The "Moral Economy" as a Theoretical Model to Explain Acts of Protest in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914 – 1919.

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While commenting upon the spate of mutinies that besieged Great Britain's Royal Navy (RN) in 1797, Admiral Horatio Nelson remarked to the Duke of Clarence, the third son of King George III, that:

> I am not surprised that Your Royal Highness should have felt all the Agony of suspense during the late extraordinary Acts at Portsmouth … But to us who see the whole at once we must think that … it has been the most Manly thing I ever heard of, and does the British sailor infinite honour.[1]

The free and open support given by Nelson for these incidents of indiscipline, in which one can sense a hint of pride and satisfaction, at first seems paradoxical given the harsh and brutal manner in which officers of His Majesty's fleet routinely punished recalcitrant sailors for a multitude of offences much less serious than open rebellion. His comments, however, become all the more understandable and provide considerable insight into the socio-military culture of the RN during the latter years of the 18th century when both the behaviour of the disaffected seamen is explored and the causes that lay behind these events are illuminated.

In April and May, 1797, sailors from the Channel Fleet based at Spithead, just outside of Portsmouth in the south of England, protested against what they deemed to be the intolerable conditions of service under which they lived and laboured. After unsuccessfully petitioning the Admiralty at an earlier date for the redress of one of their grievances, that being pay, [2] the sailors seized the Fleet with only minimal violence [3] and established a delegation to demand improvements from their senior leadership on a number of issues which included, amongst others, food, pensions, and of course, their wages. Indeed, once their initial attempts at resolution had failed, the sailors resorted to an aggressive and illegal form of protest. Now confronted with a more serious situation,

the RN gave a receptive ear to their reasonable complaints, many of which Nelson himself and the general public wholly supported, and, in due course, endeavoured to remedy many of the precipitating causes of the mutiny.[4] Aside from effecting improvements in pay and promising to provide more wholesome provisions in the future, the RN dismissed 59 of the Fleet's most brutal and inhumane officers, thus satisfying another of the sailors' major objections.[5]

Despite the obvious potential for bloodshed, the participants conducted themselves in a civil, tactful and diplomatic manner throughout the entire period of unrest by frowning upon violent behaviour of any sort, by ensuring a strict discipline aboard ship and by generally following their officers' orders with the exception of those to sail out of port.[6] So as not to disrupt Britain's essential maritime commerce or to compromise the overall security of the realm, the mutineers also resolved to maintain a protective watch over seaborne trade and to meet with and engage the enemy (the French with whom the British were then at war) should a threat materialize in the Channel.[7] In addition, the participants demanded, and eventually received, a Royal Pardon duly signed by the King that protected all individuals who played a part in the disturbance from any future punishment or recrimination whatsoever. The restraint with which the seamen acted in seeking amends, coupled with both the legitimacy of their claims and their ultimate success, seems to have encouraged Nelson to bestow "infinite honour" upon them. Earlier historians have quite reasonably postulated that British sailors borrowed their mode of protest from the larger society that they defended and of which they formed an integral part.[8]

The main theoretical aspects of the Moral Economy, a theory that explains how and why the poorer classes informally regulated certain aspects of the 18th century British economy, are easily transferable from a civilian to a military context and thus provide a powerful tool to help explore the complex dynamics associated with acts of protest in the latter.[9] According to historian E.P. Thompson, the main proponent of this concept, the poor not only possessed a common consciousness that derived from their shared experiences, but also a highly developed notion of the common good or weal. Within an economic setting, their value (or moral) system rested heavily upon a strong sense of fairness and justice that had evolved from their view of traditional social norms, obligations and responsibilities. Through popular consensus, the poor had determined over time and for themselves what were the legitimate and the illegitimate procedures concerning all aspects of the production of bread and which obligations those in positions of responsibility, like farmers, millers, bakers and merchants, ought to obey. Some business practices contrasted sharply with their preconceived norms and unwritten expectations of justice within the larger commercial marketplace. Among others, the inclination to withhold grain in times of scarcity in order to command a higher premium, the substitution of inferior or noxious substances for wholesome flour and the reduction in bread weight without a consequent reduction in price, were all deemed to be contrary to the combined interests of the poor and thus, by extension, quite immoral. In the main, they resented any form of exploitation perpetuated against them so that others could profit at their expense. When faced with a situation that curtailed the equity of an economic transaction, the poor acted against those who perpetuated the unfairness and, as a result, believed their responses to be justified, righteous and appropriate. Despite the

fact that rising commodity prices and hunger sometimes encouraged unrest amongst the masses, an outrage to their "moral assumptions, quite as much as actual deprivation, was the usual occasion for direct action." Moreover, acts of protest were motivated by a "notion of legitimation" in that the crowd believed that they were defending traditional rights or customs and that their actions were supported by the wider consensus of the community to which they belonged.[10]

Their frequent demonstrations, however, were not exercises in uncontrolled mass violence, but rather were disciplined and restrained expressions of discontent designed to achieve a very specific and limited aim, usually the return to what they considered to be proper business practices, and little else. For the most part, the protesters abided by an understood protocol of behavior that could be described as "'orderly disorder.'"[11] Their actions did not target the entire economic system, but rather only those individuals perceived to be engaging in unfair market practices. The crowd rarely employed physical violence against people, despite their obvious capacity to do so, but oftentimes destroyed mills, machinery, or even food itself in order to express their displeasure. Although acts of protest assumed many forms throughout the course of the century, participants habitually resorted to the well-established practice of "setting the price." When the poor believed merchants to be selling bread at an inflated and unreasonable rate, they frequently seized his or her goods, sold them to one another at what they determined to be a fair price and, in due course, returned to the merchant all of the money accrued through these *ad hoc* sales. This process obviously depended upon the honesty, goodwill and cooperation of the hungry participants, but contemporary evidence indicating an abuse of this system, such as blatant theft or extortion, is quite rare.[12]

In whatever form, acts of protest prevented individuals from resuming their unfair business practices for the foreseeable future and discouraged other economic players from pursuing an immoral course as well. Successful food riots, although illegal, ultimately offered a degree of commercial protection to the poor. So long as they behaved in a responsible manner and followed their self-imposed rules, the authorities, who seem to have often recognized that social peace was perhaps more important than strict adherence to and enforcement of the law, permitted the participants a degree of license and in some cases open encouragement. The willingness with which the poor resorted to such activities throughout the 18th century strongly suggests that protests were in fact an effective means of ensuring the proper conduct of those individuals engaged in certain aspects of economic production. If these forms of behaviour had consistently failed to achieve the immediate goals of the crowd, then the tradition of engaging in orderly protest would certainly have been less strong and entrenched within the norms of social conduct.

To be certain, many similarities are clearly visible between the larger civilian milieu and the Spithead mutiny of 1797 owing to the operation of the Moral Economy in both. In the first place, the sailors possessed a common consciousness that quite naturally revolved around their physical and economic welfare and which developed over time from their shared experiences both on and below deck and in the numerous grog- and gin-shops of various ports (when they were allowed off of the ship!). These individuals enjoyed a mature sense of the common good that resulted in no small measure from operating in close proximity to one another and, to a lesser extent, from being members of the same institution. A similar lifestyle led to the creation of strong bonds of

emotional attachment, especially within the small or primary groups with which they worked, ate and slept. In letters passed between ships of the mutinous Fleet, for instance, the authors oftentimes referred to their fellow seamen as "brothers" and exhorted them to keep faith with the one "common cause of the British Navy," namely the satisfactory resolution of their many grievances.[13] As historian James Dugan observes in his history of the mutinies, "unit pride and intership rivalry was a binding force in navy morale and figured just as much in the mutiny bond."[14]

The participants also demanded fair and reasonable treatment from those placed over them in return for their services to the Crown, and as such, they perceived the Admiralty in general and their immediate officers in particular to be ultimately responsible for their care. Like the civilians engaged in the production of bread, these two latter groups were also expected to act appropriately and with a degree of justice. The sailors of the Fleet resorted to protest only when the collective consequences of the conditions under which they served became unbearable, when they felt that they were being dealt with unjustly and when they perceived the Admiralty to have failed in meeting its obligations to them. By protesting treatment that affronted their combined interests and expectations, the sailors endeavoured to hold their leaders to account and to provide themselves with both a greater degree of economic protection and a better standard of living. Given the multitude of unsatisfactory surroundings in which they found themselves, many "thought right" to lay their complaints before the Admiralty and thus believed their actions to be "nowise unreasonable."[15] Of course, the specific underlying causes of mass complaint in both the naval setting and the civilian context are decidedly different, but the general belief that the participants were justified in their

actions, since tenets of their value system had not been respected, is most certainly prevalent amongst each.

Additionally, members of the Channel Fleet did not desire anything more beyond adequate solutions to their legitimate and immediate grievances; they did not wish to alter the entire naval system with all its harsh policies and punishments, only those specific conditions that they perceived to be of greatest detriment to their health and welfare.[16] One sailor, Samuel Richardson, who had spent time on "hell ships and happy ones" during his career in the RN, remarked that "In all my experience at sea, I have found seamen grateful for good usage, and yet they like to see subordination kept up, as they know the duty could not be carried out without it; …" [17] Not surprisingly then, one of mutineers' lengthiest petitions to the Admiralty ended with the reassurance that:

> It is also unanimously agreed by the fleet, that, from this day, no [further] grievances shall be received, in order to convince the nation at large that we know when to cease to ask, as well as to begin, and that we ask nothing but what is moderate, and may be granted without detriment to the nation, or injury to the service.[18]

What is more, in refuting the claims made by Earl Spencer, the First Lord of the Admiralty, that the granting of a single concession might encourage the seamen to demand further indulgences, many of the sailors' own officers believed that "their people would abide by an honest settlement."[19] The latter opinion indicates that the seamen desired little else beyond that which they thought necessary for their immediate comfort and well-being.

Aside from discouraging and refraining from violence of any sort, the sailors also resolved to abandon their protest altogether and to place themselves once again at the disposal of the Crown should a threat to Great Britain

materialize.[20] Their restraint stemmed from what was understood to be an unwritten and traditional protocol of behaviour that governed such instances of disobedience and which persuaded participants to make their complaints known in a respectable and non-violent manner.[21] To be sure, their sober conduct and the reasonableness of their claims undoubtedly aided in winning many concessions and also encouraged the public and certain individuals within the Navy's senior command to offer them their support.

On the other hand, those sailors who failed to abide by the traditional expectations of behaviour found little sympathy with their cause from their brother sailors, the Admiralty itself or the general public as a whole. In 1797, mutiny also struck at the Nore, an anchorage on the Thames estuary. Instead of following the balanced example set by the Channel Fleet to the south, these sailors transgressed the bounds of what was understood to be the acceptable course of conduct by engaging in acts of wanton violence and by blockading London during a time of war with a Dutch invasion fleet ready to put to sea; they also appeared greedy by demanding additional concessions on top of those that had already been secured by their counterparts at Spithead. Not surprisingly, the RN severely punished the main participants once they had reestablished their control over the participating vessels and their crews.[22]

Without entering into a prolonged discussion of the Nore mutiny, a few reasons that account for the sailors' violence and their break with tradition must be offered, but as British historian Conrad Gill cautions, it "is not easily explained."[23] Perhaps most importantly, a significant proportion of the seamen stationed at the anchorage were not in

full and unanimous support of the cause, unlike those who participated in the disturbance to the south. Because the Nore served as a "catchall" for the RN, the ships stationed there did not comprise a properly constituted and coherent fleet, as existed at Spithead, but rather an informal collection of various vessels.[24] As a result, "the crews were largely strangers to one another."[25] Although lacking an initial sense of attachment, the majority of sailors at the Nore supported the mutiny since the prospects for success seemed relatively bright and, by and large, the revolt followed a peaceful course and sought similar goals as the disturbance at Spithead.[26] Their disposition soon changed, however, especially amongst the men well-disposed to the King and the RN as a whole, when they realized that the government would neither consider nor accede to their additional demands and that they, owing to their behaviour, lacked not only the support of the general public but also that of the army stationed nearby.[27] In the words of Gill, if the government "had yielded, they would have acknowledged their concessions to the Spithead mutineers as a precedent, and would in effect have recognized mutiny as a regular means of naval reform."[28]

Faced with a lack of unity and accord, the leaders at the Nore eventually turned to violence in order to prevent vessels from abandoning the mutiny altogether and to intimidate both the less-committed sailors into accepting and furthering the aims of the rebellion, and also those men, be they officers or otherwise, who might decide to interfere with their activities. The mutineers resorted to aggressive measures owing to their frustration that ultimately resulted from their lack of success; as the mutiny progressed, their disappointment turned into desperation. Indeed, "the violent section of the mutineers were trying to hold

down the rest, and prevent their desertion, by a system of terror."[29] Undoubtedly, some of the violence witnessed at the Nore was partially due to "the blind fury of men who had staked their fortunes and lives in a desperate enterprise, and suddenly realized their failure and helplessness."[30] Ironically, the violence intended to keep wavering sailors committed to the cause may also have led to the lack of unanimity amongst them. When confronted with such hostility, some of the seamen may well have believed that the manner in which their leaders were conducting both themselves and the mutiny itself was totally at odds with the norms of behaviour to be followed during such incidents, norms that naval tradition encouraged and which those at Spithead followed closely, and, in the end, decided not to support the revolt. As a result, the rebellion collapsed and many of the mutineers paid the penalty for their transgressions.[31]

