"Canada-US Relations in Defence"
Defence Forum
Montreal, October 20, 1999
Report
by
Stéphane Roussel
Professor of Political Science
University of Montreal
Table of Contents
II. Aerospace Defence in North America
IV. Non-traditional Threats and the Role of the Canadian Forces
V. Economic Relations and the Defence Industry
VI. General Comments on the Forum
Introduction
On October 20, 1999, at the request of the Department of National Defence, the International Security Study and Research Group (University of Montreal/McGill University) and the Foreign Policy and Security Research Centre (Université du Québec à Montréal) organized a discussion on Canada-US relations in the area of defence.
This gathering took place at Montreal's Crowne Plaza Hotel. In attendance were some sixty people from a variety of organizations, including the federal departments involved, non-governmental organizations, the Canadian Forces, universities and the business community (see the list of participants at Appendix 2).
The purpose of the forum was to give these groups and individuals an opportunity to voice their concerns and ideas in a way that would enable the Department of Defence to initiate a thorough review of the issue. More specifically, the discussions focussed on three facets of Canada-US defence relations: the future of the aerospace defence of North America (and anti-missile defence in particular), the struggle against non-traditional threats and the evolving cooperation between our defence industries. Each of these issues is given a chapter in this report.
A number of individuals contributed to varying degrees to the preparations for the 1999 National Defence Forum. The writer wishes to begin by expressing his profund gratitude to Professor Alex Macleod of the Political Science Department, Université du Québec à Montréal, who agreed to be the gathering's co-organizer and assume all consequent duties and responsibilities. A number of students also helped with the preparations for the Forum and contributed substantially to its success. These were Karine Bernier (Pol. Sci., UofM), Pierre Jolicoeur (Pol. Sci., UQAM), Marianne Niosi (Communications, UQAM), Chantal Robichaud (Pol. Sci., UQAM) and Andri Van Mens (Pol. Sci., UofM). Three other students helped us on the day of October 20: Alexandre Blais (Criminology, UofM), Émilie Potvin (Management, HEC) and Jean-François Rancourt (Pol. Sci., UQAM). We also received invaluable assistance from the Defence Public Affairs Bureau for Quebec, especially from Captain Sarto Leblanc and Nadine Archambault-Chapleau. We are indebted to them for much of the media activity surrounding this event.
This report is based on handwritten notes made at the conference. Any errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the writer.
I. An Examination of the General Context and Identification of the Major Issues in Canada-US Relations in Defence
The first sessions of the day were allotted to an examination of the general context surrounding Canada-US relations in the area of defence. The preliminary statements and discussions among participants highlighted a number of details that are essential to understanding the current trend in relations between the two countries.
The United States is the world's only true superpower, whereas Canada has very limited resources that are steadily shrinking. This asymmetry colours all facets of Canada-US relations. For Canada, the main challenge posed by its ties to the United States is to find a balance between preserving a friendly relationship and seeking maximum independence (the security-sovereignty dilemma).
Relations between the two countries are very close, generally amicable and highly diversified, which helps to strengthen cooperation on defence. It is also a very rewarding relationship, since both partners derive major benefits in terms of both security and prosperity.
On the whole, relations between the two governments over the period 1993-1999 have been harmonious and free of acute tensions. Most disagreements, for the most part minor, have been resolved to the satisfaction of both parties.
Historically, the Canadian government has had to accept Washington's definition of threats (although not be in total agreement) and bear its share of the burden for implementing measures to block these threats.
In recent years, American leaders have voiced their apprehension regarding certain issues, particularly the drug trade, industrial espionage and the development of long-range missiles by "pariah states." Although not necessarily sharing the American sense of urgency about these threats, Canadians have taken some measures consistent with the wishes of certain US leaders.
These measures, however, merely represent minor adjustments pending clearer indications of the intentions of the US government, especially with regard to anti-missile defence and the concept of "homeland defence."
Generally speaking, if the intentions voiced by US leaders were to be confirmed, Canada would have to make some difficult decisions. Should it maximize its freedom to act by declining any involvement in US defence projects, even if this jeopardizes the benefits derived from defence ties with the United States? Or should it commit itself fully to these projects even if this entails some risks for Canada's independence or international influence?
It is difficult to clearly define the general direction the United States is taking on security matters. Some use the term "isolationism," while others prefer the idea of "unilateralism." The attitude and impact of Congress on this issue is arousing debate, with some feeling that it plays a significant role in defining security policy and others indicating that there are other influences to offset the considered opinions of some of the more conservative senators, with public opinion in the lead. One participant, however, noted that public opinion can sometimes be inflexible, for example in dealing with international commitments.
Moreover, the fact that the year 2000 will be a presidential election year contributes to this conceptual fuzziness, given that political leaders are tempted to use rhetoric calculated to please a certain segment of the electorate.
Participants expressed differing opinions about the risks run by the Canadian government if it refuses to become involved in the US projects. Despite the power differential between the two countries, the United States has only very rarely applied direct pressure to persuade the Canadian government to take part in projects it deems essential to its security. The fact that these are both democratic countries linked by a multitude of transnational exchanges may partly explain this attitude.
