

NOTE

This is a preliminary narrative and should not be regarded as authoritative. It has not been checked for accuracy in all aspects, and its interpretations are not necessarily those of the Historical Section as a whole.

Ce texte est préliminaire et n'a aucun caractère officiel. On n'a pas vérifié son exactitude et les interprétations qu'il contient ne sont pas nécessairement celles du Service historique.

Directorate of History  
National Defence Headquarters  
Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0K2

July 1986

R E P O R T NO. 52  
HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)  
ARMY HEADQUARTERS

31 May 52

CANADIAN POLICY ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF CANADIAN MILITARY FORCES  
IN WARTIME, 1899-1945

	<u>Page</u>
The South African War	1
The First World War, 1914-1918	2
The Second World War, 1939-1945	4
Appendix "A": Correspondence between Generals McNaughton and Brooke, February 1941	11
Appendix "B": Letter, General Stuart to General Brooke, 17 Jun 44	13

R E P O R T NO. 52

HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

CANADIAN POLICY ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF CANADIAN MILITARY FORCES  
IN WARTIME, 1899-1945

1           The object of this paper is to present a very brief sketch of Canadian policy with reference to the employment of Canadian troops in theatres of operations, from the time when Canadian forces as such were first employed in the field (in the South African War, 1899-1902) through the Second World War, 1939-4945.

2           Broadly speaking, Canadian policy as it has developed during this period has been based upon two principles: maintaining the greatest possible degree of concentration and unity among the Canadian forces in the field; and maintaining over those forces the largest extent of Canadian control compatible with efficiency in the field. The almost universal assumption has been that Canadians fight best when concentrated as a Canadian entity, and that the requirements of military efficiency and those of Canadian national feeling are thus not incompatible.

The South African War

3           The Canadian attitude that has become traditional may be said to have been foreshadowed by the line followed in forming the First Canadian Contingent sent to South Africa in 1899. The proposal initially made by the British Government was that Canada (and other self-governing colonies) should provide units "of about 125 men", that is to say, in effect independent companies of infantry. Orders were issued for raising eight such companies, but there was immediate agitation in favour of a unified Canadian contingent. As a result, the Governor General telegraphed the Secretary of State for the Colonies on 18 Oct 1899 as follows:

After full consideration my Ministers have decided to offer a regiment of infantry, 1,000 strong, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Otter.

My Ministers hope that Canadian contingent will be kept together as much as possible, but realize that this must be left to discretion of War Office and Commander-in-Chief.

(Sessional Paper No. 35a, 1901: Supplementary Report, Organization, Equipment, Despatch and Services of the Canadian Contingents during the War in South Africa, 1899-1900, p. 4)

4           The unit thus raised was the 2nd (Special Service) Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment. It served during the campaign as a unit of a British infantry brigade. Other Canadian units were subsequently raised for service in South Africa, but there was no further question of the raising of independent companies. However the whole number of Canadians sent to South Africa was only about 7,000 men. No Canadian brigade or other formation above battalion level was organized.

#### The First World War, 1914-1918

5           During the First World War, Canada for the first time placed in the field a really large military force, and new problems of control were accordingly encountered. The constitutional position of Canada was still basically that of a “self-governing colony” and there were no real precedents to follow. However, as the war proceeded, and the Canadian overseas force grew, Canadian authority over Canadian troops was increasingly established and vindicated in all respects except that of higher command in operations; and even in that respect the Canadian Commander acquired an increasing degree of autonomy.

6           The Canadian Official History records, on the basis of the evidence of an officer who was present, a stormy interview in 1914 between Lord Kitchener and Sir Sam Hughes<sup>1</sup> on the question of the maintenance of the 1st Canadian Division as an entity:

Kitchener...in a very stern voice said: “Hughes, I see you have brought over a number of men from Canada; they are of course without training and this would apply to their officers; I have decided to divide them up among the British regiments; they will be of very little use to us as they are.” Sir Sam replied: “Sir, do I understand you to say that you are going to break up these Canadian regiments that came over? Why, it will kill recruiting in Canada.” Kitchener answered: “You have your orders, carry them out.” Sir Sam replied: “I’ll be damned if I will,” turned on his heel and marched out.

(Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919, I, pp. 126-27.)

