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THE EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY IN THE PACIFIC COAST DEFENCES
(AUG 39 TO DEC 43)

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**THE EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY IN THE
PACIFIC COAST DEFENCES.
(Aug 39 TO Dec 43)**

A. INTRODUCTION

INFANTRY ROLE IN COAST DEFENCE

1. In general terms it may be said that the military defences of CANADA's Coasts fell into three main classes: coast artillery in fixed defences; anti-aircraft artillery in fixed and mobile roles; and infantry, operating in conjunction with supporting arms and services. The extent to which the organization of the coast and anti-aircraft artillery defences of the Pacific Coast followed systematic planning is discussed elsewhere (1); the record of the employment of infantry in the Pacific Command will show how far it was possible to meet rapidly-developing situations that previous planning did not altogether envisage. The nature of the first two types of defences makes their development essentially dependent upon the delivery of permanent equipment that may take several years to obtain, a situation that tends to produce, particularly in the case of fixed defences, a certain rigid adherence to original commitments. By contrast, the concentration and movement of infantry forces within a country at war requires a much shorter period of preparation, and on that account may operate under a more flexible system of control that in its planning can follow closely upon the turn of events.

2. In 1937, in announcing for the first time its defence policy, the Government placed primary emphasis on the direct defence of Canadian Coasts and coastal harbours and terminals (2). Plans were immediately instituted for installing the necessary armament and fortifications. What was considered the role of the infantry in such a defence policy? Generally accepted principles of defence supplied the following answer.

3. "Measures to deal with an enemy on land are required for the following purposes:-
- i. The close defence of vulnerable points.
 - ii. To observe, delay and hold an enemy attempting to land, until he can be attacked by the mobile reserve.
 - iii. To attack hostile forces if such have succeeded in disembarking.
 - iv. To hold the 'land front' of an isolated fortress against attack in force." (3).
- To these phases of the infantry's role against an active enemy must be added a fifth, -
- v. To supplement the police forces in the maintenance of internal security.

4. While it was envisaged that the guarding of vulnerable points and the garrisoning of fortresses would hold certain forces to a role of passive defence, it was intended that, wherever possible, the threat of an enemy landing should be met by a locally held mobile force, quartered at a central point (usually within a fortress) but provided with transportation facilities to enable it to engage the enemy as far from the defended centre as possible. The actual "land front" would only be occupied as a last resort (4).

PRE-WAR MOBILIZATION PLANS

5. Annually during the decade preceding the War, under the provisions of Defence Scheme No.3, District Officers Commanding submitted lists of the units within their command that would be assigned to garrison forts and defended ports ("LIST ONE"), and to provide guards for vulnerable points ("LIST TWO"), should there be an outbreak of hostilities. But plans for the employment of infantry forces went farther. It was foreseen that enemy landings might occur on a scale too great for the coastal garrisons with their local reserves to cope with. To meet such an eventuality Defence Scheme No 3 provided for the raising of a "Mobile Force," of one cavalry and two infantry divisions, to be selected by NDHQ from units nominated annually in District quotas. The state of public opinion in Canada being what it was during the middle thirties, the role of this force was considered to be Canadian defence, and no undue publication was made of the alternative overseas assignment "should a decision be made by the Government to despatch the Mobile Force abroad" (5).

6. The particular situation that might develop on the West Coast in the event of a Far Eastern War, with the resulting need for special troop concentrations there, was envisaged by the General Staff planners. Defence Scheme No 3 anticipated that in such a contingency "it must be appreciated that a Japanese diversion against the Western Coast of CANADA, including naval, air, and limited landing operations, may be expected at any time. Such operations are perhaps even more particularly to be expected in the very early War steps. Adequate provision must be made to counter them. A further defence problem of peculiar importance in this contingency will be the safeguarding of vulnerable points in BRITISH COLUMBIA against concerted attack, or acts of sabotage, by Japanese from amongst the twenty-four thousand of that race who inhabit that Province." (6).

7. To ensure that sufficient troops might be available to supplement the local forces of MD 11 in such an emergency, under the Defence Scheme, NDHQ annually compiled from District nominations, a list of militia units that would be despatched to the West Coast should war breakout with JAPAN ("LIST THREE"). These units were to be drawn from almost every military district in CANADA, the list for 1938 showing two infantry brigade headquarters, nine rifle battalions, and one field ambulance, representing seven districts (7).

THE PLANS IN EXECUTION

8. On the declaration of War with GERMANY immediate steps were taken to mobilize units of "List One" (garrisons of forts), "List Two" (Guard for Vulnerable Points), and all units of the Mobile Force (8). More than two years were to elapse before the contingency that inspired "List Three" materialized. By that time the "Mobile Force", expanded to five divisions, was overseas, or on the way, and the change in commitments thus placed upon the districts, together with the adoption of a new Defence of Canada Plan, had forced "List Three" into the discard. For the next two years the General Staff was to base its dispositions for the West Coast upon plans that were of necessity short term and flexible, designed to cope with a situation that developed rapidly to unexpected proportions.

FOUR PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT IN PACIFIC COAST DEFENCES

9. The history of the mobilization of infantry defences on the PACIFIC Coast may be said to fall, without too arbitrary a classification being made, into four phases, each initiated by a date of a varying degree of significance. These dates are 26 Aug 39, 20 Jun 40, 7 Dec 41 and 16 Aug 43. They mark respectively the impending outbreak of war with GERMANY, the preliminary threat of war with JAPAN, the outbreak of war with JAPAN, and the removal of the Japanese ALEUTIAN threat by the allied occupation of KISKA. To this chronology might be added such significant dates as those on which JAPAN announced her "Greater East ASIA" policy, entered into her tri-partite agreement with GERMANY and ITALY, or sent her forces to land in the Western ALEUTIANS and to bomb DUTCH HARBOUR. But the additional sub-dividing that the inclusion of such mile posts would entail is not, in general, warranted in the light of the action that was taken by the Canadian General Staff, and the present consideration of the organization of West Coast infantry defences will follow the outline suggested above.

B. THE FIRST PHASE - THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

MOBILIZATION

10. Late on the evening of 25 Aug 39 Headquarters MD 11 received instructions to adopt the "precautionary" stage against GERMANY (9). Immediate steps were taken to call out, under Sec 63 of the Militia Act, details from those units that had been previously designated in List Two for guard duty on Vulnerable Points.

11. Within the next few days guard responsibilities had been assumed in all parts of the Province. On VANCOUVER ISLAND the 1 Bn Canadian Scottish Regt were supplying guards at the VICTORIA Bay Street Armouries, the Government Dry dock and Joint Services Magazine at ESQUIMALT, and the cable station at BAMFIELD on the West Coast (10). On the mainland, personnel of the BC Regt (DCOR), later the 28 Arm'd Regt, were protecting vulnerable points around VANCOUVER - the 1st NARROWS Bridge, the Immigration Building (used as an Alien Receiving Station), the wireless stations at POINT GREY and LULU ISLAND, the air stations at JERICHO BEACH, and SEA ISLAND, and the oil refinery installations at IOCO (11). A company of the 1 Bn Irish Fusiliers (VR) had proceeded to PRINCE RUPERT, with a detachment of the same unit supporting the FRASER RIVER examination service at STEVESTON (12). The Rocky Mountain Rangers, with attached details of the BC Dragoons (later mobilized as the 5 CMCR), supplied guards for the RCAF Magazine at KAMLOOPS and at vulnerable points along the main lines of the CPR and CNR in the FRASER CANYON, and the CNR at RED PASS and PRINCE GEORGE (13).

12. On 1 Sep 39 GERMANY invaded POLAND, and the Canadian Army mobilized. Units of List One and of the Mobile Force were called out in addition to the List Two units already mobilized (14), and all such units, together with District Headquarters and Permanent Force detachments and units, were placed on Active Service under Sec 64 of the Militia Act (15).

13. The new order brought to full time duty all coast and anti-aircraft defence garrisons, and, in addition to the four battalions already called out, the following infantry units: at ESQUIMALT, "B" and "D" Coys The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry; at VICTORIA, 2 Bn The Canadian Scottish Regt; at VANCOUVER, The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada; and at NEW WESTMINSTER, The Westminster Regt (MG). The C Scot R were soon allotted guard duties, sending a detachment to YORKE ISLAND at the end of September, and a company to PRINCE RUPERT early in October. The two First Division units and the Westminster R (MG) (mobilized as Corps Troops with the Second Division) (16), concentrated on recruiting and training.

14. The end of the year found the five interval security units (BCR, RM Rang, Ir Fus, 1 C Scot R, and 2 C Scot R) supplying guards for vulnerable points, assisting to man fixed defences, providing small mobile reserves at the three main centres of population (17), and carrying on as much training as the diversity of their duties and shortage of equipment would allow. Mobilized on a special Home War Establishment of approximately half WE strength (18), numbers fluctuated as recruiting died down and as drafts were supplied to more fortunate units slated for overseas.

THE GUARDING OF VULNERABLE POINTS

15. The question of the protection of vulnerable points had received careful attention from NDHQ General Staff and District Headquarters. Because there had been a tendency for District Officers Commanding to place widely-varying interpretations on the needs of the vulnerable points in their respective areas, it had been found necessary to adopt a uniform principle to govern the provision of protection for vulnerable points in CANADA. A General Staff directive addressed to all DOsC in September 1938 advised that:-

"Military protection will be provided only at vulnerable points, the maintenance of which is essential to the national welfare or to the effective prosecution of the war, and which at the same time are of such a nature that military guards can in fact render effective protection." (19).

16. Under this policy military protection was to be given to (a) the canals of the Great Lakes and St Lawrence Systems, (b) railways at those points where damage would seriously disrupt trans-Canada communications (c) arsenals, magazines and all other important Defence Establishments; and (d) certain selected dry docks, cable and W/T Stations, grain elevators and hydro-electric power installations. The guarding of industrial plants, municipal waterworks, and all other installations not specially selected, was to remain the responsibility of the civil or private authorities as in peace time (20). Later, on more than one occasion, when the Japanese threat to the PACIFIC Coast appeared very real, District Headquarters was to cite this policy in dealing with urgent applications for military protection received from industrialists and municipal authorities (21).

17. In MD 11 the vulnerable points covered by (b) (c) and (d) of the above classification had been allotted in pre-war local defence schemes to the units responsible for their protection. Each battalion had made its reconnaissances and formulated its preliminary administrative plans, so that when the signal for action came, little time was lost in assuming responsibility (see paras 11 and 13 above).

18. Until November 1939 some 35 officers and 600 other ranks, drawn from the five infantry units, were employed in guarding vulnerable points other than defence establishments. During the last two months of the year, however, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who had by this time recruited throughout CANADA the services of 1,600 special constable guards (22), took over the task of guarding the railways and the wireless stations in BRITISH COLUMBIA, thereby reducing the number of troops on VP duty by more than half (23). For the next six months the five coast battalions, with strengths of approximately 350 all ranks, carried on their often uninspiring but important duties of guarding the remaining vulnerable points, providing infantry defences at the outlying forts, acting as mobile reserves at regimental headquarters, and with each of these roles accomplishing a great deal of very necessary construction and improvements in camps and communications.

C. THE SECOND PHASE - THREAT OF WAR WITH JAPAN

JAPANESE WAR APPEARS IMMINENT

19. May, 1940, brought the collapse of FRANCE in EUROPE. In the East, JAPAN was quick to apply pressure to the FRENCH-owned INDO-CHINA, a pressure that was to lead to subsequent annexation as another step was taken on the road to SINGAPORE. On 20 June the War Office in TOKYO advised British and French Military Attaches that

- “(1) Shipments of arms to CHINA from BURMA, converging on HONG KONG and FRENCH INDO-CHINA must cease;
- (2) Allied troops in SHANGHAI must be withdrawn;
- (3) JAPAN is very close to making war against GREAT BRITAIN;
- (4) The Foreign Minister can do nothing as the Army is in the saddle.”(24).

INFANTRY FORCES ON WEST COAST STRENGTHENED

20. The disquieting news from TOKYO brought immediate action in OTTAWA. A General Staff Appreciation showed that infantry defences on the West Coast consisted of the following (25):

VICTORIA-ESQUIMALT

- (i) 1 C Scot R, in process of mobilizing as a unit of the Third Division (strength, 27 and 263).
- (ii) 2 C Scot R, (less dets at PRINCE RUPERT and YORKE ISLAND) - in process of recruiting to take over CD duties of the first battalion (strength, 20 and 300).

VANCOUVER

- (i) **BCR**, in process of mobilizing as a unit of the Fourth Division (strength, 23 and 234).
- (ii) Ir Fus, (less det at PRINCE RUPERT) (strength, 20 and 120).
- (iii) RM Rang, recruiting to replace BCR on guard duty in VANCOUVER Area (strength, 1 and 18).

PRINCE RUPERT

- (i) Det of Ir Fus (3 and 130).
- (ii) Det of 2 C Scot R (3 and 35).

YORKE ISLAND

Det of 2 C Scot R (1 and 30).

21. Potential reinforcements for the West Coast were to be found at DUNDURN CAMP, SASKATCHEWAN, where the Westminster Regt, practically at-war strength, was in training, and at SHILO CAMP, MANITOBA, where the 6 Inf Bde of the Second Division, (S Sask R, Calgary Highrs, and Camerons of C) were in training at full strength. In addition, three battalions, (S Alta R, Regina Rif, and R Wpg Rif) were mobilizing in Western Canada as units of the Fourth Division.

22. On the same day that word from TOKYO was received (20 Jun 40), orders were issued that the five battalions at the coast were to mobilize to full war establishment without delay. At the same time the Westminster Regt was warned for movement to VANCOUVER at 24 hours' notice, and action was initiated to form an infantry brigade group at SHILO, supplementing the 6 Inf Bde with a field regiment of artillery, a field company of engineers, a field ambulance, and appropriate signals. If necessary, this brigade group would proceed to the Coast on 72 hours' notice, and its place at SHILO would be filled by concentrating the three Western Canadian battalions there as a further reserve (26).

HOW SERIOUS WAS THE THREAT?