II. The Aerospace Defence of North America
The next session was spent examining the problem of the aerospace defence of North America and, by extension, the evolution of NORAD and anti-missile defence capabilities.
Over the next two years, Canadian leaders will have to rule on two important and closely interrelated issues, namely the renewal of the NORAD Agreement and of ballistic missile defence (BMD). NORAD is the most visible of the bilateral defence ties linking Canada and the United States. This agreement stands out from Canada's other international security commitments that as most of these other commitments are multilateral. Considering the basic asymmetry between the two countries, the NORAD agreement therefore poses a greater risk to Canadian autonomy. And belonging to NORAD leads Canadians to take positions concerning US anti-missile defence plans that are already embroiled in controversy.
Historically, these two issues have given rise to highly emotional debates in Canada, for example, during the signing of the NORAD Agreement (1957-1958) and when Canada was invited by the United States to participate in the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). In the debates preceding renewal of the Agreement in 1986, for example, many people pointed to the risks of "strategic drift" (ie, a subtle but significant shift in NORAD's mandate), a move that would not necessarily serve the interests of Canada.
Similar questions are being asked today, with the Agreement coming up for renewal in 2001 and the United States at work on a new continental anti-missile defence system. One of the problems facing Canadian leaders arises from the fact that they do not have access to the same information as their US counterparts and thus find it difficult to make informed decisions. Are the threats invoked by the US leaders (missile programs in China, North Korea, Iran or Iraq) actually real? Are they of genuine concern to Canada?
Various information essential to making "informed decisions" is still vague: How and at what pace will the various missile programs deemed threatening develop? Is the American BMD program being artificially inflated by the election deadline of the year 2000?
It is unlikely that American plans will arouse the same passionate debates as in 1986. The disappearance of the Cold War environment, the vague nature of the threat and the technical complexity of the issue may dampen the interest of the public and the media.
Canadians, for their part, are not yet in a position to know whether the planned BMD system will actually protect Canada. And more generally speaking, there seems to be no consensus on the existence of a genuine threat to Canada or the nature of this threat. Some participants, however, see this as a non-issue: the point is to decide whether the United States perceives a threat, and it is on this basis that Canada must decide whether or not to participate in US projects intended to block this threat.
A good number of speakers saw the US project as inevitable (election year or not) and felt that Canada had to try to safeguard its own interests in this process. Moreover, it is highly likely that Canada will be "sucked into" this project due to the many formal and informal ties that bind the two countries together. Non-commitment would marginalize Canada and send a negative message to the United States.
Considered from another standpoint, it may be that the American plans will jeopardize the arms control agreements (ABM and Start II). In this case, Canada's main priority should be to find a compromise that will save what is salvageable in these agreements. The Canadian government would then be able to minimize the liabilities stemming from contradictions between two pillars of its security policy.
III. US Viewpoints
The midday session dealt with US perceptions of defence relations with Canada.
On the whole, the relations between the two countries were described as excellent by the American participants. However, certain challenges loom on the horizon. Considering the decisions that will have to be made over the next few years, both governments will have to be prepared for compromise. In the short term, the main problem to be resolved has to do with the defence production agreements:
- Information on military technologies must be better protected;
- Export controls have to be implemented;
- These problems must be handled with due regard for the differences in effective legislation in the two countries;
- It is also essential to quantify the impact of privatization in a sector where, until lately, negotiations could be limited to governments only.
In the medium term, Canada and the United States will have to engage discussion on strategic issues of common interest, for example:
- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the protection of infrastructures and populations.
- European security and the preservation of transatlantic relationships.
Lastly, in the longer term, both governments will have to deal with the growing gap in the resources each of them devotes to defence:
- At present, the United States spends 40 times more than Canada on defence, and this gap is widening;
- How do we make the best possible use of the new technologies?
- How do we pool both countries' resources to manage security problems against which traditional methods are relatively ineffective (for example, in the area of peacekeeping)?
The biggest challenge, however, is ensuring that security relations continue to be as profitable to both countries as they are now. Cooperation is never so effective as when all parties are deriving equal satisfaction.
IV. Non-traditional Threats and the Role of the Canadian Forces
One of the problems hampering current thinking about Canada-US relations lies in the lack of a common point of reference and comparable historical experiences. Today's international system is unipolar, which makes for an altogether new situation, especially in terms of relations between the two countries. It means, for example, that Canada will be hard-pressed to find a counterbalance to US influence since that country has no rivals any more. Canadians now have no alternative: they have to work with the United States.
This is especially true when we come to the so-called "non-traditional" threats (sometimes also described as "non-military threats"). These include illegal immigration, drug trafficking, transborder criminality, computer piracy and sabotage and infringements of democracy.
This type of threat raises certain problems. Though both governments see these as definitely worrisome, they do not view them as having the same importance. However, the United States' dominant position enables that country to argue its views and set the priorities. Countries like Canada have no alternative but to place these priorities on their security agendas. In this sense, the policy of the United States can be described as "unilateralist."