An exchange of cables between the British and Canadian governments followed. Kitchener’s

---

<sup>1</sup> It may be noted that the minister of Militia and Defence was wearing the uniform of a Major General, and the Secretary of State for War the uniform of a Field Marshal.

scheme was abandoned and the Canadian units and the Canadian Division were maintained as national entities.

7           Only gradually was the fact established that the British War Office had no responsibility for the administration of Canadian troops in England. In due time, however, the Overseas Military Forces of Canada, controlled by a Canadian Minister established in London, “was universally conceded to be the portion of the Canadian Military Forces organized, equipped and sent overseas to co-operate with troops of other parts of the Empire in defeating the common enemy” (this definition was published in an appendix of OMFC Routine Order No. 1962 of 11 July 1917). “In four years of war it had developed from a possible to a real entity; at the beginning a vague conception, at the last a powerful united force, under the immediate control of the Dominion Government in all matters except military operations in the field; three, as ever, it was entrusted to the British Commander-in-Chief.” (*Ibid.*, Appendix 8.)

8           The Canadian Government showed itself anxious to hold all the Canadian formations together in one theatre. In December 1915 the War Office inquired whether Canada would provide twelve infantry battalions for service in Egypt, in addition to completing the 3rd Canadian Division, or alternatively, to defer forming the 3rd Division until these battalions returned in the spring. The Canadian Government preferred to offer a 4th Division for service with the Canadian Corps already existing in France. (*Ibid.*)<sup>2</sup>

9           A similar Canadian policy developed with respect to the employment of Canadian troops within the French theatre. “As to the tactical command of Canadian units and formations after they joined the British Expeditionary Forces on the Western Front or elsewhere, there was never any question; they were integral elements of the British Armies in the Field, but it soon became apparent that the Canadian Commander, although under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, was not disburdened of responsibility to Canada” (*Ibid.*). In 1917 a Canadian officer was appointed Corps Commander, and from that time forward the Canadian Corps tended to develop an increasing autonomy. In particular, General Currie considered it important that the Canadian divisions should remain concentrated under his own command. Something of a crisis in this connection arose as a result of the German offensive of March 1918, when a series of orders reached General Currie which threatened to produce a complete disruption of the Canadian Corps. He describes the situation and his action as follows:

Thus, under the pressure of circumstances, the four Canadian Divisions were to be removed from my command, placed in two different Armies (Third and First), and under

---

<sup>2</sup> The question of regional employment -- the normal preference of the Canadian government for employing its forces in areas where Canada can be represented as having direct interests -- is not treated in the present report.

command of three different Corps (VI., XVII. and XIII.).

This disposition of the Canadian troops was not satisfactory, and on receipt of the orders above referred to I made strong representation to First Army, and offered suggestions which to my mind would reconcile y claims (from the standpoint of Canadian policy) with the tactical and administrative requirements of the moment.

(Report of the ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1918, p. 112)

As a result of General Currie's representations, new orders were shortly issued and three of the four Canadian divisions were reunited under the Canadian Corps. All four came under General Currie's command previous to the Battle of Amiens (8 Aug 1918) and remained united under the Corps during the heavy fighting thereafter until the Armistice.

### The Second World War, 1939-45

10 Between the two World Wars the constitutional position of Canada was materially altered, largely as a result of her military contribution in 1914-1918. Her new position as, in effect, an independent state within the Commonwealth was established by the Statute of Westminster of 1931. Some of the military implications of the new situation were developed in the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Acts of 1933. In general, however, its effect upon military co-operation with the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries remained to be worked out after the outbreak of war in 1939.

11 When the 1st Canadian Division was sent to the United Kingdom in 1939, the G.O.C. was not provided with detailed instructions governing the employment of his command. It was assumed that the Division would in due course be employed in France under the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, and that no special problems were likely to arise. The instructions furnished General McNaughton by the C.G.S., 7 Dec 1939, contained the following paragraph:

2. All matters concerning military operations and discipline in the Field, being the direct responsibility of the Command-in-Chief of the British Army in the theatre of operations, will be dealt with by the General Officer Commanding, Canadian Forces in the Field, through the Commander-in-Chief, whose powers in this regard are exercisable within the limitations laid down in the Visiting Forces Acts (Canada and United Kingdom).

(HQC 8249)

12 During the years that followed, the constitutional position of the Canadian forces overseas was gradually clarified. The matter may be dealt with under two headings: the position of the Senior Combatant Officer of the Canadian Army Overseas with respect to the

British military authorities; and the extent of the powers exercisable by the Senior Combatant Officer without reference to the Canadian Government.

