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Backgrounder

Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence

BG-03.026 - May 8, 2003

I. Background

On December 17, 2002, President George W. Bush announced that the United States would deploy an initial operational ballistic missile defence (BMD) system for the defence of North America by the fall of 2004.

As set out in the 1994 Defence White Paper, Canada has held regular consultations on ballistic missile defence with the US and other allies in recent years, both bilaterally and through NATO. In fact, ballistic missile defence consultations between Canada and the US took place in Ottawa in July 2002, and, more recently, in Washington on January 28, 2003.

II. US Plans for a Ballistic Missile Defence System

Brief History: The United States has been researching ballistic missile defences since the 1940s, and briefly deployed a system in the mid-1970s. President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the 1980's revived the concept of ballistic missile defence. However, SDI was based on exotic, futuristic space technologies and intended to counter the entire nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union. The initiative was not implemented due to technological challenges, high cost-estimates and the end of the Cold War.

Responding to the changing strategic environment and the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile systems, President Clinton agreed in principle in the mid-1990s to the need for missile defences, and sought to move ahead on the issue while trying to remain consistent with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Agreed to by the US and USSR, the ABM Treaty was intended to set limits on defensive missile systems. In fact, the National Missile Defense Act was passed in 1999 to deploy a missile defence system as soon as the technology permitted.

In 2002, believing that the strategic environment had deteriorated further, President Bush negotiated an end to the ABM Treaty with Russia and expanded the missile defence system which had been under development. The US also began work on adding components to allow for layered and overlapping missile defence coverage.

Current US Plans: The US objective is to develop the capability to defend against hostile or accidentally launched ballistic missiles aimed at its territory, deployed American forces, or its friends and allies.

Current US plans call for a limited, ground- and sea-based system employing six interceptors starting in 2004 and up to forty interceptors by 2005. Interceptors destroy their targets by making physical contact with them at extremely high rates of speed. The term "using a bullet to hit another bullet" has been used colloquially to describe ballistic missile defence.

Current US plans do not call for interceptors to be armed with either nuclear or conventional explosive warheads. Moreover, unlike the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative of the 1980s, current US plans for ballistic missile defence are intended to defeat only a small number of incoming missiles and are based on existing and evolving technology.

US planning for ballistic missile defence aims to use a "layered" approach to intercept missiles by using land (large interceptor rockets or mobile launchers such as the current US 'Patriot' system), sea ('Aegis' class missile ships), and air (airborne laser) platforms to shoot down incoming missiles. Air- and sea-based platforms can be positioned close to the launch site of a hostile missile and can intercept it during its "boost phase" (the period just after a missile's launch), whereas land-based platforms are better at intercepting missiles during the "mid-course phase" (the period where the missile is coasting through space or high in the atmosphere) and "terminal phase" (the period where the missile makes its final approach toward its intended target) of a missile's flight path.

Current US plans for the defence of the United States against missile attack are largely focused on the "mid-course phase" and the interceptor sites under construction in Alaska and California will provide this type of protection when they become operational in 2004.

BMD Tests: Testing of the ballistic missile defence system in recent months and years has had mixed results - five of eight ground-based interceptor tests have been successful to date. However, testing is gaining in complexity and precision. The US plans to improve on the testing process by integrating new technologies, which, according to the US, should improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the system.

Impending Decisions: In order to meet the fall 2004 deadline, the US has already begun to make decisions in important areas, such as command structures and the overall architecture of the system. These decisions will likely affect the future role of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD).

Since its formation in 1958, NORAD has been the mainstay of Canada's aerospace defence and control capability. First conceived to deal with the strategic bomber threat of the Cold War,

NORAD has evolved to track and warn of attack against North America by aircraft, missiles, space vehicles and asymmetric threats. NORAD has no direct role in the interception of ballistic
missiles. There is, however, significant overlap between NORAD's threat tracking and assessment mission and the missile defence mission recently assigned to the US-only Northern Command (NORTHCOM).

Impending US decisions are also expected to have an impact on industrial activity related to ballistic missile defence for many years to come. Missile defence is one of the largest research and development programs in the US, with an annual budget of approximately $8 billion (US). A number of countries are currently exploring industrial cooperation with the US.

