Canada-US Security Relationship
Policy Forum:
A Review of the Proceedings
Defence Forum
University of British Columbia
Vancouver, British Columbia, 13 December 1999
Report
by
Andrew Richter,
Institute of International Relations
The University of British Columbia
The consultation brought together about 65 individuals, representing the academic, military, political, non-governmental, and business communities. It reviewed issues of concern to the Canada-US security relationship, ranging from transborder threats to the revolution in military affairs (RMA). While consensus was difficult to achieve (nor was attaining it an objective of the meeting), there was broad agreement on the changing nature of the bilateral defence relationship. Indeed, the Canada-US security alliance is entering a defining phase (much like the early post-war period), which will determine the future of the relationship over the medium-to-long-term.
This paper will highlight some of the themes that were discussed at the meeting. Its intent is not to comprehensively review any of the sessions, but rather to summarize them. It will be divided into the five issues of the meeting: transnational and transborder threats, ballistic missile defence and NORAD, defence production and testing, interoperability and the RMA, and crisis response operations and peacekeeping.
The consultation began with an overview presentation by a DND official. The geographic, political, and strategic context within which Canada and the US operate was established. There are enormous disparities in size and power between the two countries. The US is a global economic and military superpower, and it accounts for roughly one third of total worldwide military expenditures. In contrast, Canada is a relatively small actor, with a military budget only 2 per cent as large as the American one. Further, in almost all areas of military equipment, the US dwarfs Canada by more than the ten to one margin that a single comparison of relative populations (i.e., 300 million to 30 million) would suggest.
And yet, in spite of the enormous disparities in capabilities, the US and Canada remain very close allies. It was noted that there are more than 80 treaty-level defence agreements (including NORAD and the DPSA), 150 bilateral defence fora (including the PJBD and the MCC), and some 250 Memoranda of Understanding between the two countries' militaries. These ties offer numerous benefits to Canada, including giving this country limited influence in critical areas of US defence policy. They also offer Canada privileged access to defence-related intelligence and information, as well as to the vast US defence market.
However, Canada and the US do not always share similar views of the world. Canada sees itself as a Middle Power, and favours multilateral approaches to security problems (including disarmament and the more recent "human security" approach). The US, on the other hand, is a power with global rights and responsibilities, and is determined to defend and assert its national interests. Further, the US is not opposed to taking unilateral initiatives to protect and enhance those interests. It is often suspicious of multilateral approaches, and is reluctant to become involved in peacekeeping and peace support operations.
Quite apart from these contrasting global views are a number of emerging issues that threaten to drive a wedge between the two countries. For example, Canada is increasingly perceived as the "soft underbelly" of the US, as not only is it seen as reluctant to spend the necessary dollars to maintain a moderate defence establishment, but it is also viewed as being unprepared to effectively combat terrorism, the drug trade, and computer/information security. The new American concept of "homeland defence" pays particular attention to such threats. Canadian concern on these issues tends to be lower than in the US, and neither the government nor DND has (at least to date) identified effective strategies to counter them.
In a final analysis, Canada's major objective is to balance two (frequently competing) strategic interests – maintaining this country's freedom of action while increasing our defence integration with the US. While the US has been encouraged by some recent developments in Canada (i.e., this country's role in the war over Kosovo, NATO enlargement, etc.), it is concerned over an array of bilateral issues that avoid simple resolution. A Canadian failure to satisfy US concerns could have enormous consequences, including a possible rupture to a security alliance that has worked to the benefit of both countries for the past 50 years.
A discussion paper was then presented that highlighted several of the themes to be discussed. It suggested that with Canadian defence resources declining, questions are increasingly being raised about this country's ability to participate in major world organizations and fora. Canada is facing a credibility gap as the country's declared objectives and policies outstrip the nation's capacity to deliver on those objectives. While there remains general support within Canada for the country's security alliance with the US, changes in the international environment, the altered security debate, and the growing importance of "human security" will result in numerous challenges in the year ahead.
Issue 1: Responding to Transnational and Transborder Threats to Security
The first presentation focused on the threat of organized crime. Crime is increasingly affecting Canadian security, particularly through its control of the drug trade, links with prostitution and gambling, and through the gradual erosion of democratic institutions. Each of these issues was discussed, with particular attention paid to how Canada and the US are attempting to coordinate their response to these threats. There is increasing concern in the US that Canada's response has not been sufficient and that, in general, Ottawa is perceived as being too lenient on such issues. This concern has recently led to an enhanced Canadian awareness and sensitivity to the problem, although the effectiveness of the response is not yet known. The sheer size of the problem, and the enormous number of bureaucratic actors involved (in both countries, ensures that organized crime will remain a bilateral security threat for some time.
