"Future Canadian Defence Policy"
Defence Forum
Montreal, QC, 8 December 2000
Report
by
Michel Fortmann,
Professor
Université de Montréal
and
Alex Macleod,
Professor
Université du Québec à Montréal
Table of Contents
I. Canada's Situation: the stakes? the consequences?
II. The Canadian Forces: their missions? their configuration?
III. The technological challenges: effectively integrating the new technologies?
Summary
This Policy Forum addressed several issues relevant to Canada's future
defence policy. Although most participants agreed that the 1994 White
Paper still represented an adequate defence policy, they concluded that
emerging areas of concern needed to be explored: for example, over-extending
Canada's military resources as a result of an unnecessarily high number
of deployments, the issue of outer space, and the impact of new technologies
stemming from the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) on the Canadian
military. These issues, along with America's rising homeland defense programme,
may increase Canada's military dependence on the United States and hamper
Canada's ability to operate outside the US sphere of interest.
Introduction
On 8 December 2000, at DND's request, the Groupe d'étude et de recherche sur la sécurité internationale(GERSI) (Université de Montréal/McGill University) and the Centre d'études des politiques étrangères et de sécurité(CEPES) (Université du Québec à Montréal) staged discussions on the future of Canadian defence policy.
The meeting was held at the Montreal Sheraton Centre and attracted about sixty participants from a variety of backgrounds ranging from the federal departments involved, the Canadian Forces, and the university and business communities.
The session was designed to offer these groups and individuals an opportunity to express their concerns and ideas, and to provide a basis for a more comprehensive examination of this issue by the Department of National Defence. More specifically, the discussions focused on four facets of future Canadian defence policy: the international situation, Canadian Forces missions, the technological challenges confronting the Canadian defence establishment and, finally, Canada/US relations in the defence field. Each chapter in this report deals with one of these themes.
A number of people were involved, both directly and indirectly, in organizing these discussions. The authors would like at the outset to thank Pierre Jolicoeur, assistant to CEPES' director for this assistance in staging the conference, along with Chantal Robichaud et Lina Gjerstad, both M. A. candidates in political science from UQAM, and Bill Hogg, assistant to REGIS' director, for their help to Pierre Jolicoeur in staging the conference. We would also like to thank Jeremy Lefebvre, M.A. candidate in political science from UdM, for his collaboration in writing the conference work document.
This report was drafted using hand-written notes taken during the conference by Lina Gjerstad, Jeremy Lefebvre, Chantal Robichaud and Manon Tessier, a colleague from CEPES. Jeremy Lefebvre and Manon Tessier wrote the first version of this report, but the authors accept full responsibility, however, for any errors or omissions that may have slipped into the final draft.
The participants agreed that the fundamental premise of the 1994 Defence White Paper remains valid today, noting that, in the short term at least, there is no urgent need for a review of Canadian defence policy. Nevertheless, the international situation has undergone a total transformation in the past six years, and several major issues, including the Revolution in Military Affairs (which this policy paper barely alludes to), have become the pressing problems of the day and require close examination. It was in this environment of discussions and updates that this workshop on the future of Canadian Defence Policy was held in Montreal on 8 December 2000.
A variety of questions were posed during the day-long conference. The report offers a brief description of the existing situation concerning each of the four themes discussed and then sums up the participants' positions concerning the short- and long-term future of these fundamental issues.
I. Canada's situation in the world: the issues, the consequences.
Review of the Existing Situation: It is practically impossible to predict the future direction of the international system. This "messy unpredictability" - to use the picturesque wording of one participant - presents planners with serious challenges. This problem, which is not unique to Canada, is somewhat characteristic of countries asking questions about the future of their defence. For Canadians, however, the problem is doubly difficult. As a relatively modest power, Canada has no input in determining the nature of the international system and must also take into account the reactions of its immediate neighbour, which also happens to be a superpower. Fortunately, our country is not a direct target of military threats, and, where Canadians are concerned, the international environment is relatively calm and secure. Our country is, however, developing in a globalized world in an "age of intervention", a world in which human security and humanitarianism are assuming ever-increasing importance. However, since we cannot respond everywhere with equal weight, Canada has to make certain choices.
The Near Future: The problems generated by the international environment in which Canada is developing opened up rifts among the participants. One faction deemed it pointless for Canada to conduct any serious independent and original planning since, in the end, our defence policy will be defined/moulded through American pressure placed on the international community. A second group evoked the transformation of American power, the cracks in that power and the US loss of control in regions like the Middle East. According to this line of reasoning, the State in general (including the United States) does not control the mechanisms of "soft power". Hence, this leaves more modest powers like Canada with some room to manoeuvre.
