of their intent, especially given the soldiers’ singular desire to supplement the amount of food that they were currently receiving.

The testimony offered at both courts-martial also reveals that these soldiers desired responsive superiors who attempted to rectify their legitimate concerns whenever possible.⁴⁵ A few of the accused, such as Private Primmitt, took great pains to relate to the court that before the mutiny occurred, they had attempted to remedy the situation by following the proper method of bringing complaints to the attention of their superiors, that is, through the formal chain of command. Indeed, all of the prisoners told Corporal McPerry that they wished to speak with the Orderly Officer who, in their estimation, could have dealt with their problems either by himself or, in turn, by informing his superiors of the current situation. When their initial attempts at resolution failed, however, they resorted to a more aggressive form of protest by refusing to parade until they were heard on this matter. The fact that the prisoners first sought amends through the appropriate channels strongly suggests that mutiny was not seriously entertained in the beginning; only when satisfaction could not be achieved did they decide to transgress the bounds of discipline for no other avenue through which they could seek redress remained available. For them, disobeying a direct order represented the surest way of making their grievances known to those in command, especially since earlier attempts to rectify the situation had all but failed. As is certain, the inability to speak with the Orderly Officer encouraged their disobedient course for this additional grievance compounded their problems and, to them, further justified their conduct.

Finally, the prisoners also appear to have valued some aspects of their daily schedule, despite its rigour and intensity, and had undoubtedly become quite accustomed to enjoying a brief respite from the severity imposed by Field Punishment during their regularly scheduled mealtime. As previously observed, Corporal Smith suggested in his

testimony that the men followed a fairly standard routine each day and that they sat down to supper at a relatively consistent hour.⁴⁶ That they would have formed through past experience a reasonable expectation that their food would arrive at a particular time seems quite plausible since four of the six soldiers began serving their sentence on 19 November, nearly one week prior to the mutiny; the other two had spent a lesser amount of time under punishment.⁴⁷ Although the amount of liberty and freedom that the prisoners could reasonably hope for while in confinement was not substantial, they were after all being punished for infractions of military law, it seems reasonable to propose that they had come to expect that their meal on 25 November would arrive at the same hour as it had on previous days. To be sure, soldiers took great enjoyment from pleasurable practices and oftentimes protested when a particular routine that they had come to rely upon for relief was, in their minds, needlessly altered by those set over them.⁴⁸ The cause of their disobedience, then, seems to lie partially in the fact that a pleasurable and routine reprieve, in addition to a highly anticipated meal, would either be postponed or eliminated altogether owing to the requirement for an additional parade. McPerry's order conflicted directly with the prisoners' expectations of fair treatment and, to a lesser extent, a consistent schedule. This divergence ultimately encouraged the men to act in a disobedient manner.⁴⁹

As is certain, this example of mutiny offers a significant amount of support for key elements of the "Moral Economy" and, in the end, contributes substantially to its validity as an appropriate model to employ when attempting to explain acts of protest in the CEF. While the testimony given at the two courts-martial does not offer evidence on every tenet of this theory, the witnesses frequently alluded to many of its most significant

and important principles. All in all, the soldiers expected fair and proper treatment from their superiors or, more precisely, an adequate amount of food. Faced with what they considered to be an intolerable situation, they endeavoured to make their grievance known through the proper chain of command. When their initial attempts at resolution failed, they escalated their response and ultimately adopted a more aggressive (and entirely illegal) form of protest. Despite engaging in mutiny, they attempted to alter only those conditions that posed a serious and unacceptable threat to their overall wellbeing. Indeed, all of these concepts form the backbone of “Moral Economy” theory. As other students of disobedience have noted, “unit or group expectations that go unfulfilled, such as expected leave, timely relief, or adequate rations may promote a sense of a broken contract with higher levels of command,” and, when combined with poor leadership, can encourage noncompliance.⁵⁰ The testimony offered by many of the prisoners suggests that when an individual in a position of authority simultaneously transgressed multiple expectations or values, acts of protest, in whatever form, became all the more likely. To be sure, the lack of food initially encouraged the soldiers to adopt a hostile attitude, but the failure of their leaders to adhere to a consistent schedule and to be responsive to their reasonable demands added additional weight to their claims of unfair treatment and, in the end, further justified their conduct.

