

REPORT NO. 22
HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)
ARMY HEADQUARTERS

31 Jan 49

The Reorganization of the Canadian Militia, 1919-20

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(1936)

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The Reorganization of the Canadian Militia, 1919 - 20

1. The object of this report is to examine the plan for reorganization of the Canadian Militia at the conclusion of the First World War. In particular, it will attempt to indicate the influence of the Committee on reorganization set up in 1919 under the presidency of Sir William Otter.

2. Lt-Col G.F.G. Stanley has dealt with the question broadly in the opening sections of the Preliminary Narrative of the History of Canadian Military Policy and of Canadian Military Forces in Canada and Adjacent Regions, 1939 - 1945 (Chapter I, pp. 4 - 18. See also Chapter II, p. 4). Published accounts on this subject are almost entirely lacking, however, and it has therefore been necessary to summarize material found in original files at Army Headquarters, Ottawa, notably H.Q. 593-31-1 and H.Q. 462-16-1. Unfortunately, the Otter Committee rendered no official report in full. In the Historical Section and Directorate of Military Operations and Plans, however, are a number of memoranda written by Generals Matthews, McNaughton and Crerar in the early 1930s when the question of reorganization again became a live issue. These indicate that the conclusions and recommendations of the Otter Committee had a decided influence upon Army policy in the years between. The Committee was undoubtedly grappling with a political problem as well as a military matter of considerable importance, particularly with regard to the controversial subject of universal military training. In consequence, many sections of public opinion had to be appeased before a programme acceptable to the Government of the day and members of the Militia alike could be evolved.

3. Of prime importance was the attitude of veterans of the Canadian Expeditionary Force who strongly wished to preserve the traditions and identity of units which had fought at the front. The Defence Forces List, Canada, of November 1939 contains complete lists of C.E.F. units of Cavalry, Artillery, Infantry and Machine Guns perpetuated by Militia units. These perpetuations were authorized in most instances as the direct result of recommendations made by the Otter Committee.

Pre-War and Wartime Militia

4. Prior to the First World War the Active Militia of Canada consisted of the Staff, Permanent Force, Active (Non-Permanent) Militia, and Reserve of Officers. The first mentioned was drawn from the officers of the Permanent Force, the last merely an unorganized list of officers who had been transferred from Active status. The Permanent Force had a legal limit of 5,000 all ranks but on 31 Mar 14 an actual strength of only 3,000 (Report of the Militia Council, 31 Mar 14, p. 26). Its Corps included:

Royal Canadian Dragoons
Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians)
Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery
Royal Canadian Engineers
Royal Canadian Regiment

and detachments of the Services.

5. Main emphasis was laid upon the Non-Permanent Active Militia, whose principal arms had approximately the following units:

Infantry - 110 battalions

Cavalry	-	35 regiments organized into brigades
Artillery	-	35 field batteries
		5 heavy batteries
		13 coast defence companies
		2 siege artillery companies
Engineers	-	9 field companies, 2 field troops
Corps of Guides	-	detachments

Eastern Canada was to form 6 divisions and the West some independent brigades. The allotment of units on this basis was detailed in Canadian Militia Field Army Tables (Provisional) 1913 (H.Q. 462-16-1, Vol 1 contains a copy). Reflecting this organization, Eastern Canada was divided into six Divisional Areas and Western Canada into three Military Districts. In 1916 these Divisional Areas became Nos 1 to 6 Military Districts (Duguid, Col A.F., The Canadian Forces in The Great War, 1914 - 19, Vol 1, Appx 9). Statistics regarding the establishment and strength of the N.P.A.M. in pre- and post-war years are given in Appendix "B" to this report.

6. In 1911 a scheme had been prepared for mobilizing an expeditionary force of one division and a cavalry brigade together with necessary L. of C. units, the battalions of infantry to be made up from companies sent from various regiments of the Militia (Ibid, Appx 11). This scheme was not used, however, and mobilization in 1914 took place quite haphazardly. Failure to utilize the Militia organization resulted in units of the C.E.F. having no direct connection with it at all. Recruiting for the Infantry at first being done by battalions, a great many more were raised than could be used as field units. As a consequence the surplus became draft-giving units which were broken up either in Canada or in England. Early in 1917, however, infantry at the front were organized into regiments bearing provincial titles, with corresponding reserve battalions in England and territorial regiments with their depots in Canada. ((H.S.) 500.099 (D81): Precis No. 26, Militia Staff Course, 1924-25,

initiated T.V.A. Maj-Gen T.V. Anderson, D.S.O., then G.S.O. at the Royal Military College with the rank of Colonel)).

Early Proposals for Reorganization

7. Through this C.E.F. reorganization, the Chief of the General Staff (Maj-Gen W.G. Gwatkin, C.B.) hoped not only to aid recruiting but to encourage military traditions (H.Q. 593-31-1, Vol 1: Memorandum initialled "W.G." undated but with papers of April 1917). There had been a suggestion by Senator James Mason of Toronto that in order to preserve their deeds fighting battalions should be allotted among the Militia regiments. The official reply prepared by the Deputy Minister (Surg-Gen Sir Eugene Fiset, K.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.) stated: "Brig-Gen Cruikshank has been detailed on duty to deal with this matter, the work to be performed in conjunction with Major Doughty, Dominion Archivist". (Ibid, Inquiry of the Minister 7 Feb, and reply, 23 Apr 17). A marginal note indicates that the C.G.S. did not entirely agree with relegating the matter to the Director of the Historical Section, however, and in May 1917 he pointed out that preservation of the identity and handing down of the traditions of the Corps then overseas could only be done by a complete reorganization of the Canadian Militia (Ibid, Gwatkin to A.G., 16 May 17).

8. Files contain no further reference to the matter until January 1918, when the Minister of Militia (Maj-Gen the Hon S.C. Mewburn, C.M.G.) and the C.G.S. spoke one evening of appointing a Committee "to consider the future life and welfare of the Militia Units" (H.Q. 1937, Vol 2: Mewburn to Gwatkin, 21 Jan 18). Mention was made of the name of Maj-Gen Sir William D. Otter, K.C.B., C.V.O., who had just submitted a tentative scheme for demobilization of the C.E.F. On this report the C.G.S. later commented:

The problem to which I hoped General Otter would apply himself, he has not touched: I mean the fusion of the C.E.F. with the Canadian Militia

leading, as I believe it will, to a re-organization of the latter on lines similar to those along which Lord Wolseley worked when he reformed the Army in 1881.

(Ibid, Gwatkin to Mewburn, 28 Jan 18. This file also contains a copy of General Otter's report, dated 9 Jan 18)

General Gwatkin went on to advocate appointment of a committee with Maj-Gen Otter as chairman and Brig-Gen Cruikshank as secretary. Suggesting its terms of reference, he concluded: "A difficult problem so far as it relates to infantry; comparatively easy for the other arms". (Ibid). Verbally instructed by the Minister to explore the situation, General Otter and his colleague reported on 31 Jan 18:

The impending demobilization of C.E.F. Units will afford an unparalleled opportunity for the reorganization and territorial readjustment of Units of the Active Militia on proper lines without material increase to the present establishment.

If this occasion is lost, it is not likely to recur, and our recommendation is that the Committee be authorized to consider and report on this question and at the same time critically examine the present Militia Act with a view to its revision and co-ordination with the Military Service Act.

(Ibid, Otter to the Minister, 31 Jan 18)

Gen Gwatkin at once suggested Gen Otter's Committee be called the "Demobilization Committee" and laid down three specific terms of reference for it (Ibid, Gwatkin to Mewburn, 4 Feb 18). His advice does not appear to have been followed, however, as no further mention of the Otter Committee is found

in the file dealing with demobilization of the C.E.F. (H.Q. 1937, Vols 1 to 4).

THE OTTER COMMITTEE

9. One year later General Gwatkin revived the question of a Committee on Militia Reorganization to be headed by Sir William Otter, who was also to be Chairman of the "Selection Board" concerned with Permanent Force appointments (H.Q. 593-31-1, Vol 1: Otter to Gwatkin, 23 Jan 19 and reply 6 Feb; also Gwatkin to D.M., 7 Feb 19. See also H.Q. 462-1-18). Following the Armistice, requests for perpetuation of C.E.F. units, particularly infantry and artillery, had begun to pour in. The C.G.S. lost no time in drafting for the Committee terms of reference, which the Minister approved on 31 Jan 19. Brig-Gen Cruikshank was designated Secretary. Some delay was caused, however, over selection of a General Officer to represent the Overseas Military Forces of Canada. Sir William wanted Brig-Gen J.F.L. Embury, C.M.G., other names proposed included Maj-Gen Sir H.E. Burstall, K.C.B., C.M.G., and Brig-Gen R. Rennie, C.G., C.M.G., M.V.O., D.S.O. The Corps Commander (Lt-Gen Sir Arthur W. Currie, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.) would not release them, however, and recommended instead Maj-Gen Sir Archibald C. Macdonnel, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., and Brig-Gen A.G.L. McNaughton, D.S.O., to represent the Permanent Force and Militia respectively. (Ibid: Gwatkin to A.G., 5 Mar 19; Gwatkin to Otter, 22 Mar 19; Currie to Canadian Section G.H.Q., 20 Mar 17).

Appointment of the Committee, 1919

10. Preliminary notification of the Otter Committee was given to all Military Districts by A.G. Circular Letter No. 424 of 28 Mar 19, but soon

after Gen Otter proposed "promulgation of a Routine Order with a view to giving greater publicity to so important a scheme" (Ibid: Otter to A.G., 15 Apr 19). This was done by C.E.F. Routine Order 1913 or 23 Apr 19, which defined the membership, terms of reference and procedure. A copy is attached as Appendix "A" to this Report.

11. The Committee as officially constituted consisted of Major-Generals Otter and Macdonell, Brigadier-Generals Cruikshank and McNaughton. During the summer, however, Generals Macdonell and Cruikshank ceased to be members. The former became Commandant of the Royal Military College in July 1919. The latter was "dropped" in favour of General Morrison, whose views on artillery the Minister desired to utilize. There is no official record of these changes, but correspondence suggests that there was perhaps some question of personalities involved. (Ibid, Vol 3: Gwatkin to Morrison, 1 Sep 19; to Cruikshank, 2 Sep; to Otter, 3 Sep). As a matter of fact, the Minister had at one time unseated Sir William Otter himself, according to a note penned by the latter in June 1919.