ARMY CULTURE AND THE CANADIAN SOLDIER

Because the Moral Economy can effectively explain earlier acts of protest in martial settings, the main elements of this theory can now be applied to more modern and perhaps more relevant examples. The theoretical framework of this model is easily transferable between centuries and also the military forces of different nations, including the Canadian Army of the First World War. Like the British sailors of earlier days, soldiers of the period between 1914 and 1919 resorted to disobedience as a means of displaying their unhappiness with either a specific issue or a larger mass of difficulties owing, in part, to the nature of the institution that they joined. Entering the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF), men quickly learned that the prevailing mode of thought was, as it had been for centuries in the armies of the major European powers, one of

obedience to and respect for authority in which officers led and the common soldier followed without question. To be certain, the military socialized new recruits to this ideal from the outset for upon attestation men swore an oath to "observe and obey all orders of His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, and of all the Generals and Officers [both commissioned and non-commissioned] set over me."[32] Those who voluntarily offered their opinion on a particular point were sometimes given "a sharp reminder that my advice was not asked for [and] that my job was to obey orders."[33] The CEF likewise expected implicit obedience from those upon whom the especial responsibility of leadership was entrusted, a point that an officer's commission made exceedingly clear for it directed the recipient:

> at all times to exercise and well discipline in Arms both the inferior Officers and Men serving under you and use your best endeavours to keep them in good Order and Discipline … And We do hereby Command them to obey you as their superior Officer, and you to observe and follow such Orders and Directions as from time to time you shall receive from Us or your Superior Officer, according to the Rules and Disciplines of War.[34]

A host of other factors also seem to have contributed to the development and maintenance of a culture of obedience. At the very beginning of the war and for sometime thereafter, many who volunteered for the CEF possessed earlier experience in either the Canadian Militia or the British Army; some had even served in both.[35] Such men would undoubtedly have been acquainted with the attitudes of deference and compliance that permeated the latter two institutions and, as a result, probably transferred some of their patterns of thought, styles of behaviour and expectations to the former. Moreover, semi-official publications such as *The Guide* written by William Dillon Otter,[36] a long-serving militiaman, stressed that once a citizen enrolled in the military, he became both a soldier and a servant of the state and therefore lost "'the privileges of

citizenship, having no will of his own, no liberty of action, no unrestrained freedom of speech … [these conditions] must be endured, for obedience and self-control are indispensable to his duties.'"[37] In return for surrendering "their civil liberties on enlistment," however, many soldiers believed that "the army had an almost feudal duty to care for their welfare."[38] Finally, codified military law provided a multitude of punishments ranging from simple admonishment to death in order to deal with those individuals who did not conform to the encouraged modes of behaviour.

Such a restrictive climate in which common soldiers possessed little real power actively discouraged them from making their grievances unilaterally known to those in positions of responsibility. Possessing few means for redress – soldiers could, however, bring their complaints and concerns to the attention of their superiors through the formal chain of command [39] – acts of protest represented an avenue through which an attempt, albeit a somewhat risky and difficult one, could be made to seek an immediate solution to a troublesome situation. Disobedience also served as an outlet that allowed the disaffected to relieve the interpersonal tension that had developed between leader and follower either over time or instantaneously as a result of a specific order or manner of conduct. In and of itself, the prevailing culture to which Canadian soldiers were subjected did not cause their disobedience, but rather influenced how they expressed their dissatisfaction. Men did not protest against the entire military system with the purposeful aim of altering it to their immediate advantage for they usually demonstrated only against those actions of their leaders that they found to be wanting. In most cases, since strict obedience was demanded from all, *dis*obedience of any sort brought immediate attention to one's plight; acting in a manner that was contrary to the encouraged modes of

behaviour also served as a means of communication that informed those in positions of leadership that, for whatever reason, all was not well within their respective commands.

From the analysis provided above, the sailors involved in the Spithead mutiny seem to have understood themselves to have had entered into an unwritten and implicit "contract" with the Crown in which the latter was obligated to provide a reasonable amount of care and economic security in return for the service, and perhaps the life, of the former. Even if the seamen did not fully recognize and understand these notions of reciprocity as such, equivalent sentiments found full and articulate expression in the introduction of one of their petitions to "the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty" which began:

> We, the seamen of His Majesty's navy, take the liberty of addressing your Lordships in an humble petition, shewing the many hardships and oppressions we have laboured under for many years, and which we hope your Lordships will redress as soon as possible. We flatter ourselves that your Lordships, together with the nation in general, will acknowledge our worth and good services, both in the American War as well as the present; for which good service your Lordships' petitioners do unanimously agree in opinion, that their worth to the nation, and laborious industry in defence of their country, *deserve some better encouragement* than that we meet with at present, or from any we have experienced. We, your petitioners, do not boast of our good services for any other purpose than that of putting you and the nation in mind of the *respect due to us*, nor do we ever intend to deviate from our former character; so far from anything of that kind, or than an Englishman or men should turn their coats, we likewise agree in opinion, that we should suffer double the hardships we have hitherto experienced before we would suffer the crown of England to be in the least imposed upon by that of any other power in the world; we therefore beg leave to inform your Lordships of the grievances which we at present labour under.[40]

In much the same manner, certain units of the CEF visually communicated to prospective volunteers that, at the time of attestation, they too would enter into a similar contract in which they would be well looked after in return for their service to the state.

For instance, a recruiting poster created by the 244th Battalion (Kitchener's Own) from Montreal related that in addition to giving a new recruit a service cap and a rifle in exchange for his fedora and walking cane, the Officer Commanding would also provide "everything else you need to be a soldier."[41] These comments insinuated that the Battalion in particular and the military in general would ensure that the basic needs of all volunteers would be met. The imagery and phraseology of the poster naturally centered on equipment since the khaki uniform and the rifle were the most visible and outward symbols of a soldier, but the suggestion that other necessities would also be afforded in return for one's service was not far from the surface.[42] Other recruiting broadsides related a similar message in that the soldier would be taken care of financially both while he was in uniform and afterwards. Aside from noting that "Enlisted men, in addition to pay and separation allowance, are CLOTHED AND FED," one poster advertising the scale of pay for overseas service also stated that "The Government will grant a PENSION when the circumstances justify it."[43] Another still from the 148th Battalion, also from Montreal, mentioned that "Pay, field and separation allowances start from [the] day of enlistment."[44] Moreover, after receiving commissions as officers in the CEF, many of the nation's elite, such as those local magnates who raised and initially commanded infantry battalions, vowed to care for their "boys" in much the same manner as a father would for his children,[45] a statement that implied that they would offer both supervision and personal leadership. Volunteers, especially those from rural areas, could again look to these men for direction and guidance as they once did in civilian life. Indeed, the notion of an implicit contract permeated many of the recruiting campaigns conducted throughout Canada during the war years.

Like the sailors of the late-18th century Royal Navy, Canadian soldiers of the First World War also possessed a common consciousness and a definite belief system that undoubtedly arose through their shared experiences in the CEF and perhaps, to a certain extent, from their civilian lives as well. The degree to which both volunteers and conscripts relied upon the values that had been inculcated at an earlier date in the various institutions of the democratic society [46] from whence they came – the holy Christian church, the family, the school and the workplace – to influence their behaviour in a military setting has not been studied from an historical perspective and thus could withstand a fair amount of academic investigation.[47] Whatever its source, whether military, civilian or a combination of both, the shared value system and general expectations that soldiers possessed must first be reconstructed and described if the Moral Economy is to prove useful as an explanatory model. Of course, as further attention is focused on the individual Canadian soldier in the First World War and his formative prewar experiences, the number of core ideals will undoubtedly increase. The summary provided below does not pretend to be a definitive account of this subject since it is offered merely to demonstrate the ability of this theory to help explain dissent in a military context and to illuminate the most salient aspects of this phenomenon.

In analyzing cases of insubordination, whether perpetrated by single individuals or by groups of men, the issue of motivation becomes particularly germane. The numerous examples offered by soldiers in their contemporary or postwar writings naturally leads one to question if the participants were in fact actuated by the general concepts encapsulated in the Moral Economy or, on the other hand, by less-lofty ideals such as greed. In a force as large as the CEF, comprised of men from all socio-economic

strata and from all regions of the country, some undoubtedly acted out of pure avarice and sheer frustration; others may have desired to see how many concessions they could exact from their superiors and to what extent their leaders could be manipulated for their ultimate benefit. Many of the resources consulted in the course of research rarely offer explicit and detailed explanations that account for the behaviour of the author or that of a larger group about which he was writing, and as such, the actual motives behind these acts of protest are somewhat difficult to ascertain.

As will become evident, however, the circumstances that soldiers actively protested against, as opposed to those that they simply groused about amongst themselves, were usually of great significance; rarely did they pursue a disobedient course and risk punishment for a matter that was of little importance. To be sure, individuals could at the same time attempt to better their present condition by taking advantage of a particular situation or person and still forcefully protest, along the lines advocated by the Moral Economy, those situations that either threatened their life or which seriously jeopardized their overall well-being. Although this paper is generally concerned with the latter, the possibility of the former must also be acknowledged since the two motives are not mutually exclusive. The behaviour of members of the CEF was indeed influenced by the situation in which they found themselves and also by the personality and immediate needs of the individual participants. While some of the following examples may not be directly related to or adequately explained by the Moral Economy, a general and relatively consistent pattern does emerge that ultimately suggests that many soldiers, in adopting various forms of protest, acted out of a genuine desire not to be mistreated or taken advantage of. With this being said, some of the conclusions

arrived at in this paper must therefore be taken in the broadest sense possible and should not be interpreted to apply to every particular act of protest. Even though some of the distinctions that have been used to simplify this issue for the sake of clarity are not always so neat and precise in reality, the common pattern that surfaces with respect to the motivation behind their responses is what is most important and relevant.

In addition, much of the content of this paper focuses on the protests of the common soldier toward his superiors, be they commissioned or not. Owing to the scarcity of evidence and constraints on time, little analysis has been offered on the acts of protest that occurred exclusively between officers. Given that they formed a distinct class unto themselves and, for the most part, abided by a somewhat different set of military traditions, social norms and patterns of general conduct than their non-commissioned subordinates did, a slightly different dynamic of protest than the one described below probably informed these exchanges and thus is best left for another day. It is to the values and expectations of the Canadian soldier that attention must now be shifted for once they are identified and integrated into the above constructs, acts of protest in all their varied forms will become more understandable and clear.

VALUES, EXPECTATIONS AND ACTS OF PROTEST

In contrast to the military establishment that defined quite carefully the manner in which superiors were to interact with their subordinates – a certain amount of distance and separation was to be maintained between both groups – common soldiers expected those placed over them to act according to a set of unwritten rules that they believed to govern interpersonal relationships. While each individual undoubtedly possessed somewhat different expectations of his leaders, most, if not all, believed that certain core

values were inviolable and sacrosanct. From all available evidence, it would seem that they prized a competent leadership that was conscious of the sanctity and supremacy of life and which endeavoured not to waste their lives in vain struggles for futile or unobtainable goals. Soldiers also demanded freedom from verbal, mental and physical abuse at the hands of their seniors and insisted that the military, to the absolute best of its ability, provide them with the necessities of life, namely clothing, accommodation, food and water. A degree of fairness and justice in all personal interactions, especially those that were of significant moment, was also thought necessary. All in all, given the austere conditions that they had to endure and the deprivations that they had to suffer, soldiers naturally expected their superiors to treat them with respect, rather than with contempt and disdain. Contemporary evidence strongly suggests that acts of protest were rooted primarily in self-interest rather than in ideology since men viewed their overall well-being as a priority and do not appear to have actively demonstrated against the war itself. To be sure, these men did not possess unreasonable or irrational expectations, but only a solid appreciation of what was right and a few simple desires that would, if met, make their life somewhat more comfortable while they prosecuted the war.

Assuming a variety of forms ranging from petty insubordination and ridicule to mutiny [48] and attempted murder,[49] acts of protest frequently resulted when individuals placed in positions of responsibility transgressed the bounds of what was thought to be appropriate moral behaviour; neglecting the values of one's subordinates or failing to satisfactorily meet their varied demands usually encouraged demonstrations of some sort. Feelings of discontent and betrayal oftentimes manifested themselves through an act of disobedience directed toward the nearest visible target, usually the individual perceived

to be ultimately responsible for the situation. Indeed, soldiers protested “for precise objects and rarely engaged in indiscriminate attacks on either properties or persons.”[50] Since any soldier could theoretically find himself bearing the weighty cross of leadership, demonstrations of displeasure occurred on both a vertical and a horizontal plane, that is, between subordinates and superiors of dissimilar rank and between individuals of equal grade. When soldiers could not easily make a superior aware of their discontent – a Corporal was of course much easier to confront face-to-face than a general-officer – grousing and the airing of complaints solely amongst themselves provided a degree of both relief and satisfaction and further reinforced the emotional bonds, and hence the common experiences, that attached one man to another. Every unfair circumstance, however, did not necessarily encourage or end in protest; only when the situation exceeded an individual’s ability to cope and endure or was of such immediate import that it could be suffered no longer did a demonstration of displeasure become all the more likely.

First of all, Canadian soldiers quite naturally desired and indeed expected to be lead by competent superiors. The exigencies of battle quickly demonstrated that some leaders, be they commissioned or otherwise, were wholly unsuited for command. Incidentally, the CEF itself later came to the same realization and ceased the practice of placing untested senior officers who came over from Canada with reinforcement battalions into comparable positions of responsibility in France; frontline experience and merit rather than social status or political connection eventually became the means by which appointments and promotions were gained.[51] Donald Fraser of the 31st Battalion from Calgary provides ample evidence of the expectation held by soldiers for adequate

leadership and the consequent loss of respect for and trust in those individuals who lacked ability. After spending a considerable amount of time at the front, he recorded in his journal that some reinforcements sent to replace earlier casualties "felt rather shaky trusting themselves to green non-commissioned officers, and gave vent to expression that they should be led by those who had experience of the line."[52] Few soldiers evidently desired to trust their life to unproven leaders and some even went so far as to make their beliefs known.[53] That such a request would come from replacements even before they had been witness to the horrors of the trenches and had learnt firsthand the absolute necessity of competent leadership makes their expectation all the more significant and compelling.