THE SENTENCES

After the witnesses had concluded their testimony, the members of the court paused to consider the previous conduct of each prisoner prior to rendering their verdict. Lieutenant A.E. Grimes⁵¹ of the 43rd Battalion, who prosecuted both trials, presented the lengthy conduct sheets of all of the accused as evidence of their past infractions of

military discipline. Each soldier had previously committed a number of offences while billeted at Dibgate Camp, England, which included being absent without leave, overstaying a leave pass, drunkenness, malingering, making false statements and breaking out of either barracks or camp; very few, however, were charged while on active service in the field.⁵² Although these men were not model soldiers – the above charges seem to indicate impatience with army life and a strong desire to enjoy the local surroundings – only a handful of indictments were leveled against these individuals for disobedience and insubordination. Regardless of the nature of their previous convictions, these records did little to improve the court's impression of the soldiers who now stood before them.

Private Bonang, the individual who in the eyes of his superiors had instigated the episode, was found not guilty of the two most serious charges of causing a mutiny and persuading others to join in an act of resistance; he was convicted of willful defiance and sentenced to two years imprisonment with hard labour owing to his role in speaking on behalf of the larger group. In like manner, the court found the remaining four participants not guilty of participating in a mutiny but convicted each of disobedience. Receiving a somewhat lighter penalty, all were sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment with hard labour.⁵³ The court unfortunately offered no reasoning to account for its decisions, although the fact that the accused were sober at the time of the incident and that their protest was brief, non-violent and had occurred well away from the enemy surely influenced its judgments.⁵⁴

All men received a relatively harsh punishment considering that they were convicted of the lesser charge of disobedience only. In similar instances where individual

soldiers from the 43rd Battalion refused to obey a lawful command, the court awarded a fairly lenient penalty. Sergeant J.C. Walker, for example, was sentenced “to be reduced to Corporal” after being convicted of “using insubordinate language to his superior officer in that he ... when ordered to go to his billet ... replied ‘I wont’ or words to that effect.”⁵⁵ In a case remarkably similar to the present mutiny, a court found Private J.M. Veitch guilty of “disobeying a lawful command,” in that he, “when ordered ... to parade with a Lewis Gun refused saying ‘I wont have nothing to do with it’ or words to that effect and did not subsequently parade as ordered.” He forfeited 28 days pay as punishment.⁵⁶ Although these incidents occurred in mid-1918, they do indicate that the military responded to individual acts of resistance with a relatively light punishment while collective acts of insubordination warranted a charge of mutiny and a much harsher sentence.⁵⁷

In reviewing the findings of both courts-martial, Major-General L.J. Lipsett, the General Officer Commanding of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, commented that:

This is a serious case and the first case of this description that we have had in the Division. ... I would ask that an example be made. Such offences must be checked at the first appearance. ... Judging from their action the men have very lax ideas of discipline.⁵⁸

Lieutenant-Colonel D.C. Draper, the Acting Officer Commanding of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade, offered a concurring opinion that the sentences should stand as awarded and recommended neither compassion nor mercy:

Having in view the gravity of the offence of which each of these soldiers was found guilty I consider, in the interests of discipline, [that] the sentences as awarded should be carried out. In my opinion the effect of leniency in these cases would be injurious to the discipline of the Unit concerned. These men were already undergoing punishment and their defiance, constituting an attempt to make a mockery of such penalty, in these circumstances must be considered to possess an additionally serious aspect.⁵⁹

To be sure, the severity of their punishments stemmed not from the fact that the men had been found guilty of disobedience, but rather that they had acted collectively in refusing a lawful order. The seriousness and novelty of this incident, an apparent first within the Division, worried senior military commanders at all levels who naturally desired the maintenance of a stringent regimen of discipline. In the hope of stemming further acts of mass action through deterrence, the court seems to have made examples of all five soldiers to demonstrate that such behaviour would not be tolerated and those who defied properly constituted authority in unison with other soldiers could expect severe punishment. By reducing or commuting the sentences in such a grave matter as this, so the reviewing officers believed, other soldiers might be tempted to act in a similar manner to these men since the possible benefits to be gained from disobeying an order could be perceived in some instances to far outweigh the expected penalty. At a Battalion parade on 13 December in the village of Westrethem, the sentences of the five men were promulgated and read to all present for effect.⁶⁰ So swift was military justice in this case that barely four days had elapsed between the convening of the courts-martial and the publishing of the sentences.

