Department of National Defence Consultation:
Report

Defence Forum
Fairmont Hotel
Winnipeg, Manitoba, 11-12 January 2001

(In preparing this Report, the Centre wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the two rapporteurs, Bailey Harris and Allan A. Wise)

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Introduction:

On January 11-12, 2001, the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba hosted a Consultation on Canadian defence policy on behalf of the Department of National Defence. This was held over the two days at the Fairmont Hotel in Winnipeg. Approximately 50 persons attended, and included serving officers and officials from NDHQ and 17 Wing, a representative from DFAIT, informed members of the public, a number of politicians, representatives from NGOs, and academics from across the West. All Western Provinces were represented as was North Western Ontario. Representatives of the media were invited, but, in the end, none attended.

The consultation was organized around four sessions preceded by an overview of the present state of Canadian defence policy by a senior DND official:

[1] The International Security Environment
[2] Canada's International Commitments
[3] What Kinds of Forces?
[4] Equipment, Readiness, and Sustainability

The topic of each session was introduced briefly by two invited speakers whose remarks served as a focus for the ensuing discussion. Under the guidance of four excellent chairs, there was broad participation from those who had been invited to attend the consultation. The discussions were wide-ranging, but, by and large, did not stray too far from the topics at hand. This happy result was facilitated by the fact that the majority of the audience was well-informed, and by the fact that most of those who had little or no expertise in defence matters were interested in learning more. Moreover, the lay perspectives offered frequently served to challenge the received wisdom of those with more expertise and ensured that the discussions did not lapse into "group think".

No attempt was made to achieve consensus, but it is fair to say that no one felt that there was a pressing need for a new White Paper or major defence review at this time and that "multi-purpose, combat-capable" forces were still required. On the other hand, there was considerable scepticism as to whether Canadian forces currently possessed this capability and, if they in fact did possess it, whether they were likely to retain it in future. In the view of most, it all comes down to resources, and many doubted that the resources required to meet the objectives of Strategy 2020, and the Department's latest guidance paper (DPG 2001), would be forthcoming. Given that probably a majority of those participating had some military background it is not surprising that most felt that increased resources for the Canadian Forces were justified.

This Report will summarize the main themes that emerged from each session and will offer some conclusions.

The International Security Environment:

The general theme that emerged from this session was that of uncertainty; however, this uncertainty could be made more manageable by identifying the regions and broad issues that are of concern to Canada. What was made explicit by some, and was implicit in many of the comments of others, was that Canada's response would be determined in large part by the responses of allies, and in particular by the direction of US policy. Only a small minority of those participating appeared to believe that Canada could chart an independent course. That said, few , if any, believed that there was not scope for autonomous Canadian policies, and most believed that Canadian freedom of action would be determined in significant fashion by what Canada brought to the table in the way of "multipurpose, combat-capable forces". There was, perhaps, a somewhat greater difference of opinion on the impact of non-traditional security threats on the future of Canadian defence policy and on the weight to be given to such threats. Some suggested that many of these non-traditional threats, those having to do with environmental degradation for example, were outside the purview of defence policy, whereas others thought that some, at least, could be accommodated within a broad concept of "Homeland Defence".

Given that this was a session devoted to an overview of the international security environment, it was to be expected that participants tended to talk about broad themes rather than the specific implications for the Canadian Forces of perceived changes in the international environment. It was noteworthy how often the concept of "order" rather than "stability" informed the discussion. Many of the contributors to the discussion stressed a preference for a particular kind of order in which particular values would be protected and expressed. Inevitably, however, preferences with respect to what constituted a desirable order were not always compatible. Some stressed development and social justice goals, while others thought in terms of securing, and if possible expanding, the geographic scope of Western-style liberal democracy. Only in discussion concerning the continued utility and relevance of arms control did the idea of stability attain any prominence, and this largely in discussions on the implications of NMD for the future of strategic arms control.

