Department of National Defence Consultation Report
Thinking Outside the Box:
The Future of Canadian Defence Policy
Halifax, Nova Scotia, 8-9 February 2001
By
Sarah Tarry, MA
Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
Dalhousie University
and
Dr. Frank Harvey
Director
Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
Dalhousie University
Table of Contents
II. Difficult Choices in an Evolving Strategic Environment
III. Canada-US-European Defence Relations: Interoperability and Integration, or Simply Isolation?
IV. The Future of Canadian Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations
V. Critical Infrastructure Protection: A Looming Threat on the Security Frontier?
Appendix I. Consultation Contributors
Appendix II. Biographies of Participants
I. Introduction
On February 8-9 (2001) Dalhousie University and the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies hosted the third in a series of four policy consultations on the future of Canadian defence policy. Four themes featured prominently in the Halifax consultation: the evolving security environment, Canada's relations with its major allies, the future of peace support operations, and critical infrastructure protection. While other policy areas would likely have generated equally intense and enlightening debates, these four in particular represent central and enduring policy dilemmas for the Department of National Defence.
DND consultations are designed to solicit informed opinions from individuals in academic and NGO communities on the future of the Canadian forces and Canadian defence and security policy. Typically, many of the questions (and associated answers) that emerge from these consultations are covered in existing defence documents, such as the 1994 Defence White Paper, Strategy 2020, DND's annual Defence Planning Guides and several other future-oriented policy statements. In an effort to generate more constructive feedback, therefore, participants in the Halifax consultation were challenged to evaluate the assumptions, preferences and/or policies DND has already adopted with respect to the four core themes. Certainly consensus was not attainable in every context, but what emerged was a healthy and articulate discussion of the key compromises facing defence policy-makers today. This report attempts to capture these debates by highlighting the recommendations and strategies that emerged from the discussions.
The organisers are grateful to the Department of National Defence, the Directorate of Public Policy and the Security and Defence Forum for the invitation to participate in the consultative process, and for providing the support to make Dalhousie's involvement possible. The presenters, discussants, and participants who generously shared their ideas from a variety of governmental, non-governmental, military, and academic perspectives are also sincerely thanked for their role. Clara Sarson, Graham Walker, Sarah Tarry and several other graduate students provided essential assistance in preparing logistically and administratively for the forum.
This report is based on audio transcripts and speakers notes. Any errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the CFPS Director.
II. Difficult Choices in an Evolving Strategic Environment
The "pockets of chaos and instability" foreseen in the 1994 Defence White Paper have, if anything, widened and deepened throughout the decade. Canada is not alone in its struggle to grapple with the ever-expanding scope of military and non-military threats to national and international security. The list has indeed become frighteningly familiar. Among traditional military threats are international terrorism; the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons; and the destabilising tendencies of identity-based sub-regional conflicts. Non-traditional transnational security threats have come to include the illicit drug trade, illegal population movements, corruption, economic espionage, environmental degradation, and the spread of diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Complicating this mixture is the uncertain impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which includes advanced surveillance technologies; the initiation of Europe's new multinational rapid reaction force; and the United States' proposed national missile defence (NMD) program. In an environment of elevated expectations about what state and non-state actors can accomplish, these issues pose real challenges for Canadian policy-makers.
Even though such threats and influences are felt world wide, Canada's response must be coloured by its unique position in the international system. Its shared border with a security-conscious superpower combined with the insulation provided by its vast maritime surroundings motivates the question, "how much defence does Canada really need?" Since the world is not expected to become significantly more dangerous for its territorial integrity, the most pressing issue for defence policy is to determine whether the Canadian Forces (CF) will continue to be involved in multilateral operations, and if so, when, where, and how? The answers are far less clear, as they are often debated in a rhetorical tug-of-war caught between Canada's politically influential reputation as a peacekeeping and internationally active nation on the one hand, and the limits of the CF's economic, human, and materiel resources on the other.
Perceived inadequacies contained within Canada's current defence policy framework, i.e. the 1994 White Paper and Strategy 2020, which address many of these issues in only a limited way (and some not at all), prompted participants to recommend that DND initiate a formal and public policy review. Such a reassessment was proposed in response to similar processes recently undertaken in the US, the UK, and Australia, as well as in NATO and the UN. Canada's decision to forego a defence and security policy review (or to even consider the possibility that the 1994 White Paper requires updating) is unique in this regard. Advocates of a review are mainly concerned with how "the spandex of our defence policy has been stretched increasingly thin to cover the plethora of old and new missions." More concretely, the over-commitment of the combat service support units in particular with the increased frequency and tempo of operations has begun to take its toll on the CF's personnel and equipment.
Nevertheless, identifying activities to which the CF ought to commit fewer resources is not an easy undertaking. Would Canadians be willing to tolerate limits to the country's membership in NATO or NORAD? Or perhaps to abandon present and future peace support operations, arms control efforts, and defence diplomacy? In terms of its domestic responsibilities, would there be any public support for the CF to suspend its search and rescue, coastal and northern surveillance, or counter-terrorism activities?
