

REPORT NO. 10

HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

Operation "JUBILEE": The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42.

Information From German War Diaries.

1 A series of Reports of the Historical Section, Canadian Military Headquarters, has dealt in detail with the Dieppe operation of 19 Aug 42. Reports Nos. [100](#), [101](#), [108](#) and [109](#) presented a summary of the information on the operation available from Allied sources; these have been supplemented by certain more recent reports, notably Nos. [153](#) and [159](#). Report No. [116](#) presented information from enemy sources, based mainly upon the report of 81 German Corps, which fell into Allied hands early in 1944. Since the German surrender in May 1945 much additional information has become available from the enemy side, and upon it the present report is based.

2 The relevant war diaries have been lent to Hist Sec (G.S.) by the German Military Document Section, Washington, D.C. The reports prepared by the enemy on

this operation were numerous and detailed, and it seems likely from its very nature to be the most completely documented operation of the War of 1939-45 from the German side. The most valuable new material which has become available is found in the reports of the Commander-in-Chief West (Field Marshal von Rundstedt) (3 Sep 42) and of the G.O.C. 302 Inf Div (Lt-Gen Conrad Maase) 25 Aug 42). Photostat copies of both these basic reports have been made and are being retained by Hist Sec (G.S.) for permanent reference. English translations of them are attached to the present report as appendices. The lengthy report of 302 Inf Div was translated by the Army Language Bureau, A.H.Q.; that of the C.-in-C. West was translated by Capt E. Skutezky, the translation being subsequently checked and modified in some particulars by Col C.P. Stacey

3. Capt Skutezky has prepared a lengthy draft report on the German documents relating to Dieppe, including detailed translations of many special documents. Copies of this draft are being retained in Hist Sec (G.S.) and will be available for permanent reference; it has been felt, however, that the present briefer and simpler

treatment is adequate for normal needs. An attempt is made in the present report to call attention to all the most essential points which have emerged from study of the German documents.

#### TIMING - BRITISH AND GERMAN

4. On 19 Aug 42 the United Kingdom, and the forces based there, were operating on British Summer Time ("A" time) - Greenwich mean time plus one hour. This is the time used in the British operation orders and in British reports relating to the operation. The Germans were operating on the equivalent of British Double Summer Time ("B" time) - Greenwich mean time plus two hours. This is the time used in their reports relating to the operation. Thus, for example, British accounts place the action between Group 5 and the German convoy at about 0350 hrs, while the Germans report it at about 0450 hrs.

5. In certain of the translations of German documents appended to the present report, "B" has been inserted after times. This has in all cases been supplied by the translator, and is not found in the original documents.

#### THE ENEMY'S DISPOSITIONS IN THE DIEPPE AREA, 19 Aug 42

6. As already noted, the German Commander-in-Chief West in 1942 was Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, who

was also Commander of Army Group "D". The Dieppe area  
fell within the zone of H.Q. Fifteenth Army, commanded by  
Col-Gen Haase (not to be confused with the officer of the  
same name who commanded 302 Inf Div). The location of  
Army Headquarters is not indicated on the maps seen. The  
Corps concerned with the Dieppe area was 81 Corps,  
commanded by General der Panzertruppen Adolf Kuntzen.  
Corps Headquarters was at Canteleu, on the north bank of  
the Seine immediately west of Rouen (Map "Gliederung, d.  
302 I.D. und Korpsreserve" Appx 1 to Battle Report of 81  
Corps (25 Aug 42): copy in War Diary No. 3 of 302 Inf  
Div, Serial No. 24353-8).

7. 81 Corps has under command three Infantry Divisions:  
711, 302 and 332. The Corps' right boundary was the Somme  
Estuary, and 302 Inf Div held the right sector, extending  
from the Estuary to inclusive Sotteville-sur-Mer, a few  
miles east of St. Valery-en-Caux. To the left of 302 Inf  
Div was 332 Inf Div, with Headquarters at Bolbec, inland  
from Fécamp (Ibid).

8. In August 1942 H.Q. 302 Inf Div was located in the village of Envermeu, roughly ten  
miles south-east of Dieppe. It had moved there from Arques-La-Bataille on 28 Apr 42).

W.D., H.Q. 302 Inf Div, serial 24353-1, 27 Apr 42). (Cf. [Report No. 116](#), para 31.)

9. The Division consisted of three Infantry Regiments: 570, 571 and 572. Of these 570 Inf Regt, (less its own 3 Bn, but with 3 Bn 572 Inf Regt under command held the le Tréport area, and 572, Inf Regt held the sector immediately south of the Somme Estuary, while 571 Inf Regt held the Dieppe area.

10. (b) Troops in the Dieppe Area

The Dieppe area was organized as a “strongpoint” (Stützpunkt) and held by a special “Stützpunktgruppe” under the direct control of H.Q. 571 Inf Regt, which was located on the West Headland of Dieppe (M.R. 21682). The Dieppe strongpoint appears on German maps as completely enclosed in wire defences which enclose Puy and Neuville-les-Dieppe and reach their most southerly point at 224654, near the main Paris road some two miles south of the Dieppe waterfront. From this point the wire defences ran in a north-westerly direction along the edge of the high ground overlooking the Scie valley front the east to the cliff overlooking the sea at 200683. The village of Pourville thus lay outside the wire defences, though it is clear that the troops holding it were reckoned part of the Stützpunktgruppe.

These all-round wire defences appear on our defence overprints issued before the

operation (see, e.g., [Report No. 130](#), Appx “C” ( i ) ).

11. This Stützpunktgruppe consisted of the following troops:

H.Q. 571 Inf Regt

H.Q. 2 Bn 571 Inf Regt (on West Headland, Dieppe)

H.Q. 3 Bn 571 Inf Regt (on East Headland, Dieppe, 237691)

H.Q. 3 302 Arty Regt (on West Headland, Dieppe)

H.Q. Flakuntergruppe Dieppe (A.A. Arty Bn) H.Q. 302 Engr Bn

Infantry Companies: Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of 571 Inf Regt

Artillery Batteries: Nos. 7, 8, “A” and “B” of 302 Arty Regt

Engineer Companies: Nos. 1 and 2 of 302 Engr Bn.

This information considerably modifies that heretofore available (see [Report No. 116](#), para 7).

12. The greater part of this force was disposed in defensive localities on the coast itself, although two infantry companies (5 and 11) were in immediate reserve respectively west and east of the River d’Arques. The defended localities were mainly concentrated on the high ground, but the actual front of the town of Dieppe, from the Casino to the harbour mole, both inclusive, was held by two platoons of No. 7 Company plus what is described as “V. Kp.”

Evidently the “Versuchskompanie” referred to in [Report No. 109](#), para 31, note 2. This

“experimental company” was a Naval unit; it is shown in German diagrams as armed with five 37-mm anti-tank guns and three light machine-guns, while the two platoons of No. 7 Company are shown as equipped with one 75-mm gun, one 37-mm anti-tank gun, one tank (in a static position) and one 47 anti-tank gun (presumably Czech).

13. Puys was held by one platoon of No. 9 Company, a platoon of Luftwaffe, and “Soondergerät” (evidently personnel handling special equipment). The sector of Pourville west of the Scie was held by one platoon of No. 6 Company, while the sector east of the Scie was held by another platoon of No. 6 Company plus a group of No. 8 Company; there were one 47-mm anti-tank gun and two 75-mm guns in this latter sector.