I am obliged to return these papers without action, as under the decision of the Hon The Minister of Militia conveyed by the Chief of the General Staff on the 7th inst. I was relieved from further duty on the Reorganization Committee, the latter officer taking my place.

(Ibid, Vol 2: Minute, Otter to D. of O., 17 Jun 19)

There is no further light on this action, which did not stand, but it is interesting to note that the C.G.S. became a member of the Committee. The files contain no authority for this but he signed numerous papers as Acting Secretary. At practically all the meetings held while the Committee was on tour Sir William presided and Generals Morrison, Gwatkin and McNaughton were present as members. Port Arthur was visited by Generals Otter and Gwatkin

alone; Charlottetown only by Generals Morrison and McNaughton, with the former presiding.

Preliminary Plans

12. By R.O. 1913 the Committee was charged to "consider and report how best to give effect to the proposal that, with a view to preserving their traditions and identity, the several of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, which served at the front, should be incorporated in the Canadian Militia". Limiting factors were that the establishment should not be avoidably increased nor the divisional system of organization prejudiced, also that due regard should be paid to the services of the Militia.

13. It began work by considering suggestions and petitions forwarded to Ottawa by various C.E.F. units desiring perpetuation. As a working basis, a confidential document was printed 7 Jul 19 entitled "Reorganization of the Active (Non-Permanent) Militia Infantry". Circulated unofficially to D.Os.C. on 2 Aug and marked as "purely tentative", this scheme listed by military districts the existing and proposed unit designations. (H.Q. 462-16-1, Vol 1 contains a copy). The N.P.A.M. Cavalry was dealt with a similar document, also printed and marked "Confidential" and "purely tentative" although undated. This grouped 21 regiments under the Canadian Light Horse and 13 regiments plus an independent squadron under The Canadian Mounted Rifles, leaving the Fort Garry Horse by itself at the head of the list. (Ibid) At the suggestion of H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught, this regiment was then being considered for inclusion in the Permanent Force. (H.Q. 593-31-1, Vol 2: Brig-Gen Patterson to Mewburn, 19 Jun 19). The C.G.S. considered the plan drastic but pointed out "It has the one advantage of allowing every unit to feel that it has in its veins the blood of the C.E.F." (Ibid: Memo initialled "W.G. to Otter, McNaughton and A.G., 21 Jul 19). The Adjutant-

General (Major-General E.C. Ashton, C.M.G.) replied with some very pointed criticisms (Ibid: Ashton to C.G.S., 25 Jul 19).

14. Regarding artillery, Maj-Gen Sir Edward Morrison, K.C.M.G., prepared early in 1919 while still overseas as G.O.C. Royal Artillery Canadian Corps a proposed demobilization scheme which he hoped would form "a dependable basis for the future reorganization of the Canadian Artillery in such post-war Army as Canada may desire to maintain" (Ibid, Vol 1: Morrison to G.O.C. Canadian Corps, 6 Feb 19). Later Brig-Gen McNaughton published in Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery Routine Order No. 108 of 4 Apr 19 his recommendations for the brigades and batteries of that Corps (Ibid, Vol 2: Memo signed McNaughton, 31 Jul 19). Printed copies of any tentative scheme for Artillery by the Otter Committee in these early stages do not appear to exist, but many of these ideas were reflected in a comprehensive table headed "Tentative Proposal for the Incorporation of the Artillery of the Canadian Expeditionary Force into the Canadian Militia (non-permanent)". It is marked "only as a basis for discussion". (H.Q. 462-16-1, Vol 1 contains a typewritten copy, undated and unsigned).

15. By A.G. Circular Letter No. 451 of 11 Jul 19 all Military Districts were ordered to submit the schemes which paragraph 4 of R.O. 1913 had directed should be prepared. These reached Ottawa after the tentative proposals of the Committee had been put forth, but doubtless were studied in detail during the summer months (H.Q. 593-31-1, Vols 2 and 3 contain copies of these Reports by D.Os.C.).

The Committee on Tour

16. Beginning in September 1919 the Otter Committee visited in turn the principal cities of Canada in accordance with paragraph 3 of R.O. 1913. File

H.Q. 462-16-1 contains very complete minutes of meetings held in leading Canadian cities. A schedule of these visits follows:

<u>Meeting</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>
Preliminary	6 Sep 19	Ottawa
First	7 Sep 19	Montreal
Second	16 Sep 19	Toronto
Third	18 Sep 19	Hamilton
Fourth	3 Oct 19	Ottawa
Fifth	6 Oct 19	Winnipeg
Sixth	7 Oct 19	Port Arthur
Seventh	24 Oct 19	Vancouver
Eighth	25 Oct 19	Victoria
Ninth	27 Oct 19	Calgary
Tenth	29 Oct 19	Regina
Eleventh	19 Nov 19	St. John, NB
Twelfth	20 Nov 19	Halifax
Thirteenth	25 Nov 19	Charlottetown
Fourteenth	1 Dec 19	London, ON
Fifteenth	12 Dec 19	Kingston
Sixteenth	15 Dec 19	Ottawa
Seventeenth	17 Dec 19	Quebec

No minutes exist for the meeting at Quebec nor for the preliminary meeting.

The purpose of the fourth meeting, held at Ottawa on 3 Oct 19, was to hear the views of Mr. H.M. Mowat, M.P. regarding universal military training. (This phase will be discussed later in paragraphs 29-30). During the tour, however, the Committee concerned itself with problems of perpetuation and redesignation of units. In each centre the District Officer Commanding sat as an Associate Member and numerous representatives of C.E.F. and Militia units attended. These representatives were responsible for their own expenses but were granted transportation warrants within the District (H.Q. 593-31-1, Vol 3: A.G.

Circular Letter No. 467 of 9 Sep 19). The minutes reveal that they entered quite vigorously into the debates and proved themselves zealous guardians of regimental traditions.

Committee Procedure

17. It was the general plan of the Committee to prepare a printed memorandum after each meeting of the tour and send 100 copies to the D.O.C. concerned for distribution and further study. These memoranda outlined "the scheme which recommends itself to the Re-Organization Committee", detailing the proposals regarding Cavalry, Artillery and Infantry of the Active (non-permanent) Militia of the District. (H.Q. 462-16-1, Vols 1 and 2 contain copies). They are very useful summaries of conclusion reached during the tour.

18. Subsequent meetings of the Committee were held in Ottawa at the turn of the year but unfortunately no record of these is at hand. A memorandum in the handwriting of Maj-Gen Gwatkin, however, indicates the subjects discussed.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS

1919	Matters Discussed
22 Dec	Artillery
27 Dec	Interim report on artillery. Status of 22nd Bn. C.E.F. Infantry units in Toronto
30 Dec	Cavalry & C.M.R. Status of 22nd Bn. C.E.F.
1920	
3 Jan	Cavalry & C.M.R. Mobilization, general. Home Defence. Mobilization, partial, for service overseas.
10 Jan	Engineers
14 Jan	Engineers

21 Jan 70th Regt de Hull. Engineers. In B.C. No. 11.
19 Feb C.A.M.C., C.A.S.C., M.G.

(H.Q. 462-16-1, Vol 2: Memo headed "Committee Meetings", unsigned and undated)

There were no doubt other meetings to finalize decisions prior to the publication of General Orders authorizing reorganization of the Militia. As these were issued over a period of several months in a series lacking logical order and subject to numerous amendments, it may be assumed that the Committee attempted to follow the principle of satisfying as many interested parties as possible. Correspondence indicates that ample opportunity was allowed for all arguments to be presented and in general promulgation was deferred in cases where disputes arose. For example, the General Order dealing with the Infantry of Military District No. 2, which registered many complaints, was published on 1 May 20 whereas in the case of other Military Districts action had been taken a month or more beforehand.

19. The procedure to be followed in the actual reorganization of Militia units was set forth in a detailed submission to the Minister in Militia Council by the Adjutant-General. (Minutes of the Militia Council, 1920, Vol 1: Decision No. 2, 7 Jan 20).

THREE CONTENTIOUS QUESTIONS

20. It was inevitable that to some extent the existence of the Otter Committee presented a convenient agency upon which could be foisted many of the problems which beset the post-war era. At least three of these were matters of major importance.

(a) Le Vingt-Deuxieme

21. Although dealing mainly with the Non-Permanent Active Militia, the Otter Committee was to a minor extent also concerned with the reconstitution of the Permanent Force. By Decision Number 224 of 19 Feb 19 the Minister in Militia Council had determined under authority of Order-in-Council 29 of 11 Jan 19 that its composition would be as follows:

Cavalry - Royal Canadian Dragoons
Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians)

Artillery - Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery

Royal Canadian Engineers - two fortress companies

Infantry - The Royal Canadian Regiment (H.Q. and five companies)
Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (H.Q. and
4 companies)

Detachments of Army Service, Medical, Veterinary, Ordnance and Pay Corps
and the Corps of Military Staff Clerks.

(C.E.F. R.O. No. 1716 of 25 Feb 19)

22. Immediately following publication of this as an appendix to G.O. 27 of 1 Apr 19, the City Council of Quebec petitioned that the 22nd (French Canadian) Battalion C.E.F. become "a portion of the permanent Militia Force and be stationed in the City of Quebec". (H.Q. 593-31-1, Vol 1 contains the official copy of this resolution adopted unanimously 4 Apr 19). Other regiments were also seeking inclusion in the Permanent Force, but this request carried considerable weight and was backed strongly by the local branch of the Great War Veterans Association. At the suggestion of the Minister, it was

immediately referred to the Otter Committee. (Ibid: Maj W.R. Creighton to C.G.S., 9 Apr 19).

23. Early in May 1919 the Director of Organization (Col J. Sutherland Brown, C.M.G., D.S.O.) stated that the authorized strength of the Permanent Force would not permit the organization of another infantry battalion, but after a visit to Montreal he observed that the East was taking little part in the unrest then prevalent in various parts of Canada and pointed out that the Militia of Quebec should be encouraged.

