CANADIAN FORCES LEADERSHIP INSTITUTE

PROFESSIONAL GROUPS AND SUBGROUPS
IN THE CONTEMPORARY MILITARY
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

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INTRODUCTION

Following the winding-down of the Cold War in the late 1980s, Western military establishments were forced to consider the nature of their future role and function. Analysts looked critically at past performance and policies before accepting that armed forces were now moving into a period of considerable uncertainly. New missions had not entirely displaced old ones. Although the likelihood of major war appeared to be low, the possibility of international conflict could not be ignored. Accordingly, the greater involvement of the military in peace support and humanitarian aid extended rather than replaced the range of skills which were required. The ability to exert a traditional application of force was matched by the need for armed forces to operate in a *constabulary* role. Increasingly, as Janowitz had forecast, the military was to be continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, seeking viable international relations, rather than victory, because it had incorporated a protective military posture (Janowitz, 1960: 418).

The potential effects of these changes to the traditional role of the military were considerable in themselves. At the same time, however, armed forces, in common with other large-scale bureaucracies, were very much affected by what have been termed 'post-modern trends' (Moskos et al, 2000). A rising individualism for instance, challenged many of the established features of military life. Such central values of the post-modern society as tolerance and the equal dignity of all individuals, contrasted markedly with the hierarchical traditions of the military. Even though persuasive forms of authority and a search for group consensus had become major features of organisational control in the armed forces (Janowitz, 1960: 8-9), the military command system retained many coercive elements which distinguished it from civilian systems. Such elements were now increasingly challenged by service personnel, who it was said,

> want to have their individual and group identities
> recognised as well as treated as equal to any other. This
> leads to a questioning of values and ends, and of
> traditional norms and institutional authority.
> (Boëne and Dandeker, 1999: 16)

At the same time, minorities became more vocal in demonstrating their differences. Traditionally, the military recruited, trained and rewarded personnel who constituted a homogeneous force. Now, the long established preference for uniformity and cohesion was criticised for being conservative, moralistic, exclusionary and hostile (Dunivin, 1994). Analysts repeatedly argued in favour of new models and innovative strategies.

The practical consequence of these two trends for the effectiveness and efficiency of the contemporary military is, however, far from certain. There is ample evidence of a complex and intricate academic debate, (Dansby et al, 2001; Kuhlmann and Callaghan, 2001) but far less attention has been paid to the effects of changing missions and societal trends upon the traditional status of the military as a profession and an organisation. Yet these, as van Doorn points out, 'are the most important institutional patterns controlling occupational and administrative decisions and actions' (1965: 262). The two concepts of 'profession' and 'organisation' have many

characteristics in common. Both display universal standards, specificity of expertise, and affective neutrality (Blau and Scott, 1962: 60ff). Nevertheless, the profession has a distinctive form of reference which serves to distinguish it, and it is with the effects of this that this study is essentially concerned.

The primary cause of this concern is the uncertain status of the military as a profession in the post-Cold War ear, a period which is coincidentally termed the *post-modern* age. The traditional models of military professionalism were formulated from the 1950s onwards – half a century ago. Two dominant conceptualisations based on the theories of Samuel Huntington (Harvard) and Morris Janowitz (Chicago) emerged. A common feature was their location of military professionalism within sophisticated theories of civil-military relations.

In the **Soldier and the State,** Huntington (1957), on the basis of a liberal theory of civil-military relation, argues that the first priority of the democratic state is to protect the rights and liberties of individual citizens. To limit the power of the military, he advocates a policy of objective civilian control whereby professional military officers willingly accept civilian authority. The three essential elements in their professionalism are their expertise, responsibility and corporateness.

Janowitz in **The Professional Soldier** (1960) favours a civic republican theory of civil-military relations whereby the professional military see themselves as citizen-soldiers rather than as mercenaries or another political pressure group. The hall-mark of their professional status is their special skill acquired through intensive training, their sense of group identity, a code of ethics and standards of performance. He identifies the military profession not as a static model but as a dynamic bureaucratic organisation which changes over time in response to broad social transformations in the parent society. This implies that armed forces are experiencing a long-term shift towards convergence with civilian structures and norms. It is hypothesised that the basis of authority and discipline in the armed forces has shifted to manipulation and consensus; there is a narrowing skill differential between military and civilian elites; the basis of officer recruitment has altered and officership has developed a more explicit political ethos.

The comparisons and contrasts between these two studies have encouraged a substantial body of further research. From this, it is possible to identify the two distinctive models of military professionalism which have influenced analysis and debate. The first, the *Profession of Arms*, draws heavily on a traditional concept which stresses the uniqueness of the task to be performed. It represents a self-image in which armed forces are sharply differentiated from civilian organisation. A defining characteristic of the model has been the emphasis placed on the essential function of the military as the ordered application of force in defence of the state and its interests. The military exercises a monopoly over the use of this force; it is also allowed a non-negotiable interpretation of its fundamental purpose and role (Ekrich, 1956).

A second major characteristic of this model is its identification with basic behavioural concepts such as 'duty', 'honour' or 'responsibility'. Underlying such identification is the belief that the military profession is a 'vocation' and that individuals have a 'sense of calling'. In combination, these concepts form the basis of the *role* of the

military professional, that is, the expected pattern of behaviour in a given situation. In many professions, the *code of ethics* which formalises this concept of role has been laid down by a Qualifying Association (Millerson, 1964). For engineers in the United States, for example, the code was specified in the 'Canons of Ethics for Engineers' (Annals, 1955). For armed forces, however, the basis of *role* continues to rely heavily on the values, implicit or explicit, of the concept, *The Profession of Arms*. It would seem that the conclusion reached by a critic of the 'Canons of Ethics' still has some relevance,

> …..no gentleman needed a code of ethics and no code
> of ethics would make a gentleman out of a crook
> (Newell, 1922).

The informal and unwritten code of behaviour in the *Profession of Arms* evolved over a lengthy period. It is the result of extensive group interaction and, today, it continues to represent a desirable standard of behaviour. As a reflection of this, the *Profession of Arms*, it is said, is 'is an essential social institution offering an orderly way of life, set a little apart, not without elegance' (Hackett, 1962: 65).

The second model, *The Pragmatic Military Profession*, is in contrast, associated with the professionalisation of the military, that is, the process by which armed forces acquire some of the characteristics of the ideal-type profession. The latter is difficult to define for the contemporary military, and there is a very real danger that a 'trait' or 'attributional' approach becomes a sterile debate. More realistically, pragmatic professionalism suggests that the shape of professionalisation is determined by immediate needs, by what is acceptable to the parent society and by what is seen to be the most effective way of getting the job done (task achievement). This implies that professional career officers recognise the political constraints within which they have to operate in a democratic society. What amount of military action is called for, 'takes place at the periphery of areas of major strategic interest, with limited objectives, resources and – ideally – duration' (Boëne, 2001: 58). The operational autonomy of the military is curtailed, but its professional role is broadened in terms of its participation in political, economic and social debates which govern the use of military force (Segal, 1986).

The critical question with which this study is primarily concerned, is whether a traditional model of military professionalism has any continuing relevance in the post-Cold War and post-modern period. In part, the question has a wider applicability. More generally, we note discussions about the viability of the concept of professionalism itself, irrespective of any specific civilian or military connotation. In contrast with the benefits implicit in the idea of 'The Professionalisation of Everyone' (Wilensky, 1964), more attention is now paid to the dysfunctional consequences of the process. Accordingly, this study is particularly concerned with five discrete objectives:

- to identify the manner in which the traditional model of the military as a profession is changing and the pressure for change

- to analyse the defining characteristics of the modern (or post-modern) military

- to review the status as professionals of diverse groups and sub-groups within the military

- to formulate a revised concept of the profession of arms which recognises the diversity of personnel in contemporary military institutions

- to determine the appropriate human resource management strategies associated with such a concept.

A common theme is an appreciation of the consequences for the contemporary military of a failure to identify a concept of military professionalism which can accommodate the increasing importance of sub-groups within western armed forces. Essentially, this is a facet of the management of diversity, for such sub-groups are both quantitatively and qualitatively representative of a shift from a policy of *exclusiveness* in the recruitment of personnel, to one of *inclusiveness*.

THE MILITARY PROFESSIONAL

The concept of the military professional is complex and multi-dimensional. It is one of the most developed and carefully researched aspects of the military as a social institution. The basic referents for discussion are the two major studies of Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960). These share a common overall perspective, for they stress that the military career officer is a member of a profession that possesses significant characteristics which contribute to its effectiveness and sense of responsibility. There are, however, differences between these two theorists which highlight the conceptual and problematic questions of the contemporary military profession in a period of change (Sørensen, 1994).

Huntington argues that the officer corps constitutes a fully developed profession because it manifests to a significant degree, three principal characteristics of the ideal type professional model: *expertise, responsibility* and *corporateness*. Only officers involved in and committed to the central expertise of the management of violence, however, are members of the military profession. This implies that neither commissioned specialists nor enlisted personnel can be recognised as military professionals. Most importantly, the image of the professional officer in a democracy is seen to be that of an individual who is obedient and loyal to the civil power, competent in military expertise, dedicated to using acquired skills to ensure the security of the state, and politically and morally neutral. The sense of professional commitment is shaped by a code of ethics which reflects a carefully inculcated set of values and attitudes. These are seen to constitute a unique professional outlook or military mind which may be characterised as,

> pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist and instrumentalist…..in brief, realistic and conservative.
> (Huntington, 1957: 79)

Janowitz, in contrast, sees the military as a social system in which the professional characteristics of the officer corps change over time. These are variable since they include norms and skills including, but also going beyond, the direct management of violence. In common with Huntington, he identifies characteristics which make officership a profession. Janowitz begins by drawing attention to the *skill* acquired as a result of prolonged training, which enables the professional to render specialised service. A profession, he goes on to point out, is , however, "more than a group with special skills". Professionals develop a sense of *group identity* and a system of *internal administration*. Self-regulation necessitates the growth of a *body of ethics* and *standards of performance*. Referring back to the second of Huntington's three essential elements, Janowitz concludes his analysis of the professional soldier, by questioning the criteria of professional responsibility expected from those engaged in modern warfare.

A major feature of Janowitz's analysis, however, is his premise that the military profession is not a static model but a dynamic bureaucratic system which changes over time in response to changing conditions in the parent society. This recognises the extent to which the structure of armed forces and, more significantly, the format of a professionalised officer-corps has been shaped by the impact of broad social

transformations. An underlying assumption is that armed forces are experiencing a long-term shift towards convergence with civilian structures and norms. In considering this further, Janowitz advances five working hypotheses, "as the point of departure for an analysis of the military profession" (1960: 7):

- Changing Organisational Authority
- Narrowing Skill Differential Between Military and Civilian Elites
- Shift in Officer Recruitment
- Significance of Career Patterns
- Trends in Political Indoctrination

Taken singly, each hypothesis suggests major changes to the historical role and function of individual officers in the military. The suggestion, for example, that there has been a change in the basis of military authority and discipline thus implies that there is a need for individual officers to acquire manipulative and persuasive skills. The reference to the narrowing skill differentials between military and civilian elites, recognises the importance, inter alia, of education and training programmes within armed forces. Overall, it appears that as a result of broad social changes, authority and discipline in the armed forces increasingly, depend upon consensus, whilst military skills have become civilianised, membership of the officer corps has become more open and officers are, now, politically aware. As a result of these trends, the traditional heroic-warrior role has given way to an ascendant managerial-technical role. In short, the traditional model of the military as a profession, is seen to be continually in a state of change in response to internal and external pressures.

