Department of National Defence Consultation Report
FUTURE CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY
Centre for Security and Defence Studies,
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs,
Carleton University,
Ottawa, Ontario
23 March 2001
The Centre for Security and Defence Studies (CSDS) organized a Policy Forum on "The Future of Canadian Defence Policy" for the DND Directorate of Public Policy on 1-2 March 2001. The Policy Forum took place in the Rideau Room of the Monterey Inn on Price of Wales Drive, Ottawa.
The Policy Forum was structured around four topics including: (a) Military Intelligence and the Future of the Canadian Forces; (b) Peace Support Operations in the Future of the Canadian Forces; (c) Future Security Challenges for the Canadian Arctic; and (d) Canada-US Defence Relations, with emphasis on Critical Infrastructure. A background paper, prepared by Professor Martin Rudner, on "Intelligence and Information Superiority in the Future of Canadian Defence Policy" was circulated electronically in advance, and printed copies were available at the Policy Forum.
A total of 65 people attended the Policy Forum. Of these, 37 were invited by CSDS from among the academic, institutional, media or non-governmental communities. The other 28 participants were invited by DND from among the inter-departmental community, including DND, the Canadian Forces, Privy Council Office, Intelligence Assessment Secretariat, Communications Security Establishment, Solicitor General, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Treasury Board Secretariat, Transport Canada, and the New Zealand High Commission.
PROCEEDINGS
This record of the Proceedings of the Policy Forum on "Future Canadian Defence Policy" summarises the discussion that accompanied each of the sessions and the General Discussion at the closing session. These Proceedings outline the main points of the discourse on a non-attributable basis, consistent with the principle of non-attribution laid down by DND for these Policy Fora. Military Intelligence and the Future of the Canadian Forces
The discussion on Intelligence considered various aspects of the issue, especially the challenges of maximising the utility, purpose and application of technology, human resources, and finances. For instance, according to one participant, rather than concentrating information technology resources within one sector of the CF, as suggested indirectly by the two presenters, it would be more beneficial to spread the capacity throughout the Canadian Forces (CF) and to develop a wider technological network capacity. In response, it was noted that the human resource demands placed on the CF are already high, and therefore it may not be possible to assign additional tasks, such as information management, to personnel. In this respect, although everyone does perform an information-gathering role to some extent, it is unrealistic and undesirable to overload CF personnel with multiple functions.
It was recognised that intelligence gathering has become increasingly complex, particularly under conditions of the RMA which diminishes the geographical component to security and conflict, and intensifies the psychological dimension. In this respect, too much information in the hands of the enemy, especially if seen to be harmless, can be dangerous and obstruct effective decision-making. For example, in the former Yugoslavia the enemy applied the knowledge that Western military leaders in theatre may be removed if they become intoxicated. Information can be used to embarrass the CF and diminish its capacity to act. As a result, the psychological dimension of warfare deserves more attention by the intelligence sector.
In another respect, intelligence has become more complex. As a reflection of Canadian global interests, the CF has a global presence and is active throughout the world. As a result, there is an added challenge of having skilled specialists (either military or civilian) managing, filtering through, and accurately and efficiently applying the enormous amount of information gathered. Moreover, there is a greater need for expertise, including language skills, on the different parts of the world in which Canada is interested. Many regional specialists are located outside the government in the private sector, but to have them apply their expertise to government service requires a security clearance. The security clearance process is lengthy and done by an external body. The process should be shortened and carried out internally in order to facilitate the integration of external experts. Some cautionary remarks were made about the emphasis in the presentations on human intelligence, particularly since human sources may be unreliable. Moreover, given the rotational nature of military deployment to theatre, the time required to cultivate local human sources of information is not always available. Another participant noted that human sources will continue to play a central role in intelligence and are far from being replaceable. Moreover, they are an undervalued resource and their contribution needs to be re-emphasised.
The discussion also considered technology-based intelligence. It was stated that this option is more expensive because of rapid changes in technology. In addition, a concern was raised about the Canadian ability to keep pace with the technological advances of allies ultimately affecting the extent to which Canada can be inter-operable, and impacting on intelligence gathering among allies of the European Security and Defence Policy. In this respect, one of the presenters noted that the Europeans need to be shown that Canadians have something unique to contribute in order to maintain the relationship.