I understand that a Bill to increase the Permanent Force from 5,000 to 10,000 is to be laid before the House very shortly ...

In order to give the Militia this stimulus, and also to provide for a French speaking force, which may be used in any part of Canada to preserve order, I strongly recommend that the 22nd Canadian Battalion, C.E.F. be constituted as a Unit of the Permanent Force.

(Ibid, Vol 1: Brown to A.G., 26 May 19)

24. Against considerable opposition, General Mewburn on 24 Jun 19 steered through the House of Commons the proposal to double the statutory limit of the Permanent Force to 10,000¹ and in November the regimental establishments of the Permanent Force were amended. Among other changes, there was added a Canadian Machine Gun Corps whose organization had been authorized in June. (G.O. 47 of 1 Jun 19 and G.O. 90 of 3 Nov 19). No provision was made for additional infantry units, but towards the end of the year the Otter Committee found the 22nd Battalion C.E.F. still strongly desirous of being included. The Committee reported that some sixteen French-Canadian units claimed

¹For financial reasons, the Force was never recruited to this number.

connection with it and therefore recommended that it be made part of the Permanent Force with a headquarters and two companies, one of the latter to be withdrawn from the Royal Canadian Regiment. The name proposed was "The Quebec Regiment: 1st Bn (22nd Bn, C.E.F.)" with the title "Royal" possibly added later.

On general grounds, the effect would be good: a French Canadian battalion borne on the establishment of the Permanent Force, and serving² in the province of Quebec, could hardly fail to stimulate the military spirit which amongst French-Canadians, especially those of the officer class, is conspicuously absent.

(H.Q. 462-16-1, Vol 2: Memo on the subject of the
22nd (French-Canadian) Bn., C.E.F., unsigned,
1 Jan 20)

To this the Minister replied on 9 Jan:

I fear it will be impossible to include this Unit as part of the Permanent Force. I spent all last evening on Estimates at Privy Council, and the attitude is to cut down and cut down.

(Ibid: Mewburn to Otter, 9 Jan 20)

The C.G.S. at once pointed out a company could be withdrawn from each of the two existing P.F. regiments, leaving only the pay of four additional officers and N.C.Os. to be met (Ibid: Gwatkin to Mewburn, 10 Jan 20). The proposal gained the favour of Sir Arthur Currie, Inspector-General and Military Counsellor, who obtained the approval of the Minister in Militia Council on

²The words "in whole or part" were inserted here in the handwriting of Gen Gwatkin.

10 Feb 20 (Decision No. 153). The new unit was actually authorized as the "22nd Regiment" (G.O. 37 of 1 Apr 20), the title "Royal" being added over a year later (G.O. 149 of 1 Jun 22). Regimental establishments of the three infantry units of the Permanent Force when amended provided four companies for the R.C.R., three for the P.P.C.L.I., and two for the 22e R.

25. There is no direct evidence that the Otter Committee had any further influence upon the reconstitution of the Permanent Force, apart from ensuring the inclusion of a French-Canadian unit. It is certain that the Committee did not originate the proposal regarding the Fort Garry Horse (see para 12, which in the event was not carried out.

(b) Prince Edward Island

26. Among matters referred to the Otter Committee was the contentious question of a separate Military District for Prince Edward Island, which in 1911 had been grouped with Nova Scotia in M.D. No. 6 on the recommendation of Sir John French.³ Certain protests made at the time through political channels were brushed aside on military grounds. (H.Q. 9939-1-9: Maj-Gen Colin MacKenzie (C.G.S.) to D.M., 28 Jul 11. This file is in a badly damaged condition). In 1918 the D.O.C., M.D. No. 6 (Maj-Gen F.F. Lessard, C.B.) found "little troubles had been gradually piling up" into a desire for a separate district but he secured instead the appointment of an O.C. Troops, P.E.I. (Ibid: Lessard to Secty Militia Council, 10 May and reply, A.G. to D.O.C., M.D. No. 6, 23 May 18).

27. In July of the following year, however, political pressure was applied and the C.G.S. commented "The Militia of Canada is a federal force which there

³In 1874, one year after entering Confederation, the Province of Prince Edward Island had been set up as Military District Number Twelve.

is a mischievous tendency to provincialize" (Ibid: Gwatkin to Private Secretary, 14 Jul 19). The Minister was besieged by Senators and Members of Parliament as well as a deputation from the Island but would take no action "until we know what the future policy of the Militia reorganization will be" (Ibid: Mewburn to D. Nicholson, M.P., 18 Jul 19). Political pressure from the Island was again applied in November, in response to which the C.G.S. wired General Morrison "Minister wishes committee while at Charlottetown to hear all that local authorities have to say regarding establishment of P.E.I. as separate Military District" (Ibid: Gwatkin to D.O.C., M.D. No. 6 for Morrison, 24 Nov 19). It should be noted that only Generals Morrison and McNaughton proceeded to the Island, the former acting as Chairman pro-tem. Files do not reveal why the other two members of the Committee returned to Ottawa after visiting Halifax on 20 Nov 19.

28. Minutes and newspaper accounts of the meeting on 25 Nov at Charlottetown bear out the previous comment of the C.G.S., for the arguments were almost exclusively based on provincial pride and prejudice. They were sufficiently impressive, nevertheless, to result in the following report:

As a result of the representations made as well as of enquiries on the spot, the undersigned members of the Committee recommend that, in their opinion it is advisable that the Province be formed into a separate military district, commanded and administered by a local officer of war experience, assisted by a Staff consisting of a Brigade Major, and Paymaster, with the necessary N.C.Os. and clerks.

(Ibid: Morrison and McNaughton to C.G.S., 3 Dec 19)

In this the Inspector-General (Sir Arthur Currie) concurred but the Militia Council postponed consideration until 1 Apr 20 (Ibid: I.G. to S.M.C., 17 Jan and reply, 27 Jan 20). Meanwhile, in a general Cabinet shuffle, the Hon Hugh Guthrie became Minister of Militia and renewed pressure was applied on him by

Island politicians (Ibid: Nicholson etc to Guthrie, 25 Mar 20. The House of Commons on 18 Mar 20 formally called for submission of the report of the Committee on Reorganization and in particular the report regarding Prince Edward Island (H.Q. 462-16-1, Vol 3: H. of C. Order moved by Mr. Robb, 18 Mar 20). In reply, the C.G.S. wrote, "The Committee on Reorganization will not submit a general report, nor has it yet completed its labours", and with regard to the report on military status of P.E.I. he pointed out to the Minister "I warn you that its production just now may create an embarrassing situation" (Ibid: Gwatkin to Secty M. & D., 26 Mar 20). The Militia Council in April deferred action pending discussion in the Privy Council, where the question was allowed to die. Even without possessing full knowledge of the political background, it is quite obvious that the Otter Committee, or a part of it, became involved in a contentious political issue which did it little good. A final attempt to reopen the matter in January 1921 met with the same fate, economy in military expenditure then coming into vogue (H.Q. 9931-1-9: A.G. to the Minister, 4 Jan 21).

(c) Universal Military Training

29. There is considerable evidence to indicate that the Otter Committee was greatly influenced by arguments favouring universal military training for the youth of Canada. Outstanding among earlier advocates of such a scheme was the Canadian Defence League, whose journal published before the War an important Senate debate on 4 Jun 12 led by the Hon L.G. Power of Halifax, N.S. (Canadian Defence, July 1913. A copy is on file H.Q.C. 2862, Vol 1). In 1917 the President of the League wrote on the subject a book which gained considerable attention (Merritt, Col W.H., Canada and National Service). Conscription for overseas service then being in force, many officers naturally came to be favourably disposed towards compulsory service in peacetime too. The very month the Armistice was declared Maj-Gen Gwatkin advised "that a scheme for universal training should be submitted to Parliament at the approaching session" and obtained permission from the Minister to prepare a

draft (H.Q.C. 2862, Vol 1: Gwatkin to D.M., 20 Feb 18, with minute initialled "S.C.M."). In this he was strongly supported by Lt-Col O.M. Biggar, then Judge Advocate General (Ibid: "Memorandum respecting military organization in Canada after the War" and "Reorganization of the Militia: Memorandum of a possible scheme", both by Lt-Col Biggar, dated 13 Dec 18 and 22 Jun 19 respectively). Attempts to arouse public enthusiasm for the proposal were led by Major H.M. Mowat, a Toronto Member of Parliament (Mowat, H.M., "A Citizen Army", Queen's Quarterly, Oct - Dec 1918. H.Q.C. 2862, Vol 1 contains a copy). The Deputy Minister, although "very much interested", was "inclined to think that it would be premature to introduce legislation on the subject of universal training, at any rate until after demobilization, when the influence of the returned soldier (should he favour the scheme) will tell" (H.Q.S. 2862, Vol 1: Gwatkin to D.M., 31 Jan 19, with minutes). A certain amount of newspaper support was forthcoming, but the Government obviously was reluctant to act.

30. On 5 Sep 19 Major Mowat gave notice in the House of Commons of a motion urging widespread military training but deferred debate in order to appear personally before the Otter Committee, who held a special meeting in Ottawa for that purpose.⁴ In brief, he favoured training in N.P.A.M. regiments all physically fit youths from 18 to 25 for a period of 40 days in each of three years, followed by 20 days per year, providing clothing and subsistence but no pay other than 25 cents per day for comforts and extras. He quoted early Acts of the other Dominions and referred to a Bill passed in 1918 by the State of New York and another at that moment before the U.S. Senate. The American measures greatly interested the Otter Committee, whose secretary was instructed to make further enquiries. Unfortunately, however, the relevant

⁴H.Q. 462-16-1, Vol 1 contains brief minutes signed by Gen Gwatkin stating that the meeting was held on 3 Oct 19. H.Q.C. 2862, Vol 1, on the other hand, contains a document dated 29 Sep 19 giving verbatim Major Mowat's submission to "the Commission", which presumably refers to the Otter Committee.

papers were transferred to another file (H.Q. 13-123-86) which is no longer in existence.⁵

31. There is certain evidence, which must be considered presumptive rather than conclusive, to indicate that the Otter Committee was considerably influenced by these arguments for universal military training. This evidence exists in the form of a memorandum entitled "The Military Forces of Canada" filed under the heading "Reorganization of the Military Forces of Canada with Relationship to the Males of Military Age in each Military District" (H.Q.S. 3500). Although unsigned and undated, the document bears pencilled notations in what is believed to be handwriting of General McNaughton. Moreover, it is filed with a memorandum entitled "Cost of Compulsory Training in Canada" and an extensive chart setting forth figures on a yearly basis. Neither of these is signed, but the former is marked "7/11/1919" and the latter bears a penned notation stating "For reasons for the preparation of this memorandum and Table refer to Col Sutherland Brown or the D.M.O. & I. It was written 7/11/1919". At that particular time the Otter Committee was en route from the prairies to the Maritime Provinces (see paragraph 16 above) and in all likelihood paused at Ottawa during the 20-odd days intervening. While references on the docket do not indicate if the file was passed to its members, there is positive proof that General McNaughton worked with tables "J", "M" and "N" extracted from the memorandum.