The next presentation focused on the issue of computer security and the challenges posed by the emerging global Internet infrastructure. There is growing concern that organized criminal groups recognize the consequences of breaching computer security systems, and that such attacks will become more frequent – and painful – in the future. While the financial consequences of computer attacks have been manageable to date, this will change as attacks grow increasingly sophisticated. In addition, neither Canadian nor American law enforcement agencies have been organized to deal with these threats effectively, and both have been slow in responding to a rapidly changing threat environment. Furthermore, neither has responded adequately to the "hacker" element, which remains a major concern. Indeed, this is made clear by polls that suggest that over 80 per cent of computer hackers claim to have never been caught (or prosecuted). The public seems unaware of both the extent and possible consequences of the threat posed by breaches in computer security and computer networks.
In the discussion that followed, there was widespread agreement that both organized crime and the issue of computer security would grow in importance over the near-to-medium term. However, there was concern of an increasing divergence in how Canada and the US are approaching the issues, with the latter growing increasingly frustrated by the slower and more deliberate Canadian response. Other speakers noted, though, that the US typically reacts with greater energy in the early stages of a threat, only to lose the sense of urgency as it becomes clear that coordinating a response is a lengthy and complex process. On a different matter, speakers noted that the US is not only concerned about the security of the Canadian border, it is the border with Mexico that has traditionally posed a greater threat.
Issue 2: Institutions and Agreements: Ballistic Missile Defence and NORAD
The next presentation focused on the issue of ballistic missile defence (BMD) and the possible consequences in Canada should it decide to decline participation in an American National Missile Defence (NMD) program. It was argued that the upcoming Canadian decision will be critical, as BMD has become a barometer in Washington of the general health of the Canada-US security relationship. Part of the presentation examined some of the current issues of concern to the BMD program, i.e., whether its deployment will violate the terms of the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (it was argued it will not) and what effect such a system may have on NORAD (that it will play an increasingly vital role). It was also noted that Canada has a strategic interest in space, and participating in NMD will safeguard that interest. The presentation concluded by noting that the Canadian concern over arms control and the possible response of Russia to NMD will carry little weight in Washington should the US decide to deploy the system, a decision the presenter believed will be made next year.
In the discussion that followed, there was some challenge to the various scenarios laid out by the presenter. Several speakers noted that the Russian response to an NMD system could not be discounted, and that considering that BMD may in fact violate the ABM Treaty, it is entirely appropriate that the Canadian government emphasize this aspect of the question. Other speakers noted that the test launches of the NMD system to date have either been failures or have been "rigged" (i.e. their success was effectively guaranteed), and thus it is still too early to reach judgements on the possible utility of the proposed system. Still others noted the possible cost of NMD, and that a Canadian decision to participate in a meaningful way may require defence expenditures beyond this country's capacity to pay.
Additional speakers returned to some of the "first principles" of ballistic missile defence. They questioned whether it made strategic sense to build and deploy a defence system that will be able to target and intercept only a handful of missiles. They also noted that many NMD supporters have assumed that such a system is beneficial, without adequately explaining why this is necessarily the case. However, this line of argument was challenged by those who noted that the US administration has justified moving forward on NMD because of the threat posed by "rogue" states, countries that already have a capability to launch a ballistic missile attack with weapons of mass destruction. Further, it was noted that the link between NMD and TMD (tactical missile defence) should not be overlooked. Given that improved TMD systems may soon be protecting US allies (i.e., South Korea, Israel, Saudi Arabia, etc.), it would be politically unacceptable to reject a system that would safeguard the continental US from similar types of threats. Speakers who made this point noted that the political aspect of the question will be critical.
Issue 3: Defence Production and Testing
Next came a presentation focused on the bilateral over defence production, one that threatens to rupture Canada-US defence trade. It was argued that despite recent news reports to the contrary, the dispute regarding the ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) has not yet been resolved, and may flare up again in the near future. At issue remains US concern that advanced technology is leaking from Canada to third countries, making Canada a "weak link" in continental defence production. While a tentative resolution to the dispute was announced in October 1999, the US remains concerned about Canadian citizens with dual citizenship, and the (foreign) ownership of some Canadian companies. The issue has marked a turning point in the defence relationship, as the US decision to end Canada's special treatment under the ITAR in April 1999 was unprecedented.
The discussion that followed first focused on the industrial/economic benefits that defence production has historically offered Canada. Several speakers noted that Canadian industry has benefited enormously from defence production agreements with the US, and the uncertain prospects of those agreements is a major cause of concern. Such speakers feared the economic consequences to several Canadian technology companies which have direct links to the (US) defence sector.
Other speakers, however, raised doubts about the desirability of maintaining a Canadian defence industrial base. On this issue, it was noted that there is a general lack of commercial viability to Canada's arm industry, and thus it is unclear why this base should be sustained – particularly at a time when the global economy is moving away from a defence model and towards a more productive civilian one. Still others raised a moral objection, noting that Canadian defence technology played a part in the US nuclear weapons program during the Cold War, while more recently it has assisted in the production of American cluster bombs and precision munitions. However, other speakers challenged this conception, and argued that the defence base still has much to offer the civilian economy. Still others noted that the Canadian aspect of the problem is a "sideshow" in the US, where the focus is on "unfriendly" third countries gaining access to American technology (demonstrated by the recent release of the Cox report). Lastly, some speakers identified the issues of enforcement and penalties as the ones preventing a resolution to the defence production dispute.