23. The General Staff's rapid response to the warning of possible danger on the PACIFIC Coast illustrates the pattern of action that was to be followed on later occasions. Neither scales of attack nor availability of troops in CANADA justified the posting of a large "standing army" in a "West Wall" type of defence at the Coast. If attacks suddenly threatened, dispositions must be planned at short notice to resist them. Enemy moves must be anticipated with a sufficient, but not excessive, margin of safety, both of time and degree. From a General Staff viewpoint such a

flexible system was the only logical method to be followed. That its operation frequently placed a heavy strain upon Administrative services is hardly to be wondered at.

24. How correctly did the General Staff gauge the Japanese threat in the summer of 1940? To what extent was it necessary to strengthen infantry defences on the West Coast? Justification of the action taken by NDHQ is revealed in an exchange of messages that took place early in July 1940, between OTTAWA and LONDON. To a suggestion from the War Office that CANADA might be able to supply additional strength to the forces then contemplated for service in ICELAND, NDHQ had pointed out that "the changing world situation and reported Japanese action make it necessary to keep in mind needs of defence in CANADA It is felt that as much as possible of the Second Division should be held in CANADA unless the need for it elsewhere is paramount." (27).

25. In reply, LONDON disparaging the possibility of a Japanese attack on CANADA, put forward the assumption that such an attack would immediately bring the United States into the War. Against the opposition of the United States Navy a Japanese land thrust at CANADA was "not considered to be a possible operation of war." (28).

26. The Canadian answer to this appreciation clearly defined the General Staff estimate of our obligations on the West Coast, and struck the keynote of the policy that was to guide subsequent dispositions there.

" It is noted that the United Kingdom Government justify their appreciation of the outcome of a possible Japanese attack on CANADA on the assumption that such an attack would immediately result in bringing the United States forces into active participation. The Canadian Government consider that while this is probable, it cannot be accepted as a certainty in all cases, and in any event it is obviously necessary for us to have sufficient forces available to Provide effective co-operation with our neighbour, and to assure the Canadian public regarding our defensive measures We have a large Japanese population in BRITISH COLUMBIA which might become disaffected and a serious menace even prior to any actual attack." (29).

MOBILIZATION IN CANADA ACCELERATED

27. The rapid deterioration that took place in the European theatre of war during May and June, 1940, called for decisive measures in strengthening CANADA's forces at home and overseas. Orders for the mobilization of the Third and Fourth Divisions were given in rapid succession (30). Formation of the Corps of the Veterans' Home Guard (afterwards the V G of C) was authorized, and twenty-nine infantry companies of Veterans quickly enrolled for service. On 19 June Parliament passed the National Resources Mobilization Act, and the Department of National Defence made plans for the training of 5,000 monthly "call-ups", whose services were required first for ninety days, then for four months, and finally for the duration. To find a place for these NRMA personnel upon the completion of their basic training, additional infantry battalions, destined later to become "home-defence" units, were placed on active service. The mobilization of the following units, not included in the Fourth Division, was ordered

in July: - RRC, VR of C , Sher Fus R, Edmn Fus (MG), D & H Rif, Alq R, Kent R (MG), and Mid R (32). All except the Algonquin Regt and the Sherbrooke Fusiliers were to appear later on the PACIFIC Coast.

EMPLOYMENT OF THE VETERANS' GUARD

28. Towards the end of June the DOC MD 11 put forward a recommendation that in order to promote the concentration of the 1 C Scot R, personnel of the Veterans' Home Guard should be utilized to guard the BAMFIELD Cable Station and the Joint Services Magazine (33). In failing to approve the recommendation, NDHQ referred to the general principle that Veterans should not guard places exposed to possible direct action by the enemy (34). A certain degree of flexibility appears in the interpretation of what constituted "exposed" places, as throughout July, August and September detachments of the newly formed 11 "A" and 11 "B" companies, V G of C, successively relieved personnel of infantry battalions from their guard duties at the Joint Services Magazine, IOCO, POINT ATKINSON, STEVESTON, and the various armouries, of VANCOUVER and VICTORIA. At the same time, defence of the vital industries and strategic points in TRAIL and its vicinity was undertaken by 11 "C" Coy, V G of C (35).

29. In Feb 41 a change in the policy of employment of the Veterans' Guard permitted units of the Corps to be assigned to protective duties at RCAF bases and other advanced points similarly exposed to armed enemy attack (36). The amended policy was quickly put into effect in BRITISH COLUMBIA. Early in April platoons of 11 "A" Coy V G of C at VANCOUVER relieved detachments of the BCR at the RCAF bases of COAL HARBOUR and BELLA BELLA (37), while 11 "B" Coy, at VICTORIA, sent reliefs for the 2 C Scot R at the UCLUELET RCAF Base and the BAMFIELD Cable Station (38).

30. The decision to use the veterans on outpost duty was nowhere approved of more heartily than by the men themselves. Not only were they releasing the new generation of troops for much needed training, they were assuming a responsibility far more suited to their military experience than the sheltered and almost "sedentary" routine of patrolling armouries and defence establishments at or near the centres of population. They were taking over guard duties that in certain circumstances might bring them into direct contact with the enemy.

31. The "old-timers" were happy in the wilderness. The last war had taught them all the wrinkles, and they knew how to keep themselves comfortable in surroundings in which a young soldier would have been helplessly miserable. Their officers looked after them with an understanding that less experienced subalterns of the current war's vintage could hardly have approximated. Pioneers of the military defences at the outlying RCAF bases of BELLA BELLA, COAL HARBOUR and UCLUELET, they performed a valuable but laborious service in building living-quarters, digging weapon pits, mounting wire obstacles, constructing roads, installing communications, reconnoitering and mapping the locality, and generally making the most effective preparations possible to withstand attack. There are few more stimulating stories of preparedness and initiative than that of the platoon commander at BELLA BELLA, who, on receipt of the wireless code-word that war had broken out with JAPAN, put up notices, "All

incoming boats to report to Wharf, - by order of the GOC-in-C", used a commandeered Japanese boat as a guard ship, and shot up the first launch that appeared, effectively bringing it to a protesting halt (39).

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

32. The establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in August 1940, to "consider in the broad sense the defence of the north half of the Western Hemisphere," (40) focussed attention upon the importance of taking adequate measures on Canada's Eastern and Western Coasts. Allocation of responsibilities under "Joint Tasks" that were to be assumed by the two contracting nations in the event of aggression, contemplated the provision of additional defence facilities in BRITISH COLUMBIA, including the assembling of Canadian troop concentrations for support of Alaskan garrisons, if required. In return, the United States Army was to provide "a mobile reserve of one division, and air forces, for co-operation with Canadian and United States defence forces in the defence of the BRITISH COLUMBIA-PUGET SOUND region." (41).

PACIFIC COMMAND ESTABLISHED

33. The increasingly important defence roles that were being assumed by Military Districts on the two coasts led to the institution, in August and October respectively, of the Atlantic and Pacific Army Commands (42). The Pacific Command comprised the whole of Military District Nos 11 and 13. Operational command was vested in a General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, who, while retaining full responsibility for policy governing administration throughout the Command, delegated administrative authority to the DOsC of the two Military Districts (43).

34. Subordinate formations within the newly-formed Command had been in existence at VICTORIA-ESQUIMALT, VANCOUVER and PRINCE RUPERT since the beginning of the War. HQ V and E Fortress, temporarily commanded at the beginning of the War by Lt-Col RL FORTT, and then Lt-Col AV TREMAINE, was at this time under the command of Lt-Col CV BISHOP, who held the appointment from the beginning of 1940 to April 1942. On the lower mainland the VANCOUVER Area, including YORKE ISLAND, was from September 1939 to August 1940 commanded by Col (later Maj-Gen) HFG LETSON MC ED who at the beginning of the War was also O C 14 Inf Bde (NPAM). On Col LETSON's appointment to WASHINGTON as Military Attache, the command of VANCOUVER Defences was assumed by Col CG BEESTON. After PEARL HARBOUR, Brig DR SARGENT ED was appointed commander, retaining the post until June 1942. HQ PRINCE RUPERT Defences was commanded continuously by Lt-Col (later Col) SD JOHNSTONE from the outbreak of war until September 1942, when he became Col Fixed Defences, Pacific Command.

35. The new GOC-in-C, Maj-Gen RO ALEXANDER DSO who had been DOC MD No 2 from November 1938, was the third officer to command MD No 11 since the outbreak of the war. In September 1939, Brig JC STEWART DSO was District Officer Commanding, - an appointment he had held since June 1938. In December 1939 Brig STEWART exchanged positions with Brig CV STOCKWELL DSO CRCA 1 Cdn Div Arty, to become CRCA 1 Cdn

Corps in July 1940. Brig. STOCKWELL, who at the beginning of the war had been Officer Administering RCA and Commandant of the Royal Canadian School of Artillery at KINGSTON, held the appointment of DOC MD No 11 until he was succeeded by Gen ALEXANDER in October, 1940.

36. Headquarters Pacific Command was gradually established on the "G" side. From parallel positions on the staff of MD 11, Col (later Brig) JF PRESTON MC and Maj (later Col) CT BATTEN were in January 1941 appointed respectively Colonel General Staff, and GSO II (Oprs), Pacific Command (44). In April, Lt-Col (later Brig) AHW LANDON OBE MC became GSO I (Trg) from GSO I MD 6 (45). Administration remained the function of MD 11, although for sixteen months the office of DOC was not filled (46). From January 1941 Col (later Brig) LW MILLER ISO was the senior ranking "A" man as Officer i/c Administration. When, in March 1942, he became DOC MD 11, he was the last to hold that office. On his retirement at the end of June, the appointment of his successor, Brig RG WHITELAW, and those who followed him as Brigadier i/c Administration, Pacific Command, brought the "A" branch directly under control of the GOC-in-C.

BRIGADE MOBILE RESERVE FORMED

37. The newly-appointed GOC-in-C found the following infantry units at his disposal in the Command towards the close of 1940. Three battalions were employed on local defence duties; - the 2 C Scot R at Esquimalt, the RM Rang at New Westminster, and the Ir Fus at Prince Rupert. 11 "A", "B" and "C" Coys VG of C were guarding vulnerable points at VANCOUVER, VICTORIA and CRANBROOK, respectively. Three other battalions were preparing for overseas: - the BCR and the S Alta R, both of the 4 Div, in tents at NANAIMO, and the Westmr R, back from training at DUNDURN, occupying the Old Vancouver Hotel. In addition, the 9 Armoured Regiment, mobilized in July at KELOWNA BC as the 5 Cdn Motorcycle Regt (BCD), were in training at MACAULAY CAMP, ESQUIMALT (47).

38. Gen ALEXANDER, counting strongly on the use of mobile reserve, recommended that an infantry brigade group (less artillery) should be provided for the NANAIMO area, and that the number of existing "static" battalions in the main defended areas should be increased by an additional infantry battalion for internal security at VANCOUVER (48).

10 INFANTRY BRIGADE

39. In February, Headquarters 10 Inf Bde was set up at NANAIMO, with the S Alta R and the BCR coming under its command. The Brigade Commander was Brig JB STEVENSON ED (OC Seaforth of C, 2 Sep 39 to 22 Jan 41, Comdr 1 CIB 27 Nov 40 to 29 Dec 40). Maj (later Lt-Col) HM THOMAS was Brigade Major, and Capt JT HARVEY, Staff Captain. Concentration of the brigade was completed in March, with the arrival of the 16/22 SASKATCHEWAN Horse (later

the 20 Army Tank Regt). To them fell the honour of being the first occupants of the newly-constructed huts at NANAIMO CAMP.

40. When the 10 Inf Bde moved East in May 1941 its place was taken at NANAIMO by the 13 Inf Bde from NIAGARA. The arrival at the Coast of the three Ontario battalions, the Lincoln and Welland Regiment, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Princess Louise's), and the Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles of Canada, marked the beginning of the practice of strengthening West Coast defences with infantry units from all parts of CANADA. Before the end of 1943, 36 infantry battalions had taken their turn at guarding the Pacific Coast. Of these, only eight were BRITISH COLMMIA units, - and of the remainder nineteen came from east of the Great Lakes (49).

41. The 13 Inf Bde, destined to service for four years in Pacific Command, and to have the honour of participating in the joint United States - Canadian Aleutian expedition of 1943, was commanded at this time by Brig OM MARTIN VD. Maj (later Lt-Col) CE TUCK ED was Brigade Major, and the Staff Captain was Capt WG GODFREY. The composition of the brigade was not long unchanged. To meet the threat of Japanese expansion in ASIA, CANADA decided to send two battalions to HONG KONG. Early in September the Lincoln and Welland Regiment left to replace the Royal Rifles of Canada on garrison duties in NEWFOUNDLAND, while the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders hurried to JAMAICA to release the Winnipeg Grenadiers for their Asiatic mission (50). With them from NANAIMO went Brig MARTIN, to assume command of the 14 Inf Bde which was beginning to concentrate in the NIAGARA PENINSULA.

PARTIAL MOBILIZATION SIXTH DIVISION

42. In July 1941, with the First and Second Divisions overseas, the Third Division under embarkation orders, and the Fifth Armoured Division expected to proceed overseas early in the fall, it appeared likely that by September the Fourth Division would be the only organized formation of troops in CANADA. There was an understanding with the UNITED STATES that the Dominion should keep two divisions mobilized as a general reserve in CANADA in addition to coast garrisons (51). A proposal to mobilize another division had been deferred by the War Committee of the Cabinet in May. Authority was sought and approved, in July, to form three brigade groups of the 6 Div, utilizing some units already mobilized (52).

43. The proposed brigades were to be composed and located as follows: -

- E0 NANAIMO** - 13 Inf Bde (To be concentrated by 15 Oct 41)
Already mobilized were Bde HQ, Wpg Gren, Ir Fus, Edmn Fus.
- B. NIAGARA** - 14 Inf-Bde (To be concentrated by 1 Nov 41)
PENINSULA Already mobilized - Kent R, Alq R, Mid R.
To mobilize - Bde HQ.
- C. VALCARTIER** - 15 Inf Bde (To concentrate 1 Dec 41).
Already mobilized, - Vol de Q.
To mobilize - Bde HQ, R de Hull, S Ste M & Sud.