14. Berneval lay outside the Dieppe strongpoint area. It was held by 2/770 Coastal Bty (strength “127 mann”) plus a party of ten men from No. 1 Coy 570 Inf Regt. There were also 114 all ranks of the Luftwaffe in this area. (During the operation this area was reinforced by sub-units of 570 Inf Regt from the east as well as by portions of the Divisional Reserve from the south.)

15. The area of the Varengeville battery was held by 813 Coastal Bty, whose strength is given in the Report of 302 Inf Div (Appendix “B” below) as 93 men. The strongpoint at the Pointe d’Ailly lighthouse nearby is credited by the same source with a garrison of 77 men.



16. The above details of dispositions derive from the map “Stützpunktgruppe Dieppe, Stand vom 19.8.42”, which forms Appx 2 to the report of 81 Corps (copy in W.D., H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Serial No. 24353-8).

( c ) Artillery in the Sector

17. The Dieppe sector was strong in artillery. On the actual front of attack there were three coastal batteries, as follows:

- (a) Varengeville, No. 813 Army Coastal Battery, six 150-mm Krupp guns.
- (b) Berneval, 2/770 Army Coastal Battery, four 105-mm Czech guns and three 170-mm guns “in M. Laf.”
- (c) Arques-la-Bataille (248638), No. 265 Coastal Battery, for 150-mm howitzers.

Certain, other coastal batteries not comprehended within the limits of our operation were able to interfere with it to a limited extent, as follows:

- (d) St. Valery-en-Caux, 1/799 Coastal Battery six French 150 mm guns fired 13 rounds during the operation (Report of Artillerie Kommandeur 117, 20 Sep 42).
- (e) Position unknown, but probably west of St. Valery, 2/799 Coastal Battery, armement unknown but heavy: fired only two rounds during the operation, at

17,000 metres (ibid).

- (f) Caveux-sur-mer (south side of Somme Estuary), 1/770 Coastal Battery, armament unknown but heavy fired nine rounds in the course of 19 Aug, at ranges up to 20,000 metres (ibid).
- (g) Mesnil Val (west of Le Préport), 3/778 Coastal Battery, four Czech 150-mm guns: fired heavily on offshore targets at Berneval (ibid).

18. There were on the front of attack in addition four “batteries” (troops) of Divisional Artillery, each armed with four 100-mm Czech field howitzers, disposed as follows:

- (a) Battery “A” (218664, near Appeville).
- (b) Battery “B” (258685, south of Puys).
- (c) Battery 7 (206676, near Les 4 Vents Ferme).
- (d) Battery 8 (262674, south of Puys).

All these batteries lay within the wire defences of the Dieppe strongpoint except 8 Bty, which was just outside them.

19. A total of eight French 75-mm guns were in position in a beach defence role on the coast between Pourville and the east cliff of Dieppe, both inclusive.

20. Anti-aircraft guns (manned by Luftwaffe troops) were also numerous. A diagram

prepared by H.Q. Fifteenth Army and annexed to the report of the C.-in-C. West 3 Sep 42 (photostat copies in possession of Hist Sec (G.S.)) indicates the presence in the 302 Inf Div sector of a total of 30 A.A. guns. Of these, 12 were 20-mm, nine were 37-mm, three were 50-mm and six were heavy guns, shown on this diagram as 75-mm but on the disposition map prepared by 81 Corps (above, para 16) as 88-mm. The report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div (Appendix "B" below, para I ((B))) appears to confirm that they were 75-mm French guns.

21. The above account of the enemy's armament derives partly from the 81 Corps map "Stützpunktgruppe Dieppe, Stand vom (above, para 16) 19.8.42" and partly from the table "Gliederung der ... Gesamtkräfte der 3 Wehrmachtteile" forming Appx 3 to the report of C.-in-C. West, 3 Sep 42. Some details have been drawn from the map forming Appx 2 to the report of Artillerie Kommandeur 117 20 Sep 42 (W.D., H.Q. 81 Corps, serial 32648-4: Photostat in possession of Hist Sec (G.S.)). The detailed report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div (Appendix "B" below) has also best authority in cases of conflict between various sources.

(d) Available Reserves

22. The enemy's system of reserves was as follows.

23. The Regimental Reserve of 571 Inf Regt was in the area of Ouveille-la-Rivière, on the River Saane some two and a half miles inland. It consisted of 1 Bn 571 Inf Regt (less 3 Coy and one platoon of 4 Coy), plus an infantry gun platoon in process of formation.

24. The Divisional Reserve of 302 Inf Div consisted of 570 Inf Regt with its Headquarters at Eu and its 1 and 2 Bns under command (see above, para 9). There were also considerable numbers of divisional troops, including 302 A. Tk Coy and 3 Coy 302 Engr Bn, in the area Envermeu – Argues-la-Bataille. (Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Appx “B” below, part I (B).)

25. Corps Reserve was disposed inland to the south-west of Dieppe with its headquarters at Doudeville, south of Saint Valery-en-Caux. It consisted of H.Q. 676 Inf Regt (Col Klemm) with under command 1 and 3 Bns 676 Inf Regt and 3 Bn 570 Inf Regt. At Yvetot in the same area was 81 Tank Company.

26. The main element of the Army Reserve was a force of four Jäger battalions under a headquarters known as “Stb Gollé”, located at Barentin, north-west of Rouen.

Also included were 226 Assault Gun Battalion, at Hotteville, east of Yvetot, and some motorized artillery in the area between Duclair and Jumièges. (map “Gliederung d 302 I.D. and Korps reserve”, above, para)

27. In Army Group Reserve were the 10<sup>th</sup> Panzer Division, in the Amiens area with its headquarters at Flixécourt, north-west of Amiens, and the S.S. “Adolf Hitler” Division (not yet shown as an armoured formation) with its headquarters at Rosny, west of Mantes-Gassicourt. (Map forming Appendix 2 to Report of C-in-C. West, 3 Sep 42.) Along with these two formations, the “7<sup>th</sup> Flieger Division” was warned by Army Group at 0700 hrs (German time)

on 19 Aug that it might be required (Report of C.-in-C. West, 3 Sep 42, part III). This division appears to have been a parachute formation (information from Historical Section, R.C.A.F.) Its location does not appear. It took no further part in the operation.

## THE SECURITY OF THE OPERATION

28. The question of whether the enemy had any foreknowledge of our intention to operate against Dieppe has been discussed at some length in [Report No. 109](#) (paras 14-23) on the basis of our own information, and in [Report No. 116](#) (para 6) on the basis of the report of 81 German Corps. Both reports reached the conclusion that the Germans had not been forewarned of the operation and that their first information resulted from the unfortunate encounter of Group 5 with a German convoy about 0350 hrs (see [Report No. 101](#), para 24).

29. These conclusions are now confirmed specifically and in detail by the new German evidence. Attention is particularly directed to the opening passages of the Report of the C.-in-C. West (see Appendix "A" below). It will be noted from these passages that German information of the operation was limited entirely to the knowledge that a considerable assembly of landing craft had taken place during the summer on the south coast of England. Although Field Marshal von Rundstedt mentions a change in British wireless procedure on 15 Aug, which made interception more difficult, and also refers to cross-Channel flights of Allied aircraft which suggested "briefing flights" (Einweisungsflüge), later in this same report (part III (B)) he

writes, “Up to the commencement of battle action on the morning of 19 Aug enemy air operations by day or night had not pointed in any particular way to an impending landing attempt”, and adds, with respect to wireless, “Interception of operational and training traffic in England presented no deviation from normal”. His statement that the first real warning of an impending operation came only with the encounter with the convoy at 0450 hrs on 19Aug could not be more definite.