32. This memorandum began with an analysis of several comprehensive tables dealing with manpower followed by brief comments on the existing military organization. From the definition "The object of any scheme of military organization in a Democratic country is defence against aggression and the preservation of law and order", it was emphasized that the internal situation in Canada demanded "A small but efficient permanent force backed by a citizen

⁵Central Registry reports that this file was destroyed by water damage.

militia based on some form of universal service". In external affairs this organization would best serve to repel possible "repetition of such incidents as the Fenian Raids", provide an expeditionary force to assist the Empire, or in cooperation with the United States form a bulwark against the Yellow Peril or a resurgent Germany. Summing up, the memorandum pointed out Canada needed "A Militia based on universal training with a small permanent Force of all arms". (H.Q.S. 3500: The Military Forces of Canada, p. 25).

33. Assuming this would be the form adopted, it recommended that the Militia should provide first recruit training, then tactical and finally advanced training. To that end, the following organization was suggested:

<u>Age</u> <u>From/To</u>	<u>Militia Units</u>	<u>Annual period of</u> <u>training days</u>
10 17	Boy Scouts & Cadets	--
18	Training Units	63
19 21	Active Militia 1st Line	14
22 25	Active Militia 2nd Line	Officers 7, O.R. 1
26 45	Reserve Militia 1st Line	1
45 on	Reserve Militia 2nd Line	Nil
		(Not organized)

(Ibid, p. 27)

34. The unit for all purposes of organization was taken to be the Division, being the smallest formed body comprising all arms. New War Establishments proposed by an Imperial Committee on Reorganization demanded approximately 750 officers and 21,000 other ranks for an Infantry Division, about half those numbers for a Cavalry Division. Assuming the peace strength to be two-thirds of the above, the following calculations were made:

The man-power of each yearly class in Canada by 1921 is estimated at about 75,000 males free from physical defects, which would disqualify them from training.

The term of service contemplated is 3 years, so that the Active Militia of the 1st Line would comprise approximately 225,000 all ranks. Of these, roughly one quarter must be set aside for the formation of the units of corps and army troops, leaving 170,000 available for organization into Divisions and units of Divisional troops.

Further, in Canada, a proportion of 3 Infantry Divisions to one Cavalry Division seems suitable, hence of the 170,000 above mentioned, 6/7 or 146,000 will be organized into Infantry Divisions, and 1/7 or 24,000 into Cavalry Divisions.

If the peace strength is taken as approximately two-thirds war establishment, this means 11 Divisions of Infantry and 4 Divisions of Cavalry.

This Force requires 132 Infantry Battalions, and 36 Cavalry Regiments.

(Ibid, pp. 27-8)

35. Considering the distribution of the Militia throughout Canada, the memorandum advocated abolition of Military Districts and substitution of a dual system suitable for both peace and wartime conditions.

It is necessary then to keep clearly in mind the different functions to be performed by and to distinguish between -

- (a) The territorial organization for administration, and training in peace and for the supply and training of reinforcements in war.
- (b) The organization for the command of the units placed in the field on mobilization.

For (a) an organization of Provincial Commands is contemplated, and for (b) a Divisional system.

If the units of all arms are evenly distributed the actual fighting Divisions may be made either on a territorial or national basis, according to circumstances.

Note: Territorial for Defence National
for Expeditionary

In view of the above, all calculations on distribution of troops will be made on the basis of Provinces, and the units of all arms and services will be uniformly distributed according to the ration in which they are required in a Division.

The localities which require garrison of fortress troops will receive due consideration when the question of distribution of Corps, Army and L. of C. units is taken up.

(Ibid, p. 30)

36. It was considered that the most suitable regimental organization for the Infantry would be two Active Militia 1st Line Battalions, one 2nd Line, and one of the Reserve Militia of the 1st Line. Canada's existing 110 infantry regiments could probably not be reduced below 100 by amalgamation or disbandment "and as a consequence the majority of the regiments will have only

one active battalion for the present", but rapid increase of population would take care of this later. With regard to the Cavalry, each regiment of Active Militia would require a 2nd Line and a reserve regiment. These calculations assumed a peace strength of 375 all ranks for a cavalry regiment and 750 for an infantry battalion with a three year term of enlistment.

37. On this basis extensive tables were worked out to show the allocation of annual drafts by Arms and Services and the distribution of units among the provinces. The memorandum then proceeded to deal with the Permanent Force organization, but after brief generalizations abruptly ended in a notation, pencilled, it is believed, in the handwriting of General McNaughton, reading "The remainder of the report is under preparation and will be submitted later" (Ibid). The file, however, contains no further papers other than estimates of the cost of the scheme (see paragraph 31 above).

38. It is interesting to note some comments made at the time by Gen McNaughton with reference to the tables referred to above, particularly Table "J" entitled "Allocation of Annual Drafts to Infantry, Cavalry, Divisional Corps and Army Troops".

This table was drawn up with 'compulsory training' in view, and is not strictly applicable to a Militia with terms of service analogous to what were in effect in Canada prior to the war.

The number of units required is approximately the same whether Compulsory or Voluntary Service is adopted.

With the latter, there seems little chance of embodying more than 50 per cent of the yearly class which are physically fit for training, but the peace strengths of the units may with advantage be considerably reduced.

(H.Q. 462-16-1, Vol 1: "Memorandum on the Re-organization of the Canadian Militia in the Western Provinces", signed by McNaughton, undated)

With regard to the Infantry, Gen McNaughton felt that there was already a sufficient number of units in the Maritimes and British Columbia whereas Ontario had some 12 surplus battalions; on the other hand, considerable increases were necessary in Quebec and the Prairie Provinces. Moreover, although satisfied with the Cavalry, he felt "In Artillery, Engineers and Auxiliary Services, a marked increase will be required in each Province". (Ibid)

39. Conscription in 1917 had dealt the Union Government a severe blow, and by 1920 neither the Administration nor the country was in the mood to be convinced of the necessity for universal military training. When a legal firm wrote for information, Gen Gwatkin pointed out that it would be "impolitic for the Militia Department to lay itself open to the charge of attempting, by means of propaganda, to pave the way to compulsory military service" (H.Q.C. 2862, Vol 1: Minute 3, Gwatkin to Private Secretary, 23 Jan 20, on letter Rowan, Sommerville & Company to the Minister, 20 Jan 20). In February, 1920, The Canadian Military Gazette and The University Magazine (McGill) publicized certain portions of the scheme, especially those concerned with the training of boys. Full dress debate in the House of Commons took place on 31 Mar 20 with Major Mowat and Brig-Gen W.A. Griesback as leading protagonists, but the Government put forward no spokesman and took no steps to promote an Act on Compulsory Training (Ibid, Vol 2: Fiset to J.W. McClung, University of Alberta, 24 Nov 20. This file also contains copies of the magazine articles and the debate in the House).

40. There is no positive evidence that the Otter Committee drafted its proposals for reorganization on the assumption that compulsory training would be adopted. On the contrary, emphasis upon regimental traditions sought to

stimulate the volunteer spirit, particularly among veterans of the C.E.F. The quotation from Gen McNaughton's memorandum (see paragraph 38 above), indicates that in either case the number of units required was considered to be approximately the same, although peace strengths would be less if volunteer service remained the basis. It is, however, quite clear that the Otter Committee was fully conscious of the manpower implications of the extensive post-war Militia reorganization put into effect. Although it cannot be proven that the memorandum on "The Military Forces of Canada" which has been discussed at length in the preceding paragraphs was drafted by, or even for, the Committee, it is reasonable to support that the contents of this document received due consideration by its members and influenced their decisions. Writing in 1924, Col Sutherland Brown stated:

In due course the Committee ... rendered a report recommending the formation of a certain number of units based to a great extent on the distribution of manpower of Canada, they made references to a war organization based on available man power of the country, but again the strategical division of Canada was not considered.

The report was approved in principle by the Union Government ...

(Brown, Col J. Sutherland, "Military Policy of Canada, 1905-1924, and Suggestions for the Future", The Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol 1, No. 4, July 1924, p. 29)

41. Another reference to the "report" of the Otter Committee is found in the Report of the Department of Militia and Defence 31 Mar 20. In this the Adjutant-General stated "The Reorganization Committee ... has finished its work and forwarded its report". As noted in paragraphs 2 and 28 above, however, the "report" of the Otter Committee, if presented in a written form,

was neither published nor officially made available and no copy has been located in the files. Nevertheless, through secondary sources, it is known that the Committee recommended reorganization of the Canadian Militia on the basis of providing eleven infantry divisions (four corps) and four cavalry division (two corps) together with ancillaries. For a future C.E.F., the maximum considered possible was six infantry divisions and one cavalry. These points will be discussed further in the final section of this report.

RECOMMENDATIONS

42. Principal recommendations of the Otter Committee regarding reorganization of the Active (Non-Permanent) Militia were embodied in a series of General Orders published in the first half of 1920. These corresponded very closely with the proposals circulated earlier to D.Os.C. for comment (see para 17). In the absence of an official report, a brief examination of those published during its lifetime will serve to indicate the policy put into practice. In addition, Minutes of the Militia Council, 1920 throw considerable light upon the manner in which final decisions were made.

(a) Cavalry and Mounted Rifles

43. General Order No. 26 of 15 Mar 20 provided for reorganization of the Cavalry into 26 regiments with two Alberta units to be disbanded. C.E.F. units were perpetuated by on additional seven regiments of Mounted Rifles, each with one or two Reserve regiments. First line regiments authorized by this Order therefore totalled 33.