The uncertainty about how Canada's defence policy should proceed follows from the frequently noted but seldom studied divergence of views between DND and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). In the eyes of many, Canada is overdue for a contemporary version of St. Laurent's Grey Lecture of 1947, or Mr. Abbott's articulation of Canada's "grand strategy" of 1945. In other words, this should be a statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs which succinctly articulates a Canadian view of both national and international peace and security, identifies issues that are a Canadian priority, and indicates a preparedness to allocate resources to ensure responsible action in those areas.
Contained within such a vision would be both broad principles about Canadian preferences (e.g. open societies versus "gated" nation-states), as well as more specific policy directions, such as whether Canada will direct its attention toward low probability but "high end" missions rather than high probability but "low end" missions. The basis for corresponding reviews reflects the simple reality that any treatment of military issues without due consideration of broader political questions is likely to be, at best, incomplete (or excessively superficial), and at worst, dangerous. Only by narrowing and prioritising Canada's future commitments can DND make appropriate decisions regarding doctrine, force deployment, and policy development. Identifying these Canadian priorities and specifying long term policy guidelines will always be a challenge for Canadian policy makers, but the obligation to ensure that our defence policy is rational, constructive and respected requires that DND accept the challenge whenever fundamental problems (and limitations) are identified.
One contributor noted that a joint review with DFAIT (and perhaps the Canadian International Development Agency) would serve to harmonise certain aspects of Canada's defence policy with its development policy. In so doing, concentrated responses to perceived threats such as corruption and drug trafficking may be found through non-military avenues. In principle this could contribute to reducing the variety of "threats" perceived to be in the military realm. Moreover, an inter-departmental discussion would likely offer a more appropriate environment to discuss humanitarian intervention policy, which remains ad hoc, despite its rising use. Greater co-ordination and transitional activities between Canada's military and civilian actors, as has been articulated in Canada's civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) doctrine, may be the best way to ensure the CF's "exit strategy" is feasible.
Two sets of issues – scale and degree of specialisation – stood out for the participants as issues that must be keenly examined in a review. First, beyond identifying the types of missions to which Canada will be committed, there needs to be more attention paid to the scale of its involvement. In the Former Yugoslavia, for instance, Canada's troop contribution was exceeded in numerical terms between 1992 and 1997 by only two European nations – France and the UK. Even after acknowledging that Canada had a role to play, some participants cautioned against "over-reacting" in relation to the amount of resources Canada has available and the other priorities that also need to be addressed.
Second, even though this was not universally agreed upon, many advocate the specialisation of Canada in more narrowly defined capabilities. Proponents argue that it is better to be a significant player in a select arena than a politically helpful but not militarily important actor everywhere. One potential direction is toward smaller and faster forces that have an increased rapid reaction capability and global reach. Such a move, however, could force DND to significantly reduce the 1994 White Paper's guideline of sustaining up to 4000 troops abroad for an "extended period."
III. Canada-US-European Defence Relations: Interoperability, Integration or Isolation?
The 1994 Defence White Paper (and supplementary statements) stipulate that Canada is not likely ever to undertake its defence needs unilaterally. The second panel, 'Canadian - American - European Defence Relations: Interoperability vs. Independence,' focussed on Canada's alliance milieu and its transformations since the events of 1991. What course should Canada pursue in order to maintain and maximise the benefits proffered by Canada's alliance matrix?
CANADA-US RELATIONS
Remarking on the centrality of the United States to Canada's defence planning
is a point that could hardly be over-emphasised. Since President Roosevelt
and Prime Minister MacKenzie King entered into a bilateral defence pact
in 1938, Canada has pledged that it would never allow its territory to
become a source of insecurity for the US. In exchange, the US guaranteed
that it would not stand idly by if Canada was ever attacked by a foreign
power. From this basic understanding, the relationship has been institutionalised
in NORAD, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and other defence sharing
agreements. Notwithstanding a few cases of friction, this partnership
has been advantageous for both countries. For Canada, bearing only a limited
share of the continental defence burden has permitted it to undertake
extensive engagements abroad, particularly in terms of conducting peacekeeping
operations.
While an asymmetry with respect to defence capabilities has always existed between Canada and the US, some fear that this gap is widening as Canada struggles to keep pace with American investments in military technology and infrastructure. A number of observers were concerned that Canada is undermining its national autonomy by relying increasingly on the US for continental coastal surveillance; addressing the collective problems of drug trafficking and illegal migration; and monitoring and deterring terrorist attacks. Participants speculated that the latent good will traditionally shown to Canada by the US could be threatened if the former is perceived as no longer fulfilling its bilateral security commitments.
The solution, according to one presenter, is to reinforce the provisions for interoperability and global deployability with the US as outlined in Strategy 2020. This path may indeed be the only acceptable one available in the wake of fiscal belt-tightening and force reductions in Canada, combined with plans in the European Union to create a rapid reaction force and foster a European defence identity that does not include North America. However, the trend lines indicate that our capacity to remain interoperable with the Americans (a key component of our policy commitments and force planning) will at some point begin to diminish, and at an increasing rate.
Although interoperability is more a policy of necessity than one of choice, it is fraught with financial and technical difficulties. The US' engagement of the RMA and recent equipment acquisitions broadens the technological deficit between the two countries making the challenges of interoperability even more problematic. The participants disagreed concerning whether or not Canada would be better served under current financial conditions to specialise in niche areas or to maintain the highest possible degree of self-sufficiency at the tactical and operational level in the areas of command, surveillance, and intelligence. Proponents of the latter view argued strongly in favour of narrowing the purview of Canadian military commitments to those that relate clearly and directly to the security and well-being of North Americans, rather than to addressing more international concerns.
