"Canada-US Defence Cooperation"
Defence Forum
Fredericton, NB, 12 April 2000
Report
by
Dr. David A. Charters
Director
Centre for Conflict Studies
University of New Brunswick
Table of Contents
1. Canada-US Defence Cooperation: An Overview
2. Maritime Surveillance and Defence
3. Peacekeeping and OOTW: A CANUS Partnership?
Introduction
On 12 April 2000, at the request of the Department of National Defence, the Centre for Conflict Studies of the University of New Brunswick convened a forum on Canada-United States defence cooperation.
The forum took place at the Wu Conference Centre on the campus of the University of new Brunswick, in Fredericton, New Brunswick. Fifty-three people attended, from a variety of organizations, including federal departments, the Canadian forces, the U. S. government and military, local government, universities, the business community, and non-governmental organizations.
The purpose of the forum was to give these groups and individuals an opportunity to discuss key issues in Canada-US defence cooperation, and to voice their views and concerns about them. The three major themes discussed at this forum were: Maritime Surveillance and Defence; Peacekeeping and Operations Other Than War; and Strategic Issues, which included two sub-themes - Ballistic Missile Defence; and Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Critical Infrastructure Security. The discussion of each of these themes is summarized in this report.
The report writer wishes to acknowledge gratefully the support of the Department of National Defence, which made this forum possible. He also wishes to thank the participants, both presenters and discussants, for generating some lively discourse on the issues. Finally, he would like to thank his staff, Brent Wilson and Deborah Stapleford, for handling all of the organization and administration of the forum. It was as a result of their efforts that the event proceeded smoothly.
This report is based on a combination of handwritten notes and audio tapes. Any errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the writer.
1. Canada-US Defence Cooperation: An Overview
The first session provided an opportunity to examine the Canada-US Defence Cooperation within the context of the wider Canadian-American political and economic relationship. This helped to put that relationship and defence cooperation between the two countries into perspective.
Presentation
At the start of the new millennium the United States has emerged as the world's only superpower. Not since the Roman Empire has a single power, without a counter-balancing rival, so dominated the world, economically, technologically, and militarily. It is unlikely to face a "peer competitor" for at least two decades. In the military sphere alone, the US accounts for one-third of all defence expenditure and almost 2/3 of NATO's. And the US is not resting on its laurels, but is investing in advanced military technology – the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) – in order to ensure that it retains its military advantage.
By contrast, Canada has only 1/10 of the population of the US, only 7.1% of the US Gross Domestic Product, and only limited military resources that are declining steadily. This gross disparity is manifest in all aspects of Canadian-American relations. For Canada, those relations are characterized by a delicate balancing act between maintaining close and friendly ties and seeking the greatest possible degree of independence.
In the defence field, drawing upon a long tradition of defence cooperation, the US is Canada's most important ally. The two countries share more than 80 treaty-level defence agreements, such as the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) agreement, some 150 bilateral fora (the Permanent Joint Board on Defence dates to 1940), and 250 Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) between the Department of National Defence (DND) and the US Department of Defense (DoD). This close relationship, albeit asymmetrical, gives Canada an unique position with respect to American military affairs: a voice in critical areas of US defence policy; a respected seat at the table in international bodies, such as the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); unmatched opportunities for combined training and operations; privileged access to significant defence-related intelligence and information (85% of Canadian foreign intelligence from allies comes from the US); cost-effective defence of continental approaches and airspace; and privileged access to the US defence market (Canada exported defence-related goods and services worth $ 1 billion to the US in 1999). Maintained throughout and since the Cold War, Canada's unique status has been envied by Canada's other allies.
But that does not mean the two countries always share a common world view. The US is intent on protecting its interests in the world, and thus is: prone to unilateralism, suspicious of multi- lateralism (unless it is in charge), and wary of international engagements unless its vital interests are at stake. Canada, by contrast, as a middle power, promotes multilateralism, international rules-based systems, human security and disarmament.
Even so, the two countries now find themselves confronting a similar range of direct and indirect threats to the North American mainland. The US is concerned about "homeland defense", the threats to which include: "Cyber-Terrorism" against communications, information, and finance; attacks on Critical Infrastructure (CI), such as water supplies, transporation, and energy supplies and distribution; cross-border organized criminal activity, such as drugs and illegal immigration; conventional terrorism and terrorism involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); and ballistic or cruise missile attack from existing or potential missile-capable powers (the latter could include North Korea; Iran; or Iraq). These problems are being addressed at the presidential level and the response is being lavishly funded.
By contrast, although Canada shares many of the same vulnerabilities, it does not feel as vulnerable. Nevertheless, some threats may originate or transit through Canada, since Canada and the US share a common porous border and inter-connected CI. Likewise, opponents of the US could target Canada to attack the US indirectly, or Canada might experience the spillover effects of an attack on the US. Moreover, there is a growing perception in the US that Canada is not doing enough on its own territory to contain potential threats to the US - that it is becoming the "soft underbelly" of North America, either as a haven for "Hackers" or "Club Med" for terrorists. Those are warning signals that we cannot take the positive relationship for granted.
