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**REPORT NO. 72
HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)
ARMY HEADQUARTERS**

18 Aug 55

Canadian Participation in the Korean War, Part II: 1 Apr 52 - 31 Jul 53

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Introduction

1. This report is a record of Canadian participation in the fighting in Korea from April 1952 until the signing of the military armistice in U 1953. It is a continuation of Hist Sec, A.H.Q., Report No. 62, Canadian Participation in the Korean War, Part I: 25 Jun 50 - 31 Mar 52.. and uses Me same abbreviations.
2. The armistice negotiations dominated the period covered by the present report. Pending their outcome, discussion of the Korean situation in the United Nations and operations at the front were both reduced. As a result., this report deals with lesser events than did its predecessor. In the political field, there are only the discussions at Panmunjom and the brief revival of U.N. debate occasioned by the prisoners of war who objected to repatriation. Military operations consisted almost entirely of minor defensive engagements along a static front.
3. Except for a brief summary of the armistice negotiations and the associated U.N. debate, this report concentrates on the military activity of the period, including the rotation of Canadian troops. With one or two exceptions, the operations of 1 Comwel Div are fairly representative of what took place across the whole front. Attention has therefore been focussed almost exclusively on the Commonwealth sector., and., in particular, on Canadian operations in that sector.
4. No information is available on the strategic objectives and plans of either side, and very little about the enemy's operations. Accordingly the fighting is described from the point of view of our own troops, on the battalion, company and platoon level. An attempt has been made to cover this in sufficient detail to provide the data (or information as to where the data may be found) for any detailed study of particular aspects of the fighting. Success in this effort has been limited by an almost completely uniform disregard of one of the main aims of the 'Iar Diary, as defined in Staff Duties in the Field 1949, Chapter 2, Section 12, paragraph 1¹.

THE FIRST ROTATION OF UNITS IN KOREA

(OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 1951, APRIL TO JUNE 1952).²

¹ The aim of a war diary is to ... provide data on which to base future improvements in Army training, equipment, organization and administration".

² Appendices "A" and "B" show all Canadian units which served in Korea or Japan between September 1950 and July 1953 as a result of this and subsequent rotations.

Early Planning

5. In describing the development of arrangements for rotation of Canadian troops in Korea, it is necessary to turn back to 17 Jun 51. on that date Brigadier Rockingham dispatched a message to the Adjutant-General, asking for information on Canada's rotation policy (H.Q.S. 2840-1, vol 1: Tel Comd 54, H,Q* 25 Cdn Inf Bde to Army Ottawa, 17 Jun 51), He was informed that a plan for rotation of troops was under active consideration, and that he would be given details when the plan had received the Government's approval (ibid: Tel A.G. 1911, Army Ottawa to H.Q.'s 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 20 Jun 51).

6. This very early planning no doubt proceeded on the assumption that 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp would be employed in Korea for some time to come. However the commencement of armistice negotiations on 10 Jul 51 made the eventual size of Canada's commitment uncertain, The C.G.S. accordingly directed the A.G. to study the problem of rotating an occupation force of approximately battalion size (ibid: Extract from Minutes 'of C.G.S. Conference No. 121, 16 Jul 51). In spite of this, most of the detailed planning appears to have concentrated on the rotation of the whole Canadian force in Korea and Japan. On 16 Jul 51 the A.G. presented to the C.G.S. a paper on the rotation of the brigade group (ibid; A.G. to C.G.S., 16 Jul 51). In this paper, the following recommendations were made.

- a. Provide for one winter only overseas.
- b. Repatriate Special Force enrollees as near as possible to the termination of their eighteen month service but compulsorily extend in some cases up to 24 months.
- c. Rotate Active Force enrollees as near as possible to the completion of twelve months in the theatre,
- d. Dispatch replacements for RCAC., RCA and RCIC on the basis of formed subunits.
- e. Dispatch replacements for other units on an individual basis in accordance with theatre demands by rank, trade and duty.
(Ibid: Para 2)

7. Sharp reductions in the strengths of infantry units in Canada were considered necessary, a.-, the only means of finding sufficient infantrymen to make rotation possible.

The provision of RCIC replacements presents by far the most difficult problem. Provided, however, that approximately 500 officers and men can be withdrawn from each Bn of the Mobile Striking Force to augment manpower available in the Wainwright Replacement Group, there is sufficient strength in sight to replace Inf personnel who will be eligible for repatriation or replacement late this year and early in 1952. This will, however, entail:

- a. Reduction of first Bns to one para company plus a nucleus for subsequent restoration.

- b. Priority of posting from first Bns to Korea rather than to 27 Bde Gp.
- c. Reduction of third Bns to the minimum required for training of recruits.

Our ability to maintain the rotation policy, after the initial replacement is dependent on the recruit intake. It is important, therefore, that the intake which is now going almost entirely to 27 Bde Gp and its replacement units be diverted for duty in Korea. To effect this with a minimum reduction in the recruit flow it is recommended that 25 Bde Replacement Group be redesigned and become a "neutral" training formation processing recruits for all formations at home and abroad. A high percentage of its output will, however, be required for Korea and will thus delay the build-up of Inf Units of 27 Bde Gp and their replacement companies.

(Ibid: para 7)

- 8. Results of the recommended policy were summarized as follows:
 - a. Bns of Mobile Striking Force will be reduced to one para coy each plus a small cadre for subsequent restoration by repatriation and recruitment.
 - b. 1 RCHA will be reduced heavily.
 - c. Static service units will be reduced in varying degrees. Curtailment of normal service must be anticipated.
 - d. 25 Bde Gp must be given priority over 27 Bde Gp in the posting of personnel from the Mobile Striking Force and other static and Home Defence units. This will inevitably reduce the rate of build-up of 27 Bde Gp and retard its date of combat readiness.
 - e. The recruit stream must be diverted from 27 Bde Gp and its Replacement, Units to the 25 Bde GD replacement stream. This will undoubtedly result in a delay in completing 27 Bde

Replacement units and retard the date of dispatch of 27 Bde Gp to Europe.

The rate of restoration of units depleted by replacement posting will be dependent on the number of repatriated personnel who elect continuing duty on return to Canada [the first paragraph in this paper had estimated that, of the approximately 4500 Special Force personnel serving among the 8000 Canadians in Korea and Japan, 500 might re-engage in the Active Force], and the maintenance of recruiting at a level above the estimated 1000 per month required to offset 400 normal discharge plus the long term reinforcement and replacement rate of 600 per month for Korea. At the best estimate, however, Home units will remain below strength well into 1952.

(Ibid- para 8)

9. The C.G.S., having studied this paper, stated the principles which were to govern rotation.
- a. Where the counterpart of a unit in the Korean theatre exists in the Active Force, other than in 27 CTB Group and its replacement element, rotation will be carried out by replacement on a unit and sub unit basis. As I see it, this could be applied to RCAC, RCA, RCE, RCIC, RCASC and RCAMC although the last named would only apply to the field ambulance.
 - b. In respect to the rotation of infantry sub units and units, battalions of the Mobile Striking Force will be used for this purpose, but in each case one para company of the 1st Battalions must be retained in Canada in operational order. In this case, the 3rd battalions will be required to find one company for each of the 1st battalions during rotation in order to complete the organization of the 1st battalions within the Korean theatre.
 - c. Rotation should begin by replacing 2 PPCLI with 1 PPCLI. In order to retain operational efficiency within the Korean theatre, a maximum of two companies should be rotated at any one time.
 - d. Rotation of "C" Sqn LSH., 1 RCHA., the Field Squadron RCE, 2 RCR, 2 R 22e R, RCASC Tpt Coy and the RCAMC field ambulance will be carried out simultaneously subsequent to rotation of 2 PPCLI. This will also apply to individuals involved in rotation of other services, headquarters, etc, elements.
 - e. Units and sub units being relieved should not bring back with them personnel who have served in the theatre for limited periods of, say, three or four months only; these personnel should be transferred to other sub units of the same unit to relieve other personnel who have served in the theatre for a considerable length of time and to the new sub units and units on arrival.
(H.Q.S. 2840, vol 1: C,G.S. to A.G.0 20 Jul 51)

10. On receipt of this directive, the A.G. had a table drawn up to show in detail a proposed schedule for rotation, This table was attached to a draft press release describing the plan in general terms., and the C.G.S. sent both papers to the Minister for approval on 30 Jul 51, In his covering memorandum, Lt-Gen Simonds explained that he considered it important., on grounds of morale, to give the first battalions a chance to fight in Korea. (ibid: C.G.S to M.N.D 30 Jul 51, with attached papers).

11. As has been stated (para 7 above), the plan for which approval was thus sought involved a sharp - though perhaps temporary - reduction in the strength of the ground force available for the direct defence of Canada. In particular, the plan involved a reduction to three para companies of the infantry element within the Mobile Striking Force. The Minister found himself unable to accept this reduction,

and ruled that the equivalent of two and one-half airborne battalions was to be retained in Canada³ (ibid: Draft of Memo C.G.S. to M.N.D. (unsigned), 10 Aug 51, para 5, and preceding seven folios). In consequence of this ruling, which roughly tripled the number of infantry men to be left in Canada, the plan was changed to provide that each of the para companies was to be augmented by a further 150 men (ibid), Provision was also made to fly 200 volunteers para training back to Canada from each of the three infantry battalions in Korea as it came due for rotation (ibid). The Minister appears to have accepted the argument that these two groups, reinforced by a certain number of trained paratroopers who had been posted to the second battalions and would be returning with them (ibid), was sufficient to keep the Infantry element of Mobile Striking Force at an acceptable strength (H.Q.S. 2840-1, vol 1: A/A.G., to C.G.S., 13 Aug 51). and a revised press release (P.N. 213-51) outlining the amended plan was finally Issued on 19 Aug 51. This release devoted as much space to the arrangements made for the defence of Canada as it did to the plan for rotation. It also stressed that. successful execution of the plan was contingent on the general military situation.

12. Three days prior to the issue of this press release, messages outlining the rotation plan had been sent to H.Q. 25.Cdn Inf Bde and C.M.M.F.E. in the Far East., as well as to the five Commands in Canada. These messages stated that it was planned to replace 2 P.P.C.L.I. by 1 P.P.C.L.I. before Christmas 1951. Other units of the formation were to be relieved early in 1952. The period of service required prior to return to Canada was set at one winter in Korea or approximately 12 months in the Far East, To retain the operational efficiency of the units deployed in Korea, it was ruled that not more than two infantry companies or equivalent sub-units would be interchanged at any one time. in accordance with this arrangement, the provisional schedule for the rotation of 2 P.P.C.L.I. provided that 1 P.P.C.L.I. would move in three groups, each two companies in strength, on about 21 Sep, 3 Oct and 15 Oct .51. The unit, however, was to leave behind one complete company of qualified paratroopers, plus an additional 150 officers and men also trained as "jumpers". These latter groups were only to be retained in Canada until sufficient personnel had been trained to replace them. To expedite this replacement, it was planned to fly 200 volunteers for para training from 2 P.P.C.L.I. back to Canada in advance of the main body.⁴ (H.Q. S. 2840-1, vol 1: Tel Org 76, Army Ottawa to H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, Canmilms, Army Edmonton, 2 C.A.U., 16 Aug 51; Tel Org 77, Army Ottawa to Army Edmonton rptd remaining Comds, 16 Aug 51).

13. The plan outlined in these two messages was followed in the relief of 2 P.P.C.L.I. by 1 P.P.C.L.I. A few details, such as the exact period of qualifying service (set at 12 months plus or minus one month (ibid: Extract from C.G.S. Conference No. 126, 11 Sep 51)) and the timing of the return of the volunteers for para training (to be such that the volunteers could complete their leave and training in

³ The evidence on the exact nature of the ministerial decision in this case, while strong, is not conclusive, The documents cited prove beyond doubt that senior staff officers in the A.G. Branch were under the impression that the ruling was as given in this text.

⁴ It has not been possible to reconcile this statement with the plan approved by the Minister (para 11 above), which plan clearly provided that three groups would be left in the M.S.F., each consisting of a para company, a supplement of 150, 200 newly-trained parachutists plus the trained "jumpers" who would be returning from Korea. Replacement of the supplement of 150 by any part of the 200 newly-trained parachutists would appear to decrease the strength of each group to a level below that set by the Minister.

time to report to the unit's home station at the same time as the main body arrived, travelling by sea (ibid: Extract from C.G.S. Conference No. 125, 28 Aug 51)) were clarified subsequently., but in the main the plan worked without substantial amendment. The Director General Army Personnel, Brigadier M.L. Brennan, O.B.E., C.D., himself traveled to the Far East in mid-September, to give decisions on individual cases and to explain the considerations which had affected the planning at A.H.Q. (ibid: Tel Org 129, Army Ottawa to 25 C.I.B., 1 Sep 51; W.D., 2 Cdn Adm Unit , 20 Sep 51). Brigadier Rockingham queried the wisdom of sending the 1 P.P.C.L.I. companies over at full strength., pointing out that this would create a problem of the disposal of approximately 400 soldiers from 2 P.P.C.L.I., who were not yet eligible for rotation (H.Q.S. 2840-1, vol 1: Tel Comd 416, H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde to Army Ottawa, 30 Aug 51). In spite of this submission, the plan remained unchanged; these 400 odd men from 2 P.P.C.L.I. were formed into replacement companies and most of them came up later as reinforcements to 1 P.P.C.L.I. ((H.S.) 681.013 (D 17)- "Interview with Lt-Col N.G. Wilson-Smith, M.B.E., formerly C.O. 1 P.P.C.L.I., 11 Jul 52". paras 4 and 6).

Relief of 2 P.P.C.L.I. by 1 F.P.C.L.I.

This, however, was still in the future when Lt-Col N.G. Wilson-Smith, M.B.E., C.O. 1 P.P.C.L.I., reported for briefing to Headquarters 1, iestern Command on 18 Aug 51.⁵ The task he was given at that time, though, perhaps not so fraught with uncertainty as the assignment which had been given to Lt-Col Stone almost a year before (A.H.Q. [Report No. 62](#), paras 75 and 81). was not without its difficulties. Perhaps the biggest problem was lack of time, In five weeks, two companies had to be readied for Korea; less than two weeks later., two more companies had to be dispatched, and the remainder of the unit was to be ready to leave 12 days afterward (para 12 above). In that time, an extensive reorganization and some re-training had to be completed, and a great many administrative details attended to. The reorganization involved sorting out the para company, the para pool (as the supplement of 150 officers and men came to be called), and 5n X-list on which noneffectives and instructors were carried. The remainder of the battalion had then to be organized on a new establishment, absorbing a rifle company (designated "D" Coy 1 P.P.C.L.I.) from 3 P.P.C.L.I., as well as replacements for the soldiers of the para company., the para pool and the X-Liat., all of whom were being loft behind in Canada. Since the unit's previous training had been directed almost entirely towards operations in the Mobile Striking Force, some re-training in "normal" infantry operations would have been desirable. However the Commanding Officer decided to forego this training and to use the time thus saved in developing a sound administrative system within the unit, a decision which was amply justified by subsequent experience in Korea.

15. This work was pressed forward with vigour, and on 21 Sep 51, "A" and "C" Coys sailed from Seattle on the U.S.N.S. General M.C. Meigs, docking at Yokohama on 3 Oct. From this port the companies were moved by train to Sasebo, where they embarked on a Japanese transport for Pusan. On 7 Oct the troops reached a reception centre which had been established by "A" and "B" Echelons

⁵ All statements in paras 14 to 17, except those for which a different source is cited, derive from W.D. , 1 P.P.C.L.I., August to November 1951 and the interview with Lt-Col Wilson-Smith.

of 2 P.P.C.L.I. at Sandok (232056),⁶ approximately 3000 yards south-west of the junction of the Imjin and Hantan rivers. Lt-Col Wilson-Smith, who had left Currie Barracks on 1 Oct., was there to meet them, having reached Seoul by air on the previous day.

16. The two companies passed a week in this reception centre, spending the time on route marches, training in U.S. weapons, and tactical exercises. At the same time, the company commanders and platoon leaders were taken forward to visit the positions which they were to occupy. On 12 Oct both companies began a two-day exercise based on the attack which 22e R. had made on Hill 222 and nearby features a short time before (A.H.Q. [Report No. 62](#), para 242). Two days later "A" and "C" Coys 1 P.P.C.L.I. relieved "D" and "C" Coys 2 P.P.C.L.I. respectively, occupying positions which the latter two companies had taken a few days previously in Operation "COMMANDO" (ibid: paras 255, 256). Approximately two weeks later, it may be recalled "A" Coy, 1 P.P.C.L.I., was committed to action in Operation "PEPPERPOT" (ibid: para 260).

17. "D" and "H.Q." Coys, with Battalion Headquarters, sailed from Seattle on 9 Oct on the U.S.N.S. Marine Adder. They followed -much the same course as the first companies, except that the Marine Adder, after docking at Yokohama to disembark U.S. Army reinforcements, carried the Canadians to Inchon, the port of Seoul, which they reached on 29 Oct. From Inchon the group traveled by rail to Tokchon, and was lifted in trucks to the reception centre. At 1000 hours on 4 Nov 51, 1 P.P.C.L.I. replaced 2 P.P.C.L.I. on the order of battle of 25 Cdn Inf Bde,⁷ "D" Coy of the former unit relieving the latter unit's "B" Coy. Next day Lt-Gen James A. Van Fleet, Commanding General Eighth U.S. Army, inspected a detachment from 2 P.P.C.L.I. and congratulated the unit on its excellent record in Korea. Six days later, "B" and "Sp" Coys, 1 P.P.C.L.I., which had sailed on the U.S.N.S. General Hugh T. Gaffey, relieved "A" and "Sp" Coys 2 P.P.C.L.I., and trio last sub-units of 2 P.P.C.L.I. withdrew from the line of battle.

18. It is fitting, at this point, to include a few words of farewell to 2 P.P.C.L.I. As a partially trained unit, it had left Seattle on 25 Nov 50 to take its place in the victorious Eighth U.S. Army (A.H.Q. [report No. 62](#), para 81). On the very day the unit sailed, this same Army was approaching the abyss of a disastrous defeat, in whose wrack and confusion 2 P.P.C.L.I. had to complete its organization and training (ibid: paras 114, 120-124). This was done in much less time than had originally been allotted (ibid: paras 81, 124); thereafter the unit served with distinction at the front, winning a Presidential Citation in the heavy fighting of the Chinese offensive of April 1951 (ibid: paras 149 to 161). Out of approximately 1000 originals, only 400 odd had been replaced (para 13 above). In other words, more than half the members of the unit had been through it all together. Now this close association was to be broken, for discharges, postings, promotions and such like were to ensure that the unit which gradually re-assembled at Currie Barracks did not contain many of the originals of 1950. However, it would be an error to suppose that these men had, except in a limited

⁶ Map

⁷ At Appx "A" & "B" are Tables showing all rotations of units in Korea.

sense, left the unit. They had done their full duty at all levels of leadership and service; their works were permanently embodied in the regimental tradition.

19. It would also appear desirable, in concluding this account of the first phase of the rotation programme, to recall briefly what the change meant in the Canadian Army as a whole. As we have seen (A.H.Q. [Report No. 62](#), paras 34 to 41, 97 to 100). the units of the Special Force had not originally been given a very high status in the regular army of which they legally formed a part. They were, in fact, regarded as temporary additions to the Active Force, to be disbanded on conclusion of what was then considered to be a transient requirement for their services (Ibid: para 40). The members of the new units had accordingly been enlisted for short periods, under lower standards (ibid: para 45). In addition, provision was made for Special Force recruits who served, in the Far East to be granted rehabilitation benefits to assist them in their return to civilian life (ibid). As time went on, however, it became apparent that the new units were fated to remain in the Active Force for a somewhat longer time than had at first seemed likely, The intention to disband the new units "after the crisis" was tacitly dropped, and a more or less abortive attempt was made to engage the Special Force enlistees under Active Force terms of service (ibid: paras 97 to 100). The replacement of 2 P.P.C.L.I. by 1 P.P.C.L.I. represented a further - and final - development in the status of the new units, which in future were to be regarded as equal in all respects to the original units of the Active Force. A bit of military-legal bookkeeping symbolized this change when 1 P.P.C.L.I. Was embodied⁸ in the Special Force CD with effect 29 Sep 51 (Supplements to C.A.Os, Issue No. 260 of 1951). 2 P.P.C.L.I. ceased to be embodied in the Force with effect 1 Jan 52 (ibid: Issue No. 283 of 1952), and was stationed in Currie Barracks, Calgary.

Further Planning - The Shortage of Infantrymen

20. While this move of 1 P.P.C.L.I. was taking place, the planning of the remainder of the rotation programme continued at Army Headquarters. It proved to be a difficult task. At the outset, it had been apparent that the assembling of enough soldiers to complete the rotation of all the infantry units would not be a simple matter (para 7 above), Between August and December the course of events - and four developments in particular -created difficulties which appeared, on first examination at least, to be insuperable. In the first place, the requirement that two and one-half battalions were to be kept in the Mobile Striking Force had roughly tripled the original estimate of the number of infantry soldiers which would have to-be provided for the direct defence of Canada (para 11 above), Then, in 3eptember, the recruiting rate began to fall sharply⁹ and during October and November depressingly small numbers of Special Force soldiers indicated an intention to engage in the Active Force (H.Q.S. 2840-1, vol 2: Nominal Rolls of Troops Returning from the Far East, Showing Intention as to 1. Engagement in the

⁸ Units were embodied in the special Force to qualify members for benefits under the Veteran's Charter, P.C. 5412 of 8 Nov 50 having designated the Special Force a "Special Force" within the terms of paragraph 7 of the Canadian Forces Act, 1950 (see also A.H.Q. [Report No. 62](#), para 56).

⁹ Intake of men for August 1951 was 1157, for September, 943 and for October 783 (A.G. Liaison Letters, Nos. 16, 17 and 18 which are attached as Appendices "A-7", "A-7" and "A-3" respectively to the A.G. Hist Record for August, September and October 1951.

A.F.). Events in Korea, where 2 R. 22e R, suffered heavy casualties in November (A.H.Q, [Report No. 62](#).. paras 263, 264). increased the gloom of an already dismal situation. The effect of all these influences¹⁰ was to create a shortage of infantrymen available for service in Korea, and their shortage was so acute as to threaten the successful continuation of the rotation programme.

21. The gravity of the situation was realized at least as early as 21 Sep 51. In a memorandum of that date the V.A.G. Brigadier J.W. Bishop, O.B.E., referred to discussions with the Director of Organization on the possible reinstatement of manpower controls, and requested D. Org to have tables compiled showing the strengths of all units of the Army in Canada, so that the C.G.S. might himself study the manpower situation in detail (A.G. Hist Record, September 1951, Appx "A-6": V.A.G. to D. Org, 21 Sep 51). On 27 Oct 51, Brigadier Bishop submitted a memorandum to the C.G.S. outlining the manpower position, and suggesting measures which might be taken to improve it. He followed this, a few days later, with a paper in which he proposed raising the three para company groups¹¹ for the direct defence of Canada from the R.C.D., Ld S.H. (R.C.) and units of the services (ibid, October 1951, Appx "A-2": V.A.G. to C.G.S., 29 Oct 51).

22. The most serious aspect of the problem, of course., was the shortage of infantrymen, particularly in the first and third battalions of the R.C.R. and the R. 22e R, During the latter part of October, it began to appear that the two battalions of the R.C.R. would be 527 men short of meeting their commitments to the end of May 1952, while the battalions of the R. 22e R. would lack 817 men, In addition, it was calculated that., even if these prospective deficiencies were made up, the problem would continue to exist, since the three regiments would require a total of 450 men per month for rotation and reinforcement after May - and recruiting had never exceeded 250 per month in 1950 and 1951 except during special recruiting drives (11.0.,S. 2840-1. vol 2: A/D. Org to A.G. and D,G,A,P,,, 31 Oct 51).

23. In the first part of November, the C.G.S. had a discussion with the V.C.G.S., D.G.A.P., and V.A.G. on means of improving the manpower position. In his preliminary remarks the C.G.S. ruled out any possibility of the Government agreeing to conscription, and rejected the V.A.G.'s suggestion that the para company groups be formed from other arms and services. The final decisions taken during this meeting, as recorded by the V.A.G., fall into three categories: the first aimed at increasing the numbers recruited into the infantry, the second at reducing the wastage rate and the third devoted to more efficient employment of the infantry at hand. Included in this last class were such projects as requesting ministerial authority to dispense with the supplement of 150 to the para companies, reducing the training nucleus of the third battalions from 247 to approximately 100, returning fit infantrymen to regimental duty from employment as mess waiters, runners,, batmen and so forth, and lowering the number held as reinforcements in Japan (A.G, Hist Record, November 1951, Appx "A-211: V.A.G. to D. Org, 10 Nov 51).

¹⁰ Actually, casualties in Korea did not turn out to be so heavy as to aggravate seriously the shortage of infantry. However there was no guarantee at the time of the rotation planning that this would be the case.

¹¹ The para company plus the supplement of 150.

24. On 11 Dec 51, the arrangements for rotation were formally published in an Adjutant-General Instruction. They differed in one respect only from those for the rotation of 2 P.P.C.L.I. Unlike the companies of 1 P.P.C.L.I., which went to Korea at full strength, the companies of 1 R.C.R. and 1 R. 22e R. were to be dispatched at a strength equal to the number of men eligible for rotation in the companies being relieved. On arrival these companies were to take on strength all the men in the second battalions who had not completed their service in Korea (H.Q.S. 2840-1, vol 1: A.G.Is 522 of 11 Dec 51).

25. The timetable for rotation which was submitted to the C.G.S. spread the movement of sub-units to Korea over three months, from mid-February until the middle of May, The C.G.S. directed that the departure of infantry be delayed until the last moment, and the relief of the infantry battalions concluded in as short a time as possible. As a result, the final timetable which was appended to the Instruction reduced the time allotted for rotation to two months, from early March until early May (ibid, vol 3: V.C.G.S. to A.G. 10 Nov 51; Tel Org 374, D. Org to H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 14 Nov 51, para 5; Appx "C" to A.G.I. 522). Although some correspondence, clarifying comparatively minor details of the programme, followed publication of the Instruction, it may safely be said that A.G.I. 522 set the pattern for the first rotation of Canadian soldiers in Korea and Japan. It did not, however, substantially affect the main problem - that of finding sufficient infantrymen to make rotation possible.

26. Toward the end of December, the infantry situation was reviewed again. The results were more heartening. 1 R.C.R. was shown as being capable of finding sufficient men to complete the relief of the second battalion, although 1 R. 22e R. promised to be 212 men short of meeting its commitment in respect of 2 R. 22e R. (ibid, vol 2- A/D. Org to V.A.G., 22 Dec 51). It should be noted that this survey did not take the provision of normal reinforcements into account along with requirements for rotation, nor did it deduct non-effectives from the strengths given. Had this last been done, 1 R.C.R. would have been shown as approximately 100 men short, and 1 R. 22e R. as deficient 300.

27. Late in December the V.A.G. reviewed the situation with the C.G.S., and records the latter as agreeing to the non-effectives being charged against the para company groups (ibid: V.A.G. for A.G. to C.G.S., 26 Dec 51; V.A.G. to D. Org, 26 Dec 51). This decision made it possible to consider 1 R.C.R. as solvent from the manpower point of view, and reduced the deficiency of 1 R. 22e R. from 300 to 200. The C.G.S. suggested that the deficiency might be further reduced by obtaining volunteers for para training from Frenchspeaking units of other arms. Soon afterward, the V.A.G. discussed Gen Simonds' proposal with G.O.C. Quebec Command, Maj-Gen J.P.E. Bernatchez, C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D. The latter agreed to appeal to units in his Command for voluntary transfers to 1 R. 22e R. (A.G. Hist Record, December 1951, Appx "A-16": V.A.G. to C.G.S., 27 Dec 51). Subsequently, D. Inf drew up plans for expediting the basic and advanced training of personnel in both battalions of the R. 22e R. who needed such training, to fit as many of the available men as possible for service with the first battalion (H.Q.S. 2840-1, vol 2: D. Inf to D.G.M.T., 15 Jan 52). As will appear subsequently (para 29 below), these and similar measures succeeded in assembling sufficient men to make it possible for 1 R. 22e R. to replace 2 R. 22e R., though it was not possible to maintain reinforcements (para 30 below).

Completion of the First Rotation

28. The work of preparing 1 R.C.R. and 1 R. 22e R. for rotation with the second battalions in Korea began in January 1952 ((H.S.) 145.2R13013 (D4): "Interview with Lt-Col P.R.. Bingham, 1 R.C.R., 14 May 52," paras 2, 3 and 4; (H.S.) 41OB25.013 (D 19): "Interview with Lt-Col L.F. Trudeau, D.S.O., C.D., 1 R. 22e R., 15 Aug 52." paras 5 and 6), In both cases, the preparations followed similar courses. There were, to begin with, considerable numbers of reinforcements to be absorbed. 1 R.C.R. increased its posted strength from 664 to 946 between 2 Jan and 31 Jan 52 (W.D., 1 R.C.R., January 1952, Appx "5": "Str Returns for 2 and 31 Jan 52"). 1 R. 22e R. accepted approximately 420 reinforcements early in the new year (Interview with Lt-Col Trudeau, paras 6 and 7).

29. Along with this reinforcement went extensive reorganizations and vigorous training programmes, the latter hampered by very low temperatures and heavy snowfalls in the training areas, as well as by the interruptions occasioned by the mass of administrative detail which required attention (W.D., 1 R.C.R., January to March 1952; W.D., 1 Re 22e R.. February and March 1952; Interview with Lt-Col Trudeau, paras 6 to 8). In spite of these difficulties, the work went ahead, and shortly after the middle of March the first companies left Petawawa and Valcartier for Korea (W.D. 1 R.C.R., 15 Mar 52; H.Q.S. 2840-1, vol 3: Tel A.G. 2232., Canarmy to 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 28 Mar 52). 1 Re 22e Re, under command of Lt-Col L.F. Trudeau D.S.O., C.D., took over from 2 R. 22e R. on 24 Apr (W.D., 1 Re 22e R., April 1952., Appx "8"; "Extract from Ops Log"), and 1 R.C.R. replaced 2 R.C.R. the following day (W.D., 1 R.C.R., April 1952, Appx "D/4": Comd 25 Cdn Inf Bde to B.M.). At the time of this latter relief, Maj F. Klenavic, the Second-in-Command, was acting as Commanding Officer, Lt-Col P.R. Bingham having been injured in a training accident a few days before (*ibid*: 14 and 25 Apr 52), 1 R. 22e R., replaced all companies of the second battalion, absorbing the men who were not yet eligible for rotation (Interview with Lt-Col Trudeau, paras 9 to 12). 1 R.C.R., however, replaced the headquarters and support companies of the second battalion, as well as two rifle companies, "B" and "D" Coys. "A" and "C" Coys 2 R.C.R., composed mainly of men of the second battalion who had not yet served their year in Korea, were absorbed by the first battalion, which provided the officers and non-commissioned officers for the two companies (W. D., 1 R.C.R., 16, 17 and 23 Apr 52; Appx "M/13" and "O/15": W.Ds. for April 1952 of "A" and "C" Coys respectively).

30. Bringing 1 R. 22e R. up to the required strength had taken all the trained - and even some of the better partially-trained - soldiers from the third battalion. Until more reinforcements were ready, it would not be possible to replace the 180 men transferred from the reinforcement group in Japan to 2 Re 22e R. as replacements for the volunteers for para training. (paras 11, 12 above) The V.A.G. pointed out this fact to the V.C.G.S., on 5 Mar (H.Q.S., 2840-1, vol 3: V.A.G. to V.C.G.S. 5 Mar 52); subsequently the General Staff ruled that 1 R. 22e R. could operate below establishment strength if necessary, and that reinforcements for 1 R.C.R. and 1 P.P.C.L.I. would be diverted to the unit in the event of an emergency (*ibid*: A/C.G.S. to A.G., 21 Mar 52). At the end of March, the authorized reinforcement holdings in Japan were reduced to six officers and 162 men of the R.C.I.C, (*ibid*: S.D. 1 Letter No. 4440, 29 Mar 52). There is no evidence in the sources available that this restriction was

made to ease the manpower shortage, but it is clear that the new arrangement would have this effect, whatever the reason for its adoption.

31. The second phase of the rotation programme was largely completed in April and early May. In general, the progress of the sub-units to the front resembled that of the 1 P.P.C.L.I. companies, except that these later arrivals passed through Britannia Camp, the 1 Comwel Div transit camp, their numbers being too great for an echelon arrangement, such as had been used for 1 P.P.C.L.I., to handle. 23 Tpt Coy, under command of Maj J.I. Dolan, took over from 54 Cdn Tpt Coy on 11 Apr (W.D., 23 Tpt Coy, 11 Apr 52). Following the rotation of 2 R.C.R. and 2 R. 22e R., 37 Fd Amb, under Lt-Col C.B. Caswell M.C., replaced 25 Cdn Fd Amb on 27 Apr (W.D. 37 Fd Amb, 27 Apr 52). In May, 23 Fd Sqn under Maj E.T. Galway M.C., G.M. relieved 57 Cdn Indep Fd Sqn on the third of the month (B.D.F. M.O. 8-4, vol 1: Tel G. 190, H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde to D.M.O. & P.), and three days later 1 R.C.H.A., commanded by Lt-Col E.T.T.D. McNaughton¹² C.D., replaced 2 R.C.H.A. (W.D., 1 R.C.H.A., 6 May 52). The last unit to leave Korea was "C" Sqn LdS.H. (R.C.), which was relieved by "B" Sqn under Maj J.S. Roxborough on 8 Jun¹³ (Monthly Summary., No, 21).