Issue 4: Cooperation, Interoperability, and the Revolution in Military Affairs
Starting with a review of what the RMA is, why it is important, and how Canada and the US have responded to it, the presentation discussed the "system of systems", and noted that it has been technology originally developed in the (US) civilian economy that is at the heart of the current RMA. It was emphasized that the US is not only the country that has most aggressively pursued the RMA, but that its advanced (civilian) technology base means that it will continue to be at the centre of this revolution for the foreseeable future. As for Canada's reaction, it was noted that it had been characterized by uncertainty and delay, although within the past year DND has begun to emphasize the importance of the RMA. However, he noted that in a declining budgetary environment, it is not yet clear if DND will have either the financial or material resources to pursue it effectively. The presentation concluded by noting that Canada can be expected to identify a "niche" RMA strategy, in that it will attempt to emphasize those missions and roles which correspond with traditional Canadian expertise and technology.
The discussion that followed was divided by those who believed that the RMA is still an unproven theory, and those who argued that it is now well under way. Those in the first group noted that the RMA debate has increasingly undertaken theological overtones, as advocates see it as virtual gospel beyond challenge. Others suggested that the RMA can be defeated by "low technology" weapons, and that it can never entirely eliminate the "fog of war" (as its proponents suggest). Still others noted that there is a divergence between what RMA supporters claim and what the system presently in operation offers. While the US clearly has the most advanced weapons systems and platforms, it still has difficulties doing relatively simple tasks (like ensuring secure communications between services). Furthermore, it was argued that the US military seems unprepared to accept traditional combat operations, either out of concern for casualties or because its high technology base does not permit it to undertake certain missions.
Among those who believe that an RMA is under way, there was considerable discussion that countries do not have to completely transform their militaries to be RMA relevant. Rather, countries will be able to "pick and choose" the roles that they wish to play. Several speakers noted that this is what Canada will ultimately do, although speakers were reluctant to identify specific roles that this country might accept, and expressed concern that Canadian forces might find themselves relegated to high-risk battlefield operations (while US forces remain largely "above the fray"). Other speakers suggested that while defence technology is changing rapidly, the decision in Canada will ultimately come down to how well the RMA corresponds with Canadian foreign policy, and particularly this country's emphasis on both disarmament/arms control and the human security approach popular with Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy. Lastly, speakers noted that the attitudes of both the Canadian public and government will also be important considerations, and in particular attitudes regarding defence spending.
Issue 5: Crisis Response Operations and Peacekeeping Within the NATO and United Nations Contexts
The next presentation focused on how Canada and the US have approached peace support and peacekeeping operations during the 1990s. Through a series of charts, Canadian and American participation in major UN operations was documented. It was noted that not only have the two countries jointly participated in several operations this decade, but they increasingly share similar strategic interests. In this regard, the primary security threats to the US are currently instability in Russia, loose (and unconcerned for) nuclear weapons, the rise of China, and "catastrophic terrorism" (termed "A" level security threats). It was then suggested that the same issues are presently at the top of Canada's list of strategic threats. The reasons for this convergence are comparable political interests and values, and a common concern for global stability. However, this is not to suggest that the two countries share comparable views on all issues. Canada prefers United Nations operations and multilateral approaches, whereas the US prefers a unilateral approach where it is free to make its own decisions. At the same time, a fundamental Canadian interest is to ensure that the US remains actively engaged internationally, and that the American tendency towards unilateralism is held in check.
In the discussion that followed, several speakers questioned whether Canada and the US, in fact, share similar strategic interests. While such speakers agreed that Canada's fundamental interest is global stability, they suggested that the US is more concerned with stability that enhances American interests and values. Other speakers questioned the legality of recent peace support operations (such as Kosovo) and whether NATO has the legal "right" to undertake such missions. Given such concerns, speakers wondered if Canada should reconsider its support for NATO. Still others raised concerns regarding the costs of such operations. It was noted that recent peacekeeping missions have been much more costly than similar missions were a few decades ago. If costs continue to rise, speakers suggested that Canada's participation may be called into doubt. Lastly, it was noted that non-military issues like police forces, NGOs, and the monitoring of elections are becoming increasingly important concerns in peace support operations, and these are all areas where Canada has considerable expertise to offer.
Conclusions
The consultation concluded with some closing remarks noting that the Canada-US security alliance must be seen within the broader context of the overall bilateral relationship. While Canada is not normally the focus of attention in Washington, this country's leadership needs to recognize that there is an American definition of the Canadian agenda. It is thus vitally important that Canadians better understand how the US Congressional process shapes the defence relationship. At the same time, though, inadequate resources devoted to defence in Canada and uncertain levels of sustainability also have a direct bearing on the relationship.
| Date Modified: 2006-11-27 |  |
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