It is often overlooked in critical analyses of the characteristics and dimensions of military professionalism, that the innovative theory building of the 1950s and 1960s, rarely treated the concept as an abstract. More usually, the status of the military as a profession was identified either with wider issues of the subordination of armed forces to the civil power or with discussions of the military as a complex bureaucracy Both themes attracted considerable further research. For the former, the initial studies by Huntington and Janowitz were followed by wide-ranging analysis. (Harries-Jenkins and Moskos, 1981: 43-73). A particular criticism made by Morris-Jones (1957) and Finer (1962) was of the questionable empirical relevance of the postulated theories. In terms of the bureaucratic nature of armed forces the status of the military as an organisation was seen to parallel the concept of military professionalism (Lang, 1965; Feit, 1973; van Doorn, 1975). When considering the current status of military professionalism, therefore, it is necessary to bear in mind the provenance of the concept.

In looking further at our contemporary interpretation of the concept of the military profession, it would seem that the first four of the working hypotheses which Janowitz put forward in 1960, continue to be useful and important analytical tools. A substantial body of secondary literature confirms that they are still significant indicators of the concept as a dynamic system which changes over time in response to internal and external pressures. On the other hand, the fifth hypothesis, *Trends in Political Indoctrination*, has a less certain relevance, today, to any analysis of the concept. A major reason for this is the historical context within which the hypothesis was originally formulated when it reflected the contemporary concern with the growth and potential dominance of the *military-industrial-complex* (Sarkesian, 1972).

Janowitz thus suggests that the military profession, "especially within its strategic leadership" had developed a more explicit political ethos (1960: 12). "Politics", in this sense, as he notes, has both an internal and external meaning. The former relates to the activities of the military establishment in influencing legislative and administrative decisions which determine security policies and affairs. The latter, "encompasses the consequences of military actions on the international balance of power and the behaviour of foreign states" (p.12).

An immediate methodological problem is whether the 1960 hypothesis is only truly relevant to the experience of the USA. As Janowitz comments,

> As compared with that of Great Britain, our military force seems much too active and outspoken as a legislative pressure group and as a "public relations force" (p.14).

To analyse further the military profession in this context, it is necessary to look critically at this fifth hypothesis. Burk (2002: 7-18) reminds us that Janowitz, in common with Huntington, was very much concerned when formulating a model of military professionalism, with major issues of civil-military relations, particularly how these reflect democratic values. He contrasts the preference on the part of Huntington for a *liberal theory* of civil-military relations with the focus by Janowitz on *civil republican theory*. The first, he contends, argues that the primary priority of the democratic state is to protect the rights and liberties of individual citizens. To ensure that the military does not interfere with these rights and liberties, Huntington advocates the adoption of "Objective civilian control" whereby civilians determine military policy but where professional officers, loyal to the civil authority, are given autonomy to implement it.

Janowitz, in contrast, consistently argues that the first priority is to involve citizens in "the activity of public life". When citizens accordingly serve as soldiers to defend the homeland, the interests of the military and state, according to *civil republican theory*, overlap. There is, nevertheless, the persistent problem of preserving the idea of the citizen soldier in an era when the changing nature of war no longer necessitates the retention of a mass army. One solution, it is argued, is to establish a system of national service, one facet of which can be a military component. At the same time, Janowitz feels that,

> it was important that professional soldiers continued to think of themselves as citizen-soldiers rather than as mercenaries or just another politically partisan occupational pressure group. (Burk, 2002: 12)

To ensure this, Janowitz argues for the provision of explicit programmes of political education to connect professional military training to national and transnational purposes (Janowitz, 1983: 74-6).

These are two important theories of democracy in the context of civil-military relations. A critical question, however, is whether in the absence of the mass army raised by conscription, and in a situation where the desirability of voluntary national

service is not acceptable to most individuals in western society, the basic philosophy underlying *civic republican theory* can continue to determine modern-day interpretations of the concept of military professionalism. The ideal of the citizen-soldier can certainly be identified in military systems such as the Israeli Defence Force. We can identify the virtual fusion of the interests of the military elite and the interests of the state elite as in the Republic of Singapore. Even so, with the ending of the Cold War, the military and societal justifications for the continuance of the draft have become very questionable (van der Meulen and Manigart, 1997). This, in turn, draws our attention again to the continuing significance in the contemporary military system of civic-republican theory with its emphasis on the role of the citizen-soldier.

The theoretical dimensions of the link between military professionalism and the development/maintenance of the *citizen-soldier* ideal have been examined at length (Boëne, 1990; Feaver, 1996; Boëne, 2002; Snider and Watkins, 2002). Today, however, an equally critical issue is the effect of an increase of *instrumentalism* within western armed forces upon traditional interpretations of military professionalism. In the ideal-type, the latter was closely associated with the stress placed within the 1960 Janowitz model on the identification of professionals and professionalism with a sense of "calling". Equally, Moskos in his analysis of the status of the military as *an institution*, emphasised that, "members of an institution are often viewed as following a calling" (Moskos, 1977: 46). The shift towards the postulated occupational model, however, suggested that the military is now, "just another job" (Moskos and Wood, 1988). Accordingly, uncertainty about the continuing validity of definitions of military professionalism which are derived from its link with the concept of civil responsibility, are matched by an often deeper uncertainty about the validity of traditional interpretations of military professionalism in an increasingly instrumental environment.

In the same way that the original Huntington/Janowitz conceptualisation of the military profession generated a considerable body of research, so has the development of the Institutional/Occupational model (the I/O model) opened the field for further research and discussion of the concept of the military as a profession (Janowitz, 1977; Moskos, 1986; Segal, 1986; Caforio, 1988). The methodological problems inherent in the I/O model are succinctly reviewed by Sørensen (1994). In this study, however, it is stressed that the challenges for the contemporary military with regard to the maintenance and development of its established professional status, go far beyond the confines of any theoretical debate.

Conceptual Analysis

In looking at the wider picture, an initial premise is that in reviewing the literature on the military profession we can identify two distinctive approaches to the analysis of the concept. In the first, a *quantitative* or *typological* approach is almost exclusively concerned with the analysis of the criteria which distinguish the military profession. Some of the resulting studies are reviews of the overall criteria of professionalism (Lang, 1972). More usually, attention focuses on the analysis of a single variable. In the early years of research (c.1970), the critical issue was to find satisfactory classificatory criteria whilst coincidentally evaluating the professional status of the military in comparison with other groups. A number of studies thus concern

themselves with the analysis of these classificatory criteria, either singly or in concert (Wakin, 1986).

The majority of these studies, are devoted to the evaluation of the professional expertise of the military (Harries-Jenkins and Moskos, 1981). In part, this reflects an appreciation of the importance of *pragmatic professionalism*, that is, a situation where the professional soldier is concerned with immediate needs, recognises what is and is not acceptable to the parent society, and is motivated by a determination to ensure the most effective means of goal attainment. This also acknowledges that the military has, as a characteristic in common with other professions, the possession of a specialised body of knowledge acquired through advanced training and experience. The contemporary difficulty, however, is how this expertise is to be defined in a situation in which the role of the armed forces is changing, and where traditional definitions which equate such expertise solely with 'the management of violence' (Lasswell, 1941) are anachronistic.

This problem is central to any discussion of the current status of the military professional. It has both a practical and theoretical dimension. The basic question is the extent to which the contemporary role of the military professional can still be identified with a traditional and narrow definition which equates expertise with the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem (Hackett, 1962). Today, "expertise" in terms of the day-to-day work of the military professional, more generally encompasses the management and application of resources, both physical and human, in deterrent, combat, peace-keeping and humanitarian functions in a world of rapid technological, social and political change.

This differentiation determines the underlying theoretical debate. Such discussion is critical when designing training and education programmes centred around the development of the expertise of the military professional. When considering the extended definition of professional expertise, we can identify three principal objectives of any training programme:

- the identification of the *basic role* of the military professional in the contemporary organisation
- the development of *primary skills* linked to the 'management of violence'
- the recognition of the *secondary* skills needed for the successful implementation of the contemporary professional role.

The continuing dilemma when designing such programmes is how best to achieve a balance between the needs of different and often competing objectives. Traditionally, the acquisition of the primary skills associated with the management of violence has been paramount. Other secondary skills have been subordinate in importance. Today, however, three pressures can be identified as having a major effect upon professional course design and planning, Firstly, there is a pressure to provide a comprehensive programme of education and training, the breadth of which is comparable with that found in courses for other professional groups, even though this may conflict with functional needs of the military. One example of this contradiction is representative of many more. An important feature of universal professional education is an open approach to the dissemination of knowledge. Whilst the

contemporary military places more emphasis than in the past, on keeping personnel informed, features of the military system work against such a policy. "Rank and access to information are intimately related" (Hockey, 1986: 134). As Feld (1959: 18) notes.

> The structuring of information is an integral part of military discipline. Security is not only a precautionary measure, it is also an instrument of authority. It apportions knowledge to rank and thus enables commanders to maintain control over subordinates at times when nothing else responds to their will.

Consequently, the content of traditional professional courses in the armed forces has often tended to be selective both on the grounds of "the need to know" and in response to the wish to recognise "the pertinence of functional knowledge".

Secondly, the emphasis placed on the extension of the professional role to include such attributes as the 'soldier-scholar', 'the soldier-diplomat' or the 'soldier-statesman' necessitates a comprehensive review of traditional course design. This is particularly important in view of the considerable responsibility given to junior officers – and enlisted personnel – in operations other than war (OOW), where imperfect decisions can have considerable dysfunctional consequences. This recognises the potential political implications, in situations such as Northern Ireland, for example, of decisions made by the junior NCO in command of the Brick, the four man patrol team normally used in the operational environment.

Interestingly, the recognition of these potential political implications is highly reminiscent of a nineteenth century situation when junior officers in an expanding Victorian army were frequently given considerable authority and responsibility. During the 1898 Sudan campaign against Mohammed Ahmed, the 'mad' Mahdi, for example, the four hundred miles of the Sudan Military Railway south of Halfa, were built by a young subaltern from the Railway Department of the Royal Engineers. This French Canadian – Bimbashi Girouard – was seen to be

> this crowning wonder of British Egypt – a subaltern
> with all but Cabinet rank (Steevens, 1900: 27)

His basic professionalism was taken for granted.

Finally, there is a lesser but consistent pressure for the introduction into training and education courses, of curricula designed to lessen the skill differential between the military professional and other professionals. Associated with this is the demand for the civilian accreditation of certain courses and qualifications. In part, this is an issue of status. In addition, such pressure reflects the complexities of human resource management (HRM) in the contemporary military. It is indicative of the need to formalise attractive recruitment and retention strategies whilst coincidentally recognising the wish of individuals to acquire professional skills and qualifications which are readily transferable into a second post-military career.

