International Strategic Situation

By:
DR. R.P. Jakubow {1}
October 1999

On the eve of the third millennium, the international environment is relatively peaceful but the fires of conflict burn in many distant lands. Powerful forces of change are sweeping the globe and transforming the lives of billions of individual human beings and entire societies, putting all states and the structure of international politics itself under stress. The world is at once complex and in flux.

This paper presents one view of the emerging international strategic situation. It identifies key factors shaping the future, describes the potential for conflict, and outlines some of the security issues of importance to Canada.

Factors shaping the future

The future shape of the world is being influenced by multiple social, political, demographic and technological trends. Their interactions contain the seeds of war and peace, poverty and prosperity, order and anarchy, indeed, hope and despair. During the next 25 years and beyond, nine major sources of change will require our attention.

The emergence of multiple centres of power. The United States enjoys global preeminence in the military, economic, political and cultural dimensions of power. Yet, the US is not and will not be the sole determinant of world order. It will likely face increased competition for regional influence from five other power centres - China, Russia, Europe, Japan and India.

These powers differ greatly and are far from equally balanced. Europe and Japan, for example, are economically strong but do not possess commensurate armed strength. India sees itself as a rival of China and has the potential to play a stronger role in Asia. Russia is struggling. The outcome of its political and economic reforms is uncertain and so are its future relations with its neighbours and, more generally, its role on the world stage. While Russia remains a nuclear superpower, its conventional capabilities are only a pale shadow of Soviet might. Finally, China is clearly striving to be both economically and militarily strong. If it succeeds in maintaining its unity, political stability and economic growth, there will be a new balance of forces in Asia. The emerging global order may not reveal itself until well into the 21st century, but the six-sided balance of power delineated above provides one possible glimpse of the future.

Nuclear weapons. On 6 August 1945, in a blinding instant, the city of Hiroshima was destroyed. The world entered the nuclear age. From then on, effectively infinite power could be unleashed on our finite planet, making war as a contest of strength between states absurd.

The fear of a nuclear apocalypse pervaded decades of Soviet-American rivalry, moderating their hostile behaviour and helping to avoid a major war. Because nuclear knowledge exists, the nuclear risk will permeate all confrontation and war between advanced states, whether or not the weapons themselves exist initially. This is the central strategic fact with which we live and with which our descendants will have to live for the rest of time.

For many decades, arms control played a significant role in managing the nuclear risk. Among its major achievements are the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Defence (ABM) Treaty limiting strategic defences and the START-2 treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, signed 3 January 1993, but yet to be ratified by the Russian Duma; it stipulates the reduction of Russia's arsenal to 3,000 warheads and America's to 3,500). Another achievement was the 12 May 1995 agreement signed by 178 countries, which indefinitely extended the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

However, there are new nuclear dangers. The May 1998 tests in India and Pakistan dramatically changed the global non-proliferation and disarmament picture. North Korea also presents proliferation difficulties. There is now an arc of countries stretching from North Korea to the Persian Gulf that are nuclear or nearly so. Moreover, terrorist attacks with nuclear weapons have been possible for some time. In the past, other threats were seen as more pressing, but this perception has been changing since the early 1990s. The probability of nuclear terrorism may still be relatively very low, but it is growing given the ability of sub-state actors to master the technology and their growing wealth thanks to the drug trade. Finally, the stalled implementation of the bilateral US Russia disarmament agenda together with prospective missile defence deployments complicate the picture.

Demography. One of the most important sources of global change in the long term is demographic change, which is practically irreversible. The population in developed countries is now ageing and static while that in the developing world gets younger and larger (according to UN estimates by nearly 80 million a year). The growing economic burden of supporting an ageing population has to be considered one of the truly fundamental changes in the developed world. In the developing world, most countries are ill-prepared to support rapidly growing populations. This will likely put considerable pressure on many states, thereby provoking instability, civil strife and mass migration.

Environment. Population growth coupled with world-wide industrialisation will put our planet's ecology under unprecedented and intense pressure. Possession of, access to, and the price of such essential resources as fresh water, energy (especially oil and gas) and arable soil will be of increasing importance to the well-being of individuals. It will also be a factor in the security calculations of states. For example, access to water will be a major issue in Egypt, Israel, Turkey and Central Asia. In the longer-term, climate change, loss of bio-diversity and new diseases will also likely have an increasing impact on humanity.

Globalisation. The collapse of communism added impetus to the process of globalisation. This marked the end of 'the centrally planned economy model' and the triumph of the market on a global scale.