On the other hand, in the face of manifest incompetence, other soldiers resolved to rely solely on their own skills and perhaps on those of a few chosen mates to ensure survival.[54] In recalling one of his first trips to the trenches in late-September 1915, Fraser noted that:

> All of a sudden there was a whiz [of a shell] and the captain came chasing back overrunning the entrance [to the shelter] in his hurry, with Lovell following. He sank on to the sandbags, buried his face in his hands, and appeared very much startled. Lt. H -- and he 'were at a loss what to do,' one suggesting to get the men out of the building and the other that they remain where they were. It was evident no instructions were given about what to do in the case of shell-fire. They were not even aware if we were within view of the enemy or not. We found out later we were not. Our estimation of our officers sank to zero and it was a lesson to us that in future it is best to rely on your own wits and do not expect too much from those senior to you.[55]

Fraser held true to his convictions for one year later while holding the line near the craters of Mont St. Eloi, he declined to volunteer for a raid planned by a number of officers, none of whom "appeared to be taking an active interest in the matter." Although

more than willing to participate if the plan offered a chance for success, he astutely observed that the raid, because of some questionable tactics insisted upon by certain individuals, was absolutely "hopeless and suicidal." His premonitions ultimately proved correct for 16 of the 30 participants were eventually wounded, some of whom later died, a less-than satisfactory result that prompted Fraser to bitterly condemn the raid as a "fiasco."[56] His decision to remain behind on a raid that promised to transpire poorly also demonstrates the value that most, if not all, soldiers placed on life, especially their own and that of their fellow comrades. Quite logically, when soldiers were asked rather than ordered to participate in an upcoming action, such as a trench raid or another special and dangerous duty, the chance that they would decline to volunteer became more likely if the prospects for success seemed slim or nil.

In parallel to this notion, men also desired that their leaders expend life judiciously; soldiers seemed willing to trust their superiors with their lives only so long as the latter did not act recklessly. Indeed, the desire for competent leadership and the sanctity of life were intimately connected. When certain situations seemed unnecessarily dangerous, soldiers oftentimes voiced their concern before any action could be taken. For the most part, an amiable relationship between leader and follower would have to exist in order for the latter's opinion to be seriously considered and eventually acted upon. In other situations, however, the fear of losing control over or the respect of one's subordinates either encouraged the acceptance of an alternative proposal or the abandonment of the original plan.

In his memoirs, Will Bird of the 42nd Battalion (Royal Highlanders of Canada, the Black Watch) offers an excellent and somewhat extreme example precisely on point.

After a full afternoon of heavy and costly fighting, a new Lieutenant who apparently had "spent most of the war in lecture halls and on parade grounds" ordered Bird and his remaining companions, who numbered only a handful, to charge headlong against a German machinegun that could fire unobstructed down a long deep trench owing to its placement. One soldier immediately exclaimed that "it would be suicide to try it." Another suggested quite sarcastically that "they were not going up the trench unless the officer chose to lead them," whereupon the latter drew his revolver and exclaimed that "'I'm giving you an order.'" No sooner had he threatened his charges then one of Bird's companions leveled his rifle at the Lieutenant and implied that "just one more move would be his last on earth." The officer soon relented and was wounded shortly thereafter, much to the relief of all concerned. Later, in only twenty minutes time and apparently without direction from any officer, the men captured the gun emplacement and suffered no casualties in the process.[57] In this specific case, the lack of experience demonstrated by the officer in both ordering such an attack and by quickly resorting to compulsion encouraged an act of protest (actually mutiny) that had the potential to end much worse than it did. Because Bird and his fellow soldiers perceived the Lieutenant to be acting without full regard for their lives, they took immediate action to prevent unnecessary casualties.

Additional examples illustrate the same argument. While on the Somme, a small party of very reluctant men from the 31st Battalion was organized to retrieve the body of one of their slain officers from the field. In command, the Sergeant-Major told the soldiers that they "would go out under the white flag" in order to make the recovery somewhat easier. The men immediately began to protest as soon as the plan had been

suggested "as we had not sufficient faith to believe that Fritz [the Germans] would pay much attention to any flag, if he had an opportunity to kill. So in the end we went fully armed." When they arrived at the front and perceived the situation too dangerous to proceed, the party retired and left the body where it lay to be retrieved later. Incidentally, men belonging to the Red Cross who were assigned a similar task over the same ground also decided to wait until the danger had passed for they too "found it hopeless to show themselves above the parapet." Most certainly, these soldiers did not desire to needlessly put their life at risk by venturing close to the enemy without adequate protection; they would go and retrieve the body only if armed and if the level of danger seemed acceptable. Through their protest, they influenced the decision of their leader who, in this particular instance, was seen to be acting without full regard for their lives.[58]

For many of the same reasons, Bird unsuccessfully protested the manner in which a different officer from that described above proposed to attack a German strongpoint. When executed, the latter's plan cost the life of a young Lieutenant and resulted in the wounding of many others; in due course, the position was eventually overwhelmed in the manner advocated by Bird who commented after the affair that "It was sickening to think of the needless death of the officer…"[59] Each of the above examples relate that Canadian soldiers valued life and would, if the situation so warranted, adopt an aggressive stance and engage in protest in order to prevent what they perceived to be unnecessary danger and loss. These men were more than willing to perform their duty as soldiers – the fact that Bird and his companions attacked on their own initiative without an officer being present adequately demonstrates this point – but only desired that their leaders limit casualties if at all possible. Agar Adamson, an officer who served with the Princess

Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry for the entire course of the war and who eventually commanded the Regiment, seems to have understood this attitude. In one of his almost-daily letters home, he related to his wife, Mabel, that:

> We are the only Regiment without a Chaplain. Before we left the last trenches, the C.O. read the funeral service on our men. We have refused to allow a Chaplain to hold a funeral service on our poor fellows who are out in front of our trenches and have been there for almost a year, it appears to be risking the lives of men for a sentiment.[60]

While incompetent leadership on the battlefield stimulated the most aggressive acts of protest, other less serious matters, which nonetheless affected the overall welfare and comfort of the troops, did so as well. For instance, a strong division of labour seems to have existed between the various arms of the CEF that could encourage insubordination if not fully respected. Amongst the Other Ranks, and probably the officers as well, one's informal status derived largely from the branch of service in which one served, with those who carried out the most dangerous duties placed highly at the top and those who served well behind the front or in England placed squarely at the bottom. In the minds of some soldiers, one's standing in comparison to others determined which duties they should perform and which chores, in the interest of fairness, they ought to be exempt from. Those individuals who fought directly at the front, such as members of either the infantry or the artillery, expected an exemption from menial duties while away from their forward positions.[61] Apparently, for these men, the dangers and privations that they faced, coupled with the sheer physical demands of their work, more than entitled them to a degree of immunity from general labour. Those in command did not always agree with their subordinates' perceptions as to the best way to employ frontline soldiers,

whether in or out of the line. This incongruence oftentimes resulted in friction, and less frequently, in protests.

In his memoirs, for instance, Bird relates that on one occasion he and a small group of soldiers who had just returned hungry and sleep-deprived from a lengthy tour at the front were ordered by a newly-commissioned and inexperienced Lieutenant to fill shell holes in a nearby road. After marching past an idle labour battalion lazily enjoying their breakfast in the sun, the soldiers refused to work and abruptly put down their tools; the men eventually walked to the nearest Y.M.C.A. tent where they purchased a well-deserved meal, partially paid for by Bird, their informal leader. After permitting Bird to fully explain the circumstances of this incident and the resultant behaviour of his companions, a well-liked and respected Major from the same battalion, the 42nd, allowed this act of collective disobedience (or more properly, mutiny) to go unpunished, and implored Bird to extend his sincerest apologies to all involved. As further compensation, he also promised to remove the offending Lieutenant from his company.[62]

By forcing these men to perform tasks that were properly the preserve of other individuals, in addition to failing to provide them with adequate rest and food, this particular Lieutenant stimulated an act of protest by creating an unfair situation that grated against the reasonable expectations and needs of his subordinates. Although well within his legal prerogative to issue such an order, he apparently failed to understand or to consider the possible implications of his directive. Having endured so much, the soldiers believed that they were entitled to certain concessions; being mistreated only added to the stress of recent days and prompted them to swiftly rectify the problem on their own. Luckily, their company commander agreed with their assessment of the

circumstances, if not entirely with their conduct. As an aside, for protecting his soldiers to the best of his ability from unfair situations and for providing them with competent personal leadership, the Major received their admiration and respect in return. The affable relationship fostered by such exchanges undoubtedly encouraged a greater willingness on the part of Bird and his fellow soldiers to follow the orders of this officer. Such a phenomenon was in fact widespread for during the First World War, the respect shown by a superior toward the common soldier oftentimes resulted in a greater and more enthusiastic compliance with orders.

As further evidence of the division of labour within the CEF, Frank Ferguson, a gunner with the 1st Canadian Siege Battery from Halifax, recorded in his diary in early-January 1917 that two men "gave us a laugh today when ordered to dig a latrine, which was not quite in keeping with their ideas of the fitness of things."[63] A similar reluctance to perform the work of others also seems to have been present between the various national components that formed the larger "British" Army of which the Canadians were a part. When ordered to assist a British battery in preparing their position, Ferguson venomously remarked in his dairy:

> Ye gods and army rations! We are up here to dig gun pits for a bunch of cripples who happen to be wearing the uniform of the Royal Garrison Artillery. Holy suffering tomcats, were we mad! The poor dears had been firing their 60 pounders and were tired out. So when volunteers were called for to go up and dig their damn gun pits, our polite and generous O.C. [Officer Commanding] speaks up, 'Why General Whoosis, don't worry about those nasty gun pits, I'll send a few men up there to settle the matter at once.' Boy, did that bird come in for a grand and beautiful cussing out today. I wonder what [he] thought we were doing for the past ten months – playing ping-pong I suppose.[64]

Although there may have been a good reason behind the order that Ferguson missed in his assessment of the situation, the fact remains that frontline soldiers resented the performance of what they deemed to be needless labour.

When out of the line in billets, the exemptions soldiers expected from menial labour also extended to such military formalities as drill and inspections. These parade-square routines were perceived to be quite useless by men who had endured the rigours of the front, had performed their duty well and, above all, longed for a well-deserved rest.[65] By overcoming the multitude of difficulties and dangers inherent in active service, soldiers believed themselves to have earned a degree of freedom from these annoying activities. In the soldiers' eyes, much to the vexation of the military establishment, rest billets were exactly for that, rest, and not for replicating life in a peacetime garrison. No other event irritated the men as much as inspections conducted for the benefit of general-officers. To be sure, the memoirs and wartime dairies written by Canadians are full of animosity toward these events. Donald Fraser, now of the 6th Brigade Machine Gun Company, recorded in his diary that in preparation for an inspection by Generals Richard Turner and Sam Hughes:

> We were continually being pulled out of our billets to go through all sorts of parade drill as if this was the chief mission of our lives and war of secondary importance. … We were subjected to no end of button polishing and inspections, twice daily, until we were heartily sick of the whole affair, and felt disgusted that so much attention was being bestowed on things of little account when a plethora of real work was to be done in the firing line.

Fraser continues that the entire affair, as anticipated, proved to be nothing short of a debacle for Hughes was apparently unsure of which brigade he was inspecting. His lack of "all knowledge of the brigade's activities and achievements" only frustrated the men

further.[66] The unwillingness of combatants to submit to a formal discipline outside areas of immediate danger seems to be have been present in the militaries of other allied nations as well.[67]

Not surprisingly, veteran soldiers also adopted a reluctant attitude toward "spit and polish" in the trenches. Leaders of whatever grade who lacked frontline experience and who also believed that the most effective soldiers were those who had been instilled with the discipline of the parade-ground, oftentimes lost all credibility with their charges when they ordered them to "keep ourselves shaved, buttons polished and clothing clean." The horrible conditions in France and Belgium obviously precluded both personal cleanliness and any smartness of dress. Soldiers consequently viewed such orders, which to them demonstrated an individual's inability to "differentiate between important and unimportant things,"[68] as ridiculous in the extreme. Wise leaders quickly altered their ways if they desired to preserve what little respect remained for them; those who did not relent did so at their own peril. The loss of respect, whether engendered through inane orders or by a lack of battlefield competence, obviously impinged upon one's ability to be taken seriously and thus to command effectively.

By comparison, the ability to understand the mind of soldiers, which more often than not came from close and prolonged contact with them, or in other words, experience, usually proved to be a welcome asset to a leader desirous of moving his charges toward a common goal. Louis Keene, a Canadian artist who eventually received a commission in the British Army after enlisting in the first contingent of the CEF, reflected upon his promotion from the ranks in 1915 that "I am very glad that before being an officer I have been a private, because I now have the latter's point of view. I am going to try hard to be

a good officer."[69] For him, success as a leader depended directly upon his knowledge of the value system of those whom he was now to command. The familiarity with his subordinates' expectations, which derived from his earlier experiences and of course his own needs and wants, allowed him to tailor orders in such a way as to encourage compliance. On one occasion, for instance, while commanding British troops, he "told them [of] the importance of the work we were to undertake. I have found it always a good thing to make the men think the job that they are doing is of great importance. Better results are obtained that way."[70] Although sheer expediency rather than deep concern for the feelings of his charges may have motivated Keene to explain the reasons behind his orders, these comments certainly suggest that soldiers valued a flow of meaningful and pertinent information through the chain of command which ultimately provided them with a greater sense of purpose. Being told *why* they were to perform a certain task, rather than simply being ordered to do so without an explanation, as the military culture so encouraged, appears to have satisfied at least one of the many expectations held by Canadian soldiers.

Such a conclusion is supported by sociological research. In describing how the possession of a sense of purpose increases the morale and motivation of soldiers, Anthony Kellet notes that:

> it has been shown that a group's cohesion is very much dependent on its having a mission or an objective. … Though soldiers tend to be parochial in their outlook, they do need to have objectives by which they can measure the progress of the fighting and assess the importance of their own contribution. This need is demonstrated by the evident value of the dissemination of information.[71]

Indeed, those soldiers who understood why they were asked to perform a specific duty and why the duty itself was important tended to be more agreeable which, in the end,

curtailed the possibility of an act of disobedience. On the other hand, when soldiers believed a task to be useless or detrimental to their well-being, discontent oftentimes resulted. The above comments offered by Ferguson in regards to the construction of gun pits for the Royal Garrison Artillery provide ample evidence on this point.