The financial dimension of effective intelligence was a subject of great concern to the participants. Other areas of the CF face similar financial demands, leading to competition among the sectors for additional resources and the need for policy-makers to set clear priorities. There is also a legal dimension to the challenges facing intelligence, particularly when it comes to ownership issues surrounding the equipment (satellites) used to collect information that is accessible by anyone.
One participant commented that the difficulties faced, in the area of intelligence in particular, and the CF in general, are a result of the move from threat-based to capability-based planning. Instead, a balance between the two needs to be reached in order to provide capability-based planning with the referent provided by threat-based planning. Given the fundamental role played by intelligence in threat-based planning, the move away from this form has diminished the importance of the intelligence sector in the CF.
In light of the tensions surrounding information management and diffusion, one participant suggested that intelligence needs to be understood under a paradigm that emphasises knowledge rather than information since intelligence is really just processed information. This shift would allow for more precise and suitable information that meets the needs of information users, i.e. in theatre or in headquarters. In this respect, there is a constant concern about validating the information collected in the new intelligence environment. Peace Support Operations (PSO) in the Future of the Canadian Forces
The discussions on peace support operations were heavily flavoured with concern about the purpose and structure of the CF. One participant noted that rather than considering how to rationalise the size of the CF for future missions, a more pertinent consideration is what sort of operations can be conducted as the CF deteriorates. In this respect, the participants were cautioned that even if financial resources were increased, the benefits would not become evident for several years. Nonetheless, CF requirements need to be identified now so any additional funds can be properly directed. Moreover, a process of identifying needs should not be done by way of a White Paper or Defence Review, but through a focused look at the needs of the CF. Another participant noted that in order to prepare for future demands on PSO, rather than fretting about dollar figures, the solution is better distribution of the money available, keeping in mind that current commanding officer numbers are below the levels needed to carry out future PSO. According to another participant, there is a danger of capital costs being driven up. One other participant noted that complaints about levels of defence spending are not new and that the equipment available is expected to have a longer duration of life than anticipated. In this respect, the CF is more combat capable and multi-purpose than ever before.
This sentiment was echoed by other participants who remarked that the CF can not afford to participate in every PSO and that hard decisions have to be made about future deployments. In this respect, one participant noted that greater discipline is needed in order to control the deployment of the CF for PSO, particularly as regards the duration of missions. At the same time, being deployed in one area gives Canada a ready reason for not getting involved in another, and this argument should be raised more frequently. Another participant approved of a niche capability for the CF along the lines of a "marine force", but cautioned that such a direction contradicted the multi-purpose, combat-capable character of the CF. Moreover, the notion of peace support operations being carried out along niche capabilities suggests a hierarchical division of labour among militaries whereby the stronger, more advanced, militaries are allocated the shorter, vanguard missions, to be followed by the poorer militaries doing the less glamorous and more difficult work. At the same time, there are different perceptions among the different militaries about what constitutes vanguard capabilities depending on their own capabilities. Another participant emphasized that decisions about rapid deployment are ultimately political decisions rather than reflections of military capabilities. This point was contested by another participant who emphasised that rapid deployment capabilities require major financial commitments and equipment independent of the equipment and capabilities of other allied forces. At the same time, multi-purpose, combat-capable forces provide the government with flexibility of response including the option of rapid deployment, and reinforce inter-operability with allies, which niche development would undermine.
Another participant suggested that Canada's national interests in potential areas of deployment need to be clarified as one way of restraining the deployment of CF and bringing CF missions in line with fiscal realities. Unfortunately, restraining the deployment of the CF, and cutting the defence budget, may hurt the Canadian public's pride in having the CF deployed everywhere.
One participant raised the concern that the Canadian military is losing its character and war-fighting capability by becoming too involved in PSO, and cautioned that the Canadian myth of the CF as peacekeepers and not war-fighters has to be broken in order to salvage the primary purpose of the CF. In response, another participant noted that it was inaccurate to describe the CF as a constabulary force given that it consists of conventional forces. Another participant remarked that including phrases such as 'war-fighting' in public communications results in reduced support from the public for such operations, even if the label is more accurate. Yet another participant responded that the CF and its peacekeeping capability was a valuable tool for building national unity and a source for international prestige, and should not be downgraded no matter how rhetorical such statements may be. The bottom line is that Canadian politics determines the emphasis on PSO for Canada.