30. The Report of the C.-in C. West notes further (para III ( C ) that the Germans received no warning from their radar installations. Equipment at the Tréport detected targets off Dieppe from 0400 hrs (German time) but, in the light of noises heard at the same time, these contacts were believed to be aircraft.

31. It is interesting to observe how relatively inefficient was the German intelligence service with respect to events in England. Responsible military authorities in the United Kingdom had thought it decidedly probable that some information might have reached the Germans concerning Operation “RUTTER”, the first version of the Dieppe project which was cancelled, after all personnel had been briefed, on 7 Jul 42 ([Report No. 100](#), para 110). With this in view, it will be recalled that the operation was re-mounted, on the suggestion of Capt Hughes-Hallett, on a different basis (involving no preliminary concentration) which it was believed would prevent the enemy from discovering that the project had been revived (see Reports Nos. [153](#) and [159](#)). In the event, these German documents make it quite clear, not only was the Hughes-

Hallett scheme effective, but the enemy had in fact heard nothing of the earlier project. He took precautions, but not more at Dieppe than elsewhere; he considered that in the summer of 1942 an attack (and possibly a major enterprise) was possible at any point along his extended front, and acted accordingly. On the night of 19/20 Aug weather and tide conditions were favourable for a raid in the eastern Channel sector, and his troops there had been placed in a heightened state of readiness accordingly. They had in fact been in such a state since 10 Aug (see below, para 35).

32. It is interesting and important to note that there had been repeated alarms during the spring and summer. On 3 Apr, for instance, the Germans believed that they had intercepted a radio telephone message suggesting the possibility of a raid on Dieppe on 6 Apr; precautions were taken accordingly, but of course no raid developed (W.D., H.Q. 302 Inf Div, serial No. 24353-1, Apr 3-7/42). There was another alarm covering the nights of 21/22 and 22/23 May (Ibid, 21-22 May 42).

33. It is of particular interest that on more than one occasion the situation on the Russian front was referred to in German orders as providing a likely motive for Allied attacks on the French shore. On 10 Jul 42 H.Q. 302 Inf Div records an order from 81 Corps for a heightened state of readiness. The same day Corps explained to 302 Inf Div that the Russian front had been partly broken; the Russians were believed to be “again” (nochmals) demanding of the British Government the opening of a second front (Errichtung der zweiten Front). For this

reason, the C.-in-C. West had ordered special precautions. (Ibid, 10 Jul 42). It was added, however, that air reconnaissance and other information did not reveal actual preparations for an attack. The division was nevertheless to be brought up to full strength forthwith (Ibid).

34. In such circumstances, those periods when lunar and tidal conditions were favourable for seaborne attack on the French coast were naturally earmarked by the Germans as times of special precaution. On 20 Jul 42 the G.O.C. Fifteenth Army issued an order directing attention to three periods during which tidal conditions were considered particularly favourable to an Anglo-American enterprise: 27 Jul –3 Aug; 10 Aug – 19 Aug; and 25 Aug – 1 Sep (W.D. “B”, H.Q. Fifteenth Army, Serial No. 26621-4).

35. On 8 Aug, accordingly, H.Q. 302 Inf Div ordered a state of “threatening danger” (Drohende Gefahr) for the nights from 10/11 to 19/20 (W.D., H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Serial No. 24353-1, 8 Aug 42). Two days later, the G.O.C. Fifteenth Army issued an order beginning with the remark, “Various reports permit the assumption that, because of the miserable position of the Russians, the Anglo-Americans will be forced to undertake something in the measurable future”. The troops were warned that such an attack would be a grim business, reminded of their responsibilities in this crisis and urged to do their duty. (W.D., H.Q. Fifteenth Army, Serial No. 75084-1, 10 Aug 42).

#### THE ENEMY REACTION TO OUR ATTACK



36. A map forming Appendix 7 to the report of the C.-in-C. West shows the encounter between the German convoy and Group 5 as taking place at 0448 hrs (German time) at a point a little more than 20 kilometres off Dieppe; the convoy is shown as turning towards Dieppe and being “dispersed” (Zersprengt) at 0500 hrs. The convoy is described in this report (see Appx “A” below,) part I as a six-knot convoy consisting of five motor or motor sailing vessels escorted by three submarine-chasers; it had left Boulogne at 2100 hrs on 18 Aug bound for Dieppe.

37. It has already been noted ([Report No. 116](#), para 6) that the German 81 Corps reported that as a result of the convoy engagement “the entire coast defence system was alerted”. Other evidence now available is to the same effect. The report of C.-in-C. West states specifically, “As a result of the noise of battle the alarm was given in the coastal sector” (Appx “A” below part II).

38. It is not clear, however, that the alert resulting from the convoy fight was quite complete. There is no doubt it is true, that it did cause immediate precautions at certain points. In particular, the report of 302 Inf Div notes that at 0457 hrs German time (i.e., within ten minutes of the encounter at sea beginning) the Luftwaffe crew of the radar equipment at Berneval manned their point of resistance (Appx “B”/below, Part II(A)). This would appear, however, to have been a somewhat isolated measure of precaution, and the fact that Naval

Group Command West reported nearly an hour after the encounter (i.e., at 0545 hrs German time) that it was probably a “customary attack on convoy” Report of C.-in-C. West, Appx “A” part II below) indicates that the battle at sea was certainly not at once recognized as indicating the imminence of a landing. It is important to note that H.Q. 302 Inf Div did not actually order “action stations” until 0601 hrs (German time) and it appears that 571 Inf Regt had itself issued the same order to its troops only one minute before (Report of 302 Inf Div, Appx “B” below, part II(A)). By this time, there had been a definite report of our landing at Pourville. (Ibid). It will be recalled that at this place we obtained almost complete surprise, and no fire was directed at the L.C.As. before they touched down ([Report No. 101](#), para 141).

39. What appears at first glance, at least, to be strong evidence that, whether as a result of the convoy fight or not, the German defences were in a high state of readiness, is contained in the detailed reports of German artillery commanders. The “Artillery Experience Report” of 302 Arty Regt (W.D., H.Q. 302 Inf Div Serial No. 24353-8, Appx 16) and the Report of Artillerie Kommandeur 117 (W.D., H.Q. 81 Corps, Serial No. 32648-4) both indicate that the first shot fired by German artillery was at 0541 hrs (German time) when 7 Bty 302 Arty Regt opened fire against “Zielraum C”, which on a map attached to the Artillery Commander’s Report appears as a defensive fire zone just offshore at Pourville. As the South Saskatchewan Regiment landed not more than five minutes late (i.e., at 0555 hrs German time) and report encountering no fire before landing (above, para 38), this German statement appears to be inaccurate. These artillery reports indicate, however, that the whole of the Divisional Artillery component in the

Dieppe area (i.e., 7, 8, "A" and "B" Batteries,) totalling 16 guns was firing at "Zielraum C" by 0545 hrs (German time); that 813 Coastal Bty joined in at 0547 hrs, firing at boats off Quiberville, and 265 Coastal Bty at 0555 hrs, firing at "Zielraum B" (a defensive fire zone off the mouth of Dieppe harbour) which had first been fired at by 7 Bty at 0550 hrs. "Zielraum A" was a defensive fire zone offshore at Puy; the first fire recorded here was at 0555 hrs, when "B" Bty fired at "anlaufende Boote".