A persistent problem, however, in professional course design is that "civilian" programmes have traditionally incorporated a large measure of what is termed, 'liberal studies'. Consequently, it is necessary to clarify when considering the design of contemporary courses designed to inculcate and develop professional values among military personnel, the determining characteristics of the professional concept.

As we have seen, a traditional strategy was based on the employment of a *quantitative* or *typological* approach. However, the typological approach to the analysis of the military profession creates a number of methodological problems. Apart from the noted difficulty of defining satisfactorily such terms as "expertise", many of the distinguishing criteria of the military profession differ markedly from those conventionally associated with other professions. The development of the military profession considerably antedates the professionalisation during the nineteenth century of other occupational groups. Consequently, the difference of criteria is often most noticeable, as for example, in the absence within armed forces of *professional associations* whose control function is comparable with that of associations in other occupational groups (Harries-Jenkins, 1970). Thus, although we may find in the armed forces of many countries associations of officers, these devote themselves primarily to protecting the material interests of their members. They play little, if any part, in the development of the military, and, in comparison with most other professions, such associations have a very minor role in establishing codes of ethics for group members, or in recruiting and controlling entry to the occupational group (Harries-Jenkins, 1977).

In consequence, *control* can be most readily effected through the imposition of bureaucratic sanctions which negate the image of the military as a semi-autonomous profession. These sanctions confirm the status of the military as a *professionalised bureaucracy*, thereby weakening further the utility of the typological approach as a comprehensive analytical tool of military professionalism.

Because the typological approach is therefore, seen to be methodologically imperfect, analysts have tended today to concentrate on a *qualitative* or *gradualistic* approach. This follows the argument put forward by Hughes that the significant question to ask is not whether a given occupation **is** or **is not** a profession, but rather the extent to which it exhibits characteristics of *professionalisation* (Hughes, 1963). This recognises the difficulties of establishing a body of abstract principles which is the basis of the claim by an occupation to be seen as a profession. Nor can such principles be readily translated into a definitive body of theory which then underpins military professionalism. This is particularly so since such theory as it applies to armed forces, is consistently subject to change as operational techniques and strategies alter over time. *Professionalisation*, on the other hand, is a series of developmental sequences whereby occupations acquire some of the characteristics of the ideal-type professional model. At the same time, it has to be noted that over time the occupational group may lose some of its previously accepted professional characteristics. For the military, this is reflected in a shift away from the absolute criteria inherent in the concept of the *Profession of Arms* (Abrams, 1965: 240). For the British Army, the classic example is the abolition in 1870 of the *Purchase System* whereby officers were able to buy their initial commission and subsequent promotion (Harries-Jenkins, 1977: 59-102).

When applied to the study of contemporary armed forces, this gradualistic strategy accepts that within the military, as a whole, there will be varying levels of professionalisation amongst groups and sub-groups and between the ways in which a military function is exercised. A classical example of such variation is noted by Abrahamsson (1972: 15),

> For instance, the particular set of values and outlooks described as 'the military mind' may be assumed to be most prevalent among commissioned officers, somewhat less among non-commissioned officers, and still less among enlisted men. Common to all three groups, however, is the *relationship* between the process of professionalisation and the holding of indigenous values and outlooks.

Further confirmation of the effect of differing levels of professionalisation within armed forces can be seen in the presence within the military of a complex pattern of sub-cultures and cultures. Whilst it is common to speak of a "military culture", in reality we find that each part of the armed forces generates its own culture. Navy culture is thus very different from an army culture which, in turn, differs materially from an airforce culture. Each is a cause and effect of differing levels of professionalisation; at a marginal level, this is represented by the variety of symbols or rituals which is unique to a given service. More centrally, differences in basic values and norms reflect interpretations of desirable levels of professionalism. In many respects this differentiation is most readily visible in instances of deviancy such as "Tailhook". At the same time, such deviancy may be indicative of the dysfunctional consequences of well-established sub-cultures within the contemporary military. This aspect of military professionalism is analysed in more detail subsequently in this study. At this point, however, it can be noted that conventional studies of the military professional tend to overlook the importance of the culture and sub-culture variables.

One reason for this is that the *gradualistic* approach to the analysis of professionalisation focuses almost exclusively on the professional socialisation of officers, that is the process by which individuals are transformed from a state of relative unawareness of their professional role and function to the state of acute awareness. Apart from any degree of anticipatory socialisation on the part of new entrants to the profession, much of the formal socialisation process is a concomitant of education, training and collegial interaction. Military academies and institutes of advanced military education and training are seen to be of central importance in this process. In many respects this mirrors the thesis that

> The profession as we know it – and as Parsons defines it – depends on the notion of the university as the institution of the intellectual. The modern university with its emphasis on teaching and research provides both the training and the intellectual tradition itself but in some measure incorporates also the legitimating structure of authority and competence. (Jackson, 1970: 4)

Such a conclusion reflects the uniqueness of much education and training in military academies. The latter have been degree awarding institutions; they have either alone or in collaboration with 'civilian' universities, pioneered specific areas of curriculum development, whilst, independently, they have been the guarantors of standards of competency.

Yet it is not only the military academy which has been charged with the development of professionalism within contemporary armed forces. In the same way that in the many civilian occupations, expertise has been gained through practical studies and apprenticeship methods of training, so does the military professional benefit from purposive skill-based activities. This does much to lessen the possible tensions within military education and training programmes between the objective of abstract intellectual training and the instrumental needs of the future military professional. The former may be of importance in itself, particularly in terms of the liberal values of a widely based programme, but it is the latter which is of more immediate relevance both to the military establishment and to the individual. The consistent problem facing programme planners in the military, in common with those responsible for other programmes of professional education, however, is how best to balance the idea of "education for life" with the more instrumental needs of a specific "education for task". Ideally, programmes of professional education and training are designed to meet both objectives; in reality, a hierarchy of priorities has to be established.

TWO MODELS OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

From an extended analysis of the literature of military professionalism, it becomes clear that analysts have tended to adopt different approaches and concepts in their discussions. In a perceptive review of the two debates, 'from institution to occupation' and 'esprit de corps', Sørensen (1994: 599) concludes that there is both a lack of empirical testing and of conceptual clarification. The latter is particularly marked when attention is given to the evaluation of specific variables such as the future role of the military professional. More generally, it is possible to identify two distinctive models of military professionalism which underlie the discussions in this area:

- The concept of the Profession of Arms
- The concept of the Pragmatic Military Profession

The characteristics of these two models can be seen in Figure One:

Figure One

Two Models of Military Professionalism

CHARACTERISTIC	PROFESSION OF ARMS	PRAGMATIC PROFESSION
Membership	Exclusive	Inclusive
Identity	Homogeneous	Heterogeneous
Structure	Singular	Pluralist
Role	Combat	Constabulary
Image	Heroic warrior	Manager-technocrat
Authority Base	Role	Rules

These models are, very much, theoretical constructs. They are a reflection of ideal types which, in reality, may not exist. Indeed, in practice and particularly in terms of comparative analysis, contemporary military professionalism will exhibit features of both models, not least because the pace of change varies from one national military to another. Significantly, however, the paradigms which constitute the collection of broad sets of often unstated values, beliefs and attitudes which underly these two models, continue to be distinctive. This will be discussed in greater detail at a subsequent point. At this stage, it can be noted that the two models continue to reflect their respective historical and cultural backgrounds.

The concept of the *Profession of Arms*, for instance has a long and distinguished history. Its neo-feudal origins can be traced to the acquisition by the sovereign of control of the military. Such control was effected in western Europe through a complex legal system of land tenure and knight service. The structure was linked to a chivalric code of honour that was international in its applicability but, as the demand for a more technically professional military increased, there was a noticeable shift

from the dominance of amateur aristocratic officers to the emergence of a professionalised officer corps. Over time, the latter became predominantly middle class, the hall-mark of officership, nevertheless, continuing to be the "commission". This contrasted markedly with the complementary use of the "warrant" to give status to qualified specialists. It is this structural diversity, further complicated during the late nineteenth century by the emergence of highly specialised corps whose professional role differed considerably from the traditional combat role of the cavalry and infantry, which complicates any review of the nature of military professionalism. At the same time, a consistent reaction by traditionalists to the identification of these "new" officers as members of the *Profession of Arms* (Turner, 1956), encouraged within armed forces the persistence of a very limited definition of "the military profession". Essentially, it was linked to the importance of the core activity of the military which defines its very existence and means, that is, *combat*. Since the primary role of armed forces is training for and fighting in war, the image of the professional military was, and is, synonymous with the combat masculine-warrior paradigm (Dunivin, 1994: 533).

Throughout the West, the officer corps, especially that of the traditional non-technical arms, consistently opposed progressive professionalisation which would inevitably, challenge the dominance of the concept of the *Profession of Arms* (Demeter, 1962; van Doorn, 1965). However, a challenge which would ultimately materially change perceptions of military professionalism was inherent in the hypothesis by Janowitz that there would be an extended shift of recruitment from

> A narrow, relatively high, social status base to a broader
> base, more representative of the population as a whole
> (1960: 10).

Whether this shift emanates from an increased demand for larger numbers of trained specialists or from political policies of positive discrimination is, in the context of this study, of little, if any, importance. What **is** significant, however, is the nature of the reaction to this shift in recruitment. Firstly, when a stress on the exclusiveness and solidarity of the officer corps, ideally represented by the common aristocratic origin of officers and the concomitant sense of belonging to an elite, could no longer retard the process of professionalisation, other philosophies become important. These, in turn, affirm the exclusiveness and uniqueness of the officer corps whilst, ideally, re-affirming the continuity of the traditional model of military professionalism. They also ensure that, as the officer corps becomes more socially representative and more heterogeneous, organisational control can still be maintained. A subtle aspect of such control is the continued emphasis placed on the importance as a criterion of professionalism, of the *code of honour*.

Such a code is more usually in the literature on professional behaviour equated with the internalised *code of ethics* which as Barber (1963) points out is one of the essential attributes of such behaviour. The link between the *code of honour* and the traditional concept of the *Profession of Arms*, is exemplified in the honour code adopted by US service academies. The assertion that, "We will not lie, cheat or steal [nor tolerate those among us who do]", epitomises a wish to guide the ethical development of cadets and midshipmen in preparation for their future roles as, "officers and gentlemen". Broadly speaking this 'ethical development' is comparable

with that which is the objective of other professional training and education programmes. Two points, however, can be made.

Firstly, the emphasis placed on the importance of the code of honour as an aspect of social control within armed forces, operationalises,

> A belief that, somehow, this line of work is one with a
> special moral status, special moral problems and special
> moral demands. (Ficarrotta, 1997: 59)

This is an assertion, the basis for which reflects very closely the justification for the value-system in many other professions, especially those associated with a process of mystification where, "the professional becomes necessarily the high priest of that area of knowledge in which he is acknowledged to be competent" (Jackson, 1970: 7). So, for the military as a whole, the justification of the need for them to have higher moral standards than other occupations, is linked to the claimed uniqueness of the military calling. It is also a logical consequence of the traditional basic values of the concept of the *Profession of Arms*; there is consequently a continuing belief within parts of the military that officers **should** continue to be bound strictly by a specific code of moral standards.