13 From the beginning, General McNaughton made it clear that the Canadian force in the United Kingdom was a national force which could not be treated as an integral part of the British Army. In March 1940 he successfully established in negotiations with the War Office the fact that training policy was “reserved for the appropriate Canadian Service Authorities” and was not a matter for the War Office or any British formation. (Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 1/Comm/1/2).

14 Although the Canadian force in Britain was never committed to large-scale action during the period when it was under General McNaughton’s command, the question of the principles on which it might be employed in action was raised during Exercise “VICTOR” in January of 1941.<sup>3</sup> During this exercise, which took place while Major-General Odum was commanding the Canadian Corps in the absence of General McNaughton, large portions of the 1st Canadian Division were taken from under the control of its own commander and placed under British formations. The G.O.C., Major-General Pearkes, subsequently reported to General McNaughton that the manner in which his Division was treated would have exposed it to serious consequences in actual operations.

15 General McNaughton took the matter up with the C.-in-C. Home Forces (General Sir Alan Brooke). Following a verbal discussion on 31 Jan 1941, General McNaughton on 1 Feb wrote to General Brooke expressing appreciation of his recognition of the position of the Canadian force and General McNaughton’s own responsibilities to his government for the safety and proper employment of the Canadian troops under his command. General McNaughton pointed out the military advantage “of employing the present Canadian Corps as a whole” and remarked that if it were not so used a heavy price would be paid in effectiveness against the enemy. He proceeded to record General Brooke’s verbal acceptance of the principles that Canadian divisions should not be detached from the Corps without the alternative courses of action being carefully weighed, and that a Canadian division should not be subdivided without its commander’s consent. General Brooke accepted these principles in an answering letter. The correspondence is attached to this report as Appendix “A”.

16 A feature of this correspondence which should be carefully noted is General McNaughton’s insistence upon the importance of ensuring that the observance of the Canadian principles should not result in any operational advantage to the enemy. On 19 Feb 41 he sent his divisional commanders copies of General Brooke’s letter (having already sent copies of his own). His covering letter to them concludes as follows:

---

<sup>3</sup> This was a command and signals exercise conducted by G.H.Q. Home forces. Troops did not actually move.

It is possible that in the course of operations, the situation may develop in such a way that it becomes of definite military advantage to detach a portion of your Division, and place it temporarily under the command of another formation.

Whenever your Division is detached from the Canadian Corps, decision in this matter rests with you. Your action at the time should be guided by one principle, namely, that the resources at your disposal are used to obtain the maximum possible effect on the enemy.

(H.Q. First Cdn Army file PA 1-0).

17           The question of the extent of the powers exercisable by the Senior Combatant Officer, Canadian Army Overseas without reference to his own government first arose actively in April 1940, when the War Office requested Canadian assistance in the campaign in Norway. The War Office approached C.M.H.Q. on the morning of 16 April, outlining an operation which was proposed against Trondheim. General McNaughton was advised by the D.J.A.G., C.M.H.Q., that he had the legal authority to detain Canadian troops for such an operation, and he accordingly agreed to take part. No information of the project was sent to Ottawa until the evening of 17 April, over thirty hours after the first proposition was made. The Canadian Government strongly objected to this procedure, and while approving sending the force expressed the view that such a commitment should not have been undertaken without prior reference to the Department of National Defence and the approval of the Canadian Government. (Documents on C.M.H.Q. file 3/Norway/1.) Subsequently, on 1 Apr 1941, the minister of National Defence told the Canadian House of Commons, with reference to the Norwegian project, that “the decision as to the employment of troops outside the United Kingdom is a matter for the Canadian Government” and that Canadian military authorities in the United Kingdom could not authorize the embarkation of Canadian forces from that country without the authority of the Minister of National Defence.

18           General McNaughton’s authority to undertake operations outside the United Kingdom was gradually widened as the result of successive incidents. He was authorized to undertake the Spitsbergen expedition, and subsequently, on 29 Oct 1941, his authority to undertake such special minor projects without prior reference to Ottawa was generalized by decision of the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet. On 1 May 1942, the project for a raid on Dieppe having arisen, this authority was again widened by the War Committee to include raiding projects on more than a “minor” scale.