40. It seems fairly clear from our own evidence that these German artillery reports cannot be accepted without some reserve. They seem to display the same tendency mentioned in para 38 above: a desire to magnify the Germans' state of readiness and the promptitude with which their troops reacted to the first indications of an attack. This, no doubt, was for the benefit of higher authority.

41. From the foregoing it is apparent that to estimate the precise influence of the encounter with the convoy in arousing the German defenders is no simple matter. The German evidence cannot all be accepted at its precise face value. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the encounter at sea did contribute to the loss of surprise and thereby reduced the chances of the operation's being successful. In practice, we seem to have obtained a large degree of surprise at Pourville, though at no other point except perhaps the Varengeville area. The mere fact that at Puy the landing was made between 15 and 20 minutes late ([Report No. 101](#), para 67-69) would in itself militate against obtaining surprise here, as the attacks at other points were well

under way before that at Puy went in; while no surprise was of course to be expected on the main beaches in front of Dieppe, where the assault was timed to go in half an hour later than on the flanks.

42. Considerable light has previously been thrown upon the movement of the enemy's reserves as the result of study of the Report of 81 Corps ([Report No. 116](#), paras 11-18). The further accounts now available do not alter the picture as previously known in any essential points.

43. The action of the enemy's more local reserves has already been outlined in [Report No. 116](#) (Paras 11-15). This account is in general confirmed by the new information.

44. Further information is now available concerning the counter-attack against 3 Commando in the Berneval area. This was carried out by a composite force commanded by Major von Blücher, O.C. 302 A. Tk Bn, which formed part of the Divisional Reserve (above, para 24). This force consisted ultimately of 302 Cyclist Sqn, 3 Coy 302 Engr Bn and 3 Coy 570 Inf Regt. Two reconnaissance patrols from 1 Coy 570 Inf Regt were also engaged in this area. The composite force succeeded in dealing with that small portion of 3 Commando which had landed in the Berneval area, and by 1030 hrs (German time) the German Command considered the situation here "as cleaned up", the attackers having been thrown out of Petit Berneval and off Hill 101, at the top of the cliffs to the northeast. (Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div,

Appx “B” below, part III.)

45. The Germans accounts suggest that the enemy never fully understood the action of Major Young’s party which landed independently to the west of Berneval ([Report No. 101](#), paras 39 – 42). None of the German maps gives an accurate picture of the movements of this party. The effects of its action, however, may be traced in detail in the German accounts. Of particular interest is the Report of Artillerie Kommandeur 117 (above, para 39). This notes that the Berneval battery (2/770 Coastal Bty) opened fire at 0600 hrs (German time) and during the next ten minutes fired 14 rounds against boats off the Berneval gully without effect. No more shots are shown until 0700 hrs (German time), when the troop fired 12 rounds over open sights at a range of 100 – 200 yards in defence of its fire position. That the enemy swung one of his heavy guns around and attempted to employ it against Major Young’s snipers was already known ([Report No. 101](#), para 40). It is of special importance to note that from this time the battery fired no further shots until 0845 hrs (German time), when it opened fire against ships off Dieppe. From this time onwards it was frequently in action.

46. The German evidence thus indicates that the action of 3 Commando, and particularly of Major Young’s gallant little party, had the effect of neutralizing the Berneval battery for more than two hours and a half at a critical stage of the operation.

(ii) Puys

47. Nothing in the German documents indicates that any action was taken during the operation to reinforce the German troops at Puys. Thanks to the extremely strong nature of the ground at this point, the small force stationed here (above, para) was able to deal with the attack of R. Regt C. without assistance.

(iii) Dieppe

48. As already noted (above, para), the front of the town of Dieppe itself was held by two infantry platoons and the naval Experimental company. At 0916 hrs (German time) it was reported that the latter unit (which this entry credits with having eight anti-tank guns, not five as noted in para above) had suffered heavy losses and had one gun put out of commission. At 0646 hrs (German time) 5 Coy 571 Inf Regt, the sector reserve at Dieppe (see above, para), assembled at the Garrison Commandant's Headquarters for an immediate counter-attack.

There is no reference to its actual commitment until 1055 hrs (German time) when it and Nos. 2 and 3 Platoons of 2 Coy 302 Engr Bn (2/3/2./Pi.302.) were ordered to push forward to Dieppe beach "to roll up the enemy who is still firing there". There is no further reference to any specific counter-attack at this point until 1410 hrs (German time), at which time it was reported that mopping up was progressing satisfactorily on Dieppe beach. (Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Appx "B" below, part II ( C)

49. As a result, obviously, of our landing tanks on Dieppe beach, the German Command decided to strengthen the anti-tank defences there; and at 0900 hrs (German time) orders were issued for 302 A. Tk Coy (from Divisional Reserve) to be placed at the disposal of 571 Inf Regt and moved to Dieppe. The unit's normal station was south-west of the Divisional Headquarters at Envermeu and south-east of the Forêt d'Arques (Map: "Gliederung ed. 302 I.D. and Korpsreserve", as above, para). This unit was armed with German 75-mm guns Pak 97/98 nine of which had been received on 17 Jul 42 (W.D., H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Quartiermeister obtailung, Serial No. 24 361 – 1, 17 Jul 42). At 1000 hrs (German time) 571 Inf Regt committed the company to action as follows: "1 platoon (Zug) Dieppe harbour, 1 platoon on west headland" (Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Appx "B" below, part II (C)) How much effect this new deployment of heavier weapons had upon the tanks on the beach does not appear, but it was probably limited.

(iv) Pourville: Regimental Reserve 571 Inf Regt

50. The sector to which the enemy throughout attached the greatest importance was that about Pourville. "Division considered Pourville and the Scie valley as the points of greatest danger in the divisional sector" (*ibid*), part III). Here also he did actually commit the Regimental Reserve of 571 Inf Regt. It was here that we made our greatest penetration; and it was here, as we shall see (below paras), that the enemy proposed to commit both his Corps Reserve and 10 Pz Div.

51. As already noted (above, para 23) this consisted of 1 Bn 571 Inf Regt with Headquarters at Ouveille-la-Rivière. At 0612 hrs (German time) 571 Inf Regt ordered 1 Bn 571 Inf Regt to action stations for an immediate counter-attack on Quiberville, and the battalion arranged for reconnaissance towards Quiberville and St. Aubin-sur-Mer, to the west of it. It subsequently came to light, however, that there was no menace at either of these points. The Germans appear to have been somewhat slow to grasp the significance of our operations in this area where the main body of 4 Commando had landed east of Quiberville and pushed rapidly inland to attack the Varengeville battery ([Report No. 101](#), paras 44 – 54). At 0814 hrs (German time) H.Q. 302 Inf Div, hearing of the peril to the Varengeville battery, ordered 1 Bn 571 Inf Regt in the event of this battery being endangered, to commit a reinforced company there for immediate counter-attack. This order, however, was not executed, “as previous instructions had been already received from 571 Inf Regt for action stations for attack on Pourville” (Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Appx “B” below, part II). These instructions had been issued at 0710 hrs (German time), the battalion being instructed to assemble “in south section of Hautot”.