The risk of closer co-operation, however, is that Canada might sacrifice its ability to act autonomously from its major allies, and particularly from the US. Under such circumstances, some observers worried that Canada would no longer be in a position to decline its participation in missions that were not entirely consistent with Canadian interests, or alternatively, to participate in multinational activities where the US refuses to become involved. Of course, to the extent that Canadian and American foreign and security policies (and interventions) are in sync, these sorts of policy dilemmas are not likely to emerge. But recent trends towards what appears to be unilateralism by the current U.S. administration (and NATO allies through ESDI ) may be relevant in this regard. Discussions centred around the policy implications for Canada of an aggressive push by the Bush administration for missile defence, a U.S. decision to pull back troop deployments from Kosovo or Bosnia, European moves to develop a new rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops (to parallel NATO), and EU efforts to define a new European Security and Defence Policy/Identity. The academic and policy communities in Canada should begin to explore the long term policy implications of these trends for Canada, especially in the context of becoming more interoperable with our American and European allies, .
CANADA-EU RELATIONS
Besides its ties to the US, Canada, through NATO, also has enjoyed extensive
defence relations with its European allies. Recent steps taken within
the EU to implement a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) which
will include a 60,000 strong multinational rapid reaction force, have
raised fresh concerns about the implications of this for NATO. Critics
of the plan fear that this arrangement will divide the alliance into EU
and non-EU camps, and furthermore, exclude Canada, as a non-EU member,
from participating in relevant decision-making. To date, policy makers
and many academic observers have tried to remedy these concerns by advocating
a new division of labour within NATO to facilitate greater NATO-EU defence
co-operation.
One presenter argued that this strategy is unlikely to work in the long run because past attempts at inter-organisational co-operation have led instead to political rivalry and animosity. Rather, the speaker recommended that the EU and NATO move from institutionalising a division of labour toward the integration of labour. In this scenario, all non-Article 5 (i.e. non-collective defence missions) and/or the so-called Petersburg task operations would take place as a combined EU/NATO operation. While this combined arrangement would not require a new institution, it would bring together NATO's North Atlantic Council and the EU's Political and Security Committee. Decisions to launch operations would be taken at 23 (the sum of all members in both organisations) with the possibility of constructive abstention for all. Furthermore, a forum, perhaps referred to as "SHAPE Plus," would consider combined defence planning and force structure. In the areas of highest priority as outlined in the defence capabilities initiative and the headline goals, the membership would consider making an extended pool of common military assets.
The two primary advantages of this plan are, first, it provides both non-EU members of NATO (such as Canada and Turkey) and non-NORAD members of the EU (such as Austria and Sweden) with an unambiguous place at the decision-making table; and second, it offers a larger and more flexible planning system as well as a more substantial pool of common assets. This final advantage could help to offset and minimise the effect of Canada's declining ability to contribute to the alliance militarily.
Other participants commented that political obstacles may be the hardest to overcome in order to implement such an initiative. Furthermore, despite the constructive abstention clause, decision-making at 23 may be an even greater impediment to action than the previous dual institution structure.
In sum, the view of the Government regarding Canada's alliance nexus is that our allies are a fundamental resource in which we must invest considerable effort, and that we should pursue strategic partnerships with "other like-minded countries and groups in order to maximise our return on investments in foreign affairs, humanitarian assistance and defence." To this end, our relationship with institutions such as NORAD and NATO remain central influences on Canadian Foreign and Defence policies. However, Canada's relationship with these institutions has become strained in the last ten years. The NMD debate has placed considerable attention on exactly what contribution NORAD will make to the future of North American defence.
Canada also has significant differences with its NATO allies over the necessary contributions to warrant a 'place at the table'. Canada is willing to support the European Security and Defence Identity, but only as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the alliance. It would be politically unacceptable to have Canadian Forces' personnel transferred to EU command without oversight by the North Atlantic Council, and thus the central issue for Canada regarding the ESDI is adequate access to decision-making circles and ensuring that both pillars remain under the same defensive umbrella. How we are to go about achieving these goals, and what we are willing to sacrifice to do so are crucial questions in the formulation of the Defence policy of the future.
IV. The Future of Canadian Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations
Observing that peacekeeping is an integral part of the collective Canadian psyche is hardly a point that needs mentioning, although it was reinforced in a recent poll that placed popular support for Canadian peacekeeping at 82 percent. Canada's 50 year long tradition in these roles, which has led to its participation in more than 58 missions is a clear source of national pride. Nevertheless, recognition of the challenges and shortcomings of several recent UN peacekeeping operations has led to a number of proposed reforms articulated in the Brahimi Report. Besides advocating their implementation, Canada is contributing to the professionalisation of peacekeepers through an emphasis on public and military education in forums like the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. The development of a rapid reaction capability has, perhaps, the greatest potential impact on CF force structure. The continuing trend of peace support operations being undertaking outside U.N. auspices will continue to raise several important moral, legal and logistical questions for Canada and the CF.