Three field regiments RCA (19, 20, 21), three field companies RCE (5, 15, 20), three field Ambulances RCAMC (6, 17, 20), and other supporting units and detachments were also to mobilize. At the time of authorization of the three brigade groups it was indicated that the 15 Bde at VALCARTIER could be considered as a potential reserve to Pacific Command if necessary.

44. Brig WG COLQUHOUN MC (OC PPCLI 1 Sep 39 to 13 Sep 40, Comdr 7 CIB 14 Sep 40 to 9 Jun 41) returned from ENGLAND to succeed Brig MARTIN at NANAIMO. To complete the infantry component of the Brigade the Ir Fus came in from coast defence duty to join the Edmn Fus (who had been brought out as a relief CD unit (53) and the Victoria Rifles of Canada, who were replacing the Wpg Gren in the original organization. Other supporting 6 Div troops for the 13 Brigade Group did not appear at the Coast until the end of the year, when the 21 Fd Regt RCA concentrated at NEW WESTMINSTER, the 20 Fd Coy RCE at NORTH VANCOUVER, the 17 Fd Amb RCAMC at NANAIMO, and the 18 (Man) Recce Bn at VICTORIA.

READY FOR JAPAN

45. In November 1941, the CGS (Maj-Gen HDG CRERAR) informed the Minister of National Defence that in the event of war with JAPAN, dispositions that had been made on the West Coast were, with minor exceptions, "adequate for the purpose of meeting the anticipated forms and scales of attack". (Exceptions were the unfulfilled requirements of four platoons of VG of C to protect RCAF bases, and the provision of certain batteries of modern anti-aircraft guns and lights). There was an infantry battalion available at each main defended area - PRINCE RUPERT (2 C Scot R), NEW WESTMINSTER - VANCOUVER (RM Rang), and VICTORIA-ESQUIMALT (D & H Rif), - with an additional general reserve of an infantry brigade at NANAIMO (13 Inf Bde). Platoons of the Veterans Guard were at the RCAF bases of UCLUELET, COAL HARBOUR, and BELLA BELLA, with ALLIFORD BAY defended by an infantry company of the 2 C Scot R (54).

46. The CGS memo continued:-
"While the present dispositions are considered adequate to meet any situation that might arise, it must be anticipated that on the outbreak of war strong pressure may be brought upon the Government to increase the active forces in BRITISH COLUMBIA. In that event, it might be necessary to move additional troops from Eastern Canada to the Pacific Coast."(55).

47. The additional troops suggested above for movement to BRITISH COLUMBIA in case of an emergency were the Canadian Grenadier Guards and the Governor General's Foot Guards of the 12 Inf Bde, and the Irish Regiment of Canada of the 11 Inf Bde. These battalions, then contemplated as the non-armoured regiments of the 4 Div, could proceed west under HQ 12 Inf Bde if needed. Later events were to show that the CGS's anticipations were well founded.

D. THE THIRD PHASE - THE EXPANSION OF PACIFIC COMMAND

AT WAR WITH JAPAN

48. The contingency against which Canada's West Coast defences had long been directed became a reality on 7 Dec 41. JAPAN herself settled any uncertainties that might have arisen with regard to CANADA or the UNITED STATES coming to each other's aid, by attacking BRITISH and AMERICAN territory simultaneously, and the Dominion beat her southern neighbour by a day in declaring war on the aggressor (56). UNITED STATES naval losses at PEARL HARBOUR and the sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse three days later gave the Japanese fleet an unexpected position of strength. On 30 Dec the United States Navy announced the presence of Japanese warships in Alaskan waters (57).

THE DEMAND – (A) PUBLIC OPINION

490 To the people of BRITISH COLUMBIA the War now appeared very close to home. Resolutions and letters came from civilian organizations and individuals urging and demanding increased protection (58). Newspaper editorials played upon the fears of a public uninformed regarding the strategical picture of the likelihood of attack and the available means to meet it (59). At a meeting of the Joint Services Committee to which Premier HART was invited, the GOC-in-C pointed out the broader issues of the war, emphasizing the need for offensive action against the enemy outside CANADA, rather than subscribing to the "defence complex" of piling up troops and weapons "for direct defence of certain areas in excess of minimum numbers considered essential to deny enemy occupation to these areas". "Nuisance value" attacks must be accepted.

50. To this the Premier replied that the people of BRITISH COLUMBIA were alarmed, and "were obsessed with the necessity of the adequate protection of BRITISH COLUMBIA from any possible eventuality, and until this can be assured did not appreciate the necessity of sending weapons and equipment abroad." (60).

51. The apprehension felt by the general public on the Pacific Coast was in two directions. They were concerned first of all over the apparent lack of coast and anti-aircraft defences available, but a very large number of them also feared the internal danger that they felt existed in the presence in BRITISH COLUMBIA of twenty-four thousand Japanese racials. A vigorously prosecuted campaign, supported by inflamed public sentiment, and hotly pursued by vehement members of Parliament and a vociferous press, urged the Dominion Government to take action in "establishing some security against possible attack from within as well as without." (61).

THE DEMAND – (B) INCREASED SCALE OF ATTACK

52. The forms and scales of attack for the Pacific Coast, to meet which all defence plans were formulated, had from 1938 anticipated, in addition to naval and air attack, raids by landing parties of up to 250 strength. While the general estimates of enemy action had been reviewed periodically since that time, as late as 12 Nov 41 the Chiefs of Staff Committee approved forms

and scales in which potential attack by small raiding parties was not expected to exceed the magnitude previously anticipated. It was on such a basis that dispositions of infantry forces had been made in BRITISH COLUMBIA during 1940 and 1941.

53. On 20 Feb 42 the British Chiefs of Staff at WASHINGTON reached the conclusion, concurred in by the US Chief of Staff, that "the most probable enemy threat is carrier-borne air attacks and sporadic naval bombardment, but a small scale destructive raid cannot be ignored." A raiding force of 10-15 fast merchant ships, carrying up to two brigades on a low scale of transport, was envisaged, - with such raids possible being accompanied by air attack from carrier-based dive bombers and fighters (62). On 1 Apr 42 the Joint Services Committee, Pacific Coast, in consideration of the changing picture, prepared an appreciation on defence requirements which included possibilities of attack by up to two brigades. Although neither of these appreciations was officially approved by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, to be embodied into the official Canadian Scales of Attack, the Canadian Army was soon to make dispositions to meet landings by two brigades on the West Coast (63).

54. With the increased scale of attack by airborne and seaborne troops the possibility of enemy attempts to seize airfields on VANCOUVER ISLAND became a matter demanding attention. Following the recommendations of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence construction had started on aerodromes at TOFINO and PORT HARDY. The Board now expressed its concern at the inadequacy of defences in the TOFINO area, which was only 150 miles from important UNITED STATES defence installations (64). A Pacific Command Intelligence report considered:-

"It is believed that JAPAN would welcome the opportunity to have provided for them an airfield in close proximity to VICTORIA, VANCOUVER, and SEATTLE, from which to carry on operations, even of a temporary nature, against these centres, and would be willing to make considerable sacrifices to obtain one." (65).

THE DEMAND - (C) THE ALEUTIAN THREAT

55. Six months after PEARL HARBOUR JAPAN struck north into the ALEUTIANS, occupying ATTU and KISKA as bases for potential thrusts eastward along the Chain to the Alaskan mainland (66). It appeared as though the Japanese strategy of advancing by "island-hopping" was to be successfully employed once again (67). As the enemy completed submarine bases in the ALEUTIANS, the supply of reinforcements to UNITED STATES ALASKA bases would become more and more difficult. On the night of the 20 June, an unidentified submarine shelled the wireless station and light at ESTEVAN POINT on VANCOUVER ISLAND (68).

THE RESPONSE

56. Action to meet the situation at the coast appeared to start slowly and to gather momentum as the need became more pressing, and the results of planning began to take form in operation. Public opinion was mollified by the removal of all Japanese from a Protected Area extending

between the ROCKY MOUNTAINS and the sea (69). Early in January airfield guards of Special Shrapnel Sections RCA armed with .75 mm guns were sent to reinforce the infantry platoons at UCLUELET, ALLIFORD BAY and BELLA BELLA (70), and a company of the D & H Rif at V & E Fortress moved to guard the aerodrome at PATRICIA BAY. The Coast received its first anti-aircraft defence when a special heavy A/A Section moved from HALIFAX in January. By the end of April the formation had been authorized of anti-aircraft units "to cover all A/A equipment likely to be available to Pacific Command in 1942" (71). And during April and May twelve additional infantry battalions arrived at the Coast, with promise of more on the way. To discover their origin and their proposed dispositions it will be necessary examine the story of successive mobilizations in CANADA during the first half of 1942.

MANNING THE WESTERN FRONTIER

57. A study of the various General Staff proposals that accompanied submissions during March 1942 for authority to mobilize formations reveals a flexibility of dispositions that presents a picture that at times becomes more than a little complicated. It is a simple matter to state that between January and June the number of infantry battalions in BRITISH COLUMBIA increased from six to nineteen; it is not so easy to show how the 6 Div came to contain brigades numbered 13, 18 and 19, - while the 8 Div included 14 and 16. Between the original authorization of a formation and its arrival in the field much may happen. The availability of instructional cadres, the comparative states of training attained by newly mobilized units, and, above all, the provision of adequate accommodation in the short time that emergency allows, - all were factors which often forced changes in General Staff planning. During that threatening spring there was much drawing up and rearranging of Orders of Battle before a disposition was reached in which the plan was to approach fulfillment.

MOBILIZATION OF UNBRIGADED UNITS

58. On 7 Mar 42 mobilization authority was issued for five infantry battalions, the Prince Albert Volunteers, the Queen's York Rangers, the Scots Fusiliers of Canada, the Prince of Wales Rangers and the Lanark and Renfrew Scottish Regiment (72). It was announced that these battalions would be used for airport defence at TOFINO and HARDY BAY (one bn each), and as local reserve at VANCOUVER, KAMLOOPS and TERRACE. This was NDHQ's answer to a recommendation by the GOC-in-C that the vulnerability of the OCEAN FALLS and BELLA COOLA - WILLIAMS LAKE avenue justified the placing of an infantry battalion near WILLIAMS LAKE (73). Before, however, any of these dispositions had been completed, increased scales of attack on the West Coast (see para 53 above) made an upward revision necessary.

COMPLETION OF 6 DIV AND 3 BDE GPS OF 7 DIV

59. On 11 March the CGS wired the GOC-in-C, Pacific Command, that in view of the possibility of destructive ground-force raids on an increased scale it was proposed to dispose

three infantry brigade groups in Pacific Command, "in addition to the battalions presently employed on coast defence and the two battalions earmarked for PORT HARDY and TOFINO Aerodromes" (74).

60. To raise the necessary troops the War Committee of the Cabinet authorized, on 18 Mar, the completion of the 6 Div and the mobilization of three brigade groups of the 7 Div. A CGS memo at the time indicated that the above units together with ten unbrigaded battalions previously authorized would enable him "to complete the garrisons at air and naval stations and other strategic points, and to maintain a mobile reserve of one division at each coast." The 6 Div would succeed the 4 Armoured Div at DEBERT and SUSSEX, - the brigade groups of the 7 Div (16, 17 and 18 Bde) would be in the Pacific Command, one in the HAZELTON area, the other two in the southern part of VANCOUVER ISLAND (TOFINO Area and NANAIMO). There would thus be fourteen infantry battalions on the coast (made up of the three brigade groups, the three battalions previously employed on Coast Defence and the two units authorized for airport defence) (75).

61. It was expected that the three brigade groups of the 7 Div would be concentrated at the Pacific Coast by 1 Aug 42. In the interval, forces at the disposal of the GOC-in-C were increased by moving during April and May seven battalions from the Prairies and Eastern Canada. From guard duties with 14 Inf Bde at NIAGARA came the Kent R, the Mid R, and S Ste M & Sud, the first two to take up similar work at VANCOUVER and PRINCE RUFERT. Le R de Hull and the reconstituted R R C arrived from VALCARTIER to join the S Ste M & Sud in the 13 brigade at NANAIMO. The reconstituted Wpg Gren and KOR of C, more recently mobilized than the other battalions, moved to TERRACE, to form with the Midlands the nucleus of the 14 Bde. At the end of May there were thirteen infantry battalions in Pacific Command.

COMPLETION OF 7 DIV AND 3 BDE GPS OF 8 DIV

62. Proposed dispositions of the three brigade groups of the 7 Div and the unbrigaded battalions detailed for coast defence and aerodrome defence duties allowed for no other active formations to back up these front-line forces. In order to make provision for the requisite "defence in depth", authority was sought and obtained at the end of March to mobilize three brigade groups of the 8 Div, and to complete the Order of Battle of the 7 Div. Two of the new brigades were slated to be reserves for Pacific Command, at VERNON and at WILLIAMS LAKE or WAINWRIGHT (later changed to PRINCE GEORGE); the third brigade was to go to VALCARTIER, as a reserve for Atlantic Command (76). The Order of Battle and mobilization authority showed that all components were new units to be mobilized, the majority of infantry battalions being second (later changed to third) battalions of existing active units. From this mobilization three units were to reach the West Coast late in 1942, - the 3 Bn Irish Fusiliers (VANCOUVER Regiment), the 3 Bn Regina Rifle Regiment, and the 3 Bn Edmonton Fusiliers (77).

63. During June six more infantry battalions arrived in the Command. Three, the Prince Albert Volunteers, the Canadian Fusiliers (City of LONDON Regt), and the Winnipeg Light Infantry, went into tents at VERNON, where, as the 17 Inf Bde, and later 19 Inf Bde (See para

65) they became a mobile reserve for the lower mainland. The other three, the Brockville Rifles, the Oxford Rifles, and the Prince of Wales Rangers, were assembled at Prince George under HQ 16 Inf Bde, to provide depth to the northern defences at PRINCE RUPERT. With the exception of the Can Fus (formed in Jan 42) none of these units had been mobilized more than three months. Brought up to strength by the posting of "R" recruits and "members HD" direct from basic training centres, these battalions filled a dual role as they carried on with training in the very country where it might have to be put to the test in actual fighting.