32. Command of the brigade changed on 27 Apr, when Brigadier M.P. Bogert, D.S.O., O.B.E., C.D., replaced Brigadier Rockingham (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, April 1952: Appx 11411: Ops Log entry for 27 Apr 52). In June, the retiring commander was created a Companion of the Order of the Bath, in recognition of his service in the raising, training and fighting of the brigade (P.N. 90-52).¹⁴ His successor was no stranger to command of a brigade in the field. A career soldier, Brigadier Bogert had joined The Royal Canadian Regiment before the Second World War. He commanded The West Nova Scotia Regiment in Sicily and Italy, being promoted brigadier in October 1944 and posted to command of 2 Cdn Inf Bde. Following the war, Brigadier Bogert held a number of staff appointments, the last prior to his assuming command of 25 Cdn Inf Bde being that of Director General of Military Training in Army Headquarters (P.N. 26-52).

OPERATIONS 1 APR - 30 JUN 52, GUARD DUTY ON KOJE ISLAND.

Astride the Sami-ch'on, 1-19 Apr 52

33. Turning now to the general tactical situation in Korea immediately prior to these reliefs, we see that, as of 1 Apr 52, the front line lay well north of the 38th parallel, except in the extreme West.¹⁵ Here it descended below the parallel to the area of the Han-Imjin junction. From this point, the line ran practically due north-east, curving around north of Chorwon and continuing east to Kumwha. This

¹² This officer changed his surname to Leslie on 20 Mar 53.

¹³ At Appx "A" & "B" are Tables showing all unit rotations in Korea and Japan.

¹⁴ At Appx "D" is a Table showing Honours and Awards given for service in the Korean conflict.

¹⁵ See Map "1"

centre lay on the western flank of a salient, approximately 20 miles in width, which rose almost to Kumsong, From the eastern flank of this salient the front curved upward to positions on the east coast north of Chodo-ri. (G-3 Ops Report No 647, Incl "I")

34. This line, it will be recalled, had been reached in the course of the U.N. advances which followed the Chinese attacks of April and May 1951.¹⁶ By mid-June of the same year., these advances had reached Chorwon in the west-central sector. Thereafter the entire front came to rest for over two months, during part of which time 25 Cdn Inf Bde patrolled the Chorwon plains. Then, in September and early October, further limited advances were made in various sectors; an enemy salient in the "WYOMING" line was reduced and the "JAMESTOWN" line established in the I U.S. Corps front at that time. During the latter part of October and the first part of November the Chinese reacted rather strongly to some of these advances and forced adjustments in the line reached.¹⁷ By the end of November, however, the forward defended localities had been stabilized on a line substantially the same as that described in the preceding paragraph. The front, in other words, had not changed to any important extent in four months. As far as 1 Comwel Div was concerned., it was destined to remain unchanged until the end of the fighting in Korea.

35. Meanwhile, representatives of the opposing supreme commanders had been meeting at Panmunjom for nearly nine months, in an attempt to negotiate an armistice (paras 263 to 274 below). Although these negotiations had not resulted in a settlement, and earlier hopes for an end to the fighting had consequently abated somewhat, the public utterances of the leading figures involved did not contain any suggestion that either side was prepared to abandon negotiations in favour of an attempt to settle the Korean question by force of arms, At the same time it was made equally clear that neither side would abandon the field to the other. Thus, as this narrative opens, the soldiers of both armies in Korea faced the prospect of a more or less indefinite continuation of the sort of action they had experienced since the latter part of November 1951.

36. During these four months the pattern of future operations in Korea - at least those of 1 Comwel Div - had begun to emerge, Already defensive layouts were assuming forms which were to remain substantially unchanged for months on end. Battalions had begun to move into areas which they had already occupied previously. As far as the term may safely be used of active operations, the struggle was becoming routine and monotonous. There were to be no long movements, no great concentrations for large operations, no deep penetrations of the enemy's front no "victory" - nothing, in short, of the - great events which occur in a general war.

¹⁶ The summary of the manner in which the final line was established in Korea is based on the G-3 Ops Reports for the period 1 Jun 51 - 1 Apr 52 (Nos 434 to 647). See also A.H.Q. [Report No. 62](#), Maps "8", "10", "11".

¹⁷ From our point of view, the most important of these was the loss of Hills 217 (1621) and 317 (1722), which is discussed in para 45 below.

37. Most important of all, the termination of the conflict rested more in the hands of the negotiators at Panmunjom than in the courage and military skill of the soldiers. The extent to which a realization of this fact had permeated the minds of the commanders and soldiers in Korea cannot be measured. It seems reasonable to suppose, however, that it was present to some extent, and its effect on operations can be readily imagined.

38. The relief of the infantry battalions and other fighting units began around the middle of April and followed closely on a change in 1 Comwel Div's front. During the first part of April, however, the situation described in the final paragraphs of A.H.Q. [Report No. 62](#) still existed. The division had two battalions forward west of the Sami-ch'on and four in the front line east of that river. The right-hand battalion lay up against Hill 355, and the divisional boundary skirted to the south of this dominating feature, 25 and 28 Bdes were in the line on the left and right respectively, while 29 Bde was in reserve.¹⁸

39. Within 25 Bde,¹⁹ 2 R.C.R., 1 P.P.C.L.I. and 2 R. 22e R. were forward, the valley of the Sami-ch'on separating 1 P.P.C.L.I. in the centre from 2 R. 22e R. on the right. 28 Bde²⁰ also had three battalions forward, with 1 K.O.S.B. left, 1 K.S.L.I. centre and 3 R.A.R. right. One company of this last unit was on the saddle between Hill 355 and Point 227, the position in which "D" Coy 2 R. 22e R. had fought its heavy defensive engagement in November 1951 (A.H.Q. [Report No. 62](#), paras 263, 264).

40. The problems to be faced in recording the conduct of this stalemated half-war will be discussed subsequently. At this point it is sufficient to say that the final portion of 1 Comwel Div's operations astride the Sami-ch'on did not contain any important action. As we have seen, the latter part of March produced one sharp brush with the enemy, when a platoon of 1 P.P.C.L.I. defeated an attack on its position near what was to be called the "HOOK" feature (A.H.Q., [Report No 62](#), para 266). By contrast with March, the first part of April was quiet, though patrol action continued. On the night 5/6 Apr an unknown number of enemy attacked "A" Coy 1 K.O.S.B. from the south, under cover of heavy artillery fire. The attack succeeded in penetrating the wire of the left forward platoon but was driven off (W.D., 1 P.P.C.L.I., April 1952, Appx "6": "1 Comwel Div Periodic Ops Report", Nos 498 and 500). Three nights later an ambush patrol of one officer and 13 men from 2 R. 22e R., established at 123125

¹⁸ See Map "3".

¹⁹ Positions given for units of 25 Cdn Inf Bde as of 1 Apr 52 are based on a location map issued on 14 Mar 52 (W.D., 1 P.P.C.L.I., March 1952, Appx "20": "25 Cdn Inf Bde Unit Disposns and Loc State, 14 Mar 52"), amended to show the important changes recorded in unit diaries as having taken place during the period 14-31 Mar 51. Only one change additional to those shown on the map was noted - the shift to a position at 190100 of a platoon of "D" Coy 2 R.C.R. (W.D., 2 R.C.R., 31 Mar 52).

²⁰ Positions given for units of 28 Britcom Inf Bde as of 1 Apr 52 are based on a location map issued by H.Q. 1 Comwel Div on 11 Mar 52 (W.D., 1 P.P.C.L.I., March 1952, Appx "7": "1 Comwel Div Periodic Ops Report", No. 448, Trace "P"). No major changes in the dispositions shown reports for March (ibid: "1 comwel Div Periodic Ops Report", Nos 450 to 488).

on a track which ran across the river flats in front of the battalion, was attacked by an enemy group estimated to be 40 strong. The patrol was surrounded but succeeded in extricating itself at a cost of four casualties., all wounded. One prisoner, who subsequently died of wounds, was brought in, and the patrol reported 15 casualties inflicted on the enemy during the encounter. (W.D., 2 R. 22e R., 8 and 9 Apr 52)

41. At the same time the weather began to change, as the miseries of the Korean winter gave way to the discomforts and hardships of the Korean spring. The soft snows of March dissolved into frequent heavy rains. The mud became even worse in April than it had been during the previous month, Roofs of dugouts collapsed; streams coursed across the floors of mess tents, and the roads became practically impassible. Then, as the rains ended, choking dust began to fill the air.²¹

Operation "WESTMINSTER", 15 to 19 Apr 52

42. Between 15 and 19 Apr 52, 1 Comwel Div's sector of the "JAMESTOWN" line was altered in two important respects. As a result of these changes, which were completed at midnight on the latter date, the division surrendered responsibility for the area west of the Sami-ch'on to 1 U.S. Marine Div and accepted responsibility from 3 U.S. Inf Div for Hill 355. (G-3 Ops Report, Nos 661, 665; 1 Comwel Div: Diary of Op Events 15 Feb - 30 Jun 52, p. 5) This was the second major adjustment in the division's boundaries. Initially i.e. in Operation "COMMANDO"--the division had captured and held the sector between the Sami-ch'on and the Injin river. In November it shifted west across the Sami-ch'on, to the sector it was holding at the beginning of this narrative. The adjustment completed on 19 Apr returned the formation to what was practically its original sector. Here it was destined to stay until November 1952; at that time its front was extended 'o the left, to include one battalion area west of the Sami-ch'on. This proved to be the last major change in the division's boundaries, and July 1953 found it still in the same sector.²²

43. Operation "WESTMINSTER", as the second adjustment of the division's boundaries was called, involved a complicated series of moves, On 15 Apr, two battalions of 1 Marine Regt relieved 2 R.C.R, and 1 P.P.C.L.I. west of the Sarni-ch'on. The latter two units then moved to areas on the right of 2 R. 22e R., whose frontage was restricted by one company locality. 2 R.C.R. took up positions next to 2 R. 22e R., and 1 P.P.C.L.I. occupied the battalion area on the brigade's new right flank. 29 Brit Inf Bde then took over in the right brigade's sector; this, as we have seen, had been extended north-east to include the Hill 355 area, (Ibid; W.D.I P.P.C.L.I., April 1952, Appx "6": "1 Comwel Div Periodic Ops Report"., No. 516., Trace "P").

²¹ This general description is based on scattered statements in the brigade and unit War Diaries for the last week of May and the first half of April 1952.

²² Map "17" is a diagrammatic representation of the divisional front from October 1951 to July 1953. Map "4" gives details of the front on completion of "WESTMINSTER".

44. A comparison of the Canadian brigade's new layout (shown in Map 11411) with that adopted on conclusion of Operation "COMMANDO" (A.H.Q. [Report No. 62](#), Map "8") shows a certain similarity. The brigade's frontage had been somewhat more extended in October 1952, having included Hill 159 (1417), and each battalion area had been correspondingly larger. Both 2 R. 22e R. and 2 R.C.R., however, held substantially the same areas they had held five months earlier, and the 1 P.P.C.L.I. area was much the same as that taken over from 2 P.P.C.L.I. As we have noted, this periodic return to familiar sectors and areas was to characterize the moves of 25 Cdn Inf Bde and, of course, those of the other two brigades until the end of active operations in Korea. (A.HeQ9 [Report No. 62](#), Map "8") "1 Comwel Div Periodic Ops Report", No. 516, Trace "P").

45. A comparison of the right brigade sector as shown in Map 11411 with that occupied during "COMMANDO" (AHQ [Report No. 62](#), Map "8") reveals that there were some differences between the original front line and the one held in April 1952. On conclusion of Operation "COMMANDO" the division's front had included Hills 217 (1621) and 317 (1722) and had stretched north-east to the Imjin. On conclusion of "WESTMINSTER" the line of the forward defended localities ran close to Hill 355 Hills 217 and 317 having been lost to the enemy some time before.²³ In addition the division's front extended only some 2000 yards beyond Hill 355, the remainder of the line running north-east to the Imjin being held by 3 U.S. Inf Div. 29 Bde held its sector with 1 R. LEICESTEIRS on Hill 159, and 1 WELCH in the Hill 355 area. 1 R. NORFOLK lay behind 1 WELCH, facing north on the valley which formed the boundary between the Commonwealth and U.S. Army formations, (Ibid; "Comwel Div: Periodic Report, 15 Feb - 30 Jun 52-.Map "A")

46. 28 Britcom Inf Bde, which had been replaced by 29 Brit Inf Bde in the line during "WESTMINSTER", was in reserve on "WYOMING", with 1 K.O.S.B. left, 1 K.S.L.I. centre and 3 R.A.R. right. The Imjin river, with the "KANSAS" positions along its south bank, lay in rear. The divisional rear headquarters, the echelons and some engineer units lay south of the river, but the greater part-of 1 Comwel Div was north of the Imjin. (Ibid)

47. A few days after "WESTMINSTER" ended, the reliefs of 2 R. 22e R. and 2 R.C.R. took place. These were followed by the other reliefs which have already been recorded (paras 29 and 31 above). The enemy did not complicate the handovers by any especially vigorous activity, with the result that the new units were given a chance to settle in without serious interruption. On 28 Apr, a farewell dinner was given for Brigadier Rockingham at the brigade headquarters officers' mess. An account of this function indicates the importance of the occasion, and shows the amenities which the officers had

²³ Details surrounding the loss of these two features are not available. Their loss may have had some tactical importance, since H.Q. 1 Comwel Div later stated "The commonwealth Division thus found itself (at the end of 1951) on the defensive, but not on ground of its own choosing" (H.S.) 681.013 (D59): "The Commonwealth Division and the Defensive Battle 1951-1953", para 13). This statement could well refer to Hills 217 and 317, though it is not certain that it does so. The whole question of the operations conducted during the latter part of October and the first part of November 1951 requires further elucidation when divisional-level sources become available.

succeeded in providing for themselves, in spite of the harsh and comfortless character of the country in which they were serving.

...The food arranged for and set up by our own RCASC, and purchased for the most part in Japan was beautiful as well as tastefully prepared. Pink blossoms, literally from the hills of our own back yard, gave the buffet tent a noticeable delicateness of appearance that drew surprising remarks from high and low. Even a serving-table centerpiece was present - a large glass bowl electrically lighted from behind, and filled with water that sported swimming filth which if not of the brightest golden variety, at least came from a superior school of minnow. (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 28 Apr 52)

48. During May and June several changes worthy of record took place in units outside the Canadian brigade. 1 R.A.R., which had arrived in Korea in April, became operational on 1 Jun and joined 28 Britcom Inf Bde as a fourth battalion. On 27 Jun an Australian senior officer, Brigadier T.J. Daly, D.S.O., O.B.E., relieved Brigadier J.F.M. Macdonald, D.S.O., O.B.E., in command of this same brigade. In 29 Brit Inf Bde, 1 R. LEICESTERS was relieved by 1st Battalion, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) (1 B.W.) on 24/25 Jun. In H.Q. 1 Comwel Div, Lt-Col Danby was relieved as G.S.O. I by Lt-Col Wilson-Smith, who was in turn relieved as C.O. 1 P.P.C.L.I. by Lt-Col J.R. Cameron (W.D., 1 P.P.C.L.I. 1 May 52). One other Canadian was added to the staff of the divisional headquarters when Col G.L.M. Smith, O.B.E., C.D. became Assistant Director of Medical Services. (1 Comwel Div: Periodic Report, 15 Feb - 30 Jun 52., paras 6. 7 and 9)

Operation "BUCKINGHAM"

49. The planning which goes on constantly at all headquarters within a division may be likened to an iceberg, in that a relatively small proportion of it comes to the public eye. Along with plans for operations which are actually mounted - and thus attract attention to the plans on which they are based - goes a great deal of planning for operations which are never mounted, and of precautionary planning against emergencies which do not arise. In this Report, as in its predecessor, only passing attention has been paid to this latter sort of planning, though it forms an important and, in certain tactical situations, even a major part of the work of the headquarters within a division. In view of this fact, it would not seem amiss to devote some space at this point to Operation "BUCKINGHAM", as an example of detailed precautionary planning which, fortunately in this case, was never put into execution. A further reason for considering "BUCKINGHAM" is that detailed planning for it was the first task given the new infantry battalions, and their subsequent activities were affected to an important extent by work arising from this planning.

50. Operation "BUCKINGHAM" was the code-word used within 1 Comwel Div in reference to the overall plan for the re-occupation of lines "WYOMING" and "KANSAS", in the event of a withdrawal from "JAMESTOWN" being ordered.²⁴ The sources available do not contain much information on the development of the plan at divisional level, nor do they describe the higher-level plan on which the divisional plan was based. However a set of the plans produced by H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, complete to April 1952, is at hand, and an account of the evolution of the plan at brigade level is therefore possible. 51. The plan for Operation "BUCKINGHAM" issued by brigade headquarters on 23 Apr 52 was the successor to six previous versions, the first of which was issued, as Operation "WATERLOO", on 21 Sep 51.²⁵ In September 1951, the Brigade had just occupied a sector of and "WATERLOO" provided for a withdrawal to "KANSAS". A revision of "WATERLOO", issued on 16 Oct 51 after the "JAMESTOWN" line had been reached gave the plan for re-occupation of "WYOMING" and "KANSAS". In a further revision, dated 2 Dec 51, the name of the scheme was changed to "BUCKINGHAM", the re-occupation of "WYOMING" being called "BALMORAL", that of "KANSAS", "WINDSOR". These names were retained in four succeeding versions; the fourth - that of 23 Apr 52 - is the one with which this narrative is now concerned.

52. In this Instruction, it was made clear that the withdrawal envisaged was a planned one, with the adjacent divisions conforming. A withdrawal in the case of the division's being heavily engaged by the enemy was to be governed by a new set of orders. 28 Britcom Inf Bde, when relieved by 25 Cdn Inf Bde on "WYOMING", was to occupy positions in the area of the two bridges - "TEAL" and

²⁴ W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, February 1953, Appx "59": "File Strippings H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde" contains one operational instruction from H.Q. 1 Comwel Div on the divisional withdrawal plan (1 Comwel Div Op Instr No. 54, 9 Oct 52), together with several lists of divisional operational instructions, which lists contain references to operation "BUCKINGHAM". In addition, the withdrawal plans of some formations and units within the division are included. This material shows clearly that "BUCKINGHAM" was the divisional code-word for the withdrawal plan in April 1952 and had been so for some time previously.

²⁵ These plans are held as follows:

- (a) W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, September 1951, Appx "5": "25 Cdn Inf Bde Op Instr No 9, Op WATERLOO", 21 Sep 51.
- (b) Ibid, October 1951, Appx "8": "25 Cdn Inf Bde Op Instr No 10, Op WATERLOO", 16 Oct 51.
- (c) Ibid, December 1951, Appx "4": "25 Cdn Inf Bde Instr No 12.. Op BUCKINGHAM", 2 Dec 51.
- (d) Ibid. January, 1952, Appx "5": "25 Cdn Inf Bde Op Instr No 18, Op BUCKINGHAM", 8 Jan 52.
- (e) Ibid: "25 Cdn Inf Bde Op Instr No 22., Op BUCKINGHAM", 26 Jan 52.
- (f) Ibid., March 1952, Appx "8": "25 Cdn Inf Bde Op Instr No 27, Op BUCKINGHAM", 10 Mar 52.
- (g) Ibid, April 1952 Appx "9": "25 Cdn Inf Bde Op Instr No 33., Op BUCKINGHAM", 23 Apr 52.

"PINTAIL" - on the Imjin, presumably to defend these important structures from infiltrating enemy groups. Battalion areas on each line were prescribed, with routes, timings and so forth²⁶ In addition, the infantry battalions were responsible for producing detailed plans for occupation of the areas, and for preparation of positions within the areas, two activities which were to occupy a good part of their time while this particular order was in effect (1 R.C.R., 1 P.P.C.L.I., 1 R. 22e R., 24-30 Apr 52, May and June 1952).

Remarks on the Treatment of 1 Comwel Div's Defensive Operations

53. By April 1952, the line of the forward defended localities in 1 Comwel Div's sector had remained unchanged for some five months; the division, and the Chinese facing it, were both conducting rather cautious defensive operations. Occasional sharp contacts occurred here and there along the front, but these were local and comparatively short-lived. For long periods, the front was quiet. This situation was to continue unchanged during the remainder of the fighting in Korea.

54. Canadian troops, it will be recalled, had been committed to action in Korea in mid-February 1951. By the first part of October in the same year, they had begun their tenure of "real estate" on the "JATMESTOOWN" line., a tenure fated to last until July 1953. The Canadians, in other words, were to spend 22 of their 30 months of fighting in Korea in the defence.

55. Though not so spectacular as the earlier operations of 1950, this protracted defence is not without its interest, at least to the professional soldier. Such aspects of the defence as layout and the associated field defences and fire plans at once command attention, together with such activities as patrolling and counter-attacks. These subjects will be covered as thoroughly as available sources permit. It might be well, in view of limits imposed by lack of information, to indicate generally how each has been handled.

56. Layout may be disposed of briefly. The successive patterns adopted by the division are shown in the attached maps. The tactical reasons for the layouts adopted are not given in available sources, However a retrospective discussion of the question is included in the final portion of the report (paras 196 to 199 below).

57. The comparatively flimsy field defences with which the division began its operations on "JAMESTOWN" were not developed to any important extent in the central sector. The ones which existed there towards the end of the war are described in the final portion of the Report, in the passages which deal with the attack on 13 R.C.R. (paras 191 to 214 below). on the left and right flanks, however, much stronger defences were developed, under the stimulus of the constantly-increasing enemy fire. Canadians took an important part in this work, and their efforts are described in the paragraphs dealing with the operations of December 1952 and January 1953 (paras 155 to 166 below) These two passages together give a reasonably complete picture of the field defences used by 1 Comwel Div throughout its active operations in Korea.

²⁶ Shown in Map "5".

58. Plans for counter-attacks at corps, division, brigade and battalion level existed. As far as the Canadians were concerned, the highest level on which attacks of this type were mounted was the unit level; these are described in some detail. The plans for counter-attacks on higher levels are only mentioned incidentally; they were never put into effect, at least in the Canadian sector, and the plans do not exhibit any significant departure from accepted doctrine.

59. The treatment of defensive fire, on the other hand, presents difficulties, since available sources do not contain much detail about developments in this field. It is, in consequence, not possible to embark on any comprehensive account of the use of the battalion weapons, the tank guns and the guns and heavy mortars of the artillery in our defensive operations in Korea. Some of the more important strengths and weaknesses of our fire, as revealed during the attack on 3 R.C.R., are recorded below, in an attempt to fill this gap to the greatest extent now possible. This, however, must be regarded as an expedient, of use only until it is replaced by a more complete account of all aspects of this extremely important subject.

60. A good deal more information is available about the patrolling and raiding which 1 Comwel Div carried on during its protracted defensive operations on the "JAMESTOWN" line. It is accordingly, possible to present a more complete account of these operations. In this Report, developments connected with patrolling will be recorded chronologically, and a summary of these developments will be included in the final portion, together with such generalizations as it is possible to make. It should be noted that the subject is by no means a simple one, The number of types of patrol - standing, fighting, ambush, reconnaissance and so forth - the changes which occurred over the months, the wide variation in performance between units (and even between individual patrols of the same unit), the influence of higher policy --all these operate to place a completely adequate treatment of the subject beyond the scope of this Report. An attempt will be made, however, to produce a general survey, in the hope that it will be of value until a more exhaustive study is produced.

Patrols - May and June 1952

61. During May and June, 1 Comwel Div patrolled vigorously in conformity with a policy stated by H.Q. 1 U.S. Corps.²⁷ Before discussing this policy and describing the division's share in its implementation, it might be well to survey the terrain on which the formation operated.²⁸

62. An unnamed tributary runs into the Sami-ch'on from the north-east, approximately four miles upstream from the latter's junction with the Imjin. The valley of the Sami-ch'on, which is quite narrow above the mouth of this tributary, widens to over 2000 yards below it. The tributary, on the other hand, flows through a valley which is little more than 500 yards wide. The features which lie to the east of this tributary, and of the wide portion of the Sami-ch'on valley, consist in the main of long ridges stretching west into the valley like fingers. The features opposite are more compact, in the sense that fewer re-entrants run into them from the valley whose western boundary they form. The area held by 1 R. 22e R. and a good half of that held by 1 R.C.R. fronted on the wide portion of the Sami-ch'on valley; the remainder of 1 R.C.R.'s positions and all of the 1 P.P.C.L.I. area fronted on the valley of the tributary. The latter two units were thus much closer to the enemy-held features opposite them, but nowhere in the Canadian sector was contact really close.

63. To the right of 25 Bde's boundary lay a ridge of high ground which ran almost due east and west and terminated, at its western end, in Hill 159 (1417). The Sami-ch'on tributary passed along the western end of this feature and then curved practically due east, enclosing the ridge on two sides. A small valley to the south of the ridge separated it from the features held by 25 Bde. Immediately to the north-east lay the mass of Hill 355 (1718). with a jumble of disconnected features in rear. The line of the forward defended localities ran close to the lower slopes of this hill, to the east of Point 227 (1518); the enemy do not appear to have occupied this latter feature continuously.

64. Starting on 18 May, each forward battalion of 1 Comwel Div was ordered to carry out one strong fighting patrol a week against known enemy positions (1 Comwel Div: Diary of Op Events, 15 Feb - 30 Jun 52, p. 7). This order was issued by the divisional headquarters in conformity with a

²⁷ *Unless otherwise stated., the material in this section of the Report has been derived from the following sources:

- (a) W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde., May and June 1952.
- (b) Ibid, June 1952: Appx "4A" - Patrol Task Tables; Appx "11" - Patrol Reports and Traces.
- (c) W.D., 1 P.P.C.L.I. May and June 1952.

- (d) W.D., 1 R. 22e R., May and June 1952.
- (e) Ibid, June 1952: Appx "14" - Patrol Report for-Night 23/24 Jun 52.
- (f) W.D., 1 R.C.R., May and June 1952.
- (g) Ibid, May 1952: Appx "Q" - 1 Comwel Div Periodic Ops Report, Nos 527 to 557.
- (h) Ibid.. June 1952: Appx "R" - 1 Comwel Div Periodic Ops Report., Nos 558 to 587 (No. 564 missing and not available in any other War Diary)
- (j) Ibid, July 1952: Appx "8" - 1 Comwel Div Periodic Ops Report, No. 588.

directive from H.Q. I U.S. Corps that at least one prisoner was to be taken every three days. The assignment proved to be so difficult and costly that it led to some debate between the corps staff and G.O.C. 1 Comwel Div. Reporting on the matter, Maj-Gen Cassels wrote:

The period has generally been very static with both sides patrolling and doing the occasional raid. Lately we have dominated NO Mans Land to such an extent that the enemy has been very loathe to enter it. In some ways this has been a considerable disadvantage as it makes it extremely difficult to get a prisoner. We are now trying to lure him forward again but, so far, he has not reacted.

During the last month we have been ordered to produce one prisoner every three days and have been authorized to use up to a battalion to achieve this. In fact we have put in a series of company raids which have killed many enemy but have not produced a prisoner. As these raids have had to go a long way to find the enemy, who are sitting back in their main positions, they have been comparatively costly. As a result I have ordered that they should be suspended and we are trying some other methods. Meanwhile I am being harassed and ordered by Corps to produce a prisoner every third day, apparently regardless of cost. As we know quite well what enemy divisions are in front of us I cannot see the point in this and have said so and have asked if there is any special reason behind the request. I have made it clear that I will do all in my power to get as many prisoners as possible, but that I consider a series of battalions or company raids a most unprofitable way of doing it, unless the need is considerably greater than I think it is. At present this has been agreed, but I do not know how long it will last, Personally I believe the reason behind the order was to keep the US Army divisions "sharp" regardless of casualties,, and at least one of their divisions had taken Very considerable casualties - between 2,000 and 3,000. The Commander of 1st US MARINE Division on my left visited me on 29 June, and raised this very point. He is in complete agreement with my views. (1 Comwel Div: Periodic Report 15 Feb - 30 Jun 52, paras 10, 11)

65. The raids to which Gen Cassels refers were too numerous to be described in detail here. However, the tactics used in various raids were similar, and the contacts were sufficiently alike to permit certain useful generalizations to be made. In strength, the raiding groups varied from 20 or 30-man patrols to an entire company, the greater part of the raids being staged by fighting patrols of the former strength, Brens, Stens and grenades were carried, and some of the men appear to have been armed with rifles. Very heavy supporting fire was provided by the artillery and tanks.

66. In the 25 Bde sector - and presumably in that of 29 Bde - the patrols passed through their own wire and minefields at fixed points where gaps existed. Routes beyond the gaps varied. The Canadian patrols had to cross the floor of the valley to the hills opposite; those from 29 Bde had to thread their way along more tortuous routes, because of the broken and patternless character of the terrain on their front. "Firm bases" were established as close to the objective as possible, in localities which lent themselves to all round defence; the actual raiding parties moved on to the objectives from these positions. (See Map "4")

67. On the objective, the raiding groups found themselves in a maze of trenches ruined by our artillery. Here they usually came under heavy mortar and small-arms fire which inflicted casualties and restricted their freedom of movement. In addition., a high proportion of the enemy trenches were connected to tunnels, through which his troops could retreat from a threatened spot or move to one which had been cleared and passed by the Canadian soldiers. Although it was possible, in these situations, for our patrols to inflict casualties on the enemy, it proved very difficult indeed to take a live prisoner.

68. The results of the raids staged in May were not particularly encouraging. One prisoner was captured on the night 6/7 May, and two deserters surrendered early in the morning of the 9th and 16th of the month. These., at least, are the figures given in the daily reports on operations issued by H.Q. 1 Comwel Div; it may be safely concluded that they are complete., since the reports would scarcely fail to mention taking a prisoner when the formation's whole energies were directed to that end.

69. Within 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 1 R.C.R. appears to have staged the most raids, or at least to have recorded the greatest number. The unit concentrated largely on two features, Points 113 (1215) and 75 (1214), which lay across the valley of the Sami-ch'on tributary, with Hill 166 (1215) immediately in rear. Of the seven raids which the unit records for May (W.D., 1 R.C.R., 1, 16, 22, 31 May 52, also Appx "X"), three resulted in casualties. The heaviest losses occurred on the night 22/23 May, when a patrol lost five wounded and one missing presumed killed.²⁹ 1 R. 22e R. shows two patrols directed against objectives on the enemy's side of the Sami-ch'on valley (W.D., 1 R. 22e R. 26, 27, 28, 29 May, also Appx "VI"). The first was a raid on Point 61.3 (1112); it was staged on the night 26/27 May by a fighting patrol of 40 all ranks. The group found the objective deserted, but was ambushed during its return and lost two wounded. One other patrol was sent out, on the night 28/29 May, to explore a track which paralleled the west bank of the Sami-ch'on between 115115 and 115119. Although the patrol was supposed to have contacted and engaged the enemy if possible, its objective would appear somewhat too general for it to be considered a raid. In any event, it did not make contact, (See Map "4").

70. 1 P.P.C.L.I. records two raids on objectives across the valley of the Sami-ch'on tributary (W.D., 1 P.P.C.L.I., 20 and 29 May., also Appx "47" and "58"). The first of these, led by Lieut David Alexander Middleton, went out on the night 20/21 May, with the aim of sweeping the eastern tip of a shoulder running east from Hill 156 (1217). The assault group ran into withering fire when it was 20 yards from the top of the ridge, Lieut Middleton, though wounded, persisted in his efforts to close with the enemy until his right leg was broken in two places by a grenade. Cpl John Glenford Dunbar, one of

²⁹ The citation ("Korean Citations" (Cpl Lernoine)) for the immediate award of the M.M. to Cpl Donald George Lemoine states that he distinguished himself during a fighting patrol sent by "B" Coy 1 R.C.R. against Pt 113 on the night of 30 Apr. The assault group was driven off the objective by heavy fire and withdrew through the firm base commanded by Cpl Lemoine. This N.C.O. covered the withdrawal skilfully, and carried back a wounded comrade when the firm base withdrew. Actually, none of the available records mentions a patrol contact by 1 R.C.R. on the nights 29/30 Apr or 30 Apr/1 May, On the night 1/2 May, however, a 1 R.C.R. patrol was driven off Pt 113 and lost two wounded. This may well be the engagement referred to in the citation, though there is no mention of Cpl Lemoine in the unit's War Diary for the period. See Appx "D".

his section leaders, reorganized the group and directed its withdrawal, carrying his officer in spite of the latter's order that he be left behind. For his gallant performance Lieut Middleton was awarded the M.C., while Cpl Dunbar received the M.M. ("Korean Citations" (Lt Middleton and Cpl Dunbar); see also Appx "D") The second fighting patrol sent out by 1 P.P,C.L.I. on the night 29/30 May became lost in no man's land and did not make contact. (See Map "4")

71. In addition to raids, which were aimed at territory on the enemy's side of no man's land, patrols were also sent out to contact the enemy in no man's land itself. Most of these patrols are described as ambush patrols. In June, as we shall see, this type of patrol assumed greater importance than it had held in May. More detailed consideration of these ambushes will consequently be reserved for the account of operations in June. At this point it is sufficient to note that, while a formidable number of ambushes were laid in -May, they had limited success in taking prisoners. At least one of our ambushes, on the other hand, was itself ambushed by the enemy 1 R. 22e 1R., 15 and 16 May 52, also Appx VI).