For the CF and other NATO militaries, participation in NATO's SFOR (Stabilization Force) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Kosovo's KFOR, has signified a marked shift in their responsibilities from past traditional peacekeeping missions. In both "peace support operations," the CF became significantly more involved in supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance as well as in participating in the host state's reconstruction and rebuilding processes. These activities have increased the military's contact with civilian and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which proliferated into the hundreds. Co-ordination between NGOs alone has been notoriously difficult, and the added dimension of military actors has led, not unexpectedly, to numerous frictions and debates.
Besides obvious differences between the organisational cultures of armed forces in comparison to NGOs (e.g. hierarchical vs. decentralised decision-making) perhaps the most fundamental and enduring distinction is in terms of the underlying purpose of their respective mandates. The military, as the strongest expression of a government's objectives, are deployed to deal with the causes of the violence (as opposed to the underlying political and social causes of the overall conflict). NGOs, by contrast, are in the field to address the social (and immediate) consequences of the violence and, over the long term, the underlying causes of the conflict. The participants disagreed, however, about whether either or both the military and NGOs could claim that their activities are universally humanitarian (as one participant observed, "aid can be as interventionist and military involvement as beneficial as the other way around").
Disagreement also emerged when it came to demarcating the division of labour between military and civilian actors as well as in terms of how closely they should work together to achieve their often varying objectives. Proponents of leaving a significant amount of "clear blue water" between them made two main arguments. First, NGO representatives argued that co-operating with soldiers compromises their neutrality – or at least the all-important perception of their neutrality – among the combatants and beneficiaries. Second, participants discussed the need to avoid a duplication of effort, and therefore several suggested that traditionally civilian and humanitarian activities could be performed better and more cheaply by NGOs rather than by their military counterparts. Their argument was not intended to detract from the essential role that soldiers have historically played in keeping the peace in war-torn countries, they only cautioned against dramatically expanding the purview of the CF's responsibilities into activities formerly in the civilian arena.
On the other hand, several experienced practitioners argued in favour of encouraging greater civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) for two inter-related reasons: it opens and maintains a dialogue at the grassroots (versus field commander) level, and it provides a firmer foundation to implement an exit strategy. By involving the local NGOs and various civilian organisations, one former CIMIC officer argued that they were collectively able to address some of the root causes of tension thereby gradually reducing the need for a military presence. However, the limitations of the CIMIC approach in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo suggest that armed forces must make a genuine effort for it to be effective. This involves creating a small CIMIC cell with specially selected and trained military personnel, and the provision of adequate financial resources to ensure that NGOs have an incentive to become engaged and co-operate with the CIMIC staff.
NGO representatives stressed that CIMIC is an advantage only when the military uses its assets to support and assist other humanitarian actors in achieving their goals. Attempts to manipulate civilian assets to benefit the military or to win the "hearts and minds" of the local population regardless of the broader implications, are seen as, at best, unhelpful, and at worst, dangerous for the beneficiaries themselves. Instead, NGOs generally are appreciative of the armed forces when they are tasked to provide security, de-mine conflict areas, provide logistical support (e.g. build emergency shelters), and/or offer transportation for relief supplies. Military involvement in areas like emergency medical care are less welcome because they are seen to duplicate the efforts of experienced NGOs already in the field.
V. Critical Infrastructure Protection: A Looming Threat on the Security Frontier?
Rising levels of interconnectivity due to advances in telecommunications, increasing transborder commercial activities, declining government ownership of key industries, and trends toward "digitisation" have all contributed to a heightened awareness of the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure (CI). The most common and frequent CI threats are natural disasters and accidents, such as the ice storm in Quebec and the Red River floods. Premeditated threats stemming from criminal activities, "hactivism," and "warfare," are increasingly possible, although they have occurred more rarely. Warfare in the unconventional realm, includes cyber information warfare, electronic warfare, and possibly the use of weapons of mass destruction against CI.
One of the greatest challenges of critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is that the list of potential targets is so extensive, with many components being interdependent and transnational. For instance, vulnerable sectors range from telecommunications, transportation, energy, finance and banking, to water and sewage, government services, and emergency response services. The damage which can be done to these sectors is of three general sorts: denial-of-service, the corruption of information, and physical violence or destruction. However, any publicity surrounding a violation of CI can lead to, among other things, a crisis of confidence, with potentially devastating consequences in a sector like finance and banking.
What does this mean for DND and the CF? While Canadian infrastructure is a national resource and protecting it a national task, it is also a transborder issue because much of Canada's CI is integrated with the US. Therefore, attempts to address these issues within a nationally isolated context will ultimately be ineffectual. Moreover, CIP is not just a DND or a CF task, nor is it strictly a federal government responsibility either. Instead, addressing these issues requires co-operation amongst federal, provincial, and municipal governments, as well as with crown corporations, public utilities, business and industry. Efforts have already been initiated by the federal government in this direction through the formation of a new co-ordination agency at the national level.
Nevertheless, a comprehensive strategy is a formidable undertaking mainly because most components of Canada's CI are in the private sector and are not explicitly defence related. This means that there is a reluctance to share information which might undermine trust in particular businesses, industries, or sectors. Such co-operation would also require the release of private or confidential data and government classified materials, all of which comes with the risk of compromising corporate liability or even national security.