THE ALLOCATION OF HIGHER FORMATIONS

64. It has been shown above (para 40) that until the end of May 1942 the only constituted infantry brigade in Pacific Command was the 13 Bde of the 6 Div, providing a mobile reserve at NANAIMO. Brig WG COLQUHOUN MC was still in command, with Maj N KINGSMILL as BM, and Maj HJ JONES as SC. Early in June, HQ 14 Bde arrived at TERRACE from NIAGARA, assuming command over the KOR of C and Wpg Gren there and the Mid R at PRINCE RUPERT. Brig V HODSON VD (78) came from commanding ESQUIMALT Fortress to succeed Brig OM MARTIN VD as Brigade Commander, and Maj CE TUCK ED and Capt WG GODFREY remained as BM and SC.

65. The original decision that the 7 Div should defend the Pacific Coast resulted in headquarters of 16, 17 and 18 Inf Bdes being formed respectively at PRINCE GEORGE, VERNON and ESQUIMALT (for ALBERNI-TOFINO) during May and June 1942. Appointed to command these brigades were, - 16 Bde, Brig OM MARTIN VD (from 14 CIB); 17 Bde, Brig CG TOPP DSO MC (Area Comdt Lansdowne Park, OTTAWA, 1 Sep 39 to 19 May 40, Comdr 4 CIB 20 May 40 to 28 Feb 42); and 18 Bde, Brig HW MURDOCK ED (OC IRTC MD No 6, 12 Jan 40 to 31 May 40, OC Nth NS Highrs 1 Jan 40 to 20 May 42) (79). Some time in May a change of plan occurred, and it was decided that the 7 Div would go to Atlantic Command and the 6 Div would stay at the Pacific Coast. Only one of the newly-formed- brigade headquarters, the 17, moved east to join its senior formation. Its place was taken at VERNON by the formation of HQ 19 Bde, of the 8 Div Order of Battle, with Brig WG COLQUHOUN MC assuming command.

66. When, in July 1942, areas of responsibility for subordinate formations within Pacific Command were mapped out, the GOC 6 Div, at ESQUIMALT, Maj-Gen AE POTTS CBE, was allotted command of the whole of VANCOUVER ISLAND, while the BRITISH COLUMBIA mainland lying north and west of the CNR main line from ASHCROFT to the ALBERTA border came under GOC 8 Div, Maj Gen HN GANONG, with Headquarters at PRINCE GEORGE. This disposition placed the 13 and 18 Brigades (who were at NANAIMO and ALBERNI-TOFINO respectively) within the 6 Div, V & E Fortress with its CD battalions being regarded in effect as a third brigade group for the division's tactical command (80). In the north, the 14 Bde at TERRACE and PRINCE RUPERT, and the 16 Bde at PRINCE GEORGE, became the two brigade groups of the 8 Div (81). 19 Bde at Vernon came under HQ Pacific Command.

CHANGES IN COMMAND

67. In the middle of June Maj-Gen ALEXANDER was transferred from GOC-in-C to become Inspector General for Central Canada. His place was taken by Lt-Gen K STUART DSO MC, and for two months Gen STUART held simultaneously the appointments of CGS and GOC-in-C Pacific Command. The temporary combination of these posts emphasized the seriousness of the threat in the West. With the CGS taking control on the Pacific Coast no resident of BRITISH COLUMBIA could now complain of lack of action from OTTAWA (82). At the same time, Brig MILLER (83) DOC MD 11, was retired on medical grounds, his place being taken by Brig RG WHITELAW (from DMT NDHQ) as Brig i/c Administration (84). In a series of other changes Col JF PRESTON MC (85) went to command Esquimalt Fortress, being replaced as Colonel Gen Staff, by Col JE LYON (from DMO & I, NDHQ) (86); Brig AHW LANDON OBE MC became OC Vancouver Defences, with Lt-Col MR TENBROEKE MC (AA&QMG MD No 11 14 May 42 to 28 Jun 42) succeeding him as GSO I (Trg); and Lt-Col CT BATTEN advanced from GSO II to GSO I (Oprs).

68. On 2 Sep 42 Maj-Gen GR PEARKES VC CB DSO MC was appointed GOC-in-C Pacific Command. Proceeding overseas in 1939 as Commander of the 2 Cdn Inf Bde, Gen PEARKES had held the command of 1 Cdn Div from 20 Jul 40 to 1 Sep 42. At the same time Brig WHITELAW was replaced by Brig WHS MACKLIN as Brig i/c Administration (87), and Col LYON was promoted to the parallel rank of Brig Gen Staff. The increased importance attached to coastal artillery defences brought Col SD JOHNSTON MC VD from OC Prince Rupert Defences to HQ Pacific Command in the post of Col Fixed Defences, his place being taken at the Northern port by Col Fixed Defences, his place being taken at the Northern port by Col DB MARTYN DSO MC VD (GSO II Pac Comd 26 Jul 42 to 31 Aug 42).

REORGANIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

69. To meet the demands created by the sudden increase of operational troops, the administrative services underwent a parallel extension and reorganization, and, effective 1 Aug 42, were set up as Pacific Command Services, with MD No. 11 ceasing to exist. The plan of superimposing mobile troops as "short" divisions upon a static system of supply and services had worked well in ENGLAND, where some of the coast defence divisions had been so operated. In Pacific Command it was a practical solution to an existing problem. Divisional services were largely removed from 6 Div and 8 Div. Instead, all formations were served from a system of static RCASC supply depots, and Ordnance depots and technical and non-technical workshops, strategically placed throughout the Command. In a similar manner medical needs of the forces were looked after by ten military hospitals in the areas of troop concentrations, with base and advanced medical stores depots situated at fixed points (87). Under the Command Engineer Officer, general maintenance of works and buildings for troop accommodation was carried out by personnel of 11 ES&W Coy and No 4 Fortress Coy RCE, the Field Coys within the divisions drawing their operational stores and material from Engineer yards established in the camp areas (88). In general, it will be noted, the system employed in Pacific Command organized the operational troops on an area, rather than on a formation basis (89).

IN AN OPERATIONAL ROLE

70. The men who had come to defend CANADA on the Pacific Coast in the summer of 1942 were not trained troops. Recently mobilized, some units came to BRITISH COLUMBIA with their ranks filled by NRMA personnel of two months or less military experience in basic training centres. During the months that followed, formation commanders from the GOC-in-C downwards concentrated on raising the efficiency of all troops in the Command. As infantry units progressed successively through section, platoon, and company stages towards battalion training, full advantage was taken of the varied types of tactical country to be found in the rolling ranges of VERNON and NANAIMO, the hardening hills of TERRACE, and the dense timberlands of West VANCOUVER ISLAND. The swampy muskeg of PRINCE RUPERT and the jungle-like thickets of AIBERNI might not provide the facilities for mobile warfare afforded by the open country of the VERNON area, but it gave the troops stationed in these regions the best possible training for meeting the enemy on ground to whose peculiar difficulties they had become accustomed.

71. But other factors than terrain affected training schedules. Only at NANAIMO did the incoming brigades find hut accommodation ready for them. At VERNON, at TERRACE, PRINCE GEORGE, AIBERNI and TOFINO engineers and civilian contractors worked desperately during the summer and fall of 1942 in the construction of brigade camps. The battle of priorities in labour and materials frequently delayed progress, and through the ensuing winter and spring the brigades supplied large fatigue parties to help push the work to completion. In many cases too, the engineers supplied the brains, the infantry, the brawn, for the construction of rifle ranges, roadways, assault courses and parade grounds, and the symbol of the pick and shovel hovered close over many a battalion's coat of arms. Fire fighting in the early summer, and fuel cutting in the late fall and winter may have subscribed to the welfare of the civilian population, but added little to the progress of military training.

72. There was a turnover of personnel within the units that lowered the hopes and raised the ire of many a battalion and brigade - commander. The last battalions to reach the Coast were from 300 to 500 men under strength (90). The drain of manpower from the Command started with the withdrawal from coast units of the "DIEPPE platoons" in the fall of 1942, and was to continue at intervals as long as GS personnel in any quantity remained in BRITISH COLUMBIA. To replace outgoing drafts came "R" recruits, in many cases direct from depots. Operational units must perforce become temporary training centres. The battalion syllabus of training was badly disorganized. It was not uncommon to find within a single unit a separate schedule being employed for each of the four rifle companies, with all the stages from recruit to specialist and battalion training being carried on simultaneously.

73. Many of the NRMA personnel showed little enthusiasm over the change that had brought them from civilian life, and the spring and summer of 1942 and 1943 brought requests for agricultural leave and postponement of service that ran into the thousands. A considerable burden was placed upon unit officers and under-staffed orderly rooms in dealing with the involved proceedings that accompanied every application for compassionate leave, and Commanding Officers resented having thrust upon them the responsibility of instituting

investigations and submitting recommendations that they considered, not without, reason, should have been the task of non-military authorities.

SPECIAL TRAINING PROJECTS

74. While the general policy of training was laid down by OTTAWA, certain variations of a specialized nature were instituted in Pacific Command. In June 1942, the first course in battle drill was given at COURTENAY to selected officers and NCOs from units and training centres in the Command (91). The Canadian Battle Drill Training Centre, which was organized by the Commandant, Lt-Col JF SCOTT, Calg Highrs, moved to VERNON in October, to be taken over by NDHQ. Late in the fall a course in Combined Operations followed the Battle Drill School at COURTENAY. Initiated under the leadership of Lt-Col RV BOYLE, Loyal Regt, a British Army officer borrowed from attachment at WASHINGTON, the Combined Operations School proved so successful that it was placed on a HWE by NDHQ in July 1943, with Lt-Col CH COOKE, C H of O, assuming command (92). Operated as Command Schools without establishments, the Bush, Forest and Jungle School at PRINCE GEORGE held its first course in September 1943 (93), while the Mountain Warfare School opened at TERRACE in October (94).

75. The most ambitious large-scale training scheme in Pacific Command took place at WAINWRIGHT. The GOC-in-C's proposal to use BUFFALO PARK for training full brigade groups in combined operations was approved by NDHQ in time for summer training in 1943. From mid-June until late October, in periods of six weeks each, three brigade groups, the 14, 19, and 18, underwent the rigorous and valuable training of "Buffalo", a total of eleven infantry battalions greatly increasing their efficiency as a result (95). Throughout the summer, the operational role of the troops at WAINWRIGHT was not forgotten. Each brigade, during its period of "Buffalo" training, became a mobile reserve, prepared to move to PRINCE GEORGE to assist 8 Div in case of emergency (96). Appropriate dispositions of units remaining in BRITISH COLUMBIA during the scheme kept the defences of the Command effectively manned.

DEFENSE OF AIRFIELDS - INFANTRY BNS

76. Shortly after the outbreak of war with JAPAN, the importance of denying to the enemy the use of airfields on VANCOUVER ISLAND and the mainland raised the problem of providing adequate ground forces to supplement any anti-aircraft defences installed. At first the duty was assigned to regular infantry troops, as PATRICIA BAY airfield was given protection by a company of the D & H Rif from V & E Fortress. On the occasion of the visit to the coast of Maj-Gen JC MURCHIE (then VCGS) in April 1942, the GOC-in-C (Maj-Gen RO ALEXANDER) put forward recommendations for one infantry battalion for each of the airfields at PATRICIA BAY, SEA ISLAND and HARDY BAY, and for an infantry brigade group at TOFINO, when work on the runways had progressed far enough to make them of use to an enemy (97).

77. Approval was given, and the 2 C Scot R immediately moved to take over the defence of the PATRICIA BAY aerodrome. To TOFINO in July went a Company of the D & H Rif with a section of carriers, forerunners of a succession of battalions who were to be stationed at LONG BEACH from September 1942 (98). In October companies from the RRC at NEW WESTMINSTER took up guard duties at BOUNDARY BAY and SEA ISLAND. HARDY BAY, which did not become an RCAF operational base until January 1943 and was less exposed geographically than TOFINO, did not receive infantry protection until late summer of that year, when two companies of the Kent Regt, which was then stationed at TOFINO, moved in as garrison for HARDY BAY, BELLA BELLA and COAL HARBOUR (99).

AERODROME DEFENCE PLATOONS

78. The rapid development of technique shown by the enemy in the seizure of airfields in the European and Asiatic theatres of war stressed the need for providing as a counter-measure a more specialized type of defence unit than the regular infantry battalion. In CANADA this requirement was first met by the mobilization, in May 1942, of twelve Aerodrome Defence Platoons, five of which were slated for employment in Pacific Command (100). Each platoon was raised on an establishment of 1 officer and 43 other ranks, and comprised a headquarters, two sections each mounting three 2-pdr A/Tk guns on carriers, and a section of two carriers with 3" mortars. Two Ronson flame-throwers were added to establishment on reorganization of the platoons Aerodrome Defence Companies in October. The addition of the new platoons to existing forces at RCAF aerodromes or advanced air bases provided for a mobile defence force at each station, consisting of the aerodrome defence platoon, carrier platoons and lorry-borne infantry, whose special role was that of breaking up and destroying any enemy attack before it reached the inner perimeter, manned by RCAF personnel (101).

79. The five aerodrome defence platoons slated for the west coast, later increased to seven, were concentrated at DUNDURN, and commenced training, with some assistance in equipment and instruction being provided by A28 CAC(A)TC. Of the five original platoons Nos 8 and 9 were composed of Active personnel, while Nos 10, 11, and 12 used members HD to complete their establishment. Lt-Col WB HENDRIE (48 Highrs), one of five officers brought back from overseas for aerodrome defence duties, was posted to HQ Pacific Command as Staff Officer, Aerodrome Defences, and given the responsibility of organizing training and generally administering the platoons.

80. At the end of June 1942, Nos 8 and 10 Aerodrome Defence Platoons moved from Dundurn to NANAIMO, to be attached to 13 Inf Bde. Here they were issued with their operational equipment and transport, and some further training was carried out. Three weeks later they moved to their operational stations, No 8 to PATRICIA BAY, to come directly under Pacific Command, and No 10 to TOFINO, where it came under 30 Lt AA Bty RCA for all purposes (102). The two platoons were immediately replaced at NANAIMO by Nos 11 & 12 ADPLs from DUNDURN. By the end of the year three more AD platoons (Nos 9, 13 & 14) had reached the Coast, and TERRACE and BOUNDARY BAY had been added to the list of airfields having defence platoons. Early in 1943 SEA ISLAND and SMITHERS received similar protection.