52. At 0930 hrs (German time) Division despatched a staff officer to the battalion to clarify the situation and also to establish the whereabouts of 3 Bn 570 Inf Regt, part of the Corps Reserve, which had been placed under the Division at 0726 hrs (German time) and ordered to move to Ouveille. At 1055 hrs (German time) the staff officer returned to Division and reported that 1 Bn 571 Inf Regt had run into the enemy near Hautot in the course of its assembly. It had



clearly come into contact with Camerons of C., who had advanced into this area ([Report No. 101](#), paras 193 –205, and cf. No. 116, para 13). It seems possible that the German close-support guns which the Camerons reported as coming into action here ([Report No. 101](#), para 201) were the infantry gun platoon forming part of 571 Inf Regt's reserve (above, para 23), although there is no reference to it in German documents. The administrative report of 302 Inf Div (below, para) mentions two 75-mm infantry guns as being in action during the day.

53. At 1130 hrs (German time) 1 Bn 571 Inf Regt ordered an attack on Pourville for a zero hour not yet fixed. The Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div notes that at this time the battalion was “severely attacked by enemy low-level aircraft”. It adds:

When C.S.M. Prögler who had been detailed as Observation N.C.O. of the battalion pushes forward towards Pourville on his own initiative with four men and brings in 200 prisoners of war, the companies of 1 Bn 571 Inf Regt advance in the direction of Pourville-West without waiting for the order fixing zero hour.

It was obviously at this time that the Germans recovered the high ground west of Pourville ([Report No. 116](#), para 13). There is little more detail about the operations of this battalion, and it would appear that it was content to follow up our men as they withdrew, maintaining moderate pressure. At 1437 hrs (German time) 571 Inf Regt was able to report, “Pourville

firmly in our hands”.

54. The foregoing details relating to the action of 1 Bn 571 Inf Regt all derive from the Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div (Appx “B” below, part II).

55. Two other small special units took part in the operations. One was on N.C.Os.’ class which was employed in the Scie valley south of Pourville (along with men from 571 Inf Regt’s engineer platoon) and was in action here, widely with the Camerons and the S. Sask R. (ibid, parts II (C) and III). The other was a reserve company composed of hospital patients fit for duty, which at 1022 hrs (German time) was moved to Janval, on the south edge of Dieppe, to relieve an engineer company there for employment in counter-attack against the beach (ibid, part III).

#### THE MOVEMENT AND ACTION OF ENEMY RESERVES

(v) Main Body of Divisional Reserve

56. The nature and disposition of the Divisional Reserve of 302 Inf, Div has been described above (para 24). The Division did not venture to use the whole of 570 Inf Regt at Dieppe, as attacks elsewhere seemed possible (Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Appx “B” below, part III) but it did move 2 Bn 570 Inf Regt, which at the commencement of the operation had its headquarters at Monchy-sur-Eu, a few miles south-east of Lefréport (Map: “Gliederung der

302 I.D. und Korpsreserve”, as above, para 4). This battalion was ordered at 0840 hrs (German time) to concentrate on the western side of the Forêt d’Arques, south-east of Dieppe. At 0915 hrs (German time) it was reported that the battalion would arrive there about 0945 hrs. It was never committed to action, however, but remained at the forest with its transport ready for an immediate move, thus constituting a safeguard either against an unfavourable development at Dieppe or an Allied airborne landing. (Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, part II (C) and III.)

57. The action of the Corps Reserves was as described in [Report No. 116](#), para 16. Col Klemm’s Regimental Headquarters, with 1 Bn 676 Inf Regt, 1 Bty 332 Arty Regt and 81 Tk Coy were placed under command of 302 Inf Div at 0845 hrs (German time) and put in motion towards “Tourville” (presumably Tourville-sur-Arques, 241612, some 2500 metres south of the aerodrome of Dieppe – St. Aubin) (Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Appx “B” below, part II (C) ). This force, or the greater part of it, was arriving in Tourville at 1145 hrs (German time), but these troops never actually came into action. Col Klemm was at 1240 hrs (German time) ordered to attack Pourville along the west bank of the Scie. It was assumed that Klemm’s attack would go in about 1430 hrs (German time). Fighting had ceased, however, before this attack could be launched. (Ibid).

58. The Army Reserves (above, para 26) were also put in motion. At 0913 hrs (German time) Col. Gollé’s regiment was ordered forward; two battalions accompanied by “Batterie

West” from the Jumièges – Duclair region were to move to Totes at the disposal of 81 Corps, the other two to Yvetot. The move was carried out, but so slowly as to arouse the ire of 81 Corps; Col. Gollé’s command post opened at Totes at 1430 hrs (German time). It was explained that the companies had been dispersed for training. (Operations Log of 81 Corps, W.D. 81 Corps, Volume “Landungsunternehmen Dieppe”, Serial No. 32648-40)

59. Mention must be made of the movement of those portions of the Army Group Reserve which were sent forward. At 0725 and 0728 hrs respectively (German time), G.H.Q. West ordered “Alarm Scale II” for 10 Pz Div and S.S. Div “Adolf Hitler”. At 0915 hrs (German time) 10 Pz Div reported that its vanguard would be ready to move at 0945 hrs, and the main body at 1100 hrs; S.S. Div “Adolf Hitler” had previously reported that its vanguard would be ready to move at 0945 hrs, but that the main body was not yet ready. At 0940 hrs (German time) G.H.Q. West, recognizing that the enemy had committed at least two Brigades, and possibly a whole Division, and appreciating that even larger developments were still possible, decided to commit 10 Pz Div was advised that it was being placed under command H.Q. 81 Corps “to clean up the situation at Dieppe immediately” (Report of C. in C. West, Appx “A” below, part III).

60. A report of H.Q. 10 Pz Div dated 25 Aug 42 (copy in W.D., H.Q. 81 Corps, Serial No. 32648-4) states that the Division was warned at 0730 hrs (German time) and had warned its units directly under command by 0740 hrs.

61. The raid on Dieppe resulted in virtually the whole German force in Northern France being prepared for action. At 1110 hrs (German time) air reconnaissance reported six large transports 40 kilometres north. West of Dieppe, three medium-sized freighters 60 kilometres north-west of Dieppe, and in the area of Selsey Bill” 26 large transports each of 6000 tons, 3 destroyers in company Decks closely packed with troops”. To G.H.Q. West this suggested the decided possibility that the Dieppe operation might be the beginning of an attempt to establish a Second Front; and at 1130 hrs (German time) G.H.Q. West ordered Alarm Scale II (obviously a very high state of readiness for the whole of the 7<sup>th</sup> Army(Normandy and Brittany) and the following formations in Army Group Reserve: 7 Flieger Div, 6 Pz Div, 337 Inf Div, and the Hermann Göring Brigade. (Report of C.-in-C West, E Appx “A” below, part III.) The German Göring Brigade became the Hermann Göring Panzer Division the following year (Order of Battle of The German Army, 1 March 1945 (Washington, military Intelligence Division, War Department), p. 304).