Luckily for Canada, the "nightmare scenario" still remains only in the realm of fantasy and science fiction. One presenter suggested that this is because capability and motive have yet to converge. In other words, those with a motive to target North America's CI have not developed the capacity to do so, while those with the capacity are not so inclined. Moreover, certain sectors, such as telecommunications, have developed with such a significant degree of redundancy and robustness that incidents or damage in one area (whether by design or by accident) are quickly and naturally overcome by the system itself (e.g. through re-routing of telephone lines). However, these safeguards cannot be counted on indefinitely, and efforts should be undertaken to aim for "management of risk," i.e. minimise the degree of vulnerability to the CI, while still recognising that complete protection of such exposed, interconnected, and multidimensional sectors is impossible.
In this context, there are several steps that ought to be taken by DND and the CF to minimise the risks to their own assets. These include following a policy of "due diligence" with respect to the Department's internal security; contributing to a national threat assessment of DND's responsibilities; working with other departments to reduce their vulnerabilities; training their personnel in cyber security and awareness, incident report procedures, and damage control and containment; and assisting civil authorities in protecting and restoring CI in the event of attacks or other incidents.
Appendix 1
Program and Presentations
Overview Daniel Bon (Director General, Policy Planning);
Chair: Fred Crickard (Senior Fellow, CFPS Dalhousie);
Presentation David Dewitt (Director, CISS at York U.);
Presentation John Harker (Research Fellow, CFPS Dalhousie U.);
Chair: Peter Haydon (Senior Fellow, CFPS Dalhousie);
Presentation Dan Middlemiss (CFPS Dalhousie University);
Presentation Alex Moens (Simon Fraser University);
Keynote Denis Stairs (Dalhousie University);
Chair: Bob Edwards (DND Fellow, CFPS Dalhousie U.);
Presentation Timothy Pitt (MSF / Doctors Without Borders);
Presentation Christine Vroom (Pearson Peacekeeping Centre);
Chair: Allen Chong (Acadia University);
Presentation Douglas Dearth (JMITC, Washington);
Presentation David Charters (University of New Brunswick);
Summary Dean Oliver (Canadian War Museum and NPSIA).
Appendix II
Biographies of Participants
CHAIRS:
Dr. Frank P. Harvey, B.A., M.A., Ph.D.
Director, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
Frank Harvey undertook the Directorship of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies in the Summer of 2000, and is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Dalhousie University. His books include: The Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory and Crisis Stability After the Cold War (1997); Conflict in World Politics: Advances in the Study of Crisis, War and Peace (1998, co-edited with Ben Mor); and Using Force to Prevent Ethnic Violence: An Evaluation of Theory and Evidence (2000, with David Carment). He has published widely on nuclear and conventional deterrence, coercive diplomacy, crisis decision-making and protracted ethnic conflict in such periodicals as International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Politics, International Journal, Security Studies, International Political Science review, Conflict Management and Peace Science, the Canadian Journal of Political Science and several others. He is an actively sought lecturer and speaker on issues such as NMD and an active participant with the SDF program. His current research interests include ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia, NATO military Strategy and Peacekeeping, and national missile defence. Professor Harvey is currently working on his next book, Coercive Diplomacy and the Management of Intrastate Ethnic Conflict.
Rear-Admiral Fred W. Crickard, RCN (Ret'd)
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
Fred Crickard has been a research fellow with the CFPS for two decades, and in addition to directing such undertakings as the Regional Maritime Security Project and the recent Force Development Concept Project, he continues to lecture at Dalhousie University regarding Maritime Strategy, Ocean Governance, and Integrated Maritime Enforcement. His current interests/research are oceans policy, maritime enforcement and the role of navies in foreign policy. He is currently devoting his efforts to establishing a database on naval developments in the Asia-Pacific region. He was Project Director for the Canadian Oceans Strategies Project: The Atlantic (COSPA), and recently ended his role as founding editor for the Maritime Security Working Papers. He continues to publish widely, having co-edited with Michael L. Hadley and Rob Huebert A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996). Fred Crickard also co-edited with Katherine Orr and Paul Mitchell Multinational Naval Cooperation and Foreign Policy into the 21st Century (Dartmouth Press, 1998). He recently was a visiting lecturer at the Canadian Forces College, in Downsview Ontario, speaking on "Oceans and Naval Policy: The Canadian Experience".
Commander Peter T. Haydon, RCN (Ret'd)
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
Peter Haydon is a Senior Research Fellow and Adjunct Professor with the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University, specialising in naval and maritime security issues and Canadian Defence policy. He is also a Senior Research Fellow with the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies and Director of Maritime Affairs for the Naval Officers' Association of Canada and editor of Maritime Affairs. He teaches a course on maritime strategy for the Department of Political Science at Dalhousie, and he also teaches postgraduate courses in war studies and maritime strategy as part of the Royal Military College of Canada's extension program in Halifax. Mr. Haydon is a widely published author, lecturer and panelist, and an fairly frequent media commentator on Canadian and international defence and maritime security matters. In these various capacities, he has been called upon to testify as an expert witness before the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy (1994), the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (1993), and the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (1992). His current research interests include: emerging concepts of sea power and maritime strategy; including the roles of naval forces and their function in diplomacy; Canadian Defence and naval policy; and civil-military relations in Canada. In support of his interest in contemporary maritime security he recently published a monograph, Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century: A "Medium" Power Perspective (published by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies in September 2000 as part of its Maritime Security Occasional Papers series). Other work in progress includes a collaborative research project with Dr. Dan Middlemiss, also of Dalhousie University, examining the evolution of Canadian defence policy during the Trudeau era (1968-84).