Canada has taken a number of initiatives to deal with these "homeland defense" issues. These include: the National Counter-Terrorism Plan; a WMD Response Team; a National Strategy on Organized Crime; and planning for CI protection. The big question is whether Canada is doing enough to ensure that it is taken seriously and not seen as a threat.
The American National Missile Defense (NMD) initiative is a significant issue. The US is worried about the proliferation of the ballistic missile technology to states hostile to the US and the potential for mating it with WMD. They are also concerned that such weapons might be used to deter the international community from taking action. Would they have been able to take action if Iraq or Serbia had possessed such weapons? If the US decides to go ahead with NMD it will have implications for arms control, for Canada-US bilateral defence relations, and for NORAD.
Overall, the US appreciates Canada's defence efforts, including the fact that we have increased spending for the last two years. They appreciate the kinds of contributions Canada makes to peacekeeping, such as in Kosovo and Haiti, and to the air war in Kosovo. That said, there is no doubt that the Americans think Canada could do more, and would like us to do more. For Canada, the question is, how much is enough? How much does Canada have to do to be taken seriously? If we don't do enough, will the US simply do defence for us, and if so, what are the consequences for Canadian sovereignty? To gain the full benefits of our relationship with the Americans, Canada probably should be even more fully integrated with them in defence matters, but what price would we pay in terms of our own freedom of action?
There is a great deal at stake. If the defence relationship deteriorates, the Canada risks losing: interoperability with the US and allies, the ability to conduct multilateral operations and to influence decisions, access to intelligence, and access to the US defence market. In the past, when Canada has confronted challenges in its relationship with the US, it has been able to take comfort in a wider international relationship, such as with the Europeans. But that option is increasingly problematic. Europe is developing its own security and defence identity, and Canada will not be part of it. So, this means that Canada probably will be confronted with a choice between doing things alone or doing them with the US. There isn't a third option.
Some questions offered for consideration:
1. Does Canada risk losing its privileged position with the US and become
just another friendly but foreign power?
2. Do we risk being seen as part of the problem rather than part of the
solution?
3. If the US fills the gaps that we leave and end up defending Canadian
territory, are there implications for Canadian sovereignty?
4. If we move closer to the US, is that possible, is it reasonable, and
what price do we pay for it?
Discussion
It was suggested that, even before any Canadian decision on participation in NMD, Canada is already losing some things that it used to have access to in a privileged way. It was observed that Canada and the US have a lot of issues to deal with besides NMD, and that given the asymmetry of the relationship problems are inevitable. Nevertheless, progress is being made, and a lot of these issues are heading toward resolution. Moreover, Canada has shown in Kosovo that it can field effective forces. The US does not expect Canada to make enormous increases in defence spending; they expect us to carry our weight and make a reasonable contribution. They want us to be able to field effective forces that can work with them. We can do that at present, but will we be able to do so in the future?
The emergence of the US as the world's only superpower is a mixed blessing. It highlights the kinds of social compromises the US has made, and Canadians are inclined to wonder if the kinds of social arrangements that follow the European model can compete with the US model. In the defence context it is important to ensure that the tail of the US defence department does not wag the dog of Canadian foreign policy. If the European option is no longer open to Canada, then we have to ask ourselves what it is we want to achieve in the international field, and whether we can focus our defence effort in a way that support the issues that really matter to us? If our defence relations are going to be primarily Canadian-American then we have to ask, what particular jobs within that relationship are most important to Canadians? Canadian participation in the Kosovo war could be a very good or a very bad example. Would participation in the NMD simply represent falling in line with a world-view based in Washington, rather than using our very small defence budget to support the things we value? Would we lose our ability to pursue arms control and multilateral initiatives? Would we be contributing to a world of two hostile camps? Is there a greater risk of missiles being used in an atmosphere of hostility and suspicion?
Canadians tend to view independence in foreign policy as doing only whatever the Americans are not doing. Yet, the two countries share a lot of common views about the world, and broadly similar values, so it is quite conceivable that they can independently reach the same conclusions about foreign policy goals. They need not always take diametrically opposed positions.
There is concern, at the highest levels of various national bureaucracies, that NATO is dividing into a "two-pillared" alliance, with one pillar centered on Europe, and the other on North America. The consequence is that the North Atlantic divide may become wider. But that is not inevitable, at least yet. This puts Canada into a position which our diplomats and others have tried to avoid: that of being alone on this continent with the Americans. But Canada has been in this position before - right after World War II, before the creation of NATO. Canada did not see itself as threatened by anyone, but the US did. So Canada made a certain degree of military effort to reassure the Americans that Canada could not be used as a base for operations against the US. But, where the threat then was straightforward, today it is more nebulous. The response then was military, but today the military would be only part of it. Moreover, if Canada concentrates on "Homeland Defense", it may lose some of its ability to play a role internationally. A contrary view took the position that we tend to drastically overestimate Canada's influence internationally. One observer noted that today Canadian territory, waters, and airspace, as well as the efforts of the Canadian Forces, are of decreasing importance to the physical security of the United States. That is different from the situation in 1946. It is a whole new world out there, and this means that Canada-US defence cooperation is a whole new debate.