Two weeks after the trials, the new Battalion commander, Major H.M. Urquhart, who was appointed on 23 December 1917,⁶¹ issued a detailed set of orders that outlined which individuals were ultimately responsible for the delivery of rations to those soldiers

in confinement. Such a task fell to the Duty Company when the Battalion was out of the line and to the Quartermaster when in. The directive also stated that “rations for Field Punishment men consist of Bully beef, biscuits and tea. Prisoners awaiting trial or awaiting sentence will receive full rations.” These orders clarified the procedures and responsibilities that seem to have been misunderstood or neglected at the time of the mutiny. Their presence in Routine Orders strongly suggests that food and its distribution was indeed the root cause of the incident. The fact that the Battalion issued these directives immediately after the event (and once a sufficient amount of time had elapsed for Urquhart to accustom himself both to his new command and to this particular situation) lends considerable weight to the claims of the convicted men regarding the inappropriate amount of provisions that they had received while in confinement.⁶²

Without drawing an undue amount of attention to itself, the Battalion appears to have admitted the existence of a problem in its daily routine through the publication of this order. Because the 43rd issued detailed instructions that explained the procedures relating to the allocation of food to men undergoing Field Punishment, this episode seems to be much more than a group of soldiers being disobedient without just cause. With this being said, however, the true significance of or the motivation behind a published order cannot be known with absolute certainty simply by its existence, yet its presence strongly suggests that “something” was indeed amiss that ultimately led these soldiers to rebel by taking unilateral action.

Despite the fact that the court awarded lengthy prison terms to each participant, none of the five served their entire sentence. Committed in early-January 1918 to Number 10 Military Prison at Dunkirk, France, most individuals remained incarcerated

for only a few months. After their trials, a recommendation was made to the Director of Military Prisons in the Field by the General Officer Commanding of the British First Army that if the men “behave themselves in prison, their sentences [should] be put before the Commander-in-Chief at the conclusion of three months.”⁶³ Receiving the harshest punishment, Bonang served the longest term of all and eventually regained his freedom in mid-February 1919 after being incarcerated for slightly more than one year. Released in the spring and summer of 1918, Clergy, Primmitt, Cuff and Graham returned to the 43rd Battalion; the latter two were wounded in the hard-fought battles that concluded the war. Incidentally, in June 1919, Clergy was committed to Wandsworth Detention Barracks at Witley Camp, England, in order to serve the remainder of his sentence. His additional period of incarceration, which lasted for one month only, probably resulted from the fact that while interned at Dunkirk he escaped from a working party but was quickly recaptured by prison guards.⁶⁴

During the First World War, acts of protest represented an effective, if somewhat risky, method for men to express their dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs. Far from being passive and completely obedient, as the military culture of the time would have them be, men of the CEF constantly held the military to account in certain situations that they deemed to be manifestly unfair or which needlessly threatened their well-being. To the army’s surprise, soldiers frequently “demonstrated a will of their own.”⁶⁵ As is certain, insubordinate activities naturally attracted the attention of the military and, in some cases, forced senior commanders to confront a problem and to implement a solution. Because behaviour of this sort aroused concern, soldiers became all the more

willing to resort to disobedience if the conditions under which they laboured could be suffered no longer or their chain of command proved completely unresponsive.

All of the soldiers involved in this particular case of mutiny resorted to a form of protest when they felt that their personal welfare suffered without reason. Although a combination of factors contributed in varying degrees to their disobedience, the want of proper treatment, as manifested through the lack of food, strongly induced the prisoners to refuse the demands of a superior that would further exacerbate their hunger and discomfort. Despite accepting responsibility for their previous actions, these men refused to tolerate undue maltreatment, and as such, believed that expressing their concerns was both justified and necessary. Moreover, the inability to bring their complaints before their superiors encouraged their protest of a situation that in their opinion could easily be rectified; the promise of being allowed to address the appropriate authorities after the parade had been completed held no weight with men who desired an immediate and satisfactory remedy. The possible use of intemperate language by one of their jailors may also have played a role in encouraging the men to disobey. The above assessment also reinforces the notion that acts of disobedience were oftentimes triggered by an additional affront to the participants' expectations and values and that such instances usually occurred when the conditions to which soldiers were exposed could be endured no longer; rarely was one difficulty the sole, exclusive and primary cause of a mutiny.

From the other perspective, however, the military establishment looked with trepidation upon their behaviour. For them, the sheer fact that these soldiers had collectively disobeyed a direct order while under punishment for earlier offences proved infinitely more important and serious than the quantity of food received by a handful of

unruly and recalcitrant prisoners. Indeed, throughout the British Army and undoubtedly the CEF as well, courts-martial “were more preoccupied with enforcing discipline than granting defendants any benefit of the doubt.”⁶⁶ Fearing that such displays of hostility toward properly constituted authority would spread, the officers overseeing both courts-martial endeavoured to make examples of these individuals for the instruction of others who might be tempted to pursue a similar course of action. Whether such punishments actually served as a deterrent or not is a point still to be reconciled for it seems that soldiers frequently resorted to acts of protest despite the risk that they incurred in order to rectify the needlessly difficult circumstances that they faced.⁶⁷ Notwithstanding the lack of attention paid by the court to the causes of this disturbance, the new Battalion commander, who seems to have recognized that discipline could in fact be maintained and upheld by treating soldiers appropriately and with fairness, endeavoured to prevent the occurrence of similar episodes in the future.