The importance of information to the common soldier must not be underestimated. In his analysis of the Kinmel Park riots of June 1919, historian Howard Coombs observes that the men's frustration at being held back in camp while troopships either sailed home to Canada or were repeatedly postponed partially resulted from the camp commander's failure to disseminate the reasons for these delays to all concerned. Their anger, combined with what they perceived to be unfair and unjust treatment, eventually erupted into full-scale mutiny.[72] As psychologists have noted, individuals respond more positively to adverse circumstances when the reasons behind the situation are explained as opposed to when they are not. Indeed, "providing people with information that justifies the need for negative outcomes enhances the extent to which they come to accept those outcomes as fair" and reasonable.[73]

Evidence of the relationship between high morale and fair treatment in whatever form is also found elsewhere in the Canadian experience. Without a doubt, soldiers expected freedom from both verbal and physical abuse and resented individuals who consistently engaged in such activities and the policies that institutionalized such maltreatment. During the First World War, varying terms of Field Punishment Number One were awarded to disobedient soldiers who had broken military law. Under such a sentence, individuals were placed on reduced rations, given extra drills and for a few hours each day were tied to a post or a cartwheel; soldiers derogatorily labeled this latter

practice “crucifixion.” Will Bird, who was unjustly sentenced in Canada to a similar form of punishment for a crime that he did not commit, recalled after the war that this experience “changed me from a soldier proud to be in uniform to one knowing there was no justice whatever in the army.”[74] In France, while speaking with a British soldier in hospital about the finer points of military discipline, Bird told him

> about the day we had seen “Old Sunshine,” the regimental sergeant-major of the R.C.R.’s, [Royal Canadian Regiment] have a man spreadeagled to the wheel of a cart. We went up the hill and cut the fellow loose, and along came Old Sunshine roaring threats. None of us ran. We simply stayed and defied him. He was told that if the man, or any other, were tied to another wheel we would get him, sooner or later, tie him to a cartwheel and send the cart downhill. We were not drunkards or rowdies. He grew hoarse and went away, but all of us saw the fear in his eyes and never again did we see an R.C.R. on a cartwheel.[75]

Confronted with a situation that grated against their value system and their expectations regarding personal treatment – Bird’s unpleasant experiences with military punishment may also have encouraged him to liberate the captive – the soldiers reacted in a sober and non-violent manner, although violence was indeed threatened, to achieve both their immediate goal, namely the release of the prisoner, and to discourage similar acts from occurring in the future. The group of soldiers who participated in this episode obviously possessed a common consciousness that incorporated, among other attributes, a strong sense of fairness and a dislike of seeing members of their community suffer needlessly. Coming to the aid of a soldier from a different unit altogether – Bird and his companions belonged to the 42nd Battalion [76] – strongly suggests a certain amount of attachment between infantrymen, despite inter-battalion rivalry and occasional enmity; as will be recalled, British seamen spoke of their fellow sailors as “brothers” despite the fact that all

did not know one another on a personal basis. In one of his letters home to his wife, Adamson observed a similar phenomenon. He wrote:

> We had a most successful show early this morning. I think for the actual number of troops engaged the results were better than any former attempt by any other Regiment. We were standing by only and took no part, but are equally as pleased as if it had been our own push, which says a great deal for the spirit of the troops, who are always delighted when another Regiment pulls something off; even if they are not in the same brigade.[77]

Finally, soldiers also valued those routines that provided them with relief from the strains and difficulties inherent in active service. Any changes or disruptions to an established and pleasurable practice, which not only benefited their physical and mental welfare, but also their morale, frequently aroused considerable complaint. In his memoirs, E.L.M. Burns, a signals officer, recalls that during the winter of 1916-1917, the General Officer Commanding of the 11th Infantry Brigade, Brigadier-General Victor Odlum, an avowed teetotaler, attempted to replace the soldiers' daily rum issue with hot cocoa. As might be expected, his "innovation got minus zero in the front-line opinion polls." Being wise to the needs of his men (and perhaps to prevent the escalation of this issue), the commander of the 4th Division, Major-General David Watson, eventually overruled Odlum's proposal thereby ensuring that the "tot" remained an integral part of military routine, much to the obvious pleasure of those who partook.[78] After becoming accustomed to the practice of receiving a drink each day, soldiers protested a change that they viewed as needless and detrimental.

While the specific methods by which they demonstrated their displeasure are unknown, the fact remains that they appear to have influenced the conduct of their superiors by expressing their "mutinous feelings."[79] On the whole, their protests did not stem from any base desire to consume alcohol simply for consumption's sake, but rather

from the fact that rum provided a degree of psychological comfort.[80] Aside from its value as a sedative, a pain killer and a reward for enduring the rigours of life at the front, rum oftentimes acted as a combat motivator by steeling the will, or conversely, by numbing the nerves. After the war, many soldiers recalled that they did not enjoy drinking while in France but did so anyway owing to the mental and physical comfort that rum provided.[81] Like other communal activities (messing, training, fighting, etc), drinking also served to bind soldiers to one another through the commonality of experience. The pleasure resultant from sharing a dram together, especially before or after a particularly trying episode, increased the strength of attachment between the members of the small groups in which soldiers interacted on a daily basis. Such were the benefits of this sweet liquor that "In an organization where soldiers had little if any power, the withholding of rum was important enough for them to raise their disenfranchised voices."[82]

Despite the fact that some pleasures such as rum were given without cost to the troops, other amusements came with a price and thus the opportunity for those who sold them to turn a profit at the expense of their customers. Canadian soldiers resented any financial exploitation at the hands of those individuals or institutions who provided either entertainment or treats as a diversion from the hardships of military life. During the war, for instance, the Y.M.C.A. earned an unenviable reputation for "getting the last penny out of the troops."[83] Being taken advantage of conflicted directly with their expectation of fair and proper treatment. Like the British poor of earlier days, they believed that some of the business practices engaged in by certain suppliers violated the unwritten rules of conduct. Abuse of this sort oftentimes occurred when soldiers were isolated and a

particular vendor(s) held a monopoly; having no one else to whom they could turn for similar products, soldiers either paid the high prices demanded, endured the inferior service and goods or went without. Again, soldiers seemed willing to tolerate some maltreatment, but when conditions became unbearable, protests, in one form or another, usually resulted. The parallels between the 18th and the 20th centuries are indeed astonishing.

In late-1915, for instance, while en route to England from Halifax aboard the Cunard liner *Saxonia*, volunteer infantrymen ransacked a canteen causing

> apples, ginger ale, biscuits and chocolate [to be] strewn about the deck in one grand mélange. It seems that the long-suffering troops had rebelled at paying ten cents for worm-eaten apples and mouldy chocolate, and … had staged a raid …[84]

Likewise, in the autumn of 1914 at Valcartier, Canada's initial mobilization camp, a civilian contractor repeatedly showed the same serial film time and time again without respite. After the soldiers could bear seeing *The Perils of Pauline* no longer, they pulled down the tent that doubled as a makeshift theatre and in the confusion that followed, the cashbox (and presumably all of its contents) vanished, while the tent itself caught fire.[85] Even before the first Canadians had reached England, therefore, acts of protest had become from their perspective an acceptable and justified form of behaviour when the circumstances to which they were subjected so warranted. From the outset, soldiers understood that if they applied enough force at the right moment, the conditions under which they lived and laboured could be altered and improved, if only momentarily.

Taken together, the above examples reveal that in protesting an unfair or unjust circumstance, soldiers frequently employed a response that was in direct proportion to the perceived wrong; a minor issue warranted a meager reaction while more serious and

potentially life-threatening situations required forceful interventions. A response tended to be more vigourous and sustained when authority figures disregarded the supremacy of life as opposed to when they ignored some of their charges' less significant expectations. Employing the appropriate response allowed soldiers to deal with most situations in a prompt and usually successful manner. Although men "behaved differently in different situations, the common elements were direct action and the imposition of some form of elementary 'natural' justice," [86] that is, they sought a solution that they believed was sufficient to right the perceived wrong. The aggressive (and in many cases illegal) measures taken by individuals or groups to protest extreme circumstances naturally aroused concern in those individuals charged with leading and administering the CEF in particular and the British Army as a whole. Not surprisingly, most individuals in positions of authority, who naturally wished to maintain a strict discipline, viewed any demonstrations of this sort with considerable apprehension owing to the potential for violence should the participants be further provoked and the dangerous precedent that they believed such actions could establish.

ALTERNATE MEANS OF DISPLAYING DISPLEASURE

Although soldiers oftentimes committed protests in the hope of immediately rectifying an adverse situation, some individuals engaged in acts of disobedience whenever the opportunity best presented itself in order to retaliate against authority and to take revenge. When the common soldier exacted retribution, thereby contenting his sense of natural justice, the satisfaction gained through such an act was immensely pleasing since he possessed little real power. Unlike earlier examples, these events were rarely in response to a specific incident, but rather to an entire series of injustices that had

transpired over time. In studying human behaviour in the workplace, psychologists have noted that:

> disrespectful treatment, adding insult to the injury of unfair treatment [such as being the victim of an unjust procedure], encouraged people to retaliate against their employers – seeking to harm them in exchange for harming themselves, even if so doing did nothing more than even the score between them … [87]

Despite the fact that such forms of protest may not correct a specific injustice or right a particular wrong, "they may do so symbolically. That is, if one cannot directly benefit oneself, then at least one can derive satisfaction from knowing that one has harmed another who has harmed oneself."[88]

In his memoirs, Ernest Black, a gunner with the Canadian artillery, provides numerous examples of such forms of protest. Concerning an incident that occurred in the village of Demuin in August 1918 and which involved many men from an unidentified Canadian infantry battalion, he recalls that:

> It was pitch-dark and one of the men decided this was the opportunity he had sought for long. He addressed himself to his platoon commander. … What was said may be summarized as descriptive: the officer's ancestry, his appearance, including his ears, his personal habits and morals; all of these were discussed and commented on. The speaker must have been an old sweat; no draftee or remount could have acquired that complete army vocabulary in a short period of service. The officer resented the remarks and tried to locate the offender. He would rush toward the voice shouting, 'Stop that man! Hold that man!' The voice would be silent, only to break out again at the other end of the platoon.[89]

By acting in such a manner, soldiers not only sought a release for tension but also indicated to all present, especially the individual to whom their comments were directed, their general dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs. Since Black was not a member of the battalion he provides no explanation as to why these men acted as they did; however, he believed that "the officer had it coming to him" [90] owing to the fact that

he had aroused a considerable amount of enmity, that no one made any attempt to stop the insults and that more than one soldier participated in the tirade, all of which strongly suggest communal support for this act. Again, those who failed to command a certain amount of admiration, or at the very least the respect of their charges, oftentimes became the targets of hostility.

On another occasion, while commenting upon the prevalence of and annoyance engendered by lice, Black noted that "One of the things we resented about our officers was the fact that for the most part they managed to keep clear of the little pests" owing to better quarters and to the meticulous exertions of their batmen (personal servants). As he recalled, "One of our gunners felt that very keenly and, having a grudge against one of the officers [for an unknown reason] … took steps to rectify what he felt was an injustice," namely the privileges enjoyed by officers. The gunner in question filled a large cigarette tin with as many lice as he could find on his person and later distributed the entire contents in the officer's bedroll. Although all the men were "in on the secret," again suggesting community consensus, each was somewhat disappointed as "Not once did we see him scratch himself on parade."[91] This incident, like the example cited above, provided soldiers with a strong sense of satisfaction by evening the score and exacting a form of retribution for past wrongs. Whether or not these two targets of hostility altered their behaviour as a consequence of these acts remains unknown but, at the very least, they probably now understood that all was not well within the group over which they had command.

Even though retribution allowed groups of soldiers and single individuals alike to satisfy their sense of natural justice, many opted instead to satisfy this desire by coming

to the aid of an individual seen to be the victim of unfairness. So unjust were certain situations to outside observers that some form of prompt action was required, regardless of the personal cost to the individual who intervened. The dynamics of these acts further indicate that a strong sense of solidarity existed between soldiers and that sacrificing one's own well-being and comfort for the sake of another was not altogether unheard of. In his memoirs, Bird recalls an incident where an individual who had performed his duty exceptionally well had had his leave revoked for supposedly not saluting an officer. While failing to persuade those in command to relent, Bird eventually "remembered that one could give another his leave if he wished. It had never been done that I knew of, but was possible." In order to rectify what he perceived to be a manifestly unfair situation, a situation that denied all justice, Bird resorted to a novel and entirely legal remedy. In the end, the individual who had been slighted left for a well-deserved rest while his benefactor remained behind. Aside from helping another soldier seen to be the victim of an unfair procedure, Bird satisfied his own sense of personal justice by outwitting (and thereby greatly irritating!) those ultimately responsible for the situation in the first place. Faced with these circumstances, those in command threatened that "They would see to it that the war was over before I went anywhere,"[92] a warning that failed to rattle the ever-persistent and resourceful Bird.