Many stressed that Canada does not live in a risk-free environment and that there would continue to be demands on Canada's military resources on the assumption that Canada would wish (to the extent that it had choice), to remain active in the politics of international security. There was no shortage of suggestions as to where and how new conflicts might arise. Indeed, several participants forcefully stated the possibility of unexpected and severe "shocks" occurring that would have a serious effect of Canada's security; nonetheless, what these shocks might be was not always clear. WMD and the risk of large-scale regional conflict in Asia, Africa, and even Europe, were all mentioned as possibilities that would readily undermine the relatively benign international security environment enjoyed by Canada at present. Even in the absence of major shocks to the system, there was a substantial measure of agreement that there will be continued regional and intra-state conflict of the kinds that have characterised the post-Cold War period so far, and consequently that there will be a continuing need for relatively robust peacekeeping operations. All agreed that these operations would continue to be primarily coalition or multinational in nature, but there was some disagreement about the likely balance between the military and civilian roles in such operations. There was also a fairly sharp cleavage between those who thought Canadian military capabilities were increasingly inadequate for the present and likely demands made on them and those who thought that in many ways Canada's forces were more capable now than they had been in 1991.

A theme that emerged in this session and that was to be repeated in one way or another throughout the consultation was the political weakness of constituencies interested in defence issues and supportive of the Canadian Forces. Defence matters receive little consistent attention either in Parliament or in the media; as a result, Canadian governments tend not to give much attention to defence either, and rarely pay any serious political price for their relative lack of attention to defence matters. Somewhat surprisingly the link between defence and foreign policy was touched upon only indirectly, although it is fair to say that it was implicit in the substance of many interventions. Some attempted to link Canadian defence policy to a domestic social and political agenda under the umbrella of a greatly expanded conception of security, but most thought that defence policy needed to be addressed directly as one important aspect of Canada's overall security situation.

Canada's International Commitments:

Unlike the first session, one of the presenters made an explicit link between defence and foreign policy in pointing out that theoretically Canada's defence policy should be directed by its foreign policy. There is a disconnect between the two if defence policy is driven by a realist paradigm while foreign policy is driven by human security needs. Moreover, as it stands, there appears to be a difference between where officials say the threat is coming from and where Canadian forces are directed. This view was in line with that of others who felt that there existed a tension between Canada's commitment to NATO and other military obligations accepted largely under the rubric of the UN. In this view, peace operations and membership in NATO (and NORAD) were difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile. Others strongly questioned this position, It was pointed out, for example, that both the operations in East Timor and the Balkans, one under NATO auspices and one not, were both based on the premise of human security. Regardless of the institutional context of humanitarian intervention, combat support will be needed, and this is the task of the armed forces. Armed forces are necessary, but not sufficient, if the objectives of the mission are to be secured.

With respect to the number and kind of military commitments undertaken by Canada it was argued that these fall broadly into two kinds: those that arise from formal long-term agreements (NATO and NORAD being the two prime examples), and those accepted in effect on a contingency basis. Formal and highly institutionalised commitments do much to shape Canadian defence policy long-term, whereas contingent commitments, even if they tend to become open-ended, in principle are subject to political choice – Canada can choose to accept them or not. The extent to which Canada will remain active militarily, it was argued, will depend in the end on the size of the defence budget. Few, if any, could foresee major increases forthcoming in the absence of a major shock.

Some in this session picked up a point raised in the earlier one by expressing concerns about developments in the transatlantic link. The development of a European Security and Defence Policy, possibly negative consequences flowing from NMD, further enlargement, and the further marginalization of Canada in NATO could force Canada further in a continentalist mould. Predictably, many thought continentalism a bad thing for Canadian defence policy, but others pointed out that continentalism should not be equated with isolationism, and some reminded the participants of the longstanding and multidimensional character of Canada's defence relations with the United States. Anyway, it was pointed out that continued projection of Canadian forces abroad will take place from a continental base. (The circumstances that allowed our original substantial deployment into former Yugoslavia are unlikely to be repeated.) This session again devoted considerable attention to peacekeeping and how peacekeeping should be conducted within an expanded conception of security that included humanitarian, developmental and environmental concerns. A minority wondered whether Canada should be involved in the military dimensions of peacekeeping at all, but most envisioned continuing demands for the deployment of Canadian forces overseas. No one at the consultation expressed the view that Canada could, or should, devolve itself of responsibility for contributing to an international order that reflected Canadian values.