19           On all occasions when Canadian forces operated detached during the Second World War, their commanders were provided with special directives defining their relationship to the British or Allied forces with and under which they were acting. They were normally accorded the right of reference (i.e., of appeal) to the Canadian Government in extreme cases. Commanders placed under United Kingdom higher command were advised that they were acting within the framework of the Visiting Forces Act. They were informed that they had



authority to remove their forces from “in combination” with the British forces under the terms of that Act - that is, to take them from under British operational command - but that this should not be done except in extreme cases. For example, the directive issued to the Commander of the Canadian brigade which was sent to Hong Kong in 1941 contained the following passage:

5. While the designation referred to in paragraph 3 of these instructions allows you discretion, you will not take the forces under your command out of combination with the British Forces serving in Hong Kong other than in circumstances that you judge to be of compelling necessity, in which case you are to seek further instructions from Canada.

6. In the fulfillment of your mission, you will bear in mind that all matters concerning Military operations will be dealt with by you through the General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong, whose powers in these respects in relation to the Force under your command are exercisable within the limitations laid down in the Visiting Forces Act (Canada)....

8. You will keep constantly in mind the fact that you are responsible to the Canadian Government for the Force under your command. In consequence your channel of authority and communication on all questions (except those concerning military operations referred to in paragraph 6 of these instructions) including matters of general policy as well as of transfers, exchanges, recalls and reinforcements, will be direct to National Defence Headquarters.

(HQS 20-1-20, 20 /Oct 41)

20. In the case of troops serving under United States higher command, the Visiting Forces Acts did not apply. The directive issued by the G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command to the Commander of the Canadian brigade group which took part in the enterprise against Kiska in 1943 contained the following passages:

5. The entity of this detachment as a Canadian Force shall at all times be maintained and it is anticipated that in the normal course of operations, tasks will be so allotted having regard to the size of the Canadian or United States forces respectively, that their respective entities can be readily preserved. It is the governing intention, however, that the Canadian and United States forces should be able to participate together in the joint effort with the utmost flexibility and it is recognized that local conditions and circumstances will in the main determine the extent and degree of integration necessary....

9. Subject to the exception mentioned hereunder, the operational control exercisable by the United States Commander shall be observed in letter and spirit as fully as if he were a Canadian Officer....

10. Each Government has reserved itself, however, the right under extraordinary circumstances to withdraw from the undertaking. You as the Senior Combatant Officer are

empowered to exercise this right of withdrawal, but it cannot be exercised at any lower level. The authority extends to withdrawal of the whole or any part of the force but any such action should only be taken after consultation with me except where there is not sufficient time to enable consultation feasibly to be carried out and it is necessary to act without consultation.

11. In addition to the foregoing the Canadian participation in the campaign is subject to the retention by you as Senior Combatant Officer of the right to refer to the Canadian Government through this Headquarters in respect of any matter in which such force is likely to be involved or committed.

(G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command to Brig. H.W. Foster, 28 Jun 43, P.C.S. 504-1-10-2-1)

21 Neither the right of appeal nor the right to withdraw from combination were ever exercised during operations.

22 The directives issued to the Canadian commanders engaged in Sicily and Italy in 1943-45 followed the general lines already sketched, being framed under the Visiting Forces Acts. The question of the concentration of Canadian forces in the Italian theatre under unified Canadian command arose more than once. General Crerar, when 1 Cdn Corps entered the line at the end of January 1944, exerted himself to arrange for the concentration of the Canadian troops in the theatre under his own command. As a result of strong representations made by him to General Leese, then commanding the Eighth Army, on 5 Feb, 5 Cdn Armd Div (which had been under 13 British Corps) exchanged with 8 Ind Div (which had been under 1 Cdn Corps) on 9 Feb. Thereafter the two Canadian divisions were under the command of 1 Cdn Corps, but the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade remained under 13 Corps. (Personal War Diary, Lt.-Gen. H.D.G. Crerar, February 1944.)

23 In general, this situation continued to exist during the rest of the campaign. In October 1944 Colonel Ralston discussed the matter with General Leese. A memorandum of their conversation contains the following paragraphs:

14. With reference to 1 Cdn Armd Bde, the Minister asked Gen Leese whether it would not be preferable to place it permanently under command of 1 Cdn Corps. Gen Leese replied that placing British formations under command of 1 Cdn Corps and vice-versa had tremendous advantages from his point of view and stated that in the case of 1 Cdn Armd Bde, it had operated most efficiently when under command of British formations. In the same manner, British formations operated very efficiently under command of the Canadians.