National economies everywhere are becoming increasingly integrated in four fundamental ways - through trade, finance, production, and a growing web of treaties and institutions. Like the Roman god Janus, globalisation has two faces - on one side, integration; on the other, fragmentation. On the positive side, by drawing states into a tighter web of economic, political and social relationships and by reinforcing the trend toward more open societies, globalisation increases overall human prosperity, promotes regional stability and provides new opportunities to manage international affairs (i.e., the role of non-state actors).

On the negative side, the recent Asian, Russian and Brazilian economic crises have demonstrated that interdependence exposes all states to shocks arising elsewhere in the international system. Domestic and international boundaries appear to meld together. Furthermore, the new international division of labour is widening the gap between rich and poor within and between countries. Feelings of alienation, vulnerability and frustration reinforce the forces of fragmentation be they tribalism, nationalism or religion. They sow the seeds of many civil wars and provide fertile ground for terrorism.

A global depression would be a great setback, causing many troubles. The odds are that it can be avoided so long as policymakers heed the lessons of the Great Depression of the 1930s. The greatest risk to the world economy lies in the potential wholesale retreat from free markets by emerging economies shaken by economic turmoil. Any such retreat would damage their long-term growth prospects, and they would need decades to recover.

The information revolution. Another source of irreversible global change is technology. Information technology in particular continues to advance dramatically. This process is driving the transformation of industrial economies into knowledge-based ones, generating economic growth and reinforcing the trend towards more democratic societies.

However, technological change also presents serious dangers. It is contributing to widening inequality within and among countries and to the diffusion of dual-use technology suitable for the production of advanced arms, including nuclear, chemical and biological (genetic research also being double-edged) weapons.

Other consequences are also important. People around the world now have the means to know, often to see, far more than was possible in the past. Images of human disaster in distant countries evoke widespread empathy among the public and generate pressures on political leaders "to do something". Moreover, the increasing dependence of post-modern societies upon complex information systems creates new vulnerabilities and generates new threats and opportunities such as information-based warfare.

The crisis of identity. Global awareness does not mean that we all live in one "global village" animated by the same vision of human universality. On the contrary, the villages are many, each built around specific citizenship, ethnic, racial, linguistic or religious myths and creeds. The boundaries of some of these are permeable while others are impassable.

Individuals everywhere are reeling under the direct impact of vast, impersonal economic and cultural forces and seek shelter in a community that can protect them and give their lives meaning. This need not lead to "the clash of civilisations" - Samuel Huntington's proposition that cultural kinship will become the main shaping force of international relations - but it has already resulted in violent clashes in which Sigmund Freud's "narcissism of minor differences" seems to be closer to the mark in terms of explaining the phenomenon of group aggression (for example, Serbs and Croats in the former Yugoslavia; Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda). If that is so, secessionist and irredentist movements will likely be central causes of many future wars.

The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). RMA is a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by advances in military technology which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and organisational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations.

Significant advances have been made in each of these components, in recent years. The emergence of information technology and systems holds out the prospect of dramatically altering the command and control of armed forces. Coupled with major advances in weapons in terms of precision, lethality, and miniaturisation, to name but three, this will likely transform the way armed forces are organised and operate across the spectrum of conflicts.

Whether or not this amounts to a revolution will continue to be intensely debated. What is not in doubt, however, is that the United States has invested a great deal in this effort and, if successful, its armed forces may be an order of magnitude more capable than they are at present. Key American allies, including Britain, France and Germany, have not yet fully embraced the RMA. Therefore, situations may arise in which the forces of the allies and potential coalition partners of the United States will be unable to operate in concert with American forces as a result of technological, doctrinal and organisational differences.

Governance under stress. The capacity of the international system to respond effectively to all these changes and ensure a modicum of order, prosperity and justice, depends critically on the strength of the nation-state, the international institutions (political, such as the United Nations; financial and monetary, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; judicial, such as the International Court of Justice; and regional organisations, such as NATO, APEC, OAU and the OAS) and "civil society." All are subject to great stress, the nation-state perhaps more so than the rest.

For the foreseeable future, nation-states will continue to exercise their sovereignty, but their freedom of action will be increasingly limited. Strong states - such as those of the European Union - will most likely continue to increasingly pool their sovereignty for mutual benefit and increased influence. Transitional states - like Russia, China, India, Iran and Ukraine - will progress at varying speeds towards economic and political liberalism and modernity. Finally, given the decline of authority and return to anarchy in the weak states, they may well be the most persistent sources of instability and violence.

Taken together, these nine sources of change – multiple centres of power, nuclear weapons, demography, environment, globalisation, the information revolution, the crisis of identity, the Revolution in Military Affairs and governance – imply a lot of uncertainty and fluidity in the international environment, Indeed, the single most striking feature of the security landscape is the diffusion, not the disappearance, of threats. However, these processes of change contain not only danger but also opportunity. This means that the future is open, that policy choices and contingency will greatly influence the course of history.