ANNETTE ISLAND

81. In the early summer of 1942 the need for the protection of the port of PRINCE RUPERT by fighter aircraft sent a Squadron of RCAF fighter planes to ANNETTE ISLAND (103). The Canadian Squadron was welcomed by the UNITED STATES Western Defence Command as an addition to the defence forces in ALASKA (104). CANADA assumed responsibility for the defence of the US aerodrome at ANNETTE ISLAND, and towards the end of June the 112 LAA Bty (6 LAA Regt RCA), with eight 40-mm Bofors guns, was despatched from PRINCE RUPERT to the island. Later in the year the guns were taken over by 34 AA Bty, and in October a troop of 22 AA Bty manning four 3.7-in guns moved in to supplement the island's defences (105).

82. No 8 Aerodrome Defence Platoon moved from PATRICIA BAY to ANNETTE ISLAND at the beginning of September 1942, to be the first Canadian infantry troops placed in an operational role on UNITED STATES soil. Accommodated for three months in pyramidal tents (US), until the arrival of Quansit huts (106), and forced to face the unpleasantness of ALASKA rain and snow with an insufficient issue of waterproof clothing (107), the men made the best of their lot, carrying on with training, constructing gun positions, and responding to occasional alarms that brought all troops to the Alert with commendable promptness. In May 1943 the 14 Aerodrome Defence Platoon relieved the 8 P1 at ANNETTE ISLAND, to remain on operational duty there until recalled in October pending disbandment.

WHITEHORSE

83. The development of the North West Staging Route during 1941 and 1942 brought with it the need for safeguarding against surprise attack and sabotage, the chain of aerodromes serving American and Russian planes flying north into ALASKA. Of particular strategical significance was WHITEHORSE, nearest point on the NW Staging Route to the Coast guarding the CANOL Pipeline from FT NORMAN, and accessible to hostile aircraft flying up the valley from SKAGWAY. Following recommendations from the Joint Services Committee, Pacific Coast, in March 1942, a decision was reached to send an aerodrome defence platoon to WHITEHORSE (108).

84. Moving into the north by boat to SKAGWAY, and thence by rail to WHITEHORSE, No 9 AD Pl took up its new duties on 10 November. The unit was rationed by the US Army Air Forces on a monthly settlement basis, and in its association with the Americans got on well, and received from the US authorities the commendations that characterized other occasions on which Canadians were to serve with their southern neighbours. During that winter the temperature dropped to 66 degrees below zero, but the men took the extreme cold in their stride, as they continued training, erected their prefabricated huts, and worked at the construction of a log garage for their carriers (109). In June 1943 the 62 AA Bty arrived to provide Bofors defence for the Aerodrome. At the same time No 9 AD Pl was relieved by No 10 AD Coy. The new units

remained at WHITEHOBSE until August, when, following the reduction of the Japanese threat to ALASKA, both the Canadian battery and the aerodrome defence company were withdrawn.

AERODROME DEFENCE COMPANIES

85. The organization of the original aerodrome defence platoons as independent units on an establishment of one officer and 43 other ranks had resulted in placing a heavy burden of administration upon the subaltern in command, - a burden that was in no way lessened by the fact that the platoons had been hastily formed of unpicked men, and in the majority of cases rushed to operational posts with very little preliminary training (110). This condition was alleviated in December 1942, when authority was granted for the expansion of each platoon into an aerodrome defence company comprising a HQ and two platoons. No 1 Pl, consisting of 1 officer and 42 ORs, was equipped with 2 pdrs, 3-in mortars, and flame throwers, all mounted on carriers; No 2 Pl, (1 officer and 38 ORs) was heavily equipped with rifles, grenades, E-Y rifles, LMG'S and SMG's, and provided with four half-track personnel trucks and one 5-cwt "Jeep" (111). Only four of the companies in Pacific Command (Nos 8, 12, 13 & 14 AD Coys) went on to the full establishment; the remainder were organized less the personnel of the Infantry mobile platoon, and drew a platoon from the infantry battalion stationed at the aerodrome they were defending (112).

2 AIRFIELD TM NCE BATTALION

86. The arrival at the Coast of two more AD Coys from CAMP BORDEN, - in Feb 43, No 6, for TOFINO, and in June, No 7, for PATRICIA BAY, (ultimately for HARDY BAY), brought to nine the number of companies thus employed in the Pacific Command and ALASKA (113). At the end of May 1943, it was decided to absorb all aerodrome defence companies on both coasts into two airfield defence battalions. In Pacific Command, the 3 Bn Regina Rifle Regiment, which, as a third battalion was facing disbandment, was converted to 2 Airfield Defence Bn (Regina Rif) CIC. The old AD companies became sub-units of the new battalion, in some cases retaining the mobile infantry platoon. The new organization allowed for the replacement of the VG of C personnel still on guard duty at IOCO and in the KOOTENAYS, by carrying on the establishment of the battalion two companies with unmounted infantry platoons (114).

87. The establishment and disposition of the defence battalion provided for:- Battalion HQ; one company of HQ and one carrier platoon at each of WHITEHORSE, TERRACE, HARDY BAY, TOFINO, PATRICIA BAY; one company of HQ, one carrier platoon and one mounted infantry platoon at each of ANNETTE ISLAND, SEA ISLAND, BOUNDARY BAY; one company of HQ, one carrier platoon and three unmounted infantry platoons at TRAIL; one company of HQ and two unmounted infantry platoons at IOCO (115). Lt-Col WB HENDRIE, SO Aerodrome Defence, Pacific Command, was appointed to command the 2 AD Bn (Regina Rif) CIC (116). But the battalion was short-lived. As the outlying companies were preparing to concentrate at VERNON for training and reorganization, the Joint Services Committee at the West Coast reached the decision that "need for additional protection at advanced RCAF stations etc and at VPs such as TRAIL and IOCO no longer exists" (117). The companies came to

VERNON, only to be disbanded, and on 15 Nov 43 the 2 Airfield Defence Bn (Regina Rif) CIC officially ceased to exist (118).

NO 1 ARMoured TRAIN

88. The broad waters of the SKEENA, navigable for a hundred miles inland from CHATHAM SOUND, and paralleling the single CNR track that closely hugged its right bank, provided a standing invitation to small enemy craft to put landing parties ashore at any one of a hundred points to cut PRINCE RUPERT's life line to the interior. To meet this threat, by providing a mobile defence for the railway between PRINCE RUPERT and TERRACE, an armoured train was put into operation on the route, making its first trip between the two stations on 29 Jul 42 (119). Protected by heavy steel plate armour, and armed with two 75-mm guns, four 40-mm Bofors, two searchlights and diesel-operated generators, the train carried accommodation for A/ A personnel to man the guns, and for a full infantry company with platoon weapons (120).

89. The railway operation of the train was carried out by CNR crews, under the orders of an army officer (OC Armoured Train), who carried a permanent staff of five other ranks. No 1 Armoured Train was commanded from its inception until 16 Mar 43 by Capt NK GATESON (Wpg Gren), and then by Maj JC HERBERT (Oxf Rif) until the removal of the train from operations in October of the same year. Artillery and infantry troops to man the armoured train were supplied from the brigade currently stationed at TERRACE. During the period of tension in the summer of 1942 the train covered the ninety miles between TERRACE and PRINCE RUPERT twice every twenty-four hours, one way by day and one way by night. Ready at all times to rush reinforcements to PRINCE RUPERT if necessary, the train, in addition to its regular operational role, proved useful in moving troops between TERRACE and the Pacific port when redistribution of units within the defence scheme took place (121).

ROLE OF THE RESERVE ARMY

90. From the inception of the Pacific Command emphasis was placed upon the employment of units of the NPAM in defence of the coast and on internal security duties (122). Early in the war reserve units had been responsible for guarding vulnerable points, and training was always carried on with a view to filling an active operational role in emergency. Typical of such roles was that given to the NPAM units of MD 13, - the Edmn R (R) the 2 Calg R (R), the 2 Calg Highrs (R), the 2 S Alta R (R) and the "Currie Force" of A16 CITC. To each of these units was assigned the task of guarding VPs along the main lines of the CNR and CPR, while to the 2 Edmn Fus (R) was given the role of mobile reserve for the defence of PRINCE RUPERT (123). Similarly, the defence of the lower FRASER VALLEY was allotted in 1941 to the three reserve infantry battalions located at VANCOUVER (124). NPAM units made comprehensive reconnaissance of the areas they were called on to protect, and directed their training towards filling the emergency role allotted them.

91. In January 1942 reorganization of the Reserve Army took place with the formation of eight Brigade Groups across CANADA 39 (Res) Bde Gp was formed in MD 11, With Col AW SPARLING in Command (125). In MD 13 Col ER KNIGHT was appointed to command 41 (Res) Bde GP (126). The organization of the two complete brigade groups in Pacific Command provided the GOC-in-C with a valuable tactical reserve, and at the same time the prospect that the NPAM units would operate as a brigade group proved a useful stimulus to recruiting and training.

92. Under the Pacific Command Defence Scheme the roles of reserve units were now seen as
- (a) Primary Role.
Defence by units of their home stations under the command of local Area or Fortress Commanders.
 - (b) Secondary Role
Protection of road and rail communications in areas of responsibility allotted by the OC (R) Bde Gp.
 - (c) Tertiary Role
Use as separate Brigade Group in defence of the Pacific Coast under the orders of the GOC-in-C (127).

93. With the incentive of an active operational role before them, members of the reserve units responded keenly to training. Particularly was this the case in cities and towns exposed to possible enemy action. The men were home-owners, the majority of them outside the call-up age groups, with a definite stake in the community. Enthusiasm was high, and specialized training appealed to many of them as a new hobby. As a result, those who later went into the active army, or other services, generally did well, quickly showing themselves worthy of promotion.

PACIFIC COAST MILITIA RANGERS

94. The organization of land forces to oppose enemy landings on the Pacific Coast did not end with the concentration in BRITISH COLUMBIA of active infantry battalion and the training of reserve units in operational roles. Even before PEARL HARBOUR there was a widespread and insistent public demand for the institution of some form of "Home Guard" composed of local residents capable of acting in defence of the various communities and areas exposed to danger. In January 1942 a General Staff letter to the GOC-in-C, considering that it was "most important that everything possible be done on the West Coast to satisfy public opinion in respect to military security," urged that immediate consideration be given to the organization of Home Guard platoons or detachments at a number of coastal points on VANCOUVER ISLAND and the mainland (128).

95. There appeared to be a growing realization by military authorities that any Active Force troops available for the defence of the West Coast could not adequately cover all the ground, and elements of the Reserve Army in Pacific Command were generally to be found only in metropolitan and closely settled areas. The training of Canadian Infantry at that time still envisioned the type of action in which movement could be made on roads and by rail. The lessons of the Malayan Jungle were still to be learned and applied. What seemed to be needed

was an organization of men with a knowledge of BRITISH COLUMBIA born of experience from living in the rocky country along the rugged coast line, and the thick, barely penetrable bush of the timberlands of the interior.

96. Authority to proceed with the formation of an Auxiliary Defence Corps of "Coast Defence Guards" under the Reserve Militia was given in February, and Maj (later Lt-Col) TAH TAYLOR (DAAG Pac Comd) was placed in charge of organization (129). The response was tremendous. In less than six weeks the movement, its name changed to Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, grew from nothing to an enrolment of 5,000 men. By July the strength had reached 14,000, with 115 companies organized from the Queen Charlottes to the International Boundary (130). Lt-Col TAYLOR, now Staff Officer PCMR, was assisted by a headquarters staff and by six officers in the field as Field Supervisors.

97. "Who are they who know BC best? The men who have ranged its mountains and valleys, fished its waters, tapped its resources." (131). These were the men who enrolled by the hundreds in the PCMRs; fishermen, trappers, farmers, loggers, big-game guides, hunters, rod-and-gun men, prospectors, fur traders, storekeepers and section hands. Each company of Rangers might differ completely from its neighbouring Company in type of personnel. Here would be a company of farmers; there a company composed entirely of timbermen; the colliers of an up-island mine would supply another company; another was organized among the workers of a coastal pulp and paper mill.

98. The operational role of the Rangers was threefold,

- (a) to possess up-to-date, complete and detailed knowledge of their own area and to be in a position to supply such information to HQ Pacific Command, and to local military commanders;
- (b) to report any unusual happenings that reflected possible subversive or "fifth column" activities; and
- (c) to be in a position to repel enemy attack or invasion, either by themselves, or in operation with units of the Canadian Army, Active (132).

99. Training was directed to preparation for these roles. Assisted by instructors loaned by the three services, by members of the Canadian Legion, and utilizing the experience of many of their own members who were Veterans of the last war, Ranger groups met at nights and on weekends to participate in map reading, signalling, weapon training, fieldcraft, and guerilla tactics. Travelling instructors from PCMR Headquarters commuted from unit to unit to give assistance in the training of company, detachment and group personnel. Sten sub-machine guns, .303 and .30-06 service rifles, and .30-.30 US sporting rifles were issued on a scale that gave all companies an opportunity to carry out range-practices on rifle ranges generally constructed by the men themselves. Training was stimulated by the monthly publication of The Ranger. In September 1942 a "Ranger Training School" was opened at SARDIS, and operated in conjunction with A6 RCE TC. To the school went selected representatives from the various companies, to receive two weeks' instruction in ranger training. By the end of 1943 the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, in their "Drybak", or khaki denim uniforms, with the distinctive red and green arm-band, had emerged as a vital part of the Pacific Command forces.

THE PEAK IS REACHED

100. From the point of view of numerical strength, the employment of operational troops on the Pacific Coast may be said to have reached a peak in the early summer of 1943. An operational force of approximately 34,000 officers and men was stationed in BRITISH COLUMBIA, co-operating with the Navy and Air Force in the defence against enemy attack. A quick glance around the Command will serve to give the picture of infantry dispositions that presented itself to Their Excellencies, the Governor General and Princess Alice, when they visited the army defences of the West Coast during May.