2. Maritime Surveillance and Defence
The "maritime" domain is one area of Canada-US defence/security relations where "the rubber hits the road" on a daily basis. There are many issues in the offshore that affect Canadian and American security: from cooperation in NATO, to policing the fisheries and the environment, enforcing laws of the sea, and apprehending illegal immigrants. There are even some outstanding boundary disputes on the East and West coasts, so there are points of friction between the two countries. However, it is interesting to note that, at the dawn of a new century, to a considerable extent Canada has achieved in the naval sphere what Sir Wilfrid Laurier envisaged at the turn of the previous one: a "blue water" navy, with ships about the size he intended, with the navy fully integrated with the major imperial power - albeit a different power from the one he knew.
Presentations
The Cold war provides a useful case study in the management of naval cooperation. Many of the issues dealt with during that period remain relevant today. How do two dissimilar countries work together with a degree of equality? The relationship is about many things: communications, cooperation, and sovereignty. Canada's freedom of action on the world stage is not damaged in any way by close cooperation with the United States; indeed it may be strengthened by it. The experience of the Cold War was also very much about Canada retaining relevance in the US security agenda. If Canada loses that relevance, it risks losing a great deal of what we stand for. So it is important to manage that relationship in a way that both sides come out as winners.
Canada-US defence cooperation was as divisive an issue in 1947 as it is today. The politicians of the day in Canada realized that the United States was going to take action in its own defence in Canadian airspace and in Canadian waters, with or without Canadian consent. So it made sense to do it collectively and be part of the process, rather than sniping from the sidelines.
At first, the concept of maritime defence was based very much on a re-run of the Second World War, but with the Russians driving the U-boats. However, the detonation of the Soviet H-bomb in 1953 signalling a shift to a nuclear strategy, quickly followed by a real increase in Soviet submarine capability including the advent of missile-firing submarines, and the appointment of Admiral Sergei Gorschkov as head of the Soviet navy, were fundamental changes that brought the maritime threat back into North American waters. This gave a new focus to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and to the need for early warning of the presence of Soviet submarines. This required the naval resources of both countries; the US could not do it alone. The Canadian navy became part of an extensive bilateral ASW defence system. The degree of cooperation and interoperability was remarkable, to the point in the late 1950s and early 1960s where it was difficult to tell the difference between an American or Canadian ship or aircraft, with the two forces doing the same things, working to identical plans, under a shared command and control structure. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis proved that this system worked; communication was impeccable. Integrated naval planning continued, and both sides benefited enormously.
In the face of modern Soviet SSBNs (ballistic missile-launching submarines - primarily the Yankee-class), this very high level of cooperation continued. That Canadian maritime forces became an integral part of the strategic ASW operation bothered several politicians, especially Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who eventually had to acknowledge that it was necessary. Throughout the entire Cold War Canadian-American cooperation at sea functioned smoothly and effectively. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Canadian ships patrolled as far south as Long Island Sound, and as American naval strength was drawn to the Vietnam War, the Canadian navy took on the task of patrolling the Gulf of Alaska. So, as far as the maritime security of the continent was concerned, there was no border. Yet, Canadian sovereignty was respected by the Americans impeccably. Friendships developed and there was a genuine openness between the naval staffs at all levels. This relationship functioned independently of the changing nature of the cross-border political relationship and thus truly reflected a collective security system. Asymmetries existed, of course; it had to be a partnership of unequals, but at a working level the two maritime forces were equals in all respects. The overall interaction strengthened sovereignty; Canada was much stronger as a result of this. What can we learn from this experience?
1. Bilateral agreements are as much about communications as they are
about operations.
2. The relationship affords access to advanced technology.
3. Working relationships become friendships, and these are very useful
in solving problems.
4. If Canada becomes irrelevant to the US, it becomes irrelevant to the
rest of the world.
CANUS cooperation in the naval field continued almost seamlessly into the post-Cold War era. This manifested itself most clearly during the Persian Gulf War. Likewise, Canadian ships, now including the new frigates commissioned during the past decade, work with USN ships on NATO operations, such as those in the Adriatic in support of recent peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans. The new frigates, with their state-of-the-art computer and communications suites, regularly accompany US carrier task forces on exercises and deployments.
This experience tells us a great deal about the current state of Canada-US defence cooperation; in the naval arena, cooperation with the United States is the only option. Independent Canadian naval combat action is not conceivable. The US Navy leads the world in maritime and defence technologies. The US Navy is alone in being able to bring decisive maritime power to a theatre. The US Navy has been the architect of network-centric warfare and concepts of information dominance. It is the sole source for much of the information and intelligence that makes any operation possible. The network is important because so much of the information and direction needed lies outside the integral sensor capabilities of any task group or of any one nation. Naval operators must be connected to the global information web.