44. It was later decreed by G.O. 184 of 1 Nov 20 that a Cavalry regiment, upon reorganization, would consist of Headquarters and three squadrons. At

the same time, G.O. 185 authorized for each active cavalry regiment a corresponding Reserve regiment.

45. Brigade organization was set up by G.O. 88 of 15 Jun 20, which provided for seven mounted brigades. Each was allotted three regiments, with an additional regiment attached in each case to the 6th and 7th Mounted Brigades. The remaining ten regiments left unbrigaded were to be available for allotment as Corps Cavalry for local defence and general duty on Lines of Communication.

46. General Orders of the period made no mention of divisional or corps organization for the Cavalry or Mounted Rifles. From appreciations written a decade later, however, it is known that the Otter Committee had in mind four cavalry divisions (two cavalry corps) requiring a total of 24 regiments plus 11 to be available for infantry divisions. By 1930 these 35 cavalry regiments were in existence. ("Memorandum on the Reorganization of the Non-Permanent Active Militia", 29 Jan 31, initialled by General Crerar (then Lt-Col, G.S.O. I), page 2 and Tables "A and "B". A copy is in the possession of Historical Section (G.S.) Army Headquarters. See also H.Q.S. 5902, Vol 1: Memo, McNaughton to the Minister, 21 Dec 31, p. 2). Also by 1930 headquarters had been organized for nine mounted brigades, corresponding to cavalry brigades in the British Army. The peace organization of the Field Army was by no means complete, however, and no higher formation than the brigade existed. (McNaughton Papers, Book C: "Memorandum on the Land Forces of Canada, 1930", initialled "H.H.M." (Col (later Major-General) H.H. Mathews, D.M.O. & I.), September 1930. In possession of the Historical Section).

(b) Artillery

47. Reorganization of N.P.A.M. artillery units was accomplished by G.Os. 13 and 25 of 2 Feb and 15 Mar 20 respectively.⁶ Field artillery units were re-numbered and re-grouped into brigades, each consisting of a headquarters and four batteries, but many were left unbrigaded. In addition, batteries of heavy or of siege artillery were grouped into brigades of heavy artillery. On the other hand, companies of Canadian Garrison Artillery were grouped into regiments. In many cases names of localities were added to numerical designations. Particular attention was directed towards grouping under the title "2nd Montreal Regiment, C.A." all artillery units on the island, the batteries being assigned to the 2nd Brigade, C.F.A. or the 2nd Heavy Brigade. The Militia Council originally intended that Commanding Officers of artillery units should be gazetted at the same time as the General Orders were published, but as this would have involved too much delay the decision was revoked.

48. Several years later G.O. 82 of 1 Jul 25 detailed drastic changes of nomenclature which introduced a number of new terms. Brigades were designated "Field", "Medium", or "Heavy"; all anti-aircraft units were called "Sections". The term "Siege" as well as the initials "C.F.A." and "C.G.A." disappeared.

49. By 1930 there had actually been organized in the N.P.A.M.:

20 Field Brigade Headquarters

65 Field Batteries (49 X 18 pdr; 16 X 4.5 in How)

3 Medium Brigade Headquarters

12 Medium Batteries (3 X 60 pdr; 8 X 6 in How; 1 X 4.7 in)

⁶Perpetuation of artillery units of the C.E.F. was made the subject of a separate General Order many years later (G.O. 83 of 1 Oct 27).

3 Heavy Brigade Headquarters (Coast)
11 Heavy Batteries (2 X 8 in How)

3 Anti-aircraft Sections

(Book C, Memo on Land Forces, op cit, p. 6)

A few other units although authorized awaited P.C. authority to organize, but there still were serious deficiencies in all types except 8 inch Howitzer batteries. For example, there should have been 150 batteries of Field Artillery based on the following:

12 for Cavalry Horse Artillery Brigades
99 for 11 Infantry Divisions
33 for Corps Army Field Brigades
6 for Army Field Brigades

There was a very serious lack of Corps and Army Troops and Air Defence units such as medium, heavy and A.A. batteries, survey companies C.A. and searchlight units. (Crerar Memo, op cit, p. 4 and Tables "A" and "B").

50. As in the case of cavalry regiments, actual allotment of artillery units to divisions does not appear to have been laid down by the Otter Committee.

(c) Engineers

51. The Otter Committee was on the verge of dissolution before policy with regard to the engineer units of the N.P.A.M. had been promulgated in General Orders (Minutes of the Militia Council, 1920, Vol 2: Decision No. 764 of 17 Jun 20). Reorganization on a temporary basis only was outlined by G.O. 89 of 15 Jun 20, which provided for 11 divisional (or district) engineer headquarters, 33 field companies, and 20 miscellaneous units. As an interim

arrangement, the Order restricted organization to certain units and detailed their distribution by Military Districts.

52. By 1930 there had been formed all 11 headquarters but only 15 field companies and not quite half the remaining units (Book C, Memo on Land Forces, op cit, p. 6).

(d) Corps of Guides

53. The Corps of Guides had existed in the Canadian Militia since 1903, but, there being no Guides on the establishment of a British infantry division, the personnel had to be distributed among other C.E.F. units during the War. On the other hand, the Canadian Militia lacked cyclist units and when the divisional War Establishment was altered in 1914 to provide a cyclist company it was necessary to call for volunteers from all arms and services. (Duguid, op cit, p. 67).

54. There is evidence that the Otter Committee at an early stage favoured reorganization of the Corps of Guides into cyclist companies. Its memorandum regarding tentative reorganization of the N.P.A.M. in Military District No. 2 stated:

It is proposed that the Corps of Guides should be associated with the Canadian Cyclist Corps, C.E.F., and, if it be decided to include cyclist units in the future establishment of the Militia, the Corps of Guides should furnish them.

(H.Q. 462-16-1, Vol 1)

55. The remarks of the Adjutant-General made later to the Militia Council in this connection are of interest.

While the Corps of Guides has, in the past, filled a useful place in the Active Militia of Canada, there is no role for the Corps in its present form in the War Organization.

It is considered that the Intelligence duties performed by the Corps of Guides in time of peace could be better performed by Battalion and Brigade Intelligence Sections.

By the creation of Battalion and Brigade Intelligence Sections, Peace Organization would be based on what was actually found necessary in time of war. The adoption of the War Organization ensured that the members of combatant Units were trained to the need of close co-operation between the sources of "Intelligence" and the means of "Action.

In the concentration of Intelligence into one Corps, there is a tendency to divorce intelligence from action, which is fatal.

The suggested reorganization of the Corps of Guides into twelve Cyclist Companies provides each Military District with a Cyclist Company, with two Companies for Military District No. 2, which will have a liberal establishment of Officers, who, in addition to the regimental duties, will carry out any special intelligence work required by the G.O.C. of the District.

On mobilization for war services or Home Defence, Cyclist Companies would be combined into Cyclist Battalions as Units of Corps Troops, or be attached to Divisions as Divisional Troops, as the case might be.

(Minutes of the Militia Council, 1920, Vol 2: A.G. Submission No. 471 and Decision No. 496 of 28 Apr 20)

56. Confirmation of this policy was made by G.O. 75 of 15 May 20, which authorized 12 cyclist companies. Later, a tentative establishment was provided by G.O. 163 of 1 Oct 20. The next month numbering and allocation of these 12 companies to Military Districts took place by G.O. 205 of 15 Nov 20. For reasons of sentiment they retained the name of Corps of Guides although without central organization. Each company was allowed a Corps Reserve

Cyclist Company by G.O. 66 of 1 Mar 21. Policy changed within a decade, however, and G.O. 191 of 1 Dec 28 provided for disbandment of Corps of Guides of the N.P.A.M. effective 31 Mar 29.

(e) Officers Training Corps and Cadets

57. The study of man-power undertaken in 1919 contemplated the provision and training of a large number of officers for the Active Militia, Permanent Force and Reserve of Officers through Officers Training Corps units open to students at universities and selected technical schools (H.Q.S. 3500: p. 28). Files on the Otter Committee do not elaborate on this, unfortunately. Authorized companies in 1919 totalled 64. General Orders of the period reflect a certain amount of reorganization but no definite policy other than G.O. 82 of 1 Jun 20 which authorized a Corps Reserve for each contingent of the C.O.T.C.

58. By 1930 the number of companies authorized had been reduced to 41, of which 30 were rated "Efficient to Good" (Crerar Memo: Tables "A" and "C"). Canadian universities that year sponsored 22 contingents with a total of 39 companies (Book C, Memo on Land Forces, p.6).

59. With regard to Cadets, files indicate that the Otter Committee studied the question at some length and while on tour obtained a great deal of advice and information from interested officers. Although General Orders of the period do not indicate what policy the Committee favoured, it is significant to note that in the year ending 31 Mar 21 Parliament increased the appropriation for Cadet Services from \$100,000 to \$390,000 and numbers trained correspondingly increased by nearly 15,000. Some 115 inactive companies were disbanded but 106 new ones were authorized. On that date total strength stood at 81,493, organized into 713 Cadet Corps comprising 1,627 companies. (Report of the Department of Militia and Defence, 31 Mar 21, p. 14).