101. Pacific Command Headquarters was at VANCOUVER, (Operations at JERICHO, Administration at VANCOUVER Barracks), the GOC-in-C, Maj-Gen GR PEARKES VC CB DSO MC, Brig i/c Administration, Brig WHS MACKLIN. Directly under Pacific Command Headquarters at VANCOUVER were four main subordinate commands:

- (i) VANCOUVER ISLAND Area
Commander - GOC 6 Cdn Div, - Maj-Gen AE POTTS ED with HQ at VICTORIA.
- (ii) Northern BC Area
Commander - GOC 8 Cdn Div, Maj-Gen HN GANONG, with HQ at PRINCE GEORGE.
- (iii) VANCOUVER Defences
Commander - Brig AHW LANDON OBE MC HQ at VANCOUVER BARRACKS.
- (iv) Command Reserve
19 Inf Bde at VERNON, under Brig WG COLOUHOUN MC.

In the VANCOUVER ISLAND area under the command of GOC 6 Cdn Div were ESQUIMALT Fortress (Brig JF PRESTON, MC); 18 Inf Bde, at NANAIMO (Brig HW MURDOCK); and 13 Inf Bde, at PT ALBERNI (Brig DR SARGENT, ED). Under the command of the GOC 8 Cdn Div, in the Northern BC Area, were PRINCE RUPERT Defences (Col DB MARTYN DSO MC VD); 14 Inf Bde, at TERRACE, (Brig JP GIRVAN DSO MC VD); and 16 Inf Bde at PRINCE GEORGE (Brig OM MARTIN VD).

102. There were twenty infantry battalions in the Command. Four of these were in the VICTORIA-ESQUIMALT area, under the command of ESQUIMALT Fortress. At COLWOOD CAMP, was Le R de Hull, supplying platoons for infantry defences at the CHRISTOPHER POINT, MARY HILL and ALBERT HEAD forts. The S Ste M & Sud at OTTER POINT provided detachments to guard the VANCOUVER ISLAND Power Company plant at JORDAN RIVER and the SOOKE RIVER crossing at MILNES LANDING. The 3 Regina Rif were temporarily in a tent camp at SIDNEY preparatory to moving into the Exhibition Buildings at the "Willows". At PATRICIA BAY the RRC had just exchanged duties with the 31 (Alta) Recce Regt, and with No 10 Aerodrome Defence Coy were on operational duties defending the RCAF airfield. No 7 AD Coy was in training at COLWOOD CAMP. On VP guard duty at VICTORIA, with detachments at HEAL'S RANGE, and the Joint Services Magazine, was No 31 Coy VG of C.

103. Carrying on with training, and acting as a mobile reserve, were the units under command of HQ 18 Inf Bde at NANAIMO, - the 2 C Scot R, the RM Rang and the St John Fus (MG), with detachments at COAL HARBOUR and UCLUELET. Up at COURTENAY the Can Fus were undergoing combined operations training. Over on the West Coast of the VANCOUVER ISLAND the 1 Edmn Fus were with HQ 13 Inf Bde at PORT ALBERNI getting valuable training in bush fighting, with detachments guarding the cable station at BAMFIELD and the UCLUELET RCAF base. The battalion stood ready, in the event of an attempted enemy landing, to support the Brock Rif, who were stationed with No 6 AD Coy at LONG BEACH in defence of the TOFINO airfield.

104. Two battalions joined coast defence artillery and A/A batteries in garrisoning PRINCE RUPERT, northern gateway to BRITISH COLUMBIA, and now of increased importance as a UNITED STATES supply port for ALASKA. The Japanese thrust into the ALEUTIANS the previous summer had focussed attention on the strategic significance of PRINCE RUPERT's position, and at one stage of the threat the CGS (Lt-Gen STUART) had set up temporary headquarters there. In the "Cy Peck" Camp No 1, a camp that they had largely built by themselves on floating muskeg, were the Mid R, experienced in guard duties on both of CANADA'S Coasts (133). Camp No 2 was occupied by the KOR of C, with one company across HECATE STRAIT guarding the advanced air base at ALLIFORD BAY, QUEEN CHARLOTTE ISLANDS, and a platoon stationed with a detachment of the 80 Fd Bty RCA at TYEE, on the SKEENA RIVER.

105. Ninety miles up the river, at TERRACE, were the Wpg Gren and the Kent R, units of the 14 Inf Bde Gp providing a mobile reserve to PRINCE RUPERT defences under the command of the GOC 8 Div. The TERRACE airfield, now nearing completion, was guarded by No 11 AD Coy. From the infantry battalions and the 48 LAA Bty of the 14 Bde Gp were drawn the personnel to man the No 1 Armoured Train on its operational runs between TERRACE and PRINCE RUPERT. At PRINCE GEORGE, 350 miles further inland, the Oxf Rif, the P of W Rang and the 3 Edmn Fus formed the 16 Inf Bde in its mobile role supplying defence in depth, and ready to strike west to PRINCE RUPERT or south to meet any threat to the interior plateau behind BELLA COOLA VALLEY.

106. VACOUVER, because of its comparatively sheltered location, was regarded as the least vulnerable of the three main BRITISH COLUMBIA ports. The wholesale removal of the Japanese population from the protected area west of the Rocky Mountains (134) had reduced to a minimum the need for employment of troops for the internal security of the Lower Mainland, and the defence of the lower FRASER VALLEY was carried as the operational role of the reserve battalions in the area. Under the command of VANCOUVER Defences, the 31 (Alta) Recce Regt CAC had recently replaced the RRC, who, during their long tour of duty as area mobile reserve at NEW WESTMINSTER, had provided detachments for airfield defence down at BOUNDARY BAY and SEA ISLAND. That duty was now being performed by No 12 AD Coy and No 13 AD Coy respectively. At HASTINGS PARK were No 8 AD Coy, just out from a winter at ANNETTE ISLAND, and No 23 Coy VG of C on periodic training, after a tour of POW duty at MEDICINE HAT.

107. Directly under Headquarters Pacific Command for administrative and operational control, the Command Reserve at VERNON, and the VG of C companies on VP guard duties, completed the muster of operational infantry forces in BRITISH COLUMBIA. At VERNON, the 19 Inf Bde Gp, its infantry battalions the PA Vols, the WLI and the 3 Ir Fus (VR), maintained a high state of training, ready for employment anywhere in the Command. The location of VERNON well back in the interior made possible movement of the brigade either by rail via KAMLOOPS north to RED PASS JUNCTION and PRINCE GEORGE, or via the main CNR line to VANCOUVER, or by road up the CARIBOO Highway to the WILLIAMS LAKE country, or down the OKANAGAN VALLEY to the International Boundary.

108. The three companies of VG of C on operational duties in the Command were at VICTORIA, IOCO and TRAIL. Since the days of their early activities at the coast (see paras 28 - 31) the number of companies in employment in Pacific Command had increased to twelve. In May 1943 a system of reliefs saw seven of these companies on guard duties at the internment camps at SEEBE, LETHBRIDGE and MEDICINE HAT, Alta, three at the operational stations named above, and two taking their tour of training at HASTINGS PARK, VANCOUVER, and at WINNIPEG. No 31 Coy VG of C was not at VICTORIA (see para 102 above). No 36 Coy had HQ and three platoons at the Imperial Oil Company's plant at IOCO, with two platoons at the RCAF base at BELLA BELLA, and the sixth at the PRINCE RUPERT Dry Docks. In the interior, No 38 Coy protected the essential industrial plants and power installations at TRAIL, NELSON and FERNIE, besides supplying two platoons to guard the important KAMLOOPS Magazine (135).

109. Such was the picture of operational infantry strength that greeted the eyes of CANADA's Governor General as he inspected the defences of the Pacific Coast. It was an impressive display. The period of hasty expansion had reached its climax, and few unfulfilled commitments remained to be completed. Administrative services had successfully kept pace with the rapid tempo of the program, and all accommodation requirements had finally been met. In the face of many obstacles, training had generally reached a high state of efficiency. The civilian population of BRITISH COLUMBIA saw with satisfaction the army in training and on parade, and regained the feeling of security it had lost in 1941. Military leaders too were satisfied that their forces were adequate for defence, - so adequate indeed that plans could now be made for their employment in offensive operations. Before May was out, proposals were under discussion for sending a brigade group from Pacific Command to participate with US Forces in the capture of KISKA from the Japanese (136).

KISKA

110. The story of the sending of the reorganized 13 Inf Bde Gp as part of a combined UNITED STATES-CANADIAN task force to drive the Japanese from their last footing in the ALEUTIANS has been told elsewhere (137). Although the disappointment was keen at finding the Japanese had fled their coming, the manner in which the 5,000 Canadian troops acquitted themselves in the landing operations and the ordeal of withstanding KISKA weather and KISKA terrain during the months of occupancy spoke well for the general calibre of the men and the training to which they had been subjected. Among many significant features of the expedition,

there stood out two facts of potential importance to future developments in Pacific Command. The first was that NRMA troops had been used for the first time in an operational role outside of Continental AMERICA, and had done an excellent job. The second, destined to make its effect shown more immediately, was the fact that the removal of the Japanese from the ALEUTIANS had materially decreased the threat to the security of the North American Pacific Coast. The time had come for a reduction in the defences of Pacific Command.

E. THE FOURTH PHASE - THE REDUCTION IN OPERATIONAL TROOPS

REVISED SCALES OF ATTACK

111. The withdrawal of the enemy in the North Pacific and the increased tempo of operations in which he was becoming engaged in the South West Pacific had so materially improved the strategical situation in respect to the West Coast of NORTH AMERICA, that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were enabled, in August 1943, to approve considerably reduced scales of enemy attack for the Pacific Coast. Instead of the 10 to 15 fast merchant ships carrying a landing party of two brigades that had been visualized as possibilities for the past eighteen months, the most that was now expected was "occasional raids by troops carried in submarines, limited to a strength of about 100 men at any one landing place." (138). An occasional carrier-borne air raid on profitable objectives was also seen as a possibility, though not a probability. In the light of these reduced scales it became possible to reassess the composition of the operational forces in Pacific Command.

DISBANDMENT OF THIRD BATTALIONS

112. The heavy drain of reinforcements for Overseas had already depleted the ranks of the operational infantry units in Pacific Command. During the month of April a draft of 600 had left the Command, bringing to more than 2,000 the total of withdrawals for service Overseas. In May instructions were received from NDHQ that all remaining GS personnel were to be released from infantry units except for a cadre of eighty key men per battalion (139). "The failure to replace these successive withdrawals," wrote Gen. PEARKES on 9 May, "is causing me increased concern." (140). The source of supply of manpower through the depots and training centres was unable to supply the needs of CANADA's armies at home and overseas on their existing establishments.

113. In July five infantry battalions were despatched overseas to be employed as units or reinforcements, and the disbandment was authorized of six others in CANADA whose regiments had more than one battalion on Active Service (141). Units affected in Pacific Command were the 3 Edmn Fus and the 3 Ir Fus (VR) (142). To maintain the number of infantry battalions at the coast came Fusiliers du St Laurent from MULGRAVE NS, and the Lanark and Renfrew Scottish Regiment from DEBERT. The 3 Regina Rif temporarily escaped disbandment by becoming converted to the 2 Airfield Defence Bn (See para 86 above). The redistribution of officers and

men from the disbanded battalions aided to a slight extent the strengths of the units that remained.

THE REDUCTION TO THREE BRIGADES

114. During June, July and August, by the measures indicated above, the number of operational troops in CANADA had been reduced by 15,000 all ranks. At the end of August Cabinet approval was given for further reductions of 20,000 (143). This was to be accomplished by disbanding a large number of units of various branches of the service, reducing other units to cadre basis, and placing in maintenance certain coastal artillery. Three Brigade Groups only were to remain in Pacific Command, and one training Brigade Group in Atlantic Command. The total number of coast defence battalions to be retained for duties in CANADA, NEWFOUNDLAND and JAMAICA was fourteen. The 7 and 8 Divisions ceased to exist.

115. The reasons for the decision to keep three brigade groups as a strategic reserve in Pacific Command were set down in the CGS memo to the Minister, Reduction in Operational Troops in CANADA;

- (a) "As a trained force for future offensive commitments in the Pacific Theatre of operations;
- (b) As a potential Source of reinforcements for the Canadian Army Overseas;
- (c) To meet any unexpected deterioration in the situation." (141).

The KISKA force had impressed UNITED STATES military and naval authorities, and it was realized that there might arise an occasion for employment of one or more of these brigades in further offensive operations with UNITED STATES forces against the common enemy. For such an eventuality it was important that a trained force be kept available. Writing from ADAK in August, the GOC-in-C had made recommendations to this end (144), recommendations that approved by the CGS in his submission to the Minister. It was disappointing to those who were anxious to see the role of Pacific Command troops change from that of the defensive, to find that the final instructions received regarding the role of the brigades omitted the use of the word "offensive". (145).

116. Reorganization became effective on 15 Oct 43. The three brigade groups retained were the 13, 14 and 15. Their organization conformed to that adopted by 13 Bde Gp for its KISKA expedition, closely paralleling that of the corresponding UNITED STATES Tactical Group. Coordination of their training and administration became the responsibility of a reconstituted HQ 6 Cdn Div at PRINCE GEORGE.

117. Each of the three brigade groups carried four infantry battalions. With 13 Bde, still in the ALEUTIANS, were the Can Fus, the Wpg Gren, the RM Rang and le R de Hull. They were destined to train at VERNON (with the Wpg Gren at GORDON HEAD) on their return to CANADA. Brig (later Maj-Gen) HW FOSTER LdSH (RC) (146), who had led the force to KISKA, was succeeded as brigade commander by Brig WHS MACKLIN (from BGS Pac Comd) in January 1944. The reconstituted 14 Bde Gp, commanded by Brig RH BEATTIE MC ED (OC Can Fus 9 Feb 42 to 12 Oct 43) took up its station on VANCOUVER ISLAND. Its four infantry battalions were the P of W Rang, the Oxf Rif the WLI, and les Fus de Sher, (who arrived from

DEBERT with HQ 15 Inf Bde). On the island the four battalions began a schedule of varied training which carried them in rotation through NANAIMO, PORT ALBERNI and COURTENAY. To PRINCE GEORGE in mid October came HQ 15 Inf Bde from DEBERT, commanded by Brig AR ROY RCR (GSO 14 Cdn (Armd) Div 26 Jun 41 to 18 Jun 42; GSO 17 Cdn Div 19 Jun 42 to 12 Oct 43). The brigade group was concentrated at PRINCE GEORGE and TERRACE with the following infantry battalions: the PA Vols, the RRC, Fus du St L, and the PEI Highrs, brought from CD duties at ST JOHN, NB.