APPENDIX 1: Description of Initial Offences. ⁶⁸

Rank and Surname	Given Name(s)	Regimental Number	Date Sentenced (d / m / y)	Length and Type of Punishment	Offence(s)
Private Primmitt	Henry James	1000981	19/11/1917	14 days, FP1	a) Absent Without Leave from 8:00 a.m. until 9:30 p.m., 16/11/1917. b) Absent from 8:00 a.m. parade until apprehended at 1:20 p.m., 17/11/1917. c) Absent from Company Orderly Room At 1:00 p.m., 17/11/1917.
Private Clergy	Charles	489185	19/11/1917	14 days, FP1	a) Absent Without Leave from 8:00 a.m. until 9:30 p.m., 16/11/1917. b) Absent from 8:00 a.m. parade until 1:00 p.m., 17/11/1917.
Private Cuff	Sidney Herbert	859385	19/11/1917	14 days, FP1	a) Absent Without Leave from 8:00 a.m. until 9:30 p.m., 16/11/1917. b) Absent from 8:00 a.m. parade until 1:00 p.m., 17/11/1917.
Private Bonang	Albert William	488709	19/11/1917	14 days, FP1	a) Absent Without Leave from 8:00 a.m. until 9:30 p.m., 16/11/1917. b) Absent from 8:00 a.m. parade until apprehended at 1:20 p.m., 17/11/1917. c) Absent from Company Orderly Room At 1:00 p.m., 17/11/1917.
Private Moar	Charles	1000201	24/11/1917	7 days, FP1	a) Absent Without Leave from 9:00 p.m., 22/11/1917 until 6:30 a.m., 24/11/1917.
Private Graham	Wilfred John	922369	23/11/1917	7 days, FP1	a) Absent Without Leave from 7:00 a.m., 21/11/1917 until 8:45 a.m., 22/11/1917.

APPENDIX 2: Additional Soldiers Present in the Guardroom. ⁶⁹

Rank and Surname	Given Name(s)	Regimental Number	Date Sentenced (d / m / y)	Length and Type of Punishment	Offence
Private LaPierre	Peter	198401	1/11/1917	28 days, FP1	a) Absent Without Leave from 5:00 p.m., 23/10/1917 until 11:30 a.m., 25/10/1917.
Private Lepine	Francis Xavier	700399	23/11/1917	7 days, FP1	a) Absent Without Leave from 6:30 a.m., 21/11/1917 until 6:30 a.m., 22/11/1917.
Private Hill	John	871072	23/11/1917	7 days, FP1	a) Absent Without Leave from 9:00 p.m., 20/11/1917 until 11:00 p.m., 22/11/1917.
Private Hatcher	Robert	693251	23/11/1917	7 days, FP1	a) Absent Without Leave from 6:30 a.m., 21/11/1917 until 3:00 p.m., 21/11/1917.

~ ENDNOTES ~

¹ Ernest Garside Black, *I Want One Volunteer* (Toronto: Ryerson, 1965), 92. Black was assigned Regimental Number 312853 upon attestation.

² In the 9th Brigade [9 Bde.] of the 3rd Division [3 Div.], as of October 1917, the 43rd Battalion from Winnipeg, Manitoba, fought alongside the 52nd, 58th and 116th Battalions, all of which were initially headquartered in Ontario at Port Arthur, Niagara-on-the-Lake and Uxbridge, respectively.

³ See Craig Leslie Mantle, *The “Moral Economy” as a Theoretical Model to Explain Acts of Protest in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, March 2004, Unpublished Paper), 54, for a brief summary concerning the number of Canadian soldiers charged with mutiny and the general location where they committed their disobedience. This paper is available online at <http://www.cda.forces.gc.ca/cfli/engraph/research/pdf/83.pdf>. As earlier historians of the First World War have noted, mutinies caused by inadequate rations and unsuitable accommodations were far from rare in the larger British Army. See Julian Putkowski, *British Army Mutineers, 1914-1922* (London: Francis Boutle, 1998), 12.

⁴ The “Moral Economy,” a theory that explores the cause-and-effect relationship between financial exploitation in the local marketplace and the behaviour of the British poor during the 18th century, has been extrapolated in Mantle, *Moral Economy*, to explain many of the disobedient and insubordinate acts that Canadian soldiers committed during the First World War.

⁵ A brief summary of the deeds that earned Lieutenant Robert Shankland his V.C. are provided in Arthur Bishop, *Our Bravest and Our Best: The Stories of Canada's Victoria Cross Winners* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1995), 70-71. Also see: 39, 74, 78 and 130.

