Canada-US Security Issues:
A Review of the Policy Consultation Proceedings
Defence Forum
Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario, 16 June 2000
Report
by
Orrick White,
Ph.D. Candidate
Queen's Centre for International Relations
Queen's University
The consultation brought together about 75 individuals who represented the academic, military, political and non-governmental communities. A number of issues were discussed ranging from the changing nature of peacekeeping to the implications of 'continentalism'. While there was rarely consensus on any given issue, there did seem to be a common recognition that the Canada-US security relationship may be at a cross-roads. The way in which Canada addresses this shift was suggested to have several implications for the future of the 'special-relationship' that Canada and the US have had since the late 20th century. To explore both the shift and the policy implications that the shift may have for Canada, was the purpose of this policy consultation.
This paper will highlight some of the major issues that were discussed at the meeting. The purpose herein is to highlight the major themes of the sessions rather than to comprehensively review the points that were raised. Keeping this objective in mind, the paper will be divided into the four topics of the consultation: 1) Strategy 2020 and the Question of 'Continentalism'; 2) The Axworthy Doctrine, Neo-Wilsonianism and Canada-US security relations; 3) The Americanization of Peacekeeping Revisited: from Blue Helmets to Green Helmets; and 4) The Renewed Quest for ESDI and its Implications for North American Security.
The consultation began with an overview of the General Context of Canada-US security relations by a DND official. He spoke about the geographic, political and strategic context within which Canada and the US operate. To do so, he highlighted the disparities between the US and Canada in terms of size and power. While Canada is much larger geographically, he noted that the US is a military and economic superpower. To emphasise this fact, the official pointed out that the Canadian military budget is only 2 percent as large as the American budget. Moreover, in almost all areas of military equipment, the US outnumbers Canada by a margin of 10:1. Indeed, the official suggested that the US is so far ahead in the Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA) that it is running its own arms race.
Despite the huge differences between Canada and the US, the DND official suggested that there is a special relationship between the two allies which can be illustrated by the fact that there are more than 80 treaty-level defence agreements (including NORAD), 150 bilateral defence fora and some 150 Memoranda of Understanding between the two countries' militaries. Canada derives several benefits from this relationship including privileged access to the US defence market, a limited influence on US defence policy and cost effective continental defence approaches.
The DND official then highlighted the reality that Canada and the US, while close allies, do not always share a similar view of the world. Canada sees itself as a Middle Power and prefers multilateral approaches to security problems as shown by its recent efforts to ban land mines and to promote its Human Security agenda at the UN. The US, however, is more intent on acting in its national interest as it defends and promotes democracy throughout the world. Unlike Canada, the US is often suspicious of multilateral institutions and is reluctant to get involved in peacekeeping and peace support operations.
In terms of the present Canada-US relationship, the official suggested that there are a number of emerging issues that threaten to cause increasing strain between the two countries. For example, in the US, there is great deal of concern over issues of "homeland defence" which include, for example, cyber-terrorism, attacks against physical infrastructure, missile attacks (cruise and ballistic), cross-border criminal activity, etc. In Canada, however, the concern over 'homeland defence' is not as strong as it is in the US and this lack of emphasis has led the US to perceive Canada as the 'soft-underbelly' of US security.
In closing, the DND official suggested that Canada must balance between two strategic issues: 1) maintaining Canadian sovereignty and 2) increasing defence integration with the US. While the US recognises that Canada is not a superpower, it does expect us to be capable of and willing to address security issues that are of concern to them. A failure to address US concerns could, in the end, greatly harm a security alliance that has served both countries well over the past 50 years. In this vein, the official proposed that policymakers should be concerned with determining the implications of National Missile Defence (NMD)– for NORAD and for Canada itself. He also noted that Canada supports the development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI); therefore, we need to determine where this leaves Canada if we do not support NMD. Will this leave Canada alone? Furthermore, what will be the Canadian role in the actual development of NMD if we do support it? These, he advanced, are the crucial questions that policymakers must address.
Dr. David G. Haglund, the Director of the Queen's Centre for International Relations (QCIR) then presented an overview paper of Strategy 2020.