(f) Infantry

60. The greatest problem facing the Otter Committee undoubtedly was the reorganization and redesignation of infantry units in order to perpetuate traditions and titles of the past. Within the framework of the Active Militia provision had to be made for the perpetuation of the 50 fighting and 260 reinforcing battalions of the C.E.F. (Preliminary Canadian Narrative, op cit, Chap I, p. 5). Many amendments subsequently were necessary but the basic scheme for each Military District was made the subject of a separate General Order. A schedule of these follows:

<u>MILITARY DISTRICT</u>	<u>GENERAL ORDER</u>	<u>DATE</u>
No. 1	39	1 Apr 20
No. 2	66	1 May 20
No. 3	27	15 Mar 20
No. 4	40	1 Apr 20
No. 5	41	1 Apr 20
No. 6	42	1 Apr 20
No. 7	28	15 Mar 20
No. 10	29	15 Mar 20
No. 11	30	15 Mar 20
No. 12	31	15 Mar 20
No. 13	32	15 Mar 20

These Orders listed in detail the new title for each regiment together with the C.E.F. units (if any) perpetuated by its battalions. In general, numerical designations which the Militia had formerly employed were abolished in favour of regimental names. Originally it was intended to add the letters "B.E.F." after those battalions which had served in France but the Militia Council ruled that "C.E.F." should be used instead. (Minutes of the Militia Council, 1920, Vol 1: Minute dated 3 Feb 20 to Decision No. 125 of 27 Jan 20). All regiments were allotted one or more active battalions together with an equivalent or higher number of reserve battalions; several

had two of the latter and a few as many as four or five. The reserve battalions, beyond having a complement of officers, were only paper units in peace, but in war they were intended to serve as reinforcing depots for the active battalions. (Preliminary Canadian Narrative, Chap I, p. 5). Within a regiment its battalions were numbered consecutively beginning with those of the 1st Line.

61. By G.O. 83 of 1 Jun 20 infantry regiments of more than one active battalion were granted an establishment of a Regimental Headquarters consisting of a Commandant (Colonel), Regimental Adjutant (Major), Orderly Officer (Captain or Lieutenant), a Regimental Sergeant Major (W.O. I) and an Orderly Room Sergeant. This was in line with that approved by G.O. 52 of 15 Apr 20 for the Montreal Regiment, Canadian Artillery and could be adopted by the following regiments:

2nd Regiment (Queens Own Rifles of Canada) (Old designation)
Royal Highlanders of Canada
1st British Columbia Regiment
North Saskatchewan Regiment
South Saskatchewan Regiment
Edmonton Regiment
Calgary Regiment

(Minutes of the Militia Council, 1920, Vol 2: A.G.
Submission No. 469 and Decision No. 494 of 28 Apr 20)

62. There were two other General Orders of the period which reflected the policy of the Otter Committee with regard to the N.P.A.M. Infantry. The first of these was G.O. 38 of 1 Apr 20, which detailed the training establishment of a battalion on a four-company basis. It stated specifically "The Reorganization of Infantry Battalions of the Non-Permanent Active Militia of Canada, both City and Rural Corps, will conform to the Double-Company

organization as laid down in Infantry Training, 1914". (A copy of this booklet is available in the library of the Historical Section (G.S.)). This provides for a Battalion Headquarters and four companies with a total personnel of 541 all ranks and meant a repudiation of the pre-war organization of eight companies which had caused so much confusion in the early days of the C.E.F. (Duguid, op cit, p. 148). This point had been left to the discretion of the D.Os.C. as late as March 1919 (H.Q. 593-31-1, Vol 4: A.G. Circular Letter No. 421, 17 Mar 19).

63. In so far as Infantry was concerned, what may be regarded as the summation of the Otter Committee's work appeared in G.O. 91 of 15 Jun 20. By this Order Infantry brigades (N.P.A.M.) of Military Districts were reconstituted as follows:

<u>M.D.</u>	<u>DIVISION</u>	<u>INF. BDES</u>
1	1st	1st, 2nd, 3rd
2	2nd	4th, 5th, 6th
2	5th	14th
2		22nd (Reserve)
3	3rd	7th, 8th, 9th
4	4th	10th, 11th, 12th
5	5th	13th, 15th
6	6th	17th, 18th
7	6th	16th
10		20th
11		23rd
12		19th, 21st
13		24th

The Order named the four battalions comprising each brigade and also specified those attached or left unbrigaded. In general, this reconstitution of

brigades followed very closely the organization of Field Army Tables, 1913 (op cit).

64. The number of infantry battalions authorized in 1919 totalled 112: by 1930 there were 123. Requirements for 11 divisions or 33 brigades, however, totalled 132 battalions. (Crerar Memo, Tables "A" and "B"). Only 26 Infantry Brigade Headquarters had been organized and no higher formation for Field operations existed (Book C, Memo on Land Forces, pp. 5 and 6). In comparison with other Arms and Services, nevertheless, organization of the Cavalry and Infantry along lines laid down by the Otter Committee had shown greatest progress.

(g) Machine Gun Corps

65. Shortly after the constitution of the Otter Committee, the Canadian Machine Gun Corps became an authorized Corps of the Active Militia of Canada. G.O. 47 of 1 Jun 19 provided for an establishment in the N.P.A.M. of two Motor Machine Gun Brigades, twelve Machine Gun Brigades, and one Machine Gun Squadron. This Order also listed in detail the composition of each type of unit. G.O. No. 1 of 2 Jan 20, amended by G.O. 67 of 1 May 20, localized their headquarters. It was the intention of the Department to perpetuate in these new units all those of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps, C.E.F. but, as the Otter Committee had not at that time completed its work, this policy was stated only in an A.G. circular and not mentioned in General Orders. Several years later this omission was remedied by G.O. 77 of 15 Nov 26 (H.Q. 640-1-22: A.G. Circular No. 434 of 27 May 19 and subsequent correspondence).

66. In 1924 the twelve brigades were redesignated battalions, but the two Motor Machine Gun Brigades and the Machine Gun Squadron retained their titles. In 1930, however, the General Staff was contemplating using units of the Corps to meet deficiencies of eight Armoured Car Regiments (two per cavalry division). (Crerar Memo: Tables "A" and "B". See also Tables "C" and "D").

The War Office did not establish a similar Corps in its Territorial Army (Book C, Memo on Land Forces, pp 3 and 5).

(h) Signals

67. With regard to Signal units, G.O. 56 of 15 Apr 20 made provision for an establishment very similar to that act up for Engineers. It also localized a few units by cities and others by M.Ds. on an interim basis.

68. By 1930, however, there had been formed only Divisional Signals H.Q. and 30 Signal companies plus a few other units (Book C, Memo on Land Forces, p. 6).

(i) Army Service Corps

69. The divisional establishment upon which the Otter Committee based its calculations with regard to man-power called for a transport H.Q. and five transport companies for an infantry division, and in the case of a cavalry division a transport H.Q., a supply company, and only one transport company. Total requirements of the Force projected therefore were 15 Headquarters and 63 transport and supply companies. These companies would be organized into Trains. In 1919, however, there were no Headquarters in existence and only 20 companies (H.Q.S. 3500, op cit: Tables "K", "L" and "M"). 14 more companies which had been authorized were not organized (Crerar Memo, Table "A").

70. Nevertheless, the submission requesting dissolution of the Otter Committee indicated that "With reference to the Army Service Corps no change was recommended from the pre-war organization" (H.Q. 462-16-1, Vol 3: A.G. Submission No. 691 dated 5 Jun 20).

71. By 1924 there were only 21 companies although 44 had been authorized. Organization into Divisional Trains had just taken place (Precis No. 26, Militia Staff Course, op cit).

72. Even by 1930 none of the Headquarters had been organized but the number of companies then totalled 36, forming 12 Divisional Trains. There yet was a need for a variety of companies - Supply, Baggage, Ammunition and Maintenance - for the divisions plus Corps and Army requirements (Crerar Memo, Tables "A" and "B"). Canada still retained 12 Horse Transport Companies, although the British Army had disbanded its last the previous year (Short History of the Royal Army Service Corps, p. 48). "Due to the constant experimental reorganization of the Royal Army Service Corps" its Canadian counterpart had to await some form of stabilization (Book C, Memo on Land Forces, pp 3 and 5).

(j) Army Medical Corps

73. Re-organization of the Canadian Army Medical Corps was accomplished by G.O. 51 of 15 Apr 20. Numbered consecutively, there were 34 Field Ambulances, including 7 designated "Cavalry" and 11 Sanitary Sections authorized plus C.C.Ss., General Hospitals, etc. Total requirements were 45 Field Ambulances.

74. By 1930 the Army Hydrological Corps and Advisors on Sanitation had disappeared and a number of new types of medical units had sprung up. The 34 Field Ambulances still were in existence but there were deficiencies in all types of medical installations except C.C.Ss., whose number had increased from 7 to 11 (Crerar Memo, Tables "A" and "B"). The ancillary units, however, existed for the posting of officers only and did not train (Book C, Memo on Land Forces, p. 6. See also Minutes of the Militia Council 1920, Vol 1: Decision No. 248 of 4 Mar 20).

(k) Dental Corps

75. In 1915 the Canadian Army Dental Corps had been created by Privy Council authority for the C.E.F. but G.O. 195 of 1 Nov 20 authorized its disbandment. Files on the Otter Committee contain no reference to discussions on the subject.

76. In 1930 the N.P.A.M. included 11 Dental Corps Detachments as part of the Army Medical Corps (Book C, Memo on Land Forces, p. 6). No statement regarding Dental requirements, however, have been located.

(l) Veterinary Corps

77. In 1919 there were nine Sections of the N.P.A.M. Veterinary Corps in existence. No General Order authorizing reorganization appeared in that period. Although by 1930 the total stood at 11 Sections, they do not appear to have been intended for the Field Force. Documents reveal that in 1919 its requirements were 11 Veterinary H.Q. and 12 Mobile Veterinary Sections (H.Q.S. 3500: Tables "K", "L" and "M").

78. By 1930 requirements had changed to two Cavalry Mobile Veterinary Sections per cavalry division and one Mobile Veterinary Section per infantry division plus four Veterinary Evacuating Stations for Army Troops. To meet this only two Cavalry Mobile Veterinary Sections and seven Mobile Veterinary Sections had been organized and a notation indicated they were of the Reserve Formation (Crerar Memo: Tables "A" & "B").

(m) Army Ordnance Corps

79. It was not until late in 1920 that the pre-war establishment of the N.P.A.M. Canadian Ordnance Corps was officially changed. Until then there were only three Detachments, located at London, Toronto and Kingston respectively. G.O. 188 of 1 Nov 20, however, authorized one detachment per Military District. It should be noted that this Order was published after

dissolution of the Otter Committee, which had earlier considered replacing detachments by one Ordnance Group per division and cavalry division (H.Q.S. 3500: Tables "K", "L" and "M").

80. By 1930 the 11 detachments, however, were still in existence. No attempt appears to have been made to organize the large number of Workshops and Field Parks required for the Field Force (Crerar Memo: Tables "A" & "B").