National Missile Defence again insinuated itself in the discussion as part of the wider discussion of the Canadian-US defence relationship. It would be fair to say that about half the participants were either opposed to, or concerned about, NMD. Many were resigned to the US going ahead with missile defence but thought it important for Canada to engage in a dialogue with the US based on mutual shared concerns and interests. On the other hand, about half the participants saw few negative consequences for Canadian security if the US goes ahead with NMD, and some felt that it could be a positive development for Canada. Discussion of NMD could have wandered farther afield, but the chair ensured that the focus of the session - international commitments - was maintained.

Problems with policy development with respect to Canadian defence policy were given substantial attention in this session. Someone suggested that there were three main considerations to be taken into account: current roles, future policy, and public understanding of policy. It was pointed out that frequently there is a disjoint between what Canada's policy is and the public's understanding of that policy. The result is lack of interest in defence policy and a resulting lack of political interest. Unless there is some crisis that makes the headlines, the political salience of defence policy is low. Thus is was pointed out that the Parliamentary committee system is structured to listen to the views of the interested public but that there is no particular incentive for governments to take the reports of committees into account. There was a widespread feeling among participants that defence policy is too ad hoc and that there is a lack of clear guidelines that might assist in choosing what commitments to accept and what Canada's contribution might be. On the other hand, what such guidelines might be was the subject of considerable disagreement.

There was a general consensus that Canada must continue to rely on a multilateral foreign and defence policy framework. This, in turn, led also to a general consensus that Canada had an interest in institution building. It is through multinational institutions that Canada maintains an active voice in the politics of the international system. It was remarkable how participants who otherwise had very different views on the character and relevance of Canada's armed forces nonetheless agreed that the multilateral approach remained the best course for Canada. Even the question of burden-sharing was placed in this framework with the suggestion that Canada should undertake commitments in areas where the Americans were unable or unwilling to act. It was at this point that the question of Canada's ability to act multilaterally was raised. There was general agreement that Canada could not do everything, but there remained the question of what Canada should be prepared to do. This question was the subject of the next session.

What Kinds of Forces?

This session started out with the theme that surprise is a constant in the field of international affairs, and that the Canadian Forces should be prepared to respond to it. This requires forces that are tactically responsive, and balanced and flexible. In other words, again there was the argument that Canada's armed forces needed to be multi-purpose and combat capable. This raised the further question of how much Canada should spend in order to achieve and maintain forces that meet these requirements. Although not all agreed, there was a widespread sentiment that Canada could afford to spend more on defence and that a modest but real increase (in the sense of adding to overall capability), was possible. Without such an increase, some argued, there would occur a growing "commitment-capability gap". Problems with the lack of technologically advanced equipment and with numbers of personnel were also identified. If Canada is to continue to play an active role in the multinational maintenance of a security environment congenial to Canada, then numbers and problems of interoperability with others need to be addressed.

On this latter point, the argument was made that Canada requires a clear strategic vision of what kind of international security environment is most beneficial to Canada and to allocate sufficient resources to that goal. Most participants thought that these resources currently were insufficient, and cited the Auditor-General's report in support of this judgement. The perennial question of the role of the Reserves was raised in this context, and among the many suggestions for the future of the Reserves that have emerged in recent years, particular scepticism was expressed about the viability of turning the reserves (particularly the Militia) into purely combat support units. The importance of the Reserves in providing a point of contact between the Canadian Forces and the wider community was made, as was the recognition that as presently constituted the Reserves are not as flexible and as useful to the Canadian forces as they might be.

The notion that the primary function of the Canadian Forces is peacekeeping continued to be reflected in the discussions, and it seemed to be impossible to disabuse those who held this view that in fact it is not the case. There were also sharp exchanges when the suggestion was made that as peacekeepers the Canadian Forces do not need and could not afford adequate combat capabilities. This led to a somewhat theological discussion as to what was meant by such terms as peacekeeping and peace operations more generally. "Robust" peacekeeping, it was argued, requires multipurpose, combat capability; this being particularly the case when peace operations turn out differently from what was initially expected.