Cooperation in any military sphere depends on a trusted relationship, built on a common understanding of objectives and intentions as well as on a shared appreciation of the risks inherent in the application of force. Increasingly, it also depends upon the exchange of operational information between trusted partners. In this era of strict rules of engagement and personal accountability for commanders, the controlled application of force is more and more dependent upon the rapid exchange of information, transcending all levels from individual soldiers and units to presidents and prime ministers. The present, far-reaching RMA is fundamentally an information phenomenon. The interconnected RMA technologies offer a significant qualitative improvement in command and control of forces and in surveillance of the "Battlespace". However, this degree of interconnectivity also creates interdependence. For national and NATO forces, this "system of systems" is impotent without access to current information that is largely under US control. Recent operations with NATO forces in Kosovo indicate the fragility of the flow of information, a fragility that stemmed from political concerns rather than technological limits.
1. The US response to the threat of information leaks within NATO was
to withhold essential information from nations and from cooperating forces.
2. The US monopoly on current information demanded a leap of faith by
cooperating forces that target selection and weapon direction was consistent
with NATO objectives and national restrictions, because national governments
were not always consulted in advance.
The Kosovo campaign offers several significant lessons for bilateral cooperation. First, information "transparency" is key element for developing programs, plans, and capabilities which have mutual advantage. It ensures that cooperating forces have a shared appreciation of threats and a common response to danger. It is a key element in preservation of allied cooperation in providing information vital to national decision-making. For the information "owner", there must be a long-term commitment to information exchange. Keeping pace with change in IT can only be achieved through a continuous, in-depth relationship. The need for accuracy may depend on the situation. Rapid dissemination is another obligation. The provider also must be sensitive to varying missions and mission restrictions. Finally, information must be free of interpretation.
Defence cooperation rests on this free exchange of information. It has to be a constant priority, and a practiced art, above and below the 49th Parallel.
Discussion
There may be some outside DND and the defence/academic community who might find the navy's degree of interoperability with the US Navy as something that forecloses options for the Canadian government. It is important to recognize that this level of cooperation is in America's national interest, and that others may view it with caution. The US cooperates with Canada when Canada has something to offer; we have to bring something to the table. But does the ability to sail with US carrier battle groups actually achieve what Laurier wanted, or is it the very thing he didn't want? Does it affect Canada's ability to deploy balanced task groups of its own? It was argues that it does not, but in fact, enhances Canada's ability to command and direct its naval forces.
Moving into the realm of defence trade, it was noted that since Canada and the US have a free trade agreement, and the US is moving rapidly to an "information economy", the ability to communicate with eachother is essential. But the Canada-US border is an impediment in this regard. There is a whole range of protectionist measures that keep Canadian suppliers out of the US market, with protectionism justified on the grounds of "national security". In the new economy, restrictions can only harm the cooperative relationship, and that can't be a good thing. But, of course, removal of all restrictions would carry a price; would Canada be prepared to accept a completely free market in the construction of naval vessels and other vessels built for the Canadian government? Would the Canadian shipbuilding industry survive in such a market? What would be the effect on other parts of the Canadian economy? While opening up the border might benefit ship construction in New Brunswick, on the west coast the currently protected cruising industry that operates out of Vancouver might move to Seattle. So, it's hard to define a national policy for Canada on this matter which would serve all parts of the country and their economic objectives equally and without penalty. It was also pointed out that Canada's privileged position in defence economic offsets and benefits has been noticed in the US Congress, and we may begin to lose some of that. Canada has actually done rather well selling to the US, and if we decided to play "hardball, occasionally we may get beaned." Indeed, the two economies are so integrated already, it is difficult to determine whose cross-border trade belongs to whom.
The RMA has an impact on cooperation and interoperability. Concern was expressed that the drive - led by the US - for greater sophistication of systems may actually degrade the ability of allies to be interoperable, simply because they can't afford to keep pace with the changes that the US introduces. It also forces the pace of decision-making, which can be overcome to some extent by putting agreements into place beforehand - for example, agreeing in advance about Rules of Engagement. These are not new problems for navies. Even in the inter-war period, if one did not have the technology, one didn't have anything. Once you had the technology, you then had a political management problem.
Canada had to import a lot of US expertise and technology to make the Frigate program happen and to make it US Navy-compatible. But if the cutting-edge capabilities that created are allowed to "wither on the vine", as is happening in naval shipbuilding now, how much longer will Canada be able to keep up with the US, if technology is changing at the pace suggested? Will we have to "reinvent the wheel" several years down the road? Canada did have a great "intellectual property" stake in the advanced systems incorporated into the Frigate program. What it lacked, and had to turn to US companies for, was the capacity to turn concepts into workable products. In the naval field, Canada has invested a lot of Research & Development (R&D) in niche areas, and it needs to pick the winning technologies in which to spend its limited R&D funds. Technological change and privatization may force Canada in the future to buy ships "off the shelf" from other countries. It may also be necessary to "skip" some generations of technology. One needs to ask, as well, how much interoperability is enough? Attempts to innovate may also hold us back, since innovation may outstrip the ability to conceptualize the application of new systems. If one focuses on the degree of communication needed, then technology will make it work, somehow.