72. 1 R. 22e R., in its War Diary,, shows a number of patrols, described as fighting patrols, whose aim was to contact and engage the enemy if possible. These patrols are consistently distinguished, in the text, from ambush patrols, but the exact difference is not clearly developed. It would appear, from the brief references made, that these fighting patrols were intended to range about no-man's land, seeking an encounter engagement. In most cases, they failed to make contact, but on the night 6/7 May one such patrol was ambushed close to the east bank of the Sami-ch'on and lost one killed, one wounded and two missing presumed killed (W.D., 1 R. 22e R., 6, 7 May 52., also Appx VI). Pte Jean Guy Guay's good conduct on this occasion is recorded in his citation for the M.M. ("Korean Citations" (Pete Guay); see also Appx "D")

73. On 3 Jun, H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, issued a directive permitting units to discontinue fighting patrols. Ambush, reconnaissance and standing patrols were to be continued. It is not possible to connect this instruction directly with Gen Cassels' order suspending raids³⁰, but presumably there was some connection. Also his "other methods" cannot be identified, but it seems probable that they at least included attempts to lure the enemy into ambushes. If these assumptions are correct, and a policy³¹ of ambushing was substituted for one of raiding, then the new policy did not prove any more successful than the former had done, nor did it lower the casualty rate to the extent which was perhaps expected.

74. Before summarizing the results of the ambush patrols, it is possibly desirable to describe this type of patrolling in as much detail as available sources permit. The Patrol Task Tables issued by 25 Cdn Inf Bde for the period 18-30 June show that these patrols were to have a strength of 12 or 13, under command of an N.C.O. Patrol reports indicate that they were armed in much the same way as the fighting patrols, and that the patrol leader had on call an impressive weight of fire support. As far as

³⁰ The date of this order could not be found in available sources.

³¹ This lack of information as to higher policy on patrolling is matched by an even more complete lack of information about the manner in which the staffs at corps, division and brigade participated in planning patrols and in processing the intelligence which resulted from them.

location of the ambush is concerned,, the task tables list 25 ambush patrols of which four were laid on the enemy's side of the Sami-ch'on or of the Sami-ch'on tributary. No information is available as to the factors which affected the location of all these patrols, but stream junctions, crossing places, tracks, and the western ends of the long fingers stretching out into the Sami-ch'on valley appear to have been favoured. The deployment of the troops in the ambushes is not described in the material at hand. (See Map "4").

75. It is not possible to present a comprehensive summary of the results achieved by these ambushes during the month of June. If their aim was the capture of a live prisoner, they failed; the daily reports on operations issued by HQ, 1 Comwel Div do not record a single prisoner being taken by any means during the month, though one deserter from the enemy was apprehended on the night 28/29 June. The number of ambushes set across the divisional front during the month is not given, and it is not possible to sort out the number of contacts made by ambush patrols since, in recording patrol contacts, the reports do not always distinguish the type of patrol which made the contact. Casualties Inflicted on the enemy are largely estimates, and the figures given for our own casualties are preliminary figures. However, a study of each of the 25 ambushes set by 25 Cdn Inf Bde from 18-30 June provides what might well be a reasonable sample of the month's activity - a sample, in other words, of one-half of the front for one-half of the period.

76. This study reveals that one contact was made by these ambushes, on the night 25/26 Jun. Conflicting details about this action are given in the sources. The Patrol Task Tables for 23, 24, 25 Jun (sub-para (b) of footnote to para 61 above) show that three ambushes were to be laid by 1 R.C.R. at 136151, 135147 and 125140 on the night 23/24 Jun, and that all three were to be repeated in the same location on the following two nights, 1 Comwel Div's Periodic Ops Report No. 583 (ibid: sub-para (h)) states that the ambush at 125140 -was surrounded on the night 25/26 Jun (its third successive night in the same location) but succeeded in fighting Its way out. The War Diary of "D" Coy 1 R.C.R. (ibid: sub-para (f)) locates the ambush at 127143 not 125140, and states that it was laid on the nights 22/23, 23/24 and 25/26 Jun, on the last of which it made contact with a Chinese patrol. A report on the operation in question (ibid: sub-para (b)) places the contact at 129143, and states that it occurred when a Chinese patrol heading north-east marched past the ambush in single file, presumably to lay an ambush of its own near one of the gaps (para 66 above) in the perimeter wire and minefields of an R.C.R. company. When the R.C.R. patrol opened fire, the enemy group turned, forming a line which barred the Canadian withdrawal. Our patrol, however, succeeding in charging through the enemy, at a cost of one Canadian killed and two wounded. One dead Chinese soldier was found later in the area of the contact. (See Map "4")

77. Towards the end of June there occurred what would appear to be a brief, unexplained revival of the raiding policy, as a result of which each battalion of the brigade staged a raid on an enemy-held feature on the western side of the valley. On the night 20/21 June, 1 P.P.C.L.I. sent a party 35 strong to raid Point 133 (1216), The group suffered six killed and 18 wounded, and failed to secure a prisoner. The following night 1 R.C.R. lost one killed and 22 wounded in a raid on Point 113 (1215). Again, no prisoners were taken. In each case, heavy explosions, as of powerful

charges buried in the patrol's path and detonated electrically or mechanically, occurred just as the patrol moving in on the objective. On the night 23/24 Jun, 1 R. 22e R. lost one killed., five wounded and two missing in a similar patrol to the spur running north-east from Hill 169 (1011). At the time, it was thought that both of the missing soldiers had been killed. However L/Cpl Dugal, one of the casualties in question, survived, and was returned with the sick and wounded prisoners exchanged in "LITTLE SWITCH" in April 1953 (para 170 below). For the first time, our men wore the new "armoured" vests on this patrol. These garments were made of a fabric sufficiently thick and tough to provide some protection from shrapnel, and they were designed to cover the upper body. Further experience was to confirm their value. (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, June 1952: Appx "6" - Reports on Enemy Activity (Appx "A" to Report for 24 Jun 52) ; see also Map "4")

78. In addition to these raids and ambushes, other types of patrolling were used by the division. Of these, the "standing" patrol was the most numerous. This type of patrol will be discussed subsequently (para 242 below). At this point it is sufficient to note that they generally consisted of three to five men, who were stationed close to the perimeter of a forward defended locality and charged with detecting enemy movement in the area of the locality.

79. It could be supposed that a considerable number of reconnaissance and "lie-up" patrols would have been conducted during the operation of the raiding policy, to provide the necessary intelligence about the enemy. While limitations in available information make it impossible to be definite on the point, it would appear that such was not the case. The division's daily reports on operations mention only two or three patrols described as reconnaissance patrols, and one "lie-up" of 1 WELCH is recorded in the reports for the period 10-13 Jun, 25 Bde's patrol task tables for the latter part of June do not list a single reconnaissance patrol, though it is possible that some of the other patrols had reconnaissance tasks. This whole question of reconnaissance and "lie-up" patrols - part of the general question of the intelligence sources used in patrol planning - can only be answered when more complete information is available on the staff work done in connection with patrols. On the face of it, a lack of detailed information about the enemy's hour-to-hour routine (best provided by reconnaissance and "lie-up" patrols) would appear to make the planning of fighting or, more particularly, ambush patrols rather difficult.³²

80. Another type of patrol carried out by the Canadians was the "Jitter" patrol. These, as accurately as they can be reconstructed from the record, were composed of from 10 to 15 men, who were given the task of approaching an enemy position and engaging it with small arms. The object of this manoeuvre, as the name of the patrol suggests, was to give the enemy the "Jitters". The patrols could, of course, have served also as sources of intelligence about the location of enemy weapons, and possibly as decoys to draw enemy parties into ambushes. Again, unfortunately, the available record is inadequate for complete description.

³² It is possible, of course, that some of this information was provided by line passers, but available sources do not contain many particulars about the use of these agents by 1 Comwel Div.

1 R.C.R. Fighting Patrol, Night 31 May/1 Jun 52.

81. A more precise idea of what the raids were like may be gained from an account of a 1 R.C.R. fighting patrol which was sent to Point 113 (1215) on the night 31 May/1 Jun.³³ This patrol, described in one of Maj-Gen Cassels' periodic reports as "a specially daring raid against a strong enemy position" (1 Comwel Div: Diary of Op-Events, 15 Feb - 30 Jun 52, p. 8), consisted of 22 men under the command of Lieut Allan Angus Sloss Peterson. Although he failed to return with a live prisoner, Lieut Peterson so distinguished himself in command of the patrol that he was awarded the M.C., and Cpl Arthur Irvine Stinson, a member of the group, won the M.M. for his part in the operation. ("Korean Citations" (Lt Peterson, Cpl Stinson); see also Appx "D").

82. The patrol entered no man's land via the "South Gate", a gap in the wire and minefields at 135147, almost immediately on completion of an air strike on the objective Point 113. In nine minutes it had worked its way approximately 1000 yards over the floor of the valley to the stream, which it reached at 2034 hours. The crossing was made at 130148, apparently without incident.

83. Point 113 lay 500 yards to the north-west of the crossing place. A small group of houses stretched across the base of the height, whose slope above was banded by lines of trenches. When he reached the shattered houses, Lieut Peterson called down an artillery concentration on the objective, and then led his men to the first line of trenches, which proved to be unoccupied and in disrepair. Leaving a "firm base" of six or seven men under an N.C.O. in this position, the patrol began its final advance. At the same time, the artillery concentration was replaced by a timed programme of tank fire which, being more accurate³⁴ than the artillery fire, could be maintained until the advance was very close to its objective.

84. Under cover of this fire, the patrol climbed up a draw to the next line of trenches, which were also found to be deserted. Cpl Stinson and six men were left to clear the bunkers in this area while the remainder of the patrol, under Lieut Peterson, pressed on to the crest of the feature.

85. Here the defences were in much better repair. A trench ran west along the crest of the height., paralleled on each side by two rows of foxholes, each pair joined by a tunnel under the main trench. This warren came violently and quickly to life as soon as the patrol's supporting fire lifted, and Lieut

³³ The account of the raid given in this and succeeding paragraphs derives from (H.S.) 145.2R13013 (D6): "R.C.R. Patrol Report, 31 May 52". Map "4" may be referred to for topographical detail.

³⁴ The tank guns, having very flat trajectories and excellent sights, could place rounds within a few feet of the desired point on the steep slopes across the valley. The artillery concentrations, on the other hand, spread over a wider area of these slopes, since the steep pitch of the hillside caused a relatively small dispersion to create a large beaten zone on the slope. For this reason, artillery concentrations were normally used on the 920pes during a patrol's movement across the valley. As the patrol began to climb the hills on the other side, the tank guns took up its support. A tank officer, acting much the same as a forward observation officer of the Artil!Or7, controlled the shoot.

Peterson realized that he must withdraw at once, if his group was to avoid becoming engaged in a hand-to-hand mêlée.

86. Meanwhile, Cpl Stinson's section had taken one prisoner from a bunker opening into the bottom of the communication trench to the left. Shortly afterward., the enemy began to close in on the section, and Cpl Stinson accordingly commenced to withdraw to the firm base, with four of his men wounded. The prisoner tried to escape when the withdrawal began, but was shot as he scrambled away.

87. Lieut Peterson's group attempted to return by way of Stinson's former position, but there were so many of the enemy in the area by that time that the route had to be abandoned in favour of a course straight down the hill to the firm base. Here the party reorganized behind a heavy artillery concentration and returned to the 1 R.C.R. area by way of a more northerly route. The patrol had inflicted a number of casualties on the enemy, at a cost of only four wounded, a success which was due largely to the excellent timing of the withdrawal, and the firm control which was maintained throughout.

Operation "JEHU", 17 Jun

88. On 17 Jun, armour made a brief and not conspicuously successful effort to further the division's raiding policy, when tanks of the 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards (5 D.G.) attempted a raid on enemy positions across the valley from the 1 P.P.C.L.I. right flank. Prior to this raid, the armoured units of 1 Comwel Div had not been employed in a mobile role since the division settled on the "JAMESTOWN" line. This statement should not be taken to imply that the tanks had been idle, for the reverse is true. In addition to important roles in Operation "BUCKINGHAM" (paras 49 to 52 above) and in the plans for counter-attacks to restore any "JAMESTOWN" positions captured by the enemy (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, February 1953: Appx "59" - 1 Comwel Div Op Instr No 37, 14 Apr 52), the tanks had very active employment in support of the infantry.

89. This employment is exemplified by the operations of Sqn Ld S.H. (R.C.) in support of 25 Cdn Inf Bde.³⁵ The squadron had one troop in support of each of the battalions, with the fourth troop in reserve, The tanks supporting the infantry were dug in on the hilltops in forward positions; here they provided close fire support to infantry patrols³⁶, destroyed enemy bunkers on the slopes across the valley and generally kept the enemy under extremely accurate direct fire. ((H.S.) 41OB25.013 (D 46):

³⁵ "B" Sqn replaced "C" Sqn on a Jun (para 31 above) and continued the deployment which it found "C" Sqn using.

³⁶ The employment of tanks in support of infantry patrols is exemplified in the citation for the immediate award of the M.M. to Tpr Roy Charles Stevenson, "B" Sqn Ld S.H. (R.C.). On 1 Oct 52, a 1 R.C.R. patrol against Point 227 was stopped by machine gun fire. At the same time, the enemy directed a heavy mortar concentration on Tpr Stevenson's tank. In spite of the danger, the gallant trooper clambered out of the turret on to the rear deck of the tank, where he manned the heavy machine gun mounted on the top of the turret. With this weapon he silenced the hostile machine gun ("Korean Citations", (Tpr Stevenson); see also Appx "D"). The citation does not explain why the tank's main armament (much more accurate and effective) was not fired on this target.

"Interview with Maj J.S. Roxborough, "B" Sqn Ld S.H. (R.C.), 1 May 53") No comprehensive statistics on Canadian tank casualties resulting from enemy artillery or mortar fire are available. However a number of Centurions similarly deployed were put out of action by damage to gun,, gun mantlet,, transmission cover, sight linkage and so forth. A good part of this damage was caused by the fire of medium mortars and field artillery. ((H.S.) 494,013 (D2): "1 C.A.O.R.T. Memo No. 1")

90. It was unusual, however, for them or any other tanks of the Division to sally forth into no man's land, and it cannot be claimed that the results of operation "JEHU" - as the 5 D.G. raid was called - provided any strong reason for an increase in tank movement ahead of the forward defended localities. (In May 1953, however, Brigadier Allard made changes in the employment of tanks (para 238 below)).

91. The plan³⁷ of the operation called for squadron headquarters and two troops of "IC" Sqn 5 D.G., at a total strength of nine tanks, to cross the start line (149175) at 0500 hrs, 17 Jun and move west along the re-entrant south of the height at 144175. When it reached the valley on which the 1 P.P.C.L.I. positions fronted, the force was to change direction and move north-west to the spur at 136178 and thence to the objective. (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, February 1953: Appx "59" - Outline Plan,, Op JEHU., 14 Jun 52). On the day, the tanks moved off as planned, encountering very little opposition except for light shelling. The "going", however, proved to be very bad,, and the force was recalled when the leading tanks were within 600 yards of the objective. During the withdrawal, five of the vehicles became bogged. Four of these were recovered within 36 hours, but the fifth sank four feet in one night and was not recovered until 14 days after the raid, (1 Comwel Div: Periodic Report 15 Feb - 30 Jun 52., p. 9).

Guard Duty on Koje Island, 25 May - 8 Jul 52

92. On 22 May, Canadian front-line soldiers became directly involved in a troubled situation far removed from the front, when "B" Coy 1 R.C.. was ordered to prepare to move to Koje Island, near Pusan, for a tour of guard duty over the unruly prisoners there.³⁸ This duty of guarding prisoners was, in itself, not an unusual employment, but it was interpreted as involving a splitting-up of the Canadian forces in Korea without the prior consent of the Canadian Government. This latter circumstance led the Government of Canada to lodge a formal protest with the Government of the United States, and this protest became the subject of a good deal of discussion in the press and in the House of Commons. As

³⁷ See Map "4" for topographical detail.

³⁸ Maj-Gen Cassels gives 25 May as the date on which H.Q. 1 Comwel Div received orders to provide one British and one Canadian company for duty on Koje Island (1 Comwel Div: Periodic Report 15 Feb - 30 Jun 52, para 12, appx "A" - Diary of Op Events 15 Feb - 30 Jun 52, p.7). This could be the date on which confirmation of earlier verbal orders was received. In any event, there is no doubt that "B" Coy was warned for movement at 1900 hrs 22 May (W.D., 1 RCR's loss of a company (W.D., 1 R. 22e R. extended its front at 0500 hrs 23 May to compensate for 1 R.C.R.'s loss of a company (W.D., 1 R. 22e R., 23 May 52). This timing is confirmed in the periodic operational report of H.Q. 1 Comwel Div for 23 May, which shows "B" Coys of 1 R.C.R. and 1 K.S.L.I. clearing their battalion areas at 0800 hrs, 23 May 52 (W.D., 1 R.C.R., May 1952: Appx "Q" - 1 Comwel Div Periodic Ops Report, No. 549).

a result of all this stir, the duty achieved a publicity - and to that extent an importance - quite out of) proportion to its military significance.

93. The trouble in Koje was revealed to the public on 22 Feb. when a report was issued that riots had broken out among the prisoners (Chronology: Supplement to the World Today, 144). Conditions on the island went from bad to worse until, on 7 May, the commander of the camp, Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, was dragged within one of the compounds and held prisoner (*ibid*, No. 10, P. 301). He was released three days later, after his successor, Brigadier General Charles F. Colson, had made a number of promises - including such promises as "prisoners will receive humane treatment in the future" to the prisoners (*ibid*, pp 301, 302). On 13 May, Gen Colson was relieved by Brigadier General H.L. Boatner (*Ibid*, 302), who at once began, at the expense of some bloodshed, to move the prisoners into smaller compounds, where they could be more easily controlled.

94. In the course of this operation, orders were issued to H.Q. 1 Comwel Div, through H.Q. Eighth U.S. Army, to provide one British and one Canadian company for service on Koje (1 Comwel Div: periodic Report 15 Feb - 30 Jun 52, para 12). This order was passed to Brigadier Bogert, who assigned a company of 1 R.C.R. to the duty, and informed the C.G.S. about what was happening (House of Commons Debates, L.B. Pearson, 26 May 52, p.2552). The action on this message can perhaps best be recorded in the words of Mr L.B. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, who made a statement on the matter to the House of Commons a few days later.

On receipt of this message an inquiry regarding the order was immediately made in Washington. The inquiry confirmed that the order had been given, and that orders had also been given for the posting of units from certain other national forces under the United Nations command to similar duty. It also appeared that the movement of the Canadian troops in question was under way.

The government feels that it is essential that the Canadian policy in respect of the breaking up of the Canadian brigade for miscellaneous duties in Korea should be made clear. A note has accordingly been presented to the state department in Washington.

The following is the text of this note:

The Canadian government recognizes the importance of re-establishing and maintaining effective control over communist prisoners of war captured in Korean operations. The Canadian government also recognizes that custody of prisoners of war is a military responsibility which should be performed in accordance with military requirements.

It has., however, been a long established policy of the Canadian government that Canadian forces dispatched abroad for military operations should remain under Canadian command and control and that, except in the event of a military emergency which does not permit of time for consultation, no part of these forces should be detached therefrom except after consultation and with the agreement of the Canadian government.

The Canadian government therefore views with concern the dispatch of a company of the 25th Infantry brigade to Koje Island without prior consultation with the Canadian government, and hopes that it may be possible to re-unite this company with the rest of the Canadian brigade as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the Canadian forces concerned will, of course, carry out loyally the orders of the unified command with respect to participation in guarding prisoners of war on Koje Island. The Canadian government also wishes to be reassured that, if it is proposed in the future to detach any Canadian forces from Canadian command and control for military or other duties., this will be done only after consultation and with the consent of the Canadian government, except in the event of a military emergency which does not permit of time for such consultation.

(Ibid: pp 2552, 2553)

95. A reply to this note was received on 18 June 52 (ibid: L.B. Pearson, 18 Jun 52, p. 3382), and the contents of the reply were summarized in the House of Commons by Mr Pearson on the following day.

In that reply, the United States government states its appreciation of the importance attached by the government of Canada to the maintenance of Canadian forces as a unit, and the feeling underlying Canada's traditional position in this matter, and therefore, the United States government desires to meet the wishes of the Canadian government in so far as is practicable without endangering the United Nations military effort in Korea...(Ibid: 19 Jun 52, p. 3416)

96. The Government's action was rather warmly criticized by members of the Opposition, who contended that Canada had shown herself unduly sensitive about preserving the Canadian identity of her troops in Korea (Ibid, 20 Jun 52, pp 3481-2 and 3495-6). Meanwhile, on Koje, the soldiers went about their business quite calmly, "B" Coy 1 R.C. R., with "B" Coy 1 K.S.L.I., had arrived on the island on Sunday 25 May³⁹. Ten days later, the Canadians took over Compound No. 66, in conjunction with the K.S.L.I. company which was to furnish alternate 24 hour guards. The duty was performed in the following manner:

We occupied seven towers, placed at intervals about the Compound, with a Bren gunner on each of the towers' two platforms. Between these towers., there were sandbagged ground positions, seven in all, each containing a Bren gunner. There were three high barbed wire fences about 66 and in between the outer two we had an 8 man perimeter guard, constantly patrolling and watching the PsOW for unusual occurrences or disturbances. There were approximately 3200 prisoners in the Compound, chiefly North Korean Officers, Our job was to keep them inside the Compound and to apprehend prisoners who might try to escape. (W.D. "B" Coy 1 R.C.R.0 22 May -14 Jul 52, p. 3)

97. On 12 Jun, the Commonwealth troops were ordered to move the prisoners to a new compound on the following day. This promised to be a more difficult task than the guard duty had been,

³⁹ Statements in this and the following paragraph are based on W.D., 1 R.C.R., June 1952: Appx "V(iii)" - W.D., "B" Coy 1 RCR, 22 May - 14 Jul 52.

since U.S. Army soldiers clearing Compound No. 76 two days previously had met furious resistance, in the course of which 31 prisoners had been killed and 111 wounded. On 13 Jun., however, the prisoners moved out of Compound No. 66 in an orderly fashion,, leaving the R.C.R. and K.S.L.I. companies temporarily unemployed while their compound was empty. During this time they furnished a guard of honour for Viscount Alexander of Tunis, who was visiting Korea as Minister of Defence in the United Kingdom. Further duty on Compound No.. 66, and on other compounds, followed Brigadier Bogert visited his soldiers on 7 Jul, and attended a sports meet held by the prisoners, at which one of the prisoners presented him with a garland in honour of the occasion. Next day the companies handed over to a U.S. Army unit. By 14 Jul "Bn Coy was back with 1 R.C.R., which by that time was in reserve, with other units of 25 Cdn Inf Bde, on WYOMING".

98. The guard duty on Koje, already something of a cause célèbre, was destined to attract further public attention. On .25 Aug, Brigadier A.B. Connelly, C.B.E., C.,D., vacated command of C.M.M.F.E., being replaced on the following day by Brigadier Morton, D.S.O., C.D. (Supplements to C.A.Os., Issue No. 305 of 1952). Subsequently Brigadier Connelly was retired from the Army and the charge was made in the House of Commons that his retirement had been approved because of his failure to inform the Government about the proposed employment of Canadian troops on Koje, while this plan was still in the discussion stage (House of Commons Debates, 1-16 Dec 52, pp. 209-12, 281, 584, 748, 761-2). There was apparently an inference that the Secretary of State for External Affairs had been connected in some way with Brigadier Connelly's retirement, for the Minister of National Defence, in a statement read to the House by Mr. R.O. Company (as acting Minister of National Defence) specifically cleared Mr, Pearson of any connection with the affair.

The chief of the general staff recommended to me that Brigadier Connelly should be retired and after discussing the matter with the chief of the general staff I felt that the retention of Brigadier Connelly would not be in the interests of the services or of the public and therefore approved the recommendation.

This retirement was dealt with entirely as a military matter and the Secretary of State for External Affairs had nothing whatever to do with it in any way, (Ibid., 17 Dec 52., p.861)

99. Returning now to Korea and to the latter part of June 1952, we find 25 Cdn Inf Bde-in the process of being relieved by 28 Britcom Inf Bde, On Koje, "B" Coy 1 R.C.R. was entering the final week of its duty on the island. The relief of 25 Bde was completed at 0200 hrs 30 Jun 52 (W.D., 1 R.C.R. June 1952: Appx "R" - I Comwel Div Periodic Ops Report., No, 587). As of 5 Jul, the two brigades had interchanged areas, the British brigade occupying substantially the same defended localities as the Canadians had vacated ⁴⁰(ibid., July 1952: Appx "8" - 1 Comwel Div Periodic Ops Report, No. 592, Trace "P"). Within 25 Bde, 1 R.C.R. was left, 1 P.P.C.L.I. centre and 1 R. 22e R. right (ibid). 29 Brit Inf Bde remained on the right of the divisional front (ibid).

⁴⁰ See Map "17".

25 CDN INP BDE ON THE RIGHT AND ON THE LEFT OF THE DIVISIONAL FRONT, 10 AUG 52 TO 30 JAN 53

Relief of 29 Brit Inf Bde by 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 10 Aug 52

100. In the early hours of 10 Aug., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde assumed responsibility for the right sector of 1 Comwel Div's front from H.Q. 29 Brit Inf Bde (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 9 Aug 52). This relief marked the Canadian brigade's return to the line from its reserve positions on "WYOMING", where it had been since 30 Jun. As in previous reliefs, no major⁴¹ changes were made in the battalion positions. On the left of the brigade front, 1 R. 22e R. took over from 1 B.W.⁴² In the center, 1 R.C.R. replaced 1 WELCH and on the right 1 P.P.C.L.I. occupied the 1 R. Norfolk positions. (Ibid, August 1952: Appx "8" - 1 Comwel Div Ops/Int Summary No. 19, Trace "P") 1 R.C.R. was in the Hill 355 area, the scene of 2 R. 22e R.'s gallant stand in November 1951.

101. To the south-west of the Canadians, 28 Britcom Inf Bde still held the positions which it had occupied when it relieved 25 Cdn Inf Bde on 30 Jun. 29 Brit Inf Bde went back to "WYOMING", having been in the line on the right of the divisional front since the redeployment of 19 Apr (paras 42, 43, 45, above).⁴³

102. During the six weeks they had spent in divisional reserve, the three Canadian infantry battalions had been busy developing positions on "WYOMING", as well as areas on the line "KANSAS", each of these lines having been divided into six battalion areas in the then-current plan for Operation "BUCKINGHAM". The "BUCKINGHAM" plan in effect while 25 Bde was holding the left sector of 1 Comwel Div's front (paras 49 to 52 above) had provided for the Canadians holding three battalion areas on the left end of the "WYOMING" and "KANSAS" lines in succession. The new plan superseded this version when 25 Bde moved back to "WYOMING" on relief in "JAMESTOWN" by 28 Bde (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, July 1952: Appx "6" - 25 Cdn Inf Bde Op Order No. 38, Op "BUCKINGHAM", 3 Jul 52). It was substantially the same as its predecessor in ultimate effect, but involved a more complicated pattern of moves. While in reserve, 25 Bde was to have two battalions on "WYOMING" and one on "KANSAS".⁴⁴ On a withdrawal from "JAMESTOWN" being ordered, the battalion on "KANSAS" was to be interchanged with one of the battalions on "WYOMING". The third

⁴¹ Such adjustments as were to be made (at least those to be made initially after the relief) are shown in a trace issued by H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde on 9 Aug (ibid, August 1952: Appx "9" - 25 C.I.B. JAMESTOWN POSITIONS, 10 Aug 52). Map "7" gives details.

⁴² 1 B.W. had replaced 1 R. LEICESTERS on 24/25 Jun (para 48 above).

⁴³ See Map "17".

⁴⁴ 1 R.C.R. and 1 R. 22e R. in turn moved to their areas on "KANSAS" for ten-day periods, during which they were replaced on "WYOMING" by 1 K.O.S.B. from 28 Britcom Inf Bde. On 1 Aug, however, this unit left the divisional area on its way out of the theatre. 1 P.P.C.L.I., when it moved back, was relieved by a composite group, called "KING FORCE", formed from 1 R.C.R. and 1 R. 22e R. (ibid, 10, 19 Jul, 1 Aug 52, ibid, August 1952: Appx "8" - 1 Comwel Div Ops/Int Summary No. 9, para 1 (b)).

unit for the left sector of "WYOMING" was to be provided by 28 Bde. On a further withdrawal to "KANSAS", this last battalion was to join its parent formation, and the two Canadian battalions were to join the third in the left sector of "KANSAS". Another "BUCKINGHAM" plan superseded this one when the Canadians went back into the right brigade sector of "JAMESTOWN" in August. (ibid, August 1952: Appx "9" - 25 Cdn Inf Bde Op Instr No. 42, Op "BUCKINGHAM", 8 Aug 52). This new plan resembled the others, except that it made 25 Bde responsible for the right sectors of "WYOMING" and "KANSAS". The effect of these changes in areas on the development of the areas is not shown in available sources.⁴⁵

103. In July the monsoon rains broke the baking heat which had persisted during the latter part of May and the whole of June, These downpours began on 27 Jul and very quickly gave employment to the company from 1 P.P.C.L.I. which had been assigned to the protection of the division's two bridges over the Imjin. The company furnished two detachments, each supported by two tanks and equipped with searchlights, whose duty it was to defend the bridges against ground attack and to break up debris and detonate floating mines before they could damage the piers of the "TEAL" (1705) "PINTAIL" (2309) bridges. Operation "NOAH'S ARK", as these protective measures were called, did not achieve complete success. Rain fell continuously from 28 to 31 Jul, and the Imjin rose 39 feet above normal summer level during the peak period. The tanks shot manfully at the floating debris, but in spite of their best efforts "TEAL" collapsed on 30 Jul. (Ibid. 4, 12 and 31 Jul 52; 1 Comwel Div: Diary of Op Events, 1 Jul - 31 Oct 52; p. 2; W.D., 1 P.P.C.L.I., June 1952: Appx "42" - 1 P.P.C.L.I. Op Instr No. 9. NOAH'S ARK) 25 Cdn Inf Bde was relieved of its "NOAH'S ARK" commitment on 10 Aug.. when it went back into the line. On 24 Aug, further heavy rains caused the level of the Imjin to rise 41 feet above normal summer level, displacing the centre pier of "PINTAIL". The bridge continued in use for essential traffic, however, with everyone wearing life jackets while crossing it. On 15 Sep Operation "NOAH'S ARK" terminated,, with "PINTAIL" still in operation and "TEAL" in course of being restored (1 Comwel Div: Diary of Op Events, 1 Jul - 31 Oct 52, pp 4 to 6). The attacks of the Imjin on the divisional supply routes had been -more successfully withstood than they had the year before when the river succeeded several times in isolating our troops.

104. A number of changes took place in the division during the three months which followed the return of 25 Cdn Inf Bde to the line. In 28 Britcom Inf Bde., 1 K.O.S.B, was relieved by 1st Battalion, The Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment) (1 R.F.) in August and 1 K.S.L.I. was replaced by 1st Battalion, The Durham Light Infantry (1 D.L.I.) during the next month. In September, also, 1 R. Norfolk of 29 Brit Inf Bde was relieved by 1st Battalion, The King's Regiment (Liverpool) (1 KINGS), In August, Lt-Col. Wilson-Smith was succeeded by Lt-Col E.A.C. Amy, D.S.O., M.C., as G.S.O. 1 at H.Q. 1 Comwel Div and in September Maj-Gen Cassels was relieved as G.O.C. by Maj-Gen M.M. Alston-Roberts-West, C.B.,D.S.O. (1 Comwel Div: Periodic Report., 1 Jul - 31 Oct 52, paras 5, 6 and 8) Late in October, 1st Battalion. The Duke of Wellington's Regiment (West Riding) (1 D.W.R.) arrived in the divisional area to relieve I WELCH (1 Comwel Div: Diary of Op Events, 1 Jul 31 Oct 52, p. 9)

⁴⁵ See Map "5".

25 Cdn Inf Bde in the Fight for No Man's Land, 10 Aug to 23 Oct 52

105. 25 Cdn Inf Bde returned to the line on the eve of an important change in the general tactical situation of 1 Comwel Div and., indeed, of I.U.S. Corpse During the brigade's previous tour in the forward positions, the enemy had not followed a very active raiding policy. Though the detailed records do not entirely support the official view (para 64 above) that our troops dominated no man's land, it is true that the contacts made during the previous tour were relatively light. The other divisional fronts were similarly "quiet". During the period now in review, however, the enemy gradually instituted a more aggressive policy. He moved into the no-man's land opposite the corps in some strength, attacking our patrols, raiding forward positions and generally making his presence felt in areas where he had previously moved very quietly, if at all. At the same time, he increased the volume of his harassing fire on the forward positions., and supported his raids by powerful concentrations of mortar and artillery fire.