Reference was made to Strategy 2020 as a guide to the kind of force structure that the Canadian Forces require. Many felt that the kinds of forces implied by 2020 were unlikely to be afforded on current defence budgets. It would be wrong to emphasize deployability at the expense of combat capability, and many thought that without the necessary funding. faute de mieux, the government would have to be much more selective than in the past in accepting overseas commitments. This, as someone put it, would increase the "commitment-credibility gap" with respect to Canada's international security policy. Increased selectivity, others thought, would challenge the idea that Canada should be a net contributor to international security.

Stress was placed on the generally shared perception, and in conformity with long-standing policy, that Canada would undertake expeditionary operations only in association with allies and like-minded countries. This meant, many thought, that Canada should be prepared to pull its weight, and that there were limits to the extent that others would be prepared to make-up for any combat deficiencies in Canada's forces. This point was made by several participants in connection with what would happen if something seriously went wrong. Canada, for example, might face serious difficulties if rapid force extraction was required in an emergency. Others observed that the more capable Canadian forces were the less likelihood that they would have to resort to force. Shaping the environment to minimise the possibility of using force was preferable to attempting coercive means to bring about a desired result.

There was some discussion of whether Canada required a rapid-reaction capability with the implication that strategic sea and airlift were required. On the other hand, the question was asked what operationally did rapid reaction mean? In most circumstances an ability to respond initially in a time frame of 10 to 30 days is adequate, and it was claimed that Canada possessed such a capability. Yet others suggested that a more fundamental restructuring of the armed forces was required. One participant went so far as to argue that despite unification and the numerous reorganizations that the armed forces have suffered, at the end of the day the structure of the armed forces did not look all that different from that which existed at the end of WW II.

Despite the general consensus that a new White Paper or major defence review were not required at this time, one participant in this session thought that sooner or later a thorough "bottom-up review" will be necessary. There was more general agreement that without adequate funding any discussion of force requirements was futile. Many were concerned the Canadian Forces might find themselves in dangerous situations without the resources and capabilities to deal with them. There was a plea for a more bipartisan approach to defence policy because it was felt that without such bipartisan support the necessary coherent "vision" as to the purposes of the Canadian Forces would not be forthcoming. Counter to this, it was pointed out that in a perfect world this would be the case, but in reality, capabilities and roles are determined first by budgets and secondly by political exigencies. The defence budget is small and in the view of many at the Consultation, inadequate, because there is little pressure on governments to spend significantly more. This conclusion, in turn, was challenged by it being pointed out that globally Canada's defence budget is the 17th largest, and the 8th largest in NATO. The relevance of these statistics was met with some scepticism.

Equipment, Readiness, and Sustainability:

This, the final session of the Consultation, was intended to address "nuts and bolts" issues, but in fact it proved to be largely a continuation of the discussion raised previously. A strong theme that emerged in this session was the need to structure forces for the full range of contingencies that can be described under the rubric of "peace operations" This means humanitarian assistance at one end of the scale and combat capabilities at the other. Since Canadian forces were withdrawn from Germany they have become contingency forces, but without the equipment for rapid deployment (strategic lift), nor for rapid force extraction if necessary. Doubts were expressed, in this as in other sessions, whether the forces have the numbers and equipment to sustain government mandated tasks. The audience was reminded that both the White Paper and the Defence Planning Guidance require the Canadian Forces to be able to participate in widespread conflict as part of a multinational operation. If the Canadian Forces are not equipped properly, then the government the government should opt out of all but the least demanding missions. This, as a number of participants stated, would mean a major shift in Canada's foreign and international security policy.