There is a wide range of coastal "policing" issues that affect both countries: adventure tourism, boundaries, fisheries, flag of convenience shipping, resource exploitation, search and rescue. These point to a need for a greater degree of ocean management, and possibly to the use of force. There is already extensive cooperation between the two countries. Canada maintains a highly sophisticated interdepartmental coordination system, owned and operated by the navy on behalf of the government, on both coasts, which is integrated into the US coastal management system. This is a constabulary role, in which the first line of defence is good intelligence, whether it is on drug smuggling or illegal immigration. The navy's role is to backstop other government departments' efforts. Neither the US nor Canadian navies believe that their role is for application of force within our own territorial waters for these kinds of tasks. This is done only with very careful direction and control by the civilian authorities vested with peace officer status (eg., Coast Guard, RCMP).
Would the Canadian navy benefit from specialization? Probably not, because the fundamentals of operating abroad on a boundary-less ocean in a complex command and control environment, against other forces that are able to operate with similar impunity requires a navy to have a certain basket of capabilities. At the moment, for example, the Canadian navy does not have a capability to project power over or onto the shore. Canada will have to look at that issue. But it already is a "niche navy"; it does only multi-purpose frigate activities and does not have a whole range of other capabilities. What we may have to decide is whether the niche we have is the niche we want.
3. Peacekeeping and Operations Other Than War
Presentations
The strategic environment which Canada faces may be disorderly and dangerous for some countries, but it is not for Canada. For Canada, it is a safe world; it's core interests and values are not threatened. Today, it is going abroad in support of a "Human Security" agenda. In the post-Cold War world Canada has a much greater degree of latitude in choosing between engagement and detachment. This has important implications for assessing the so-called "commitment-capability gap". For if Canada does not really have solid and continuing commitments abroad, then the gap is not as wide or as significant as some would argue. At the same time, in collaboration with the United States and other Western countries Canada has been deploying its shrinking forces into dangerous places for reasons unrelated to direct national interests, and this is likely to continue. However, there is a difference between cooperating with Washington in sharing the burdens of the new peacekeeping and what some in the US refer to as "window washing" when it comes to OOTW that Washington does not wish to engage in. Canada should not feel that it is obliged to deploy into situations where the US is not prepared to risk its own forces.
Turning to discussion of capabilities, if many commitments are, in a very profound sense, not commitments at all but discretionary options, then the gap can be narrowed even further. Capabilities can be tailored in terms of size and structure to fulfill a limited number of roles in larger multilateral efforts. This was demonstrated in the Kosovo air campaign, where the small Canadian air contingent flew a disproportionate number of missions. Likewise, the Canadian land force contingent was one of the first into Pristina. So, it is not so much the commitment-capability gap in Canadian force structure decisions that needs narrowing, in order to place relations with the US on more solid footing. Rather, it is the commitment-credibility gap. That is, given limited financial resources, what should most concern the government is that, when it decides to commit the CF abroad in coalition efforts, the forces it sends have the capability to credibly perform the roles assigned by Ottawa in agreement with coalition partners. This means that these roles may well be limited. The question that needs to be asked is: what does the Canadian Government need from the military in terms of Canada-US relations, and are they getting it? The evidence suggests that they are, and that the US is also getting what it needs from Canada in terms of supporting its diplomacy and its initiatives in OOTW, which have started to look a lot like war.
Canada's contribution to international peacekeeping has been second to none qualitatively and its participation has been disproportionate numerically. In 1994 the Canadian government decided to augment this contribution by establishing the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC). This has brought about an increase in individual and organizational cooperation between Canada and the US and has brought benefits to both countries. Since 1988 the UN has become involved in more intra-state rather than inter-state conflicts, and the tasks assigned to peacekeepers have become more demanding. Many of these are of a humanitarian nature. The PPC views these multi-faceted operations as requiring a cooperative "partnership" of military, government, civilian, and non-governmental organizations. The PPC's cooperative ventures with the US include: provision of course materials; academic program recognition; participation in ABCA exercises; preparation and management of exercises; seminars on civil-military relations; the Cornwallis Group (operations research specialists), which lends its research expertise to the work of the Centre; and publishing. In the future, PPC courses may become part of the professional training of the US military. IT opens up new opportunities for the PPC to deliver this training. It is in the interest of improved and enhanced peacekeeping that Canada and the US continue to cooperate.