Secondly, a significant piece of research draws attention to the particular difficulties faced in this context by sub-groups. In the case of women at the US Naval Academy, for example, it is argued that women as a social sub-group are over-represented at the Academy as 'honor violators'. It is suggested that they are indirectly targeted because of their high visibility, the greater likelihood of their being perceived as sub-performers and the lower likelihood of their being protected by norms concerning peer loyalty (Pershing, 2001). Comparable comments can be made with regard to other marginalised sub-groups within armed forces. In this context, we can note that firstly, all these groups and sub-groups operate within the confines of what is, in many respects, a *total institution*. They tend to be inward looking, establishing their own pattern of values and beliefs which guide and regulate occupational behaviour. Over time, a complex and often dysfunctional normative code develops which imposes sanctions on those who 'are deemed to have transgressed its precepts' (Hockey, 1986: 123). This unofficial code challenges and often contradicts conventional interpretations of prefessionalism. A marked example of this is where sub-groups question the expectation that all members of the military will accept unquestioningly the pattern of corporateness and collegiality which is generated by the official socialisation process. Moreover, attempts made by authority to ensure conformity through the imposition of sanctions, tends to be counter-productive in that they increase rather than lessen a sense of opposition within the sub-group. Sanctions which are based on the implementation of equal opportunities legislation or which are designed to eradicate sexual discrimination, seem to attract particular reactions from some sub-groups (Vogelaar, 1998). The persistent dilemma is that while the unofficial normative code is welcome when it creates a sense of cohesion amongst personnel, it becomes unwelcome when it poses a threat to the maintenance of good order and discipline (Winslow, 1999). A further cause of tension is the extent to which issues of discipline are reflective of the hierarchical structure of the military as an organisation, whereas the philosophy of corporateness and collegiality is

symptomatic of the status of armed forces as a profession. Sub-groups can feel disadvantaged in both respects.

Increasingly, the emphasis placed within this model of the *Profession of Arms* on the need for the military to maintain high moral standards associated with a code of honour or a code of ethics, is subject to critical review. In part, this is a response to the development of a highly technical, multi-skilled military in which individuals adopt a *cosmopolitan* rather than *local* frame of reference. This encourages comparisons between life in the military and life in the parent society. More rarely, the critical review examines in depth the complexities which arise when seeking to define the concept, 'moral standards' (de Young, 2001). The need for armed forces to maintain such standards, however, usually presumes that there is a functional justification for them. The functional argument recognises that the military demonstrates possibly unique reasons for the need for a high level of co-operation amongst personnel. Linked with this is the need for the demonstration of such personal qualities as 'bravery'; 'selflessness'; 'conscientiousness' (Ficarrotta, 1997: 64) thus imposing strict demands on behaviour and character. This is most readily realised in practice through the emergence within the group of a significant level of *cohesion*. The latter can be defined as

> The bonding together of its members in such a way as
> to sustain their will and commitment to each other
> (Johns, 1984: 9).

Conventionally, this is associated with a high level of *horizontal integration* or peer bonding. Ideally, such bonding consolidates and develops further the code of honour. Such bonding also enhances the sense of corporateness which is consistently identified as a major characteristic of effective professionalisation. It also reinforces the exclusive and homogeneous images of the *Profession of Arms*. There is, however, ample evidence to suggest that in certain situation, the sub-group, whilst developing a sense of cohesion, is far from being professional in its development of what are essentially subversive tendencies. Here, group bonding poses a threat to legitimate authority since small group loyalty becomes more important than the maintenance of good order and discipline. To avoid this, it may be preferable for the bonding process to be linked more positively with *vertical integration*. This emphasises the importance of effective leadership in the process, particularly in the development of appropriate professional attitudes and values. Yet there is a danger that the ideal-type of leadership in the context of the identification of military professionalism with the *Profession of Arms*, continues to be equated with anachronistic images. The classic example of the latter is seen in the declaration by the Commanding Officer of 168 Officer Cadet Training Unit in England in 1941 that,

> Man management is not a subject which can be
> 'taught'; it is an attitude of mind, and with the old
> school tie men this was instinctive and part of the
> philosophy of life (**The Times** 16 January, 1941).

The Pragmatic Military Profession

The second model of military professionalism, *The Pragmatic Military Profession*, is of more recent origin. It represents a major theoretical shift from the 'trait' or 'attributional' approaches to professionalism which, for armed forces, are conventionally associated with the long-established concept of the *Profession of Arms*. Whereas these approaches persistently sought, usually in vain, to isolate **the** defining characteristic of the military as a profession, the pragmatic approach is primarily concerned with the analysis of the process of professionalisation. Its starting point is the critical evaluation of the status of the non-specialist or generalist within the military. Traditionally, this status represented the epitome of expertise within armed forces. Its importance was reflected in role identification in the way in which the most prestigious officer branch in the Royal Air Force was Trenchard's concept of the General Duties Officer (James, 1990: 133ff). In the United Kingdom, more generally, the concept of the generalist was a dominant feature of the Home Civil Service, whilst the tradition in the military of the 'gifted amateur', died hard. In the United States, this status was initially linked to the rejection of the 'chevalier' image associated with the *Profession of Arms*, and the coincidental preference fro what Cunliffe (1968) termed, the 'rifleman image'. This emphasis on the practical, down-to-earth ability of the ordinary individual in the armed forces was a continuation of a long-standing militia tradition (Perret, 1989).

A pragmatic philosophy, however, recognises the ever-increasing importance in the contemporary military of the possession of specific skills and knowledge. The 'generalist' continues to have an important part to play, particularly at lower rank levels or where the principle of *inter operability* requires all personnel to demonstrate their possession of common basic military skills. Over time, however, there is a need for the specialist whose advanced skills are best acquired through extensive training and education, preferably in the form of full-time structured programmes. This ensure that the military professional appreciates immediate needs, is aware of what is acceptable to the parent society and, most importantly, can identify the truly effective way of getting a job done (the functionalist thesis). At the same time, this enhanced degree of professionalisation justifies the claim of members of the military to their monopoly of the legitimate use of force (the monopoly thesis).

The associated theoretical model is complex. Whereas the model of the *Profession of Arms* was traditionally isolated from the pressures of the parent society, the *pragmatic* model is consistently subject to public review and critical appreciation. This is exemplified in the extension to the military profession of civil legislation, such as the **Canadian Human Rights Act** (1978) and the **Charter of Rights and Freedoms** (1985). Such external pressure is complemented by demands within the military for the development of skills to a level comparable with that to be found in other occupational groups. Some thirty years ago, for example, as the pragmatic debate took off a strong case was argued for a new policy in which officer graduate education at civilian universities should be a pre-requisite for promotion above middle rank levels (Taylor and Bletz, 1974). These external and internal pressures continue to shape the characteristics of this pragmatic model of military professionalisation. National legislation, for instance, is now complemented by international decisions such as KRIEL v BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTCHSLAND (Court of Justice of the European Communtiy: C-285/98) and SIRDAR v THE ARMY BOARD,

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE (ECJ Case: C-273/97). In both cases, the traditional exclusion of women from direct combat on the ground occupational specialties, was brought into question. In the German case, the decision of the Court that such exclusion was contrary to the 1976 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DIRECTIVE on direct discrimination (76/207/EEC), ensured that the rules and regulation which shaped the pragmatic model, were as equally applicable to women as to men. The British case was more complex. The decision reached by the Court revolved around the legal issue of 'derogation'. With regard to the concept of *The Pragmatic Military Profession*, however, the importance of the reached decision was its emphasis on the need to keep under constant review the rules and regulations which shape the characteristics of contemporary military professionalism (Harries-Jenkins, 2002). This is a salutary reminder of the extent to which this is very much a dynamic model.

Comparative Analysis

The nature of such dynamism can be most readily identified through the comparative analysis of the basic characteristics of these two models. The notion of change, per se, in the defining characteristics of 'profession' is, by now means, new. It is for example, a central feature of the Moskos-Janowitz debate about the shift within the military from the institution to the occupation model (the I/O debate). Analysis, however, not only identifies the parameters of change today, but also clarifies the source of the pressure for change.

From Figure One, it can be seen that the primary difference between the classicl concept of the *Profession of Arms* and the model of the *Pragmatic Military Profession* is the move from 'exclusive' to 'inclusive' membership. This difference exemplifies the 'shift in officer recruitment' to which Janowitz drew attention in his third working hypothesis for the analysis of the military as a profession (1960: 10-11). In the beginning, the nature of this 'shift' was almost exclusively identified with changes in the *social* base of recruitment to the military elite (Little, 1971). A considerable body of literature subsequently considered this aspect of military professionalisation. Some looked at specific national case studies (Otley, 1970; Martin, 1981). More rarely, we were presented with an in-depth analysis. Thus, Segal and Segal in an innovative paper in 1971, drew our attention to the nature of this shift within the specific context of a developmental framework. They suggested that in a *pre-bureaucratic* model, the important factors are the existence of ascriptive, traditionalist and affective bases of recruitment. In the context of our discussion, this concept is highly reminiscent of the historical *Profession of Arms* model. Subsequently, however, this model they argue, is succeeded by a *bureaucratic* model in which the concept of military professionalism is closely linked to the philosophy of 'affective political neutrality'. We would argue that this thesis is very reminiscent of the scenario of the Huntington/Janowitz debate, the theoretical base of which is cogently analysed by Burk (2002). Finally, Segal and Segal identified a *post-bureaucratic* model in which recruitment and promotion are linked to the recognition of the need in the contemporary military for pragmatic, technical, organisational and administrative skills.

When we examine further the nature of this shift from 'ascription' to 'achievement', and from 'generalist' to 'specialist' today, a consistent and significant variable is the

effect of a move from an 'exclusive' to 'inclusive' base of recruitment upon the composition of the officer corps of western military establishments. In many respects, changes within armed forces are comparable with changes in other professions, but,

> The pattern and strategies of recruitment are not uniform and isomorphic between or among military and civilian professions (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1976: 113).

The notion of 'inclusive' membership thus goes further not only to acknowledge that the military, as a profession, now recruits from a wider range of aspirants but also to recognise its effects. In part, this is a response to the need to meet force levels ('business'); in part, it is a response to demands for equality, particularly gender equality ('equity'). Even so, although the increased recruitment from this wider range is indicative of the noted 'shift', minorities continue to be under-represented in western armed forces in comparison with their relative numbers in society. Manigart (2002: 46-49) in a review of the current representation of women in the Belgian armed forces where, legally, all occupational specialisms are open to them, thus shows that they continue to be under-represented. From Figure Two, it can be seen that although their number has increased since 1976, they continue to be under-represented to the extent that they still qualify as a 'token population' according to Kanter's definition (1977: 208-9). This argues that the male/female ratio for such a population is 85/15. For the status of women to be elevated to that of a 'minority population', the ratio must be 65/35.