While Gen Leese fully appreciated the Canadian point of view of having all Canadians under one command in the Italian theatre, he considered that such an arrangement had the serious objection that it lacked flexibility and, therefore, restricted the commander in formulating

his tactical plans. He therefore requested the Minister not to press for all Canadians under Canadian command. He informed the Minister that if the Canadian Government felt very strongly on the matter, he would be only too pleased to conform but felt that from the military point of view it would be a mistake.

(Brigadier E.G. Weeks to Lt-Gen K. Stuart, 11 Oct 44)

The 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade continued to operate under British formations during the remainder of its time in Italy. It may be noted that both in that theatre and in North-West Europe many detachments and sub-divisions were amicably made, as between Canadian and British formations, to meet the temporary needs of operations.

24 In December 1944, when the possibility of Canadian troops being employed in Greece was being publicly discussed in Canada, and when it was confidentially reported that 1 Cdn Corps might be used in an operation against the Dalmatian coast, the instructions to the G.O.C. 1 Cdn Corps were amended to make it clear that it was "not desired that Cdn tps should be employed out of Italy or become involved in present Balkan difficulties without prior opportunity for full consideration and approval by Cdn Government." (C.M.H.Q. file 1/COS/9). Mr. King informed Mr. Churchill of this action. (HQS 8809, Vol. 2, 15 Dec 44).

25 Both the sending of 1 Cdn Div and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde to Sicily in the summer of 1943, and the building up of the Canadian force in the Mediterranean to a corps in the following autumn, were undertaken as the result of requests addressed to the British Government by the Government of Canada. This was a divergence from normal Canadian policy, since it involved splitting the Canadian field force between two theatres. It was the result of abnormal circumstances, and chiefly of the Government's view that it was desirable to get the part of the long-idle Army into action at an early date. The Canadian Government shortly reverted to the more usual Canadian view of such questions and exerted itself to have its forces re-united under a single Canadian command. When in the spring of 1944 a directive was prepared for General Crerar as G.O.C.-in-C. First Cdn Army, it contained the following paragraph:

11. At the request of the Government of Canada certain formations of the First Canadian Army were despatched to the Mediterranean theatre with the objects at that time of increasing the effectiveness of the Canadian participation in the war and obtaining battle experience. Now that these objects have been gained the Government of Canada regards it as highly desirable that as soon as military considerations permit such formations now serving in the Mediterranean theatre as well as field formations and units elsewhere should be grouped under unified Canadian command.

(C.G.S. to G.O.C.-in-C. First Cdn Army, 25 May 44, HQS 8809)

26               Representations along these lines were continued until 1 Cdn Corps was withdrawn from the Mediterranean theatre early in 1945. The whole Canadian field force overseas was then concentrated in North-West Europe under the command of General Crerar.

27.               In a series of discussions with the War Office and the C.-in-C. 21 Army Group in the early summer of 1944, Lt-Gen. Stuart, then Chief of Staff C.M.H.Q., explained the Canadian point of view on the issues discussed in this paper. He found that General Montgomery was inclined, on military grounds, to be doubtful of the Canadian argument in certain respects. General Stuart wrote to the C.I.G.S. defining the Canadian position and emphasizing that General Crerar had a responsibility for his troops from which the Canadian Government would not release him. He wrote in part:

5. Crerar does not expect to be consulted more than any other Army Commander as regards operational plans, but the Canadian Government does expect Crerar to be consulted prior to any regrouping of Canadian Formations which would result in their detachment from Canadian command. In practice, no issue should ever arise because Crerar will have an opportunity to discuss any particular Canadian issues during what Montgomery describes as “normal consultation”..

(Stuart to Brooke, 16 Jun 44)

28               On 17 Jun 1944 General Stuart wrote formally to Sir Alan Brooke concerning the detachment of Canadian formations from unified Canadian command. As this brief letter affords an effective summary of the Canadian point of view, a copy of it is attached to his paper as Appendix “b”. It may be noted that the quotation in para 3 is from the draft of the directive to General Crerar (above, para 25), which was altered and shortened before final approval.

Historical Section,  
Army Headquarters,  
31 May 1952.