Topic 1: Strategy 2020 and the Question of 'Continentalism'
Presented by D. David G. Haglund (Director, QCIR)
Dr. Haglund's presentation focused on the `implications of continentalism for Canadian security interests. The presenter suggested that while he does not necessarily believe that history is cyclical, we can learn from the past and use those lessons to address future challenges. In this light, he likened our current concern over National Missile Defence (NMD) to that of an issue which preoccupied Canada-US relations in the late part of the 19th century – the replacement of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and the subsequent construction of the Panama Canal. He noted that, as was the case after the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was replaced, there will likely be a continuation of cooperative behaviour in the Canada-US security and defence relationship after NMD; regardless of whether or not we support its development. He suggested that this continuation will occur because there are many elements of "homeland defence" around which collaboration is necessary – combating crime and terrorism, for example.
Dr. Haglund then turned to address Strategy 2020 by suggesting that 'continentalism', a policy that Canada has followed since the 1940s, is a key component of Canadian internationalism. Indeed, he purported that continentalism is the method that Canadian policy-makers since 1945 have used in order to embed the country's 'American policy' within the broader context of an international agenda that can only be achieved though the 'appropriation of American power to Canadian ends'. (In other words, continentalism is the means to a multilateralist end.) He then expounded upon his view that Strategy 2020 continues this continentalist tradition. An example is found in its support of interoperability (ie. so that we can participate with our allies in missions that matter to Canadians.) In the end, Dr. Haglund suggested that the question for the future of Canada-US relations is not whether Canada will defect from continentalism; rather, the question is whether or not the US will remain committed to the same type of continentalism as it has in the past; or, instead, turn inward to focus on homeland defence, at the expense of mulitateralist efforts, as many unilateralists in Congress would prefer. He noted that the US could move in either direction on this issue.
In the discussion that followed many agreed with Dr. Haglund's argument that whether or not continentalism leads to multilateralism depends on the United States. It was posited that continentalism is indeed the Canadian tactic for achieving foreign policy objectives and it stands to follow that the key question is whether or not our neighbour will enhance our foreign policy objectives in the future. In this light, the key concern over NMD was viewed by some to be more a case of trying to determine if the programme is indicative of the US turning inwards or simply of it trying to maintain national security in order to be effective multilateralists. Either way, there was a general consensus that the US would condition Canadian security and defence policy.
On a somewhat different note, several participants suggested that interoperability has potentially negative consequences if the Americans become increasingly unilateralist because Canada would be capable and, therefore, potentially obligated to participate in dubious missions that might put our soldiers in harm's way. However, others countered with their view that interoperability does not obligate us to participate in missions that are not in the national interest. Indeed, some stressed the point quite bluntly that continentalism and interoperability, as advanced in Strategy 2020 does not mean that Canada must put itself into the "pocket of the US".
Topic 2: The Axworthy Doctrine, Neo-Wilsonianism and Canada-US Security Relations
Presented by Dr. Joel Sokolsky
Dr. Sokolsky began his presentation by suggesting that the American ascendance to unipolar status has made the world safe for human security. He suggested that both the US's neo-Wilsonianism and Canada's Axworthy Doctrine are 'crusading policies'. In this context, his main argument was that the source of friction between the US and Canada over Human Security is not over policy objectives, but over having 'two pulpits'. In other words, the United States wants to set the agenda and when our foreign minister preaches policy to the Americans we are infringing on this desire. Dr. Sokolsky went on to argue that the United States has, in fact, followed a human security agenda that allows it to 'go out and do good and do well' by promoting economic liberalism and democracy. He suggested that for Canada Human Security is the only way to legitimise overseas interventions and thus the next logical step, given that our overall foreign policy objectives mesh with those of the US, would be for human security to lead us to greater interoperability with the US. The major schism between these allies, he suggested, is that Canada pursues its agenda multilaterally (ideally, through the UN); whereas, the US tends to pursue its agenda unilaterally while 'cloaking' its efforts in multilateralism.