Figure Two

Representation of Women in the Belgian Armed Forces

Year	Officers		NCOs		Enlisted		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1976	0	0	0	0	1067	2.1	1067	1.22
1987	143	2.2	60.6	2.6	2724	9.1	3473	3.75
1991	139	2.1	790	3.6	2141	9.2	3070	5.91
1998	210	3.8	1033	5.4	1891	9.9	3113	7.30
1999	218	4.1	1030	5.6	1899	10.1	3147	7.42
2000	227	4.5	1021	5.7	1954	10.1	3202	7.60
2001	236	4.7	1017	5.9	1937	10.1	3190	7.70

Source: MOD, Belgium

It can be concluded from this example, which is more generally representative of the situation in western armed forces, that the extent of the shift in recruitment to which attention has been drawn, continues to be minimal. Indeed, as a result of downsizing, the recorded *percentage increases* in the proportion of women in the military can obscure a *numerical decrease* in their absolute number. In short, the military profession continues to be essentially homogeneous in terms of its gender. Only in

Canada and the United States does the percentage of women approach double figures at 11.4% and 14.0% respectively (NATO Review 2000/2001).

The emergence of an 'inclusive' membership is both a cause and effect of a growth of *heterogeneity* within the military profession. One feature of this, as Janowitz forecast (1960: 10) is the postulated change in the social base of recruitment to the officer corps and the effect of this upon the concept of the military profession. A more significant issue, however, is that of the effect upon the concept of the noted major increase in the number of *skilled specialists* who are recruited. In the past it was argued that such differentiation did not affect the continued dominance of the classical image of military professionalism. Thus van Doorn argues in 1975 that,

> The presence of numerous specialists in the army, both within and outside the Officer Corps, does not alter the fact that the central skill and the distinct sphere of officership is, in Laswell's phrase, "the management of violence" (1975: 265).

A quarter of a century later, we can advance an alternative conclusion. Today, the pragmatic military profession is characterised by multiple 'spheres of officership'. When we review and categorise the plethora of occupational specialties which exist in a contemporary western armed force, it is readily evident that the sharp distinction which may have existed between 'combat arms' and the rest, no longer exists as such. A growth in heterogeneity results in a considerable blurring, for example, between the role of 'combat personnel' and 'combat support personnel' let alone 'combat service personnel'.

A number of issues arise. In the first instance, a contentious issue is the degree to which an increase in specialisation within the officer corps coincidentally results in a demand for the modernisation and/or the democratisation of the military profession. The contemporary stress which is to be seen in the legal and medical professions in this context, is mirrored within armed forces by increasing criticism of the conservatism of the military profession. As one critic comments,

> The military must begin to view the warrior as a soldier whose job extends beyond combat and whose ability transcends gender or sexual orientation (Dunivin, 1994: 542).

Secondly, a secondary dimension of increased specialisation is the possible implication of this for the professional prestige of the military. The status of the classic *Profession of Arms* varied considerably according to the nationality of the armed force and the time of evaluation. Even so, a common variable was the social distance between members of the military and the citizenship of the parent society (Soëters, 1997). This, together with the projected image of armed forces, especially the officer corps, materially affected assessment of prestige and the designation of status. With the increased recruitment of specialists to the military, however, not only may this social distance disappear, but assessment can consider as the basis of evaluation not the primary military skills and associated image, but the status of individuals as skilled achievement professionals in their own right.

Perhaps, the most significant aspect of the growth of heterogeneity in this pragmatic model is the increase in the breadth of skills and experience which constitute the 'sphere of officership'. No longer is the primary question the identification of the distinctions between the noted categories of military occupational specialties such as 'combat', 'combat support', 'combat service' and so on. Now, an important aspect of heterogeneity is the emergence of new categories of military professionalism. The idea of the 'soldier scholar'. 'soldier diplomat', 'soldier statesman' or 'soldier humanitarian' thus draws attention to the increasingly heterogeneous scope of military activities.

An issue of increasing importance in the evolution of the comcept of the pragmatic military profession, is the development of an alternative *pluralist structure*. As we have suggested a defining characteristic of the traditional model of military professionalism is the singularity of purpose. The shift towards pluralism can be identified in a number of areas. Moskos thus pointed out in 1973 that a 'plural military' was emerging with a structure and value-system that could dialectically accommodate both civilianised and traditional military professionalism (Moskos, 1973: 255-80). An important structural characteristic more significantly reflects the status of the traditional model of armed forces as the ideal-type model for all other bureaucracies. Its authority structure is typically identified with a rigid hierarchy of command. The model is simple. The hierarchy rests on a broad base of basically unskilled enlisted personnel under the command of a superior with limited expertise who is in turn under the command of a senior superior. At each successive echelon or rank grade, there is an officer of higher rank who controls subordinates through the exercise of legal sanctions. This authority structure creates the traditional hierarchical pyramid which is a defining characteristic of all bureaucratised organisations.

With the growing demand in the pragmatic model of military professionalisation for an increased recruitment and retention of technical specialists, a number of issues arise. Firstly, the emphasis placed in this ideal-type model on authority derived from rank, contrasts markedly with the reality of authority associated with the possession of expertise. The associated potential conflict, which is so frequently the basis of popular accounts of military life, can materially affect the performance of armed forces, particularly in the field. The degree of conflict which can arise between specialists of equal rank, becomes more acute when those involved are in a superior/subordinate relationship. This is very much so if such a relationship is in inverse proportion to the respective levels of expertise. Gender considerations then accentuate the problem even further. Secondly, there is the complex question of the relationship in the organisation between the office-holder and the staff of specialists who are needed to assist the bureaucrat in the control of subordinate groups and sub-groups. Many of these specialists find that their performance is controlled by two distinctive institutions. Their professional association controls occupational activities by establishing general standards and norms. The organisation at the same time lays down task objectives, targets and goals whilst specifying the means by which there are realised. In practice, the contrast is between the *vertical* structure of the bureaucratic organisation and the *horizontal* structure of the profession. How far this affects the capacity and ability of a military to innovate, raises further interesting questions in terms of both operational and structural demands.

The pluralist characteristic of pragmatism, however, is something more than a structuralist distinction. Indeed, its most important feature may be more correctly identified as the alternative value-system with which it is associated. The traditional or classical model of the *Profession of Arms* emphasises the importance of a set of attitudes, values and beliefs which 'inform a correct understanding for future officers' (Snider et al, 2001). Clearly, the identification of a 'correct understanding' is highly subjective. One approach when evaluating changes in contemporary military professionalisation, accordingly draws attention to the belief that successful military cultures are dependent upon such criteria as

> Soldiers who are tough and self-sacrificial, the importance of structure and a clear chain of command, mutual trust among soldiers, accurate internal communication flows, meritocratic promotion systems, the absence of sexual harassment and the institution's trust in political leaders (Snider et al, 261).

This image of the *heroic warrior* is very closely identified with the primary *combat role* of an armed force. Whilst it is conventionally associated in the literature with membership of the officer corps and with officer cadet training programmes in military academies, it is in reality equally relevant to the status of enlisted personnel in combat specialties. At all rank levels, and irrespective of service, complications arise however when increased specialisation brings with it significant developments in these 'attitudes, values and belief'. Some of this is a derivative of the 'new roles' which are exercised by the pragmatic military (Johansson, 1998). More generally, the emergence of the *manager-technocrat* image represents both a quantitative increase in the percentage of specialists within a national armed force and a qualitative increase in the breadth of technical skills which contemporary military personnel are required to possess. From an historical perspective, neither increase is entirely novel. In the United States in the nineteenth century, West Point was a pioneering institution for the teaching of engineering. In the United Kingdom, the evolution of the Scientific Corps (the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers) with its own Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, provided the base upon which 'new' universities based their research and teaching. In both cases, however, as in Continental Europe the dominance of the heroic warrior image persistently lessened the status of non-combat corps. Today, the *manager-technocrat* image challenges this dominance.

One feature of this which is of particular importance in the analysis of pragmatic military professionalism, is the evolution of an alternative value-system that underlies this image. The existence of this system is central to our greater understanding of the importance of the concept of their professionalism to contemporary western armed forces. This is reflected in the substantial body of literature which considers such a value-system. This study, however, concentrates only on the latter as it relates to the concept of the *pragmatic military profession.*

Much of this literature focuses, almost exclusively, on the influence of professional military education at the pre-commissioning level on the development of 'values, attitudes and perspectives' (Snider et al, 2001: 250-70). The study of West Point is comprehensive (Priest, 1982; Stevens et al, 1994; Priest and Beach, 1998; Franke, 2000) More rarely are there studies of attitude formation within the Navy (Bodnar,

1999) and even, more rarely, comparative studies (Soëters, 1997). In recent years, research has looked more critically at attitude formation outwith formal education programmes (Vogelaar, 1998; Titunik, 2000). It would, however, be injudicious to conclude from these studies that the totality of professional values within armed forces is linked to the *heroic-warrior* image. For groups and sub-groups within the military, the associated value-system incorporates many of the classical attitudes and perceptions linked to the uniqueness of the function of armed forces. It does, however, also represent the importance of the internalised professional interests of the group or sub-group.

One indication of the complexities of these shifts from the combat role/heroic-warrior image to a constabulary/manager-technocrat image, lies in the subtle changes of the *authority base* within the contemporary military profession. Traditionally, that base within the *Profession of Arms* model was linked to the importance of the degree of control implicit in the concept of *role*. As in other professional groups, authority within the military could in theory be most effectively exercised by ensuring that group members were very aware of - and accepted – their role, that is, the expected pattern of behaviour in a given situation. A common feature of pre-qualification education and training was thus the inculcation of this sense of role. When in some armed forces, it could no longer be assumed that such a sense would be initially ensured through anticipatory socialisation, more sophisticated professional training programmes were introduced. From a legal perspective, however, there was always a complex relationship between the exercise of authority on the basis of role and the underlying reality that the military, as an organisation, exercised draconian powers. Moreover, the greater recruitment of women and minority groups to the military, together with the demonstrated need for a greater number of technical specialists within armed forces has made it increasingly difficult to rely solely on the concept of role as the basis for the exercise of authority. This has been particularly so since one of the post-modern trends in today's armed forces, has been a greater willingness to challenge the logic of the concept. The notion of 'an expected pattern of behaviour', has been questioned by reference to 'whose expected pattern?'. To critics of the concept, it seems that 'role' continues to be identified with anachronistic images of the *Profession of Arms*. These are images which have seemingly remained unchanged since the 1840s when Sir John MacDonald, the Adjutant-General of the British Army, declared,

> It is the proud characteristic of the British Army that its officers are gentlemen by education, manners and habits; that some are men of the first families in the country, and some of large property, but the rules and regulations of the service require strictly that they should conduct themselves as ought gentlemen in every situation in which they may be placed. (**The Times**, 24 October, 1840)

Consequently, to many modernists, a shift to the placing of a greater reliance on the use of 'rules' as the basis of authority is both functional and normatively desirable. This also accords with the extension to the military, of management philosophies which prefer the certainties of bureaucratic principles to the uncertainty of behavioural precepts. Most importantly, this re-assures members of many sub-groups

that authority is linked to relatively objective rules rather than to the subjective interpretation of their role in terms of the expected pattern of behaviour.