(n) Postal Corps

81. Reorganization of the N.P.A.M. Canadian Postal Corps was delayed until the end of 1920. G.O. 226 of 1 Dec 20 provided for an establishment of 58 all ranks divided into a Detachment for each Military District. The survey on man-power, however, indicated that existing detachments were to be replaced by 11 Field Post Offices and 4 Cavalry Field Post Offices (H.Q.S. 3500: Tables "K", "L" and "M").

82. In 1930 requirements called for 15 Postal Units for the divisions and 12 Post Offices of various types for higher formations but all were lacking except 12 Postal Detachments, this term apparently having survived in the existing organization (Crerar Memo: Tables "A" and "B"). There also had been organized one Base Post Office (Book C).

(o) Chaplain Services

83. In the survey on manpower provision was made for a Chaplain Group to be allotted to each division. This would seem to have been a new term (H.Q.S. 3500: Tables "K", "L" and "M"). No General Orders in that regard were published in the period, however.

84. By 1930 the proposal appears to have been dropped in favour of a General List of Officers (Book C, Memo on Land Forces, p. 7).

(p) Provost

85. In drafting recommendations regarding Provost Marshals services, the Otter Committee had the benefit of proposals put forth by the Reorganization Committee advising the British Army. In brief, they advocated that combined police and traffic services be performed by a self-contained troop in a cavalry division and by a headquarters plus a self-contained company for each infantry division (H.Q. 593-31-1, Vol 4: Col G. Godson-Godson (Provost Marshal) to McNaughton, 26 Aug 19, with enclosures). This basis was useful in calculating manpower figures although none of the units then existed (H.Q.S. 3500: Tables "K", "L" and "M").

86. In 1930 they were still shown as deficiencies, although the term "Provost Squadron" had been substituted for "Troops" and an additional number was required for Corps and Army purposes (Crerar Memo: Table "B").

(q) Employment

87. The composition of an infantry division in 1919 included an Employment Company, that of a cavalry division an Employment Troop. None of these had been organized. (H.Q.S. 3500: Tables "K" and "M"). By 1930 the term had disappeared from tables of calculations.

(r) Tanks

88. The Otter Committee does not appear to have considered in any way the institution of armoured units into the Canadian Army. By 1930, however, it was recognized that each infantry division should have a Medium Tank Battalion although none had been authorized. In the Table of Composition they were not included with the Cavalry but were listed directly before infantry battalions. (Crerar Memo: Table "B").

(s) Pay Corps

89. Similarly, the Otter Committee appears to have neglected the organization of Pay units. By 1930, however, each division was to have a Field Cash Office and Army Troops were allotted two Command Cash Offices (Ibid).

(t) Railway Corps

90. Disbandment of units of the Railway Troops provided for the C.E.F. was accomplished by G.O. 196 of 1 Nov 20. Prior to that date, however, G.O. 50 of 15 Apr 20 authorized the Canadian Railway Corps to be a Corps of the Canadian Militia, its establishment to be notified later. Files on the Otter Committee, unfortunately, do not reveal specific recommendations.

91. Much later, temporary establishment was authorized by G.O. 18 of 1 Feb 23, which permitted only the posting of officers. N.P.A.M. Railway Groups were to be organized as follows:

No. 1 - Ontario and Quebec

No. 2 - Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick

No. 3 - New Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan

No. 4 - British Columbia and Alberta

This intention was borne out the following year by G.O. 142 of 15 Oct 24, which authorized corresponding Reserve Depots at Montreal, Moncton, Winnipeg and Edmonton but similarly allowed only the posting of officers.

92. No action apparently was taken to implement these Orders, and on 4 Nov 36 the Adjutant-General stated with regard to the Railway Corps "It has never been organized" (H.Q.C. 600-10-79: A.G. to Defence Council, 4 Nov 36). Disbandment was effected 15 Nov by G.O. 151 of 28 Nov 36).

(u) Forestry Corps

93. The Otter Committee while in tour heard certain representatives of the Forestry Corps but made no provision for its continuation during peace. By G.O. 212 of 15 Nov 20 forestry units of the C.E.F. were disbanded.

(v) Reserve Formations

94. Frequent reference has been made above to Reserve formations for the N.P.A.M. They can undoubtedly be attributed to the policy of the Otter Committee but are dealt with in too many General Orders to justify detailed examination.

95. An excellent summary of the 1930 situation in this regard is given in the McNaughton papers.

The peace organizations provide for:

- (i) One of more reserve units for each active unit, confined to posting of officers only, who are liable to annual training with their respective active unit should the latter fall short of its quota in any year.
- (ii) Reserve Regimental Depots. (Cavalry and Infantry only) at present a paper organization only.
- (iii) Reserve of Officers - Composed of officers who have seen service with active units, and who desire to be so carried on retirement from the active list. Officers who fail to report themselves, in writing, to their respective District Headquarters on the first day of April in each year are, if so recommended by the District Officer Commanding, automatically struck off the list.

Approximate strength of the Reserve of Officers as at June 30th,
1930: 6,400.

(Book C, Memo on Land Forces, p. 7)

DISSOLUTION OF THE COMMITTEE

96. On 1 Jun 20 Maj-Gen Gwatkin writing on behalf of the Inspector-General requested the Adjutant-General to institute steps to dissolve the Otter Committee (H.Q. 462-16-1, Vol 3: Gwatkin to A.G., 1 Jun 20). Five days later a formal A.G. submission "upon recommendation of the General Staff" was made to the Minister in Militia Council. It read, in part:

2. The policies laid down for the reorganization of all Branches of the Service have been approved, and, with the exception of the Engineers, have been promulgated in General and Militia Orders.

3. With reference to the Army Service Corps no change was recommended from the pre-war organization.

4. Any suggested changes recommended by District Officers Commanding which have been received subsequent to the promulgation of Orders, have each been made the subject of individual Submissions to Militia Council.

(Ibid: A.G. Submission No. 691)

By decision No. 764 the Militia Council on 17 Jun 20 authorized dissolution. Official action was promulgated in Routine Order No. 2501 of 29 Jun 20, which read as follows:

The Committee authorized under authority of C.E.F. Routine Order, 1913 of 23rd April, 1919, to investigate and report on the absorption of Canada into the Canadian Militia, in order to preserve its identity, having completed its work, is dissolved.

97. As has been pointed out above (see paragraph 28), the fact that the Otter Committee did not submit a general report may perhaps be attributed to political considerations. It is emphasized again that this policy had been settled upon as early as 26 Mar 20, some three months before dissolution and while the Committee was still engaged on its work (H.Q. 462-16-1, Vol 3: Gwatkin to Secty N. & D., 26 Mar 20). In 1942 the Secretary to the Minister of National Defence received a request for a copy of such a report and was apparently unaware that none existed (D.H.S. 5-1-18: O.J. Waters to Col Duguid (D.H.S.), 27 Apr 42).

Principles Underlying the Otter Plan

98. To conclude this examination of the Otter Committee and its recommendations, some attention must be paid to circumstances of the period which caused adoption of a peace organization for the Militia of Canada aimed at providing on mobilization a total force of 11 divisions and 4 cavalry divisions. By its terms of reference, the Committee was bound to act "without avoidable increase of establishment" and "without prejudice to the divisional system to reorganization" (see Appendix "A"). The consequences which arose from its recommendations have been summed up as follows:

Insofar as Infantry and Cavalry units were concerned, the requirements for this considerable force already existed or could readily be provided by the perpetuation in the Militia of some of the overseas units then in process of demobilization. The provision of the additional needs in technical and supporting arms and services was, however, a matter left for future action.

(D.M.O. & I. folder No. 51: Memo entitled "The Principles Underlying the Plan for the Future Organization of the Canadian Militia", unsigned, 14 Aug 36)

Fully aware of the manpower involved, the Committee must have felt certain justification for advocating this "considerable force" of so many divisions. The survey on manpower of that period contained a section entitled "The objects of military organization in Canada" which presented arguments based on both internal and external conditions then prevailing (see para 32 above for a summary). A decade later certain senior officers elaborated upon these reasons.

99. In 1930 Maj-Gen (then Col) H.H. Mathews as Director of Military Operations and Intelligence dealt at some length with the tasks and general principles upon which existing defence plans were drafted. Quoting figures for 30 Jun 30, he pointed out that the Peace Establishment of authorized N.P.A.M. units totalled 124,241 while the actual strength was only 53,160; also that in the preceding year funds had been voted to train only 34,695 all ranks. To raise the additional units necessary to complete the 15 divisions with ancillaries was impossible due to shortage of funds, "even if the General Staff defence plans had required it, which they do not." (McNaughton Papers, Book "C", Memorandum on the Land Forces of Canada, 1930, Part I, initialled "H.H.M.", September 1930, pp 5 and 7). He felt that the existing system was based largely on sentiment, although none the less cogent when examined in the light of practical results. At the same time he pointed out:

If it is permissible to apply the principles of war to defence problems in peace then it might be argued that the peace organization of the land forces contravenes two of them viz:- economy of force and concentration.

(Ibid: Parts II and III, also initialled "H.H.M.",
September 1930)

100. Early the next year General (then Lt-Col) Crerar enlarged upon these considerations. He remarked that in 1919-20 there were certain aspects of world politics which seemed reasonably definite - "the improbability of a major European war for at least a decade, the rise to first-class importance as a world power of the United States, and the dangers inherent in the manifest intentions of Japan to occupy a dominant position in the Pacific". Moreover, "the Bolshevik revolution in Russia had spread its contagion to the foreign element in Canada and also to the less intelligent Canadian born citizens". Demobilization and civil re-establishment of large numbers of C.E.F. personnel resulted in "a not unnatural feeling of unrest ... a condition favourable to revolutionary propaganda". Therefore it was "with these views as regards usefulness in peace and responsibilities in War" that the Otter Committee began its work. General Crerar commented upon its conclusions as follows:

The termination of the Great War found Great Britain unchallengeable on the seas, and inferior only to France as regards air power. The other components of the British Empire were at a maximum of efficiency and strength in land forces. In visualizing a possible conflict with the United States, therefore, the problem as regards Canada was the rapid mobilization of the largest Militia forces possible in order that effective defence of essential communications in Canada could be maintained pending the arrival from overseas of the necessary Empire land and air forces; such being made possible by the strength of the British Navy. A detailed examination of the question of Canadian manpower by the Otter Committee led to the following conclusions: - that in a war of self-defence conducted on our own territory, the maximum force that Canada could raise and maintain in a war of approximately two years' duration would not exceed 11 divisions and 4

cavalry divisions with certain additional and necessary units and formations; the whole reaching a total of some 300,000 all ranks. And while it was recognized that deficiencies in many units and formations, and in much equipment, would exist for a number of years, even under conditions most favourable to re-organization, this project of 11 divisions and 4 cavalry divisions formed the basis of the conclusions and recommendations of the Otter Committee on which the subsequent re-organization of the Militia was carried out.