The issue of casualties was raised in the discussions. The extent to which Canadians may be willing to accept casualties on PSO was questioned, despite a widespread assumption that public opinion is wholly averse to any casualties, and the tendency of politicians to reiterate this mantra and use it to avoid difficult decisions. In this regard, one participant noted that politicians need to do a better job of identifying national interests and informing the public of the importance of missions carried out on behalf of national interests. Another participant remarked that more evidence is needed, for what we may be witnessing is the development of a learned experience to be casualty averse, rather than such a sentiment actually existing.
The matter of resources was raised in the context that all Canadian government departments have experienced cutbacks that have impacted their ability to be more active. For departments involved in Canadian international activities, the cutbacks undermine the extent to which Canada is able to participate, in any credible way, on the international stage. Canada's international presence will not be enhanced by minimal participation, in a myriad of activities, by a variety of agencies. Instead, it was argued, Canada's international influence can best be served by developing a significant capacity across a fairly broad number of issues that reflect our national interests and objectives, and DND should set its priorities accordingly.
Likewise, expectations need to be lowered about what the CF can do, and it doesn't help that the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs contradict each other regarding the readiness and capability of the military. Another participant noted that there is no contradiction between these statements since military capability is separate from the issue of being over-stretched. In any event, the participants noted that there needs to be a stronger effort to draw the line concerning the limits of the military's capabilities, rather than extend that line (and raise expectations) further by accepting more and more assignments.
The relationship between the military and NGOs in PSO was considered in light of comments that relationships with NGOs should be cultivated in order to maximise necessary and appropriate NGO involvement in PSO. The participants were reminded of the long tradition of civilians working with the military in PSO. One participant noted that NGO participation in PSO should be carefully considered given that NGO representatives are not trained as peacekeepers, and have limited capabilities, especially regarding discipline and self-coordination. In this respect, each actor has his or her advantages and should be deployed accordingly. Another participant cautioned that the stronger, more effective, NGOs, with whom the military could work, do not need the military and do not want to work with them. Moreover, civilian involvement in peacekeeping operations tends to be more expensive than the deployment of military personnel since civilians are paid overtime and military personnel are not. As a result, greater emphasis on NGOs in PSO should not be seen as a solution to Canada's peacekeeping dilemmas.
Future Security Challenges for the Canadian Arctic
The discussion on the Canadian Arctic concentrated primarily on issues pertaining to natural resources, and especially, the impact of global warming on northern exploitation, Canadian sovereignty, perceptions of the north by Canadians, and the role of the CF in addressing these challenges.
There was consensus among the participants that interest in the Arctic waxes and wanes. For the most part, few Canadians are interested in Arctic issues, if they think of them at all. Given that the vast majority of the population lives along the border with the US, the extent to which Canadians even identify with the north was questioned. One participant noted that interest in the Arctic was a function of the Cold War, and that current international conditions have made it difficult to justify maintaining the same level of involvement since there is no identifiable threat to that area. To illustrate this low level of interest, one participant recounted the 1995 discovery of a Russian submarine in Arctic waters that received very little Canadian coverage. In this respect, Canadians manifest what interest they have in the North mostly in terms of stewardship, rather than as a concern with security or sovereignty. At the same time, another participant remarked that interest in the Arctic may be on the rise again, and that this time it may be more permanent given the concerns resulting from the impact of global warming on the Arctic. Another participant noted that Canada must do a better job of fostering a northern component to its identity, or at the very least, of taking a proactive approach to Arctic issues such as northern sovereignty, in order to distinguish itself. The US is farther ahead in impacting on its North than Canada in large part due to its stronger capability and capacity for proactivity.
With respect to natural resources and the impact of global warming, a northern strategy also needs to consider fish stocks which are likely to decrease as a consequence of global warming. Moreover, as the polar ice cap melts under global warming, operations in the North Atlantic Ocean will be affected as icebergs travel south and disrupt transportation and shipping. In this respect, one participant noted the already detrimental impact on diamond mining in the north because global warming has melted the ice roads used for transportation and shipment. In another context, a participant noted that it is difficult to invest money in the Arctic and to pursue business interests based on natural resources and development of the north given the uncertain outcome of land claim settlements. The perceived challenge to Canadian sovereignty caused by global warming opening up the Northwest Passage ought to be tempered by the realization that global warming could also bring new dangers to the Arctic seas. For example, ice chunks may make the passage less navigable. One participant suggested the possibility of greater consideration to iceberg generation as a source of fresh water and the harvesting of icebergs as a possible entrepreneurial activity in which Canada can be engaged. Another wondered about the possible detrimental effects to Canadian Arctic economic activities caused by Siberian economic development with the construction of the bridge between Alaska and Russia. Another participant cautioned about the dangers posed to the northern and aboriginal cultures from greater economic activity and economic diversification.