106. In general, 1 Comwel Div received less of these attentions than did its neighbours, a circumstance which Maj-Gen West attributed tentatively to the system of defence adopted by the division. Unlike U.S. Army formations, 1 Comwel Div made no use of outposts, preferring instead to maintain standing patrols forward of the main positions. These groups, being less committed than outposts to the occupation of specific features, were correspondingly more difficult for the enemy to reconnoitre and pinch off in a raid.⁴⁶ (1 Comwel Div: Periodic Report, 1 Jul - 31 Oct 52, paras 9 to 11)

107. This increased enemy activity began late in September and assumed formidable proportions in October and November. It affected the western and central sectors of the front, held from left to right by U.S. Corps, IX U.S. Corps and II ROK Corps in that order (A.H.Q. Int Review, Vol. 1. No. 9, pp 9 and 10).⁴⁷ The fighting took the form of raids and limited attacks against outposts and forward positions, most of which lay in the vicinity of important features. On the right of 1 U.S. Corps' front, in the Chorwon area, 2 U.S. Inf Div lost some ground near heights covering the classic invasion route

⁴⁶ It is to be noted that Maj-Gen West's policy on outposts had not been implemented across the divisional front by the end of the period (1 Jul - 31 Oct 52) on which he was reporting. 1 R.C.R., in its report on the Chinese attack of 23/24 Oct, records several small forward positions ("VANCOUVER" (p3ra 123) was one of them) which were dug and otherwise prepared for defence, -and referred to as "outposts". Subsequently, references to outposts became less frequent, being replaced by "standing patrols". These patrols, however, were rather large (three to five men) and they tended to occupy the same position night after night. Because of this, they suffered from the same weakness as the G.O.C. attributed to outposts, Under Brigadier Allard, 25 Bde attempted to replace them by two-man patrols who were to roam the valley floor, getting in behind enemy patrols and reporting on them by wireless from the rear (paras 239, 242 below).

⁴⁷ Map "1" shows places and areas mentioned. Corps frontages were generally the same at this time as those shown in Map "2".

south to Seoul. on the left, in 1 U.S. Marine Div's sector, outposts were lost forward of the "HOOK" which covered another route south-east to Seoul. (G-3 Ops Report . Nos 800 to 829)

108. All the while, 1 Comwel Div remained undisturbed by direct attack, and comparatively unaffected by the fighting elsewhere on the corps front. During the latter part of September, however, a number of sharp engagements were fought close to the division's right flank, when 3 U.S. Inf Div lost several outposts to Chinese raids. (Ibid; W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, September 1952: Appx-"8" - 1 Comwel Div Ops/Int Summary, Nos 57 to 69). Then towards the end of October, a savage attack on "B" Coy 1 R.C.R., near "LITTLE GIBBRALTAR", virtually wiped out the company. At the end of October 1 U.S. Marine Div's positions on the "HOOK" (1010) became the scene of very heavy fighting, during which several outposts were lost to the enemy H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, October 1952: Appx "8" Comwel Div Ops/Int Summary, Nos 96 to 98). In November these "HOOK" positions, then held by 1 B.W. of 29 Brit Inf Bde, were attacked once again (paras 151 to 154 below). The front became relatively quiet in December, and remained so until the last three months of the war, Then the enemy bore down again on the U.N. positions, this time directing his heaviest - or at least most successful - attacks against South Korean troops in the Kumsong salient (paras 232, 233 below).

109. All this, of course, was in the future as the infantry of 25 Bde filed along the communication trenches to their weapon pits and bunkers in the early part of August, No operations of any great moment had taken place while the brigade was in reserved and its first operation on return to the line, "TROJAN", did not involve the possibility of heavy casualties.

110. "TROJAN" was a deception scheme aimed at giving the enemy the impression that American troops had replaced Commonwealth units about Hill 355. U.S. Army steel helmets had been issued to the Canadian infantry prior to their movement into the line, and, in the early morning hours of 9 Aug., all brigade wireless stations began to transmit on new frequencies, using U.S. Army wireless procedure. The subterfuge apparently met with some success, for a week often it began Chinese voices were heard on one of the brigade's wireless sets, calling "Hello American, Hello American". The deception was maintained until 24 Aug when normal procedure was resumed. (Ibid, August 1952: Appx "B" -1 Comwel Div Ops/Int Summary No. 24; Appx "13" - H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde to Units, 7 and 20 Aug 52)

111. Meanwhile, life in the front line had become difficult. The brigade's new sector was one of the most heavily-shelled areas on the front of I U.S. Corps. A steady trickle of casualties due to shelling and mortaring began to flow back through the regimental aid posts. Tanks deployed on the tops of hills became the targets of accurate and heavy concentrations, worrying crews and nearby infantry. In an effort to misdirect this shelling, dummy tanks were erected on unoccupied summits, but no great success attended this manoeuvre. Towards the end of August torrential rains began to fall again. Enemy shelling diminished while this rain was falling, but the water did as much and perhaps more - damage to the positions than the shells had done. over 150 bunkers collapsed or became otherwise unserviceable between 18 and 25 Aug. Then, when the skies cleared and the slime began to dry up, the enemy resumed his shelling with redoubled vigour. (Ibid, 10 to 31 Aug 52)

112. Although the Chinese, possibly influenced by Operation "TROJAN", had begun to feel around in front of the brigade by 17 Aug (ibid, 17 Aug 52), our own troops did not go out in any strength until the end of the month, when 1 P.P.C.L.I. and 1 R.C.R. sent fighting patrols to 176211 and Point 227 (1518) respectively. 1 P.P.C.L.I. did not make contact, though it found some freshly-dug trenches; the 1 R.C.R. patrol struggled up the slope of Point 227, but found its way to the summit barred by old wire (ibid. September 1952: Appx "6" - H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde Int Summary, 1 Sep 52).

113. Early in September, a situation which had been anticipated for some six months finally materialized, when 1 R. 22e R. began to run seriously under strength. In March, it will be recalled, the V.A.G. had informed the V.C.G.S. that there were insufficient trained reinforcements available to keep 1 R. 22e R. at full strength. Subsequently, the General Staff had ruled that the unit could operate below strength while the front on which it was employed remained quiet (para 30 above). At the end of the first week of September, the unit showed a total posted strength of 687 all ranks (W.D., 1 R. 22e R., September 1952: Appx "3" - Unit Strength Return,, 6 Sep 52). It was, in other words, nearly 300 (the rough equivalent of two rifle companies) under strength. Since it was obviously impossible for the battalion to maintain four companies, its "All Coy was broken up among the three remaining companies. At the same time, 1 R.C.R's left boundary was moved south-west to include the area formerly held by "A" Coy 1 R. 22e R.⁴⁸ This position was then assigned to "E" Coy 1 R.C.R., which had been formed from the other R.C.R. rifle companies and the echelons (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 7 Sep 52). As a result of this development, C.O. 1 R.C.R.. who was already responsible for the most active part of the brigade's front, became responsible also for the largest battalion area.

114. In September the monsoon rains ceased. Operation "NOAH'S ARK ended (para 107 above), and the soldiers began to repair their positions in reasonable confidence that fresh downpours would not destroy their work as soon as it was completed. Enemy shelling continued heavy, and bitter patrol clashes occurred from time to time. There was, however, no clear indication., either in the nature or scale of the enemy activity, of the heavy fighting which was to break out later in the month. On the night 5/6 Sep an ambush patrol from "B" Coy 1 R. 22e R. detected approximately 60 Chinese filing along a ridge toward its position at 154182. The patrol thereupon called artillery fire down on the enemy and withdrew. Subsequently, another patrol was⁴⁹ sent out to find the leader of the first patrol, who had not returned with his group. As this second patrol approached the spot which the first patrol had left, it heard the missing man shout a warning that there were still Chinese in the area. The patrol then went to ground and exchanged grenades with the enemy., while heavy fire from both sides blanketed the slopes. By the time the second patrol had got back inside the wire and the front had quieted down, the unit had

⁴⁸ Map "7"

⁴⁹ The good work of Sgt Joseph Renaud Champoux, who was in command of the platoon locality from which the second patrol was found, is mentioned in his citation for the award of the M.M. ("Korean Citations" (Sgt Joseph Renaud Champoux)). The citation also refers to the skill and courage displayed by this N.C.O. during an enemy probe of the unit's forward positions on 17 Aug (para 112 above). L/Cpl Jean Robert Gingras, who led the second patrol, also distinguished himself, and his determination and courage on the occasion (5/6 Sep) are mentioned in his citation for the M.M. (ibid: L/Cpl Gingras).

lost four killed, five wounded and one missing⁵⁰ (W.D., 1 R. 22e R., September 1952. Appx "6" - patrol Report, 6 Sep 52).

115. A few days later a patrol from 1 R.C.R., led by Lt Herbert Russell Gardner, spent 48 hours on the enemy-held slopes across the valley from the 1 R.C.R. positions. They passed part of this time observing the activity about a kitchen at 151195⁵¹ where 20 to 25 enemy soldiers were being fed. (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, September 1952: Appx "18" - Interim Report, 1 R.C.R. Lay-up Patrol, 12 Sep 52). Then, on the night 23/24 Sep, Lt Gardner led a patrol to this kitchen area, with the object of taking a prisoner. Near the kitchen he found a signal wire which he broke. As he had expected, an enemy soldier who was attempting to find the break soon came along the path followed by the wire. When he reached the point where the wire had been broken, the patrol seized him. Despite his very determined struggles, they succeeded in subduing him and getting him back alive to the 1 R.C.R. lines. For this daring exploit Lt Gardner was awarded the M.C., while Cpl Karl Edmund Fowler, who had been on both patrols, was given the M.M. ("Korean Citations" (Lieut Gardner, Cpl Fowler)

116. At 0530 hours 5 Oct H.Q. 29 Brit Inf Bde took over from H.Q. 28 Britcom Inf Bde on the left of the divisional front (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, October 1952: Appx "8" - 1 Comwel Div Ops/Int Summary, No. 74). On completion of this relief, 1 Comwel Div had 29 and 25 Brigades in the line, and 28 Brigade in reserve on "WYOMING" (ibid: No. 77, Trace "P").⁵² 28 Britcom Inf Bde had held the left sector for slightly longer than three months, ever since it took over from 25 Bde on 30 June. During this time, the formation had followed an active raiding policy, and had suffered relatively heavy casualties (1 Comwel Div: Diary of Op Events, 1 Jul - 31 Oct 52., pp 1 to 6).

117. During the first part of October, 1 Comwel Div remained comparatively undisturbed, although quite heavy fighting took place to the east, on 3 U.S. Inf Div's front. The enemy it is true, became more active in no man's land opposite the Commonwealth division, but he did not, until the latter part of the month, attack the forward positions, as he was doing further east. Then, at the beginning of the last week of October, he put in a strong attack against 1 Comwel Div and, a few days later, against 1 U.S. Marine Div to the west.

118. Prior to these attacks, a number of sharp contacts occurred in no man's land. On the night 12/13 Oct, 1 Comwel Div carried out two raids in order to create a diversion for an attack by 1 ROK Div on the right. This formation had replaced 3 U.S. Inf Div and was attempting to regain the forward Positions which had been lost in the heavy fighting of the latter part of September. In the event, 1 ROK Div's attack did not materialize, but 1 Comwel Div was not informed of the change of plan and launched its two raids. On the left, a company from 1 KINGS crossed the Sami-ch'on and occupied a small feature without contact. During its withdrawal, however, it was heavily shelled and mortared and lost three wounded. On the right, "B" Coy 1 R.C.R. attacked Point 227. The company was ambushed

⁵⁰ Map "7"

⁵¹ Map "17"

⁵² Map "17"

on the forward slopes of the feature and suffered casualties before it could extricate itself. (Ibid: pp 7 and 8; W.D., 1 R.C.R., October 1952. Appx "11F" - Operation Order No. 27, Operation "APOSTLE", 11 Oct 52; W.D., H.,Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, October 1952: appx "35" - Debriefing "B" Coy Patrol, 12/13 Sep (sic) 52).

119. Three nights later, 1 P.P.C.L.I. sent a patrol to 177211, on the slope of a ridge running south-east from the height immediately to the north of Point 217. The patrol detected enemy activity on the objective and had just called for artillery fire on this target when it was attacked by an enemy platoon, which apparently came on the spot by chance. The parties became intermingled, and in the ensuing fight the Canadians lost two missing, believed killed, and nine wounded. (W.D., 1 P.P.C.L.I., October 1952: Appx "34" - 1 P.P.C.L.I. Fighting Patrol Report, 15/16 Oct) Sgt John Henry Richardson, who commanded the patrol, was subsequently awarded the D.C.M. for the courage and skill he displayed during the engagement ("Korean Citations" (Sgt Richardson)).

120. This enemy activity, particularly in the vicinity of Points 227 and 217, indicated that the Chinese were up to something on that sector of the front. What they were up to became quite clear a week later, when "B" Coy 1 R.C.R. was practically wiped out by a heavy and well co-ordinated attack., supported by stunning concentrations of artillery and mortar fire.

The Attack on "B" Coy 1 R.C.R., Night 23/24 Oct 52. Operation "SOVEREIGN".
26 Oct - 3 Nov 52.

121. Since 10 Aug. when 25 Cdn Inf Bde returned to the line on the right of 1 Comwel Div's front, 1 R.C.R. had held Hill 355 and the Immediately adjacent grounds Early in September, it will be recalled, the battalion's original area had been expanded to the south, when "E" Coy 1 R.C.R. was formed to replace "A" Coy 1 R. 22e R. (pars 113 above). Hill 355 was known as "LITTLE GIBRALTAR", and its conformation and orientation bore a certain resemblance to that of its namesake. To the south and east the slopes fell sway almost precipitously, while to the north and west the descent was more gradual.⁵³ The lower slopes of the hill were bounded on the north and south by two east-west valleys, and on the west by a draw which contained two saddles. The first of these saddles lay due west of Hill 355, and connected the feature with Point 227; the second lay to the north-west and joined Hill 355 with the Kip'un'gol feature. The valleys to the north and south were continuous, with developed tracks running along them. Hill 355 and the adjacent features to the west and northwest had been the scene of bitter fighting, on varying scales, since the area was first occupied during Operation "COMMANDO" in October 1951. From the Canadian point of view, the most notable action was the defence by 2 R, 22eR. of the positions on the Point 227 saddle in November of the same year.

⁵³ See Map "9".

122. Five company areas lay within the boundaries of 1 R.C.R.⁵⁴ Of these, Area I lay in the angle formed by the valley to the south of Hill 355 and the draw to the west of the hill. The area looked across the draw to the south-east slopes of Point 227, and its northern extremity approached the saddle connecting Hill 355 with Point 227. A depression to the rear of the area opened on the valley running south of Hill 355. Area II, the area soon to come under attack, lay immediately east of the saddle between Hill 355 and Point 227, the kitchen area being in the south-east corner, accessible to the valley south of Hill 355. The platoon positions of Area III ran due west in a line from the peak of Hill 355. To the north of these positions the ground fell away in gullies and folds to the northern valley and the Kip'un'gol saddle some 700 to 1000 yards distant. Area III was served by a cableway,⁵⁵ the approaches from the south and east being too precipitous for supply by normal means. The three areas formed two sides of a triangle, whose apex pointed at, but fell short of, the Kip'un'gol saddle. Areas IV and V lay to the rear of Areas I and III respectively and served to add depth to the battalion position.

123. The enemy's artillery preparation for his attack on Area II began on 1 Oct. when his guns and mortars shot almost 1000 rounds into the 1 R.C.R. positions. Most of this fire fell on Area II. Next day he repeated the performance. Although he fired only 600 rounds on this occasion, he succeeded in destroying the field defences in the "VANCOUVER" outpost⁵⁶ and in knocking out the tank in the left or southern platoon position of Area II. The unit abandoned "VANCOUVER" after this shelling and the enemy moved in close to the 1 R.C.R., forward defended localities. He moved in so close, in fact, that his patrols were able to throw stones into the perimeter wire, a device which they probably used in an attempt to draw the defenders' fire and determine the defensive arrangements. On the night 12/13 Oct. as we have seen, he ambushed "B" Coy as the company was advancing on Point 227. After the heavy bombardment of the first three days of October, the hostile fire slackened until 17 Oct, when it began to increase in volume daily. On 21 Oct the enemy fired approximately 1600 rounds into the 1 R.C.R. area. Next day he increased this to 2400 rounds, and on 23 Oct he had launched over 2000 rounds at 1 R.C.R. before he began to fire his final concentrations. The greater part of all this shelling fell on Area II.

124. "B" Coy 1 R.C.R. relieved "D" Coy in Area II some time after last light on 22 Oct. When this relief was completed the unit was deployed with "E" Coy in Area I, "B" Coy in Area II, "A" Coy in Area III and "C" and "D" Coys in Areas IV and V respectively. The three platoon positions of Area II,

⁵⁴ This description of 1 R.C.R.'s dispositions, and of the action fought by the unit is based on:

- a. (H.S.) 410B25.013 (D67): "1 R.C.R. Report on their Action, 23/24 Oct 52".
- b. (H.S.) 410B25.013 (D24): "Interviews with Pers of 1 R.C.R. re Attack on "B" Coy, 23 Oct 52".
- c. (H.S.) 410B25.013 (D26): "Interview with Lt H.R. Gardner M.C., 30 Oct 52".
- d. (H.S.) 410B25.013 (D27): "Interview with Pte C. Peacock, 7 Nov 52".

⁵⁵ Another cableway was added later (H.S. 410B25.013 (D34): "Interview with Capt R.R. Doddridge, 23 Fd Sqn, 27 Mar 53").

⁵⁶ A forward position at 162190, on the track running across the Point 227 saddle. The shelling buried the command post and killed or wounded most of the soldiers in the position. Lt Andrew Martin King's courage in going forward to dig out and evacuate the troops is mentioned in his citation for the M.C. ("Korean Citations" (Lt King))

which were on a north-south line immediately east of the Point 227 saddle, were occupied by 4, 5 and 6 Pls, 4 Pl being on the south and 6 Pl on the north. The 5 Pl positions in the middle were roughly 300 yards east of the track across the Point 227 saddle. 14 Pl of "E" Coy was the flanking platoon to the south, and 2 Pl of "A" Coy was immediately east of 4 and 5 Pls.

125. When "B" Coy moved into Area II., it found the field defences very badly damaged by the heavy fire to which they had been subjected. The greater part of the reserve ammunition stored in the weapon pits had been buried, most of the bunkers had caved in and the telephone lines were cut. The company remained at the alert all night, one of the occupants of each weapon pit watching while the other rested on the bottom of the pit, huddled in his poncho. From time to time very heavy explosions added their roars to the noise of bursting shells; the presumed cause of this added uproar was the enemy working on the forward wire with bangalore torpedoes.

126. At the same time, he began to move in on the positions. Three Chinese were shot from a weapon pit in the 4 Pl area. They fell within ten feet of the pit, their weapons still slung on their shoulders. It was conjectured later that they were attempting to pass through the position, to cut it off from the rear when the frontal attack went in. It is not known whether other parties succeeded in doing this, in accordance with standard Chinese tactics for the attack.

127. At first light on 23 Oct, 6 Pl was withdrawn into the 5 Pl area., where the soldiers of both platoons got some rest in the few bunkers which remained habitable. No warm food had been brought forward from the company kitchen since the company moved into the area, and none came forward during the day. Most of the soldiers, however, were able to lay their hands on some "C" rations., and some were fortunate enough to be able to heat part of their food. During the day, the constant heavy shelling kept everyone below ground, except for a small detachment manning the company's observation post. There is no record in the sources cited of any work having been done on restoring the defences or the line communications.

128. During the afternoon, the bunker which housed the command post of 5 Pl caved in, and Lt H.R. Gardner, the commander of 6 Pl, took shelter in a nearby trench with Sgt G.E.P. Enright of 5 Pl. At that time, there was no communication, either by line or wireless, between the platoons or with company headquarters. In addition, all wires to the battalion command post were dead, except one in the kitchen area. Lieut J. Clark, the commander of 5 Pl, had accordingly spent most of the day in liaison between the 4 and 5 Pl areas and with company headquarters, while Lieut Gardner remained with 5 and 6 Pls.

129. Around 1700 hours Gardner and Enright began an attempt to organize the men in the 5 Pl area. The two platoons, whose combined strength at this time was approximately 34, had no food, no water, very little ammunition and no communication, except by runner, with company headquarters. In view of this situation, Lieut Gardner sent a message back to company headquarters, suggesting that a part of the two platoons be withdrawn and re-organized. On receipt of this message the company commander, Major E.L. Cohen, sent Lieut Clark to the kitchen area to ask battalion headquarters for the necessary authority. Lieut Clark found the wire in the kitchen area dead. Accordingly, he carried the message

himself to the battalion command post, where he outlined the company's situation and received permission to withdraw and re-organize the two platoons. On his return he accompanied Major Cohen to the 5 Pl area, where they met Lieut Gardner and together set about planning the re-organization. Major Cohen had just issued his orders when the enemy, who had previously slackened his fire appreciably, suddenly put down a tremendous concentration. This concentration began at 1820 and lasted from 8 to 10 minutes. Then it lifted to the positions of the left, and right flanking platoons, where it held for some 45 minutes, effectively sealing "B" Coy off from both its neighbouring companies.

130. Within "B" Coy, the three officers in the 5 Pl area were driven to ground by the very heavy bombardment. When it lifted, Lieut Gardner checked to the left. Finding no enemy in that direction, he started getting the men up into the trenches of the inner platoon position. At the same time Major Cohen and Lieut Clark moved off to the right, to organize some sort of defence on that flank. They picked up a few "B" Coy men, to which group they added the members of two "D" Coy standing patrols who were passing through Area II on their way forward for the night's watch. Some of the "B" Coy soldiers had no weapons, others had no ammunition. These were sent back along the communication trench to "A" Coy, where they obtained grenades and small arms ammunition. On their return, four or five of them were sent off to the right under a corporal, as a grenade-throwing party. By this time enemy small arms fire in the area was heavy. One of the group, a soldier of "D" Coy, had already been killed. Major Cohen and Lieut Clark with five or six men then fought their way back along the communication trench to "A" Coy. The grenade throwing party or some other group in the northern part of Area II moved south on the 5 Pl position where Lieut Gardner was still very much in action.

131. Shortly after Major Cohen and Lieut Clark had moved to the right portion of the company area, Lieut Gardner manned a slit trench. Here he was joined by a group from the right, who told him that the Chinese were coming in from that direction. Shortly afterwards the enemy appeared in some strength, and Gardner engaged them with his sub-machine carbine, the five men indicating targets (they were not armed, or at least did not use their arms). The whole position was so swept by fire that it was impossible to move anywhere without being shot at, either by the enemy or by the defenders of the position.

132. Initially, as we have seen, the enemy fire and movement came only from the right. Suddenly, however, Chinese soldiers appeared on the left. Seeing this, Lieut Gardner gave the order to withdraw to "A" Coy. As soon as he left his shelter, however, he was wounded by shrapnel in the right fore arm and both legs; he also received a bullet wound in the upper right arm. A lance corporal near him was blown to bits by a mortar bomb. Perceiving that further movement in the open was impossible, Lieut Gardner played dead while the Chinese milled about the position, shouting and blowing horns. When they had disappeared, Gardner made his way to "A" Coy, taking with him a man who had been wounded in the leg. These two entered "A" Coy area through the 2 Pl position, at this time held by a group commanded by Lieut Clark.

133. When they withdrew on "A" Coy, Major Cohen and Lieut Clark had found the 2 Pl position vacant. Clark had accordingly rounded up a force to cover it while Major Cohen went to the "A" Coy

command post to report to battalion headquarters. Subsequently, Clark had organized a larger force and moved into the 2 Pl position, which he held during the remainder of the engagement.

134. Major Cohen's report to battalion headquarters, received at 1943 hours, cleared up a good deal of the uncertainty which had, until that time, somewhat restricted the activity of the command post. The report stated Major Cohen, Lieut Clark and 12 men had reached the "A" Coy lines and that no friendly troops remained in action in Area II. Seven minutes earlier, it had been established that the standing patrols had not gone out. since the enemy's attack had coincided with the normal time for these groups to go forward. Armed with this information, the command post felt free to direct fire on Area II and on the standing patrol positions, and this it proceeded to do.

135. Up to this moment, battalion headquarters had been largely in the dark as to developments in the "B" Coy area. One message - that the enemy assault had commenced - had been received from someone in the company. Nothing, however, was heard from the company commander until Major Cohen's message was received at 1943 hours. In the interval, "E" Coy had reported its observation of the developments within Area II, but these reports became progressively less useful as smoke and dust obscured the area from view. At 1836 hours., Lieutenant MacDonald, commander of 4 Pl, arrived at battalion headquarters with a report that his platoon had been overrun. This officer had emerged from his bunker when the final enemy concentration lifted to find Chinese already in the platoon position. Some of them, in fact, were on top of his bunker. He thereupon ordered someone (he could not afterwards recollect who this was) to tell the C.S.M. and the company signallers to withdraw, and then himself left the position via the kitchen area, ordering the withdrawal of the and kitchen staff en route. Neither his report nor the information being received from "E" Coy, however, clarified the situation within Area II sufficiently to justify a change in the fire plan "APOSTLES" which had been requested as soon as the attack began. As a result, artillery and heavy mortar fire continued to fall on approaches and likely enemy forming up places until Major Cohen's report and the information about the standing patrols had been received.

136. Thus provided with 2 reasonably clear picture of the situation in Area II, battalion headquarters ordered the battalion supporting weapons to fire on the area and on the standing patrol positions. At the same time it began to put the counter-attack plan into operation. "A" Coy 1 R.F. replaced "D" Coy 1 R.C.R. in Area V and the latter began to move up for the counter-attack. At about 2100 hours, however, a sudden increase in the enemy fire on Areas I and III led to the conclusion that the former of these areas was about to be attacked.⁵⁷ Immediately, our own artillery began a very heavy bombardment of Area II, Point 227, the draw to the west of Hill 355 and the valley to the north. Shortly afterwards, the hostile fire slackened and the threat of further attack was judged to be ended. "D" Coy thereupon began to move in to the counter-attack. The right flanking platoon of the company took some time to get into position, and the left platoon moved in on the southern end of Area II to create a diversion. This manoeuvre cost one killed and two wounded. Finally, at approximately 0110 hrs the assault commenced. The left platoon moved into the former positions of 4 Pl without meeting

⁵⁷ There is not sufficient information available on the enemy's part in this engagement to confirm this appreciation of his intentions.

opposition and the right platoon occupied the 5 Pl area in the same manner. By 0330 hours the platoons had linked up and the situation was restored.

137. No reliable figures are available on the casualties suffered by "B" Coy during this engagement. The casualties sustained by 1 R.C.R. on 23 and 24 Oct 52 amounted to 18 killed, 35 wounded and 14 missing as prisoners of war ((H.S.) 41OB25.065 (D7), "Korean Casualties") . A part of the first two classes of casualty were no doubt suffered by other companies; "B" Coy's losses are included in the totals. In default of more exact information, however, the total unit casualties for the two days must be taken as the best available figures.⁵⁸

138. Two immediate awards of the M.C. and one of the M.M., were made later. Capt Herbert George Cloutier, at that time in command of "E" Coy, won the M.C., together with Lt John Clark. The latter officer, as we have seen, was in command of No 5 Pl. Sgt Gerald Emerson Peter Enright was awarded the M.M. for his stout-hearted performance. The citations for several periodic awards mention the courage and skill shown during this engagement by other individuals. Of these, Major Francis Klenavic, who was acting in command of the unit, was awarded the M.B.E. Capt (A/Maj) George Gray Taylor, commander of "A" Coy, won the M.C. In addition, 2 George Maurice Fox.. C.S.M. of "E" Coy, and W.O.2 Leo Austin Johnson, C.S.M. of "A" Coy, were both awarded the M.M., their citations specially mentioning the good work they did during the attack on "B" Coy. ("Korean Citations" (under appropriate names; see also Appx "D"))

139. The divisional front was relatively quiet on 24 Oct, and continued so during the week which was left of 25 Bde's tour of duty on the right of the division's sector (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, October 1952: Appx "8" - 1 Comwel Div Ops/Int Summary, Nos 93 to 101). The respite gave 1 R.C.R. an opportunity to reorganize, and to restore its positions. "D" Coy 1 P.P.C.L.I. moved over into the 1 R.C.R. area, and "D" Coy 1 R.C.R. replaced it as a reserve company in the 1 P.P.C.L.I. area. "B" Coy 1 R.C.R. was re-organizing in the echelons, its place being temporarily taken by a company from 1 R. C. R. , 24 Oct 52) . On 25 Oct, the R.C.R. received 83 reinforcements, and by 27 Oct both "D" and "B" Coys were back in action in the battalion area. "D" Coy relieved "D" Coy 1 P.P.C.L.I. and "B" Coy relieved "A" Coy 1 R.F. (ibid 1 25 and 27 Oct 52). Next day, a patrol from the 1 R.C.R. pioneer platoon went out to the "VANCOUVER" position and blew up six bunkers which had been discovered soon after the engagement of 23/24 Oct and which were thought to have sheltered part of the attacking force (ibid, 28 Oct 52).

140. While 1 Comwel Div enjoyed a quiet period during the last week of October, 1 U.S. Marine Div to its left (west) was heavily attacked. On the night 26/27 Oct, the Chinese came in on the outposts covering the "HOOK" (1010), and even on the "HOOK" itself. Fighting began at 1940 hrs 26 Oct, and the situation, was not completely restored until 0625 hrs 28 Oct. (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, October 1952: Appx "8" - 1 Comwel Div Ops/Int Summary, Nos 96, 97)

⁵⁸ Appx "C" shows total casualties, by units, of the Korean fighting.

141. This attack was of more than passing interest to 1 Comwel Div, since the formation was also destined to spend some busy and trying hours defending the "HOOK". A more complete description of the feature will be given later, in the account of these engagements (paras 153, 154, 159 to 169, 232 below). Here it is sufficient to note that possession of the height, which lay west of the Sami-ch'on., immediately across the valley from the left battalion area of 29 Bde., was important in denying the enemy observation of a good part of our rear areas. Possibly for this reason the "HOOK" had attracted Chinese -attacks intermittently ever since its occupation by U.N. troops.

142. 2154 hrs 1 Nov, H.Q. 28 Britcom. Inf Bde relieved H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde (Ibid, 2 Nov 52). This relief was part of Operation "SOVEREIGN", an operation which also involved a change in 1 Comwel Div's boundaries. The change began at 2100 hrs 26 Oct, when 2 Bn of 11 Regt 1 ROK Div relieved 1 P.P.C.L.I. on the right of the Commonwealth division's front. The general line of 1 P.P.C.L.I.'s left boundary was followed by the new right boundary for the division. The left boundary was moved west during the night 3/4 Nov, when 1 B.W. of 29 Brit Inf Bde relieved 3 Bn of 7 Regt 1 U.S. Marine Div (ibid, October and November 1952: Appx "8" and "9" respectively - 1 Comwel Div Ops/Int Summary, Nos 96 and 104). The exact line of the new left boundary to the west of the "HOOK" cannot be determined from the sources now available.⁵⁹

143. As we have noted (para 42 above), the adjustment made during "SOVEREIGN" - or at least completed by the night 1/2 Dec - was the third and last major change in the boundaries of 1 Comwel Div.⁶⁰ The general effect of the moves was to reduce the division's front by one battalion area on the right (the area in rear of Hill 355 held by 1 P.P.C.L.I. prior to "SOVEREIGN") and to increase it by one battalion area west of the Sami-ch'on (the area occupied by 1 B.W.). As a result of the adjustment, 1 Comwel Div had to defend both the "HOOK" on the left and Hill 355 on the right of its sector. Fortunately, the Chinese appear to have transferred their interest from the former to the latter feature. In any case,, it is a fact that they did not again attempt any large-scale raids on Hill 355, though they did make two very determined efforts to expel the Commonwealth troops from the "HOOK".

⁵⁹ The maps attached to this report only cover the periods when 25 Bde was in a sector of the front line. The situation at the end of the first week of November 1952 might be made an exception to this rule, since a boundary change was involved. However available sources do not contain sufficient information to make mapping possible. Map "11" shows the front as of the early part of December 1952, when 1 Comwel Div had just stationed three brigades forward (para 155 below). It is likely that the boundaries reflected in this map are generally the same as those of November. The divisional right boundary is substantially the same as the left boundary of the right forward battalion throughout the period covered (cf. Maps "4"; "7"; also traces referred to in paras 99, 116 above). The left boundary shown in Map "11" may differ in one respect from the November boundary, since an operational instruction of that time (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 8, Aug 51 - 21 Feb 53: Appx "1" - 1 Comwel Div Op Instr No 57) gave the proposed November boundary as a straight line running slightly north of north west. The December left boundary, on the other hand, crossed the line of the F.D.Ls. at the same point as the boundary proposed for November and then veered sharply left for some 2000 yards before resuming a course parallel to the proposed November boundary. Available sources do not state whether this jog was followed in November, as a result of an amendment to the operational instruction, or whether it was put into the line in December.

⁶⁰ See Map "17"

Relief of 1 P.P.C.L.I. by 3 P.P.C.L.I., 3 Nov 52. Operation "IPPERWASH", Night 18/19 Nov 52.

144. On completion of the relief of 25 Bde and of the change in the divisional boundaries, 1 Comwel Div had two brigades in the line, 29 Bde being on the left of the divisional sector and 28 Bde on the right. 25 Bde was in reserve on "WYOMING", with 1 P.P.C.L.I. and 1 R. 22e R, on the left and right of the Sami-ch'on respectively, in rear of the forward positions. 1 R.C.R. was on the extreme right of the division's sector of "WYOMING" and the main brigade headquarters was at 189118, roughly in the centre of the line, (W.Ds., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 1 R.C.R., 1 R. 22e R., 2 Nov 52; 3 P.P.C.L.I., 1 Nov 52)

145. With exception a counter-attack by 3 P.P.C.L.I. - the units remained in these locations until the end of the month when the brigade returned to the front line, this time on the left of the divisional front (para 157 below). Except for the counter-attack mounted by 3 P.P.C.L.I., little occurred during November to distinguish this period in divisional reserve from previous ones. There were the usual training programmes, work on the "KANSAS" positions, movement of drafts to Japan on leave and so forth. Although most of the days were clear and warm, the nights were becoming quite cool, and the troops discovered heavy ground fogs or thin crusts of frozen soil at reveille. (Ibid, November 1952)

146. South of the Imjin, in the area of 1 P.P.C.L.I.'s "B" Echelon (223045), the Patricia's third battalion was preparing to relieve 1 P.P.C.L.I. (W.D., 3 P.P.C.L.I., 1 Nov 52). The unit was roughly 200 under strength, since the plan was for it to absorb the men of the first battalion (approximately 300 in number) who were not yet due for rotation ((H.S.) 41OB25.013 (D49); "Interview with Maj C.E.C. MacNeill, 3 P.P.C.L.I., 12 May 53", para 1). At noon on 3 Nov⁶¹ under command of Lt-Col H.F.