⁶ J. Stuart McLean, “Passchendaele,” *Cameron Highlanders of Canada Museum Page: Recording the History of the Regiment: 1914-1919*, 11 November 2002, <http://ca.geocities.com/cameronhighlanderscanada/43pg3.htm>. The present author calculated the casualty figure provided in the text by dividing the number of soldiers who remained unscathed after the battle (148) by the number that participated in the attack (497) and then subtracting this value, which represents the proportion that survived, from 100. The War Diary of the 43rd Battalion is available online at http://www.archives.ca/02/020152_e.html and encompasses the period from February 1916 to March 1919.

⁷ *Library and Archives Canada [LAC]*, Albert Cook West Fonds, Manuscript Group 30–E32, 3. West originally enlisted in the 174th Battalion, Cameron Highlanders of Canada, from Winnipeg, Manitoba, and was assigned Regimental Number 693265. After being promoted to Corporal, West was awarded the Military Medal for his bravery during the closing battles of 1918. See *Fourth Supplement to the London Gazette of Tuesday, the 11th of March, 1919*, Issue 31227, 40. Available at <http://www.gazette-online.co.uk/archiveViewFrameSetup.asp?IssueNumber=31227&PageDuplicate=n&pageNumber=40&SearchFor=31227&selMedalType=&selHonourType>.

⁸ According to West, the billets occupied by the 43rd Battalion were scattered throughout the town. His diary entry for 23 November, 1917 to 20 December, 1917, records that: “We live fairly well except our cook-kitchen is a kilometer or more from our billet and food gets cold before billet 61 [presumably the one in which he lived] gets there.” *LAC*, West Fonds, 5.

⁹ The particulars of FP1 are described in Putkowski, *Mutineers*, 11 & 14; Desmond Morton, *When Your Number's Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First World War* (Toronto: Random House, 1993), 84; Tim Cook, “‘More a medicine than a beverage’: ‘Demon Rum’ and the Canadian Trench Soldier of the First World War,” *Canadian Military History* 9, no.1 (Winter 2000), 15.

¹⁰ Charles McPerry, Regimental Number 420761, was an original member of the 43rd Battalion.

¹¹ Private Charles Moar was neither charged nor brought to trial in connection with this incident. He eventually resumed his duties with the 43rd Battalion, presumably after he completed his initial sentence of FP1. He later died on 6 March 1918 from the effects of being gassed and was buried in Barlin Communal Cemetery Extension located in the Pas de Calais in northern France. See:

http://www.cwgc.org/cwgcinternet/casualty_details.aspx?casualty=470309

¹² Often composed of a President and three Members, all of whom were commissioned officers, Field General Courts-Martial could try both officers and Other Ranks for serious offences committed whilst on active service and could, if necessary, award the death penalty. See Putkowski, *Mutineers*, 10. In this specific instance, the same officers presided over both trials. Major Duncan James Hunter Ferguson, an accountant by trade and an officer in the 43rd Battalion, served as President, while the Members included Captain Warner Elmo Cusler, a banker from the 58th Battalion, Lieutenant Burpee Clair Churchill from the 52nd Battalion, and Captain J.H. Thorpe of the British Army's 7th Manchester Regiment. Thorpe appears to

have lectured to the CEF on the topic of courts-martial as a reference to him acting in this capacity has been found in the War Diary of the 26th Battalion from New Brunswick. See *LAC*, Confidential War Diary of the 26th Canadian Battalion, 1 September 1917 to 30 September 1917, Volume [Vol.] 25, Entry for 30 September 1917, 9, which is available online at <http://data2.collectionscanada.ca/e/e039/e000969729.jpg>. Lieutenant E. Ward of the 43rd Battalion acted as the “prisoners’ friend” at both courts-martial and as such assisted the accused in both the preparation and presentation of their defence. According the *LAC*’s database of courts-martial prosecuted during the First World War, which is available online at http://www.archives.ca/02/020107_e.html, none of the five men who participated in this mutiny were brought to trial for earlier or later offences; this was their first and only court-martial.

¹³ *LAC*, Record Group [RG] 150, 8, 649-B-4231, Microfilm T-8652, Court-Martial proceedings for Albert William Bonang (488709), Schedule. [This court-martial hereinafter referred to as CM1.] Bonang was charged under Sections 7(1), 7(2) and 9(1) of the *Army Act*. See Great Britain, War Office, *Manual of Military Law [MML]* (London: HMSO, 1914), 384 and 387.