Accordingly, as an alternative to the introduction and development of revised programmes of professional education and training which would focus on the exclusive importance of 'role' as the basis of authority, armed forces in the west have tended to favour a greater reliance on the use of *rules* to maintain discipline. This acknowledges that,

> Maintaining and fostering discipline is a responsibility
> of any military superior and, in particular, the
> commander. It implies a thorough knowledge of the
> norms and maintenance procedures that are valid in the
> armed forces….. (van Gorp and Jofriet, 1998).

Popular accounts of the use of rules as a means of exercising control within armed forces, conventionally draw attention to their harshness and rigidity. In practice, however, these rules are subtle and exceedingly complex in both their form and utilisation. Technically, distinctions can be drawn between disciplinary law, criminal law and administrative regulations, each of which forms part of a complicated set of rules. Moreover, in contemporary operations other than war (OTW), military personnel are also subject to the rules of engagement (ROE) and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Accordingly, 'a commander is (also) confronted with a host of written and unwritten legal rules' (van Duurling and Kroon, 1998).

One objective of professional training, particularly in the field of leadership, is ensuring that personnel are familiar with these rules and their applicability. This also recognises the significance of the 'dialectic of control'.

As has been noted, there is evidence within the military of a long-term shift in the locus of immediate authority within the hierarchy of command. This can be variously attributed to changes in the role of the military, technological innovation, the context of operational leadership, societal pressure and so on. One result of this is the enhanced responsibility given to junior officers and enlisted personnel.

> As the military takes on an ever-increasing number of
> these kinds of politico-military missions, one can see a
> changing role for the junior-level soldier. No longer is
> it enough to associate the junior soldier, the E-1 through
> E-5, solely with traditional war-making functions
> (Seaton, 1994: 549).

A comparable conclusion can be reached for junior officers, particularly at the level of tactical leadership. The associated professional dilemma, however, is that on the one hand, junior leaders continue to respond to traditional role expectations. As a Dutch senior officer comments with regard to the work of his subordinates in Cambodia,

> They could not contact me for consultation or
> permission. They could act because they knew I trusted

them and that they "were in my mind" (Cammaert,
1998: 34).

On the other hand, technological advances in communication have encouraged the
centralisation of control and the micro-management of operations by 'headquarters'.
These two conflicting trends represent the juxtaposition of the identified models of
military professionalism. The emphasis placed on the importance of *role* as a
determinant of an expected pattern of behaviour in a given situation, particularly one
of crisis, represents a significant characteristic of the classical model of the *Profession
of Arms*. In contrast, micro-management through the use of control mechanisms,
notably in decision-making, reflects the philosophy underlying the pragmatic model
of military professionalism. The consequent question is how this issue of the
'dialectic of control' can be most readily resolved.

In the context of an analysis of contemporary military professionalisation, there are in
this context, two areas of particular interest. The first is the identification of the most
appropriate professional education and training programmes for military personnel.
This involves the discussion of the two constituent parts of the 'dialectic of control',
as well as the re-evaluation of the 'role' and 'rules' interaction. It also necessitates a
re-consideration of the changes which have occurred over the last forty years to the
idea of 'Trends in Political Indoctrination' which constitutes Janowitz's fifth working
hypothesis for an analysis of the military profession. The broad social and political
perspectives which he associated with 'career experiences and military indoctrination
at all levels' (1960: 12) can now be refined. The second area of interest, therefore, is
the critical review of the characteristics of **new** professional roles. The *soldier-
scholar*, for example, is concerned with the conditions for applying force in the
context of the post-Cold War military force. The *soldier-stateman's* role reflects the
complexity of the political problems of contemporary military operations. Preparing
military personnel for these and comparable new roles requires considerable
innovation in professional education, training and organisation.

This is a particularly complex facet of contemporary military professionalisation. The
'new' missions of the post-Cold War era have considerable potential for changing
traditional interpretations of the military function. An emphasis on the importance of
multi-national missions, for example, quickly draws attention to the political
implications of military operations. This suggests that the "blending of political and
military factors" (Boëne, 1996) is now a major determinant of the way in which we
determine the constituent elements of programmes designed to enhance the
professionalisation of military personnel.

Military professionalisation within groups and sub-groups

As has been suggested, a significant feature of the contemporary western military
force structure is the emergence of accession and personnel policies which favour
increased recruitment from previously under-represented and/or excluded groups.
The reasons for this policy change are complex. An underlying primary problem was
spelt out by Janowitz some thirty years ago. He argued that,

> The basic features of an advanced industrialised society
> create problems in the recruitment and management of

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> military manpower…..The rise of the welfare state with unemployment compensation and social security payments, plus mass education (also) undermine the traditional system of recruitment. Those who can be impressed into military service because of sheer poverty are fewer in number and marginal persons have the alternative benefits of the welfare state (1973: 5).

When faced with such problems, one alternative has been to create a technologically advanced force (TAF) which is smaller but better. This creates a demand for recruits whose status can be determined not by their numerical strength, but by their sheer quality and possession of skills. This move from a labour-intensive to a capital-intensive military has brought into the system groups of officers and enlisted personnel with very specific professional needs. Indeed, Segal and his colleagues go so far as to suggest that such recruitment develops a specific type of military professionalism in which practitioners are sharply differentiated from non-practitioners (Segal et al, 1999: 6). At the same time, this business need for carefully identified skilled personnel, has been complemented by demands, often supported by legislation, that specific 'equity needs' be satisfied. In practice, this has resulted in the increased recruitment of women into diverse occupational specialties, for this has satisfied the conditions of both criteria of 'needs'.

It would, therefore, be incorrect to assume that a concern with the professional status of women in the contemporary military, is simply the result of a wish to solve the problems of the noted shortfalls in recruitment and retention. The debate about this professional role represents a more general concern in western industralised society, with the extent to which this and other groups are more generally disadvantaged in employment situations. The issue has produced a considerable body of research. Some of this is now more than thirty years old (Fidell and Lamater, 1971) but the debate in the military still continues. A common theme is the extent to which military professionalism can be equated with professionalism in other occupational areas. An associated question is the extent to which the operational demands of the military as a combat force prevent an increasing convergence with the norms and values of other civilian organisations. This is especially important with regard to pressures in the parent society for the equality of opportunity in the military (Woodward and Winter, 2003). This is irrespective of whether this is based on gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation.

We can conclude, therefore, that the variety of those groups will increase over time. This is partly because western armed forces require a wider range of technically qualified specialists. It is partly a response to societal pressure for enhanced recruitment from hitherto under-represented groups. When considering their professional status or degree of professionalisation, it becomes clear that these members of the military are faced with considerable challenges. One central issue is neatly summarised by Fenner (2001: 21).

> We have structured a system in the military – a defining institution of our polity – in which out-groups are either ostracised, banned from participating, or limited in opportunities and benefits.

The further analysis of these 'out-groups' is fraught with methodological and analytical problems. We can begin from the premise that they face three distinctive challenges. Firstly, they are affected by the general issues which we have discussed previously. In critically analysing, however, their relationship to the two identified models of military professionalism, it can be concluded that further specific research is required to determine whether such groups are more affected by such issues then the remainder of the military. Secondly, there are precise areas of special concern which are unique to these groups and sub-groups. Here, much of the published literature reflects the specific experience of women as a group within the military (Simon, 2001). We would suggest, however, that the challenges faced by other groups and sub-groups equally merit further analysis and consideration. In particular, we would draw attention to the challenges increasingly faced within the contemporary military by sub-groups of technical specialists, irrespective of their formal rank within the military organisation. The encountered difficulties are by no means novel. Because the fusion of profession and organisation is almost complete in the military environment, intra-group strain is usually conceptualised in terms of the noted conflict between professional (role) and bureaucratic (rules) authority. As we have seen, both have many characteristics in common, not least those identified by Parsons as a set of defining variables. An alternative perception emphasises the effect of distinctive frames of reference which are derived from the contrast between the armed bureaucrat (Feit, 1973) and the achievement professional (Harries-Jenkins, 1971).

Finally, these groups and sub-groups are very much affected by immediate contemporary problems, a major feature of which is their transitory nature. A primary example of this, drawn from British experience, are the difficulties faced in terms of her professional career development, by the first woman officer to complete successfully the *All-Arms Commando Course* (AACC). Captain 'Pip' Tattersall, a former Roedean pupil, was awarded the coveted Green Beret but was not immediately posted to the Commando Logistic Regiment, a vital support unit to combat operations in 3 Commando Brigade. She remained badged to her parent unit, the Adjutant-General's Corps. Whilst the media vehemently criticised the failure to post her away from her previous appointment as an instructor at the Army Foundation College, (**The Sunday Telegraph**, 25 August 2002), objective analysis suggests that the rules and regulations of personnel planning have been carefully followed. We again see the potential tensions for these groups and sub-groups, of the interaction between the bureaucratic rules and regulations of the military as an organisation and the development policies and practices of the military as a profession.

This profession-organisation dialectic has long been a major topic in academic studies of armed forces. An established theoretical base is succinctly reviewed by van Doorn (1975). He draws attention both to the emergence of 'formal organisation' and to the increased professionalisation of 'the officership'. As we have noted, a significant characteristic of this dialectic which can be noted increasingly in the contemporary military is, 'the fusion of profession and organisation' (1975: 37-42). Even so, it is essential, when reviewing the contemporary effect of this dialectic, to appreciate that **all** military personnel, irrespective of rank and occupational specialties, **are** members of a highly structured, sophisticated bureaucratic organisation. At the same time, individuals will be affected by varying degrees of professionalisation. This **Report** is

very much concerned with the extended analysis of these differences, as they affect groups and sub-groups within the contemporary military.

A starting point for such analysis is the identification of three areas of particular concern. These can be summarised as 'the problem of the three Cs':

- The combat-warrior paradigm.
- The status of the non-commissioned professional.
- The professional culture.

The combat-warrior

Although we can see considerable evidence of the interaction within armed forces between mission changes and technological innovation, the persistence of the 'fighting spirit' is most marked. This heroic-warrior image can be readily rationalised. Notwithstanding any possible shift towards a constabulary role, the basic defining characteristic of the military which distinguishes it from other large-scale complex organisations, continues to be its *combat* function. Yet for two sub-groups in the armed forces, the associated combat-warrior image materially affects their professional requirements. For women in the military and for many technical specialists, the military profession requires a new set of self-conceptions. In the recent past, it appeared that this would be satisfied in the identification of three major professional roles within armed forces: the heroic leader, military manager and military technologist (Janowitz, 1960: 21). The *heroic leader* role is a continuance of the classical philosophies inherent in the concept of the Profession of Arms. The *military manager* can be defined as the professional with effective links to civilian society whose function reflects the scientific pragmatic and objective dimensions of war-making. The *military technologist* is instrumental in introducing and developing sophisticated technological innovations. The contemporary military establishment requires all three roles whilst ensuring a balance between them which varies at different levels in the hierarchy of command within the organisation. Even so, members of the two noted sub-groups may feel that role differentiation of this kind does little to re-assure them that their professional requirements will be met.