The Distant Future: In the final analysis, the international environment in which Canada is developing presupposes the problem of Canadian sovereignty and her dependence on her powerful neighbour. As one participant pointed out, addressing this problem involves defining "the price we are prepared to pay to distance ourselves from the United States" and finding a point of equilibrium between our national interests and our defence of universal values. We run a risk here of pursuing a non-selective, scattergun policy of intervention. In the absence of criteria and options, the only constraint on Canadian intervention is (and will be) the limits of Canadian military resources. Under such circumstances, Canada risks having to say no to participation in a mission vital to its security simply because it has no more resources at its disposal.
II. The Canadian Forces: their missions, their configuration.
Review of the Existing Situation: In their discussions, the participants acknowledged that rising demands on the Canadian Forces (CF) in the last decade, most evident in the accelerating pace of overseas deployment of Land Forces, have eroded Canada's military capacities and the quality of life of its soldiers. This flood of peacekeeping missions has therefore had a major impact not only on individuals and families, but also on the combat readiness of Canadian troops.
Even if we exclude its peacekeeping operations, the CF is already involved in a host of activities both in Canada and abroad: contributions to NATO and NORAD, training of foreign military personnel, territorial surveillance, aid to the civil power, rescue operations, anti- terrorist and drug interdiction initiatives, etc. None of the participants expressed support for adding to this already lengthy list of missions. On the other hand, most of the contributors rejected the idea of making CF members more specialized because of the ensuing loss of flexibility; and they voiced their support for bolstering the current trend towards establishing coalitions and multinational brigades in collaboration with like-minded nations.
The Near Future: The discussions primarily focused on two topics: peace-keeping missions and the training of foreign military personnel. Regarding the latter issue, several participants noted that Canadian military personnel were already conducting regular training with their foreign counterparts, and they supported further expansion of these opportunities for contact and exchange, particularly within the framework of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Canada's participation in the PfP has already benefited us in many ways and may help strengthen our transatlantic ties with Europe should our relationship be compromised following the creation of a European rapid response force.
Several of the participants felt that the idea of training Blue Helmets from developing countries, although interesting, was not cost-effective or expedient since it failed to resolve the issue of exhaustion of Canadian troops; they also insisted that the Brahimi Report correct a number of the current peacekeeping problems relating to this area.
As for the peacekeeping operations themselves, which carry the torch for Canada in other countries, more and more of them are being carried out in hostile environments, which means that they are becoming increasingly prey to "casualty aversion", ie, the reluctance, real or perceived, of the public to accept significant loss of human life in combat. In view of this attitude, Canadian troops, and Land Force in particular, must be equipped with the proper tools and continue to train for situations involving combat in hostile environments so as to ensure adequate protection in worst-case scenarios. None of the participants suggested eliminating any one mission in particular so as to resolve problems stemming from the overextension of Canadian troops, and no one made specific comments concerning CF restructuring. The status quo, however, was perceived as unsatisfactory.
The Distant Future: The question of what role the Canadian Forces should play is critical. The CF must remain a balanced organization capable of developing on a par with other members of the international coalitions. Given this fact, jointness and interoperability with the allies would appear to represent the most prudent future course. Here again, the delicate issue of Canada/US relations raises its head both in the context of US-dominated coalitions and the context of coalitions with no American involvement. Ultimately, it seems important, even vital, for Canada to define its needs at the national level before establishing its security requirements at the international level; and finding a balance between foreign policy and security policy is indispensable here.
III. The Technological Challenges: Effectively integrating the new technologies.
Review of the current situation: The participants alluded to a variety of different problems associated with the emergence of the new technologies and their military applications. These technologies derive all their importance from the current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), led primarily by the United States. If Canada wishes to maintain the interoperability of the CF with their American counterparts, it must be prepared to invest considerable sums of money. Since our current budgetary context, although somewhat improved, prevents us from scattering money in all directions, we must undertake to define Canada's current and future military requirements. Our main task will be to determine whether we need a CF that is smaller but better equipped from a technological standpoint or vice-versa, and whether the various branches of the CF can or should maintain their existing roles.
The debate on the RMA and its ramifications for Canada focused on the problem of making effective use of these resources on missions. While acknowledging the potential benefits of the RMA for Canada, the participants raised several points of concern. If the investments needed to pursue the RMA reduce the CF's ability to satisfy its national and international commitments, doesn't this make it less viable in the short term? And, pursuing this line of thought, certain participants raised doubts about the value of the RMA in resolving the low-intensity or "machete" conflicts endemic to the post-Cold War world. Finally, Canada should not necessarily make significant investments in the RMA in order to narrow the growing technological gap with the United States, a gap created by the Americans, who have embraced the RMA to such an extent that some people suspect them of wanting to launch an arms race with their allies! Some participants voiced the opinion that the Americans would offer the technology to Canada whenever they saw fit.