ELECTING NOT TO PROTEST

While common soldiers frequently encountered circumstances that grated against their value system and expectations, many withheld their expressions of discontent and opted not to protest every individual difficulty that they faced. Their willingness to bear trying episodes seems attributable to their sense of duty and personal discipline, their

acceptance of lethargic military bureaucracy, their toleration of the inevitable conditions of war and their anticipation of reward. With further research, additional reasons that account for their reluctance to engage in protest will surely be found, as will alternate means of displaying displeasure. To be sure, soldiers chose their battles wisely in order to add both weight and credibility to their complaints and, above all, to ensure a reasonable degree of success. Demonstrating against only the most serious and grievous conditions guaranteed that acts of protest would retain a degree of novelty and thus their effect since an unremitting flow of complaints and calls for concessions could potentially antagonize and erode the sympathy of those in a position to realize the desired change.[93]

Some soldiers believed quite strongly that their duty to prosecute the war to the best of their ability and to see the conflict to its successful conclusion took immediate precedence over demonstrating against either the systemic inequity so entrenched within the CEF or the manifest difficulties faced by soldiers in the field. Writing home in mid-1916 from Belgium, Stanley Rutledge, a graduate of Queen's University at Kingston and a sniper with the 28th (Northwest) Battalion from Winnipeg, related that:

> One thing I have carefully avoided in letters home [is] that no captious criticisms are indulged in – no grievances aired. But do not think the boys are without their thought on all these matters. We see where injustice lies – we know the game is not played fairly in some quarters, but the soldier is here to 'carry on.' *Après la guerre* one may put into words thoughts now without expression.[94]

While harbouring some resentment, the individuals to whom Rutledge refers also seem to have understood that complaints lodged against elements of the established military culture, either the numerous privileges enjoyed by officers or the manner in which common soldiers were treated by their superiors, would result in little real change. Even within the British Army proper, the recognition existed that the lowly private was unable

to alter the larger environment in which he lived and laboured; one soldier remarked, for instance, that the system of "discipline, with the death penalty behind it, was a canker we could not cure."[95] Like Britain's poor of the 18th century, Canadian soldiers did not endeavour to alter the entire system with which they were confronted, but rather to protest individual acts of injustice that would, if successfully resolved, result in an immediate improvement to their present condition.

Other soldiers also echoed the importance of both performing one's duty and of accepting many (but certainly not all) of the circumstances into which they were thrust. Arthur Lapointe, an intensely devout Roman Catholic, noted in his diary while serving with the 22nd Battalion from Quebec that "I can't avoid the duties that are a soldier's, so, with resignation, I await whatever events lie in store."[96] Owing to his strong Christian faith, Lapointe oftentimes prayed to Almighty God "to grant me the ability and courage to carry out my duty as a faithful soldier."[97] In like manner, Adamson once related to his wife that:

> I had one of my old original men shot in the stomach in a digging party last night and he died this morning. He was always badly behaved when in billets, but an excellent fellow in the trenches and I was rather counting on him being of use to the Company now that we are going in.[98]

Indeed, many men seem to have resigned themselves to the simple fact that they now belonged to the military and thus were subject to all the difficulties engendered by a hierarchical system that demanded both obedience and compliance to one's superiors. This is not to say, however, that such men did not protest, but rather that their sense of duty and obligation quieted their willingness to resort to such activity. Only when circumstances became absolutely unbearable or exceeded their capacity to endure did they consider an act of defiance appropriate. For many, protesting a particular

circumstance or disobeying the less important orders given off of the battlefield was not inconsistent with performing their duty well, for the matters against which they dissented needlessly impacted their physical and mental well-being. In the end, they would ultimately fight well and be brave – their commitment and will is certainly not in question – but until battle was joined, they were not willing to quietly tolerate maltreatment.

On one particular occasion, in concert with other soldiers, Lapointe participated in an act of protest for many of the reasons given above. This particular group of men believed that they had not received proper treatment from those responsible for their care and thus refused an order as a means of illustrating their displeasure. After spending a bitterly cold night in a billet with shattered windows and a broken stove, he later recalled that "This morning, after the distribution of a miserable ration, which none of us could eat, the men in our hut refused to parade. A sergeant ordered us out, but we told him: 'Better treatment, or we won't budge.'" An officer eventually induced the men to parade as ordered with the promise of more agreeable arrangements in the future.[99] Lapointe's willingness to be insubordinate in this situation and not in others seems attributable to his membership in a larger group that collectively sanctioned a defiant course of action. Throughout his diary, he constantly relates his fear of acting in a manner that his fellow soldiers could construe as either cowardice or weakness.[100] His reluctance to give voice to his difficulties or to protest a situation that the remainder of the group could well deal with, such as a difficult march, appears to stem from this fact. Only when he could complain about certain conditions and still retain his status as a reliable soldier and friend within the larger group to which he belonged did he act. Because the group as a whole

sanctioned the protest, Lapointe could participate without fear of condemnation from his peers.[101]

In like manner, many soldiers accepted the natural lethargy inherent in the CEF and realized much to their dismay that no amount of complaining would ever change it; the military moved slowly and would continue to do so. For example, after enduring a battery of medical tests to determine his suitability as a pilot in the Royal Flying Corps, Rutledge and a handful of other men waited for three hours for a slip of paper stating that they were fit. Of the episode, he wrote home that "Some of the chaps were in quite good shape for a mutiny, but the longer one is in the army the more one wonders at some of the ways of running the job."[102] These individuals seem to have realized that the sluggishness of military bureaucracy was both constant and unchangeable, a situation to which they were unfortunately compelled to adapt. While some men understood that slowness was indeed inevitable, "the red tape with which the whole damn British Army is bound" [103] aroused a considerable amount of comment and animosity from other less patient soldiers.

In addition, the prospect of a tangible and comforting reward, no matter how small, muted the will to protest and provided the motivation to endure a temporarily uncomfortable situation; conversely, men oftentimes voiced their complaints when a promised reward did not materialize.[104] In and of itself, the reward did not have to be substantial, only meaningful to whom it was conferred. Since "fatigues are a source of much annoyance and anxiety, especially when one has a perpetual longing for sleep and more sleep," the return to billets would have been reward enough for Fraser.[105] Again in his memoirs, Burns recalls that on many occasions at the front he supervised a working

party of infantrymen digging a six-foot deep trench in which armoured communications cable would eventually be laid. Regardless of whether the ground was soft or not, this task "was regarded by the weary foot-soldiers as onerous and disagreeable, and one to be avoided as much as possible." Rather than aggressively complaining, the men worked expeditiously because the sooner they completed their assignment, the sooner they could return to billets.[106]

Historian Tim Cook has also reached similar conclusions regarding the relationship between the behaviour of soldiers and the rum ration. Noting its value as a reward, he observes that men would "work in the rain or stand in mud for hours on end if they knew they would receive a shot of rum in the end." Contending that many soldiers considered the tot to be owed to them for enduring the rigours of the front, he asserts that "When rum was issued, men were content. If it were withheld, it could lead to a plunge in morale" in which individuals "could turn mutinous or 'swing the lead,'" that is, malinger. Failing to soldier as hard as they could provided the disaffected with yet another method of protesting against what they deemed to be an injustice. Other means of demonstrating their displeasure included feigning sickness in order to temporarily remove themselves from the day's early chores and parades. On this point, one soldier contended that "'more than half will parade sick in the morning'" if rum was denied.[107]

Life in the trenches was made more bearable by the realization that the opportunity for rest out of the line would soon be at hand. Despite the fact that the military's definition of rest differed considerably from that of the soldiers' – the former believed that subjecting the men to drills, additional training and parades while not engaged in fighting or holding the line was appropriate – the removal from the constant

dangers and stress associated with the front provided soldiers with hope. The men's expectations that relief would soon be forthcoming added to their stamina and resolve. As Rutledge noted in one of his letters home, "We are happy as the day is long when we come out after our tour, with rest and companionship awaiting us."[108] Sociological research suggests that if soldiers have something to look forward to, such as time out of the line, then morale is likely to be higher which, by extension, necessarily limits the likelihood of serious complaint.[109]

Owing to the fact that time out of the line served as a type of reward for surviving the last rotation and also for performing their duty well, men expected to receive proper accommodations and meals upon their return to rest billets, especially when suitable facilities existed. Private Fraser, for instance, recalls in his journal that when he was sent to a rest camp, he found the walls of his quarters to be in such poor shape that they stopped neither the daylight nor the cold; no clean or warm water was to be had either. Under these trying circumstances, which closely resembled those he had encountered in the trenches, he opined that "For a winter billet it was a crying scandal. Instead of a rest camp, it was torture." Fraser also commented upon the effect that poor billets had on morale:

> Housing soldiers under these conditions, miles behind the firing line, is very poor policy. It only helps to undermine their constitution and sow seeds of discord in the ranks. There is absolutely no reason, when there is a stationary front, why suitable reserve billets are not found.[110]

Contemporary evidence also suggests that soldiers understood quite clearly that inhospitable conditions existed at the front that could rarely be ameliorated despite their best efforts to do so. Aside from grousing, another constant of soldierly life, few serious protests regarding conditions at the front occurred for "When we go up [the line] the boys

soon accept the inevitable and copy the trench-rat's mode of life."[111] Only when soldiers returned from the front did they expect more amenable living conditions. As Adamson once related to his wife, Mabel:

> The men never complain when in the line of any kind of hardship, but when out in billets, supposed to be resting quite out of danger from anything but bombing [from the air], they expect comfort and shops and entertainments and they jolly well deserve them.[112]

Because of the prevalence of adverse surroundings in the trenches, the little concessions given by one soldier to another proved immensely welcome and earned a healthy applause for the donator, regardless of rank. It is precisely because life at the front was so difficult and spartan that the smallest concession became over-exaggerated in its importance. As historian Tim Cook has observed:

> Soldiers adapted to their surroundings and they reveled in the few pleasures available to them. For men desperately looking to push aside the ghastly nature of war, the simple joys of letters, food, cigarettes, and rum became paramount.[113]

When such indulgences did not arrive, morale could, and sometimes did, plummet. So valued and immense was the pleasure that soldiers exacted from the smallest of luxuries that "Men could stoically endure a drumfire bombardment or the swirling tendrils of poison gas, only to swear and scream bloody murder when their Woodbine cigarettes failed to arrive or their rum ration appeared smaller than the bloke's beside them."[114]

Because soldiers possessed a remarkable degree of tolerance and endurance, as some of the above examples clearly illustrate, many men expressed their dissatisfaction only when they were abused by their superiors. Will Bird relates in his memoirs that one particular engineering officer, who felt the infantry to be "the lowest form of humans in uniform" – such a comment provides evidence for the contention that an individual

oftentimes perceived his status to be related to his responsibilities – verbally abused and exploited the men under his command who were responsible for digging trenches for communication cables. Aside from resorting to abrasive sarcasm throughout the night, the officer purposely measured the depth of the channel incorrectly so that he could exact more work from his weary charges. In response to this maltreatment, one individual dug a narrow yet very deep hole that caused the officer to fall violently into the trench when he attempted to measure the depth with a stick on which he leaned for support. This particular soldier responded not so much to the task at hand but rather to the conditions of his treatment; although willing to work, he demanded to be dealt with fairly and to be free from all forms of abuse.[115]

AVOIDING PROTEST

Although neglecting a soldier's legitimate concerns could stimulate an act of protest, those individuals who consistently met or exceeded the varied expectations of their men appear to have been held in greater esteem by their subordinates than those who did not. When individuals in positions of responsibility adequately attended to both the physical and psychological needs of their soldiers, the latter was left with little or no reason to protest; their willingness to pursue a disobedient course waned when their most important expectations were satisfactorily met. Leaders who possessed the same values as their men and, more importantly, who made a determined effort to illustrate this point to their charges by behaving in a manner that suggested their true belief in such principles as proper leadership and respectful interpersonal treatment seem to have understood that paying attention to the needs of their soldiers in the present would pay untold dividends in the future. Simply offering lip-service to these ideals, as opposed to practicing them

with honesty and sincerity, could not and did not convince soldiers that their leaders truly held these convictions.

In much the same manner, officers earned the respect and admiration of their subordinates if they temporarily abandoned either the encouraged modes of behaviour and / or the many privileges granted them by the military establishment. To be sure, displays of fairness, compassion and benevolence, especially those that came upon soldiers unexpectedly, went a long way to sooth the animus that they routinely directed toward those in command and toward the unfortunate situations in which they found themselves. Faced with the difficulties of campaigning in less-than hospitable circumstances and the constant threat of death and injury under which they lived, soldiers tended to respond more favourably to those individuals who attempted to improve their well-being whenever possible; the proffering of the simplest of concessions, such as a warm mug of tea, an extra tot of rum or an additional cigarette, proved exceedingly welcome by those accustomed to aloof and detached officers and ultimately fostered a greater esteem for their leaders.[116] As E.L.M. Burns relates in his memoirs, "good officers paid attention to what the men were grousing about, and if there were reasonable grounds for it the officer tried to put it right. The men did not usually expect more than this."[117] In protesting a specific situation, most soldiers did not endeavour to obtain more than that which was required for their immediate comfort. As in the 18th century, these individuals only demanded a solution to what could easily be rectified without undue difficulty and did not go beyond what was sensible and practical. Indeed, morale and discipline benefited greatly from conscientious officers who took care to make certain

that their charges were well looked after; those who did not could encourage dissatisfaction amongst their subordinates.

In many instances, officers earned for themselves a degree of respect by sharing in the hardships of service (and thus in the experiences and life of their men) despite having the opportunity to enjoy more comfortable surroundings and amenities as afforded by their rank and encouraged by institutional culture. For example, Black recalls in his memoirs that on one particular occasion, after a long and arduous march, then-Colonel A.G.L. McNaughton simply asked for a tin of bully-beef, a slice of bread and some tea instead of ordering more elaborate fare from the mess cook like a certain unnamed Major did. In a similar vein, he oftentimes shared very informal meals over good conversation with his men. Black could "not recall any other officer sharing our mugs of tea [with us]." Such was McNaughton's personality that he "had not thought of his own needs until he had seen that everything possible had been done for man and beast [the horses upon which the artillery was dependent]." Owing to their apparent novelty, word of such events circulated quickly amongst battery members, much to their amusement and delight, since the gunners soon realized "that he could rough it like the rest of us when the going was tough."[118] Adamson also noticed the value of sharing in the experiences of his subordinates. In a letter home he commented that "I am off up the line as we are retaliating in an hour's time and want to be there, not that I can do any good, but the men I think like to see one around."[119] To be sure, the commonality of experience brought about in part through the endurance of similar hardships endeared to their men those leaders who shunned their many privileges.

