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Canada and the Revolution in Military Affairs

By:
DR. Elinor Sloan {1}
June 2000

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Note: The complete text of the report will be posted on this site after it is made available in both official languages.

INTRODUCTION

1. One of the most important trends that will affect Canada's security and defence policy over the next two decades is the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This term refers to a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by advances in military technology which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and organisational concepts, fundamentally alter the character and conduct of military operations.

2. Key technological, doctrinal and organisational changes associated with the RMA include, but are not limited to, the following elements:

Technology

Doctrine

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Organisation

POLICY STATEMENTS AND VISIONS

3. Although the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF) have been aware for several years of the dramatic advances in technologies that are "revolutionizing" warfare, they have only relatively recently begun to focus their attention on the RMA in its entirety, and its implications for Canada. Work on this issue in DND's Directorate of Strategic Analysis in 1997 and 1998 provided part of the impetus for the Defence Management Committee's direction, in May 1998, that the Department develop a Canadian perspective on the RMA. DND has responded to this imperative with two high-level conferences. Canadian Defence Beyond 2010 (November/December 1998) focused on the impact of the RMA on various CF and departmental activities, while Creating the Canadian Forces of 2020 (April 2000) looked at concept development and experimentation, and the integration of modeling and simulation across DND and the CF.

4. Beginning in 1997, some of the vision statements of the Canadian military services began referring to the RMA. Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada (April 1997) discusses many of the technological elements of the RMA and some of the doctrinal and organisational implications, as does Canada's Army (April 1998). Beyond the individual services, some more recent DND-wide defence policy documents discuss RMA-related technologies and concepts, including Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020 (June 1999) and Defence Planning Guidance 2000 (August 1999).

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CONCRETE MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO THE RMA

5. The Canadian Forces has already undertaken some limited measures that are consistent with the RMA's advanced technologies. DND is acquiring its first dedicated military satellite communications capability, the Air Force has equipped its CF-18s with the capability to conduct precision strike missions, the Army is in the process of "digitizing" the battlefield, and the Navy has upgraded the satellite communications systems on its Iroquois-class destroyers. Notable gaps in the Canadian military's RMA technologies include satellite-guided precision systems, enhanced battlespace awareness capabilities such as operational and strategic unmanned aerial vehicles, and land attack missiles for sea power projection onto land. During international military operations Canada, like many of its allies, is almost entirely dependent on the United States for these capabilities.

6. Canada has also begun to take some steps that are consistent with the doctrinal and organisational trends of the RMA. To increase the CF's "jointness", 1 Canadian Division in Kingston has been amalgamated with the Joint Force Headquarters to create the Canadian Joint Force Headquarters, a deployable command and control organisation capable of national command and logistic support at the operational level of war. Jointness is also being promoted through exercises such as the bi-annual Maritime Co-ordinated Operational Training (MARCOT) exercises, which incorporate elements of all three of Canada's services. Canada's Army is also undertaking to transform the land forces into the Army of Tomorrow, a force that will be optimised for expeditionary operations using precision weapons, modular units and lighter more mobile equipment. To this end, the army is in the process of rationalising its fleet of armoured fighting vehicles, and shifting the balance from tracked to wheeled vehicles.

7. In addition, in January 2000 the Minister announced the CF's intention to establish a combat-ready strike force ready to respond rapidly to global crises in the context of NATO or UN mandated missions. Central to achieving this capability will be strategic lift, an area where the CF has only limited resources. Its Hercules and Polaris aircraft are often overworked, and the CF has no dedicated sea lift assets. DND has begun studies to determine the CF's future strategic lift requirements, one element of which will likely be an Afloat Logistics and Sealift Capability that will combine capabilities for fleet replenishment at sea, in-theatre support to joint forces ashore, and strategic lift for the army.

8. Canada has not made any concrete moves towards a third RMA doctrinal area of unmanned combat using unmanned combat aerial vehicles. This is not surprising, considering that the 1994 Defence White Paper explicitly stated that Canada would not seek a full range of capabilities. To date the focus of attention has been on updating our manned fighters, the CF-18, and looking at future options for new manned fighters, such as America's Joint Strike Fighter. Finally, Canada's navy has begun to change its focus from being a "blue-water" open ocean force, to one that can also conduct littoral operations in shallower, potentially more dangerous waters. During the Somalia operation, for example, one of the Navy's Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment ships supported the Canadian contingent ashore. That said, the navy has none of the major tools for sea power projection onto land, like the land attack cruise missiles that proved so useful during the peace enforcement missions in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999). While America's Tomahawk cruise missile is considered out of the question due to cost, a feasible option for Canada may be the Standoff Land Attack Missile.

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CONCLUSION

9. As Canada continues to develop its approach to the RMA, it may want to bear in mind some important contextual factors. First, the 1994 White Paper argues for a multi-purpose, combat capable force that can respond to a range of operations, including not only peacekeeping and observer missions, but also enforcing the will of the international community and collective defence. It follows that Canada will want to identify and invest in those RMA technologies, doctrines and organizational concepts that are applicable to both low and high intensity operations. Advanced command and control and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, for example, are relevant to the efficient conduct of operations at all points along the spectrum of conflict. Unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance have proved their worth in a range of conflict scenarios, from the high-intensity battlefield of the Gulf War, to the medium-intensity NATO operation in and around Kosovo, to the low-intensity task of monitoring the peace in Bosnia. Strategic lift is another good example of a capability that is suited to both high and low intensity tasks, while precision-guided munitions are clearly relevant both to warfighting scenarios and to the peace enforcement aspects of peace support operations.

10. More broadly speaking, if the Canadian Forces is to concretely support the achievement of Canada's future global security objectives it will need to be able to make a meaningful contribution to coalition operations. In part this means maintaining and enhancing interoperability between the Canadian Forces and its most likely coalition partner, the United States Military. This will be no small undertaking as the United States continues to pursue an ambitious program of developing and integrating revolutionary technologies into its military forces. A plausible guiding framework may be to develop a force structure that reflects suitable capability for the most likely forms of employment, peace support operations, while retaining the ability to integrate into the RMA forces of the United States to confront the most dangerous contingencies. Beyond interoperability, making a meaningful contribution also involves maintaining a sufficient number of forces to form a combat relevant force, and ensuring that those forces are sustainable.

11. Finally, as Canada moves forward with its response to the RMA it may want to view the phenomenon as much as an opportunity as a challenge. The nature of the RMA is such that it is changing the most important elements of a country's military potential. Whereas the determining factors used to be a country's population and the size of its economy, increasingly they are the quality of its standing forces and of its high-tech sector. Such a shift has important implications for Canada and the ability of the Canadian Forces to support Canadian foreign and security policy objectives. While the large, mass army of the Industrial era was not a feasible option for Canada, the smaller, more technologically capable force of the Information Age is well within its reach.

1. Directorate Research Notes are written to document material which does not warrant or require more formal publication. The contents do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of National Defence.

Date Modified: 2006-11-27 top Important Notices