Since the bulk of the literature considers the professional difficulties faced by women (Dunivin, 1994; Tanner, 1999; Davis, 1999; Simon, 2001; van Creveld, 2001; Pinch, 2002), technical specialists, as a generic group, conclude that their specific problems are overlooked. An initial dilemma is that this group is far from homogeneous. On the periphery of a centre-periphery model, we find a sub-group of non-combatants characterised by the duality of their professionalism. This is seen in the potential conflict between the 'operational' ideology of these professionals and their 'civilian ideology'. The former will vary in relation to their employment in combat zones. Nurses, for example, irrespective of their gender, particularly require as battlefield specialists, personal qualities very reminiscent of those attributed to combat troops; 'strength, psychological and emotional stability, bravery under fire and willingness to risk capture' (Fenner, 2001: 11). Their civilian idealogy, legitimised by their professional qualifications and the associated membership of a qualifying association, differs markedly from their operational ideology which is a part of a complex military culture. A primary issue is the identification of the appropriate balance between these two ideologies; uncertainty is a reflection of the

contradiction between the traditional local orientation of combat specialists and the cosmopolitan orientation of these peripheral specialists.

Moving from the periphery toward the centre, we can identify the two sub-groups of *combat service* and *combat support* specialists. For the former, there is a very close similarity between their function and that of their counterparts in civilian society. This can be equated with a military-civilian convergence model, for in some national armed forces many of these occupational specialties have, indeed, been civilianised. There are, however, limits to such institutional changes, if an armed force is to retain an expeditionary capability. The professional dilemma depends on the extent to which combat service personnel in uniform identify with their civilian counterparts. The need for common civilian professional qualifications as the basis of performance for example encourages individuals within armed forces to use civilian professionals as their reference group. A sense of relative deprivation, in terms of career, reward, conditions of service and status, may result from this. At the same time, it is often forgotten that many of these specialists possess very transferable skills and that they are in demand in the wider labour market. Their retention within the military can be difficult when their expertise is discounted by peer groups and their status denigrated, since they are not 'real soldiers'.

Few of these specialists are academy graduates. Accordingly, they tend to be seen as an out-group because their socialisation and training experience differs from that of the group at the centre of our model. Some will have qualified professionally before joining the military. Others will have been trained within the military as enlisted personnel, a small number of whom will, on the basis of their expertise, have been subsequently commissioned. The effect of this diversity tends to be more noticeable at junior rank levels, both commissioned and non-commissioned. At a senior level, evaluation of ability takes into account a wider range of criteria, most noticeably leadership experience in missions commensurate with those undertaken by combat personnel. When such experience is linked to the military qualifications which have been gained through participation in advanced training courses, it can be concluded that this very specific sub-group of senior ranks differs very little from groups at the centre of the organisation. In most military establishments, however, this is a relatively small sub-group. The remaining question is whether a greater use can be made of the untapped potential inherent in these specialist members of the military.

The challenges faced by *combat support* specialists are particularly complex. Their professionalism is closely associated with that of the combat groups at the centre of military activity. This is particularly so when the distinctions between combat and combat support roles in contemporary armed forces become increasingly blurred. Paradoxically, however, this closeness is often the source of professional dissatisfaction. Members of peripheral groups are often reconciled to their limited or negative status within the military, preferring to use civilian colleagues as their point of reference. Combat support specialists, however, more readily identify themselves with the defining characteristics of conventional military professionalism. Often sharing basic socialisation and training programmes with those in traditional combat specialties, they seem on the face of it to share equally their expertise, responsibility and corporateness. Yet, they continue to be seen as 'different' by many at the centre of the military organisation. This reaction is rationalised by a reference back to the defining characteristics of the *Profession of Arms*, reinforced by an interpretation of

pragmatic professionalism which equates this solely with the exercise of a combat role. The implication is that *combat support* personnel, irrespective of their rank or gender, can never be truly identified as military professionals.

The logic of this conclusion continues to be highly suspect. There are innumerable examples of situations in which the distinction between combat roles (at the centre of military professionalism) and combat-support roles (toward the periphery of military professionalism) are so blurred as to be non-existent. In the Panama mission, military policewomen were shot at and shot back. Following the Gulf War, Canadian women from a combat-engineer regiment arrived on the Iraq-Kuwait border to clear mines and unexploded shells (Tanner, 1999: 44). Personnel more generally deployed in peace-keeping operations in a combat support role, are subject to a very real possibility of risk. Moreover, in an operational situation the principles of *inter-operability* and *close-support* make role distinctions an academic rather than practical issue.

The continuing dilemma is the extent to which conceptualisations of military professionalism in referring back to the two identified models of the *Profession of Arms* and *Pragmatic Professionalism*, focus almost exclusively on the *combat-warrior paradigm*. The inference to be drawn is that 'peripheral' or 'out' groups are not seen to be truly professional. The rationale is both subtle and traditional. It can be argued, for example, that

> In a private enterprise society, the military establishment could not hold its most creative talents without the binding force of service traditions, professional identifications, and honour (Janowitz, 1960: 422).

This dichotomy constitutes the basis of the sense of dissatisfaction felt by many combat support specialists. On the one hand, it is realised that the postulated narrowing of the gap between military and civilian skills as a result of a technological and organisational revolution within armed forces, appears to be less here than in the case of other sub-groups. The military establishment in this case continues to be a special environment because of the specific requirements of this support role. On the other hand, personnel in this role usually lack experience of those military appointments which develop senior administrative, negotiating and political skills that are attractive to second-career employers. Some combat-support personnel however are able to develop their technical skills to the extent that their advanced training gives them common interests with their civilian counterparts.

It is, however, women in the military who are seen to be the group most affected by the *combat-warrior* paradigm. Indeed, the latter is often termed, the *combat-masculine-warrior* paradigm (CMW). Thus, in analysing change and continuity in military culture, it is suggested that the CMW paradigm is a determinant of continuity,

> As an institution comprised primarily of men, its culture is shaped by men. Soldiering is viewed as a masculine role – the profession of war, defence, and combat is

defined by society as men's work (Dunivin, 1994: 533-4).

In the context of this study, an initial question is whether the process of military professionalisation continues, today, to be shaped by a dominant CMW philosophy, characterised by its masculine norms, values, and lifestyles, or whether the process is now more properly associated with an inclusionary egalitarian paradigm. Much of the literature linked to this question is based on national experience. A consequent critical variable is the effect of the exclusion of women from combat. Where women are excluded, it can be argued that a cult of masculinity prevails which encourages the retention of processes of professionalisation that reinforce masculine norms and values (Loring, 1984). This can be particularly noticeable in basic training courses where efficient aggressive programmes are designed to create 'the masculine male'. Recruits end up internalising many of the norms and values of the masculine-warrior image (Hockey, 1986: 44-62). Where there are no barriers to women serving in combat, it would appear that alternative professionalisation strategies have been adopted which question the traditional CMW paradigm. Canadian experience (Pinch, 2002), is particularly significant in this context as is that of Sweden (Nilsson and Göbel, 1992).

A primary purpose of structured programmes of military professionalisation is to ensure the successful *integration* of women and other minority sub-groups into the armed forces. Integration into the military system is both a process and an objective. As a *process*, integration is the means whereby a group of disparate individuals are motivated to accept their function and role within the organisation. As an *objective*, integration is that sense of belonging to the corporate professional body. Both process and objective are the goals of complex programmes of socialisation complemented by strategies designed to achieve successful peer bonding (horizontal integration).

Studies of the integration process are legion in their number, but notwithstanding the wide range of issues which they consider, the basic process is criticised for its innate gender specificity. It is argued for instance that

> For female soldier, the idea of diversity allows their incorporation into the army, but only insofar as they can be like men. Military discourses about gender construct women as different in specific ways, and many differences are seen not as physical but social. Some differences are presented as incompatible with military life (Woodward and Winter, 2003).

Integration as a part of military professionalisation, it would appear, is a phenomenon which is based on the needs of men and is designed to meet their specific requirements. Critics of the process of integration as a part of military professionalisation, compare the limited objectives of the process within armed forces with the wider aims of integration in the civilian work-place. For the latter, the process applies equally to men and women; in the military, however, it is consistently argued that the primary aims of programmes of integration are to attain combat effectiveness by promoting a sense of group cohesion. Since women continue to be marginal participants in direct combat, critics of the military position argue that the

relevance of many integration programmes to the needs of women in armed forces is highly questionable. This is particularly so when, as in the United Kingdom, the military enjoys *de facto* or *de jure* exemptions from equal opportunities legislation. It would accordingly appear that the dominance of the combat-masculine-warrior image continues. In consequence, women military personnel can conclude that they are in a Catch-22 situation. Because they are an out-group, programmes of integration ignore their professional needs; because programmes of integration ignore their professional needs, they are an out-group. As Woodward and Winter conclude, in their review of integration in the British Army,

> We found that the army is still a traditional masculine organisation that is only adapting gradually to the inclusion of women (2003).

The non-commissioned professional

Whilst considerable attention is paid to the stress which is experienced by women in their search for an equity of professional status within the military, the issues surrounding the status of personnel other than officers, have received far less consideration. Uncertainty initially stems from the identification of the military professional solely with officership. It is furthered by the argument that the differential social origin of officers and men in earlier centuries which led to a sharp dichotomy in the military forces, has been followed by the maintenance of a sharp distinction between officers and the lower ranks.

> The combination of profession and organisation in the army has thus been institutionalised in two ways: in a fusion on the level of the officer corps, and in a simultaneous segregation of both patterns in the army as a whole by a sharp division between officers and men (van Doorn, 1975: 39).

The importance of this perceived division, however, is not simply associated with any historical process. Essentially, the issue is whether there is a major functional distinction, that is, whether the activities of enlisted personnel can truly be seen to be 'professional'. Here, there is a major definitional problem. As we have noted, the definition of 'expertise' in conventional interpretations of military professionalism is often the source of a considerable number of methodological problems. The analyses of military professionalism carried out in the 1960s and 1970s thus consistently refer to the military as a *managerial profession* (van Doorn, 1975). Expertise is either undefined, or is linked with the 'skills and orientations common to civilian administrators and civilian leaders' (Janowitz, 1960: 9). Rarely is there any reference to that 'expertise' which can be more readily associated with the day-to-day primary military roles of junior leaders, at either the commissioned or non-commissioned rank level.

The professional status of enlisted personnel is, accordingly, doubly uncertain. Firstly, their possession of that degree of 'combat expertise' which is essential if goals are to be achieved and tasks successfully completed, is not associated with the basic

criteria of professionalism. This is possibly because 'combat expertise' is ignored in most analyses of the military as a profession. Thus

> The narrowing difference in skill between military and civilian society is an out-growth of the increasing concentration of technical specialists in the military (Janowitz, 1960: 9).

The second source of uncertainty, as we have noted, is the consistent identification of the military professional with the concept of officership.

> En France, comme à l'étranger, aucune étude systématique n'a été consacreé au corps des sous-officiers. La sociologie militaire s'est en fait traditionnellement interésseé aux officiers lorsqu'elle a étudié les personnels militaires (Schweisguth et al, 1979: 9).