Likewise, individuals in positions of responsibility oftentimes received the esteem of their charges if they paid close attention to their sense of fairness and justice. Treating soldiers with respect, compassion and dignity in matters pertaining to their welfare, whatever those matters may have been, usually resulted in a positive and more amiable relationship between subordinate and superior. Adamson, who was "more convinced than ever that nothing but a mutual understanding and a mutual feeling of respect can keep a Regiment together and make it do its best in the face of death," [120] always attempted to treat his subordinates with respect and his manner towards them seems to have contributed to the high esteem in which he was held by his men. As psychologists have observed, people are very much "concerned with the quality of the interpersonal treatment they receive at the hands of decision-makers."[121] During his time with the 6th Brigade Machine Gun Company, for example, Donald Fraser served with an individual who "had not much of a manner, but was fair in his dealings with the crew and was likeable."[122] In this particular instance, Fraser equates the degree to which men were partial to an individual in a position of authority – the man described above served as the Number One on a gun-crew, that is, he fired the weapon – to the manner in which they were treated. If interpersonal dealings were congenial, the possibility existed that the relationship between those involved would be more pleasant and perhaps stronger. Historian and author Reginald Roy has noted the same phenomenon in his biography of George Randolph Pearkes, a highly-decorated infantry officer and later both Minister of National Defence and Lieutenant-Governor of British Columbia. Citing the comments of numerous veterans, he observes that:

> Both officers and men remarked about his concern for the private soldier. 'He was always interested in the comfort of his men and their training,' wrote one of them later, and although Pearkes was strict, 'the troops admired him from the first day he took command [as Senior Major of the 116th (Ontario County) Battalion] because they soon realized they would always get a fair hearing.'[123]

Such sentiments suggest quite strongly that these soldiers, since they were treated with respect and were allowed to explain themselves fully, were more willing to abide by his decisions even if they suffered from it in the end. To be sure, "people are more accepting of decisions that result from fair procedures than those that result from unfair procedures."[124] Psychologists have identified a number of factors that make the decision-making process seem fair to those upon whom the consequences of the decision will ultimately fall: being consistently applied, being highly accurate, allowing for correction should an improper decision be made, being representative of all concerns, being based on prevailing ethical standards and being free from bias. One of the most important, if not *the* most important, however, is voice. Individuals who are allowed to express their opinions and to be heard on a particular matter judge certain procedures to be more fair than those processes that deny the input of all concerned.[125] The respect bestowed upon Pearkes by his men seems to derive in part from his willingness to hear them out.[126]

On the other hand, those individuals and practices that were deemed to be unfair could either encourage an act of protest or, more likely, damage a soldier's morale and commitment. After being unjustly convicted and punished for a crime that he did not commit, Bird became "determined to buck" every representative of authority who abused their position and who failed to accord to their charges a modicum of both respect and decency; the officer in Canada who sentenced Bird to a term of Field Punishment denied him a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.[127] In comparison, the respect showered

by Bird and his companions upon the Major who allowed them to go unpunished after committing a blatant act of mutiny partially resulted from the willingness of this officer to give the men the opportunity to explain the situation and their subsequent behaviour; the regard in which this particular individual was held also stemmed from his fair character and his competent leadership both on and off the battlefield. To be sure, the importance of both voice and fairness indicates a strong desire on behalf of the common soldier for a responsive chain of command in which they possessed the chance for input and in which they believed that their comments, after proper and due consideration, might influence the decision of their superiors. Based as it was upon strict obedience and overall direction from the top, the prevailing institutional culture did not encourage such a situation. When soldiers encountered officers who valued their input, therefore, the novelty of these interactions was not lost and, as illustrated above, increased the respect of the former for the latter. Of course, soldiers only desired to be heard on matters that affected their personal welfare and which were of such importance and salience that they could not be left without comment; few men, for instance, demanded to offer their opinion on the general direction of the war and to be taken seriously.

The use of dissent to achieve a certain goal or to satisfy a certain need seems to have been a common feature of life in the prewar army; a brief glance at a handful of the memoirs and diaries written by Canadian soldiers during the latter half of the 19th century reveals that acts of protest, in all their many forms, were oftentimes resorted to in earlier periods as well. By employing insubordinate behaviour, these individuals also attempted to rectify a grievance or to communicate their dissatisfaction with the current circumstances. Far from being a product exclusively of the First World War, the tradition

of engaging in disobedience, if measured from 1914, stretches back at least four or five decades, and probably even further. In many cases, the methods by which members of the CEF pursued an acceptable remedy to a difficult situation, in addition to the grounds that to them justified such demonstrations in the first place, closely mirrored those of their antecedents to a remarkable degree. Owing to these similarities then, soldiers of the early-20th century probably inherited a strong tradition of disobedience that was informed by the broad concept of the Moral Economy.

For instance, Andrew Greenhill, a volunteer militiaman belonging to the 13th Battalion from Hamilton, Ontario, recorded in a recently-discovered manuscript many of his impressions of the summer camp held at Niagara in 1871, an event which he attended and thoroughly enjoyed. He remarked at one point in his narrative that:

> … tricks & jokes form quite an essential feature of life under canvas. Any opportunity is eagerly taken hold of to create fun & jollity. Blanket tossing became a great sport. It was introduced by the cavalry who found out a contractor giving in short allowance of fodder. He was forthwith seized and tossed high in the air no doubt very conducive to his honesty.[128]

Aside from this example, his account also includes another description of soldiers displaying their dissatisfaction at being exploited and misled. He recalled that:

> A man exhibiting an 8 legged horse which was a great imposition had his show 'busted' by a number of irate volunteers. The horse ran away only using 4 legs and the tent was perforated all over by bayonet thrusts. A guard of the 12th [Battalion] … was sent to clear the streets.[129]

One decade later, Walter Stewart, a Sergeant with the Midland Regiment, recorded in his diary during his return to Port Hope, Ontario, after helping to suppress the North West Rebellion of 1885, that he was:

> On the train all night, no sleep. On the train all day. Nothing to eat; no provisions had been made by the officers in charge to feed us. No stops were made and no supplies on the train; a bungled piece of business. But we were getting home. Otherwise there might have been a riot.[130]

Similarly, David Morrison Stewart, a trooper serving with the Lord Strathcona's Horse in the South African War, noted in his diary in mid-1900 that he and his companions thought the "Grub very poor" on one particular day which eventually led to "A little kick about it."[131]

In all of these examples, the operation of the Moral Economy seems evident since the reasons that account for the soldiers' disobedient sentiments and behaviour closely parallel those witnessed in the 18th century. Of course, more detailed and extensive research than that offered above is absolutely essential before concrete conclusions can be drawn as to the prevalence and efficacy of protest within the Canadian military prior to the First World War. In each era, however, there seems to have existed a set of expectations that required individuals in positions of responsibility to behave in a proper and acceptable manner toward others. The beliefs that governed appropriate treatment changed somewhat over time in accordance with the circumstances in which they operated and existed. When they were not respected, acts of protest and disobedience became more likely.[132] With the possibility of a strong tradition behind it, the Moral Economy seems all the more powerful as an explanatory model since it is able to rationalize many instances of disobedience over a number of successive decades. One must be cognizant of the fact that historian E.P Thompson developed this theory not to explain a small and relatively isolated set of disturbances, as has been done above, but rather to explain and to give meaning to the social turbulence that resulted from the economic abuses inflicted upon the lower classes of Great Britain throughout the 18th

century. The Moral Economy, as laid out herein, must therefore not be seen to apply to the period between 1914 and 1919 exclusively, since many of its main concepts appear to be applicable to other eras as well.

Scholars have also suggested that a similar tradition of resorting to protest along the lines described above might also be found in the history of Canadian agriculture and labour in the late-19th and early-20th centuries.[133] An in-depth analysis of these fields is also required but is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. If a tradition of protest is ultimately found to exist in these spheres of activity as well, then one might reasonably assert with a fair degree of confidence that Canadian soldiers of the First World War, like the sailors of the Royal Navy eleven decades before them, transported into a martial setting many of the generally-accepted and common behavioural patterns that formed a key element of the socio-political culture from which they came.

Between 1914 and 1919, the CEF officially charged 167 of its members with mutiny and prosecuted 51 of these cases prior to November 1918. To be sure, the vast majority of insubordination did not occur at the front but rather in support areas or in training camps such as Kinmel, Bramshott and Ripon. Most of the individuals who were subsequently brought to trial on charges of mutiny tended to be either non-combatant troops or soldiers on the strength of reserve infantry formations.[134] Unfortunately, an accurate assessment of both the frequency and number of protests engaged in by Canadian soldiers during the First World War is very difficult to ascertain since any investigation on this point is limited by the fact that many of the instances cited above were neither prolonged nor serious enough to find their way into official records. Unlike larger mutinies, where a number of participants expressed their discontent over an

extended period of time, these short-lived examples usually involved only one or two individuals and the method of protest that they employed oftentimes resolved the issue at hand quite successfully. Indeed, bringing to an end the circumstances that induced a state of disaffection (or at least making their grievances known in order to satisfy their personal sense of justice) necessitated no further activity on behalf of the protestors. Court-martial records do provide some insight into the frequency of these acts; however, only those individuals formally charged with an infraction of military law are to be found in these documents. For whatever reason, the reluctance of some officers to take formal action when confronted with a breach of discipline necessarily limits the amount of official documentation as well.

The unwillingness of those involved in such episodes, be they a participant or target, to record their experiences in dairies, journals or letters for the enlightenment of subsequent generations also prevents an accurate assessment of the regularity of this important phenomenon. Relying exclusively on such resources is admittedly risky for without collaborating documentation, one may be lead to believe that such instances were exceedingly rare (since they do not appear on a consistent basis in the recollections of soldiers) or, on the other hand, quite common (since an event that occurred all the time would be of little interest and therefore did not necessitate recording). Because the conditions that encouraged displays of discontent varied considerably – anything from poor food to poor leadership could serve as a catalyst – it seems reasonable to suggest that protests, in one form or another, would probably have been an almost daily occurrence. Large-scale mutinies such as that witnessed at Kinmel Park in 1919 were exceptionally rare within the Canadian context, and yet it would seem that relatively

small, short-lived and non-violent acts of complaint were not. To be sure, the number of incidents that could technically be labeled as mutiny is definitely higher than that suggested by both official CEF records and the contemporary or postwar writings of Canadian soldiers. Because of their greater frequency, a theoretical model that attempts to explain the latter is particularly valuable and useful.

The essential components of the Moral Economy as set down in the introduction – the possession of a definite value system that rested upon a strong sense of fairness, justice and respect, the longing for those in positions of responsibility to conduct themselves properly, the restraint protestors showed while demonstrating against unfavourable circumstances and the desire to change only the conditions that brought about the initial difficulty – all appear to apply to the Canadian experience during the First World War and tell a great deal about the military culture that existed at this time. This model seems particularly well-suited to explain acts of protest given the sheer number of similarities between both the civilian and the non-civilian milieus in regards to the dynamics of and reasons for complaint. What was initially conceived to describe collective action in the 18th century now appears to explain certain instances of collective action in the 20th century as well.

Both individually and as a larger community, Canadian soldiers of the First World War adopted a variety of means ranging from passive resistance to open rebellion in order to express their dissatisfaction with certain conditions under which they served and the less-than-satisfactory leadership with which they were sometimes and unfortunately burdened. Possessing a realistic appreciation of their place in the military's hierarchy, members of the CEF expected and demanded that their leadership at all levels show some

consideration for their values which derived from their prewar civilian lives, their military experiences or a combination in varying degrees of both. When such attention was not forthcoming, acts of protest became more likely and, when they did occur, tended to reflect the sentiments of the discontented with different degrees of intensity, that is, the most serious circumstances warranted the most serious responses. In a sense, the military establishment and the individual soldier had entered into a form of contract with each party exercising its own set of responsibilities and obligations to the other; the former provided the necessities of life and adequate leadership in return for the service of the latter.

Like the military and civilian protests of earlier centuries, acts of defiance committed by soldiers of the CEF were both spontaneous in nature and frequently "triggered" by an additional affront to either the men's sense of fairness or their established values. Assuming a variety of forms, this trigger usually served as a catalyst that brought underlying animosities and resentment to the fore. In some respects, acts of disobedience represented the culminating point of a larger process in which tension between the common soldier and those in command gradually accumulated until it could be endured no longer. Such incidents, therefore, cannot be viewed in isolation from the larger cultural context in which they developed and occurred. The general absence of mechanisms for soldiers to express their displeasure with a particular matter and the vigour with which the military establishment discouraged such acts through socialization and punishment contributed to an underlying stress that oftentimes erupted into dissent. As noted above, however, those leaders who attended to their subordinates' understood and implicit demands before they surfaced not only commanded their respect and

admiration but, more importantly, lessened the amount of existing tension and thereby the probability of an act of protest.[135]

Much of the strain that existed between those in command and their followers undoubtedly arose in some instances from the discrepancy between the various messages that confronted the average soldier. In Canada, both military and civilian recruiters alike told males of appropriate age that to be a man in the truest and fullest sense of the term, they had to enlist in some military force (preferably the CEF) and serve their nation well, whatever the consequences to themselves and their family. Since a man's place was in the firing line or, at the very least, in khaki, anyone who avoided his duty without just cause was portrayed as effeminate and unmanly. Once in the military, however, many found that they were not in fact being treated like men or, more properly, in a fashion consistent with their sacrifices. This circumstance, coupled with the conditions of military life and their reasonable expectations, led some to demand proper treatment from those placed over them. Indeed, like other contemporary mutinies throughout the larger British Army to which the Canadians belonged, men oftentimes resorted to disobedience and insubordination in order to remind the military of its "obligations" to care for them.[136]

Although the soldiers who engaged in such activities endeavoured to protect their individual interests and, to a lesser extent, the interests of the larger community as a whole, their actions oftentimes ran contrary to the goals and aims of both the nation's military and government; the war could not be prosecuted with disobedient armies. To be sure, some individuals attempted to articulate their concerns in an acceptable fashion through the appropriate chain of command and within the proper norms and traditions of

the institution. Other soldiers, however, perceived specific circumstances to be totally unacceptable and / or of such immediate import that the normal and proper channels could not be followed lest they suffer more.