(Crerar Memo, pp. 1-3)

In the files of the Otter Committee no contemporary evidence exists for this statement of Gen Crerar that the inflated force of 15 divisions for home defence was based on the possibility of war with the United States.

101. Gen Crerar went on to discuss the political and strategical evolution of 1919-30 and its influence on the problem of the direct defence of Canada but this lies beyond the realm of the present report. It is of interest, however, to quote his findings:

To summarize the conclusions of this memorandum, the existing Militia organization is radically incomplete; without greatly increased expenditure can never be completed, and, as the circumstances indicating the need of this force of 11 divisions and 4 cavalry divisions no longer exist, even if the organization were completed, there is now no question to which it would offer the only practical answer.

There are, however, two military contingencies which Canada must face - participation in an overseas Empire war and defence of Canadian neutrality in the event of a war between Japan and the United States. A Canadian Militia organization of 6 divisions and 1 cavalry division, with requisite Corps and Army Troops, capable of rapid mobilization and

concentration and equipped on modern lines is considered adequate to meet either contingency.

(Ibid: p. 23)

To reinforce his argument, he appended a table indicating that the proposed force of seven divisions plus ancillaries would call for a War Establishment of 147,863 but a Peace Establishment of only 85,235. This latter figure was based on an estimated 50% of W.E., allowing for certain units with a W.E. only. (Ibid: Table "E").

102. At the end of 1931 Gen McNaughton as Chief of the General Staff prepared for the Minister of National Defence prior to the Conference for the Limitation of Armaments an elaboration of the Crerar thesis. In his paper he stated:

... the role of the land forces of Canada was clearly to hold back any invasion from the United States until such time as adequate forces for decisive operations could be brought in from Great Britain and elsewhere, and to do this it was held to be expedient to place in the field the maximum forces which could be organized and maintained.

Actually, the Militia establishment recommended in 1919 was based on the total manpower available in Canada less the numbers estimated to be required for replacements in two years of active operations only. Reduced to terms of divisions, this force amounted to 11 Infantry and 4 Cavalry Divisions, together with the required complement of Corps, Army and Lines of Communication units, depots, etc. In the reorganization of the Canadian Militia the full complement of Infantry and Cavalry units and a substantial proportion of Artillery, Machine-Gun, Engineer, Signal and other units required for this establishment were created or recreated and are in existence today.

(H.Q.S. 5902, Vol 1: McNaughton to the Minister,
21 Dec 31, p. 2)

He went on to explain why that basis was no longer suitable and then proposed the following:

The possibility of war with the United States being ruled out the need disappears for a militia organization designed for home defence and based on the maximum man power available. And there now emerges as of first importance, the problem of organizing a force capable of overseas employment in support of other members of the British Empire, or possibly to implement a decision of the Council of the League of Nations, if that should be decided upon. In 1919 this question of a future Canadian Expeditionary Force was also investigated. It was then considered that a force of 6 Infantry and 1 Cavalry Division was the maximum that could be effectively organized and reinforced in a war of long duration overseas. Recent re-consideration of this problem confirms this view.

(Ibid: pp 4-5)

103. Continuing, Gen McNaughton estimated that provision of the necessary artillery and ancillaries to support the force of 15 divisions would involve, beyond those already provided, "a further increase of nearly 100,000 in the Peace Establishments" (Ibid: p. 6). For the reduced force, the proposed Peace Establishments would be:

6 Divisions of 10,000 all ranks	60,000
1 Cavalry Division at 5,000 all ranks	5,000
Corps Army and Lines of Communication units	20,000
Schools, Administrative Units and Coast and Anti-Aircraft defence units	<u>15,000</u>

TOTAL

100,000

(Ibid: p. 7)

This would be composed of 10,000 Permanent Force of which 1,000 should be officers, and 90,000 N.P.A.M. including 6,000 officers.

Reorganization in 1936

104. Late in 1932 the Conference of Defence Associations at its organization meeting in Ottawa heard from Lt-Col G.A. Drew a detailed criticism of the existing Militia organization based on the recommendations of the Otter Committee and passed a resolution urging reorganization (H.Q.S. 5902, Vol 1: Minutes of Conference of Defence Associations, 18-19 Nov 32, pp 6-16). The General Staff subsequently drew up a "Memorandum on the Present Military Requirements of Canada" proposing reorganization on the basis of one cavalry division plus six divisions and the necessary proportion of fortress, L. of C. and administrative units (Ibid: C.G.S. confidential letter 21 Feb 33, Appx "A"). Instructions were issued to D.Os.C. in October 1933 to discuss the matter with senior officers and detailed comments were submitted by all Military Districts (Ibid: synopsis of notes contained in replies from D.Os.C.).

105. The new scheme, although approved in principle by the Bennett administration in 1933, required considerable staff work before it was finally accepted in detail by the King Government three years later. In May 1936 the Hon Ian Mackenzie as Minister of National Defence announced the plan in the House of Commons. As before, actual reorganization was achieved through a series of General Orders. Although it is beyond the scope of this report to deal in detail with the changes which were thereby effected a summary of those proposed in 1936 is given in Appendix "C". Further study may be made through

C.E.F. ROUTINE ORDER 1913

(23 Apr 19)

1913 A COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT ON THE ABSORPTION OF UNITS OF THE OVERSEAS MILITARY FORCES OF CANADA INTO THE CANADIAN MILITIA, IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THEIR IDENTITY AND TRADITIONS.

Owing to typographical errors, Routine Order No. 1900, dated April 7th, is cancelled, and the following substituted: -

1. A committee composed as follows will assemble upon orders of the President:

PRESIDENT - Major-General Sir William Dillon Otter, K.C.B., C.V.O.

MEMBERS - Major-General Sir Archibald Cameron
Macdonell, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Commanding First Canadian Division.

Brigadier-General Ernest Alexander Cruikshank, Director of the Historical Section.

Brigadier-General Andrew G.L. McNaughton, D.S.O., Commanding Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery.

2. The committee will consider and report how best to give effect to the proposal that, with a view of preserving their traditions and identity, the several units (especially the Infantry Battalions) of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, which served at the front, should be incorporated in the

Canadian Militia: this without avoidable increase of establishment, without prejudice to the divisional system of organization, and with due regard to the services which at various times, both before and during the war, the Militia itself has rendered.

3. The committee will visit in turn each Military District, where it will be assisted by associate members, who shall be appointed by the District Officer Commanding, and shall include, besides the District Officer Commanding, Officers Commanding Units of both the Canadian Militia, and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, and any prominent citizens interested in military matters.

4. District Officers Commanding will, in the meantime, consider the question involved, and will prepare a scheme calculated to meet the requirements of their respective Military Districts; a scheme which will serve as a basis for discussion, when the committee, in due course, visits the Headquarters of the Districts.

5. The President of the committee will give the District Officer Commanding due warning of the time that the committee will make its visit.

(Reference: H.Q. 593-31-1, of 19-4-19).

APPENDIX "B"
TO REPORT NO. 22

STATISTICS REGARDING PRE- AND POST-WAR N.P.A.M.

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>ESTABLISHMENT⁷</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
1913-1914	76,606	55,282
1914-1915	70,064	59,004
1924-1925	122,600	50,492
1925-1926	121,183	49,075
1926-1927	138,316	49,075
1927-1928	136,705	52,326
1928-1929	134,967	52,248
1929-1930	123,843	51,831
1930-1931	125,748	53,201
1931-1932	126,633	51,287
1932-1933	134,707	51,873
1933-1934	134,751	52,627
1934-1935	135,284	50,074
1935-1936	133,935	48,761
1936-1937	99,585	45,746
1937-1938	85,982	45,631
1938-1939	86,310	51,418
1939-1940	89,294	46,855

⁷Establishment figures are the totals of the Peace Establishments of authorized units.

(Report of the Department of National Defence,

31 Mar 40, pp 48-49)

APPENDIX "C"

TO REPORT NO. 22

THE SCHEME FOR THE REORGANIZATION
OF THE CANADIAN MILITIA (1936)

A statement showing the changes in the total number of N.P.A.M. Units, total
Peace Establishments, etc. that would be affected by the Scheme.

<u>N.P.A.M. Units</u>	Present <u>(1.6.36)</u>	<u>Future</u>
Cav & armoured car regts.	29	20(a)
Artillery batteries	97	166
Engineer companies	17	42
Signal coys & troops	36(b)	36(b)
Infantry, M.G. & tank bns.	131	93(c)
R.C.A.S.C. coys, etc.	47	45
Medical units	56	42
Ordnance units	11(d)	14
Veterinary units	9	11
Postal units	<u>12(b)</u>	<u>12(b)</u>
TOTALS	<u>445</u>	<u>481</u>
 <u>Total Peace Establishment</u>		
(Includes authorized units only)	102,182(e)	88,943(e)
 <u>Actual Strength of N.P.A.M.</u>		
(From Half-Year Strength Statement		
N.P.A.M. 31.12.35	48,761	-

<u>Number of all ranks Trained 1935-36</u>	39,806	-
 <u>Total War Establishment</u>		
(Includes authorized units only)	170,304	148,239(f)

- NOTES:
- (a) Includes three interim regiments.
 - (b) Already reorganized.
 - (c) Includes four interim battalions.
 - (d) Detachments.
 - (e) Calculated as 60% of War Establishment.
 - (f) Includes interim units which have a war establishment of 4,894 and a peace establishment of 2,936.

21.8.36

(D.M.O. and I. folder No. 51, Notes and Memos with reference to Reorganization of the Canadian Militia)