In traditional studies, specialists who are enlisted personnel are identified, at best, as 'technicians in uniform'. Quantitatively, the number of such specialists continues to increase in response to the growing importance within armed forces of technological developments. Qualitatively, there is a marked narrowing of the skill differential between commissioned officers and many enlisted personnel. Where the latter have strong group affiliations either within the military or with civilian reference groups, the possible dysfunctional consequences of this erosion of the basic skill differential are very much lessened. Member of a Corps of Engineers, for example, relate to each other as qualified specialists, irrespective of rank. Here, the *artificer* enjoys a status both within and without the military which recognises expertise irrespective of whether this is equated with 'professionalism'. Problems, however, still occur when the narrow identification of 'professional' with officership, is located within the strict hierarchy of the military as a bureaucratic organisation.

We see here the difficulties of linking these two distinct conceptualisations of the military. This is particularly noticeable when the stress faced by enlisted personnel is specifically linked to the central issue of *authority*. In the ideal-type professional model, the basis of authority is identified with the expertise of individuals. In the bureaucratic organisational model, on the other hand, the basis of authority is the office of the individual. Translated to the military situation, the professional dilemma is the potential conflict which arises when orders are issued on the basis of the rank of the individual rather than an individual's expertise, skill and experience.

The dilemma is summed up in the comments of a very senior NCO artificer. Trained at Woolwich and with more than forty years experience in the British and Australian armed forces including work with Special Operational Forces, it was put forward that,

> They (the junior officers) thought they were professionals; we knew we were.

A central issue in this context continues to be the identification of the basic characteristics of the concept of the military profession. As we have seen,

considerable emphasis has been placed in the past on the existence of *collegiality* as a distinctive feature of the 'profession' in contrast with the generic 'occupation'. Thus, in analysing the status of the military as a profession, Huntington (1957) considered *corporateness* to be an essential element in military professionalism. When only officers were considered to have professional status the existence of collegiality or corporateness was often taken for granted. Accordingly, the analysis of this aspect of professionalism tended to concentrate on how such collegiality was most readily generated. Answers considered such variables as the ascriptive base of officership, the shared socialisation processes within schools and military academies and the more complex attributes of the combat-masculine-warrior paradigm.

In looking to the future, the continuing problematic issue is the status as professionals of non-commissioned personnel. What can be termed the traditional perspective, continues to distinguish between commissioned and non-commissioned personnel. As we have noted, this can be rationalised by reference to the subordinate status of the latter on a hierarchy of superior-subordinate ranks. An alternative perspective looks critically at the respective functions of these different ranks. This begins from the working hypothesis that non-commissioned personnel exercise leadership responsibilities and are required to master complex skills. It is implicitly implied that the distinction between these functions and those of junior officers is increasingly blurred. Equally, this sub-group display a strong sense of *group identity*, a characteristic which has been said to be a major determinant of the professional status of military personnel (Janowitz, 1960: 6). When this is linked to the tactical responsibility of the non-commissioned officer and to the considerable technical skill which many possess, their claim to professional status seems to be perfectly justified. It is, however, more appropriate to analyse the issues which arise, not in terms of a dichotomous professional/non-professional model, but rather against a continuum of professionalisation. In the centre of such a scale, there will be an area, which is consistently expanding, where the professional functions of officers and senior NCOs overlap. At the tactical level, both sub-groups will share, in common, many aspects of military expertise. The breadth and scope of the professional expertise of the officer corps, however, will extend beyond this. With increasing seniority, officers function more and more at an operational and strategical level, with some becoming involved in policy making at the highest geo-political level.

When we look again at the professional status of the non-commissioned officers, therefore, we can conclude that whilst they possess very considerable technical expertise, together with a sense of responsibility and a commitment to the military, this is a *restricted professionalism*. Looking toward the future, however, it can be argued that the historical differentiation between officers and NCOs will be subject over time to an increasing degree of convergence. In the near future, the primary objective of the professional development of this sub-group of NCOs will be to utilise more fully their skills and abilities. One way to achieve this will be through the implementation of positive policies designed to promote *team management*. These have two aims. Firstly, to recognise the distinctive identities and sub-cultures of the sub-group whilst acknowledging the importance of co-operation in the attainment of identified goals. Secondly, to recognise that the historical identification of individuals as no more than 'technicians in uniform' is outmoded. Such a designation fails to take into account both wide range of expertise which this sub-group of senior non-

commissioned officers bring to their daily tasks, and the narrowing of the basic skill differential between this and other sub-groups within the military.

The professional culture

Sub-groups in the contemporary military often complain that they are particularly affected by the presence of a well-established traditional culture. We have already noted, for instance, that in reacting to a perceived *combat-masculine-warrior* image, commentators argue that the professional culture of the military is shaped by men. Indeed, it is suggested that the use of the term, 'manning' rather than 'staffing' is sexist and, 'speaks volumes because it pre-supposes an entirely male force' (Woodward and Winter, 2003). The consequent challenge faced by sub-groups within armed forces is how best to accommodate to this perceived dominance of an essentially masculine culture.

Adapting Parkin's identification when examining class stratification in Western societies, of three major value systems – the *dominant*, the *subordinate* and the *radical* – we can begin answering the question by drawing attention to the importance of **core-values** to the development of a culture. The *dominant* value-system has evolved over many years. We have suggested that some aspects of this, notably classical normative precepts, are derived from the values of a traditional *Profession of Arms*. A number of studies examine the detailed origins and characteristics of this value-system, (Marlowe, 1959; Coates and Pelligrand, 1965; Jones, 1968; Goldman and Segal, 1976; Cochrane, 1977; Arkin and Dobrofsky, 1978). A generally common theme is the identification of this value-system with the status of the officer as the true military-professional. Essentially this is an imposed value-system, its dominance reinforced through the use of military law to counter deviancy or total rejection of the system.

The subordinate value-system is 'a moral framework which promotes accommodative responses to the facts of inequality and low status' (Parkin, 1975: 81). Parkin suggests that the dominant value-system is not so much rejected or opposed, as 'modified' by the subordinate group. Consequently the latter utilises two distinct levels of normative reference: the *dominant* value-system on the one hand and a *negotiated version* on the other. Hockey (1986) in his analysis of British private soldiers as a sub-culture confirms the presence of these two distinct value-systems within the military system, as does Moskos (1970) for American soldiers.

Traditionally, the relationship between the *negotiated* and *subordinate* value-systems has depended on a complex blend of both external and internal variables. There are major variations of this relationship in different national armies (Kinzer Stewart, 1991). Nevertheless, there is a general sense of accommodation in which potential conflict tension are resolved within the boundaries of what is and is not seen as acceptable professional behaviour.

Increasingly, however, the military is faced with demands for the acceptance of a *radical* value-system which does not simply wish to modify the established dominant system, but wishes to change it. In the past, such a value-system was associated with the demands of minority groups who questioned traditional norms and institutional authority (Boëne and Dandeker, 1999: 16). Today, it is more usually associated with

the presence within armed forces of an identifiable and distinctive sub-group of women. This accepts, however, that many women, in common with their male counterparts, will prefer to acknowledge the presence and appropriateness of the other two value-systems.

What is far from clear, is the extent to which any pressure from the establishment of a *radical* value-system is favoured by a majority of women in any given armed force. In the context of the debate about the exclusion of women from combat roles in the United States army, it has been suggested that feminist activists must choose between the competing goals of creating a debatable rhetoric, and representing the sometimes contradictory beliefs of army women (Miller, 2001). A similar conclusion can be more generally made with regard to any pressure for more substantial changes. A possible explanation for any contradictory tendencies is the demographic differences between the activists and the majority of army women. The latter are often recruited from a blue-collar background in which the dominant value-system tends to be modified as a result of social circumstances and restricted opportunities (Parkin, 1975: 81-93). The former, in contrast, represent an educated elite which either favours the *dominant* value-system, or paradoxically, prefers to replace it entirely.

Core-values, it can be concluded, are central to the development and maintenance of an effective professional culture. They represent the fundamental beliefs and expectations of armed forces, whilst ensuring the establishment of a positive self-image which recognises the significance of the military task.

In establishing programmes designed to inculcate a set of these core-values, an important determinant of success however is the presence of appropriate *role-models*. It is significant that for western armed forces as a whole, the training of minority sub-groups is said to be affected by a noticeable lack of such models. In terms of the ethnicity or sexual preferences of a group, it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain pertinent objective data for national militaries. For the sub-group of women, however, such data is more readily available. On the basis that senior officers are a classic example of such role-models, it is argued for instance, that throughout Western Europe women are under-represented at this rank level. Thus in the Danish Military Forces, of 14,417 male reserve and regular personnel, 342 (2.37%) serve in the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and above; for women, the comparable figures are 863 and 3(0.37%) respectively (Sørensen, 2002). In France, where in 2000, the grand total of women in the three services was c.22,000 or 8.9% of the overall force levels, one woman medical officer reached flag rank in 1981; as in other western countries, a small number of women commanded Navy ships. In the United Kingdom in October 2001, of a total of 32,651 officers, 3,103 (9.5%) were female; there were, however, relatively few in the senior ranks. In 2000, four women held the rank of Captain in the Royal Navy, one the Army rank of Brigadier and one, Air Commodore. A year later, the highest rank held by women had increased to one Commodore in the RN and three Army Brigadiers, but no one was ranked as Air Commodore in the RAF (Dandeker,2002). It is noted that in the Canadian Forces (CF), the proportion of women in the rank of Major and above has doubled since 1989 (from 7% to 13%). Nevertheless only a small number has progressed to the most senior ranks. A comparable conclusion is reached in respect of senior non-commissioned officers (Pinch, 2002).

The importance of appropriate role-models is such, that a consistent HRM problem is how to ensure their existence in contemporary armed forces. One way forward, it is suggested, is to adopt policies comparable with those employed in some commercial and public-sector organisations (Soëters, 2002). These favour two strategies. Firstly, in order to increase the number of women in senior positions, the organisation implements policies of *positive discrimination* when considering the promotion of staff. Secondly, a system of *fast tracking* is introduced which recognises potential ability at an early point in the career of the individual and follows this up with promotion ahead of the age cohort. Neither strategy is new. Both are associated with difficulties. The first can contravene Equal Opportunities legislation; the second contradicts the basic preference within a bureaucratic organisation for the use of objective criteria such as age and seniority as the basis of promotion. Nevertheless, the need to create more role-models continues to be an issue of professional concern within contemporary armed forces.

CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding changes in the role of western armed forces following the ending of the Cold War, their status as a profession continues to reflect their special attributes: expertise, responsibility, corporateness, self-regulation, a code of ethics and standards of performance. As an example of the total fusion of organisation and profession, armed forces continue to be both a professionalised bureaucracy and a bureaucratised profession. They represent the continuance of the traditions of the classic *Profession of Arms* whilst coincidentally operating as a sophisticated pragmatic profession. The shape of its professionalisation is determined by the immediate needs of the military, by what is acceptable to the parent society and by what is seen to be the most effective way of attaining the goals set by the civil authority. The operational role of the military may have been curtailed in recent years, but its professional role continues to be extended as western policies change.

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