62. The convoy of 26 ships which so alarmed the Germans remains something of an enigma. It certainly had nothing to do with the operation and it may be assumed that the Luftwaffe was in error in reporting that its decks were crammed with troops. Capt Hughes-Hallett, the Naval Force Commander, in conversation with the present writer at Portsmouth on 29 Sep 46, indicated that this was probably a normal channel merchant convoy which was turned back into harbour, at his request, to make its destroyer escort available to assist him in escorting his own small craft back to Newhaven.

It received the order for commitment only at 1000 hrs, but its "Eingreifbataillon" had been ready to move since 0821 hrs, and it was actually on the march at 1045 hrs (German time), as were the leading units of 7 Pz Regt. The main body of the Panzer Regiment moved at 1100 hrs (German time). The leading column reached Longueville-sur-Scie, roughly ten miles due south of Dieppe, at 1455 hrs (German time) while the "Eingreifbataillon" reached Torcy at 1630 hrs. As the operation at Dieppe had already ended, the Division was ordered not to cross the line Tourville – Arques-la-Bataille, and proceeded to make camp on either side of its axis of advance.

63. Although the German Command had made such comprehensive arrangements for the reinforcement of the Dieppe area, Corps arms and Army Group reserves never came into action and our raid was in fact repulsed by the troops manning the coastal positions and the immediate local and Divisional reserves. The action of the enemy's more local reserves has already been outlined in [Report No. 116](#) (Paras 11 – 15). That account is in general confirmed by the new information

#### ACTION OF GERMAN ARTILLERY

64. The action of the enemy's artillery, as already noted, can be studied in detail in the report of 302 Arty Regt (Appx "C" below) and in that of Artillerie-Kommandeur 117 (above, para 39). According to the latter report, as we have seen, German artillery first opened fire at

0541 hrs (German time). Fire continued until 1458 hrs, and Artillerie-Kommandeur 117 records thereafter three final shots fired by 1/770 Coastal Bty at 2310 hrs (German time). His report lists a total of 5357 rounds fired by German artillery during the operation. This figure clearly does not include rounds fired by anti-aircraft artillery, by the anti-tank guns facing the Dieppe beach, or by the eight 75-mm beach defence guns; in other words it represents artillery rounds of a calibre larger than 75-mm.

65. It is of interest to note that higher German headquarters considered that too much ammunition had been fired. One battery (troop) of 302 Arty Regt ("B" Bty) fired 1163 rounds (of these, 550 were directed towards preventing the reinforcement or evacuation of Blue Beach), and 81 Corps commented adversely on this expenditure, which seemed to endanger the ammunition supply (W.D., H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Quartiermeisterabteilung (Serial No. 24361-1) 25 Aug 42). The C.in-C West, in his own comments on the operation (report of C.in-C. West, Part IX, "Basic Observations of the C.-in-C. West No. 8", 23 Aug 42) referred to this matter and observed that it was necessary to take precautions against excessive expenditure conceding however that it was also important to be certain that ample ammunition was available, "for a landing operation does offer many rewarding targets".

66. Attention has already been directed (para 45 above) to the light thrown by German documents on the effects of 3 Commando's attack on the Berneval battery. Similar information is available with reference to the Varengeville battery. The Report of Artillerie-Kommandeur

117 (above, para 39) notes that this battery opened fire at 0547 hrs (German time) and fired chiefly at naval targets until 0735 hrs the battery fired 13 rounds over open sights at ranges of 300 to 350 metres in defence of its fire position. No more shots are reported until 0845 hrs, when (it is said) six more rounds were fired in the same manner. This would suggest that it was at this time that 4 Commando made its final attack on the battery; information from that unit, however, is to the effect that it was actually considerably earlier, and that fire of the guns were blown up at 0650 hrs (0750 hrs German time) and the sixth a little later ([Report No. 101](#), para 51). In the circumstances, the records of the German battery were presumably written from memory; it is not surprising that the timing should be inaccurate, quite apart from the possibility that the survivors of the battery might wish to exaggerate the duration of their defence. The Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div (Appx "B" below, Part II(D)) confirms the British timing with rather surprising exactitude; it records that 813 Bty reported at 0750 hrs (German time) the capture of its position and the blowing up of fire of its guns. This further invalidates the report of Artillerie Kommandeur 117 as a source of exact information.

67. A pathetic short history of the fall of this battery at Varengeville was recorded in the operations log of H.Q. 81 Corps as received through 2 Bn 676 Inf Regt in the afternoon :

Early this morning towards 0600 hrs this battery was suddenly attacked by men with blackened faces and all but 25 men were slaughtered. The guns were blown up by the enemy, and the black-faced men disappeared again.



(Heute früh gegen 6:00 Uhr ist diese Batterie von geschwärzten männer überfallen und bis auf 25 mann niedergemetzelt. Die Geschütze wurden vom feind gesprengt, die geschwärzten männer sind wideder verschwunden.)

(W.D. H.Q. 81 Corps, volume "Landungsunternehmen Dieppe" (Serial No. 32,648-4), folio

12.)

#### THE END OF THE OPERATION

68. It is important to establish, if possible from the German accounts the times at which fighting ceased in the various sectors. From our own sources we are well aware that the remaining troops on the main beaches at Dieppe were overrun about 1308 hrs ([Report No. 108](#), para 262). There is no such exact information available from Canadian sources for any other sector.

69. [Report No. 101](#) (para 128) suggests the impossibility of settling from Canadian sources the time when the troops remaining alive on Blue Beach (at Puys) surrendered. The time can now be fixed with fair accuracy from the German sources; for at 0935 hrs (German time) 571 Inf Regt advised H.Q. 302 Inf Div, "Puys firmly in our hands; enemy has lost about 500 men prisoners and dead" (Report of 302 Inf Div, Appx "B" below, part II( C )). This would indicate that the remnants of R. Regt C. had probably surrendered a little before 0830 hrs (British time).

70. With respect to Pourville, the evidence of some Canadian officers ([Report No. 101](#), para 243) was to the effect that the men left on the beach here probably surrendered about 1500 hrs. German evidence, however, indicates that fighting actually ended here about the same time as at Dieppe; as we have seen (para 53, above) 571 Inf Regt reported “Pourville firmly in our hands” at 1437 hrs (German time). Evidence of this sort, pretty clearly derived from an operations log, is the best type of information normally available on actual times.

71. Concerning Berneval, the report of 302 Inf Div records at 1100 hrs (German time) that the remaining British troops had been taken prisoner in the gully north-east of Belleville and on Hill 101 east of Petit Berneval. At 1120 hrs Major von Blücher’s headquarters reported that the situation in this area was “völlig bereinigt”. (Report of 302 Inf Div, Appx “B” below, part II(B)).

72. As for the operation as a whole, at 1445 hrs (German time) 302 Inf Div reported to 81 Corps as follows:

Enemy attack as good as repulsed along the whole front. It is not only a matter of mopping up.

([Ibid](#), part II ( C ))

## GERMAN INFORMATION ON THE ACTION OF OUR TANKS

As noted in [Report No. 116](#) (paras 34 – 5), the report of 81 German Corps confirmed the information concerning the action of our tanks obtained from repatriated personnel of 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn, stating that “probably 16” tanks crossed the sea-wall and reached the promenade, but that many of them subsequently returned to the beach. The Canadian evidence was to the effect that certainly 13, and probably 15, tanks crossed the wall.

already arrived at 7,4 which

in the light of the rather remarkable degree of agreement between the best Canadian and German evidence appear to be well established (in spite of the insistence of Lt-Col R.R. Labatt, O.C. R.H.L.I., that not more than three tanks reached the promenade). The report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, which would be an excellent source of information on this point, unfortunately makes only a vague reference to it (see below, para 78). There is a reference in the Report of C.-in-C. West (Appx “A” below, part IX, Basic Observations of C.-in-C. West No. 8, 23 Aug 42), which remarks: “24 tanks were immobilized, having been hit by fire and bogged down on the beach in the deep gravel. Got just as far as the beach promenade.”