⁶¹ The unit diarist was under the impression that the relief took place on 4 Nov (W.D., 3 P.P.C.L.I., 4 Nov 52), and this may well be the date on which the unit actually began to function as replacement for 1 P.P.C.L.I. It is highly unlikely, however, that there could be. The maps attached to this report only cover the periods when 25 Bde was in a sector of the front line. The situation at the end of the first week of November 1952 might be made an exception to this rule, since a boundary change was involved. However available sources do not contain sufficient information to make mapping possible. Map "II" shows the front as of the early part of December 1952, when 1 Comwel Div had just stationed three brigades forward (para 155 below). It is likely that the boundaries reflected in this map are generally the same as those of November. The divisional right boundary is substantially the same as the left boundary of the right forward battalion throughout the period covered (cf. Maps 0-1111 .9 '17"; also traces referred to in paras 99, 116 above). The left boundary shown in Map 111111 may differ in one respect

Wood, 3 P.P.C.L.I. replaced 1 P.P.C.L.I. on the order of battle of 25 Cdn Inf Bde (W.D., H.Q, 25 Cdn Inf Bde, November 1952: Appx "6" Ops Log (entry for 031200 November 52)). The two units interchanged positions, the first to prepare for its return to Canada., the second to begin the last phase of its training for Operations in Korea⁶² (W.D., 3 P.P.P.C.L.I., 4, 5 Nov 52).

147. During this training period, 3 P.P.C.L.I. was responsible for counter-attacks to restore the "HOOK" positions held by 1 B.W., should any of these be taken by the enemy (ibid, 18 Nov 52). This responsibility gave rise to a rather unusual incident in the training programme, when it led to what was, in effect, one of the exercises (a rehearsal of the counter-attack plan) being run a second time, with live ammunition and a real enemy.

148. Mention has already been made of the "HOOK" (paras 141 and 143 above), the scene of, this action.⁶³ It now becomes necessary to describe the feature and its surroundings in some detail, since the defence of this area., which had already cost the Canadians some lives in March 1952 Report No 62, para 268). was to lead to further rather heavy casualties to other Commonwealth units before the end of the fighting in Korea (paras 153, 154, 232 below).

149. An unnamed tributary flows into the Sami-ch'on from the west., roughly three miles upstream from the point where the Sami-ch'on enters the Imjin river. The valley of this tributary is dominated on the south side by a crest line which runs from northwest to south-east. Hill 146, which lies within the angle enclosed by the Sami-ch'on and its tributary, forms the eastern end of the crest line. The "Hook"(103102) lies approximately 1500 yards north-west of Hill 146, and marks the western limit of, the portion of this hill system with which we are now concerned. Observation of the lower Sami-ch'on valley was possible from this feature, and for this reason its retention by the U.N. forces was essential. H.Q. 1 Comwel Div judged that, had it been lost to the enemy, a withdrawal of 4000 yards would have been necessary ((H.S.) 681.013 (D59): "The Comwel Div and the Defensive Battle", para 17).

from the November boundary, since an operational instruction of that time H.(-- 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 8,--Aug 51 - 21 Feb 53: Appx 11111 - 1 Comwel Div Op Instr No 57) gave the proposed November boundary as a straight line running slightly north of north west. The December left boundary, on the other hand, crossed the line of the F.D.Ls. at the some point as the boundary proposed for November and then veered sharply left for some 2000 yards before resuming a course parallel to the pro-posed November boundary. Available sources do not state whether this jog was followed in November, as a result of an amendment to the operational instruction, or whether it was put into the line in December.

⁶² At Appx "A" and "B" are Tables showing all rotations of units in Korea and Japan.

⁶³ See Map "10"

150. When 1 Comwel Div moved its left boundary west across the Sami-ch'on (para 142 above), 1 B.W. occupied three company areas in a line along the crest which has just been described. The left area covered the "HOOK", the right included Hill 146. The fourth company was on Hill 121, to the south of the "HOOK".⁶⁴ (W.D., 3 P.P.C.L.I. November 1952: Appx "D" - 3 P.P.C.L.I. Op Instr No 1, Op Ipperwash, Trace "P").

151. After its relief of 1 P.P.C.L.I., 3 P.P.C.L.I. occupied Area "7B", approximately 3000 yards south-east of the positions held by 1 B.W. Unlike its predecessor, the unit does not appear to have carried out an exercise at battalion level prior to assuming an active role, On 15 Nov. however, a rehearsal of Operation "IPPERWASH" - the counter-attacks in the 1 B.W. area - was conducted (ibid. 15 Nov 52), and it may well be that this was considered an adequate substitute for the battalion-level exercises with which the other units had concluded their training.

152. "IPPERWASH" provided for the restoration of three company areas - Hill 121 (after further penetration had been blocked), the centre forward company position and the "HOOK" itself. Troops were, to be transported forward to a debussing point at 113084, and to march from there to the forming up place appropriate to the area being counter-attacked. In addition, two companies were to be moved to the Samboktong feature (1008) and to Pt 98 (115091) as soon as possible after any heavy enemy attack developed.⁶⁵ ("3 P.P.C.L.I. Op Instr No 1, Op Ipperwash")

153. Three days after the rehearsal, on the night 18/19 Nov. the enemy moved in on the "HOOK", and it became necessary to launch an amended form of "IPPERWASH" as an actual operation of war. In view of the interest which attaches to this incident, it seems unfortunate that the rehearsal and the execution of this operation are not recorded in greater detail. From the account which is available (W.D., 3 P.P.C.L.I., 18, 19 Nov 52), it appears that the first move - the relief of "B" Coy 1 B.W. on Hill 146 by "B" Coy 3 P.P.C.L.I., - was not one provided for in the plan. The relief took place smoothly, and on its completion "B" Coy 3 P.P.C.L.I. remained comparatively undisturbed during the subsequent fighting. On being relieved, "B" Coy 1 B.W. put in a counter-attack., but this did not succeed in clearing the "HOOK". Accordingly it was decided to commit "C" Coy 3 P.P.C.L.I. and a troop of tanks of "B" Sqn Ld S.H. (R.C.) to this task. The action of this force is described as follows.

At 0315 hrs C Coy moved up complete with FOO, reserve amn and KSC [Korean Service Corps] porters. Major McPHAIL received his orders at 0430 hrs in the vicinity BW CP. CPO By 0530 hrs C Coy had reached their FUP. As the situation still was not clear the company deployed, waited, then crossed the start line at first light (0615 hrs). The long wait in the bitter cold was very uncomfortable. The temperature had fallen to 10 degrees.

9 Pl under Lt Halahan moved first to the shoulder of the HOOK feature. 8 Pl under 2-Lt Anderson and 7 Pl with Lt Marvin passed through in succession to the top of HOOK.

⁶⁴ See Map "10"

⁶⁵ See Map "10"

Just prior to the arrival of the two platoons, all enemy except the dead had vacated the feature. Evacuation of enemy casualties was still taking place on spur leading to WARSAW [104107] outpost.

As the BW troops on HOOK had suffered heavy casualties and the entire position had been knocked about and disorganized, the two platoons posted sentries and then assisted in the evacuation of casualties.

Lt Marvin accompanied by a BW corporal and one private moved out toward WARSAW in search of casualties who were known to be there. An enemy SMG fired from the bunker area on WARSAW, wounded Lt Marvin and killed the BW private. Others of the party were prevented from reaching them because of enemy small arms fire. Lt Marvin managed to crawl back to a ridge behind which the rest of the party and some others who had come to their assistance were gathered. The group then withdrew to HOOK under continual small arms and mortar fire. During the withdrawal Lt Marvin was again hit. The others were untouched.

Throughout the morning the HOOK feature was subjected to sporadic shell and mortar fire., which inflicted some casualties. Shelling decreased in the afternoon, and by evening only the occasional one landed in the area. (Ibid, 19 Nov 52)

154. "B" and "C" Coys 3 P.P.C.L.I. remained where they were for several days, under command of 1 B.W. The latter unit had suffered rather heavy casualties in the engagement, and required the companies to man two of its localities while it reorganized. On 22 Nov, "C" Coy was relieved, and two days later "B" Coy rejoined the battalion (ibid., 22, 24 Nov 52). The remainder of the month was spent in training, and In preparation for 25 Bde's return to the forward positions (ibid. 22 to 30 Nov 52). 25 Cdn Inf Bde on the "HOOK".. Development of Field Defences

155. On 29 Nov, 1 Comwel Div commenced a redeployment which it completed on the night 1/2 Dec (1 Comwel Div: Diary of Op Events, 1 Nov 52 - 1 Apr 53, pp 3, 4). The object was to place three brigades in the line, each with two battalions forward (1 Comwel Div: Periodic Report, 1 Nov 52 - 1 Apr 53, para 16; also Map "A") . Maj-Gen -West summarized the advantages to be gained from such a layout as follows:

The advantages of this are that Brigade Commanders now have:

- a. A two - battalion frontage instead of a three - battalion one, which Was proving too much for them to control properly.
- b. Their own reserve battalion with which to counter attack and with which to carry out inter-battalion reliefs at their own convenience.
- c. A complete sector in depth instead of just a front line. (Ibid)

156. As part of this redeployment, 25 Cdn Inf Bde moved back into the line on the left of the divisional front, in the "HOOK" area. Available records do not show the exact time when the formation took command of its sector; it was supposed to have done so when 3 P.P.C.L.I. had completed the relief of 1 B.W. on the "HOOK" at 0600 hrs (W.D. H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, November 1952: Appx "40" - 25 Cdn Inf Bde Op Instr No 46, para 2 (c) (iii)). In point of fact, 3 P.P.C.L.I.'s relief of 1 B.W. was not completed until 0645 hrs (W.D., 3 P.P.C.L.I., 1 Dec 52), and this is in all probability the time when 25 Bde became responsible for the "HOOK" and "YONGDONG" features.

157. As we have seen, 3 P.P.C.L.I. was on the "HOOK" 1 R. 22e R. had taken over the "YONGDONG" system to the east of the Sami-ch'on, the river thus, splitting the brigade front in two. In rear of 3 P.P.C.L.I. and west of the Sami-ch'on lay 1 R.C.R. This last-named unit had occupied 3 P.P.C.L.I.'s former positions in area "7B", except that it had one company forward, under command of 3 P.P.C.L.I. "E" Coy 1 R.C.R. had been disbanded early in November (W.D., 12 Nov 52). To the east of the Canadians was 29 Bde; 28 Bde still held the right portion of the divisional sector.⁶⁶ (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, December 1952: Appx "7" - 25 Cdn Inf Bde Ops/Int Summary, 3 Dec 52, Trace "P"; Appx "10A", "28 Britcom Inf Bde Intrep No 229"; "1 Comwel Div: Diary of Op Events 1 Nov 52 -1 Apr 53", p. 3).

158. The Canadian brigade held these positions for two months., until 2 U.S. Inf Div relieved 1 Comwel Div at the end of January 1953 (para 175 below). The period was a relatively quiet one, the most important activity being the preparation of much stronger defensive works than had been used hitherto by Commonwealth troops. The greater part of this work was done on the "HOOK", which was held by 3 P.P.C.L.I. in December, and by 1 R.C.R. in January.⁶⁷

159. In October., it will be recalled, the enemy's preparatory artillery concentrations had so pulverized the field defences of "B" Coy 1 R.C.R. that effective resistance from them was impossible. the division shifted left in November., to occupy the "HOOK", work on tunnels into this feature started almost immediately. During, the attack on 1 B.W., the enemy artillery again flattened the open defences on the "HOOK". This time., however, the defenders were able to take shelter in the tunnels as soon as their trenches were invaded, and call down artillery fire on the Chinese above, who were attempting to consolidate their gains. (1 Comwel Div: Diary of Op Events, 1 Nov 52 -1 Apr 53" p. 2)

160. When 3 P.P.C.L.I. and 1 R. 22e R. took over the forward battalion areas on each side of the Sami-ch'on, engineers assisted them to restore and strengthen the position.⁶⁸ Top priority was given to

⁶⁶ See Map "11".

⁶⁷ See Map "12".

⁶⁸ The account of the work, as given in this and the following eight paragraphs, is derived from:

- a. W.D., 23 Fd Sqn, December 1952, January 1953.
- b. Ibid, February 1953: Appx "9" - Report on Defensive Works, Hook Area.
- c. Ibid: Appx "14" - Traces.
- d. W.D., 1 R.C.R., January 1953.
- e. Ibid: Appx "35" - Handover Notes (reference here is to the sketches, in red, of the positions of "B" and "C" Coys which are attached to these Notes but are not mentioned in the text).
- f. W.D., 3 P.P. C.L.I., December 1952.

the "HOOK" -area and a troop from 23 Fd Sqn began work there on the day following 3 P.P.C.L.T.'s relief of 1 B.W.⁶⁹ Later, the greater part of the squadron was employed on the "HOOK", together with three companies of South Korean labourers, the whole working three eight-hour shifts per day. The defences prepared for 1 R. 22e R. on the "YONGDONG" feature were not so extensive, and engineer assistance there was limited to the provision of supervisory personnel. Their effort centred on a tunnel leading from the rear of the feature to an artillery observation post on the forward slope, a "double-decker" bunker and a command post within the hill.

161. To make it possible for the reader to place the more elaborate works which were prepared on the "HOOK", it is necessary to describe this feature in somewhat greater detail than has been done previously (paras 141, 143, 148 to 150 above). Viewed from above, the upper levels of this height ran from north-west to south-east, and were roughly rectangular in outline. A shoulder ran out from the south-west corner, in a line curving to the north-west. Two small features, "RONSON" (101102) and "SEATTLE" (100103) lay on this shoulder, the former 100 yards out, the latter a further 150 yards from the forward defended localities on this corner of the "HOOK". Two spurs projected from the north-west corner, the first running north-west into the valley of the Sami-ch on's tributary and the second, separated from the first by a gully, due north to a height called (104107). The ridge on which the "HOOK" lay carried on to the south-east, to Hill. 146. Immediately south-east of the "HOOK", the top of this ridge was quite broad and reasonably level, but it narrowed considerably at the point where it ran into Hill 146. To the south of the "HOOK", lay Hill 121, a very shallow, curving saddle connecting the two features. It was on the "HOOK", the area immediately to its right and Hill 121 that these tunnels, trenches and bunkers were concentrated, together with one observation post and an underground machine gun position.

162. When this work was started., a trench-line of sorts ran along the north-west and north-east faces of the "HOOK". Another ran along the south-west face. This last, however, stopped short of the south-west corner, "WINDY CORNER", and was joined by a cross-trench to the line on the north-east face. Three tunnels had been dug in the "HOOK", running in from the trenches on the south-west., north-west and north-east faces. The company position immediately to the right of the "HOOK" ran south-east in a relatively narrow line. A single trench, which soon forked into two roughly parallel lines, ran along the position from left to right. Here three tunnels had also been dug, one running in from the single trench, the other two entering the slope from the lower of the two lines of trenches - the line, that is, along the south-west face.

163. When 23 Fd Sqn took over., the first leg of each of these tunnels had been completed from an entrance in the trench-line opposite a fire bay to an underground chamber. It remained for the Canadian engineers to complete the excavation of some of the chambers and to run a second leg of each tunnel from the chamber to a new entrance either in the same trench-line or in an adjacent one. This was done

⁶⁹ This engineer work proved both difficult and dangerous, and an engineer officer, Lt Charles David Carter was awarded the M.C. partly as a result of his good work on the "HOOK" ("Korean Citations" (Lt Carter)).

by the end of January, 368 feet being added to the existing tunnels, largely through solid rock. Plans to link up all the tunnels, however, were not executed.

164. The tunnels were five feet six inches deep and three feet six inches wide. They were sharply angled a few feet in from the entrance, to minimize the effect of blast, and grenade traps were constructed at these turns. The legs were dug from both ends, and some difficulty had been experienced at the junction. In one case, there was a difference of ten feet in level between the two stretches of, the tunnel; a ladder had to be placed in the well which was dug to connect them.

165. The greater part of the trenching work consisted in deepening and revetting the original trenches, although several new lines were dug. Of the latter, the one at "WINDY CORNER" was the most important, since it completed the line along the south-west face of the "HOOK". Work was done on the trenches in all three company areas. For the most part, hand tools were employed, although a compressed-air drill was used on the rear positions on the "HOOK", a special bunker being built for the compressor unit. Rock, frozen ground and the fact that work in exposed trenches had to be done at night tended to slow progress. In spite of these and other difficulties 650 yards of new trench were dug, in addition to the deepening of the original system.

166. In view of the important role played by our artillery in breaking up enemy attacks, special care was given to the construction of an observation post from which the Forward Observation Officers could command a good view of the battlefield, uninterrupted by enemy attack or shelling. For this, a large underground chamber was built in the "HOOK", and a tunnel was run from it to a second, smaller chamber immediately under the surface of the peak of the hill. An observation slit was opened in the wall of this second chamber, and the ground in front of the slit was cratered to improve the field of view. The gunners themselves, with engineer supervision, ran a tunnel 80 feet long into Hill 146, and built a second underground observation post at the end of it.

167. Plans were also made to construct three underground machine-gun positions, by running branch tunnels out from the main tunnels, under the forward trenches and thence to the hillside below these trenches. A firing slit was then to be made in the hillside, following which the chamber for the crew would be excavated. Only one of these projected positions was completed, on the western end of the company area to the right of the "HOOK", below the single trench-line mentioned previously.

168. The infantry also busied themselves in strengthening the positions, laying wire on the ridges leading to "RONSON" and "WARSW" and in the Sami-ch'on valley, and placing steel overhead covers, provided by the engineers, on firing bays and weapon slits. The engineers also dug two prefabricated personnel bunkers into the "HOOK", and prepared the excavations for six more on Hill 121. Thus, as January wore on, the "HOOK" area came to have some of the defensive strength which an almost unbelievably vigorous digging programme, had long ago given to the main Chinese positions.

169. While all this was being done, a good deal of attention was directed to training - or refreshing the training of the infantry in the defence, and in the construction of the field defences for which the infantry is responsible. A model fire trench was prepared near brigade headquarters, and groups of

junior officers were brought in from the battalions to inspect it (W.D., 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 11 Jan 53). The South Koreans had apparently dug in the Chinese manner, much more extensively than had the Canadian and British troops. Accordingly visits were made to one of the battalions in the II ROK Corps area, to view the underground works there (W.D., 1 R. 22e R. 7 Jan 53). In December, also, Brigadier Bogert lectured the 1 R.C.R. officers on the organization of a defensive position, and the siting of infantry weapons (W.D., 1 R.C.R., 10 Dec 52).

The Defence of the "HOOK", December 1952 and January 1953, Operation "THAMES"., 27 to 30 Jan 53.

170. Meanwhile, of course, the fighting went on, but at a reduced tempo. The heavy Chinese attacks of October and November were not renewed in the following two months, and patrolling and patrol encounters dominate the record of this period. This statement should not be taken as implying that the troops in the line were idle, for the direct opposite is the case. Standing, reconnaissance, ambush and fighting patrols, together with frequent "stand to's" under warning of Chinese attack, provided constant employment. During January, there were indications that the patrol policy which had been in effect in May and June (paras 64, 73, 77 above) was about to be revived. Reporting on this development, Maj-Gen West wrote:

During January there was a drive throughout 8th Army to get more POW and there were indications that I Corps was going to bring out a patrol policy ordering every forward battalion to send out so many patrols per night or week. To forestall this I issued a special divisional patrol policy... and this has had the desired effect as we have now received a Corps instruction deprecating the practice of laying down an arbitrary number of patrols to be carried out by forward units.

With the change over in Army Commanders there has been a noticeable increase in centralization in the control of patrols. Strict almost hide-bound, orders are in force regarding the briefing of patrols and any setback, however minor, is the subject of a searching inquiry in U.S. units - indeed the unfortunate patrol commander may even have to report to the Army Commander. As a result there is a tendency in U.S. units for patrols to become less and less aggressive. I anticipate that we shall have to patrol and fight exceptionally hard in order to regain NO MAN'S LAND when we return to the line.

Periodic Report: 1 Comwel Div, 1 Nov to 1 Apr 53 , paras 18, 19)

171. The patrol policy (ibid: Appx "A" - G.O.C. Personal Memorandum No. 9, 23 Jan 53) mentioned in the first paragraph quoted above stressed the importance of giving each patrol a specific task. It deplored the practice of patrolling for patrolling's sake (sending "so many patrols per so many days"), and stated that the tactical situation on each battalion and even company front must dictate the patrol plan for that front. Apparently the staff at H.Q. I.U.S. Corps was persuaded of the wisdom of this doctrine, and accordingly abandoned plans to impose a rigid patrol plan on the whole corps front, regardless of differences in the tactical situation. This change made it possible to adjust patrol plans to

the requirements of individual sectors. As a result, it was possible to assign specific tasks to patrols and thereby avoid routine patrolling, with its destructive effects on morale & patrol methods.

172. On the Canadian front., two widely-different conditions existed. The left flank, in the "RONSON", "SEATTLE" and "WARSAW" areas, was in very close contact with the enemy. To the right, contact was not so close, since the opposing troops were separated by the broad Sami-ch'on valley. Patrolling was equally vigorous on both flanks, those sent in from the right being much longer than the ones from the left. No really serious contacts developed from these patrols, however, the action in most cases being for our patrol to withdraw on detecting enemy and to bring down an artillery or mortar concentration on the spot where the Chinese group was moving. (W.D., 3 P.P.C.L.I., December 1952., Appx "B2" - 25 Cdn Inf Bde Ops/Int Summary, December 1952, W.D., 1 R.C.R., January 1953: Appx "22" - 25 Cdn Inf Bde Ops/Int Summary, January 1953). The right of the divisional front, however, was not so quiet. Patrols of 28 Britcom Inf Bde became involved in several bloody encounters in the Hill 355 - Point 227 area, and suffered rather heavy casualties (1 Comwel Div; Diary of Op Events, 1 Nov 52 - 1 Apr 53, pp. 4-7).

173. On 28 Dec, 3 P.P.C.L.I. and 1 R.C.R. exchanged positions, one company of the former battalion remaining forward under command of the relieving unit (W.D., 3 P.P.C.L.I., 28 Dec 52). Little remains to be added to the record of 3 P.P.C.L.I.'s first month in action except perhaps to mention the spectacular tokens of Christmas spirit which were produced by the Chinese during the last two weeks of December. These culminated, three days before Christmas, in an attractive display of Christmas trees, cards and gifts, the whole surmounted by a huge banner over twenty feet long, which the dawn's early light brought into view on "RONSON", less than 100 yards from the Canadian forward positions (ibid, 22 Dec 52).

174. 1 R.C.R.'s month on the "HOOK", likewise, was not distinguished by many events which require special mention. Although the unit patrolled actively, few contacts were made, and none of these resulted in heavy casualties. On the night 12/13 Jan 53, a patrol to "SEATTLE" had several of its members wounded by a grenade which a Chinese soldier threw at the assault group, just as it was approaching a trench on the northern end of the feature. The explosion wounded the patrol leader and forced a withdrawal, which the enemy followed with mortar and small arms fire. Except for a few similar incidents, the month's patrolling was uneventful, nor did the enemy bestir himself actively in the immediate vicinity of the "HOOK" positions.⁷⁰ The 1 R.C.R. snipers, to whose training particular attention had been paid in November when the unit was in reserve, ran up an impressive score of kills, and the unit pounded the enemy unmercifully with concentrations of mortar and artillery fire. Toward the end of the month, preparations for a handover to a U.S. Army unit were added to these activities, and on 30 Jan 1 R.C.R. moved off the "HOOK", on relief by 2 Bn 38 Inf Regt 2 U.S. Inf Div. (W.D., 1 R.C.R., January 1953; also 25 Cdn Inf Bde Ops/Int Summary, January 1953 (att as Appx "22")).

⁷⁰ The military skill and power of leadership displayed by Lt Dan Gordon Loomis (1 R.C.R.) during the patrols of this period are mentioned in his citation for the M.C. ("Korean Citations") (Lt Loomis)).

175. Early In the morning of 30 Jan, H.Q 25 Cdn Inf Bde passed responsibility for its sector to the headquarters of the American regiment, and moved to a reserve area some seven miles south of the Imjin-Hantan junction (25 Cdn Inf Bde Ops/Int Summary, 31 Jan 53). This move was part of Operation "THAMES", in which 1 Comwel Div, on relief by 2 U.S. Inf Div, went into reserve for the first time since its formation in July 1951 (1 Comwel Div: Diary of Op Events, 1 Nov 52 - 1 Apr 53, pp 6-7). On 2 Nov H.Q. 1 Comwel Div had completed a year in the same position (ibid, p. 1). Although the headquarters of the infantry brigades had made short moves into and out of the line, the formation had been static since the adjustments which followed Operation "COMMANDO". Possibly as a result of this state of affairs, H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde had acquired an enormous amount of baggage, including a prefabricated mess, and had reached an actual strength of approximately 200 all ranks. Apparently the same sort of thing had happened to U.S. Army units in Korea, for the diarist of the Canadian brigade headquarters mentions that H.Q. 38 Inf Regt was 300 strong. (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 23 Dec 52, 29 Jan 53)

THE LAST SIX MONTHS-FEBRUARY TO JULY 1953

1 Comwel Div in Reserve, 30 Jan to 8 Apr 53. Operations to 2 May 53

176. 1 Comwel Div remained in reserve from 30 Jan until 8 Apr.⁷¹ In addition to normal training, which included one exercise on corps level, two developments of some importance occurred during this period. The first was the beginning of a scheme to augment the infantry units of 1 Comwel Div by the addition of South Korean soldiers. The other was the beginning of the second rotation of Canadian units in Korea.⁷²

177. Normal training was conducted while the division was in reserve. Exercises on unit brigade and divisional level were carried out, but unusually heavy rains in March interfered. The largest exercise was "EVEREADY", directed by H.Q. I U.S. Corps and aimed at practicing the reserves, especially 1 Comwel Div, in their counter-attack roles. Divisional headquarters, the whole of 29 Bde and the headquarters of the other two brigades (each with the headquarters of its infantry battalions) moved to the Chorwon area., to counter a supposed enemy penetration in that sector. In spite of the long time which 1 Comwel Div had spent in a static role, it claims to have completed the move smoothly. (1 Comwel Div: Diary of Op Events, 1 Nov 52 -1 Apr 53, pp 7 to 10).

178. While in reserve, 1 Comwel Div was reinforced by South Korean soldiers, under the "KATCOM" (Korean Augmentation to Commonwealth) programme. On 15 Mar, H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde published an instruction covering the scheme as it applied to the Canadian brigade. Approximately

⁷¹ Available sources do not give the exact date and time of the relief of H.Q. 1 Comwel Div by H.Q. 2 U.S. Inf Div. However, H.Q. 1 Comwel Div moved back during the daylight hours of 30 Jan (see p. 8 of source cited at end of para 177) and it is presumed that the relief took place early in the morning of this day. The date when H.Q. 1 Comwel Div again assumed responsibility for the sector is precisely established (para 186 below).

⁷² See Appendices "A" & "B".

100 South Korean soldiers were to be integrated in each of the infantry battalions, on the scale of three to a section. Unlike the Korean Service Corps personnel who were employed as porters, servants, and so forth, these "KATCOMS" were to be used to augment the fighting strength of the units. (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, March 1953: Appx "28" - Op Instr No. 54, "KATCOM").

179. The scheme appears to have started "according to plan", 3 P.P.C.L.I. and 3 R.C.R. receiving their allotments on 28 Mar and 1 Apr respectively (W.D., 3 P.P.C.L.I. 28 Mar 53; W.D., 3 R.C.R., April 1953: Appx "1 a", "1 b", "1 d" - W.Ds. "A", "B", and "D" Coys, 1 and 2 Apr 53). The unit diarist of 1 R. 22e R. does not mention the arrival of the "KATCOMS", but it is certain that the battalion received its share of these South Korean soldiers at the end of March or the first part of April ((H.S.) 410 B 25.013 (D 41); "Interview with Lt-Col L.F. Trudeau D.S.O., O.B.E., C.D., C.O. 1 R. 22e R., 21 Apr 53", para 11).

180. As could be expected, differences in language, outlook, customs, pay and so forth created problems, and no simple judgment on the success of the scheme is possible. Lt-Col E.A.C. Amy, then G.S.O. 1 at H.Q. 1 Comwel Div, was of the opinion that the scheme succeeded in proportion to each commander's determination to make it work ((H.S.) 681.009 (D 9): "Interview with Lt Col E.A.C. D.S.O., M.C., G.S.O. 1 R.1, 1 Comwel Div, 12 Jun 53", para 18). The commanding officers of 3 R.C.R. and 3 R. 22e R. have both mentioned difficulties which they encountered ((H.S.) 410 B 25.013 (D 57) "Interview with Lt Col K.L. Campbell M.B.E., C.D., C.O. 3 R.C.R., 27 Jun 53". para 39, W.D., 3 R. 22e R., April 1954: Appx "5 c" - Summary of Korean Experience, para 4 (1)). It should be noted, however, that the scheme provided much-needed manpower, and that South Korean soldiers did in fact serve in battle, some of them becoming casualties (para 230 below).

181. The last week of March saw the beginning of the second rotation of Canadian units in Korea. The reliefs were spread over two months, the last being completed towards the end of May⁷³ On 25 Mar 3 R.C.R. (Lt-Col K.L. Campbell, M.B.E., C.D.) replaced 1 R.C.R. Two days later 56 Tpt Coy (Maj E.G. Hession) relieved 23 Tpt Coy; next day 59 Indep Fd Sqn (Maj L.E.C. Schmidlin, M.B.E., C.D.) took over from 23 Fd Sqn. 191 Cdn Inf 77 ksp, which had not been replaced during the first rotation, was relieved by 23 Inf Wksp (Maj V.W. Bethel) on 16 Apr. Five days later, 3 R. 22e R. (Lt-col J.L.G. Poulin, C.D.) took over from 1 R. 22e R. and on the following day 81 Fd Regt (Lt-Col H.W. Sterne, M.B.E., C.D.) replaced 1 R.C.H.A. on 1 May 38 Fd Amb (Lt-Col R.A. Smillie) relieved 37 Fd Amb. The rotation was completed on 24 May when "A" Sqn Ld S.H. (R.C.) (Maj W.H. Ellis, C.D.) took "B" Sqn's place. In general, this second rotation was conducted in much the same manner as the first, but there were two important differences.

182. The first concerns the infantry battalions. In the 1952 rotation, as we have seen, the problem was to find sufficient trained infantrymen to bring the first battalions to an acceptable strength, and still leave behind in Canada a force large enough to be capable of discharging the Mobile Striking Force

⁷³ With the exception of 56 Tpt Coy, all dates of relief shown are derived from the unit's war diary for the day in question. 56 Tpt Coy's War Diary for March 1953 shows the date at Appendix "6" - Monthly Report on Ops. Appendices "A" and "B" show all rotations of units in Korea and Japan.

commitment (paras 20 to 27 above). In the second rotation, on the other hand, this problem does not appear to have been so acute. It was replaced, however, by another, though perhaps not so serious, difficulty. During the summer of 1952 (the last period in which effective continuous training could be done prior to departure for Korea) both 3 R.C.R. and 3 R. 22e R. were responsible for preparing themselves for service in Korea and also for training reinforcements for that theatre. This double commitment made heavy demands on the units, though neither of the commanding officers considered that it prejudiced their preparations seriously. (Interview with Lt Col Campbell, para 2; (H.S.) 410 B 25.013 (D 53): "Interview with Lt Col J.L.G. Poulin, C.D., C.O. 3 R. 22e R., 31 May 53", para 3)

183. Another difference lay in the fact that the units which went to Korea during the second rotation were, with two exceptions, relatively new units. During the first rotation the Special Force units in Korea were replaced by original units of the Active Force. In the second rotation, these older units were relieved by units formed during and after 1950. Of these latter units the third battalions were the oldest, having been formed late in 1950 (A.H.Q. [Report No. 62](#), paras 82 to 84). The transport company and the field squadron were formed in August 1951 (Supplements to C.A.Os., Issue No. 245 (Part B) of 1951). The field regiment and the field ambulance were formed in April and May of 1952 respectively, the former from three field batteries originally organized to provide replacements for 79 Fd Regt of 27 Cdn Inf Bde Gp (Supplements to C.A.Os., Issues 283 and 238 (Part B) of 1952; D.H.S. 9-26-0: S.D. 1 Letter No. 4451 of 22 Apr 52). In contrast, the workshop which replaced 191 Cdn Inf Wksp was one of the original Active Force units, and the armoured squadron, of course, was from a still older unit.

184. It will be observed that, with this second rotation, service in Korea had become fairly widespread among the units of the Canadian Army. Originally it was thought to confine service in that country to units specially raised for the purpose. However the duration of the conflict led to several of the original units of the Active Force becoming involved. Now, in the second. rotation, units were sent to Korea even though they had been organized in connection with (but not necessarily expressly for) the formation of the brigade group for Europe.