118. The number of infantry battalions in the Command with a static coast defence role was reduced to four. A system of reliefs from operational duty brought one of these units into Willows Camp, VICTORIA, for a period of training and conditioning every three months. The initial disposition found the S Ste M & Sud guarding the ESQUIMALT Area and the Mid R at PRINCE RUPERT, with a company at ALLIFORD BAY, the Kent R on the north and west coasts of VANCOUVER ISLAND, and the KOR of C in training at Willows Camp. At TOFINO the OC Kent R was given command of the NORTH ISLAND AREA. It comprised the cable station at BAMFIELD, and the Advanced Air bases at UCLUELET, TOFINO, COAL HARBOUR, PORT HARDY and BELLA BELLA. At each of these points the Kent R placed detachments varying in strength from one platoon up to two companies, operating in support of 33 and 59 AA Btys, and 36 AA Tp (147). These detachments replaced companies of the 2 Airfield Defence Bn (Regina Rif) whose employment no longer appeared necessary in view of the recently approved scales of attack (148).

FURTHER DISBANDMENTS

119. Four brigade HQ were disbanded, the 16, 18, 19 and 20. The first three had all been formed in Pacific Command, and had served there for sixteen months. HQ 20 Inf Bde had been organized at the same time in Atlantic Command under Brig P EARNSHAW DSO MC (Dir of Sigs 1 Oct 37 to 15 Oct 40; Comd Cdn Tps Nfld 16 Oct 40 to 24 Nov 40; Comd Combined Nfld & Cdn Forces in Nfld 25 Nov 40 to 24 Dec 41; Comdr 20 CIB 20 Aug 42 to 25 Dec 42). It came to the Pacific Coast in July 1943 commanded by Brig JB STEVENSON ED (who had come from the command of 10 Inf Bde to succeed Brig EARNSHAW). Stationed at PORT ALBERNI, with the Lan & Ren Scot R, 1 Edmn Fus, and Fus du St L under its command, the brigade had temporarily filled the gap in the defences caused by sending the 13 Inf Bde Gp to KISKA.

120. Disbanded at the same time were the Lan & Ren Scot R, and the C Scot R, a battalion that had completed a fifty month tour of duty on the Pacific Coast. In November the 2 AD Bn (Regina Rif) passed out of existence. (See para 118 above). The removal of two battalions to Coast duty in Atlantic Command, - the 1 Edmn Fus to SUSSEX, and the Brock Rif to SIDNEY, - completed the redistribution of the infantry forces in Pacific Command.

121. Corresponding reorganization and reductions were taking place in the administrative services. Establishments came under the closest scrutiny, as strengths of headquarters staffs and sub-staffs were pared to the minimum consistent with efficiency of operation. The OSAB worked hard to allocate the officers that came from disbanded units and formations. Many of these, having rendered useful and faithful service in the time of emergency, were now unable to

meet age and medical standards and returned to civilian life. The beginning of 1944 found a streamlined Pacific Command feeling more secure in its defences than at any time in the past four years, and preparing for whatever operations the future turn of events might bring.

1. See The Fixed Coast Artillery Defences of the Pacific Coast and The Anti-Aircraft Defences of the Pacific Coast, compiled by Historical Section (GS).
2. General Staff Memo 13 Feb 39. HQS 3498 Vol 10. See also Hansard 1937, pp 891-905.
3. Principles of defence as laid down in the Manual of Coast Fortress Defence (Provisional) 1930. Ch VI Sec 18. This is expounded in a memo Col POPE A/DMO & I to Maj-Gen ASHTON, CGS, in preparing an answer to the DOC MD 6, who felt his allotment of troops for mobile or fixed defence inadequate. HQS 3498 Vol 9, dated 21 Sep 38.
4. A/DMO & I Memo, above. See also "ESQUIMALT Defence Scheme", Chap IV Sec 4, "Action of the Mobile Garrison" - V S 38-1-1-1 dated 6 Apr 38 on HQS 3545, Vol 1.
5. Defence Scheme No 3. Sec 21 "Mobile Force". See also General Staff Memo 13 Feb 39, HQS 3498, Vol 10.
6. Defence Scheme No 3 Sec 3. "Particular Situation to be anticipated in the Event of a Far Eastern War".
7. For LIST ONE and LIST TWO for MD 11, 1939, and LIST THREE, 1938, see Appendices 1, 2 and 3.
8. Tele GS 139 dated 1 Sep 39, HQS 3498, Vol 12.
9. Tele GS 46 dated 25 Aug 39.
10. War Diary 1 Bn C Scot R dated 26 Aug 39.
11. War Diary 28 Arm'd Regt (BC Regt) dated 26 Aug 39.
12. War Diary - 1 Bn Irish Fus (VR) dated 28 Aug 39.
13. War Diary - 1 Bn RM Rang dated 26 Aug 39.
14. Tele GS 138 dated 1 Sep 39.
15. Tele GS 139 dated 1 Sep 39.
16. Go 135 dated 1 Sep 39.
17. VICTORIA-ESQUIMALT, VANCOUVER-NEW WESTMINSTER, and PRINCE RUPERT.
18. Establishment of the BC Regt (DCOR) was set at 20 officers and 336 other ranks - War Diary, 28 Arm'd Regt dated 2 Oct 39.

19. GS Circular letter. Defence Scheme No 3, Protection of Vulnerable Points, - HQS 3498, Vol 9, dated 9 Sep 38.
20. See also "Note on Canadian Government Policy in respect of the guarding of Vulnerable Points" - Report of Service Members to Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 26th Meeting, 25, 26 Feb 42.
21. (a) PCS 508-1-5-1 (GO) dated 30 Jul 42, re request of DEEP COVE Ratepayers' Association for military guard on Reservoir.
(b) PJBD Journal, Vol 3, dated 14 Dec 42 - re application of the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Co Ltd for defences at TRAIL, BC.
22. AG Memo, "Guarding of VPs in CANADA" - HQS 6717, FD 22 (AP) dated 19 Nov 41.
23. For lists of Vulnerable Points, MD 11, taken over by RCMP, and those remaining a responsibility of National Defence, see Appendix 4.
24. Tele No 46, Charge d'Affaires, TOKYO, to External Affairs, OTTAWA, dated 20 Jun 40. On file HQS 8613, Vol 1.
25. HQS 8613 Vol 1 dated 20 Jun 40.
26. Tele GS 0388 CGS to DOC 11 d 20 Jun 40 HQS 8613, Vol 1.
Tele GS 0387 CGS to DOC 12 d 20 Jun 40 HQS 8613, Vol 1.
Tele GS 0389 CGS to DOC 10 d 20 Jun 40 HQS 8613, Vol 1.
27. Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, OTTAWA to High Commissioner for CANADA in GREAT BRITAIN. No 834, dated 27 Jun 40 - HQS 20-1-17.
28. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to High Commissioner for CANADA, dated 6 Jul 40 HQS 20-1-17.
29. External Affairs to High Commissioner, dated 11 Jul 40, HQS 20-1-17.
30. Effective date of mobilization of 3 and 4 Division was set back to 24 May 40. GO 184 of 1940 amended by GO 50 of 1941.
31. Effective date of organization of Veterans Home Guard was 24 May 40. GO 112 of 1940.
32. Weekly Summary 38 dated 27 Jul 40.
33. Tele 746 Ref Org 460 dated 21 Jun 40 HQS 8613, Vol 1.
34. GS 0400 dated 22 Jun 40 HQS 8613, Vol 1.

35. War Diaries 11“A”, 11“B” and 11 “C” Coys VG of C for Jul, Aug and Sep 40.
36. Oprs 113 dated 14 Feb 41, HQS 8588, Vol 7 (Oprs).
37. War Diary 11“A” (25) Coy VG of C, 4 Apr 41.
38. War Diary 11“B” (26) Coy VG of C, 6 Apr 41.
39. War Diary 26 Coy VG of C 7 Dec 41, supplemented by personal interview, Capt. JC COOKE, 0 i/c.
40. Joint Statement, issued following the OGDENSBURG Conference, 18 Aug 40, HQS 5199-W-1, Vol 1.
41. Joint Basic Defence Plan, Sec IV 10 Oct 40 - PJBD Journal Vol 1.
42. Institution of PACIFIC Command dates from 10 Oct 40, when Maj-Gen RO ALEXANDER DSO was appointed the first GOC-in-C.
43. "Instructions for the Guidance of General Officers Commanding-in-Chief ATLANTIC and PACIFIC Commands" - dated 28 May 41, HQS 8704 (DSD).
44. Suppt to CARO 941 dated 20 Feb 41.
45. Suppt to CARO 1067 dated 28 May 41.
46. In a Memorandum on “Command – Pacific Command” Maj-Gen the Hon WA GRIESBACH, Inspector General, WESTERN CANADA, criticized the method of command, by which the GOC-in-C, Pacific Command was also DOC MD 11. He recommended the early appointment of a DOC for MD 11, - 23 Sep 41 on HQPC 602-1-3.
47. 1 C Scot R moved to DEBERT 4 Oct 40, to replace in 2 Div the R Regt C which had proceeded to ICELAND. - HQS 20-1-17, dated 5 Jun 40.
48. VS 38-1-1-1, VS 38-2-1-1, VS 38-1-1-1, FD 3 dated 16 Dec 40. Appx to War Diary, Pacific Command GS Vol 1.
49. For a list of infantry battalions stationed in BC at some time between 1939 and 1943 see Appendix 5.
50. CGS memo to Minister - 11 Aug 41 - File HQS 8704-1 FD 3, Vol 1.
51. An entry in the War Diary of ACGS (Maj-Gen MA POPE) dated 6 Nov 41 refers to a “PJBD understanding that a general reserve be maintained by CANADA over and above the necessary coastal garrisons of not less than two divisions”. See also PJBD Journal Vol 1, 10 Oct 40, "Provision of troops for initial support of US Garrisons in ALASKA",

in which the CGS (Maj-Gen HDG CRERAR) queries the military advantage to CANADA of this responsibility, and the DCGS (Brig K STUART) stresses the "political need to include in the plan some measures of defence in which CANADA accepts a specific responsibility to assist the UNITED STATES".

52. CGS Memo to Minister 15 Jul 41. Approved by War Committee 29 Jul 41 - HQS 20-1-5.
53. See 49 above.
54. CGS Memo to Minister 18 Nov 41, HQS 8613.
55. Ibid, para 4.
56. CANADA declared war on JAPAN on 7 Dec 41. The UNITED KINGDOM and the UNITED STATES declared war on the following day.
57. Canada Year Book, 1942. War Chronology, p 997.
58. E.g.
 - (i) From the Dominion Command - Can Legion BESL to the Minister of National Defence - dated 13 Jan 42 - HQS 8704-1, Vol 2.
 - (ii) From United Commercial Travellers of AMERICA, Vancouver Council, to the Prime Minister dated 10 Mar 42 HQS 8704-1, Vol 3.
 - (iii) From Pitt MEADOWS ARP, BC to Geo CRUICKSHANK MP (FRASER RIVER) dated 22 Dec 41 HQS 8613, Vol 1.

See also letter from Mrs HL KEENLEYSIDE, Secy, Cdn Sec PJBD, to Maj-Gen MA POPE reporting information received from various sources in regard to the defence situation on the West Coast - 11 Feb 42, HQS 5199-W-1, Vol 2. Note also a slogan used on North VANCOUVER ISLAND during the War (Cont'd) Loan Campaign of Feb 42 - "You move the Japs: We buy the Bonds" - Pac Comd Weekly Intell Report No 59. - 18 Feb 42.

59. "Vancouver Sun" Editorials. The Derelict Defence by Alan MORLEY, 14-17 Mar 42. "Our present defence is based upon the assumption that we must surrender, and might as well do it first, rather than last." "Nine-tenths of their energy and thought is engaged in training forces for use in EUROPE, or elsewhere, - one tenth in defence of THIS coast. Moreover, they do not keep the troops they have trained but lose them and get raw men from time to time". "Our derelict defence is not ready to fight a 1942 battle. We are preparing, with minute forces, to fight SINGAPORE, HONG KONG and DUNKIRK over again." - Copies of editorials on file HQS 8704-1, Vol 3. Legal action was taken against the "Sun" and the newspaper paid a fine of \$300. - 24 Apr 42 HQS 8704-1, Vol 3.
60. Report of GOC-in-C to CGS of a Meeting of Joint Services Committee with Premier HART - 16 Mar 42. HQS 8704-1, Vol 3.

61. Report of BRITISH COLUMBIA Security Commission 1942, p 3.
62. CGS Memo dated 17 Nov 42 - HQS 5199-J.
63. For complete lists of "Forms and Scales of Attacks" with periodic revisions see HQS 5199-J. A four page memo on the history of Forms and Scales of Attack for the Pacific Coast, prepared by the narrator from HQS 5199-J appears at Appx 6.
64. US Army Progress Report, - 25th Meeting PJBD dated 20 Jan 42. PJBD Journal Vol 2.
65. Report following reconnaissance of TOFINO airfield by Capt D GODFREY, Intelligence, Pacific Command - 28 Feb 42 - HQS 8704-1, Vol 3.
66. DUTCH HARBOUR was raided on 3 Jun 42. KISKA was occupied by the Japanese on 6 Jun 42.
67. "It appears that the Japanese are to continue reinforcements of the ALEUTIAN bases and are expecting to continue Eastward advances unless RUSSIA joins the war against JAPAN" Daily report - 2053 Pacific Command to Defensor from US 4 th Army - 19 Jun 42 HQS 8613, Vol 1.
68. Pacific Command Report to Chiefs of Staff, Tele 2076 dated 21 Jun 42 - HQS 8613 Vol 1. See also Report on Attack on ESTEVAN, from COPC to Secy, Naval Board, Dept of Nat Def - dated 1 Jul 42, PC 5-11-5-2.
69. It is interesting to note that a request for the internment of Japanese on the Coast, to avoid inter-racial clashes, submitted by Maj-Gen ALEXANDER on 30 Dec 41, (VS 638-1-1-13), as well as a recommendation by the Joint Services Committee for similar action "from the point of view of defence of Pacific Coast," (PC Tele 663 dated 12 Jan 42) at first met with no approval at OTTAWA. In a memo to the CGS (Maj-Gen STUART) Maj-Gen POPE suggested "the VCGS is unable to (Cont'd) agree to such a drastic step, as VANCOUVER is subject only to bombardment, and the Japanese, of whom 80 per cent are Canadian Nationals, are unarmed." The memo goes on to refer to the entirely satisfactory behaviour of the Japanese on the West Coast of the UNITED STATES as reported by the FBI, and points out that both in HONOLULU and at MANILA Japanese residents had behaved correctly from a US point of view when these places were attacked - Memo -HQS 7368 Vol 1, dated 13 Jan 42.
Following a conference held in OTTAWA between the Standing Committee on Orientals in BC (Home Committee) and delegates from the services, the BC Legislature, the Police, and Departments of the Federal Government, a decision was reached to proceed with the evacuation of the Japanese from a designated protected area (PC 365 dated 16 Jan 42).
70. Mobilized on 12 Dec 41 and in positions early in January.
71. DSD Memo dated 20 Feb 42 HQS 8704-1 FD 18.