One participant noted that northern issues are a source of cooperation between Canada and countries, such as Denmark, with similar northern interests, particularly with respect to National Missile Defense. Another participant added that there is a great deal of interaction already taking place among these countries on these issues. For example, the Arctic Council has been a good forum for discussion on a range of common interests, particularly military matters.
The financial cost of addressing Arctic issues was also raised during the discussion. Some participants stressed the importance of the Arctic to our identity and suggested that the acquisition of a fleet of icebreakers would go a long way towards demonstrating Canadian sovereignty and interests. At the same time, others noted that the cost for icebreakers would be in the neighbourhood of several hundred million dollars per unit. Another participant questioned the emphasis on icebreakers claiming that they are not the most efficient means for realising Canadian interests because of the length of time required to deploy them. Instead other means and tools should be explored that are more mobile and quickly deployed. In any case, there was a plea for greater study and thought regarding icebreakers in the north. From a defence policy view, one participant noted that the allocation of financial resources is a zero-sum game, with hard choices having to be made between, for instance, a presence in the Arctic and deployment to Africa.
It was noted that, given the wide range of government involvement in the North, perhaps concentrating on a militarised northern strategy is not appropriate, especially if Canada, like other circumpolar countries, chooses not to militarise its own northern issues. What may be required instead is greater inter-departmental coordination maximising the involvement of other departments, and assigning another agency to take the lead in a northern strategy since DND's role is really to assist other departments. Another participant echoed this sentiment, noting that northern security issues, from DND's point of view, are less significant than security issues from a policing or fisheries point of view. In this respect, one participant suggested that although northerners are extremely proud of the Rangers and generally welcome military personnel and the training missions, the military presence is neither prominent nor widely experienced compared to that of the RCMP or the Coast Guard. In addition, there are high costs associated with maintaining an Arctic presence and the costs must be justified to those who decide on relevant policies. Another participant disagreed and argued that DND is not only in the best position to coordinate inter-departmental activity, but also needs to take ownership of these issues rather than pass responsibility to another agency. Moreover, the costs of establishing a permanent Arctic base in order to improve military representation and reinforce Canadian interests in the north were argued to be reasonable.
Ultimately, there seemed to be a consensus among participants that Northern challenges will not go away this time and that there is a need for stronger political will to address the range of Northern issues. Strong leadership is necessary to define a northern strategy that, while not defined on the basis of security concerns predominantly or alone, should continue to involve the CF and DND. At the same time, one participant cautioned against a paternalistic approach to northern issues, and called for the federal government to seek greater cooperation and engagement with the territorial governments.
Canada-US Defence Relations, with emphasis on Critical Infrastructure
The discussion on critical infrastructure concentrated primarily on threat definition, the impact of new threats on the capacity of the CF, and if it was appropriate to use the CF to confront critical infrastructure threats. One participant emphasised the importance of reassessing threats in light of our knowledge-based economy, and the added danger of inaccurate knowledge. Under current conditions, knowledge and the accuracy of that knowledge is under threat, ultimately affecting the research that directs political and economic activity.
There was consensus among the participants that critical infrastructure issues are of common interest to several Canadian societal and policy communities, and their US counterparts, and that cooperation should be facilitated to confront these potential threats. At the same time, inter-departmental cooperation should not be disregarded, and departmental reluctance to share information about threats needs to be overcome. Likewise, there is the added challenge of integrating the Canadian population into efforts to address threats to critical infrastructure, particularly where there could be serious legal and ethical implications. There was a perception that the Canadian government is laggard in responding to and preparing for critical infrastructure threats compared to both the private sector and the US government.
There was some discussion about the extent to which threats to critical infrastructure were being exaggerated, thereby exacerbating the perceived atmosphere of danger. In reply, some participants suggested that such threats are in fact long-standing and have simply been re-labelled. Another participant suggested, that while the scope of the danger may be new, the implications of threats to critical infrastructure are more of an inconvenience than life-threatening. To illustrate this, reference was made to computer viruses being considered by businesses as part of the costs of doing business. In this respect, there was some discussion about the wisdom of concentrating so much effort on critical infrastructure threats since the impact and visibility may be high, but the occurrence is highly improbable.