185. Command of 25 Cdn Inf Bde changed on 21 Apr 53, when Brigadier J.V. Allard, O.B.E., E.D. relieved Brigadier Bogert (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 21 Apr 53). The new commander had led 6 Cdn Inf Bde in North-West Europe during the latter part of the Second World War. Previously, he had commanded R. 22e R. in the Italian theatre. In November 1945 he was appointed Canadian Military Attaché in Moscow, an appointment which he held for two years. Immediately prior to his posting to Korea, Brigadier Allard had occupied the appointment of V.Q.M.G. at Army Headquarters. (PN 12-53)

186. Operation "COTSWOLD", I Comwel Div's relief of 2 U.S. Inf Div. began on 6 Apr. Two days later the Commonwealth formation assumed responsibility for the sector. On completion of the operation, 29 Bde was astride the Sami-ch'on, in the positions held by 25 Bde prior to the division's relief in January. 25 Bde was in the central sector while 28 Bde was back again in the positions about

Hill 355.⁷⁴ (1 Comwel Div: Diary of Op Events, 1 Apr - 1 Aug 53, p. 1; H.Q, 25 Cdn Inf Bde, April 1953; Appx "39" 1 Comwel Div Ops/Int Summary, Nos 201, 202)

187. During the relief, H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde took over from H.Q. 23 Inf Regt at 0600 hours on 8 Apr. Within the Canadian sector, 1 R. 22e R. was on the left and 3 P.P.C.L.I. on the right. 3 R.C.R. was in reserve near the junction of the Sami-ch'on and the Imjin river. It may be of interest to note that 3 P.P.C.L.I., when it relieved the Thailand battalion, occupied an area much the same as that taken by 2 P.P.C.L.I. early in October 1951. (1 Comwel Div Ops/ Int Summary, Nos 201 and 202; W.D., 1 R. 22e R., April 1953: Appx "12" - 1 R. 22e R. Jamestown Line Coy and Sp Pls Posns; W.D., 3 P.P.C.L.I., April 1953: Appx "26" - Trace of 3 P.P.C.L.I, Posns April 1953; A.H.Q. [Report No. 62](#), Map "8"; 1 Comwel Div: Diary of Op Events, 1 Apr - 1 Aug 53, Map "B")

188. The month of April was relatively quiet and the division settled back into its front-line routine without serious interruption from the enemy. On 20 Apr, 3 R.C.R, and 1 R. 22e R. exchanged positions, preparatory to the latter's relief by 3 R. 22e R (W.D., 1 R. 22e R., 20 Apr 53; *ibid*: Appx "5" - O.O. No 5, para 3). As had been the case with 3 P.P.C.L.I., completion of the move into the front line placed 3 R.C.R. in substantially the same area as had been occupied by 2 R.C.R, during Operation "COMMANDO".⁷⁵

189. On the night 23/24 Apr there were patrol contacts on all sectors of the divisional front. These were relatively minor affairs but they did result in the capture of a prisoner, the first taken by the division since October. Unfortunately the prisoner died before identification could be established. (1 Comwel Div: Periodic Report No. 6: Appx "B", Pt II, "Enemy Ops", p. 2; 1 Comwel Div, Diary of Op Events 1 Apr - 1 Aug 53, p. 3)

190. Meanwhile, agreement respecting an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners had been signed at Panmunjom on 11 Apr. Some details of the negotiations which preceded this agreement are recorded elsewhere (para 279 below). Operation "LITTLE SWITCH" as the exchange was called, resulted in two Canadians returning from captivity. Of these Pte Arthur Baker had been captured during the attack on 2 R. 22e R. in November 1951 (A.H.Q. [Report No. 62](#), para 263; PN 115-53), while L/Cpl Paul Dugal, then serving with 1 R. 22e R., was taken in June 1952, during the special efforts being made by 1 Comwel Div at that time to capture prisoners (para 77 above; PN 114-53). The return of L/Cpl Dugal derived special significance from the fact that he had kept a careful record of other prisoners whom he met while in the hands of the Chinese. From this record he was able to provide valuable information on the status of several individuals whose fate had, until then, been

⁷⁴ See Map "14".

⁷⁵ Two further reliefs took place in May and June. On 14 May, 3 R. 22e R. replaced 3 P.P.C.L.I. on the right of the brigade front; on 8 Jun the latter unit took over from 3 R.C.R. on the brigade's left battalion area, Traces or marked maps of the positions occupied are attached to the War Diaries of 3 R. 22e R., and 3 P.P.C.L.I. as Appendices "1A and "11" respectively.

unknown or in doubt. Partially as a reward for his excellent work in this direction, Dugal was awarded the B.E.M. ("Citations for Korean Campaign" (L/Cpl Paul Dugal)).

Field Defences, Wire, Minefields and Fire Plan in the Central Sector

191. This report has not as yet described the arrangements for defence (layout, use of artificial obstacles, fire plans and so forth) within the Commonwealth sector in the detail called for by the nature and scale of the operations conducted by 1 Comwel Div after the stalemate had developed in Korea. From the latter part of November 1951 to the armistice, the fighting consisted of minor defensive engagements, usually on the section and platoon level. In recording this sort of action, the layout of platoons and even sections, minor folds in the ground, construction of weapon pits, arcs of fire of individual weapons and such like assume a greater importance than they do in the accounts of larger operations. Consequently, it is proposed to undertake at this point as detailed a description as possible of the 3 R.C.R. defences in the Hill 187 area⁷⁶, in order to present the terrain, layout, field defences and fire plan of a typical battalion area. It is to be noted that much of the detail given here is typical of the central sector only. More elaborate works had been constructed in the "HOOK" and "LITTLE GIBRALTAR" areas after October 1952, when the attack on 1 R.C.R. demonstrated the vulnerability to hostile artillery of their comparatively light defences. Nothing much was done in the central sector, since the width of no man's land was held to justify a concentration of engineer resources on the left and right, where contact was closer. As a result, much of what is written here about the 3 R.C.R. area may be applied to the whole Commonwealth sector of the pre-October 1952 period, and to the central sector throughout. This account, read with that of the "HOOK" development (paras 159 to 169 above), gives a reasonably complete picture of defence in the Commonwealth division's sector during the whole of the formations static defensive operations in Korea (mid-November 1951 to July 1953). The present account also serves as an introduction to the narrative which follows of the attack on "C" Coy 3 R.C.R, on the night 2/3 May 53.

192. The terrain within the battalion area was typical of that along the greater part of the "JAMESTOWN" line.⁷⁷ The area fronted on the valley of an unnamed tributary running north-east from the Sami-ch'on; the highest ground in the area, Hill 187, lay in the north-east corner. Three irregular fingers of high ground radiated out from this feature to the north-west, to the west and to the south-west. Hill 159 (142137) rose from the last-named of these ridges, and three additional fingers ran west from it, roughly paralleling, each other and the ridge which ran west from Hill 187. At least the

⁷⁶ The information contained in paras 191 to 214 is derived from the following sources:

- (a) (H.S.) 681.009 (D9): "Interview with Lt Col E.A.C. Amy D.S.O., M.C., G.S.O.1 1 Comwel Div, 6 Aug 53", paras 6 to 14.
- (b) (H.S.) 681.013 (D63): "Fd Defs 1 Comwel Div to Feb 53".
- (c) (H.S.) 410B25.013 (D51): "Interview with Brigadier J.V. Allard, C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D., Comd 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 10 Jun 53".
- (d) (H.S.) 410B25.013 (D57): "Interview with Lt Col K.L. Campbell, M.B.E., C.D., C.O. 3 R.C.R., 27 Jun 53".
- (e) (H.S.) 681.011 (D1): "Personal Recollections of Fd Wks of "JAMESTOWN", "WYOMING", & "KANSAS" by Capt J.R. Madden, September 1954".

⁷⁷ Map "14".

northern two of these four ridges running west were open to observation from Hill 166 (122156), which lay on the enemy's side of the valley.

193. All these ridges and hills were steep-sided, and their slopes were scalloped by gullies and folds of varying depths. These depressions made it difficult - and in most cases impossible - to cover the slopes running down from any given locality by direct small arms fire from a flank. At the same time, the sternness of the hillsides sharply limited the fields of fire of L.M.G.s; and rifles firing to the front down these gullies, unless the firer exposed himself to a dangerous extent above the lip of his fire bay. To further complicate the problem of covering the immediate approaches to the localities by direct small arms fire, the hillsides were covered with shrubs and long grass which, even in winter, gave good cover from view to a crouching man.

194. The ground between the ridges and hills varied from narrow, bush-choked ravines to wide, flat-bottomed valleys floored with paddy. Within the battalion area in question, three roughly parallel valleys separated the four fingers of high ground which have already been mentioned. At night these valleys offered an approach to the heart of the battalion area, while the ravines and gullies which ran into the slopes from these valleys offered covered approaches, up the sides of the fingers.

195. In the valleys the earth was rich, deep and dark-coloured, Towards the summit of the ridges, it was mixed with a shale rock, which was easy to split but hard to dig. At this level, the soil was yellowish-red in colour, with a clay content which made it soggy when wet, but had the advantage of holding up reasonably well at the edges of any digging which was not revetted. Even at the tops of the hills the soil was surprisingly deep. Trenches could be dug there to a depth of at least six feet without striking solid rock.

196. The battalion area, in common with the others in 1 Comwel Div's sector, was laid out in defended localities, according to the doctrine stated in Chapter VI of The Infantry Division in Battle 1950. It may be remarked in passing that this doctrine had so commended itself to the Americans that Maj-Gen West mentions a special duplication of the chapter for wide distribution in I U.S. Corps. (1 Comwel Div: Periodic Report No. 6, para 18). It would be desirable at this point to summarize the reasoning behind the layout of the battalion area. Unfortunately, however, no statement is available of the considerations on which these dispositions were based. As a result, all that can be done at this time is to record the layout, in the hope that the reasons for it may come to hand later.

197. Whatever the reasons for it, the 3 R.C.R. companies and platoons were laid out in the following pattern.⁷⁸ "A" Coy was on the high ground about Hill 187; "D" Coy was on the ridge to the south-west; "C" Coy, with which this narrative is particularly concerned, held the western half of the ridge which ran west from Hill 187, while the platoons of "B" Coy were distributed between the two ridges to the south.

⁷⁸ Actually, there is no precise information available as to 3 R.C.R.'s layout. However a sketch of it which is attached to an interview with the commanding officer (sub-para (d) to footnote to para 191 above) correspondence so closely with the layout used previously by 1 R. 22e R. and subsequently by 3 P.P.C.L.I. (paras 187, 188 above), as to leave little doubt about the 3 R.C.R. dispositions. Map "15" gives details.

Within "C" Coy, 7 Pl was on the western tip of the finger, about Point 97. 8 Pl was two to three hundred yards in rear and 9 Pl. with company headquarters, held Point 123 approximately 400 yards east of 8 Pl. Available sources do not throw much light on the pattern of roads and developed tracks to and within the 3 R.C.R. area, It is known., however, that there was a jeep road along the northern side of the ridge which lay to the south of the Point 97 - Point 123 ridge. This road turned north across the valley between the two ridges, and this stretch had a camouflaged wall along its west side, to screen it from enemy observation.

198. One of the significant features of this layout was the dispersion of the companies and platoons. The distances separating the platoons of "C" Coy - characteristic of the dispersion of the average company - have already been given. As far as the battalion was concerned, the distances which separated "C" Coy from the other three companies was typical of those to be found in the areas of the remaining battalions of the division. The distances involved were not small. The two platoons of "D" Coy on the ridge immediately to the south of "C" Coy were at least 700 yards away, and the nearest troops of 3 P.P.C.L.I. lay 1000 yards to the north-east. At the same time, the forward platoon of "A" Coy was approximately 800 yards behind "C" Coy's rear platoon on Hill 123. It will be readily appreciated that these distances precluded effective Mutual support by rifle or L.M.G. fire, though they did not in themselves, make support by M.M.G. fire impossible.

199. One feature of the layout in the Hill 187 area was the slight extent to which it was changed during some 17 months of occupation. The dispositions of October and November 1951, a disturbed period during which 25 Bde seized the area from the Chinese and consolidated their positions in it, are not clearly or accurately recorded. By December, the situation had become more static, and a fixed pattern of layout had emerged. A trace issued by H.Q. 1 Comwel Div on 14 Dec 51 shows that 2 R.C.R. had three companies in the Hill 187 area, disposed as follows: three platoons in on east-west line on the ridge tipped by Hill 97 (the feature attacked on the night 2/3 May 53), one platoon on the ridge to the south, three platoons in a north-south line with the centre platoon on Hill 187, one platoon on Hill 159 and a platoon immediately to the south (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, December 1951: Appx "8" - 1 Comwel Div Periodic Ops Report No 272). This layout was used for the next ten months (Maps "3", "4", "7" and trace referred to in para 99 above); in October 1952 the pattern was changed slightly (trace referred to in para 116 above). Three platoons were placed on the upper two of the three ridges running west from Hill 159, and the platoons in the Hill 187 - Hill 159 area were arranged to form an almost continuous line. The same layout was used in April, when 1 Comwel Div returned to "JAMESTOWN". (cf Maps "14", "15") No traces of the layout used between October 1952 and April 1953 are available, but it would seem likely that the Americans made some changes, to accommodate the defences to their organization and tactical doctrine. Whatever changes they made were not retained by 1 Comwel Div., for 1 R. 22e R.'s dispositions in the Hill 187 area were the same as those shown for the area in October 1952. This layout was maintained until 10 Jul 53, and quite likely until the Armistice, although no traces covering the last 17 days are available. The upshot of all this is that (except for possible changes during 2 US. Inf Div's occupation) only two layouts were used by the Commonwealth division in the area during 17 months. Furthermore, the layout of the platoons on the ridge held by "C" Coy 3 R.C.R. (the point attacked on the night 2/3 May 53) had not changed at all during this time.

200. As has been stated, the trenches, fire bays, weapon pits, shelters, command posts and observation posts within the "C" Coy area were fairly characteristic of those in use across the divisional front prior to October 1952. A communication trench, not revetted or provided with duckboards, ran west along the ridge from Hill 187 to Hill 97, connecting the three platoon localities of "C" Coy. The trench varied in depth from five to seven feet, and the portion which ran forward down the slope of Hill 187 was covered by wire netting woven with strips of hessian. The purpose of this camouflage was not so much to conceal the trench as to prevent enemy observation of movement in it. No attempt had been made to conceal the spoil which lay along the lip of the trench throughout its length.

201. The defences in each of the platoon localities connected by this trench were similar. A trench, deeper than the communication trench previously described, ran along approximately two-thirds of the circumference of the occupied feature, at a level only slightly below that of the summit. In each locality the gap in the trench lay on the eastern side of the feature (i.e. on the part that was sheltered from enemy observation). Fire bays had been dug at intervals along this trench, forward of it and connected to it by short trenches. Few of these bays were provided with overhead cover. The cover which was in use projected above ground level sufficiently to make it possible for the enemy to locate the position, but not sufficiently to provide protection during a heavy bombardment. In some cases these bays were mere holes in the ground; in others the sides had been revetted and lined with sand bags; others again had sand bags along the forward lip. Some idea of the complexity of the trench system may be gained from the fact that the brigade historical officer mentions becoming lost in it when he accidentally separated from the party he was accompanying. (W.D., 25 Cdn Fd Hist Det, 16 Apr - 31 May 53, 18., 19, May 53).

202. During an enemy attack, the Chinese who succeeded in invading our localities made straight for these trenches, seeking shelter in them from our artillery fire. After the attack on "C" Coy 3 R.C.R., Brigadier Allard directed that the tops of the trenches were to be wired in with single strands of barbed wire, criss-crossed just below the lip of the trench. The purpose of this step, of course, was to keep the enemy out in the open, where our proximity-fused concentrations could attack him more effectively.

203. The shelter bunkers were grouped on the less-exposed (i.e. eastern) side of each of the three features. They lay in and below the gap in the trench which ringed the summit. A description of these structures runs as follows:

When I entered the company area, I was surprised by the number of bunkers but as each bunker held only three or four men, the reason for the number is quite obvious. The construction of some of these bunkers was distinctly flimsy. The frame beams were but four inch logs and the roof beams were steel pickets welded or lashed together with signal wire. These were covered with mesh and three or four layers of sand bags. There were no firing positions at the bunkers but some of the entrances could have been used although there would have been no overhead cover. I am not certain of the dimensions of the bunkers but I would guess they were 6' x 6'. The frames of the bunks were made with steel pickets welded or wired together and the "springs" were made from signal wire woven to form a mesh which would support the body. Overhead cover of bunkers varied from about two feet where the bunker

projected from the hill to four feet where it burrowed into the hill. ("Recollections, Capt J.R., Madden", paras 16, 21)

204. The command posts on the rearward slopes and the observation posts on the forward slopes were of more solid construction.

On my first visit to Hill 123 on 17 May, only the OPs and CPs were of fairly solid construction. There was about five feet of overhead cover for the Coy CP, six feet for the FOO's OP (which the Coy Comd used) and seven feet for the FOO's bunker. The only tunnel in the position was that from the communication trench to the OP and that would be about six feet long. (Ibid, para 18)

205. Unfortunately, there is little information available about the use of mines and wire in the area now being described. However a careful study of the whole divisional front, including the area now under consideration, was made between December 1952 and February 1953, as a result of reports to the War Office which raised doubts as to the adequacy of 1 Comwel Div's field defences (see sub-para (b) of footnote to para 191 above). While it is impossible to determine the exact applicability to the 3 R.C.R. area of all the statements made in the report on this study, it is highly probable that they reflect accurately the situation which existed in the area during April 1953. Such information as is available about the defences in the area supports this belief. Consequently the major points which emerged from this study are summarized in succeeding paragraphs, for such light as they shed on the use of artificial obstacles within the 3 R.C.R. area.

206. The greater part of the wire about the platoon localities was protective wire of the double apron type. The wire was laid in roughly concentric belts around each locality, the inner belt being 15 to 20 yards - grenade throwing range - from the fire bays while the succeeding belts were each a further 10 to 20 yards out. There were usually three or four belts in front of a platoon locality and two or three behind it. Most of this wire had been in position for a long time; it had sagged badly and was covered by vegetation. In addition, the folds and gullies in the hillsides made it practically impossible for even the inner belt to be covered throughout its length by small arms fire from the posts which it protected. Some attempts had been made at laying both tactical and defensive wire, but by far the greater part of the wire in use was of the protective type described above. Dannert concertina wire became available in 1952, being issued at the rate of 2000 coils (total divisional issue) per month. The extent to which this change affected the 3 R.C.R. area is not known. It is improbable, however, that it had any great effect, since the limited quantity which became available, spread over a very wide front whose right and left sectors had higher priority, could not have provided sufficient wire for any notable improvement in the central sector.

207. Each locality also had a minefield about the forward portion of its perimeter, the outline of the field being marked by a single strand of barbed wire. A proportion of the mines in these fields had deteriorated to the point of unserviceability. As a result, the obstacle gave a false sense of security to the troops behind it. The records of the boundaries of these minefields were not completely accurate, and much work had to be done in locating the exact limits of known fields. No information is available

about the casualties inflicted on the Chinese by our mines, but it is recorded that 11.5 per cent of the division's total fatal casualties to November 1952 were caused by our own mines.

208. A further adverse effect of these minefields was the degree to which they restricted the mobility of our own troops. It was not possible to vary the routes of patrols into and out of the localities because of the existence of the minefields. As a result, patrols came and went through the same gap for months on end, and the Chinese took advantage of this habit by placing ambush parties near the gaps, or by bringing fire down on them when the patrols were returning. Lt Col Poulin reported 3 R. 22e R., April 1954: Appx "5c"- Summary of Korean Experience) that his unit used napalm bombs in an effort to render the minefield defences more effective. These devices consisted of four-gallon containers filled with napalm and containing a detonator which was connected electrically with the platoon command post. They were buried one foot underground at intervals of 20 yards across the front of the unit's forward position. When ignited, the bombs were capable of spreading fire over an area of 50 yards. Their effectiveness, however, was never put to the actual test of battle.

209. The pattern of the defensive fire which protected the localities was normal. The immediate approaches were covered by direct small-arms fire from the locality itself and from the flanks. To thicken this fire each section had been allocated an extra Bren gun⁷⁹ and each company had acquired at least one .30 caliber Browning per platoon. Dead ground close in to the posts was registered as targets for the company 60 mm mortars and the support company's 81 mm mortars. Artillery defensive fire tasks hemmed each locality in closely, and the territory beyond was liberally sprinkled with gun, heavy mortar, tank and M.M.G. targets.

210. This fire plan, however, suffered from one or two defects. In the first place, the lack of overhead cover on the fire bays made it necessary for the troops which normally manned them to take shelter in the bunkers at the rear of the locality during the enemy's preliminary bombardment. Since these bunkers were between 50 and 75 yards from the fire bays, it was not always possible for the soldiers to return to their posts in time to prevent the enemy, who always followed his supporting fire closely, from getting into the trenches and turning the engagement into a hand-to-hand fight. The supporting fire from the flanking companies, usually limited by the distances between companies to M.M.G. fire, was also affected by this circumstance, though perhaps to a lesser extent, since the M.M.Gs. usually had some form of overhead cover. As we have seen, the effectiveness of fire from the flanks was in any event limited by the folds and gullies in the hillsides which were being covered.

211. Turning now to mutual support (in the form of direct small arms fire) between platoons, we must note that no precise information is available as to the extent to which this mutual support was possible particularly in the case of "C" Coy. It seems likely, however, that the dispositions of "C" Coy's three platoons (in a line running east from the tip of the finger) would have limited any effective mutual support, at least in the case of an attack coming in along the ridge from the west. This circumstance, added to the limitations in the fields of fire imposed by the steepness and irregularity of the slopes,

⁷⁹ The allocation of this extra Bren gun was standard throughout the division.

measurably reduced the overall effectiveness of small-arms fire, both from flanking localities and from the locality itself, in repelling an attack. In the opinion of Brigadier Allard, this led to undue reliance on artillery fire, with the result that the guns and heavy mortars were not left as free as they should have been to concentrate on counter battery and counter mortar shoots.

212. The indirect fire of the infantry battalion's mortars and the artillery's guns and heavy mortars offered the greatest threat to the enemy. Over the long months of occupation, a formidable number of targets had been registered across the divisional front. Practically every bit of dead ground, every possible forming-up place and line of approach, as well as all the best routes across the valley in front of the area were marked as targets on which telling concentrations could be quickly directed where, necessary, the artillery concentrations could be fired with proximity fuse, a device which had shown itself to be extremely effective in the destruction of enemy infantry. To complete the record, it should be added that our counter battery and counter mortar programmes had only had a limited success in preventing the enemy from firing the concentrations which contributed so much to the success of his attacks in addition, the effectiveness of the close-in defensive fire tasks was absolutely dependent on their being called for at the proper moment. The Chinese, however, sometimes succeeded in getting inside the line of these tasks before the tasks were called for.

213. It may be of benefit, in concluding this description of the defences within the 3 R.C.R. area, to record some statements made about them in an interview with the Commanding Officer of the unit.

When 3 R.C.R. moved into its sector, the position was badly run down. The wiring was insufficient. The trenches were not deep enough. There were gaps in the communication trenches. The fire bays were of a poor design and had no adequate overhead cover. The bunkers were too high, too lightly timbered and had too little overhead cover. They were also too far removed from the fighting positions. Lt-Col Campbell drafted a program to improve the wire, the communication trenches, the fire bays and the bunkers. He also employed one platoon of the reserve company to work on the defences of the right forward company (C Coy). But the enemy fire was such that each night the men just managed to repair the damage done during the day. ("Interview with Lt Col Campbell" para 12)

214. All this, it could be added, was very probably known to the enemy. His patrols had been active in the valleys running into the area, and he had good observation from Hill 166 of the forward positions at least. If it did nothing else, this observation must have shown him the outline of the layout as revealed by the spoil. The fact that the dispositions had not changed substantially in many months gave him the further advantage of a long period of time in which to study the area. Events were to demonstrate that he had put this opportunity to good use.

The Attack on "C" Coy 3 R.C.R., Night 2/3 May 53⁸⁰

⁸⁰ This account is based on the following sources:

- (a) (H.S.) 410B25.013 (D57): "Interview with Lt-Col K.L. Campbell, M.B.E., C.O. 3 R.C.R., 27 Jun 53".
- (b) "1 Comwel Div: Periodic Report No. 6, 1 Apr - 1 Aug 53": Appx "B", Annex "1" - The Attack against "C" Coy 3 R.C.R., 2/3 May 53.
- (c) W.D., 3 R.C.R., 2 - 3 May 53.

215. When it took over its new area on 20 Apr., 3 R.C.R. found the no man's land in front of it dominated by the enemy. The unit was new to action, and the disadvantages arising from its lack of experience were aggravated by the Korean terrain and Chinese tactics. It was evident., therefore, that an attempt to wrest control of no man's land from the enemy would require careful preparation. Accordingly, Lt-Col Campbell at first sent out large numbers of reconnaissance patrols, to accustom his officers and men to the ground and the enemy in front of them. After a week of this, he began sending stronger patrols - fighting patrols - out into the valley. He was just nicely into this phase of his programme when the enemy struck.

216. With the exception of possible wireless intercepts (not mentioned in the sources available), the days preceding the attack had produced no clear evidence that the night 2/3 May was going to be any different from previous nights. There had been, it is true., an increasing number of reports of enemy patrols on the front and north flank of "C" Coy. A good part of these, however, could be discounted as products of the imagination of green troops, and the remainder did not provide positive evidence of an impending enemy attack. Similarly the hostile artillery and mortar fire failed to show the progressive increase in volume which had preceded former attacks. On this occasion, the Chinese registered their additional guns and mortars very subtly, giving the least possible indication of any increase in the volume of fire which could be brought down on "C" Coy.

217. Thus it happened that the plan for 3 R.C.R.'s patrol activities for the night 2/3 May followed the pattern which had been normal for the past several days. The reconnaissance and standing patrols were to be sent out in front of the forward companies, and in the valleys between them. In addition, a fighting patrol of one officer (Lieut G.B. Meynell) and 15 men from "A" Coy was to destroy the enemy who had been working on the wire covering the northern flank of "C" Coy. The "C" Coy "stand-by" patrol⁸¹ for the night consisted of a section of 8 Pl under command of the platoon leader, Lieut D.W. Banton.

218. The attack on "C" Coy was preceded by a patrol encounter involving both the fighting and the "stand-by" patrols. While the sources available show the general outlines of this clash., they do not provide sufficiently precise information for it to be described in any great detail. According to the plan, the fighting patrol was to have left the "C" Coy area at 2030 hours via the path through the gap in the minefield at 135151. From this point the group was to have gone to a point between the track at

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- (d) Ibid, May 1953: Appx "1" - W.D., "A" Coy (entries for 2, 3 May 53).
 - (e) Ibid: Appx "3" - W.D., "C" Coy (entries for 2 and 3 May 53).
 - (f) Ibid: Appx "13" - Ops Log (entries for 2 and 3 May 53).
 - (g) W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, May 1953: Appx "10" - Patrol Task Tables ("A" Coy 3 R.C.R. Patrol 02 2030 May 53).
 - (h) (H.S.) 410B25.013 (D45): "Interview with 2/Lieut E.H. Hollyer, 3 R.C.R., 6 May 53".
 - (j) W.D., 81 Fd Regt, September 1953: Appx "9" - Account of Battle on 3 R.C.R. Front, 2-3 May 53.

⁸¹ Every rifle company was required to have a patrol standing by each night, briefed to operate in the company area or within three to four hundred yards of the perimeter, and prepared to deal with enemy groups spotted by reconnaissance or standing patrols but too large for these small bodies to cope with.

134152 and the stream at 134154, with the intention of ambushing the enemy who had been penetrating into the valley between 3 R.C.R. and 3 P.P.C.L.I. It was not, however, strictly an ambush patrol, since it was free to move about in search of the enemy.

219. As far as can be ascertained, the patrol went to its appointed position 100 metres west of the minefield gap and between one and three hundred metres north of it. Here it lay down in ambush. Presently, however, an enemy group was spotted in rear and the patrol turned to face it, at the same time moving to the shelter of a paddy wall. The patrol leader then called for a flare, which was supplied by the 60mm mortars of "C" Coy when the flare went up., a heavy "fire fight" developed between the two patrols at grenade-throwing range. Lieut Meynell received a head wound in the encounter, from which he is presumed to have died.

220. Cpl Joseph Cecil McNeil then assumed command of the patrol, which by this time was running short of ammunition. In addition, it had become apparent that the group was involved with not one but two and perhaps three enemy bodies. The corporal therefore requested permission to return to the unit lines, and began to lead the patrol in along the path to the minefield gap. Just short of the gap, however, the survivors again come under heavy fire from a group of Chinese positioned near the path. A general melée ensued,, during which the Canadians separated, some of them making their way through the minefield into the 7 Pl position.

221. Meanwhile., the "stand-by" patrol had been sent to the aid of the "All Coy patrol. Lieut Banton and his section met some of the survivors as they came in through the minefield, and these men warned him of the Chinese near the gap. In spite of this warning, the "stand-by" patrol carried on down towards the valley, but it had not gone more than 125 yards from the "C" Coy position when it fell into a Chinese ambush. Lieut Banton was killed in the encounter and the survivors of his patrol were scattered. At this time, then, the remains of two patrols were on the slopes and in the valley north of "C" Coy, together with a formidable number of enemy. The Chinese, it soon developed, were busily preparing for their part in the destruction of 7 and possibly 8 Pls

222. The Chinese had planned their raid carefully (sub para (b) of footnote to para 215 above). The force devoted to it was divided into five groups, the first of which was a counter-patrol force of three patrols, given the task of engaging our patrols and dominating the periphery of the area to be attacked. Next came section groups charged with gapping our wire. Three bunker and trench destruction groups, of approximately 15 men each, were to pass through the gaps, followed by two "snatch" groups, each of platoon size. Finally, a force of company strength was held in reserve to reinforce the effort or to exploit success.

223. It would appear, from the one source at hand that the attack developed according to plan, at least in its first stages. As we have seen, the patrols dominated the area up to the wire on the northern flank of the 110 Coy area, particularly in the vicinity of 7 and 8 Pls.⁸² At the same time, the

⁸² This, at least, is the interpretation of the patrol clashes implicit in the account prepared by the divisional intelligence staff. Others, however, believed that our patrols had contacted a part of the main enemy assault groups, and had disrupted his plan to a certain extent by their fight with these groups. The information available on the

wire-gapping parties performed their tasks, and the two remaining groups moved into position along carefully reconnoitred and paced routes. When all was in readiness the enemy directed a fearful concentration of artillery and mortar fire on to the objective, and the assault groups rushed in. They came in right on the heels of their own fire, which was then lifted to the rear of the position. As it lifted, the assaulting force began to throw concussion grenades in all directions, to create the impression that Chinese fire was still falling on the objective, and so keep the defenders' heads down until the attack was upon them. Once in the trenches, the destruction groups set about the task of demolishing the field works, while the "snatch" groups, following close behind, began to seize prisoners and pass them to the rear. All this, of course, happened very quickly and without serious check.. Suddenly, however, a grave threat to the attackers developed in the form of proximity-fused concentrations of artillery fire which began to rain down on the objective, The Canadians, having withdrawn into their bunkers, were calling down their own fire directly on to the position.

224. This effective retaliation was the work of 2/Lieut Edgar Herbert Hollyer, the commander of 7 Pl, in association with Lieut Laurie George Coté. The latter officer, a member of the R.C.C.S. attached to 3 R.C.R., had come forward to the 7 Pl position to supervise the operation of a wireless relay station which had been set up there to maintain communication between the "A" Coy patrol and the battalion command post. As soon as the final enemy bombardment began, Hollyer called for "PARASOL". the counter-mortar fire plan, to be shot. He followed this with a request for the close-in defensive fire tasks. A number of enemy, however, appeared in the trenches at about the same time as this latter fire came down, probably because they were already inside the line of these concentrations when they fell. As soon as he saw the Chinese in his trenches, Hollyer called for proximity-fused concentrations on his position.

225. This was supplied immediately, and the initiative began to pass from the attacking to the defending force. By then, the Chinese groups were being torn to shreds by a hail of artillery, mortar, tank and medium machine-gun fire, which fell on the Chinese objective, on the immediate approaches and the routes across the valley floor, and on the hostile guns and mortars supporting the attack. In spite of heavy casualties, the Chinese persisted in their efforts, pushing up the communication trench towards 8 Pl and even into the platoon position itself, Here they met an energetic resistance, led by Cpl William Daniel Pero, who had assumed command of the platoon on the loss of Lieut Banton. Soon after, it became apparent that the attack had either lost momentum or had achieved its purpose, for the Chinese began to clear their dead and wounded from the objective preparatory to withdrawing.

226. While this was going on, Hollyer and Coté made a rapid check of their position. Finding only five or six men left, they asked permission to withdraw to 8 Pl, and this permission was granted. Subsequently L/Cpl George Patrick Julien, who had led his section most gallantly throughout the engagement, appeared in the 8 Pl position with eight more men.

enemy's part in the action is not sufficiently detailed to permit final choice between these two interpretations.

227. Meanwhile, Lt-Col Campbell had begun to organize a counter-attack by "D" Coy. When 2/Lieut Hollyer reached the "C" Coy command post, however, he reported that he thought the position could be reoccupied by a patrol, since the Chinese were withdrawing. "A" Coy was accordingly ordered to provide a fighting patrol of one officer and ten men, together with a stretcher-carrying party of ten men to evacuate the casualties from the position. This group came under heavy mortar fire when it entered the 7 Pl area., and it did not complete its task until shortly after first light on 3 May.