The working session at Montreal also devoted a great deal of time to Canadian policies governing outer space and its use for military purposes. Special emphasis was placed on Canada's lack of strategic vision in this area, despite promising projects like RADARSAT II, MILSATCOM and the Space Surveillance Network. However, space has major security implications and the RMA "will be nothing" without this dimension of space. Consequently, Canada should not adopt a reductionist position that can be boiled down to an opposition to the weaponization of space, but should participate in discussions pertaining to its development. Denying the military significance of space may end up being a costly policy given the fact that space appears destined to become the commercial and military centre of gravity for the United States and Western countries.
The Near Future: The impact of the RMA on the CF needs to be examined in greater depth, and this process must take into account the above observations. By 2005, the CF will be making ad hoc investments in the RMA that correlate more closely with the specific objectives of the various branches of the CF than with the needs of the CF as a whole. Furthermore, the RMA gives one the impression of a bottomless pit; namely, the development of weapons that are better and more technologically advanced will continue unabated. However, DND is unable to invest in every area. This implies that for the immediate future we need to identify appropriate means and ends. If there are no immediate plans for a new White Paper, this would be an opportune time to draft an overall plan dealing with the RMA and outer space. Strategy 2020 represents a step in the right direction but has certain shortcomings with respect to its details and strategic objectives. Another source of anxiety relating to the RMA is that it risks making Canada more dependent on the United States. If the Americans do share their technology with Canada, we will find it difficult to refuse to co-operate with the Americans in waging a conflict in which the United States has vital interests but which Canada deems marginal.
The Distant Future: The RMA moves the problem of the growing cost of weapons to front and centre. The main question here is whether Canada can enjoy the benefits of the RMA without mortgaging its budget and its sovereignty. Investments in the RMA and in outer space will most certainly have an impact on the international system as it exists today. The participants raised the possibility that the shift to the RMA in the West is boosting world-wide arms sales and triggering a new arms race, and noted that it may spur third-world countries lacking the means to counter an RMA-type military force to employ weapons of mass destruction, thus increasing recourse to "asymmetric" threats.
IV. Canada/US relations
Review of the Current Situation: During this session, the participants described the factors responsible for the fundamental change in the evolution of the Canada/US defence relationship. The main impulse behind this new development has come from the United States, which is extremely worried about the burgeoning non-traditional threats to the security of their territory. In response, they have developed the concept of "homeland defense", which encompasses a variety of situations, including a possible continental attack with ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction, domestic and international terrorism, computer piracy, narcotics trafficking, illegal immigration and transborder organized crime.
These non-traditional threats, perceived by the Americans as asymmetric alternatives for state or non-state actors hostile to the United States, have led to the development of a series of responses involving a host of civilian and military personnel at every level of government. For the Department of Defense (DoD), "homeland defense" comprises a number of projects including the missile defence system, the war on terrorism, maintenance of national order, humanitarian disaster relief and the war on drugs. Moreover, the United States has not ruled out creating a new chain of command, the CINCHOMELAND, that would help harmonize American responses. The integrity of this "homeland defense" will indirectly depend on the participation of the Canadian and Mexican governments in creating a "security perimeter" aimed at restricting access to the North American continent. In October 2000, the American ambassador to Canada also invited Ottawa to develop, in collaboration with the United States, joint policies aimed at standardizing the way they deal with immigration, trade, information technology and even culture.
The Near Future: It became apparent from these discussions that even though Canadians do not share the American appreciation of threats to the security of the North-American continent, the implementation of this "homeland defense" plan, particularly the anti-missile defence component, and the building of a "security perimeter" would have significant consequences for Canadian security and defence policy. The maintenance of good relations between Canada and the United States, particularly in the defence field, will depend on the decisions that the Federal Cabinet will be obliged to make in the near future regarding support for these projects. Canada's limited room to manoeuvre will shrink even more if we take our time responding to the American initiatives.
Conclusion
Several conclusions can be drawn from this day's work. First of all, of the three elements, Land Force faces the bleakest future. Consequently, the men and women developing Canadian defence policy should accord priority to Land Force when allocating both equipment and human resources. Secondly, in the medium term, Canada is in danger of finding itself caught between a rock and a hard place, in other words, between Europe and its "Common Security Defence Policy" and the United States and its "homeland defense". Canada should therefore be ready to redefine its relationship with each of its partners. For the immediate future, decisions concerning the issues of antimissile defence and outer space, which are closely tied to Canada/US relations, will have to be taken soon if Canada does not wish to pay the price for a wait-and-see policy. It will be critical for our country to identify a point of equilibrium, a selective approach to defence that will allow us to narrow the capability gap between our internationalist rhetoric of full-scale commitment and our limited resources, while at the same time ensuring that our reduced military commitments do not destroy Canada's international reputation.
| Date Modified: 2006-11-27 |  |
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