Commander Robert Edwards, CD, Canadian Forces
Defence Studies Visiting Fellow, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
Commander Bob Edwards is the Defence Fellow at Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies. He works primarily in the field of maritime security and oceans policy but maintains a keen interest in peacekeeping affairs. He graduated from Dalhousie University in 1970 with a Bachelor of Science degree, and returned to earn his Master of Arts in International Relations in 1996. Commander Edwards has served in a variety of capacities on Canada's east and west coasts and his most recent command position was aboard HMCS Gatineau. He has also served in various staff positions within the Canadian Forces, such as with the maritime staff at Maritime Command Headquarters, at the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, and most recently within the Directorate of Peacekeeping Policy at Defence Headquarters where he was involved in planning Canadian operations in Central Africa. His most recent academic project was as an advisor and participant in the successful undertaking of the Joint Airborne Surveillance and Patrol workshop, which was a pilot proceeding for the evolving Force Development Concept Project, a Dalhousie initiative to explore university based capability-scoping seminars to supplement the Canadian Forces Concept Development and Experimentation program.
Dr. Allen K. Chong, B.A., M.A., Ph.D.,
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Acadia University
Allen Chong lectures at Acadia University, offering such courses as International Political Economy, International Defence Policy, and Canadian and Comparative Foreign Policy, in addition to being a Post-Doctoral research associate with the Centre for International Strategic Studies. Additionally, he is an academic peer reviewer with the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal and brings the added expertise of fluently speaking both Cantonese and Mandarin Chinese. He has published widely with articles such as "Dual Use Technologies and Their Proliferation: Developing New Norms ?" and "Re-evaluating the Missile Technology Control Regime" in periodicals like the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal. Dr. Chong is a regular contributor and participant in the SDF program, having acted as presenter and discussant on dual use technologies and proliferation issues at the 1999 SDF consultation at York University, and has also acted as Chair at such conferences as Domestic Governance and Economic Reform Sessions: The Future of Indonesia Conference at McGill University in 1999, and the Asia Pacific Summit in Vancouver in 2000. His current research interests include Chartered Financial Analysts as an Epistemic Community, the post-Crisis Evolution of sub-regional Growth Zones in East Asia, and urban violence in China and Indonesia.
PRESENTERS:
Dr. David B. Dewitt, B.A., M.A., Ph.D.
Director, Centre for International and Security Studies
David Dewitt is a Professor of Political Science and, since 1988, has served as Director of the Centre for International and Security Studies, York University, Toronto. He is author or editor and contributing author of eleven books dealing with Canadian foreign, security, and defence policy, regional security and conflict management, arms control, nuclear proliferation, and international security. Other publications have covered security concepts and approaches in North America, in NATO, in the Asia Pacific, NATO "out-of-area" management, peacekeeping, Canadian foreign, defence and security policy, refugees and security, United Nations reform, Japan's role in international security, conflict management on the Korean peninsula, Canada-Korea security cooperation (translated into Korean), small state vulnerability, and emerging trends in East Asia - Middle East relations. His current research interests include linkages between development and security, regional security mechanisms, and the Canadian state, civil society and foreign policy. Dr. Dewitt was a non-governmental member of the Canadian delegation to the Third Review of the NPT. For over a decade he was an annual lecturer at the Canadian Forces Staff College and also lectured at Canada's former National Defence College. From 1983 through 1990, his Centre conducted an annual peacekeeping symposium on behalf of Canada's Department of National Defence in cooperation with the International Peace Academy in New York. He currently is co-director with Carolina Hernandez (ISDS, Manila) of a multi-year research program on "Development and Security in Southeast Asia" (DSSEA) funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Along with Evans and Brian Job, Dewitt co-founded the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security (CANCAPS) serving as its chair. He was one of the founding members of the international Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and also was a founding member of the Canada-Korea Forum. In 1998 he succeeded Dean Harry Harding as chair of the executive committee for the Program for International Studies in Asia (PISA) based in Washington, DC.
Mr. John Harker, B.A., M.A., LL.D.