228. By this time, "D" Coy had relieved "C" Coy, occupying the 8 and 9 Pl positions only, since Lt-Col Campbell had decided that the 7 Pl position was too badly torn up to be tenable. A listening post was sent forward from "D" Coy, and it remained in 7 Pl's former position during the daylight hours of 3 May. That night, the company sent a platoon forward to reoccupy and restore the position.

229. Without more information as to the Chinese Intentions it is impossible to judge the balance of success or failure in this engagement. Soon after midnight, an enemy force believed to be forming up for an attack on Hill 159 (1417) was caught in the open and dispersed by artillery fire (Interview with Lt-Col Amy, para 16). If this effort was associated with the attack on 3 R.C.R., the Chinese did not achieve complete success. Brigadier Allard, however, was convinced that the engagement represented a Canadian defeat, in that the Chinese achieved their objectives of inflicting casualties, taking prisoners, destroying our defences and clearing their dead and wounded from the battlefield (W.D., 25 Fd Hist Det, December 1953: Appx "4" -- Notes on Brigadier Allard's Lecture "Phases of War", 22 Dec 53, paras 12 to 15).

230. However that may be, the engagement cost the Canadians rather heavy casualties. Twenty-six were killed, 27 wounded and seven taken prisoner,⁸³ ((H.S.) 41OB25.065 (D7): "Stats on Battle Cas 25 Cdn Inf Bde"). In addition 4 KATCOM were killed, 13 wounded and four missing 3 RCR, May 1953:-Appx "12" Report on Action 2/3 May, p. 4). Gallant leadership had been shown in the face of great difficulties. Cpl McNeil was awarded the M.M. for the skill and courage he showed in command of the "A" Coy patrol after the loss of Lieut Maynell. Cpl Pero also won the M.M. for his work in the defence of 8 Pl after Lieut Banton's death. L/Cpl Julien, who had led his section most gallantly throughout the fight and brought it out with survivors from other sections, was likewise awarded the M.M. In addition, Lieut Cote and 2/Lieut Hollyer each won the M.C. for calmness under fire and determination and skill in directing the defence of 7 Pl. Subsequently, Lieut George Edward Moodie Ruffee, a Forward Observation Officer from 81 Fd Regt serving with 3 R.C.R., was awarded a periodic M.C., his citation mentioning the technical skill and determination he had shown during this engagement.

231. A view of the "other side of the hill" is afforded by an account ((H.S.) 41OB25.023 (D15): "Interview with Cpl Pelletier, 3 R.C.R., 8 Aug 53") of the experiences of one of the Canadian prisoners taken during the engagement. It provides one of the few glimpses now available of the conditions which existed in the elaborate warrens across the valley from the Canadian area. Cpl Pelletier, the prisoner in

⁸³ These, at least, were the casualties sustained by 3 R.C.R. on 2 and 3 May 53. Most of them are directly attributable to the attack on "C" Coy, and they are the best figures available.

question, was captured in the 8 P1 position after he had been wounded. He was escorted across the valley floor in company with a group of 30 Chinese, 15 of whom were carrying wounded on their backs. Once across the valley, the whole party climbed half-way up one of the enemy-held hills, where they entered the Chinese tunnels.

...They walked about 12 yards in, then climbed down a 10 foot ladder, then made their way along a twisted corridor. Both passages and rooms lead off the main corridor. Finally the group of prisoners, which now numbered nine Canadians, one Katcom and seven or eight KSC, was halted in one of the off-shoot passageways. The prisoners were searched and books, wallets etc removed. The Chinese did not take watches or rings and returned all wallets with money intact. The prisoners remained in the passageway an hour and were then taken outside again. As they left the "honeycomb" by a different route, the Corporal lost his orientation and cannot locate the route followed. All he knows is they took him to another hill and another honeycomb.

Including the route to the first honeycomb, the Corporal moved through an estimated 700 yards of enemy trench. "Trench" is actually the wrong word for it varied in depth from two to six feet and shelling had so pounded the positions that it was more a gully. There were no fire bays but every 20 yards or so along the trench there was a Chinaman standing to. Behind him and in the side of the trench was a three foot hole. This hole might have been an entrance to the honeycomb or merely a shelter from our shelling. All the Chinamen were armed with burp guns. The Corporal never saw any of the enemy carrying a rifle. He only saw one machine gun set up and that was at the enemy FUP near the base of the C Coy positions.

The entrance to the second honeycomb was again like that of a mine but this time it was located almost at the top of the feature. The tunnel extended for ten yards, then there was a ten foot ladder down, then a tunnel for about 25 yards, then another ladder, then another tunnel and yet another ladder. All the tunnels slanted downwards and by the time the Corporal got to the main part of the honeycombe he thought there was at least one hundred feet of overhead cover. While the Corporal was in the position, it was bombarded by our guns (or mortars?). Only the faintest tremor was felt within the honeycomb and the sound was like that of a man drumming his fingers on a table.

The tunnels or passageways and the rooms were shored with beams again as in a mine. Where the beams did not cross, the walls were bare earth. Overhead, there was a continuous roof of logs three to four inches in diameter. To a greater extent than the first honeycomb, the second honeycomb was a mass of off-shoot passageways and rooms. The passageways were only five feet high and the rooms were sometimes only three to four feet high. The main room looked like a briefing room and was about 20 feet square but again only five feet high. The walls were canvas lined and there were goat and sheep skins on the floor. In this main room there was a rack for weapons where the Chinese would deposit their guns when they entered and pick up their weapons when they left. The Corporal saw five of our Brens, newly cleaned, and some of our rifles. There was also a 3.5" rocket launcher and a mortar like our 3". But the Chinese never took these weapons with them when they went out. They carried only burp guns. Also armed with burp guns were the women. These were dressed as the men., wore long hair and

seemed to be regular soldiers. The Corporal was not certain concerning the ammunition supply. At various places he saw piles of stuff covered with rice mats and believed this might have been the ammunition. He did not think food was under the mats because bags of potatoes and rice were left uncovered.

The honeycomb was dry, clean (the Chinese removed their shoes at the entrance), well ventilated (by holes to the outside some two feet in diameter) and not smelly (bodily wastes were deposited in the paper tube containers for mortar bombs and these disposed of in some fashion).

The place swarmed with Chinamen and the Corporal thinks he saw up to 500 in the second honeycomb. The Chinese treated him with more curiosity than animosity. Most of the time the Corporal lay in one of the little sleeping rooms. When he opened his eyes he would find many of the enemy looking in at him through the doorway as if he were an animal in a zoo. Then he would close his eyes and that group would go away but when he opened his eyes again there would be as many Chinamen as before(Ibid: paras 3 - 8)

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232. The remainder of May and the two final months of the Korean conflict were relatively uneventful as far as the Canadians were concerned. Except for a few minor patrol contacts and the operational moves arising from reliefs in the line, there is little to record of Canadian activity. On the divisional level, the outstanding events were the successful repulse, later in May, of an attack in company strength on the "HOOK", followed by the defeat of a further and much stronger attack on the same feature towards the end of the month (1 Comwel Div: Diary of Op Events, 1 Apr to 1 Aug 53, pp 5, 8).

233. During June and July the Chinese left the Commonwealth troops alone, concentrating instead on South Korean and U.S. Army formations. 1 ROK Div to the right of 1 Comwel Div was kept under constant pressure during the latter part of June and the first part of July, and from the middle of July until the signing of the armistice. (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, June and July 1953: Appx "8" and "64" respectively - 1 Comwel Div Ops/Int Summary, Nos 280 to 289, 298 to 310). Around the middle of July, also, the Kumsong salient (para 33 above) was reduced by very powerful Chinese attacks, the heaviest since April 1951 (Int Review, July, 1953, p. 311).⁸⁴ Then, immediately prior to the signing of the armistice, attacks in divisional strength were directed against 1 U.S. Marine Div on the left of the Commonwealth division; these attacks gained ground to the immediate left of the "HOOK" and created the possibility that this important height would be outflanked and lost without a struggle (1 Comwel Div: Diary of Op Events, 1 Apr to 1 Aug 53, p, 13). None of these enemy moves against South Korean or U.S. Army formations affected the Canadians profoundly, and our sources of information about them

⁸⁴ See Maps "1" and "2".

are meagre. They are, however, mentioned to complete the record of operations in Korea during the last three months of the conflict.

234. During this period, particularly in May, two opposite trends were evident within 25 Cdn Inf Bde. The first was an effort to rectify certain faults in the brigade's defensive system. The second was a growing expectation that a military armistice might soon be signed at Panmunjom (Interview with Brig Allard; Monthly Summary No. 30). The scanty records available do not provide sufficient information about this latter development to make possible a judgement as to its exact nature and effect on operations. It is evident, however that the possibility of an early truce was present in all minds, and it may safely be conjectured that this possibility tended to diminish somewhat the sense of urgency brought to the efforts at improving the brigade's defences.

235. These efforts were aimed at removing three faults in the brigade's defensive arrangements which had, in the opinion of Brigadier Allard, been revealed by the engagement of 2/3 May.⁸⁵ These were weaknesses in patrolling, the fire plan and field defences.

236. Improvements in field defences had three aims - to reduce time spent on their maintenance, to enable machine-guns to continue firing during a bombardment, and to keep the enemy out of the entrenchments should he succeed in reaching them. To achieve these aims, Brigadier Allard proposed to revet as much of the trench system as possible with corrugated iron, and to modify the existing prefabricated Bren gun pits to provide more effective overhead cover and a longer, narrower firing slit. Finally, he planned to substitute tunnels for existing trenches to the greatest extent possible. Where tunnelling was not practicable, trenches were to be deepened to nine feet, and single strands of barbed wire were to be criss-crossed at the top, just below ground level, to keep the Chinese in the open where our proximity-fused concentrations could destroy them. The programme, though necessary, was perhaps somewhat beyond the existing resources of material and man-hours. While no comprehensive reports on progress are available, the Historical Officer of 25 Cdn Inf Bde records that the programme was far from completion towards the end of June, when only two weeks remained of the brigade's tour in the central sector (ibid: Hist Offr 25 Cdn Inf Bde to D. Hist, 25 Jun 53).

237. As far as defensive fire was concerned, the Brigadier considered that the brigade depended too much on the artillery. He held that the Bren gun was the foundation of a proper system of defensive fire. Accordingly, he proposed to build his plan on the tasks assigned to that weapon, adding the fire of the Brownings, and the defensive fire tasks of the 60-mm mortars, the M.M.Gs., the 81-mm mortars and the tank guns in that order. Finally, a few very important D.F. (S.O.S.) targets were to be assigned to the artillery. This Arm, having its load thus lightened, would be left free to concentrate on its principal task of silencing the enemy's guns and mortars. The purpose of this move, and of the provision of overhead cover, was to diminish the strength and decrease the effect on the defending troops of the enemy's artillery and mortar concentrations; these, as we have seen, were important - almost decisive - elements in the success of the two Chinese attacks against the Canadian sector.

⁸⁵ This and the succeeding four paragraphs are based on the record of the interview with Brigadier Allard (H.S.) 410B25.013 (D51): "Interview with Brigadier J.V. Allard, C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D., Comd 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 10 Jun 53".

238. Commenting on the new plan the Brigadier said:

Moreover, the Chinese have evolved a tactic which requires the planned use of all (our) available infantry weapons, particularly the mortars and machine-guns. With probing patrols the enemy locate our arty DFs and then before their assault lie-up in the gap between our arty DFs and FDLs. This gap is now covered by the fire of our infantry...

An objective in the reorganization of the Brigade's fire defences is to restore the initiative as soon after the enemy attack as possible. It was found that the place for the tanks is not only at the tops of hills but also on the valley floor. The tanks can move - not of course in the paddy fields, but along the edge of these fields. The hill is usually not too steep here. The Brigadier now has four tanks on the valley floor. During the day, the tanks hide in the reentrants of the hill positions of the forward companies. At night they take up their position in the valley. The Brigadier is also using the armoured cars (M-8s) of the engineers in a similar fashion. (Ibid: paras 6 and 7)

239. Turning to patrolling, Brigadier Allard commented:

The A Coy patrol of 3 RCR did serve a useful purpose the night of 2/3 May and it did disrupt the enemy attack but it also hindered our defence. Its location caused a delay in bringing down the defensive fire. The patrol did not provide an accurate estimate of the enemy's strength. These statements are not meant as criticisms of the men of A Coy patrol for they were trying to do what should have been done by others.

A defensive line such as we hold, with a very wide no-man's land, requires numerous, two man,, wireless-equipped, combination recce patrols and outposts. These patrol-outposts must be in position on the enemy side of our DF fire zones as soon after last light as possible. It is their task to warn of the enemy approach and to remain out in no-man's land even after the battle starts. Their work does not end when the enemy makes contact with our FDL's. By careful movement, our two-man patrol-outposts can supply vital information as to enemy manoeuvres, casualties and reinforcements even while the battle rages. They are just as safe in no-man's land as they are back in the hill positions. These patrols were not in position the night 2/3 May. (Ibid: paras 2 and 3)

240. To further improve his formation's patrolling, the Brigadier opened a brigade patrol school on 25 May placing it under command of Maj W.H. Pope, M.C., of 3 R. 22e R. (ibid. para 4). In June this officer wrote a paper (H.S.) 41OB25.033 (D5): "Paper on Patrolling in Korea by Maj W.H. Pope" in which he outlined what he considered to be the faults of the brigade's previous policy and recommended the changes which would remove these faults. In view of this officer's appointment, it may safely be considered that his opinions were not incompatible with those held by Brigadier Allard, Respect for Maj Pope's views is enhanced by consideration of his long service at the front in Korea (he

served a full tour with 1 R. 22e R, and requested an extension to serve with 3 R.22e R.), and by his demonstrated capacity, which led to his being awarded the M.C.⁸⁶ ("Korean Citations" (Muj pope)).

241. In his opening paragraph, Maj Pope expressed the opinion that the enemy had held the tactical initiative in no man's land for the past year or more, raiding our outposts and forward positions and ambushing our patrols at will. This he ascribed in part to an overly-cautious attitude on the part of commanders (and consequent lack of aggressive spirit in the troops) induced by the desire to avoid wasting lives when an armistice might at any time end hostilities.

242. Passing to comments on specific types of patrols, he dealt first with standing patrols, which he referred to as outposts. These he considered to have been too large and to have occupied fixed positions whose locations were-known to the enemy. For standing patrols whose strength varied from three or four men to a section, he proposed to substitute patrols of two men. These smaller patrols would not hold fixed positions in minefield gaps or on secondary features outside the localities but would occupy a new spot each night, forward of our company localities or on their flanks. Their role would be to give early warning of the approach of any considerable enemy force towards our positions; they were to do this by remaining in position or getting behind the enemy, all the while reporting his movements by wireless.

243. Dealing with reconnaissance patrols, he advocated a similar reduction in strength and a much deeper penetration of the enemy's front than had hitherto been required. He also called attention to the importance of "lay-ups" in furnishing intimate details of the enemy's habits, and recommended a wider use of this type of reconnaissance patrol. His idea of the role of reconnaissance patrols, including "lay-ups", was to gain "definite information about the enemy, directly leading up to a raid or ambush by us" (para 10 (b)(iii)).

244. His suggestions for improvements in our raids and ambushes may be inferred from his analysis of the faults shown in previous patrolling of this sort:⁸⁷

These were ordered from time to time in an effort to redress the defeatist spirit. Their practically continuous lack of success served only to depress morale still lower and ensure further defeats. These patrols were of two types: the ambush and the raid.

The ambush would consist of subaltern or NCO and five to twenty men. Usually they were sent out without regard to the, fact that recce patrols had been reporting no sign of the enemy. In other words, the schedule called for ambush patrols and so they were duly sent out to places

⁸⁶ It is to be noted, however, that Maj Pope's generalizations are based, in the main, on his experience as a regimental officer. The application to other units of all his statements cannot be precisely ascertained.

⁸⁷ Maj Pope specifically excepted Lieut Gardner's "snatch" (para 115 above) from these strictures. He considered this patrol excellent, the only really good patrol staged by the brigade during his (Maj Pope's) service in the formation.

where it would be most convenient for us for the enemy to pass. Rarely was provision ever made to reinforce the ambushes should they have accomplished their object, that is of ambushing the enemy. And, of course, since ambushes were usually ordered from forward companies, the company commanders concerned were, simply quite incapable of reinforcing their ambushes adequately without denuding the entire company position - an impossible risk. So on the rare occasions when our ambushes did fire first, the initiative quickly passed to the enemy who alone had the power of quick reinforcement. And the morale factor must not be forgotten: our men knew the enemy patrols were specially trained for their jobs and would be quickly reinforced whereas they themselves were simply out in the valley for a routine task that came around to their platoon every third night and was interspersed with other routine assignments of standing guard, cleaning weapons, cleaning up the area, laying wire and digging. In other words "the basic sense of mission" was lacking. Our ambushes have been uniformly unsuccessful.

The fighting Patrol numbered between 10 and 40 men (including the firm base) and commanded by subaltern or a sergeant. Sometimes their object was simply to sweep an area in search of the enemy and then to engage him. This woolly idea inevitably led to defeat when the enemy was met. A fighting patrol cannot operate as a recon patrol and then become a fighting patrol when the enemy is located: ten men cannot move as silently as two. Sometimes it would be decided to raid an enemy platoon position. To do this two groups each of 20 men under a subaltern would be selected - one as firm base, one as raiding party. I say "groups" because I know of one occasion when only 3 men of one 20-man group were known to the subaltern in charge and only 8 of the other group to the other subaltern. It had been decided by the company commanders supplying the men that it would be more convenient to have bastard groups attacking the enemy than to have to reshuffle sections in our line. No special training was given to these important patrols, no rehearsal over ground similar to that to be attacked, no time for the groups even to begin to think or act as a team. The company commander in charge, even when he asked permission to exercise his command on the site of the proposed action, that is to say, at least as far forward as the firm base across or on the river, was ordered to remain a mile and more away on his hill top. The weapons used by the patrols for close-in night fighting included more than the usual scale of machine carbines and LMGs, but still were in the main single action rifles. Finally the recon leading up to the raid were usually not deep or complete enough. This last fact always caused us to attack straight from the front: apart from information obtained from air photos we had not the foggiest idea of what to expect on the flanks or rear. Without exception all our raids have failed. (Ibid, para 6(c)(i)(ii)(iii))

245. Maj Pope also devoted some attention to use of special devices in patrolling. He recommended wider use of patrol dogs, snipers copes and special attachments to wireless sets to reduce user noises. Although detailed treatment of these devices is beyond the scope of this Report (and could not, in any event, be supplied from the material available), it might still be advantageous to consider them briefly. The patrol dogs and their handlers were held in pools, and could be obtained for use with a patrol by prior application from the unit mounting the patrol. Their purpose, of course, was to detect the presence of enemy by sound or smell. The Historical Officer of 25 Cdn Inf Bde describes their use in a training

exercise conducted by Maj Pope at the brigade patrol school (W.D., 25 Cdn Fd Hist Det 0 4 Jun 53). On this occasion, the dogs failed to find the "enemy" outpost, and set off two trip flares searching for it. Although they appear to have had similar experiences, both Lt Col Campbell (3 R.C.R.) and Lt Col Poulin (3 R. 22e R.) considered that the dogs had proven their worth in action 3 R. 22e R., April 1954: appx "5 C" - Summary of Korean Experience; W.D., 3 R.C.R., March 1954; Appx "4" Summary of Experience - Korean Campaign). The wireless equipment referred to consisted, inter alia, of silent switches and microphones sensitive to faint whispers. The importance of such devices to a patrol in no man's land is obvious. Sniperscopes, as the name to a certain extent implies, were rifle sights containing a source of infra-red light powered by a battery, and a viewer designed to make the light visible. The effective range of illumination was in the neighbourhood of 80 yards. Though the battery was cumbersome to carry on a patrol, and the equipment was subject to failure, Lt Col Campbell considered it a valuable aid to patrolling.

246. Available sources do not contain sufficient information to make possible an estimate of the progress made in implementing Brigadier Allard's programme. As has been noted, the number of improvements which the brigade was able to make in its field defences did not represent anything like completion of all the work required. Failing the test of enemy attack, it is not possible to judge the extent to which the forward defended localities were strengthened by the work which was done. The same remark applies to the re-organization of the fire plan. As far as patrolling is concerned, it must be recorded that no startling changes in our general patrol experiences became evident, at least in the daily reports on operations issued by H.Q. 1 Comwel Div in June and July (para 233 above). It may be that it was too late in the day for the aggressive spirit on which Maj Pope's recommendations were based to assert itself.⁸⁸ It is possible, however, that important improvements were made in our conduct of standing patrols, though precise and complete information on this point is not available.

247. All this time, the normal routine of life in the line continued, while developments at the front, in sharp contrast with those at Panmunjom caused expectations of an armistice to rise and fall. On 11 Apr an agreement for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners was reached. The month of May saw localities on the front of 1 Comwel Div become the targets of two powerful raids and one heavy attack. On 7 June the most serious obstacle in the way of an armistice was removed when agreement was reached on a plan for repatriating prisoners of war. Around the middle of June approximately 25,000 anti-Communist prisoners were released by their South Korean guards, and the Chinese began to launch very strong attacks against South Korean and U.S. Army formations. Then, on 27 July, the armistice agreement was signed.

248. The armistice found the brigade on the right of the divisional front, in a sector for which it had assumed responsibility on 10 July during Operation "EMPEROR". This operation involved a move, to the right by 29 and 25 Bdes and a move from right to left across the divisional front by 28 Bde. On completion of "EMPEROR", 28 Bde was astride the Sami-ch'on; 29 Bde was in the central sector and 25 Bde was on the right (1 Comwel: Diary of Op Events, 1 Apr to 1 Aug 53, p. 11 and 12). In the

⁸⁸ Some time late in May or early in June, Brigadier Allard limited the forward movement of patrols to the river line in front of the Canadian positions (W.D., 25 Cdn Fd Hist Det, 18 Jun 53).

Canadian sector, 3 P.P.C.L.I. was on the right, in the Hill 355 area; the 3 R.C.R. companies were lined up from east to west on the Hill 159 feature to the south-west. 3 R. 22e -R. was in reserve along the division's right boundary, in map square 2213 (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, July 1953: Appx "23" - Order of Battle and Loc State; Appx "61" - 25 Cdn Inf Bde Int Summary, 11 Jul 53, Trace "P").

249. Between 12 and 20 Jul "B" and "C" Coys of 3 R. 22e R., with the mortar and M.M.G. platoons, occupied positions on the right of 3 P.P.C.L.I., relieving 1 and 2 Coys of 11 ROK Regt so that the South Korean formation could concentrate its forces against the attacks then being made on it (para 233 above). The two companies did not become involved in any fighting, but they did suffer from the heavy monsoon rains (W.D., 3 R.22e R., 12 - 20 Jul 53; Appx "1" - 3 R. 22e R. Coy Locs). As in previous years, these rains destroyed a large part of the bunkers and shelters across the brigade's front 25 Cdn Inf Bde, July 1953).

250. On 27 Jul, at 2200 hours, the guns and mortars which had so long pulverized the Korean soil along the "JAMESTOWN" line fell silent. The armistice had become effective. The event was celebrated casually and briefly; there was a great deal to be done in the 72 hours given each side to withdraw from the demilitarized zone, (W.D., No. 25 Cdn Fd Hist Det, 27 Jul 53; para 281 below)

251. The demarcation line had, as we shall see (para 271 below), been located along the actual line of contact. In 1 Comwel Div's sector, it followed the valley of the Sami-ch'on's tributary, swinging almost due south at its south-western end to bisect the broad stretch of the, Sami-ch'on valley. On its north-eastern end, the line passed to the east of Point 227 and then continued north and slightly east to the point where it cut the divisional boundary. Two thousand yards to the south-east, the southern boundary of the demilitarized zone paralleled this demarcation line.⁸⁹ ("1 Comwel Div: Periodic Report, 1 Apr to 1 Aug 53", Map "A")

252. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, in common with the other U.N. formations in Korea, had to complete a withdrawal to positions south of the demilitarized zone by 2200 hours on 30 July. The brigade planned to make this withdrawal in two phases. The first, for a few of the units at least, was to interim positions immediately south of the demilitarized zone; the second., to "permanent" post-armistice positions. on leaving the scene of its protracted defence, the formation planned to take with it all "G 1098" stores and equipment, all ammunition, trench stores and dumps of defensive stores as well as the material which could be salvaged from existing field defences. (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, July 1953: Appx "37" - 25 Cdn Inf Bde Op Instr No. 64)

253. This plan appears to have been executed as ordered, some of the units moving directly to their permanent positions. 3 R.C.R. and 3 P.P.C.L.I., however, occupied temporary positions along a "no-pass line" immediately south of the boundary of the demilitarized zone. Here their duties were to erect signs and man road-blocks to prevent movement into the demilitarized zone. Shortly afterward, the move to permanent areas was completed and work began on their development. The brigade's

⁸⁹ Map "2".

dispositions and role during this phase of its existence lie outside the scope of this Report. (Ibid., also W.Ds. 3 R.C.R. and 3 P.P.C.L.I., 27-31 Jul 53)

THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS, 10 JUL 51 - 27 JUL 53

254. In considering the armistice negotiations whose successful conclusion has just been recorded, it is important to realize that the agreement signed at Panmunjom represented a rather narrowly-limited achievement. It ended active operations, but left the opposing armies facing each other across the demilitarized zone, both fully capable of resuming the fighting at very short notice. Final settlement of the conflict was still to be achieved, and there were cogent reasons for supposing that such a settlement could not be reached - or, if reached, could not be made to endure -independently of a general settlement of the other matters at issue between the opposing power blocs.

255. To the Canadian soldier in Korea, on the other hand, the military armistice was a very significant achievement indeed. For him, it meant relief from a good many hard and dangerous tasks, and an escape from living conditions frequently described as appalling.⁹⁰ The military armistice, and the negotiations leading to it, thus merit some description, as important events on the battalion and company level - the level, it must be remembered, on which the nature of the fighting in Korea has forced this Report to concentrate. In the following account, however, no attempt will be made to trace the efforts directed towards a final settlement. This larger subject must wait until more complete information is available, and the vast and complicated issues involved have fallen into some sort of historical perspective.

256. The idea of arranging a cease fire in Korea, as a preliminary to the negotiation of a final settlement, appeared early in the United Nations' consideration of the conflict. On 14 Dec 50 the Political Committee of the General Assembly approved a resolution requesting the President of the General Assembly "to constitute a group of three persons, including himself, to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea could be arranged" (External Affairs, January 1951, p. 4), His Excellency Nasrollah Entezam, the President of the General Assembly, nominated Sir Benegal Rau of India and Mr. L.B. Pearson of Canada to serve with him on this Cease-Fire Group (ibid). Earlier in the month, Mr. Pearson had made two major foreign policy speeches, in both of which he had suggested that a cease fire followed by negotiations appeared to be the best sequence to follow in attempting to solve the Korean problem (ibid, December 1950, p. 433).

257. Once formed, the Group consulted representatives of the United Nations Command as to the position it should take in discussions on a cease fire, and received the suggestion that a demilitarized zone 20 miles deep be established above the 38th parallel, and that the cease fire be supervised by a United Nations commission ((H.S.) 681.013 (D60): "Canada and the Korean Problem", p. 15). The

⁹⁰ It is to be noted that this estimate of the troops' reaction to the armistice is not accepted by the then historical officer of 25 Cdn Inf Bde ((H.S.) 410B25.013 (D 86): "25 Cdn Inf Bde in Korea, 27 Jul 53 to 23 May 54", para 1). He states that conclusion of the armistice made little difference. It is considered, however, that the War Diaries and other records amply justify the statement in the text.

Chinese, however, refused to negotiate with or even recognize the Group (External Affairs, January 1951, p. 5). One of their greatest fears appeared to be that the United Nations forces, defeated in northern Korea, might profit by a cessation of hostilities to regroup and begin a counter-offensive (ibid, February 1951, p. 47). They argued that negotiations for a political settlement should precede rather than follow a cease fire (House of Commons Debates., L.B. Pearson, 2 Feb 51, p. 58).

258. After the failure of this first attempt, the Group drew up a statement of principles as a basis for cease fire.⁹¹ This statement advocated, inter alia, immediate negotiations for a cease fire, followed at once by the calling of a conference to which representatives of the People's Republic of China would be invited. On 13 Jan 51 the Political Committee of the General Assembly approved these principles, which were then transmitted to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.

259. A reply to this communication was received on 17 Jan. Its expression of the Chinese attitude on several of the important issues was somewhat vague. In particular, it did not make clear the Chinese views on the relationship in time between a cease fire and negotiations. Mr. St. Laurent therefore suggested to Mr. Nehru that the latter obtain a further clarification of the Chinese position, in the form of answers to three questions. The second of these questions asked the Chinese if they insisted that negotiations on political issues precede a cease fire. In reply, the Chinese stated that a cease fire for a limited period could be agreed upon at the first meeting of the conference.

260. Consideration of these replies convinced the Canadian delegation that the Chinese position should be explored further. In a speech before the Political Committee, Mr. Pearson described a detailed programme for negotiation, and suggested that this programme be presented to the Chinese as a final test of their intentions. The Canadian proposals provided for the assembling of a conference. As its first order of business, this conference would appoint a small committee to arrange an immediate cease fire. Similarly specific suggestions were advanced about the other major issues.

261. Previously, a group of Asian and Arab states had submitted a resolution calling for the convening of a seven-nation conference to clarify the Chinese Position, and arrange for a settlement in Korea. This group accepted the Canadian suggestion in part, and amended their resolution to provide that arrangement of a cease fire would be the first matter discussed in the proposed conference. This amendment, however, did not go quite far enough, since it would still have been possible for the conference to cover a wide field before reaching any agreement about a cease fire. For this and other reasons, the Canadian delegation felt itself unable to support the amended resolution. However, the Canadians did not wish to vote against it, since they were in sympathy with its underlying principles. As a result, Canada abstained from voting on the resolution, which was rejected by the Political Committee.

⁹¹ The account (paras 258 to 262) of this second attempt to open negotiations with the Chinese is based on:

(a) External Affairs, February 1951, pp 47 to 57.

(b) House of Commons Debates, L.B. Pearson, 2 Feb 51, pp 56 to 61.

(c) (H.S.) 681.013 (D60): "Canada and the Korean Problem", pp 15 to 19.

262. Meanwhile, the United States representatives had been conducting a vigorous agitation for a quite different sort of action on the Korean question. They interpreted the first Chinese reply to the statement of principles as outright rejection of negotiation, and on 20 Jan introduced a resolution which named China an aggressor in Korea. Public opinion in the United States, which had been highly inflamed by Chinese intervention in the fighting, favoured acceptance of this resolution by the United Nations. The Canadian delegation at first strove to postpone consideration of the resolution, since it believed the naming of China as an aggressor to be premature and unwise at this time. However it proved impossible to obtain the postponement, and the Canadians accordingly arranged for a moderation in the wording of the resolution, and for an amendment giving precedence to negotiation over consideration of "additional measures" against China. The resolution, as amended was accepted by the Political Committee, and on 1 Feb 51 it was approved by the General Assembly, Canada voting for it on both occasions.

263. For nearly six months after the passing of this resolution, nothing was done about arraigining a cease fire in Korea. The Chinese disregarded the Good Offices Committee established under the authority of the resolution ((H.S.) 681.013 (D60): "Canada and the Korean Problem", p. 19), and the fighting continued. Then, on 23 Jun 51, Mr. Jacob Malik, the permanent delegate to the U.N. of the U.S.S.R., made a radio address in which he said "The Soviet peoples believe that as a first step discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the thirty-eighth parallel" (External Affairs, July 1951, p. 231).

264. The reasons behind this public advocacy of a cease fire are not revealed in the sources available. It is highly likely, however, that stalemate at the front in Korea had something to do with it. The course of the fighting in that unfortunate country had shown that the willingness of either side to arrange a cease fire varied inversely as the success of its military operations. When, following the Inchon landings, the United Nations forces stood on the 38th parallel, with the North Koreans fleeing in disorder before them, no suggestion of a cease fire followed by negotiations emerged from the discussion of the situation in the United Nations. Later, when the Eighth U.S. Army was conducting a deep withdrawal before the Chinese offensive, the latter showed themselves averse to agreeing unequivocally to a programme embracing a cease fire followed by negotiations. By June of 1951 it was plain that a military solution to the Korean problem could not be achieved, unless one side or the other greatly increased its commitment. The front was established in the general area of the 38th parallel and promised to remain there, although the possibility of limited tactical advances or withdrawals still existed (ibid., October 1950, pp 363-366; April 1951, p. 118).

265. In this situation, four main alternatives faced the contending powers. They could get out of the country altogether, or expand their commitment to the extent required for a decision. Failing the adoption of either of these courses, a cease fire was the only alternative to indefinite continuation of a bloody and indecisive struggle. Support of the United Nations for a cease fire and a negotiated settlement was on record and a strong indication that this support was genuine had been afforded by the dismissal of General MacArthur, after he had publicly advocated extending military operations into Chinese territory. In addition, the utterances of leading figures in the United Nations, and the cautious manner in which United Nations operations had been conducted in the vicinity of the 38th parallel,

served to provide further assurances that the United Nations, while determined to defend the border indefinitely, were opposed to any adventurous course in North Korea and were correspondingly willing to arrange a cease fire on the parallel (ibid. May 1951, pp 150-153, July 1951, pp 230-232).