III. International Perspectives on Ballistic Missile Defence

NATO: Canada-US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperation in addressing the threat of short-range missiles has been underway for almost a decade. At the Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO leaders agreed to broaden their examination of missile defence by commissioning a new NATO missile defence study that would look at options for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats.

The United Kingdom has been supportive of US efforts to develop missile defences. On February 5, 2003, the UK announced that it had finalized an agreement with the US on the upgrading of the radar site at RAF Station Fylingdales for the purposes of the ballistic missile defence system. In addition, Denmark has been asked by the US to allow the Thule radar site in Greenland to be upgraded.

Other Allies and Nations: Australia has also been supportive of ballistic missile defence, while Japan and Israel both have their own joint missile defence programs with the US.

As part of the May 2002 Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between Russia and the US, the US agreed to assist in improving Russia's missile early-warning coverage through the establishment of a joint ballistic missile launch information-sharing centre, and in continuing to develop the Russian-American Observation Satellite warning system.

IV. Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence

New Threats and the Changing Global Security Environment: Canada shares US and NATO concerns about the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and new weapons technology, combined with the changing character of international terrorism, is creating a more dangerous and complex security environment, both at home and abroad.

Although the ballistic missile threat to Canada is not currently considered to be high, joint Canadian and American intelligence estimates suggest that in the coming years the range and accuracy of ballistic missile technology available to potential proliferators will improve, weapons of mass destruction proliferation will continue and the threat to Canada and Canadian interests could increase.

The ballistic missile defence system is also meant to respond to unauthorized or accidentally launched missiles.

The nature of the threat posed by ballistic missiles, coupled with the significant time required to develop and field a ballistic missile defence system, is such that deciding to wait until the last minute to deploy defensive systems would carry significant risk.

Canadian Approach: Canada's approach on ballistic missile proliferation is based on: engaging diplomatically with potential ballistic missile proliferators; promoting multilateral arms control mechanisms; and examining the employment of defensive capabilities.

Through this approach, Canada, along with its allies, is actively seeking to address the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology, in a manner that respects Canada's longstanding policies on arms control and strategic stability - including Canada's opposition to the weaponization of space, as articulated in the April 1999 Government Statement on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.

Canada is a founding member of the Missile Technology Control Regime established in 1987 as a means to counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation by controlling the transfer of missile equipment, material and related technologies. Canada was also instrumental in the development of the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation - the first multilateral agreement which establishes principles and confidence building measures regarding ballistic missiles and related activities.

Complementing these efforts to halt the proliferation and use of missile delivery systems, Canada remains active in working to control the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that could be employed as warheads for such weapons. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty forms the foundation of Canada's nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policy and Canada continues to play an active role in strengthening this important cornerstone of strategic stability. Canada has also been very active in the development, universalization and implementation of the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as well as the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention.

More recently, Canada has begun devoting considerable resources to support the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Through this initiative, Canada will focus on working closely with its G8 partners, including Russia, to assist Russian authorities to secure the destruction of chemical weapons, dismantle nuclear submarines, ensure the safe disposition of nuclear fissile materials and find employment for former weapons scientists.

Canada and the US also established a BMD Bilateral Information Sharing Working Group that has met twice a year since 2000. In addition, Canada placed a Canadian Forces Liaison Officer with the US Missile Defense Agency in early 2001 for the purpose of supporting the ongoing consultation and information gathering process. And, Canada has been involved with short-range missile defence efforts that have been underway in NATO since the early 1990s.

Consultations: The Government holds regular consultations with Parliamentarians, security and defence experts, interested non-governmental organizations and interested Canadians. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has heard the views of Canadians during the 'town hall' meetings he has attended as part of the Foreign Policy Dialogue. The Department of National Defence has convened missile defence forums with expert stakeholders, as well as a number of focus groups on the issue of North American defence. The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade made a recommendation on missile defence in its December 2002 report, which the Government has reviewed.

V. Conclusion

No final decision has been made on Canada's involvement in the missile defence of North America.

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