Discussion
In terms of Canada-US relations, what is striking is that what Canada did in the 1990s, supported by the public, it would have been criticized for in the 1980s. It is a permissive environment. Public attitudes about cooperating with the US on such operations have shifted, because the reasons for doing them have shifted. This has been beneficial for the relationship. But, in the process, peacekeeping has become less and less uniquely Canadian, and more and more American. IFOR/SFOR/KFOR demonstrate this. And, while peacekeeping may make Canadians feel good, it doesn't address the central issue of Canadian politics: federalism. There is also some question as to how much influence it really gains for Canada on its own. If Canada is going to go abroad on these types of missions, it makes sense to do so with the Americans. The question was raised, however, whether in the future Canada's contributions might be so small and coming so late in any operation (as in the case of East Timor)that they will not be needed. This, in spite of the fact that the government, being "peacekeeping junkies", seem willing to take on any commitment regardless of the military advice they get about forces available and capabilities needed.
The RMA will have some relevance to peacekeeping operations, but not universally. Surveillance and communications capabilities are important. If the US wants Canada and other allies to join it on operations then it will have to make this available to them. Coalition operations are more about trust than technology. One discussant asked whether NATO has supplanted the UN in peace- keeping (ie., peacekeeping by proxy). It was pointed out later that this has occurred only in the European theatre, and that NATO has not extended its mandate outside Europe.
4. Strategic Issues
Presentations
The United States moved markedly closer during 1999 towards deciding to put into place a National Missile Defense (NMD) to protect itself against limited ballistic missile strikes. It may proceed further in 2000 towards deployment, despite persistent Russian objections, and later invite Canada to participate in operating the new defences. The U.S. still hopes that an agreement with Russia can be reached on missile defences.. If not, Ottawa could face a difficult choice between its arms control convictions and its interest in the long-term continuation of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). The role and scope of NORAD has changed dramatically from its early years, when it involved an extensive series of radar arrays and a large contingent of interceptors and missiles in both Canada and the US. With the changes in the nature of the strategic threat, NORAD now operates only a few peripheral radars and commands only a handful of aircraft. As a consequence, the Canadian role has declined substantially. Canada never played a direct role in ballistic missile detection and tracking, but NORAD's integrated tactical warning and assessment function for strategic missile attack was expanded, and CF personnel have been central to that at NORAD headquarters.
No final decision on NMD has yet been taken by Washington. But in January 1999, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced that in the Clinton administration's view, the potential ballistic missile threat to the U.S. posed by countries such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran warranted a new defence. At the same time, he said that spending on missile defence would be increased significantly over the next several years in order to provide the potential basis for NMD deployment. He also confirmed that President Clinton, after taking into consideration the results of scheduled tests of missile defence technology, and other factors, would be making a formal decision in June 2000 on whether to begin deploying NMD in 2005.
Some U.S. officials predict that about a year after a June 2000 decision by the president to proceed further with NMD, a formal invitation to participate would be tendered to Ottawa. But on this matter, as well, no formal decision has been reached by the U.S.
Canada will be quite free to decline the invitation. Although U.S. officials certainly are hoping that it would accept, there is most unlikely to be any real pressure exerted on Ottawa by Washington. Canadian cooperation is not necessary, for neither Canadian territory, waters, or airspace, nor any contributions by the Canadian military would be needed by the U.S. for the operation of NMD.
Ottawa might well say "no" to the U.S. invitation because of arms control concerns which in recent years have been close to the heart of Canadian foreign policy. The greatest worry for the Canadian government is that the U.S., in order to deploy its new missile defences, will abrogate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which has been fervently supported by successive Canadian governments. NMD would not be compatible with the treaty as it now stands. Discussions between Washington and Moscow, the treaty's other signatory, over amending it to accommodate NMD have –thus far– gone nowhere. Canada's saying "no" to NMD would probably also means eventually having to say "goodbye" to NORAD. Planning for NMD is proceeding in the U.S. from the premise that the NMD battle management system will be intimately linked to the process of integrated tactical warning and assessment of nuclear attack that is today's NORAD's core function. If Canada decides not to participate, it will also no longer be able to participate fully in warning and assessment; NORAD will then lose most of its reason for existing as a binational command. There would be no need for it. Canada might instead play a role in space surveillance, jointly with US Space Command.
But there would be long-term costs for Canada if NORAD – the most important structure in the CANUS defence cooperation arrangement – were dissolved. It might have a limiting effect on Canada's future military capabilities, such as the use of space to support the three services in modern tactical environments. These include: communications, intelligence, mapping, navigation, weather, and search and rescue projects. To achieve many of these, cooperation with the US is key, and the link between NORAD and Space Command is an undoubted facilitator for them. The defence production relationship probably would suffer as well. Canadian influence in the US and elsewhere would decline (although the influence argument has often been overstated).
The recent series of arrests of (and ongoing search for) suspected Middle East terrorists on both sides of the Canada-US border has brought terrorism as a bi-lateral problem into sharp relief. This is not an entirely new problem for either country; the threat dates back to the 1970s. However, a number of factors appear to have changed the nature of the threat.
First, although the number of international terrorism incidents had declined sharply since the end of the Cold War, there has been an offsetting and worrying trend toward increased lethality. Mass casualty attacks increasingly are the norm, and this also has been a feature of domestic terrorism. A series of attacks between 1993 and 1998 – including the World Trade Center, Oklahoma City, and African embassy bombings, and the nerve gas attack in Tokyo – claimed 1,000 lives and injured 14,000, figures unprecedented in previous decades.