¹⁴ *LAC*, RG 150, 8, 649-C-29813, Microfilm T-8659, Court-Martial proceedings for Charles Clergy (489185), Sidney Herbert Cuff (859385), Wilfred John Graham (922369) and Henry James Primmitt (1000981), Schedule. [This court-martial hereinafter referred to as CM2.] These four soldiers were charged under Sections 7(3) and 9(1) of the *Army Act*. See *MML*, 384 and 387.

¹⁵ Bonang was tried on 10 December 1917 while the remaining four participants were tried on 11 December 1917. See CM1 and CM2, Certificate of President as to Proceedings, respectively.

¹⁶ Morton, *When Your Number’s Up*, 83.

¹⁷ Moar may have decided not to participate in the mutiny since he may have viewed himself as an “outsider” to the larger group. As will be recalled, four of the six men seem to have committed their offence together. See **Appendix 1**. Such a common experience would have undoubtedly created or at the very least reinforced a strong bond of attachment between all of the participants and might have, in the end, encouraged them to participate in yet another act of disobedience together. Since Moar does not appear to have been involved in this earlier episode, his will to follow a similar course as the others may therefore have been less strong and compelling. His emotional distance from the group may also have resulted from the fact that he, on the morning of the incident, remained in the guardroom unlike the rest of the accused

who were out on fatigue. See p.10 above. Finally, his fear of additional punishment may also have encouraged his compliance. Explaining Graham's participation is more difficult as he too was not involved in the earlier incident and was sentenced to Field Punishment after the other four soldiers had received their sentence; duress or his reasonable desire to gain group acceptance, especially since one seems to have existed, may have encouraged him to follow Bonang.

¹⁸ For the entire paragraph, see CM2, McPerry Testimony, I & II; CM1, McPerry Testimony, I & II. The testimony offered by McPerry at both trials was remarkably similar. Some witnesses told the court that McPerry entered and left the guardroom on two separate occasions between 3:45 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on 25 November 1917. Since the transcripts of both courts-martial offer so little evidence on this point, no definite conclusions as to his actual whereabouts during these fifteen minutes can be offered here. Despite this limitation, however, the fact remains that the men disobeyed his order.

¹⁹ Harold Reuben Smith, Regimental Number 859542, was an original member of the 179th Battalion.

²⁰ The order must have been quite clear and understandable for Private Cuff testified that: "I took the order to be one which meant we were to get out on pack drill as soon as possible." CM2, Cuff Testimony, VIII.

²¹ CM2, Smith Testimony, III-V; CM1, Smith Testimony, III-IV. At the latter trial, Smith stated that he had been in charge of the guardroom since 3:00 p.m. that afternoon. The actual amount of time over which he had control of the prisoners is somewhat immaterial for while he was present "there were no complaints laid to me about food."

²² When the Orderly-Sergeant arrived to drill the men at 4:00 p.m., he promptly canceled the parade since only one prisoner had obeyed the Corporal's command; McPerry eventually ordered Moar to remove his cumbersome equipment, which was to be worn during the drill, and to dig a latrine. CM2, McPerry Testimony, II.

²³ CM2, Moar Testimony, V & VI. As a point of note, dinner is more commonly known today as lunch.

²⁴ This selfish act, which would seem to contradict the notion that soldiers generally ensured each other's well-being and looked out for one another's interests, may possibly be explained by the fact that the majority of the prisoners who were brought to trial were new arrivals to the Battalion; they arrived under punishment and probably did not interact with other soldiers as they were, no doubt, immediately incarcerated. As such, the "old hands" who had served for a longer period of time in the 43rd and who now

found themselves imprisoned as well may have looked down upon them. The “veterans” may have felt that their previous service somehow entitled them to a greater proportion of the food. Without confirming the actual amount of time that the other four prisoners, as listed in **Appendix 2**, had been with the Battalion, the above statements remain somewhat speculative.

²⁵ CM1, Major William Kellman Chandler, Acting Officer Commanding, 43rd Battalion, Cameron Highlanders of Canada, to 9 Bde., 13 December 1917.

²⁶ CM1, Bonang Testimony, VI & VII.

²⁷ He stated to the court that: “I enlisted [in] August 1914. I came to France [in] June 1916 and went into the line at Ypres. I was wounded in June. I went to England sick in [November] 1916 and rejoined [the Battalion] in [November] 1917.” CM1, IX.

²⁸ CM1, Bonang Testimony, VI & VII. Private Cuff offered similar testimony for he stated to the court that: “Supper, the previous night, was our last meal.” CM1, Cuff Testimony, VIII.

²⁹ CM2, Graham Testimony, VII.

³⁰ Putkowski, *Mutineers*, 11.

³¹ CM2, Primmitt Testimony, VI. Italics added for emphasis by the present author. Primmitt also echoed much of his peer’s testimony regarding the lack of food for he stated to the court that: “I did not go on the pack drill as I had had nothing to eat.” CM2, Primmitt Testimony, VI.