Others pointed out that the forces faced not only an equipment crisis, but one of personnel recruitment and retention as well. One suggestion made to deal with this personnel crisis was to revisit the option of short-term enlistments, and to coordinate recruitment better with post-secondary education. The belief was expressed that a combination of short-term enlistments with the promise of educational opportunities would attract more people than the present long-term career approach. There was criticism of the quality of recruitment advertising, although suggestions as to how it should be re-directed came from very different and, probably, irreconcilable perspectives. Again, there was disagreement as to how far "out-sourcing" could go without affecting operational capabilities, as there was as to how far technological innovation and smarter ways of doing things could compensate for personnel shortages. It was pointed out that the shortage of personnel affected some trades more than others. Although no one claimed to have the solution, it was felt that recruitment and retention (especially the latter) constituted an urgent problem.

Attention was also directed to the unusual character of the defence-industrial sector in Canada. It was pointed out bluntly that in reality Canada does not possess a defence-industrial base; rather, Canada has predominantly civilian firms undertaking work and some small amount of research for military contracts. It was pointed out also that the relatively low level of government funding for capital spending on defence and for defence research has ramifications for industrial policy generally and not simply for the kinds of equipment that the Canadian Forces might acquire, and where that equipment is acquired, but also for such important political issues as industrial location and labour recruitment. Given the high level of foreign ownership in the defence sector (primarily US), and the existence of an industry highly integrated with the US outside of the FTA and NAFTA, Canadian industry is driven more by American needs than by independently determined Canadian ones. Complaints were also expressed about the procurement process in Canada. It was felt to be over-regulated, involved too many separate government agencies, and did not make the best use of scarce defence procurement dollars. This state of affairs had deleterious effects on levels of equipment, readiness, and sustainability.

There was relatively little discussion of precise equipment needs, either of types or quantities, but there was a general feeling that further hard choices with respect to capabilities would be needed. Thus one participant questioned the need for continued infantry parachute training, while another, more radically, wondered for how much longer the Canadian Forces could afford fighter aircraft. Needless to say, the suggestion that the Air Force no longer have a combat role did not go down well in some quarters! In the end, it was recognised that what equipment was acquired for what roles would come down to funding, and perhaps this question of the size of the defence budget was the dominant theme or sub-text to the whole Consultation.

Conclusions:

With one or two exceptions, those participating in the Consultation did not question the need for a Canadian security policy that included a significant role for the Canadian Forces. Moreover, a majority of those present resisted the idea, publicised some years ago by the Canada 21 Report, that the Canadian Forces should restrict themselves to niche roles. On the other hand nearly all present appreciated that the Forces had given up significant capabilities over the last ten years, but recognised that this was part of a trend that extended back into the Cold War. There was substantial disagreement on what present capabilities Canada could still give up, and many thought that the Forces had divested themselves of too much already; nonetheless, there was a general fear that the Forces would likely lose further skills under budgetary pressure. The disagreements over what could further be lost and what must under any circumstances be saved was not simply based on protecting territory in turf battles, but also reflected uncertainty and differences of opinion over what kinds of operations the Canadian Forces might be called upon to undertake in future years. After all, as was pointed out in the first session, there are major problems in predicting the unfolding security environment. Opinions could be divided into the "optimists" who thought that relatively low intensity peacekeeping would continue to be the norm, and the "pessimists" who felt that we should continue to keep our powder dry in case a sharp deterioration in Canada's security environment should occur. In between, were the "prudent sceptics", who did not envisage anything like a return to the Cold War in any policy relevant time frame, but who nonetheless felt that the Forces should retain the capacity to take part, with others, in medium intensity combat.

Little attention was given to what is increasingly being called "Homeland Defence" and to the more general domestic roles of the Canadian Forces. Perhaps this was because these roles are shared with other domestic security agencies, but more likely because the agenda did not specifically feature them. Overwhelmingly, the Consultation dwelt on the employment of the Canadian Forces overseas and on force projection in association with allies and coalition partners. In this respect, it is a little surprising that more attention was not given in the final session to the specifics of what size of forces, equipped with what, would be needed in order to continue these overseas tasks effectively and safely. Little attention was given to the so-called "Revolution in Military Affairs", and perhaps we should be grateful for that.

Date Modified: 2006-11-27

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