Wars in the 21st century

A prominent historian, John Keegan, asked in a recent Reith Lecture "Can there be an end to war?" As we leave the tragic twentieth century behind, this question is indeed worth reflecting upon. And a brutal century it has been: the First World War killed ten million people; the Second fifty million; and, civil, national liberation and inter-ethnic wars are often estimated to have killed another fifty million people. Moreover, nuclear weapons, a product of the Second World War, have the potential to destroy lives on a scale that numbs the imagination and chills the soul and threaten to obliterate organised society itself.

There are modest grounds for optimism, particularly in regard to old, established states - those of Western Europe and North America - which seem to have transformed themselves from belligerent to benevolent entities that place a high value on the lives of their citizens. Yet there are also causes for pessimism, especially when we consider the newer states that have emerged from the decolonisation process: many of them are weak, poor and unable to liberate themselves from the grip of violence.

War is collective killing for some collective purpose. Humanity is struggling to contain and reduce the role of war in human affairs, but the challenge remains formidable. The four horsemen of the Apocalypse - war, famine, pestilence and death - will, regrettably, also ride in the 21st century. The incidence of conflict is unlikely to decline significantly. Three categories of risk can be distinguished: great power, regional, and internal wars.

Great Power conflict. The first is the least likely, but the most important. No global rival to the US exists and there would be significant warning time, perhaps 10-15 years, before such a threat could be reconstituted. The primacy of economics on the domestic agenda of major powers and the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons also work in favour of peace.

A direct clash between the major power centres is thus very unlikely. That is not to say that there is no risk of miscalculation, a risk that is most significant in the case of Taiwan and Korea. The atmospherics of global security could, however, deteriorate rapidly. There are worrying signs of this happening. Relations between the United States and Russia are not what they used to be. Russia, concerned about its conventional weakness and status, has revalued nuclear weapons especially for "tactical" use. Significant disagreements exist and may intensify over issues such as the enlargement of NATO, missile defences and the future of Kosovo. Relations are also troubled between the United States and China. These two countries not only differ on fundamental issues such as human rights, non-intervention, missile defence, and Taiwan, but also have potentially conflicting visions of their roles in Asia. These differences could intensify in the next century. Thus, simply because today we do not foresee the re-emergence of a global threat, we cannot take it for granted. It is clearly in our interest if current positive trends (for example, definitive success of reform in Central Europe; continued evolution of Russia as a non-imperialist country; continued progress in the Middle East Peace Process; and, inclusion of China in international economic institutions) continue to strengthen and do not go into reverse.

Regional conflict. Regional conflicts like the Persian Gulf War are more probable than world wars. These clashes may have ethnic, religious, territorial, or economic origins, or may simply be the result of aggressive moves by states seeking regional hegemony. As recent skirmishes between India and Pakistan illustrate, such conflicts may emerge with limited warning. They could have wide and lasting implications given the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and advanced conventional arms. Any response by the international community would require existing forces that are modern, mobile, flexible and sustainable.

Internal conflict. Internal conflicts are likely to be the prevalent form of conflict. These include civil wars as well as communal strife induced by economic poverty and social discontent and an associated loss of the ability to govern. These are "the wars of conscience", to borrow the striking phrase of "The Economist", as opposed to "the wars of interest" described in the two prior categories. The intense, almost primordial, nature of internal wars fuelled by extremism of one kind or another and facilitated by an abundance of cheap weapons, constitutes the chief threat to international security in the post-Cold War world. Such conflicts may have destabilising regional consequences as manifested, for example, by the strife in the Democratic Republic of Congo. They often generate calls for swift and extensive humanitarian intervention by the international community.

Issues for Canada

There is no direct or immediate military threat to Canada. The risk of a global conflict which could give rise to such a threat is currently very low. General uncertainty, instability and the likely outbreak of regional and internal conflicts will nonetheless pose serious challenges to the maintenance of international peace and stability. Moreover, in a nuclear age, there is no "fireproof house". Five sets of issues are likely to be prominent on the Canadian security agenda for years to come. They are briefly delineated below.

Nuclear stability. Many analysts see the world as being on the cusp of the second nuclear age. Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan show that not all countries share the view that the value of nuclear weapons is diminishing. While nuclear weapons could arguably induce restraint in conflict situations, conditions for stable nuclear deterrence may not always be present. Stable nuclear deterrence depends on technical factors such as effective command and control, diversity of delivery means, survivability, safe storage, and a measure of second strike capability. More importantly, however, it depends on a stable political decision-making process with multiple checks and balances. The lack of stability will increase the risk that such weapons will be used. This risk would pose two major threats to Canadian security interests: directly, it could threaten the lives of Canadians whether in Canada or abroad; and indirectly, environmental contamination and refugees would magnify the toll of consequences.