APPENDIX "A"

CC 7/3-2

H.Q. Cdn Corps,  
Home Forces,  
1 Feb 41

Dear General,

COPY NO 9

I appreciate the opportunity which you gave me yesterday to outline the situation which developed in the 'Victor' exercise resulting, among other unfortunate consequences, in elements of 1 Cdn Div being committed to action in widely separated areas under a number of different commanders and without any possibility of support being given, in time, by other formations or units of the Canadian Corps.

I appreciate also your ready acceptance of the need for taking appropriate steps to make certain that no such situation should arise in actual operations and your willingness to recognize the position of the Canadian Forces and my own continuing responsibilities to my Government for the safety and proper employment of the Canadian Troops which have been entrusted to my command.

From our conversation and from your own experience years ago with the Canadian Corps and more recently with your own Corps in France, I feel sure you recognize the military advantage of employing the present Canadian Corps as a whole. Our various elements are closely knit by intimate personal acquaintance and mutual friendships; they have been trained to work together; the staffs have been constantly interchanged so that a common doctrine and system permeates every service and department; the composition of the Corps Troops, though not as yet complete, has been adjusted to supplement and meet the needs of the Divisions -- in short the Canadian Corps is well developed as an organic entity and if not so used and units or subordinate formations were detached and employed elsewhere then a very heavy price would have been paid in military efficiency and effectiveness against the enemy.

I am naturally most anxious, on grounds both of military advantage and of constitutional propriety, that the Canadian Corps should be kept together; nevertheless you will recall my own recognition of the fact that in the special circumstances of the battle of Britain this might not always be best in the general interest and my agreement that for valid reasons our Divisions might be detached, as such, for so long as might really be necessary.

I recall your promise that before any 'instructions' to make a detachment are issued, that the alternatives will be carefully weighed, and I confirm that under this condition I will accept your judgment at the time; it being definitely understood that a Canadian Division is

not to be subdivided except with the consent of its commander and that it will be returned to the Canadian Corps at the first practicable moment; the fact that a Canadian Division is detached will not interfere in any way with the normal system of Canadian administration nor with my right and duty to intervene should the situation so require.

Very sincerely yours,

(A.G.L. McNaughton)  
Lieut.-General

General Sir Alan F. Brooke, C.B., D.S.O.,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Home Forces.

Copy No.	1	-	C.-in-C. Home Forces
	2	-	G.O.C. 1 Cdn Div.
	3	-	G.O.C. 2 Cdn Div
	4	-	Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q.
	5	-	High Commissioner for Canada (for information)
	6	-	War Diary
	7	-	“ “
	8	-	“ “
	9	-	File
	10, 11, 12	-	Spares.

-----

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
HOME FORCES

5 February, 1941.

My dear McNaughton

Thank you for your letter of 1st February. I agree with all you say, and have forwarded a copy of your letter to the Army Commanders of Southern and South Eastern Commands.

Yrs ever

A.F. Brooke

Lt.-Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,

Comd.,

Canadian Corps.

APPENDIX "B"

17 Jun 44

Dear

I am writing this note to advise you of the views of the Canadian Government in respect of the detachment of Canadian Army Formations from unified Canadian command.

2. As you are aware the 3 Cdn Inf Div and 2 Cdn Armd Bde are under command Second Army at the present time. In this connection the Canadian Government considers "that only the urgent requirements of military operations should justify the continuance of detachment of such forces and the resultant loss of the obvious practical advantages resulting from unified Canadian control and administration".

3. You also know that at the request of the Government of Canada certain Formations of the First Canadian Army were despatched to the Mediterranean theatre with the objects of increasing, at that time, the effectiveness of the Canadian participation in the war and obtaining battle experience. Now that these objects have been gained the Government of Canada "regards it as highly desirable both from a national point of view and from the point of view of making, in the present circumstances, the most effective contribution and because of administrative advantages that, as soon as military considerations permit, such Formations now serving in the Mediterranean theatre, as well as field Formations elsewhere, should be grouped under unified Canadian command."

4. The above quotations are extracted from the instructions issued on behalf of the Government of Canada to G.O.C.-in-C First Canadian Army. I am forwarding these extracts to you for your information.

Sincerely yours,

(K. Stuart) Lt-gen  
Chief of Staff  
CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke, GCB, DSO.  
The War Office



Copy: GOC-in-C First Cdn Army.