To date, Canada-US relations have been marked by respect, and the positions taken by Canada have not been trampled underfoot. At this level, multilateralism has served Canada's interests well. To maintain this state of affairs, however, it is important to keep working on a multilateral basis and to ensure continued public support, in Canada as elsewhere.
The Canadian Forces are not ready to assume, on their own, significant duties in the struggle against non-traditional threats. Nor have they been given a mandate to do so by the political authorities. Before entrusting them with such a role, it would be appropriate to wonder about the suitability of such a move and its acceptance by the citizens. Some feel it would be more useful to increase the resources of the civil authorities (which are working well so far) than to expand the participation of the Canadian Forces.
The fight against non-traditional threats may be an area in which it would be possible to strengthen cooperation between the two countries. The Canadian government could define some options in this sense and take the initiative in order to curb criticism in the United States (which has been growing for some time), put a stop to the feelings of suspicion this arouses and sidestep US policies that work against the values and interests of Canadians. Other participants suggested that the Canadian government define its own concept of the threat so that it can stand out from the United States and take initiatives more consistent with its own interests.
Some participants challenged the very idea of "non-traditional threats." These phenomena are not necessarily new and do not pose threats in the military meaning of that word. Others held that inasmuch as the US government perceives these phenomena as threats Ottawa has no choice but to take them seriously: Canadian territory can be used as an access route to the United States. In this as in other areas, Canada has to take US perceptions into account.
This point becomes even more valid when we consider that Canada is increasingly seen in Washington as a "component of the hemisphere," which means it can be dealt with on the same basis as Latin American countries even though the problems festering there are very different. Border controls speak to this matter, since the border between Mexico and the United States raises problems that have nothing in common with the ones that arise on the Canada-US frontier. The Canadian government must therefore take diplomatic and political measures to dispel potential confusion in this area.
V. Economic Relations and the Defence Industry
On April 12, 1999, the US government amended the ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations), a move that could have had serious effects on Canada-US cooperation in defence production. These regulations stipulated that Canadian firms had to obtain certificates before gaining access to the technologies required for the production of military materiel. They therefore jeopardized the basis of this trade inasmuch as they eliminated much of the preferred access to the US market enjoyed by Canadian firms.
On October 7, with President Clinton's visit just hours away, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy found a compromise that spared Canadian firms from having to submit to the certification process. Though these firms had a narrow escape, the episode raises some questions and concerns for the future.
The precise consequences of such a measure on the activities of these Canadian firms remain hard to quantify, but they would be significant. Some sources cite 2,000 jobs and sales of over $500 million. The problem is that Canada means relatively little to the United States (barely 5% of US armed forces procurement), while the US market is essential to the Canadian industry, accounting for 50% of production. Some of the exchanges between participants dealt with assessing the figures involved.
It is also appropriate to note that the ITAR apply to a host of "dual-purpose" (civilian and military) products. They may therefore have consequences in other industrial areas seemingly distant from defence production. However, the fact that the Canadian and American industries are so strongly integrated might result in a "boomerang effect" by which measures affecting Canadian firms would have repercussions on their US partners.
The new US regulations are more indicative of economic concerns-the competitiveness of an important US industrial sector-than of actual security problems. Four considerations have to be weighed in order to understand the present situation:
The globalization of trade and production
Industrial production is increasingly subject to the globalization phenomenon. This translates into loss of control over the production process by American companies. US businesses are losing their advantage and this situation exacerbates the US trade deficit.
Transformations in market structure
The end of the Cold War resulted in falling demand and a trend towards corporate mergers, especially in Europe. The new companies born of these mergers are now powerful enough to compete with US corporations.
Transformations in types of products in demand
The "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) is creating increased demand by armed forces for products involving information technologies. Since these products are generally developed by civilian industries, the distinction between the two industrial sectors is tending to blur. Competition is therefore livelier and it becomes harder to control so-called "sensitive" information.
Transformations in production methods
The reduction of production costs does not begin with economies of scale any more: it involves partnerships. This means it is no longer necessary to concentrate production in large units in order to develop sophisticated systems. This trend is also spurring the competition phenomenon and posing more acute security problems.
Inasmuch as these phenomena are more concerned with the development of technology and industrial production, little place is left to reflect on the role of the military and the Department of National Defence. However, the ITAR might have positive consequences if they make it possible to draw Canadians' attention to US concerns and force them to review some of their habits.
VI. General Comments on the Forum
Media participants expressed their gratitude at having been invited to take part in this forum. The event was a major source of information for them. A number of connections were established between media representatives and university experts, and the media representatives fully intend to strengthen these ties in future as they write their articles.
One participant wanted to register a comment on the consultation as a whole. Several points were raised.
- Women were under-represented in the group;
- The group was not representative of the Canadian population;
- Discussions were bereft of ethical or human considerations. According to this participant, the trade in defence equipment should be placed in the same category as trade in slaves, sex or drugs, as they all create victims. No one was wondering about the consequences of the arms trade.
The high level and quality of the discussions were emphasized by a number of participants.
1 November 1999
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