Second, this suggests that the objectives of terrorist attacks have changed. Terrorists now seem less interested in mobilizing attacks to attract attention and support or in coercive events to compel governments to change their policies or release prisoners. Instead, the motives of such major attacks seem to be wholly punitive; to inflict maximum casualties and damage on an opponent. Large bombs are now the weapon of choice, and the target could be anywhere.
Third, since the groups involved can achieve their goals through punitive rather than mobilizing attacks, many no longer claim responsibility for their actions. This poses a real problem for the United States, which faces numerous potential attackers, at home and abroad. For if the perpetrators and their motives remain unknown, then it becomes difficult to assess patterns and trends, to anticipate likely attackers and to investigate and respond to an attack.
Fourth, many analysts feel that the 1995 nerve gas attack in Tokyo "Crossed the Rubicon" by legitimizing the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by sub-state groups. They argue, therefore, that it is only a matter of time before other groups try to emulate the Aum Shin Rikyo attack. Concern is heightened by knowledge of: the poor security surrounding former Soviet nuclear weapons; the desperate situation of former Soviet nuclear scientists and technicians whose knowledge and skills might be purchased; proliferation of nuclear and other WMD-related capabilities, including the extent (and now the lack of international supervision and control) of the Iraqi WMD program, as well as those of India and Pakistan (and possibly Iran and North Korea).
The fact that five years have passed without a "copycat" attack tends to lend weight to the arguments of those who assert that the level of concern about terrorist use of WMD still exceeds real capability. There are technical impediments to the production and use of WMD by small groups (the Aum was unusual in its size and wealth), including real risks to the users. And the reputed omnipotence of Russian organized crime notwithstanding, there is no proof in the public domain that they have been trafficking in fissile material. Still, there probably is no room for complacency; those who might use WMD operate in secrecy, and it would be a mistake to assume that no group will ever try to use such a weapon again. It scarcely needs saying that the US – in particular, a major American city - would be the most likely target. For reasons consistent with past experience relative to terrorism, Canada is less likely to be attacked.
Finally, some analysts (and doomsayers) argue that we have entered the age of "Cyber- terrorism". They point to North America's increasing dependence on computer networks for a variety of vital functions of society, and its inherent vulnerability to electronic attack. In my view, the term Cyber-terrorism is over-hyped and meaningless in relation to any common understanding of terrorism; sabotage, electronic warfare, and information operations are perfectly adequate terms for describing "hacker" attacks on websites and the introduction of viruses. There is no question that electronic/communications networks are vulnerable to attack – this has been confirmed by both real and simulated attacks. But, most real attacks have been no more than an annoying (and occasionally expensive) nuisance, not "Weapons of Mass Disruption". There is also considerable redundancy built in to telecommunications and other networks, so it is hard to envision any kind of sub-state group having the means to bring a country to its knees through cyber attacks of any sort, at least in the foreseeable future.
However, any large-scale WMD (NBC) attack on a major urban center in either country could have serious cross-border implications, such as the spread of contamination, masses of displaced and injured persons, surge demand on emergency services, and disruption of vital communications and trade links. These concerns shift the focus of attention to Critical Infrastructure (CI) security. CI are those "Interdependent, interactive, interconnected networks of institutions, services, systems, and processes that meet vital human needs, sustain the economy, and maintain continuity of and confidence in government." These networks include, but are not limited to: electrical power generation and distribution; transportation; telecommunications, other utilities and public services, and public safety. As these are connected and interdependent, a significant attack on any one sector could have an equally significant impact on others, with a "cascade effect" as the failure in one system causes failure in others. In this respect, the 1998 Ice Storm was a "Wake Up Call". The cross-border element is two-fold. First, some CI, such as telecommunications, the electrical power distribution grid, and railroads, are linked across the border, serving both countries. In this respect, an attack on CI in one country could amount to an attack on CI in the other. In the electronic realm, this was demonstrated recently by the detection of Canadian hackers who attacked American internet servers and websites used by both Americans and Canadians. Second, the consequences of a major WMD attack on one country could, in effect, transform it into an attack on the other. In short, CI security is also "Collective Security", a familiar concept in Canada-US relations.
The implications of all this for Canada-US defence cooperation are several. First, these issues transcend national and institutional boundaries, so contingency planning is essential and must be joint and combined: bi-lateral and multi-agency. This, of course, means that such planning is fraught with political and bureaucratic minefields. Second, since the risks are shared, risk reduction also must be a shared responsibility. Exchange of intelligence and cooperation between law enforcement and security services is vital. Finally, joint training and exercising of designated response teams (including, government, military, police, emergency services, NGOs) of both countries - especially in command/control and information – will assist preparations for a more effective response should a threat emerge or an attack occur.
The key questions to be considered here include the following:
1. Is the terrorism/WMD threat sufficiently high to warrant a major commitment
of Canadian resources and if so, what sort?