In the discussion that followed Dr. Sokolsky's presentation, several people suggested that he was being overly optimistic when he portrayed the 'two pulpit' issue as being relatively non-problematic. While some did agree that the friction between Canada and the US is exaggerated, many felt that a component of the relationship is indeed troubled and will be affected by these crusading foreign policies. Given this reality, it was suggested that considerable attention must be paid to the 'mood' of the relationship. In this regard, Canada should 'pick its fights carefully' because the Americans will remember the issues over which we have challenged them when it comes time for future policy negotiations.
In the end, most felt that the relationship between Canada and the US is still fairly solid. While many noted that there is a tendency to overestimate our ability to influence US policy, it was also recognised that there is considerable value in 1) Canada having a seat at the table and 2) Canada being well regarded by American policymakers. In other words, the consensus seemed to be that we should be seen as being sympathetic to American interests because we are not going to have a large impact on the American policy agenda in any case.
Topic 3: The Americanization of Peacekeeping Revisited: From Blue Helmets to Green Helmets.
Presented by Dr. Jane Boulden
The purpose of Dr. Boulden's presentation was to determine whether or not the trend, originally identified by Dr. Joel Sokolsky in 1997, of the Americanization of peacekeeping has continued and if it has continued, to determine what effect it has had on Canadian and US decision-making and the Canada-US relationship. She pointed out that by looking at the willingness of Canada and US participation in peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era, a trend can be identified whereby Canada continues to be an active participant and the US has become increasingly so. Importantly, Dr. Boulden also pointed out a shift in the nature of UN operations from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement. She went on to posit that the shift could be reflective of the fact that the United States agreed to become more involved in peacekeeping only if it could choose the approach that best suited its interests. That being said, she was careful to suggest that the changing nature of peacekeeping was 'separate but not separable' from increased American involvement.
With regard to Canadian and US involvement, Dr. Boulden suggested that while the US was concerned in the early 1990s with trying to decide when and under what circumstances to intervene in conflicts, this was not really an issue in Canada. Instead, Canadian policymakers were more concerned with how to make peacekeeping better. Moreover, she suggested that in Canada, there has traditionally been the tying together of national and international security that can now be identified as being the case in the US as well. In the end, Dr. Boulden argued that the arrival of the US into peacekeeping is not, in itself, a problem; indeed, this could be an opportunity for Canada to embed its foreign policy objectives. The real issues for Canada, she said, were to be found in 1) the practice of the UN contracting out its peace support operations and 2) the increasing use of force. In closing, Dr. Boulden said that the challenge for Canada is how to ensure that the advantages of traditional peacekeeping are not lost in the shift towards the greater use of force.
In the discussion that followed, one participant stated that while the US has been absolutely committed to peacekeeping it is now necessary to rethink how peacekeepers are trained and equipped to deal with post-Cold War conflicts. Because the effectiveness of the entire international system is at stake, what is now needed is a more robust peacekeeping and enforcement mandate. With regard to a more robust mandate, some surmised that it might be difficult for Canada to legitimise because the Canadian public is 'risk adverse' (unwilling to accept casualties). On the other hand, some suggested that Canadian soldiers have been intervening in dangerous places for decades; therefore, the Canadian public is no more risk adverse than to be expected given our duty to protect the lives of our soldiers. One participant pointed out that if we were not concerned about the welfare of our troops, then this would be perverse.
On a related note, the changing nature of conflict was raised by several participants. They pointed out that the civil-military distinction in conflict has been eroded significantly. Now, there is little protection from wearing a blue beret in a conflict environment. Given this shift, some questioned the wisdom of intervening in conflicts that do not threaten our 'vital national interests'; especially, since intervening in these types of conflicts has largely been done without the consent of the warring parties. In response to this position, others argued that in the end, instability in one part of the world that does not affect our national security initially, will eventually do so. The final theme raised, was that Canada seems willing to participate in these new types of peace-enforcement missions and therefore, Canada should address its capability to carrying out the roles that it wishes to play in the future.