As is certain, soldiers' expectations changed considerably according to the situation in which they found themselves. When in the line, competent leadership and the reasonable preservation of life became their predominant concerns, but when removed from the front, personal needs and comfort took immediacy. The understandable desire of Canadian soldiers to improve their personal welfare and the general conditions under which they served prompted many to act in a manner quite contrary to the modes of behaviour encouraged by the CEF. Many individuals would have undoubtedly disagreed with the statement made in the British *Manual of Military Law* that "Provocation by a superior, or the existence of grievances, is no justification for mutiny or insubordination" and would have taken little comfort from the fact that "such circumstances would be allowed due weight in considering the question of punishment" when, and if, he was brought to trial or summarily convicted.[137] For many, if the military would not willingly treat them in a manner consistent with their values and expectations, then they would demand it. Lord Nelson would certainly have been pleased.

~ **ENDNOTES** ~

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[1] As quoted in Allan Douglas English, *The Masks of Command: Leadership Differences in the Canadian Army, Navy, and Air Force*, 28. Paper presented to the "Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces & Society, Challenge and Change for the Military Institution, Leadership and the Military Profession in the 21st Century," Kingston, Ontario, Canada, 25 to 27 October 2002. Available online at: http://www.rmc.ca/academic/conference/iuscanada/papers/english_commandpaper.pdf

[2] A copy of this initial petition is reproduced in James Dugan, *The Great Mutiny* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1965), 64-65.

[3] Dugan relates one particular episode on H.M.S. *London* in which a number of the ship's officers and mutineers fired on one another with small arms; the latter, who lost three dead and some wounded, attempted to lynch one of the former but eventually decided to confine him in his cabin. See Dugan, *Great Mutiny*, 140-142.

[4] A.D. English, *The Naval Mutinies of 1797*, Unpublished graduate paper prepared for Professor Edward Palmer Thompson, HISTORY 853, Queen's University at Kingston, April 1988, 16-23.

[5] No Author, "Mutiny in the Royal Navy at Spithead," *History Today* 47, no.4 (April 1997), 34-35. Many of the mutineers asserted that certain officers had routinely mistreated and abused them in the past; one of the participants' main goals during the revolt, therefore, was the removal of the offending officers from their ships and their commands.

[6] The rules of behaviour (and the consequent punishments to be enforced should any be broken) that the seamen of H.M.S. *Saturn* established for themselves and agreed to abide by during the mutiny are reproduced in Dugan, *Great Mutiny*, 119-120. In part, these regulations enjoined them not to turn their

backs to the cause in which they were presently engaged and to obey their officers. Similar directives written by the crew of H.M.S. *Atlas* can be found in Dugan, *Great Mutiny*, 116-117.

[7] After seizing the Fleet, the leaders of the disturbance allowed two vessels, H.M.S. *Romney* and H.M.S. *Venus*, to depart Spithead and the mutiny so that they could escort a merchant convoy to Newfoundland. See Dugan, *Great Mutiny*, 97.

[8] English, *Masks of Command*, 27.

[9] E.P. Thompson, *Customs in Common* (London: Merlin Press, 1991), Chapter 4 "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century" and Chapter 5 "The Moral Economy Reviewed," 185-351, inclusive.

[10] Thompson, *Customs*, 188.

[11] Thompson, *Customs*, 289.

[12] Thompson, *Customs*, 224-233.

[13] Dugan, *Great Mutiny*, 135 and 136, respectively.

[14] Dugan, *Great Mutiny*, 137.

[15] Dugan, *Great Mutiny*, 110 and 103, respectively.

[16] They did not, for instance, protest against the practice of flogging, only its arbitrary and excessive use.

[17] Dugan, *Great Mutiny*, 61.

[18] Dugan, *Great Mutiny*, 103-104.

[19] Dugan, *Great Mutiny*, 105-106.

[20] See note 6, above.

[21] English, *Masks of Command*, 27. As noted herein, "The form mutinies usually took can be imagined from these unwritten rules of mutiny in the RN: '1) No mutiny shall take place at sea or in the face of the enemy; 2) No personal violence may be employed (although a degree of tumult and shouting is permissible); 3) Mutinies shall be held in pursuit only of objectives sanctioned by the traditions of the Service.' As long as they followed these rules, mutineers usually were not treated harshly."

[22] English, *Naval Mutinies,* 16-23.

[23] Conrad Gill, *The Naval Mutinies of 1797* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1913), 254.

[24] Dugan, *Great Mutiny*, 176.

[25] Gill, *1797*, 103.

[26] Gill, *1797*, 115-116.

[27] Gill, *1797*, 155.

[28] Gill, *1797*, 257. Also see Gill, *1797*, 144.

[29] Gill, *1797*, 187.

[30] Gill, *1797*, 237. Also see Gill, *1797*, 255-256.

[31] Richard Parker, the leader of the Nore mutiny, was eventually hanged, as were a number of other sailors; many were flogged for their role in the disturbance.

[32] Canadian Expeditionary Force Attestation Paper (Other Ranks), Oath to be Taken by Man on Attestation.

[33] William Richard Bird, *Ghosts Have Warm Hands ~ A Memoir of the Great War ~ 1916-1919* (Nepean: CEF Books, 1997), 112.

[34] As quoted in Desmond Morton, *When Your Number's Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First World War* (Toronto: Random House, 1993), 96.

[35] Ex-British soldiers living in Canada formed the bulk of the initial contingent of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), a regiment established in 1914 and financed by Hamilton Gault, a successful Canadian businessman. Moreover, by late-1916 and early-1917, Canadian infantry battalions still included a fair proportion of volunteers who claimed previous military service upon enlistment. For instance, from a sample of 140 recruits, the 253rd Battalion from Kingston, Ontario, contained 18 men (or approximately 12.86 % of their total attested strength) who had served exclusively in any unit of the prewar Canadian Militia and 4 men (or approximately 2.86 % of their total attested strength) who had served exclusively in any element of the British Army or the Royal Navy. Three volunteers had served in both the Canadian and the British forces prior to joining the CEF; twelve had already served in the CEF and opted to reenlist. See Craig Leslie Mantle, *Bagpipes and Limestone: The History of the 253rd Battalion (Queen's University Highlanders) C.E.F.* (Queen's University at Kingston: Unpublished Master's of Arts Thesis, September 2002), 71-72.

[36] William Dillon Otter, *The Guide, a manual for the Canadian Militia (infantry): embracing the interior economy, duties, discipline, dress, book and correspondence of a regiment in barracks, camp, or at home:*

with bugle calls and instructions for transport, pitching tents, etc. Various titles. Various publishers. Various dates.

[37] As quoted in Ronald G. Haycock, "'The Stuff of Armies': The NCO Throughout History," in *Backbone of the Army: Non-Commissioned Officers in the Future Army*, Douglas L. Bland, ed. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000), 18. *The Guide* significantly influenced the Canadian Militia from 1880 to the beginning of the First World War and beyond.

[38] Julian Putkowski, *British Army Mutineers, 1914-1922* (London: Francis Boutle, 1998), 18.

[39] See for instance, Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, *Infantry Training for use of Canadian Militia* (Ottawa: 1915), 4, which states that "A soldier having a complaint to make will make it to his company commander through his company sergeant major. He must not go direct to an officer to complain or request indulgences."

[40] Dugan, *Great Mutiny*, 102. All italics added by this author for effect. Some of the mutineers at the Nore expressed similar sentiments. Take for instance, Henrey Long of H.M.S. *Champion*, who wrote: "Dam my eyes if I understand your [the Lords Commissioners of the Board of Admiralty] lingo or long proclamations, but, in short, give us our due at once, and no more of it, till we go in search of the rascals the eneyms [sic] of our country." See Gill, *1797*, 123.

[41] *First World War.Com ~ The War to End All Wars*, Propaganda Posters, 244th Overseas Battalion. Available online at: http://www.firstworldwar.com/posters/canada5.htm

[42] Also see a poster issued by the Canadian Officers Training Corps at McGill University, Quebec, that stated that for those desiring military training, "Uniforms will be supplied." Canadian War Poster Collection [CWPC], Rare Books and Special Collections Division, McGill University Libraries (WP1.R18.F3) ~ Available online at: http://digital.library.mcgill.ca/warposters/w1recr3.htm

[43] CWPC (WP1.R26.F5) ~ Available online at: http://digital.library.mcgill.ca/warposters/w1recr5.htm

[44] CWPC (WP1.R6.F1) ~ Available online at: http://digital.library.mcgill.ca/warposters/w1recrui.htm

[45] Morton, *When Your Number's Up*, 19. Sam Hughes, Canada's Minister of Militia and Defence from 1914 to 1916, frequently referred to members of the CEF as "his boys" as well.

[46] The term "democratic" is used in this context, not to suggest that Canada at the beginning of the First World War granted full suffrage to all citizens, but rather to distinguish between those nations that modeled themselves after a democracy and those that did not.

[47] For instance, the broad notion of a relationship based upon social reciprocity, in which each party had certain obligations to the other, found solid expression in the Canadian socio-political culture of the 18th, 19th and early-20th centuries. In all probability, this concept would not have been wholly unknown to individuals of the immediate prewar years. Political scientist *cum* historian S.J.R. Noel has termed this reciprocal relationship "clientelism." Under such an arrangement, the patron, almost always an individual of standing and authority, offered his services and resources to his clients, usually needy settlers relocating to Upper Canada who initially lacked the resources, be they financial or otherwise, to operate independently of assistance. The commodities bestowed ranged from the economic (credit, cash, land, etc) to the personal (leadership, advice, planning, etc). In the middle- and latter-decades of the 19th century, the dispensation of political office and patronage surpassed the above goods as the patron's prime article of exchange, although in less developed areas the original manifestation of clientelism, with its emphasis on agricultural growth and rural development, probably remained salient for most. In return for such dispensations, the patron expected electoral support, personal loyalty, trust and affection from those upon whom such favours were granted and who owed their advancement directly to their benefactor. By the very nature of this system, both parties were required to fulfill their promises to and to meet the expectations of their counterparts. See Sidney John Roderick Noel, *Patrons, Clients, Brokers: Ontario Society and Politics, 1791-1896* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), especially the Introduction, "The Culture of Clientalism,"1-18 and Chapter 3, "Patrons and Clients," 61-78. See also Paul J. Maroney, *Recruiting the Canadian Expeditionary Force in Ontario, 1914-1917* (Queen's University at Kingston: Unpublished Master's of Arts Thesis, 1991), 67 and 79 (note 98). Examining the influence of this concept on the beliefs and behaviours of CEF soldiers may be a worthwhile endeavour since an investigation of this type focusing on the idea of an understood "contract" would certainly be relevant to the study of disobedience. Limitations on both time and space do not allow for such an investigation at the present moment.

[48] As defined in the British *Manual of Military Law* to which the Canadians were subject, mutiny "implies collective insubordination, or a combination of two or more persons to resist or to induce others to resist

lawful military authority." See Great Britain, War Office, *Manual of Military Law, 1914*. 6th Edition. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1914), 15. The conditions under which a soldier could be charged with mutiny are enumerated in Section 7 of *The Army Act* [44 & 45 Vict. c.58] as follows: "Every person subject to military law who commits any of the following offences, that is to say, (1.) Causes or conspires with any other persons to cause any mutiny or sedition in any forces belonging to His Majesty's regular, reserve, or auxiliary forces, or Navy; or, (2.) Endeavours to seduce any person in His Majesty's regular, reserve or auxiliary forces, or Navy, to join in any Mutiny or sedition; or, (3.) Joins in, or, being present, does not use his utmost endeavours to suppress, any mutiny or sedition in any forces belonging to His Majesty's regular, reserve, or auxiliary forces, or Navy; or, (4.) Coming to the knowledge of any actual or intended mutiny or sedition in any forces belonging to His Majesty's regular, reserve or auxiliary forces, or Navy, does not without delay inform his commanding officer of the same, shall on conviction by court-martial be liable to suffer death, or such less punishments as is in this Act mentioned." See War Office, *Manual of Military Law,* 384-385.

[49] The possibility of attempted murder, however remote and unlikely, must be acknowledged since some evidence exists on point. See Stephen Pike, Gene Dow, ed. *World War One Reminiscences of a New Brunswick Veteran* (New Brunswick: Privately Published, 1990), 46-47.

[50] George Rudé, *The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848*, Revised Edition (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1981), 254.

[51] Stephen J. Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). After the implementation of this new policy, officers arriving from Canada who held the rank of Captain or higher were given the option of returning home or reverting to the rank of Lieutenant in order to go to the front. Only a limited number of appointments with the British forces could be found and these positions were quickly filled owing to the large number of surplus officers. In a similar vein, Agar Adamson, an officer who served with the PPCLI during the war, refused to consider the numerous petitions and requests written by relatively well-connected civilians who desired to obtain from him field commissions for their acquaintances. Adamson promoted only those soldiers who in his eyes had earned their advancement solely by merit and who also possessed enough experience to lead

effectively. Agar Adamson, N.M. Christie, ed., *Letters of Agar Adamson, 1914 to 1919* (Nepean: CEF Books, 1997), Agar Adamson to Mabel Adamson, 4 March 1917, 268.