This report does not invalidate the more circumstantial account by 81 Corps, which is stated to be based on the evidence of eyewitnesses (Augenzeugen). This report of 81 Corps, incidentally, is attached as an Appendix to that of C.-in-C. West along with the conflicting

“Basic Observations” just referred to.

; remained unac75unted

for in R.A.F. reconnaissance photographs taken on 21 Aug. Some further light can now be thrown on this matter. Most German reports agree that 28 tanks fell into the enemy’s hands. (See , e.g., [Report No. 116](#), Appx “B”, and cf. Report of 302 Inf Div, Appx “B” below, part V. But the C-in-C. West’s “Basic Observations, No. 8”, above, para 74, give the total as 29, as does the list of captured equipment in the “Enemy Situation Report” annexed to his report). We did leave 29 tanks behind, but it will be recalled ([Report No. 108](#), para 119) that one went down into deep water. The problem of the tanks missing in the reconnaissance photographs is at least partially solved by a reference in the “Q” War Diary of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, 25 Aug 42 (see above, para 65) to the effect that tanks counted at low tide amount to 26 on the beach plus two taken away by 81 Tk Coy. This suggests what had happened to two of the missing tanks; the third presumably was present but not visible in the air photographs. The two tanks recovered by 81 Tk Coy were most likely taken from the promenade, and it may perhaps be assumed that, as three still remained there when the air photographs were taken on 21 Aug, there had been five there at the end of the operation. This may be the source of the remark in the observations of C.-in-C. West (above, para 74); some staff officer, seeing only five tanks on the promenade, doubtless not unnaturally assumed that only this number had crossed the wall.

## COMMENTS ON OUR TROOPS AND METHODS

76. The report of 81 Corps ([Report No. 116](#), para 33 and Appx “A”) is the only German document to comment adversely on the fighting spirit of the Canadian troops, except for a remark occurring in a message “Personal impressions from the battlefield” sent at 1945 hrs (German time) 20 Aug 42 to the Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht (Gen Jodl) by the Chief of Staff G.H.Q. West (Gen Zeitzler). Zeitzler’s message ran in part:

English fought well. Canadians and Americans not so well, later quickly surrendered under the influence of the high bloody losses.

(Report of C.-in-C. West,  
Appx “A” below, part IX.)

77. It is rather unfortunate that the report of 81 Corps has been the only German document to reach the public; it was published in [MacLean’s](#), 1 Jul 44. The comments made in this document are specifically repudiated in others, notably in the comments of H.Q. Fifteenth Army, 27 Aug 42 ([Ibid](#), Appx II). Col-Gen Haase wrote :

The large number of English prisoners might leave the impression that the fighting value of the English and Canadian units employed should not

be too highly estimated. This is not the case. The enemy, almost entirely Canadian soldiers, fought – so far as he was able to fight at all – well and bravely. The main reasons for the large number of prisoners and casualties are probably :

1. Lack of artillery support. The effect of naval artillery was seriously hampered by the smoke. After the loss of his tanks the enemy had hardly any heavy weapons at his disposal.
2. The Englishman had underestimated the strength of the defences. and therefore, at most of his landing found himself in a hopeless position as soon as he came ashore.
3. The effect of our own defensive weapons was superior to that of the weapons employed by the attacker.
4. The craft provided for re-embarkation were almost all hit and sank.

78. The remarks of H.Q. 302 Inf Div (Appx “B” below, part IV ©) are notable and worthy

of separate quotation here :

The main attack at Dieppe, Puys and Pourville was commenced by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Division with great energy. That the enemy gained ground at Il in Puys, and in Dieppe could take only parts of the beach not including the west mole and the western edge of the beach, and this only for a short time, was not the result of lack of courage, but of the concentrated defensive fire of our Divisional Artillery and infantry heavy weapons. Moreover, his tank crews did not lack spirit. They could not penetrate the anti-tank walls which barred the way into the town of Dieppe (a large demolition charge failed to explode) and some of them were unable to get forward over the rolling beach shingle and cross the sea wall. In Puys the efforts made by the enemy in spite of the heavy German machine-gun fire to surmount the wire obstacles studded with booby traps on the first beach terrace are signs of a good offensive spirit (Angriffsfreudigkeit). The large number of prisoners at Puys was the result of the hopelessness of the situation for the men who had been landed, caught under German machine-gun, rifle and mortar fire between the cliffs and the sea on a beach which offered no cover.

At Pourville the enemy, immediately after landing, pushed forward into the interior without worrying about flank protection.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Division which carried out this attack consisted predominantly of French-Canadians; about 90% of the names on a captured Company nominal roll were clearly

of French origin.

The operations against the coastal batteries were conducted by the Commandos with great dash and skill. With the aid of technical devices of all sorts they succeeded in clambering up the steep cliffs at points which had seemed quite inaccessible.

79. The comments of the German reports on our plan and the direction of our operations follow the same lines as those of 81 Corps already noted in [Report No. 116](#) (paras 24-30).

80. The general comment of H.Q. 302 Inf Div (Appx "B" below, part IV( C ) is worthy of quotation :

The English higher command considerably underestimated the strength in all weapons required for such an attack. The strength of air and naval forces was not nearly sufficient to keep the defenders down during the landings and to destroy their signal communications. It is incomprehensible that it should be believed that a single Canadian Division should be able to overrun a German Infantry Regiment reinforced with artillery.

The English command at the middle levels (mittlere Führung) drew up the plan of attack moderately well (mässig), but draw the time-table for the intended



withdrawal at “W” Hour in a theoretical manner which reflected inexperience of battle (mit einem kampffremden Schematismus).

The employment of the tanks against Dieppe alone was an error, even if they counted on destroying the anti-tank walls.

There is no information as yet on the English command at lower levels.

81. It is of interest that the C.-in-C. West took steps to have our captured operation order translated, reproduced, and distributed down to Divisions. The covering letter signed by Field Marshal von Rundstedt (Basic Observations of C.-in-C. West No. 9, W.D. No. 3, H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Volume “Dieppe II”, Serial No. 24353-9) remarked, “According to German ideas, the order is not an order, but an aide-memoire or a scheme worked out for a map exercise. Nevertheless, it does contain many points of value to us.” Formation staff were directed to study the order closely with a view to profiting by it as much as possible. One observation of the Field Marshal is particularly interesting:

It would be an error to believe that the enemy will mount his next operation in the same manner. He will draw his lessons from his mistakes in planning and from his failure and next time he will do things differently.