Topic 4: The Renewed Quest for ESDI and its Implications for North American Security
Presented by Dr. Charles C. Pentland
Dr. Pentland's presentation was concerned mainly with trying to explain the emergence of the St. Malo declaration as well as the possible implications that ESDI will have for North American security. Essentially, Dr. Pentland suggested that the St. Malo declaration served to highlight the EU's perceived need for an autonomous ability to define its security interests and ability to act. He highlighted possible reasons as to why St. Malo was signed in 1998. These reasons included: 1) because it was in the national interest of the two major European powers (France and Great Britain) 2) because it was a functionalist continuation of deepening European structures (not very convincing); and 3) because Kosovo acted as a catalyst to improve the European pillar. With regard to the implications of ESDI for Canada, Dr. Pentland suggested that there are a few possibilities. If the ESDI includes an Atlanticist vision, there is not much to worry about; however, if ESDI follows a French vision of autonomy, then Canada will be left out of decision-making processes. In the end, he proposed that the best case scenario for Canada would be for ESDI to improve only slightly so that autonomous capacity for action is not developed but institutions are established that can provide for European identity.
In the discussion that followed, some suggested that neither the US nor Europe really are concerned about our reaction to ESDI nor about how it affects Canada. In this sense, many agreed that it is mainly a Canadian problem. Given this reality, some suggested that we should try to determine how we will obtain a seat at the table for ESDI policy consultations and what the Europeans will want from Canada (interoperability and increased defence capacities). Many intimated that ESDI is pushing Canada towards a North American Security and Defence Identity (or 'NASDI', as Dr. Charles Pentland referred to it). However, it was also suggested that this point might be moot because the Europeans have not even agreed upon whether or not they will pursue an Atlanticist or autonomous version of ESDI . Similarly, the point was raised that North American Defence might be a non-issue for Canada because the Americans have not formally invited Canada to participate in NMD.
Some participants addressed the issue of a partially developed ESDI in terms of the potential problems that this could cause for Canada. For example, one participant pointed out that if the EU does not have the capability to provide for its own defence and security; it will rely on NATO assets and Canada has a 6% ownership stake in how these assets are used. Others cautioned that policymakers should not perceive Canada as being imprisoned in the "triangle myth" (ie, Canada-US-Europe). Instead, we should try to maximise our options. To illustrate this point, one participant pointed out that Canada could have a significant number of forces in Europe and still not be recognised by the Europeans; therefore, perhaps we should take a step back and decide, instead, if and when we will participate in an EU led mission (ie. Canada should not be overly concerned with trying to offset the North American and European defence identities). Finally, others provocatively suggested that Canada doesn't really have a problem at all with ESDI because we do not have any security interests left in Europe; nor, do we have any significant economic links – the so called "Third Option". This view was seen to be significant because it may be indicative of a radical shift in the axis of Canadian security policy away from Europe. If this is indeed the case, the implications for Canada-US relations could be significant.
Conclusions
The consultation concluded with some closing remarks by Dr. David G. Haglund. He noted that there were a couple of ways to view the Canada-US security relationship. Either the relationship is so strong that it can withstand many shocks or the relationship is going to be faced with a number of problems because of a fundamental shift in key security concerns. He suggested that now is the time to try to determine the overall health of the relationship and in this light, he offered his view that relative to years past, the Canada-US security relationship is in fairly good condition and will likely remain so for some time to come.
With regard to NMD, which may be a core issue in the relationship, Dr. Haglund advised policymakers to refrain from taking a definitive position on what might end up being a purely hypothetical system. At the same time, however, he also suggested that we should be cautioned against being too critical of the system lest the critiques cause unnecessary friction between Canada and the US. In the end, he surmised that NMD will probably not radically alter our security relationship because we have a number of security issues upon which to collaborate. Homeland defence is more important for Canadian defence and security than is NMD and if Canada focuses on selected aspects of homeland defence (e.g. combating terrorism, fighting crime) he suggested that this can also serve to reassure the Americans.
In closing, Dr. Haglund noted that changes in the US electoral cycle during the next decade should be of concern to Canadian policymakers. If there is a shift towards Congressional leadership from the Executive, then there will most likely be a shift in US foreign policy from 'global meliorism' to 'isolationism'. Dr. Haglund suggested, however, that this development would not be entirely negative for Canada since it would enable us to save money and to decrease obligations/commitments abroad, should we so desire. Overall, then, whichever way one interprets the state of the Canada-US security relationship, Dr. Haglund suggested that there are still many positive aspects of the relationship that can be emphasised in the future.
| Date Modified: 2006-11-27 |  |
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