³² CM2, Clergy Testimony, VII. He also asserted that: “I would have gone on parade if my request [for food] had been attended to.” CM2, Clergy Testimony, VII. Private Bonang expressed similar sentiments when he asserted that: “If the [Corporal] had asked us a second time to go on parade in a proper manner I would have done so.” CM1, Bonang Testimony, VII.

³³ CM2, Cuff Testimony, VIII.

³⁴ During the trial of the four remaining prisoners, Corporal Smith, who was present in the guardroom at the time of the mutiny, offered no clarification on this point either; he simply testified that: “I don’t remember their reason for wanting to see the Orderly Officer.” CM2, Smith Testimony, IV.

³⁵ CM1, Moar Testimony, V; CM1, Smith Testimony, IV.

³⁶ CM1, Smith Testimony, IV; CM2, Primmitt Testimony, VI; CM1, McPerry Testimony, II.

³⁷ CM1, Bonang Testimony, VI & VII. When examined by the court, Bonang stated that Corporal McPerry “was not staggering but he had been drinking.” At his court-martial, Clergy stated that: “When the [Corporal] came in to us he was intoxicated.” CM2, Clergy Testimony, VII. Neither Bonang nor Clergy offered convincing proof that McPerry was drunk at the time that he entered the guardroom.

³⁸ CM1, Chandler to 9 Bde., 13 December 1917.

³⁹ CM2, Smith Testimony, IV.

⁴⁰ CM2, McPerry Testimony, II.

⁴¹ For another historical analysis that further tests the validity and the accuracy of the “Moral Economy” as an explanatory model, see Craig Leslie Mantle, *Polished Leathers and Gleaming Steel: Charges of Mutiny in the Canadian Army Service Corps at Bramshott Camp, England, November 1917* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, March 2004, Unpublished Paper).

⁴² Mantle, *Moral Economy*, 49-51.

⁴³ Mantle, *Moral Economy*, 4 and 47.

⁴⁴ CM2, Graham Testimony, VII. He told the court that: “If I had got some food I would have gone on pack drill.” Cuff, who “had just come off fatigue when we were ordered to go on pack drill,” expressed a similar willingness to comply. He stated at his trial that: “If I had received a meal or a promise of one I should have gone on parade.” CM2, Cuff Testimony, VIII.

⁴⁵ For an example of how a responsive chain of command could benefit morale, see Mantle, *Moral Economy*, 25 and 49-51.

⁴⁶ CM2, Smith Testimony, IV. He testified that: “The prisoners have their supper at 4:30 p.m.”

⁴⁷ See **Appendix 1**.

⁴⁸ Mantle, *Moral Economy*, 32-33.

⁴⁹ In all fairness, however, McPerry seems to have been carrying out the orders of a superior when he directed the prisoners to prepare themselves for pack drill. As noted in both trials, one of his duties late in the afternoon of 25 November was to assemble the men on parade for the Orderly Sergeant to drill at 4 p.m. CM2, McPerry Testimony, II & CM1, McPerry Testimony, II-III.

⁵⁰ Joel E. Hamby, “The Mutiny Wagon Wheel: A Leadership Model for Mutiny in Combat,” *Armed Forces & Society* 28, no. 4 (Summer 2002), 581.

⁵¹ Lieutenant Albert Edward Grimes originally enlisted in the 113th Battalion.

⁵² The number of separate occasions on which each soldier received punishment for a breach of military discipline follows their name: Bonang, 9; Clergy, 8; Cuff, 6; Graham, 3; Primmitt, 10. In many instances, a soldier committed more than one indictable offence on each occasion. CM1, Conduct Sheets & CM2, Conduct Sheets.

⁵³ CM1, Schedule & CM2, Schedule.

⁵⁴ These factors seem to have played a role in minimizing the sentences handed down by British courts and probably did so at Canadian trials as well. Putkowski, *Mutineers*, 12.

⁵⁵ *LAC*, RG 150, Vol. 83, 43rd Battalion Part II Orders, File 5, 8 June 1918, Sheet 1. John Campbell Walker, Regimental Number 153514, was an original member of the 79th Regiment Draft. The transcript of his court-martial is available at: *LAC*, RG 150, 8, 649-W-26664, Microfilm T-8690. This document was not reviewed for the purposes of this study.

⁵⁶ *LAC*, RG 150, Vol. 83, 43rd Battalion Part II Orders, File 5, 27 July 1918, Sheet 1. John McGregor Veitch, Regimental Number 693223, originally enlisted in the 174th Battalion. The transcript of his court-martial is available at: *LAC*, RG 150, 8, 649-V-1952, Microfilm T-8686. This document was not reviewed for the purposes of this study.