82. In spite of the fact that they were in possession of our operation order, which it may be noted in passing they state was “found on a dead British major on the Dieppe beach” (bei einem am Diepper Strand gefallenem englischen Major) (W.D. No. 3, H.Q. 302 Inf Div, Volume “Dieppe I” Serial No. 24353-8, Appx 14, Intelligence Report of 302 Inf Div on the Landing Operation of 19 Aug 42), the Germans were unable to believe that the Dieppe operation was actually a mere raid. The Report of the C.-in-C. West (Appx “A” below, part VIII) calls particular attention to the commitment of a large tank force: “One does not sacrifice 29 or 30 of the most modern tanks for a mere surprise raid”. From this and other indications G.H.Q. West draws the conclusion that there was always in the background the possibility of new orders – orders for the beginning of large scale invasion – being issued if the landings had been successful, and the report remarks with assurance, “That these orders would have been given, if Dieppe had fallen, appears certain”.

83. The enemy thus remained convinced that the Dieppe operation was in fact intended to be the preliminary to the opening of the much-heralded Second Front, and he actually believed, in spite of the strong evidence in his hands to the contrary, that his effective defence of Dieppe had prevented the Second Front from becoming a reality. That this could be the case is certainly not to the credit of the German intelligence service. It must however be remembered that in August 1942 the war stood at a point where the western Allies held the initiative; there were large disposable forces in the United Kingdom and it was not yet clear what use the Allies would make of them. It had in fact been decided, late in July, to open a new front in North

Africa; but this the enemy did not know. When it is recalled that the highest United States military authorities had argued strongly for a Second Front in North West Europe in 1942, the Germans' apprehensions appear rather better founded than they do in the light of the knowledge of later events which we possess today.

#### THE ENEMY'S LOSSES

84. In [Report No. 116](#) (paras 19 – 23) it was noted that there is some discrepancy between the statement of German losses contained in the Combat Report of 81 Corps, and those contained in the German High Command official communiqué issued after the raid, which actually gave somewhat larger totals. Some doubt was expressed whether these figures had not actually been “doctored”, and whether the German losses were not actually much larger than was admitted in their statement.

85. In the light of the additional German document now available it seems necessary to accept the fact that these figures were not falsified and that the German casualties, at least so far as ground troops are concerned, were actually smaller than we have heretofore been prepared to concede.

86. The figures given in the Report of the C.-in-C. West are precisely those contained in the German High Command official communiqué, amounting in all to 591 men. It is rather

remarkable that a table of losses attached to a report dated 3 Sep 42 should be so completely in accord on this matter with a statement published immediately after the operation, and one seems forced to the conclusion that the C.-in-C. West was in this instance more concerned with maintaining uniformity with the story already officially published than with producing a completely accurate statement. The fact remains however that the figures of losses he gives are larger than those found in any of the other German statements now available.

87. It should be noted in passing that the discrepancy referred to in footnote 3 to para 36 of [Report No. 109](#) is resolved by the figures given by C.-in-C. West. As suggested in [Report No. 109](#), the figure of naval wounded should be 35, not 135.

88. For purposes of comparison, the four chief versions of the German casualties now available are set forth below. In some cases no distinction is made between officers and other ranks, in certain others the figures are divided by officers, N.C.Os. and soldiers, and in some cases by officers and other ranks.

(a) C.-in-C. West (and High Command Communique)

	<u>Dead</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Missing</u>
<u>Army</u>	115	187	14

<u>Navy</u>	78# Dead and missing: missing from the sunk submarine-chaser.	35
<u>Air Force</u>	104# Dead and  missing (missing  from aircraft shot  down) (Vermisste	58
		(Grand total : <u>591</u> )

(b) 81 Corps (see Report No. 116)

	<u>Dead</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Missing</u>
<u>302 Inf Div</u>	5 - 14 - 68	5 - 27 - 124 (Total : 253)	0 - 1 - 9
<u>Total all arms</u>	6 _____ 144	5 _____ 270	_____ 15
(Army, Navy, Air			
(Grand total : <u>440</u> )			

(c) 302 Inf Div (Report 25 Aug 42) (Appx "B" below)

	<u>Dead</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Missing</u>
<u>302 Inf Div</u>	5 - 14 - 74	5 - 27 - 136	0 - 1 - 6
<u>Army Coast Arty</u>	_____ 28	1 _____ 32	_____ 4
<u>Navy</u>	_____ 28	_____ 27	
<u>Org Todt</u>	_____ 3	_____ 7	
(Grand total : <u>398</u> )			
(Air Force not included)			

(d) 302 Inf Div (Quartiermeisterdbteilung) 23 Aug 42

(W.D. No. 3, Serial No. 24361-1).

	<u>Dead</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Missing</u>
<u>Army#</u> Includes Army Coast Arty, 30 killed, 30 wounded.	5 _____ 111	5 _____ 195	_____5
<u>Navy</u>	1 _____ 32	_____ 27	
<u>Air Force</u>	2 _____ 30	_____ 55	_____ 41
<u>Org Todt</u>	_____ 3	_____ 7	

(Grand total : 519)

89 These figures reinforced by other references in the documents, appear to indicate beyond all probability of doubt that so far as the German Army was concerned it had fewer than 125 fatal casualties during the operation, and that its grand total of casualties was in the vicinity of 325 all ranks. For the total German losses of all services, the figure of 591 all ranks given in the original communiqué still remains the largest found in any German record yet seen.

90 It seems unlikely that any new evidence that may come to light in the future will materially change the situation with respect to German Army casualties. With respect to the Luftwaffe, however, the position is by no means so clear. The figure of air force casualties (104 dead and missing, 58 wounded) given in the Report of C.-in-C. West still seems very inadequate to cover the losses of the Luftwaffe in the air battle over Dieppe, the more so as in

addition considerable numbers of Luftwaffe troops were engaged on the ground.

91. In this connection it is important to note such German evidence as is at present available concerning the enemy's losses of aircraft. It is very slight, consisting of a note in the Weekly Situation Report of H.Q. Fifteenth Army for the week 17 - 23 Aug 42 (W.D., H.Q. Fifteenth Army, Serial No. 26621-6). It notes: "Aircraft shot down: 142 R.A.F., 34 German". These figures are so ludicrously at variance with the R.A.F. computation of 170 enemy aircraft destroyed ([Report No. 109](#), paras 40-41) that they cannot possibly be accepted. Any firm conclusion on the Luftwaffe losses at Dieppe, either in aircraft or personnel, must it appears await the examination of Luftwaffe records not at present available to Hist Sec (G.S.).

#### NOTE ON GERMAN DOCUMENTS

92 The originals of the German documents referred to in this report are in the hands of the German Military Document Section at Washington, D.C. Photostatic copies of the most important (notably the Report of C.-in-C. West, the operations report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div) and the report of Artillerie-Kommandeur 117 are preserved by Hist Sec (G.S.), Army Headquarters, Ottawa. No attempt has been made to reproduce maps and tracings, which are numerous, for the purposes of the present report, though a great deal of information drawn from them is incorporated in it. Photostats or tracings of the most important pieces of evidence of this type are in the hands of Hist Sec (G.S.).

93. It may be noted that H.Q. Fifteenth Army evidently prepared no report on the Dieppe operation; Col-Gen Haase contented himself with making detailed observations on the report of H.Q. 81 Corps. Both the Corps report and the Army observations upon it are attached as appendices to the report of C.-in-C. West.

94. Translations of the following documents are attached as appendices :

Appendix "A", Report of C.-in-C. West, 3 Sep 42 (less appendices).

Appendix "B", Operations Report of H.Q. 302 Inf Div, 25 Aug 42>

Appendix "C", Report of 302 Arty Regt, on artillery lessons, 2 Sep 42.

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