Shoring up the nuclear non-proliferation regime, reviving the stalled US-Russia nuclear disarmament process and coming to grips with fissile material is increasingly urgent. Prospective missile defence deployments will also need to be carefully assessed. On the one hand, proliferation is increasing the perceived need for missile defences as well as leading to a new assessment of the value of even limited defences, particularly in regional settings. On the other hand, such defences could, inter alia, stimulate the diversification of the weapons of mass destruction threat, including compensatory offensive deployments by some of the five nuclear-weapon states. In considering its approach to the National Missile Defence system, whose development was announced by the United States, Canada will need to take into account all these implications as well as its bilateral defence relationship and the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of international nuclear arms control and strategic stability. Reducing nuclear dangers and ensuring the stability of the international security system remain the ultimate goals.

Conventional capabilities. What kind of combat-capable armed forces should Canada have? This question encompasses a variety of issues given the wide spectrum of potential conflicts, the often dramatic advances in military technology, and the need for the Canadian Forces to remain interoperable with the forces of the United States and those of our European Allies.

Whatever the choices made by the navy, army and air force, it is useful to dispel the myth that technologies developed for high-intensity warfare and those targetting lowintensity conflict are mutually exclusive. On the contrary, many advances in military technology are very relevant to the efficient conduct of peace-support operations. Technologies that provide accurate, real-time situational awareness can serve critical functions in intra-state conflict. Moreover, advanced command and control technologies are as important in peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations as in full-scale combat. At the same time, the value of precision-guided weaponry was demonstrated in both Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999). The use of precision munitions would not have been possible without the extensive exploitation of a wide array of intelligence, command, control and communications assets found in all environments including space. Finally, once a cease fire is in place, the ability to monitor the activities of all parties is critical to achieving and verifying compliance.

Homeland defence. A third area of security concerns focuses on what the United States calls "Homeland Defence" - the protection of people, property and systems on its territory against non-traditional threats such as terrorism and attacks on the critical infrastructure. The possibility that terrorists will resort to weapons of mass destruction or cyber-terrorism is real, but perceptions differ as to the likelihood. Whatever the case, efforts to reduce vulnerability to such attacks will be of continued concern on both sides of the Canada-US border. Coordination will be required to ensure not only that Canada is protected, but also that it does not become an easy access route to the rest of the North American continent. The focus on prevention puts a premium on intelligence, but there is also a need for an appropriate capacity to respond to crises and to deal with the consequences of such attacks. Because perceived risks to homeland vary widely - from terrorist and missile attacks to international crime, drugs and alien smuggling - there will be a continuing requirement to coordinate strategy within the federal government, between federal agencies and their provincial counterparts, and finally, bilaterally, between Canada and the United States.

The dilemmas of intervention. The issue of military intervention is currently on the international agenda and will likely remain there. UN humanitarian intervention in Iraq in 1991 challenged the traditional concept of sovereignty, and UN-sponsored actions in Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti followed in its wake. NATO's air action in Kosovo in 1999 was not sponsored by the UN, raising serious questions about the role of regional organisations in interventions and the legitimacy of the use of force. At the time of writing, the United Nations, with the concurrence of Indonesia, authorised intervention in East Timor.

In all these cases, intervention posed a whole set of moral, legal, and practical questions, not the least of which concerns the increasingly high cost for the developed states of the use of force. Both the practice of the international community in responding to humanitarian disasters and the evolution of international law allowing the use of forcible counter measures to impede a state from committing large-scale atrocities on its own territory bear watching and deserve to be debated.

Beyond force? The specter of war continues to haunt the human species. Lawful force legitimately used can often stop the killing. But military force alone cannot force the warring factions to reconcile. It is true, of course, that big peacekeeping battalions play a vital role in ensuring security. But communities have to be built from within and must stand on a wider base that includes economic well-being, education - especially for girls - and a robust cultural identity. An essential weapon in the war against conflict must be progress in economic development programmes that reduce insecurity and inequality.

The concept of human security championed by Canada recognises that for peace to prevail the conditions for peace must be built. This is a challenge of the first order, one that moves beyond force and towards justice. It is a challenge worthy of Canada's attention, but one that all of humanity must grapple with at the beginning of the new millennium.

---

1. Directorate Research Notes are written to document material which does not warrant or require more formal publication. The contents do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of National Defence.

Date Modified: 2006-11-27

Important Notices