⁵⁷ This statement also holds true for the period prior to the mutiny. On 28 February 1917, for instance, a Field General Court-Martial sentenced Private Robert James McGowan, Regimental Number 859722, an original member of the 179th Battalion, to 60 days FP1 for “disobeying a lawful command given by his superior officer.” *LAC*, RG 150, Vol. 82, 43rd Battalion Part II Orders, File 4, 9 April 1917, Sheet 2. The transcript of his court-martial is available at: *LAC*, RG 150, 8, 649-M-14400, Microfilm T-8675. This document was not reviewed for the purposes of this study.

⁵⁸ CM1, Major-General Louis James Lipsett, General Officer Commanding [GOC], 3 Div., to Canadian Corps [C.C.], 19 December 1917.

⁵⁹ CM1, Lieutenant-Colonel Dennis Colburn Draper, Acting Officer Commanding, 9 Bde., to 3 Div., 11 December 1917.

⁶⁰ LAC, Confidential War Diary of the 43rd Battalion, 1 December 1917 to 31 December 1917, Volume 23, Entry for 13 December 1917, 5, which is available online at <http://data2.collectionscanada.ca/e/e045/e001110923.jpg>.

⁶¹ Major (later Lieutenant-Colonel) Hugh M. Urquhart, D.S.O., M.C., served as Brigade Major of the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade immediately prior to being appointed to command the 43rd Battalion. LAC, RG 9, III-C-3, Vol. 4196, 43rd Battalion Routine Orders, Folder 7, File 1, Number 489, 24 December 1917.

⁶² LAC, RG 9, III-C-3, Vol. 4196, 43rd Battalion Routine Orders, Folder 7, File 1, Number 504, 31 December 1917.

⁶³ CM1, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General [DAAG] for GOC, First Army, to Director, Military Prisons in the Field [DMPF], 27 December 1917. This recommendation applied to all of the soldiers except Private Bonang; the First Army desired that he serve his entire sentence. CM1, DAAG for GOC, First Army, to DMPF, 13 January 1918. In reviewing the findings of the courts-martial prior to forwarding them to higher levels of command, Lipsett offered a similar recommendation for he desired “that the men be committed to prison. If, for lack of space, it is deemed impossible to commit them all, I deem it essential that Pte. BONANG, who was evidently the ringleader, should be sent to prison and the other sentences commuted to 90 days F.P. No.1.” CM1, Lipsett to C.C., 19 December 1917. Sir Henry Sinclair Home commanded the First Army of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) at the time of this particular mutiny.

⁶⁴ LAC, RG 150, Acc. 1992-93/166, Box 865, File 24 (A.W. Bonang), Box 1793, File 50 (C. Clergy), Box 7986, File 2 (H.J. Primmitt), Box 2196, File 50 (S.H. Cuff) and Box 3713, File 35 (W.J. Graham).

⁶⁵ Morton, *When Your Number's Up*, 19.

⁶⁶ Putkowski, *Mutineers*, 10.

⁶⁷ Mantle, *Moral Economy*, 55-56.

⁶⁸ References for **Appendix 1**:

Primmitt:	LAC, RG 150, Vol. 82, 43 rd Battalion Part II Orders, File 4, 6 December 1917, Sheet 2.
Clergy:	LAC, RG 150, Vol. 82, 43 rd Battalion Part II Orders, File 4, 6 December 1917, Sheet 2.
Cuff:	LAC, RG 150, Vol. 82, 43 rd Battalion Part II Orders, File 4, 6 December 1917, Sheet 3.
Bonang:	LAC, RG 150, Vol. 82, 43 rd Battalion Part II Orders, File 4, 6 December 1917, Sheet 3.
Moar:	LAC, RG 150, Vol. 82, 43 rd Battalion Part II Orders, File 4, 8 December 1917, Sheet 1.
Graham:	LAC, RG 150, Vol. 82, 43 rd Battalion Part II Orders, File 4, 8 December 1917, Sheet 1.

⁶⁹ References for **Appendix 2**:

LaPierre: *LAC*, RG 150, Vol. 82, 43rd Battalion Part II Orders, File 4, 20 November 1917, Sheet 1.
Lepine: *LAC*, RG 150, Vol. 82, 43rd Battalion Part II Orders, File 4, 8 December 1917, Sheet 1.
Hill: *LAC*, RG 150, Vol. 82, 43rd Battalion Part II Orders, File 4, 8 December 1917, Sheet 1.
Hatcher: *LAC*, RG 150, Vol. 82, 43rd Battalion Part II Orders, File 4, 8 December 1917, Sheet 1.