72. HQS 20-1-11-E FD 3 MRI dated 7 Mar 42.
73. VS 638-1-1-1 dated 1 Feb 42 on HQS 8704-1 Vol 2 FD 23.
74. GS 010 dated 11 Mar 42 on HQS 8704-1 Vol 3 FD 22.
75. CGS Memos to the Minister dated 20 Mar 42 and 24 Mar 42 - HQS 20-1-25.
76. CGS Memo to the Minister dated 24 Mar 42 - HQS 20-1-25.
77. Mobilization authority dated 21 May 42 HQS 20-4-25 MRI.
78. Appointments of Brig V HODSON in the present war were:
DAA&QMG MD No 2 5 Sep 39 to 25 Nov 39; OC RCR 26 Nov 39 to 28 Nov 40;
Comdr 1 CIB (Actg) 20 Oct 40 to 26 Nov 41; Comdr 12 CIB 4 Jan 41 to 24 Ear 42;
Comdr 4 Cdn Div (temp) 26 Dec 41 to 24 Mar 42; Comdr 2 Army Tank Bde (temp) 25
Mar 42 to 23 Apr 42; Comdr Esquimalt Fortress 24 Apr 42 to 20 May 42; Comdr 14 CIB
21 May 42 to 26 Aug 42.
79. For complete lists of Inf Bde HQ Staff appointments in Pacific Command see Appx 7.
80. Pacific Command Operational Instructions No 32 dated 30 Aug 42 - HQS 20-2-12-11.
81. Pacific Command Operational Instructions No 40 dated 26 Sep 42 HQS 20-2-12-12.
Authority was granted on 25 Jun 42 for the formation of HQ 8 Div and certain associated
units. Concentration took place at OTTAWA and JASPER, and the GOC assumed
Command at PRINCE GEORGE on 1 Oct 42.
82. If there was any way in which General Staff, Pacific Command, erred, it was possibly in
not having asked enough for the Coast. The attitude had been taken that the needs of
BRITAIN herself and CANADA's MARITIMES were greater than those of BRITISH
COLUMBIA, and it was appreciated that every additional gun sent to the Pacific Coast
weakened more vital defences. These considerations changed when the CGS came
to VICTORIA.
83. Appointments held by Brig MILLER during the war were: DAAG MD NO 10, 1 Sep 39
to 24 Oct 40; AA&QMG MD No 11 25 Oct 40 to 14 Jan 41; Officer i/c Administration
MD No 11, 15 Jan 41 to 18 Mar 42, DOC MD No 11, 19 Mar 42 to 30 Jun 42.
84. Previous appointments of Brig WHITELAW in the present war were:- GSO 2 NDHQ, 1
Dec 37 to 16 Oct 39; GSO 1 NDHQ, 17 Oct 39 to 9 Mar 41; Comdt, No 01 OTC Staff,
BROCKVILLE, 10 Mar 41 to 10 Apr 42; DMT NDHQ, 11 Apr 42 to 30 Jun 42.
85. Col PRESTON's previous appointments were those of ADM&I 1 Jan 39 to 14 Dec 39;
GSO 1 MD No 11, 15 Dec 39 to 14 Jan 41; Col Gen Staff Pac Comd 15 Jan 41 to 28 Jun
42.

86. Col LYON held the appointments of GSO 2 (Surveys) 25 Dec 36 to 25 Sep 40; GSO 2 NDHQ 26 Sep 40 to 16 Dec 40; GSO I NDHQ 17 Dec 40 to 23 Dec 41; DMO&I 24 Dec 41 to 25 Jun 42; Col Gen Staff Pac Comd 26 Jun 42 to 31 Aug 42; Brig Gen Staff Pac Comd 1 Sep 42 to 28 Feb 43.
87. (i) CGS memo to GOC-in-C Pac Comd 29 Sep 42 HQS 20-1-12-11.
(ii) Organization of Services, Pac Comd Brig i/c Admin Memo dated 30 Oct 42 – PC 602-1-3-3.
88. CEO letter to Brig i/c Admin Pac Comd dated 24 Nov 42 -36-1-1.
89. For an account of the organization of Pacific Command Services, 1942, see Chapter
90. A letter from Brig MACKLIN to NDHQ. Deficiencies – Infantry Battalions, drawing attention to a shortage of 3,000 infantry from WE, lists as the battalions most badly hampered -
- | | | |
|----------------------|-----------|-----|
| Midland Regt, | deficient | 210 |
| Kent Regt | " | 275 |
| 3 Regina Rifles Regt | " | 310 |
| 1 Edmonton Fusiliers | " | 303 |
| 3 Edmonton Fusiliers | " | 546 |
| 3 Irish Fusiliers | " | 453 |
- 602-7-1 d 10 Nov 42, on HQS 20-6-12-11-E
91. Pac Comd Gen Staff Circular, Canadian Battle Drill Training Centre dated 4 May 42 V 2-25-1-4 (Trg).
92. HQS 20-1-18 FD 77 over HQS 20-4-18 FD 100 (Mob 2) dated 29 Aug 43.
93. HQ 8 Cdn Div to HQ Pac Comd dated 27 Jul 43, on PCS 502-1-4.
94. PCS 502-25 MWS over PCS 504-25 MWS(GS) dated 19 Oct 43.
95. Infantry units participated in Buffalo Training as follows:-
- | | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Buffalo I | Buffalo II | Buffalo III |
| <u>14 Inf Bde Gp</u> | <u>19 Inf Bde Gp</u> | <u>14 Inf Bde Gp.</u> |
| POW Rang | WLI | S Ste M & Sud |
| Oxf Rif | P A Vol | RRC |
| Kent R | | Fus du St L |
| 2 C Scot R | | Brock Rif |
| | | KOR of C |
96. Pac Comd Oprs Instr No 73, 74, 78, dated 31 May, 8 Jul, 18 Aug 43 respectively - PCS 508-1-1-1 over 502-1-21 (GO).

97. Pacific Gen Staff Memo. Case II for VCGS Visit 8 April 42.
98. The following infantry battalions were stationed at TOFINO and LONG BEACH during 1942 and 1943:- D & H Rif, ("A" & "D" Coys) 5 Jul 42 to 25 Aug 42; 2 C Scot R, 2 Aug 42 to 27 Dec 42; S Ste M & S 27 Dec 42 to 3 Apr 43; Brock Rif 3 Apr 43 to 16 Jul 43; Lan & Ren Scot R 17 Jul 43 to 15 Oct 43; 1 Edmn Fus 17 Jul 43 to 21 Sep 43; Kent R 10 Oct 43 to 27 Mar 44.
99. Pac Comd Inst No 101 dated 18 Oct 43 PCS 508-1-1-1 over 504-7-KR (GO).
100. Mobilization Authority HQS 20-1-12-E FD 3 over HQS 20-4-12-E MR 1 dated 15 Apr 42.
101. Defence of Aerodromes, Pacific Command. PCS 508-1-4-1 (GS) dated 29 Sep 42, on HQS 8920 Vol 2.
102. Pac Comd Mvt Ord No 3 dated 16 Jul 42, PCS 504-28-1.
103. Minutes of 27th Meeting of Permanent Joint Board on Defence - 7 Apr 42 - PJBD Journal Vol 3.
104. Report of Meeting held at HQ 13 Naval District SEATTLE between heads of US & Canadian Services on Pacific Coast - 6 Mar 42. VS 638-1-1-5.
105. Authority to despatch anti-aircraft batteries to ALASKA was given in PC 7995 dated 4 Sep 42.
106. War Diary 8 AD PI 5 Sep 42 , and 30 Nov 42.
107. War Diary - 8 AD PI 9 Nov 42 - "Waterproof clothing still not supplied, and in spite of every possible precaution being taken numbers of the men have colds. Two men have been in hospital from this cause, and others could easily have been admitted. Partial shipment of oilskin suits and rubber boots received but not sufficient to clothe all the men, only nine pairs of trousers and twenty-three jackets having been received. The only size in rubber boots supplied eights and nines."
108. Letter from Col KH BUSH, US Army Chief of Staff, HQ North West Service Command, WHITEHORSE, to Brig JE LYON, BGS Pac Comd, dated 13 Nov 42 on PCS 504-28-9.
109. Letter from Lt RAJ READER, OC 9 AD PI to SO Aerodrome Defences Pac Comd, dated 9 Feb 43, on PCS 504-28-9.
110. Letter 5-0 14 Oct 42 from Lt LJ HOBBS, OC, 10 AD PI LONG BEACH, to HQ 18 Inf Bde PT ALBERNI, On PCS 504-28-10 (ADP).
111. WE Cdn V/1940/353A/1 effective 1 Oct 42.

112. PCS 504-26-1 (AD) dated 21 Apr 43.
113. In Feb 43 disposition of Aerodrome Defence Companies, actual or anticipated, was as follows:-
No 6 ADC TOFINO; 7, PATRICIA BAY (ultimately HARDY BAY); 8 ANNETTE IS 9, WHITEHORSE; 10, PATRICIA BAY; 11 TERRACE; 12, BOUNDARY BAY; 13, SEA ISLAND; 14 SMITHERS - DMO&P Progress Report dated 20 Feb 43. HQS 8538 - Vol 3.
114. HQS 20-1-E FD 11 (Oprs) dated 26 May 43.
115. WE Cdn V/357B/1 effective 1 Jun 43.
116. Pers 6039 dated 20 Sep 43.
117. PCO 7085 dated 12 Sep 43 1 MURCHIE from PEARKES.
118. HQS 20-1-E FD 40 dated 19 Oct 43.
119. PC Tele 2666 dated 31 Jul 42 GOC-in-C to CGS.
120. PCS 508-2-3-1 (GS) dated 13 Jul 42. Appx 152 to War Diary, Pacific Command GS, Jul 42.
121. War Diary - 1 Armoured Train - 8 May 43, 4 Jun 43 etc.
122. Col MURCHIE (DMO&I) to GOC-in-C Pacific Command - Employment of Units of the NPAM HQS 7363 (Oprs) dated 2 Nov 40.
123. MD 13 Operation Order No 1 and Appendices A,B,C,D, 2 Dec 41.
124. VS 638-1-1-1 - GOC-in-C to CGS dated 30 May 41.
125. For composition of 39 (Res) Bde Gp See Appx 8.
126. For composition of 41 (Res) Bde Gp See Appx 9.
127. For Pac Comd Def Scheme applying to Reserve Units in MD 11 see PCS 508-1-1-1 (GO) over 504-1-6 dated 7 Oct 42; for MD 13 see DOC MD 13 to OC 41 (R) Bde Gp, file CS 3-2 dated 9 Nov 42.
128. HQS 20-1-19 FD 24 (ACGS) dated 31 Jan 42.
129. HQS 20-1-19 FD 24 (DSD).
130. PCS 602-27-1 dated 20 Jul 42.

131. Quotation from The Ranger Vol 1 No 3 dated 1 Oct 42.
132. PCMR Memo V-2-27-1 dated 18 Mar 42.
133. The Midland Regt spent five months in 1941 on guard duties at ST JOHN, NB. The regiment moved to PRINCE RUPERT in May 1942, to spend the next two years at the northern BC port.
134. See para 56 above.
135. HQS 3545 Vol 4 (Oprs) 25 May 43.
136. PCO 2020 dated 25 May 43 PEARKES to STUART.
137. The Canadian Participation in the KISKA Operations compiled by Historical Section (GS), 10 Dec 43.
138. HQS 5199-J dated 10 Sep 43.
139. Org 320 dated 3 May 43.
140. PCS 5-0-1-23(GOC) dated 9 May 43, on HQS 20-6-12-11-E. But on 13 May 43, HQS 20-6-12-11-E Mob 5, the AG in reply declared that "over 6,000 infantrymen have been ordered to your Command since last November, and the total withdrawals from Infantry units to date number slightly over 2,000."
141. CGS Memo to Minister, Reduction in Operation Troops in CANADA HQS 20-1 FD 110 dated 30 Aug 43.
142. HQS 20-1-E FD 12 dated 18 Jul 43, promulgated in GO 438/43. The reasons for selecting the 3 Edmn Fus and the 3 Ir Fus for disbandment are set forth in a DSD memo to CGS dated 4 Jun 43 on the above named file.
143. See 141 above, CGS Memo, para 20.
144. PCS 504-1-10-2 FD 1 (GOC) dated 13 Aug 43.
145. HQS 20-1 FD 103 dated 31 Aug 43 CGS to GOC-in-C Pao Comd.
146. Brig HW FOSTER - OC 4 Recce Regt (4 PLDG) 29 Jan 41 to 6 Aug 42; GSO 1, 1 Cdn Div 7 Aug 42 to 13 Dec 42; OC HLI of C, 14 Dec 42 to 14 Feb 43; Comdr 7 CIB 15 Feb 43 to 8 Jun 43.
147. Pac Comd Opr Inst No 101 dated 18 Oct 43. PCS 508-1-1-1 over 504-7-KR (GO).

148. PCS 508-1-1-4 (JSC) dated 11 Sep 43.