Research Fellow, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
John Harker specializes in peacebuilding and conflict resolution, advising governments and civil society on these issues, particularly concerning Africa and the Balkans. He has served as a Special Advisor in the Office of the Deputy President of South Africa, and was the Senior Advisor to the Chairman of Canada's Senate Special Committee on the Airborne Regiment and Somalia. In 1987, he was appointed Representative in Canada of a UN Special Agency, the ILO. He advised its programme on the Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament, assisted governments, unions and employers on a wide range of issues, and addressed the House of Commons on manpower issues and the Armed Forces Reserves. He served in this senior diplomatic capacity until 1993. In 1991 he succeeded the Hon. Barney Danson as Chair of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament. He has served as an advisor to Canada's delegation to the UNGA on Human Rights and De-colonization, and in 1990-91, he chaired the Commonwealth Expert Group on Human Resource Development for a post-apartheid South Africa. From 1993 to the present, he has managed a consulting firm and carried out individual assignments. His firm has, among other things, involved the Policy Unit of DND in a project to assist staff development at the senior levels of South Africa's new Defence Secretariat, and he was called on to facilitate the first ever meeting between the Defence Industry and Civil Society in that country. In October 1995, he was awarded with a Medal of Honour by the Minister for Foreign Affairs for his contribution to the United Nations, and at the end of that year, he chaired the Roundtable on the Dayton Accords held by the Canadian Council on International Peace and Security. He has since advised CIDA on Kosovo and Bosnia. In 1999, he was appointed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to head Canada's Fact-finding and Assessment Mission to Sudan, tasked with determining if oil activity there was exacerbating the country's civil war. Since completing his Sudan report, which was made public in February, 2000, he has been advising CIDA and DFAIT on a number of African conflicts. In October, 2000, Dalhousie University conferred on him the degree of Doctor of Laws, (honoris causa).
Dr. Danford W. Middlemiss, B.A., M.A., Ph.D.
Professor of Political Science, Dalhousie University
Dan Middlemiss is a former Director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, a professor of Political Science and is recognised as one of Canada's foremost commentators on Canadian Defence policy. He has testified before several parliamentary committees regarding this subject, and has published numerous articles on topics such as Defence procurement and economics. He has co-authored monographs such as "Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants" with Joseph Sokolsky and continues to actively conduct research in the field of Defence Policy lecturing at Dalhousie University on Canadian Defence Policy and Civil - Military Relations. His current research interests include a new project with Mr. Peter Haydon on Defence Policy in the Trudeau era, and comparative studies in civil-military relations. He was a symposium planner for, and syndicate participant in, the Halifax Maritime Symposium on Multinational Naval Cooperation and Foreign Policy into the 21st Century, in May 1996. He also served as the Round Table chair, for "Academic Retrospectives on the Cold War World", the Centre's 25th Anniversary Symposium and was a valuable participant in Dalhousie's Force Development Concept Project this past January.
Dr. Alexander Moens, M.A., B.A., Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Political Science, Simon Fraser University
Alexander Moens is a member of the Political Science department at Simon Fraser University and lectures on International Relations, Comparative Politics, and American Government and Politics in addition to U.S. Foreign Policy and the Politics and Foreign Policy of the European Union. He has been the recipient of several fellowships, including a NATO Fellowship (1990), the European Community Visitors Fellowship (1991), a Marcel Cadieux Fellowship in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (1992), a Centre for Hemispheric Defence Studies at National Defense University, Washington D.C., in April 1999, and been a participant of the DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) briefing program since June 2000. Dr. Moens continues to publish actively, and has authored such texts as Foreign Policy Under Carter (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), in addition to NATO in Kosovo: A Crisis Mismanaged (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001 forthcoming) co-authored with Christopher Anstis, and numerous periodicals in various publications including Survival, Political Science Quarterly, Journal of European Integration, Canadian Defence Quarterly, International Journal, European Security, Canadian Foreign Policy, Security Dialogue, Policy Options. He has also co-edited with Christopher Anstis Disconcerted Europe: The Search For a New Security Architecture (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) His current research interests include North American and European Security and Defence policies, and the European common Foreign and Security Policy.
Dr. Denis Stairs, B.A., M.A., Ph.D.
McCulloch Professor in Political Science at Dalhousie University.
Denis Stairs is highly respected as one of Canada's foremost scholars in Foreign and Defence policy and has published widely over the course of his distinguished career on both these subjects. His current research interests are Canadian Foreign and Defence policy, the policy consultation process in both these fields, and Canadian - American relations. He gave the "Concluding Commentary" for the 'Canadian APEC Consultative Meeting,' sponsored by the Asian Pacific Foundation for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Toronto, February 1996. He presented "Canada and Peacekeeping", a lecture for 'Course 101 - Interdisciplinary Cooperation: the New Peacekeeping Partnership in Action' at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre in March 1996; and "Regionalism and the Ebb and Flow of Continentalism" for a panel on 'Canadian Foreign Policy in the 1990's: the end of Internationalism?' at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Brock University, June 1996. He also presented a paper "The Role of NATO in the Post-Cold War Era: Canadian Perspectives" at the XI Atlantik-Brucke (Canada-Germany) Conference at Sydney, NS, in October 1996. His monograph "Canada and Quebec after Quebecois Secession: "Realist" Reflections on an International Relationship" was published by the Centre in June 1996.