2. If so, what is the role of DND and the Canadian Forces and their US
counterparts?
3. Would such a role require re-allocation of military resources from
other tasks?
4. Is there some way Canada could contribute to threat reduction, through
arms control, counter- proliferation, confidence-building measures, or
conflict resolution?
5. What would be the consequences for Canada-US relations of Canadian
unpreparedness, failure to prevent an attack on the US originating in
Canada, or of failure to cooperate in the event of an attack?
Discussion
Discussion immediately centered on whether dealing with terrorism and CI are "defence" tasks per se, or just for law enforcement. It is true that these don't have "defence" written all over them, but responding to disasters is a familiar function for the CF. The after-effects of an attack on a US city close to the Canadian border probably would quickly overwhelm the resources of any nearby Canadian community, and the armed forces would be drawn in.
Is the RMA kicking off a new arms race, leading to the threat of asymmetric use of WMD against the US, which then justifies the US deployment of the NMD? Would abandoning NMD forestall this? The response cast doubt on this, because the motivations of groups that might contemplate such an attack pre-date the RMA, the grievances they have don't relate to it, and they aren't developing these capabilities simply because the US is more technologically advanced. There doesn't seem to be any connection to the RMA or the NMD. Moreover, the NMD probably doesn't offer any kind of deterrence to or protection from this kind of attack. There does not appear to be any model of stable deterrence for this type of threat, and that is a cause for concern. Another dimension to this threat, which does overlap into the NMD field, is the potential for attack from another state using cruise missiles or Unmanned Aerial vehicles (UAVs). They are much harder to detect, and could be deployed close to North America by clandestine means. NMD and the existing air defence systems would not be able to deal with them, since they are orientated to much larger targets (ICBMs). Detection and defence against cruise missiles or UAVs would depend heavily on good intelligence and surveillance, so that the launch platform could be located and attacked before launching. Detection of efforts to smuggle weapons or precursors into the continent through ports would be very difficult.
There isn't a large groundswell of demand in the US to have Canada participate in the NMD. One source of support for it is NORAD itself, which advocates this to both governments – since it's a logical extension of NORAD's functions. At higher levels, it's a question of desiring Canada's political and diplomatic support; the US would like Canada to agree that the threat is real and that the response is reasonable. By declining to participate, however, Canada would lose sovereignty; it would cede total control of missile defence of North America to the US. Conceivably, if current arrangements continued, a Canadian general officer could be authorized to release the NMD. But the Rules of Engagement might have to be worked out ahead of time by the two governments.
It was noted that the "Human Security" agenda is founded upon "Western" values (about the importance of rights and laws), and is being imposed upon people who don't share them and don't want them. The same could be said about the economic agenda, such as free trade. This points Canada and the US in the same boat; we could both be targets. Whether the missile hits Detroit or Windsor is largely immaterial; both countries will feel the consequences. So protection against this sounds like a good idea, and if the US wants to pay for it, Canada should say "we're in." Is there any reason to shake Canadian complacency that none of this is it's concern? Is Canada likely to be attacked as an indirect strike against the US or as a demonstration of resolve? Past experience suggests that terrorist groups have never regarded Canada as a high priority target; the main enemy is the US. But, is Canada a haven for terrorists? Probably not to the extent that the alarmist headlines in the US suggest. The biggest attack in the US was "home grown", and before beating up on Canada about this issue, the US needs to look at the fact that it has its own armed insurgents training on its own territory. Furthermore, the most recent case (the suspected terrorists apprehended over the Christmas period) suggests that Canada and the US have methods and procedures of border control that seem to work.
NMD and theatre missile defence (TMD) are proceeding on separate tracks. NMD is a fixed-site system, located solely in North America. It would be commanded from Colorado Springs. Any mobile TMD system deployed elsewhere would come under the theatre commander. But no decisions have been taken on TMD. Sometime in the future, if space-based interceptors become feasible, then it is possible to conceive a merging of NMD and TMD under a single command.
It makes no sense for Canada to make a decision on NMD before the US makes two decisions: first, to proceed with it, and second, to invite Canada to participate. The debate is effectively over in the US, but it is just beginning here. That debate may well be founded in ignorance; many Canadians (and Americans) probably think that there is missile defence already. The response to the issue will depend on the question asked. The prime minister and the key members of cabinet are free to make their own decision on it, and they can probably lead public opinion on the matter.
If it decides to participate, Canada may not be asked to pay a portion of the costs of NMD, but it might be asked to make some other kind of contribution to continental aerospace defence – eg., deep space surveillance. It might involve augmenting the existing staffs, or contributing to the upgrading of command and control systems, but would be quite limited. There may be material benefits as well, that is work for Canada's aerospace/electronics industries. It was suggested that it might be good for Canada to be in on the ground floor if TMD and NMD were ever to become a single global protection system.
The seminar closed with the observation that the presentations and discussion had given DND much to think about, and that the members of the public who had participated could continue to make their views known to government. They may also leave the session being better informed citizens.
| Date Modified: 2006-11-27 |  |
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