[52] Donald Fraser, Reginald H. Roy, ed., *The Journal of Private Fraser, 1914-1918* (Victoria, British Columbia: Sono Nis Press, 1985), 18 July 1916, 175. With respect for the need for competent leadership, Fraser offers similar comments concerning a recently arrived draft officer who was perceived to be utterly useless in the line. Fraser, *Journal*, 3 August 1916, 181. In all fairness, however, the inexperienced were oftentimes thrust into positions of leadership owing to the lack of suitably trained and prepared replacements. As Adamson once wrote: "We are also very short of good senior N.C.O.s having lost so many at Passchendaele and having to fill their places with inexperienced youngsters who do not know the job, either in or out of the line." Adamson, *Letters*, Agar to Mabel, 21 January 1918, 331.

[53] Adamson provides additional evidence on this point as well. After one of his first tours in the trenches, we wrote to his wife that "It appears that McRening 'blew up' and hid himself in the only safe place in the trench for 48 hours cursing and swearing at his subalterns and N.C.O.s all the time and as soon as he got out bolted for the dressing station to having [sic] imaginary wounds attended to. The N.C.O.s of the [company] told the C.O. that if they were ordered to go into [the] trenches with him again they would refuse and stand a Court Martial." Adamson, *Letters*, Agar to Mabel, 4 March 1915, 32.

[54] For an example of how Fraser outwitted a drunken officer from the 27th Battalion so that he would not have to follow his orders, see Fraser, *Journal*, 14 September 1916, 211-212.

[55] Fraser, *Journal*, 26 September 1915, 30-31.

[56] Fraser, *Journal*, 8 August 1916, 184-187.

[57] Bird, *Ghosts*, 110.

[58] Fraser, *Journal*, 14 September 1916, 214-215.

[59] Bird, *Ghosts*, 112-113.

[60] Adamson, *Letters*, Agar to Mabel, 21 February 1916, 149

[61] These two elements of the Army suffered some of the highest casualty rates during the war; the Engineers and members of the Machine Gun Corps ranked close behind. See Gerald William Lingen Nicholson, *Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962), Appendix C, Table 4, 548.

[62] Bird, *Ghosts*, 128-9.

[63] Frank Byron Ferguson, Peter G. Rogers, ed. *Gunner Ferguson's Diary: The Diary of Gunner Frank Byron Ferguson: 1st Canadian Siege Battery, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1915-1918* (Hantsport, Nova Scotia: Lancelot Press, 1985), 6 January 1917, 60. For an additional example of artillerymen refusing to carry firewood that would eventually be used to heat their own bathwater, see Ferguson, *Diary*, 22 May 1917, 85.

[64] Ferguson, *Diary*, 19 April 1917, 79.

[65] Ferguson, *Diary*, 29 December 1917, 145.

[66] Fraser, *Journal*, 18 August 1916, 189-190. Richard Ernest William Turner commanded, in succession, the 3rd Infantry Brigade, the 2nd Infantry Division and then all Canadian troops in England; Sam Hughes served as Canada's Minister of Militia and Defence from October 1911 until dismissed by the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Laird Borden, in November 1916.

[67] For a singular comment concerning the character and behaviour of Australian pilots, both while in the air and on the ground, see Lord Moran, *The Anatomy of Courage*, 2nd Edition (London: Constable & Company, 1966), 165.

[68] Fraser, *Journal*, 3 January 1917, 241.

[69] Louis Keene, *"Crumps" ~ The Plain Story of a Canadian Who Went* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1917), 66.

[70] Keene, *Crumps*, 92. Agar Adamson also found that passing information downward through the chain of command had a salutary effect on the "spirit of the men." Adamson, *Letters*, Agar to Mabel, 25 October 1917, 307.

[71] Anthony Kellet, *Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle* (London: Kluwer~Nijhoff Publishing, 1982), 251.

[72] Howard G. Coombs, *Dimensions of Military Leadership: The Kinmel Park Mutiny of 4/5 March 1919* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, March 2003), 24, for instance. Available online at: http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca/cfli/engraph/research/pdf/43.pdf

[73] Russell Cropanzano and Jerald Greenberg, "Progress in Organizational Justice: Tunneling Through the Maze" in *International Review of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 1997, Volume 12*, Cary L. Cooper and Ivan T. Robertson, eds. (Chichester, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), 331.

[74] Bird, *Ghosts*, 2.

[75] Bird, *Ghosts*, 25.

[76] The 42nd Battalion and the Royal Canadian Regiment belonged to the 7th Brigade of the 3rd Division.

[77] Adamson, *Letters*, Agar to Mabel, 23 July 1917, 298.

[78] Eedson Louis Millard Burns, *General Mud: Memoirs of Two World Wars* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company, 1970), 14-15. The event to which Burns refers must have occurred after 25 January 1917, the date on which Odlum took command of the 11th Brigade.

[79] Tim Cook, "'More a medicine than a beverage': 'Demon Rum' and the Canadian Trench Soldier of the First World War," *Canadian Military History* 9, no.1 (Winter 2000), 15.

[80] Cook, "Demon Rum," throughout.

[81] One soldier remarked that 'I have no love for it [rum], but sometimes take it with the others when very cold and wet.' Another soldier similarly remarked that 'I take my rum … not because I like it, I don't, but it drives out the wet and cold and keeps a man fit.' Cook, "Demon Rum," 18 and 19, respectively.

[82] Cook, "Demon Rum," 15. Cook also mentions an incident where an officer of the 54th Battalion refused to issue rum to his men immediately before a battle whereupon the "expectant soldiers" threatened him; they eventually received their tot. Cook, "Demon Rum," 12.

[83] Adamson, *Letters*, Agar to Mabel, 20 November 1917, 315.

[84] Ferguson, *Diary*, 28 November 1915, 18-19. The soldiers who destroyed the canteen were most likely from either the 54th Battalion (Kootenay, British Columbia) or the 58th Battalion (Toronto, Ontario).

[85] Morton, *When Your Number's Up*, 19.

[86] Rudé, *The Crowd in History*, 238.

[87] Cropanzano and Greenberg, "Progress in Organizational Justice," 331.

[88] Cropanzano and Greenberg, "Progress in Organizational Justice," 359.

[89] Black, *Volunteer*, 165-166.

[90] Black, *Volunteer*, 165-166.

[91] Black, *Volunteer*, 11-12.

[92] Bird, *Ghosts*, 136-137.

[93] Earlier historians have noticed a similar phenomenon in the mass protests of the 18th and 19th centuries in that participants carefully chose against whom and what circumstances they would demonstrate and selected with care the best means of voicing their displeasure that seemed most appropriate to the specific situation. See Rudé, *The Crowd in History*, 254. To be sure, naval authorities certainly did not appreciate the additional demands placed on them by the Nore mutineers after they had just granted concessions to the sailors at Spithead.

[94] Stanley Arthur Rutledge, *Pen Pictures From The Trenches* (Toronto: William Briggs, 1918), 14 July 1916, 123. French language and italics in original.

[95] Bird, *Ghosts*, 25.

[96] Arthur J. Lapointe, R.C. Fetherstonhaugh, tr. *Soldier of Quebec, 1916-1919* (Montreal: Editions Edouard Garand, 1931), 2 September 1917, 69.

[97] Lapointe, *Solider*, 10 May 1917, 29.

[98] Adamson, *Letters*, Agar to Mabel, 10 January 1916, 126.

[99] Lapointe, *Soldier*, 8 January 1917, 15.

[100] Lapointe, *Soldier*, 14 May 1917, 35 & 1 July 1917, 43-44 & 14 April 1918, 88.

[101] A similar phenomenon has been noted elsewhere. Stanley Scislowski, a veteran of the Second World War, mentions in his memoirs that as a newcomer to the Perth Regiment he opted not to protest against the quality of the food that he received at one of his first meals owing to his desire not to give an unsatisfactory impression to his new mates. He recalls: "I looked around hoping to see the orderly officer of the day to let him know how bad the food was, but he was nowhere to be seen. Then I thought it mightn't be a wise move on my part, being a newcomer, to start complaining the minute I joined the regimental family. It just might be asking for trouble later on down the line." For new men, the need to "fit-in" and to gain acceptance was paramount and appearing weak would not have facilitated these goals. During the First World War, given that frontline battalions and even units behind the line or in England constantly received new men, some Canadian soldiers undoubtedly behaved in a similar manner to and for the same reasons as Scislowski. See Stanley Scislowski, *Not All Of Us Were Brave* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997), 31-32.

[102] Rutledge, *Pen Pictures*, 10 June 1917, 134.

[103] Ferguson, *Diary*, 29 July 1917, 99. Adamson possessed a similar attitude toward bureaucracy for he once noted that "The workings of the Army from the inside passes man's understanding." Adamson, *Letters*, Agar to Mabel, 5 October 1916, 222.

[104] Ferguson, *Diary*, 24 April 1916, 31.

[105] Fraser, *Journal*, 4 July 1916, 166.

[106] Burns, *General Mud*, 37. See also Fraser, *Journal*, 20 July 1916, 175 & 176.

[107] Cook, "Demon Rum," 15.

[108] Rutledge, *Pen Pictures*, 29 March 1916, 107.

[109] Kellet, *Combat Motivation*, 251.

[110] Fraser, *Journal*, 8 February 1916, 93.

[111] Rutledge, *Pen Pictures*, 29 March 1916, 105.

[112] Adamson, *Letters*, Agar to Mabel, 21 November 1917, 316.

[113] Cook, "Demon Rum," 13.

[114] Cook, "Demon Rum," 14.

[115] Bird, *Ghosts*, 53-54. For an additional example of a soldier's reaction to being toyed with and teased while working, see Burns, *General Mud*, 37.

[116] See Black, *Volunteer*, 31-32, for an example of an officer who, knowing his men to have committed an obvious infraction of military law, namely the theft of chickens from a French civilian, turned a blind eye and allowed them to enjoy their catch rather than taking any form of punitive action against them. The officer, nicknamed "Shorty," an individual for whom the men "would have gone to hell" for, had earlier in the day participated in an investigation, headed by numerous military officers and prominent Frenchmen, to determine the fate of the livestock. In the presence of both the officials and the perpetrators, he simply overlooked a sack that, owing to its bulkiness and shape, obviously contained the stolen property and continued the "search" for the chickens, much to the delight of his gunners. Later that night, in compensation, the men gave this officer a chicken for dinner.

[117] Burns, *General Mud*, 63.

[118] Black, *Volunteer*, 136-138.

[119] Adamson, *Letters*, Agar to Mabel, 26 November 1916, 239.

[120] Adamson, *Letters*, Agar to Mabel, 18 April 1917, 275. As evidence of his concern for the manner in which he interacted with his men, Adamson related to his wife that "I am beginning to find out more about the men in the Company [by] sitting about and talking during the day." Adamson, *Letters*, Agar to Mabel, 24 March 1915, 49. He also related to her that "I always ask each man if there is anything he would like to tell me about himself in private and I get many secrets and I think it is inclined to help the men if they know you take more than a general interest in them." Adamson, *Letters*, Agar to Mabel, 24 November 1917, 317. Finally, Agar frequently asked Mabel to visit wounded men and officers who were recovering in English hospitals and to ask if there was anything that they needed or would like done for them. For one of many possible examples, see Adamson, *Letters*, Agar to Mabel, 25 October 1918, 346.

[121] Cropanzano and Greenberg, "Progress in Organizational Justice," 330.

[122] Fraser, *Journal*, 16 October 1916, 227.

[123] Reginald H. Roy, *For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George R. Pearkes, V.C., Through Two World Wars* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977), 66-67.

[124] Cropanzano and Greenberg, "Progress in Organizational Justice," 327 & 330-331.

[125] Cropanzano and Greenberg, "Progress in Organizational Justice," 327.

[126] Soldiers serving with the PPCLI apparently respected Adamson for many of the same reasons. As a company commander, one of his responsibilities was to censor his men's outgoing mail. According to him, one of his soldiers wrote: "'Our Captain whose name is Adamson is a dear, good, fat old man who crawls about in the trenches like a porpoise and speaks to us like real men.'" Adamson, *Letters*, Agar to Mabel, 4 March 1915, 32.

[127] Bird, *Ghosts*, 1-3.

[128] Cameron Pulsifer, ed., "Narrative of the Volunteer Camp at Niagara June 1871 ~ By a Full Private [Andrew Greenhill, 13th Battalion]," *Canadian Military History* 12, no. 4 (Autumn 2003), 51. Blanket tossing involved a number of soldiers who stretched a blanket between them and forcefully heaved into the air whomever or whatever happened to be on top, sometimes to a lofty altitude, by simultaneously raising the sheet to a greater height than before.

[129] Pulsifer, "Narrative," 47.

[130] *Canadian Letters and Images Project*, Department of History, Malaspina University College, British Columbia, Canada [*CLIP*], Walter F. Stewart Collection, Diary entry for 16 July 1885. Available online at: http://web.mala.bc.ca/davies/letters.images/W.F.Stewart/diary.4.htm.

[131] *CLIP*, David Morrison Stewart Collection, Diary entry for 17 June 1900. Available online at: http://web.mala.bc.ca/davies/letters.images/D.M.Stewart/diary2.htm.

[132] For instance, expectations such as those concerning the production of bread were salient to the British poor of the 18th century; expectations relating to proper leadership and adequate treatment were of the utmost importance to Canadian soldiers of the First World War.

[133] This possibility was raised by a number of Dr. Allan English's graduate history students during a seminar given to the class of HISTORY 876 by the author on 12 February 2004 at Queen's University at Kingston. The decades leading up to the beginning of the First World War are particularly germane to this study for during these years many of the soldiers who would eventually serve in the CEF matured into adulthood and thus would have been exposed to the many cultural norms and assumptions of this period. Studies focused primarily on the late-18th and early-19th centuries, although important in establishing an even longer tradition of protest, are not as relevant owing to their distance from the events that form the basis of this paper.

[134] Putkowski, *Mutineers*, 90-92. Of the 167 men charged, 127 were found guilty either of mutiny or of a lesser charge.

[135] Rudé, *The Crowd in History*, 242-45.

[136] Putkowski, *Mutineers*, 14.

[137] War Office, *Manual of Military Law*, 16.