Mr. Timothy Pitt
Executive, Medecins sans Frontieres
Timothy Pitt has been a Humanitarian Aid worker with Medecins sans Frontieres since 1992. His first posting was to Mogadishu during the 1992-93 period as the Logistics / Administration Coordinator during the UNITAF and UNOSOM II missions. In 1994 he continued in Somalia, initially as the Political and Humanitarian Advisor in the Canadian High Commission at Nairobi and afterwards he returned to the field as the Head of Sub Delegations in Baidoa and Kismayo, with the International Federation of the Red Cross. In 1995 Mr. Pitt was the Head of Mission for MSF in Albania whereupon he brought the mission to closure. He has led 2 subsequent Emergency missions to Albania; the first was in response to the polio epidemic in October 1996, and the second was during the civil strife in February 1997. His first Emergency Team mission was in January -February 1996 in Somalia. From 1996 to 1998 Mr. Pitt was the President and Executive Director of MSF Canada. As President, Mr. Pitt represented MSF Canada on the International Council of MSF, its Restricted Committee and was Chairman of the Commission on Jurisdictions of MSF Bodies. As Executive Director, he oversaw a renewal of MSF Canada in the areas of Human Resource Recruitment for the field, Communications and Fundraising. He was also responsible for liaison and relations with the Government of Canada. Returning to the Balkans in the spring of 1999, Mr. Pitt was the Head of Mission for MSF in Macedonia during the Kosovar refugee crisis and also in Kosovo upon the return of the refugees. Concurrently, Mr. Pitt was the MSF Representative in Kosovo charged with diplomatic relations to the United Nations, KFOR and other agencies on behalf of all MSF. Other travels and work have taken Mr Pitt to Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Botswana, South Africa, Haiti and throughout Europe. Mr. Pitt's academic interests centre on political philosophy and specifically include the transition from chaos or the state of nature to an organized political arrangement. When not in an airport terminal, he lives in Toronto.
Mr. Douglas Dearth
Lecturer, Joint Military Intelligence Training Centre
Douglas Dearth teaches at the Joint Military Intelligence Training Centre in Washington D.C. A veteran of some 27 years in the intelligence business, he has had assignments dealing with Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern affairs, counter-terrorism, and crisis management, and has served at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Prior positions include: Special Assistant to the Executive Director for the Defence Intelligence Agency, Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of the US Special Operations Command, and Faculty Member at the US Army War College. Mr. Dearth served in both military and civilian capacities in the Republic of Viet Nam, holds degrees in International Relations and Political Science, and is a graduate of the US Army War College. He has lectured on security affairs in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada and is the author of several articles. He is co-contributing co-editor of: Strategic Intelligence: Theory and Application (1995); Cyberwar: Security, Strategy, and Conflict in the Information Age (1996); and Cyber 2.0: Myths, Mysteries, and Realities (1998).
Dr. David Charters, B.A., M.A., Ph.D.
Professor of History, Director of the Centre for Conflict Studies Brunswick.
David Charters was co-founder of the Centre for Conflict Studies at the university of New Brunswick in 1980, and has served as its Director since 1986. He is also the Executive Editor of The Journal of Conflict Studies, published by the Centre, and is author of The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine. His edited works include: The Deadly Sin of Terrorism; Democratic Responses to International Terrorism; Deception Operations; and Armies in Low Intensity Conflict. He also has published many articles, and chapters on various aspects of Low Intensity Conflict Studies. Dr. Charters has lectured widely to official and academic audiences in Canada, the US, and Europe. His research interests have focussed on intelligence, particularly as it relates to counter-insurgency, countering terrorism, special operations, and peacekeeping. Since 1988 Dr. Charters has been a faculty member of the Department of History, where he teaches courses on modern warfare, intelligence, and the Middle East.
Mr. Richard Reynolds
Freelance Journalist and Researcher
Richard Reynolds has had a varied career in Journalism and the business world. As a foreign correspondent for the British Broadcasting Corporation, National Public Radio (USA) and RTE (Ireland), he covered the former Soviet Bloc extensively and went on to cover the collapse of communism throughout Eastern Europe. He subsequently spent nearly three years in Yugoslavia covering one war after another. In 1994, Mr. Reynolds took a sabbatical from journalism and founded a pioneering new media company. In the past three and a half years, he again shifted gears to examine the role of technology in our society and cover the impact of technology on policy, culture, education and business. Richard's first book, Disconnected, will be published in the Spring of 2001 and his next publication, on the future of the media, will be published later in that same year.
Dr. Dean F. Oliver, B.A., M.A., Ph.D.
Senior Historian, Canadian War Museum
Dean Oliver is currently the Senior Historian at the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa, and Adjunct Research Professor at The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA), Carleton University. He was formerly Assistant Director of York University's Centre for International and Security Studies and, from 1996-98, was a post-doctoral fellow at NPSIA. He has taught military history, political science, and international security and currently lectures at Carleton on defence policy and international affairs. Dr. Oliver is the contributor for "foreign affairs and defence policy" to the Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs and Series Editor of Studies in Canadian Military History, a monograph series with the University of British Columbia Press. He is also a member of the Selection Committee of the Security and Defence Forum at the Department of National Defence and a member of the Editorial Advisory Board of Canadian Military Journal. He writes on post-1945 defence and foreign policy, war veterans, and army involvement in the two world wars. Articles published recently include pieces on the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the concept of 'soft power,' and military demobilization after the Second World War. He recently curated "NATO: A Pledge for Peace," a major modification to the Canadian War Museum's permanent galleries, and "Korea: War in the Service of Peace," another permanent gallery modification. His first book, Canvas of War: Painting the Canadian Experience, 1914-1945 (co-authored with Laura Brandon) was published in August 2000 by Douglas & McIntyre; his second, Cold War Dues: Canada and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, will appear in 2001 from Irwin Publishing and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.
| Date Modified: 2006-11-27 |  |
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