The additional challenges posed by the necessary timeliness of information in identifying and responding to critical infrastructure threats was raised. In this respect, one participant noted the importance of better knowing the potential sources of such threats in order to overcome or prevent the implications of misinformation. Another participant cautioned against publicizing our own vulnerabilities to potential sources of threat.
When considering critical infrastructure protection, the bottom line is that one can never protect completely. Instead, one must become used to infrastructure vulnerabilities and develop a policy framework to prioritise which vulnerabilities will receive the most attention. Furthermore, threats to Canada's critical infrastructure would involve the CF, and this could greatly exacerbate the personnel problems facing the military.
General Discussion and Summary Remarks
The final session was devoted to discussing future Canadian defence policy in light of themes raised throughout the consultation such as the complexity of defence policy, the involvement of actors other than the CF in defence matters, financial considerations, challenges regarding human resources, and informing the Canadian public. For instance, regarding the challenge of human resources, one participant raised the possibility of better using and maximising the Reserves, particularly when the skill sets necessary to confront many of the new challenges and threats are located in the Reserves.
There appeared to be consensus among the participants of the need for a better definition of the purpose of the CF and the objective of Canadian defence policy. In other words, what are military capabilities for? This question stemmed in large part from the shift from threat-based to capabilities-based assessment that has produced a lack of clarity in defence priorities. One participant noted the need to shift back to a threat-based assessment of military needs and activity. Another participant questioned the apparent sudden appearance of critical infrastructure concerns, suggesting that we are desperately looking for new "threats" and fresh challenges for the CF to justify defence postures and resource commitments. Another participant noted that there are dangers stemming from an exaggeration of critical infrastructure threats and the consequences of attacks to these areas since they erroneously amplify our vulnerability, and suggest that recovery is impossible. In response, another participant noted that views such as "no threat exists" are risky since they raise doubts about even having a CF and imply greater dependence on the US to act on behalf of our interests. What needs to be done instead is to continue impressing upon politicians and policy-makers that threats do exist, because they do. One participant remarked that the political leadership needs to take responsibility by defining purposes and identifying the types of tools required.
Another participant noted that, in the context of future Canadian defence policy and under current fiscal and environmental conditions, difficult decisions need to be made about prioritising CF activities. Realistically, while everything is important, it is impossible to react to everything. Overall, most participants agreed that the CF is over-committed and is doing more than it is capable of doing under current conditions. Of great benefit would be a discussion on how to reduce the activities of the CF. Such a discussion can begin by considering niche roles for the CF or by finding a functional integration with the US, although this may be difficult given the public perceptions and political costs involved. Ultimately, both the political and military leadership needs to become better at saying 'no' to requests for CF participation and to stop adding items to the list of CF activities. This should be easy given that the environment is more conducive to cutting back; for instance, the South is already playing a larger role in peacekeeping. Another participant noted, that while in agreement with the suggestion that politicians need to be more specific about reasons for undertaking new tasks, the 1994 White Paper provides some of the guidance requested. In this respect, there was some agreement that a new White Paper is not necessary since the direction set out in the 1994 White Paper is still applicable and flexible enough to allow for changing priorities. While there was some dispute as to whether in fact the priorities have changed, there was general agreement that the White Paper needs to be implemented. In this respect, one participant remarked that Canada already has the military of the future, and it just needs to be kept at this level and refined.
One participant remarked with surprise, that nothing was said about the need to increase spending on the CF, while recognizing that any discussion regarding funding needs to be directed by an understanding of the larger purpose. Without this understanding, current funds may in fact be misspent and erroneously allocated. In reply, another participant commented that Canada's defence policy is not the problem, but funding is. Low spending levels force DND to make choices imposed by government policy. What is needed is a defence budget review. Another participant noted the danger in advocating such reviews since, from past experience, defence budgets have been reduced as a consequence, not increased.
In summary, future Canadian defence policy in the areas of intelligence, peace support operations, Arctic security, and critical infrastructure will continue to be confronted with difficult choices imposed by financial and human resource constraints, and by CF over-commitments. Participants at this consultation were in general agreement that the number of responsibilities and tasks of the CF must be reduced. Some suggestions as to how to arrive at this reduction included developing niche roles, becoming better at declining requests for involvement, and drawing on the expertise and skills of other actors as appropriate.
| Date Modified: 2006-11-27 |  |
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