266. Whatever the motive, it soon became apparent that Mr. Malik had accurately reflected the official policy of the U.S.S.R. On 28 Jun 51 the Government of the United States announced:

Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko received the United States Ambassador in Moscow yesterday afternoon. In discussing Mr. Malik's statement Mr. Gromyko indicated that it would be for the military representatives of the United Command and of the Korean Republic Command on the one hand and the military representatives of the North Korean Command and of the "Chinese volunteer units" on the other to negotiate the armistice envisaged in Mr. Malik's statement. The armistice, Mr. Gromyko pointed out, would include a cease-fire and would be limited to strictly military questions without involving any political or territorial matters; the military representatives would discuss questions of assurances against the resumption of hostilities.

Beyond the conclusion of an armistice the Soviet Government had no specific steps in mind looking toward the peaceful settlement to which Mr. Malik referred. Mr. Gromyko indicated, however, that it would be up to the parties in Korea to decide what subsequent special arrangements would have to be made for a political and territorial settlement. He said that the Soviet Government was not aware of the views of the Chinese Communist regime on Mr. Malik's statement. (Ibid, August 1951, p. 274)

267. Next day, it was announced in Washington that the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command had been authorized to attempt to open negotiations for a cease fire, and on 10 Jul the official representatives of the opposing supreme commanders met at Kaesong for the first session of the Military Armistice Conference (ibid, pp 2740 275). The delegation representing the United Nations Command was led by Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy, and included a representative from the South Korean army. The Chinese/North Korean delegation was headed by General Nam II of the North Korean army and included two Chinese delegates. ((H.S.) 681,013 (D37): "Korean Truce Material". "Chronology of the Military Armistice Conference" (entry for 10 Jul 51))

268. Initially there was some difficulty over the status of Kaesong. The Chinese had occupied the area, and they maintained posts on the roads leading to it from the south. It could thus be made to appear and was, in fact, so represented by the Communists that the representatives of the United Nations Command were coming into enemy-held territory to sue for peace. General Ridgway therefore demanded that the Kaesong area be neutralized, and the other side finally agreed to this condition. (External Affairs, August 1951, P. 275)

269. On 26 Jul agreement was reached on the agenda. This agreement Was made possible by the Chinese and North Koreans abandoning their insistence that withdrawal of foreign forces be included in

the agenda. The U.N. negotiators considered this a political issue and, as such, outside the scope of the armistice negotiations. (Ibid, pp 275 to 277) The complete agenda ran as follows:

- (1) Adoption of agenda:
- (2) Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides., so as to establish n demilitarized zone Qs n basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea;
- (3) Concrete arrangements for the realiz3tion of a cease-fire and an armistice in Korea including the composition, authority and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of the cease-fire and armistice;
- (4) Arrangements relating to prisoners of war;
- (5) Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides. (Ibid, p. 277)

270. It would be fruitless to attempt to follow in any detail the protracted, wrangling discussions -carried on intermittently for two whole years - of the items on this agenda. Initially there were hopes of success, but as the negotiations dragged on from one deadlock to another, it began to appear that even the first stop towards a final settlement in Korea could not be taken.

271. The second item on the agenda - the location of the cease fire line - was not settled until 27 Nov 51. The United Nations Command insisted on the actual line of contact being chosen for the cease fire line, while the other side stood out for 36lection of the 38th parallel, At the same time, arguments over alleged violations of the neutral zone were added to the already sharp debate on Item 2. Finally the conference site was changed from Kaesong to nearby Panmunjom, and on 27 Nov agreement was reached that the actual line of contact would be the cease fire line. ("Canada and the Korean Problem", p. 20; "Chronology of the Military Armistice Conference" (entries for the period 27 Jul to 27 Nov 51))

272. At the same time, approval was given to a demarcation line along the front as it then stood. Since hostilities were expected to continue until the signing of the armistice, and the line of contact was therefore subject to change, it was agreed that the line so approved was to remain valid for 30 days only. If the armistice was signed after 30 days had passed., the line would be revised to conform with the positions held at the time the armistice was signed. (External Affairs, December 1951, pp 410, 411). As we have seen, orders limiting the operations of I U.S. Corps to those of a purely defensive nature were issued soon after agreement was reached on Item 2 (A.H.Q. [Report No. 62](#), para 265).

273. The conference then passed to Item 3 - the concrete arrangements for a cease fire and supervision of the armistice - but discussion of this item was soon deadlocked ("Canada and the Korean Problem", p. 21). The U.N. negotiators then proposed that Item 4 - arrangements relating to prisoners of war- be discussed concurrently with Item 3 in order to save time. This was finally agreed to, and a sub-committee began working on Item 4. Both it and the sub-committee studying Item 3,

however, made very little progress, and once again the U.N. Command suggested expediting the negotiations by passing to Item 5 - recommendations to the governments concerned. This also was agreed to, and discussion on Item 5 began on 6 Feb 52, Surprisingly enough, agreement was reached ten days later, in the following terms.

In order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.⁹² (Ibid)

274. In the fifth plenary session of the Armistice Conference, held on 7 May 52, it was announced that agreement had been reached on all issues except the disposition of prisoners of war (Item 4) ("Chronology of the Military Armistice Conference", entry for 7 May 52). The agreement on Item 3 reached at this time is not revealed in the sources available, but it is highly probable that it did not differ substantially from the one given in the final agreement, and summarized in the concluding paragraphs of the Report.

275. Thus by early May of 1952 only one item on the agenda of the Armistice Conference remained to be settled. The difficulty with Item 4 was from the fact that a number of prisoners held by the United Nations did not wish to be repatriated. The Chinese/North Korean side contended that prisoners who held such views should be sent back to their parent state willy-nilly. The United Nations Command, on the other hand, argued that such prisoners should be allowed to choose or reject repatriation. From 11 Dec 51, when concurrent discussion on Items 3 and 4 began, the fate of these recalcitrant prisoners was the subject of violent and often abusive debate. Then, on 8 Oct 52 the negotiations went into an indefinite recess, called by the U.N. Command. ("Canada and the Korean Problem", pp 21 and 22; "Chronology of the Military Armistice Conference". 11 Dec 51 to 7 Oct 52)

276. The seventh session of the General Assembly opened on 14 Oct 52, and this session saw the resumption of discussions within the United Nations on means of ending the fighting in Korea.⁹³ After naming China an aggressor in Korea on 1 Feb 51, the Assembly had suspended deliberations on a cease fire, pending the outcome of efforts by the Good Offices Committee to get some sort of

⁹² The U.N. side made it plain that they considered the term "foreign forces" to embrace Chinese forces, and that the "etc" did not include matters outside Korea. Since the Chinese were deeply committed to discussion of at least two matters outside Korea (Chinese representation in the United Nations and U.S. action on Formosa), it is doubtful if they subscribed entirely to this interpretation. However both sides probably felt that, having recommended a conference, the membership and agenda of the conference could be left to higher authority (ibid).

⁹³ The account given in paras 276 to 279 of the developments within the General Assembly, and of the final stages of the armistice negotiations is based on "Canada and the Korean Problem", pp 22 to 28.

negotiations started. Then, in July 1951, the Military Armistice Conference had begun, and it was felt that discussion of a Korean settlement by the Assembly might prejudice the success of these negotiations. As a result, nearly two years passed before the Assembly resumed -active consideration of the problem of bringing the conflict to an end.

277. When the matter was revived, interest centred on the problem of repatriating the prisoners, as the one unresolved issue standing in the way of an armistice. A total of four resolutions was offered on the question. The first was sponsored by 21 nations, including Canada. It called upon China and North Korea to agree to an armistice based on the principle of voluntary repatriation. The second and third resolutions dealt with special aspects of the question while the fourth, sponsored by the U.S.S.R. rejected the first resolution and called for the establishment of a commission to settle the Korean question peacefully. The proposed commission was to consist of representatives of 11 states, four of them from within the U.S.S.R.'s sphere of influence, and decision was to be reached by a two-thirds majority.

278. In an effort to reconcile the two conflicting points of view, Mr. Krishna Menon of India introduced a new resolution. The Indian resolution was supported by Canada and the United Kingdom from the first. Later the United States also came to support the proposal, after certain amendments had been made to the original draft. On 3 Dec 52 the resolution was accepted by the General Assembly. As approved, it provided for a repatriation commission to which all prisoners would be surrendered. The commission would repatriate those who wished to return to their parent state. The disposition of the remaining prisoners would be considered by the conference recommended in the agreement on Item 5. If this conference failed to reach agreement on the question within 30 days, the prisoners would become the responsibility of the United Nations. The Chinese, however, rejected this arrangement and it began to appear that the impasse reached in the armistice negotiations would be duplicated in the United Nations.

279. On 22 Feb 53 the United Nations Command stated that it was prepared to repatriate sick and wounded prisoners according to the Geneva Convention, and the other side agreed to discuss such a limited repatriation., adding that resumption of armistice negotiations might also be discussed if agreement were reached on the first question. The meetings which followed were successful., a plan for the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war being approved on 11 Apr; full armistice negotiations were resumed 15 days later. On 7 Jun agreement was reached on a plan for the disposal of prisoners of war and on 27 Jul, as we have seen, the armistice agreement was signed. During the last week of the negotiations, a dramatic threat to their success developed when President - Rhee of South Korea connived at the release of approximately 25,000 prisoners who objected to repatriation.

280. Article I of the armistice agreement dealt with the establishment of a 47 military demarcation line 3rd of a demilitarized zone.⁹⁴ Article IV concerned recommendations to the governments on both sides. The text of both articles reflected agreements reached early in the negotiations and already

⁹⁴ The summary which follows is based on the text of the armistice agreement contained in (H.S.) 681.013 (D61): "Official Text of the Korean Armistice Agreement".

summarized in preceding paragraphs. The demarcation line followed the line of contact as it stood at the end of July and the demilitarized zone was to be formed by each side withdrawing its forces two kilometres from the demarcation line. Similarly, in the case of Article IV, the text faithfully reproduced that of the earlier agreement, including the terms "foreign forces" and "etc".

281. Article II set forth the concrete arrangements governing the cease fire and armistice. Hostilities were to cease at 2200 hours on 27 Jul 51, 12 hours after the armistice was signed. Withdrawal from the demilitarized zone was to be completed within 72 hours after the armistice became effective. Rotation of troops and replacement of equipment in Korea was permitted on a "man-for-man" and "piece-for-piece" basis. There was not, in other words, to be any expansion of either army during the life of the armistice.

282. Supervision of the armistice was entrusted to a Military Armistice Commission composed of ten senior officers, five of whom were to be nominated by each side. Ten Joint Observer Teams were to be formed to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the demilitarized zone and the Han river estuary. Movement of troops and equipment through authorized ports of entry were to be checked by a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (composed of four officers nominated by Sweden, Switzerland, Poland and Czechoslovakia) assisted by 20 Neutral Nations Inspection Teams. On request of the Military Armistice Commission, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was also to arrange for inspection of areas outside the demilitarized zone where violations of the truce were reported to have occurred.

263. Article III dealt with the repatriation of prisoners of war and the return of displaced civilians. Prisoners who were willing to accept repatriation were to be handed over at Panmunjom to the side from which they had been taken, under the supervision of a Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of war. In a similar manner, the movement of displaced civilians who wished to return to their homes was to be organized by a Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians.

284. More complicated arrangements were made for the disposal of prisoners of war who were unwilling to accept repatriation. A Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, composed of members appointed by Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India, was to be formed. Troops and administrative personnel required by the Commission were to be provided by India. This body was to accept custody of all prisoners not repatriated directly, to arrange for "explanations" to be made to them by the side to which they had originally belonged, to repatriate those who decided to return home and to dispose of the remainder according to the following arrangement.

11. At the expiration of ninety (90) days after the transfer of custody of the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, access of representatives to captured personnel as provided for in Paragraph 8 above, shall terminate, and the question of disposition of the prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated shall be submitted to the Political Conference recommended to be convened in Paragraph 60, Draft Armistice Agreement, which shall endeavor to settle this question within thirty (30) days, during which period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall continue to retain custody of those

prisoners of war. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from the prisoner of war status to civilian status of any prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been agreed to by the Political Conference within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed their Custody. Thereafter, according to the application of each individual, those who choose to go to neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Red Cross Society of India. This operation shall be completed within thirty (30) days, and upon its completion, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall immediately cease its functions and declare its dissolution. After the dissolution of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission., whenever and wherever any of those above-mentioned civilians who have been relieved from the prisoner of war status desire to return to their fatherlands, the authorities of the localities where they are shall be responsible for assisting them in returning to their fatherlands. (Ibid. Annex "Terms of Reference for- Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission", para 11)

285. This report was written by Maj H.W. Thomas.

for (C.P. Stacey) Colonel
Director
Historical Section (G.S.)

**CANADIAN ARMY UNITS IN KOREA
FEBRUARY 1950 - JULY 1953**

CORPS	UNIT	ASSUMED OPERATIONAL ROLE IN KOREA	RELIEVED FROM OPERATIONAL ROLE IN KOREAN	COMMANDING OFFICERS IN KOREA FEBRUARY 1950 - JULY 1953
-	Canadian Section, Headquarters First (Commonwealth) Division, United Nations Command Headquarters, 25 th Canadian Infantry Brigade	1 Aug 51	-	Lt-Col ED Danby DSO OBE (1 Aug 51 - 30 Apr 52) Lt-Col NG Wilson-Smith DSO MBE (1 May 52 - 15 Aug 52) Lt-Col EAC Amy DSO OBE MC (16 Aug 52 to end of period)
		25 May 51	-ya	Brig JM Rockingham CB CBE DSO ED (25 May 51 - 27 Apr 52) Brig MP Bogert CBE DSC Cd (28 Apr 52 - 20 Apr 53) Brig JV Allard CBE DSO ED (21 Apr 53 to end of period).
RCAC	"C" Squadron, Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) (2 nd Armoured Regiment)	25 May 51	8 Jun 52	Maj JW Quinn CD (25 May 51 - 20 Jul 51). Maj VW Jewkes DSO MC (21 Jul 51 - Jun 52)
	"B" Squadron, Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) (2 nd Armoured Regiment)	8 Jun 52	24 May 53	Maj JS Rozborough MBE (8 Jun 52 - 24 May 53).
	"A" Squadron, Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) (2 nd Armoured Regiment)	24 May 53	-	Maj WH Ellis MC CD (24 May 53 to end of period)
RCA	2 nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (Designated 2 Fd Regt RCHA until 18 Jun 51)	25 May 51	6 May 52	Lt-Col AJB Bailey DSO OBE ED (25 May 51 - 1 Oct 51). Maj JS Orton MBE MC (2 to 22 Oct 51 (Acting)). Lt-Col EG Brooks DSO OBE CD (23 Oct 51 - May 52).
	1 st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery	6 May 52	22 Apr 53	Lt-Col EMD Leslie DSO CD (6 May 52 - 22 Apr 53). This officer changed his name from MCNAUGHTON to LESLIE on 20 Mar 53).

CORPS	UNIT	ASSUMED OPERATIONAL ROLE IN KOREA	RELIEVED FROM OPERATIONAL ROLE IN KOREAN	COMMANDING OFFICERS IN KOREA FEBRUARY 1950 - JULY 1953
	4 th Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (Designated 81 Fd Regt until 16 Oct 53)	22 Apr 53	-	Lt-Col HW Sterne DSO MBE CD (22 Apr 53 to end of period).
RCE	57 th Canadian Independent Field Squadron, RCE	25 May 51	3 May 52	Maj DH Rochester OBE Cd (25 May 51 - 15 Oct 51). Maj HW Ball, MBE (16 Oct 51 - May 52).
	23 rd Field Squadron	3 May 52	28 Mar 53	Maj ET Galway MBE MC GM (3 May 52 - 28 Mar 53).
	4 th Field Squadron (Designated 59 Indep Fd Sqn until 16 Oct 53)	28 Mar 53	-	Maj LEC Schmidlin MBE MC CD (28 Mar 53 to end of period).
RC Sigs	25 th Canadian Infantry Brigade Signal Troop (Designated 25 Cdn Inf Bde Sig Sqn until 13 Dec 51).	25 May 51	-	Maj DH George MBE MC (25 May 51 - 1 Nov 51). Capt WE Wheeler MBE CD (21 Dec 51 - 27 Apr 52). Capt JR Connell MBE CD (28 Apr 52 - 4 Apr 53). Capt RR Ulrich CD (5 Apr 53 to end of period).
	2 nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery Signal Troop (Designated 2 Fd Regt RCHA Sig Tp until 18 Jun 51).	25 May 51	6 May 52	Lt WR Allen (25 May 51 - 8 Jun 51). Lt FE sorensen (9 Jun 51 - May 52).
	1 st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery Signal Troop	6 May 52	22 Apr 53	Lt JG Berry (6 May 51 - 6 Oct 52). Capt EE Doidge (7 Oct 52 - 22 Apr 53).
	4 th Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery Signal Troop (Designated 81 Fd Regt RCA sig Tp until 16 Oct 53).	22 Apr 53	-	Lt G Vann (22 Apr 53 to end of period).
RCIC	2 nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry	19 Feb 51	4 Nov 51	Lt-Col JR Stone DSO MC (19 Feb 51 - 4 Nov 51). See Note (3).
	2 nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment	25 May 51	25 Apr 52	Lt-Col RA Keane DSO OBE 25 May 51 - 2 Jan 52). Lt-Col GC Corbould DSO OBE ED (3 Jan 52 - Apr 52).

CORPS	UNIT	ASSUMED OPERATIONAL ROLE IN KOREA	RELIEVED FROM OPERATIONAL ROLE IN KOREAN	COMMANDING OFFICERS IN KOREA FEBRUARY 1950 - JULY 1953
	2 nd Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment	25 May 51	24 Apr 52	Lt-Col JA Dextraze DSO OBE (25 May 51 - 15 Dec 51). Lt-Col JAAG Vallée OBE CD (16 Dec 51 - 24 Apr 52).
RCASC	1 st Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry	4 Nov 51	4 Nov 52	Lt-Col NG Wilson-Smith DSO MBE (4 Nov 51 - 30 Apr 52). Lt-Col JR Cameron OBE (1 May 52 - 4 Nov 52).
	1 st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment	25 Apr 52	25 Mar 53	Lt-Col PR Bingham DSO (25 Apr 52 - 25 Mar 53)
	1 st Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment	24 Apr 52	21 Apr 53	Lt-Col LF Trudeau DSO OBE CD (24 Apr 52 - 21 Apr 53)
	3 rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry	4 Nov 52	29 Oct 53	Lt-Col HF Wood (4 Nov 52 - 4 May 53) Maj CEC MacNeill ED (5-15 May 53 (Acting)) Lt-Col MF MacLachlan OBE MC CD (16 May 53 to end of period)
	3 rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment	25 Mar 53	-	Lt-Col KL Campbell OBE CD (25 Mar 53 to end of period)
	3 rd Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment	21 Apr 53	-	Lt Col JLG Poulin DSO (21 Apr 53 to end of period)
	No. 54 Canadian Transport Company	25 May 51	11 Apr 52	Maj RCD Laughton MBE (25 May 51 - 11 Apr 52)
	No. 23 Transport Company	11 Apr 52	27 Mar 53	Maj JI Dolan MBE (11 Apr 52 - 27 Mar 53)
	No. 25 Transport Company (Designated 56 Tpt Coy until 16 Dec 53)	27 Mar 53	-	Maj EG Hession MBE (27 Mar 53 to end of period).
	No. 38 Canadian Motor Ambulance Company	25 May 51	-	Lt WS Brown (4 May 51 - 7 May 52) Lt PT Crosby (8 May 52 - 13 May 53) Lt GR Stark (14 May 53 to end of period)
RCAMC	No. 25 Canadian Field Ambulance	25 May 51	27 Apr 52	Lt-Col BLP Brosseau OBE MC (25 May 51 - 27 Apr 52).

CORPS	UNIT	ASSUMED OPERATIONAL ROLE IN KOREA	RELIEVED FROM OPERATIONAL ROLE IN KOREAN	COMMANDING OFFICERS IN KOREA FEBRUARY 1950 - JULY 1953
RCDC	No. 37 Field Ambulance	27 Apr 52	1 May 53	Lt-Col CB Caswell OBE MC (27 Apr 52 - 19 Feb 53). Lt-Col JD Galloway OBE (2 Jun 53 to end of period). Lt-Col RA Smillie MBE (1 May 53 - 1 Jun 53). Lt-Col JD Galloway OBE (2 Jun 53 to end of period)
	No. 4 Field Ambulance (Designated 38 Dd Amb until 16 Dec 53)	1 May 53	-	Lt-Col RA Smillie MBE (1 May 53 - 1 Jun 53). Lt-Col JD Galloway OBE (2 Jun 53 to end of period)
	No. 25 Canadian Field Dressing Station	11 Aug 51	-	Maj WR Dalziel MC (11 Aug 51 - 6 Jan 52) Maj AC Hardman (7 Jan 52 - 15 May 52) Maj JS Hitsman MBE (16 May 52 - 12 Oct 52) Maj JR Arsenault (13 Oct 52 to end of period)
	No. 25 Canadian Field Dressing Station	25 May 51	-	Maj CF Egan (25 May 51 - 13 Feb 52) Maj AM Davidson (15 Feb 52 - 27 Oct 52) Maj AC Derby (28 Oct 52 - 15 Dec 52) Maj L Lavallée (16 Dec 52 of period)
	No. 25 Canadian Field Transfusion Team	25 May 51	-	Attached to various medical units during its service in Korea. Did not, in practice, exist as an independent command.
	No. 25 Canadian Field Dental Unit (Designated 20 Cdn Fd Dent Det until 5 Jan 52).	23 Sep 51	-	Lt-Col GE Shragge CD (23 Sep 51 - 18 Jul 52). Maj GR Covey MBE CD (19 Jul 52 - 27 Apr 53) Maj AR Smith (28 Apr 53 - 20 May 53) Lt-Col BP Kearney MBE CD (21 May 53 to end of period)
	RCOC Canadian Army Ordnance Elements, First (Commonwealth) Division	1 Dec 51	-	Maj HR Ferris MBE CD (11 Dec 51 - 17 Apr 52) Maj GF Pinford CD (18 Apr 52 - 5 Mar 53) Maj WR Preston MBE (6 Mar 53 to end of period)
RCOC	No. 25 Canadian Infantry Brigade Ordnance Company	4 May 51	Reduced NIL strength in Korea 2 Jan 52	Maj HR Ferris MBE CD (4 May 51 - 2 Jan 52)
	No. 2 Canadian Ordnance Liaison Establishment	4 May 51	Reduced NIL strength in Korea 30 Nov 51	Capt FB Revell (4 May 51 - 24 Oct 51)
RCEME	No. 191 Canadian Infantry	4 May 51	16 Apr 53	Maj RE Hallam (4 May 51 - 23 Nov 51)

CORPS	UNIT	ASSUMED OPERATIONAL ROLE IN KOREA	RELIEVED FROM OPERATIONAL ROLE IN KOREAN	COMMANDING OFFICERS IN KOREA FEBRUARY 1950 - JULY 1953
	Workshop			Maj RC Lane ED (16 Dec 51 - 13 May 52) Maj IM McLaughlin MBE (14 May 52 - 29 Nov 52)
	No. 40 Infantry Workshop (Designated 23 Inf Wksp until 16 Dec 53)	16 Apr 53	-	Maj VW Bethel CD (15 Apr 53 to end of period)
	No. 25 Canadian Support Workshop	5 May 51	Reduced NIL strength in Korea 2 Jan 52	Maj WA Down ED (8 May 51 - 13 Jun 51) Maj RC Lane ED (14 Jun 51 - 15 Dec 51)
	No. 192 Canadian Light Aid Detachment (Type B)	5 May 51	6 May 52	Capt RC Rivers (5 May 51 - 1 Dec 51) Capt RA Auckland (2 Dec 51 - 23 Mar 52) Capt EP Bishop (24 Mar 52 - May 52)
	No. 193 Canadian Light Aid Detachment (Type B)	4 May 51	-	Capt HE McLaughlin MBE (4 May 51 - 31 Jul 51) Lt JR Peters (1 Aug 51 - 15 Dec 51) Lt RA Hill (16 Dec 51 - 8 May 52) Lt WJ Jamieson (15 May 52 - 5 Aug 52) Lt DH Fraser (6 Aug 52 - 31 Jan 53)
	No. 198 Light Aid Detachment (Type B)	18 Apr 53	-	Lt WJ Mildon (23 Apr 53 to end of period)
C Int C	No. 1 Canadian Field Security Section	25 May 51	Reduced NIL strength in Korea 31 Dec 51	Capt MC Corbeil CD (25 May 51 - 15 Dec 51).
CProC	No. 25 Canadian Provost Detachment	25 May 51	-	Maj RI Luker MC CD (25 May 51 - 17 Mar 52) Maj EJ Amirault (18 Mar 52 - 5 Dec 52) Maj QE Lawson MBE CD (14 Dec 52 to end of period)
	No. 25 Field Detention Barracks (Designated 25 Cdn FP Camp until 20 Sep 51)	5 May 51	-	Capt VH Richardson (5 May 51 - 31 Oct 51) Capt CA Breakey (1 Nov 51 - 15 Dec 51) Capt EJ Amirault (22 Dec 51 - 14 Mar 52) Lt W. Fiddes (24 Mar 52 - 14 Apr 52) Capt JB McNeill (15 Apr 52 - 1 Sep 52) Capt DS Patterson (2 Sep 52 - 11 Dec 52) Capt JM Jacques (12 Dec 52 to end of period)

CORPS	UNIT	ASSUMED OPERATIONAL ROLE IN KOREA	RELIEVED FROM OPERATIONAL ROLE IN KOREAN	COMMANDING OFFICERS IN KOREA FEBRUARY 1950 - JULY 1953
	No. 25 Canadian Public Relations Unit	4 May 51	-	Maj CC McDougall (4 May 51 - 15 Dec 51) Capt P Plastow, CD (16 Dec 51 - 14 Apr 52) Capt GH Bowering (15 Apr 52 - 9 Oct 52) Capt GE McElroy (10 Oct 52 - 22 Mar 53) Maj GW Pearce (10 May 53 to end of period)

NOTES

1. Officers are shown in the rank they held on the day they relinquished command. Decorations shown include those awarded for service in Korea.
2. The periods of command shown cover only the unit's tour of duty in an operational role in Korea. In many cases the officers shown in command during this period also commanded the unit prior to its assuming an operational role in Korea, or subsequent to its relief from an operational role.
3. In the case of 2 P.P.C.L.I., the date given is that on which the unit assumed an operational role under command of 27 Britcom Inf Bde. In sense, the unit was in an operational role from the time of its arrival in Korea (18 Dec 50).

APPENDIX B
TO Hist Sec AHQ Report No. 72

**CANADIAN ARMY UNITS IN JAPAN
24 SEP 50 - JUL 53**

UNIT	ARRIVED IN JAPAN	COMMANDING OFFICERS SEPTEMBER 1950 - JULY 1953		REMARKS
Headquarters Canadian Base Units, Far East	10 Feb 53	Col WJ Moogk OBE CD Col JB Allan CD	11 Feb 53/9 Jul 53 10 Jul 53 to end of period.	Unit formed in Japan Unit in Japan at end of period.
No 1 Canadian Base Signal Troop	6 May 51	Capt WH Shaw BEM CD Capt DH Thomson Capt EE Doidge Capt RM Fleury CD	6 May 51/6 Dec 51 7 Dec 51/30 Apr 52 1 May 52/21 Sep 52 22 Sep 52/15 Oct 52	Unit Reduced to Nil Strength in Japan: 15 Oct 52.
No 58 General Transport Company	17 Jan 53	Maj RA Labelle CD	17 Jan 53 to end of period	Designated 57 Gen Tpt Coy until 27 Feb 53 when it assumed present designation. Unit in Japan at end of period.
No. 2 Canadian Movement Control Group	20 Apr 51	Maj EAC Reynolds CD Maj WBT Gillis CD	20 Apr 51/17 Sep 52 18 Sep 52 to end of period	Unit in Japan at end of period
Canadian Section British Commonwealth Hospital	28 Jun 51	Lt-Col JE Andrew ED Maj ABC Powell Lt-Col NH McNally Lt-Col EH Ainslie CD Lt-Col WHR Croskery	28 Jun 51/11 Dec 51 12 Dec 51/21 Feb 52 22 Feb 52/4 Nov 52 5 Nov 52/7 Jul 53 10 Jul 53 to end of period.	Unit in Japan at the end of period.
No 1 Canadian Ordnance Liaison Establishment	6 May 51	Capt GF Chapin CD Maj WJ Finney CD	6 May 51/7 May 51 8 May 51/24 Oct 51	Unit Reduced to Nil Strength in Japan: 30 Nov 51
No 1 Canadian Communications Zone Postal Unit	6 May 51	Capt WL Ford Lt PA Ross Capt WA Coles	6 May 51/26 Mar 52 27 Mar 52/29 Mar 53 30 Mar 53 to end of period	Designated Cdn L of C Postal Unit until 21 Aug 51 when redesignated 1 L of C Postal Unit. Assumed present designation 24 Feb 53. Unit in Japan at end of period.
No 25 Canadian Reinforcement Group	6 May 51	Lt-Col GC Corbould	6 May 51/26 Dec 51	Unit in Japan at end of period.

		DSO OBE ED Lt-Col JR Cameron OBE Lt-Col GO Taschereau DSO CD Lt Col :NM Gemmell DSO	27 Dec 51/20 Apr 52 21 Apr 52/3 May 53 4 May 53 to end of period.	
No 2 Canadian Administrative Unit	6 May 51	Lt-Col TH Carlisle ED Lt-Col RM Campbell Lt-Col RR Taylor DSO ED Lt-Col JAK Rutherford	6 May 51/11 Jun 51 12 Jun 51/19 Jun 52 20 Jun 52/31 May 53 1 Jun 53 to end of period	Unit in Japan at end of period
Canadian Military Mission, Far East	24 Sep 50	Brig FJ Fleury CBE ED Brig JPE Bernatchez CBE DSO CD Brig AB Connelly CBE CD Brig REA Morton DSO CD	24 Sep 50/23 Aug 51 24 Aug 51/15 Nov 51 16 Nov 51/25 Aug 52. 26 Aug 52 to end of period	
Canadian Communications Zone Detachments, British Commonwealth Forces in Korea	26 Sep 51	Lt-Col LR Crue MBE ED Maj JM Mulligan	26 Sep 51/25 Feb 53 26 Feb 53 to end of period	Unit formed in Japan as Cdn Sec, L of C & Base Tps, BCFK. Assumed present designation 10 Feb 53. Unit in Japan at end of period.

APPENDIX C
TO Hist Sec AHQ Report No. 72

**STATISTICAL REPORT ON BATTLE CASUALTIES
(FAR EAST)**

UNIT	KILLED IN ACTION		OFFICIAL Y PRESUMED DEAD		DIED OF WOUNDS		WOUNDED IN ACTION		INJURED IN ACTION		MISSING	PRISONER OF WAR	RETURNED PRISONER OF WAR	TOTALS		
	Offrs	Men	Offrs	Men	Offrs	Men	Offrs	Men	Offrs	Men	Offrs	Men	Offrs	Men	Offrs	Men
A Sqn, LdSH (RC)						6										6
B Sqn, LdSH (RC)	2					18		6								26
C Sqn, LdSH (RC)				1		4										5
1 RCHA	3					5							1	1		8
2 RCHA	2			1	1	1	16	1	1				1	3		21
81 Fd Regt (4 RCHA)	2					2										4
23 Fd Sqn (1 Fd Sqn)						5										5
57 CDN Indep Fd Sqn (2 Fd Sqn)						1										1
59 Indep Fd Sqn (4 Fd Sqn)						2										2
25 Cdn Inf Bde Sig Tp						4										4
HQ 25 Cdn Inf Bde	1					1								1		1
1 RCR	40		3	1	7	13	191		13				14	14		268
2 RCR	30				1				10					8		167
3 RCR	2	24	4		5	1	70		1				1	6	4	110
1 PPCLI	1	26	2		5	10	168		25					11		226
2 PPCLI	1	39	1	1	8	9	132	2	20					13		200
3 PPCLI		18				3	58		7				1	3		84
1 R 22e R	1	26	3		3	3	81		6				1	4		120
2 R 22e R	3	28			4	6	130		9				3	9		174
3 R 22e R		4	2			1	16						4	1		26
56 Tpt Coy (5 Tpt Coy)						1										1
25 CDN Fd Amb (2 Fd Amb)		2					8									10
1 CDN FS Sec		1					1									2
TOTALS	8	248	15	3	35	56	1045	3	98				2	30	72	1471

NOTE - Statistics taken from (H.S.) 133.065 (D651) "Statistical Report on Cas 25 Cdn Inf Bde to 1200 hrs, 15 Apr 54 - D Rec".

**HONOURS AND AWARDS
CONFERRED ON CANADIANS
FOR SERVICE IN THE KOREAN CAMPAIGN**

A. OFFICERS

SURNAME	GIVEN NAMES	RANK	AWARD	DATE (IMMEDIATE AWARDS)	UNIT
Abbott	Albert Joseph	Maj	MBE	-	HQ RE 1 Comwel Div
Allan	James Chalmers	Maj	MBE	-	(HQ 25 Cdn Inf Bde (1 PPCLI))
Amy	Edward Alfred Charles	Lt-Col	OBE	-	HQ 1 Comwel Div
Bailey	Anthony John Beswick	Lt-Col	OBE	-	2 RCHA
Baker	Alfred Jeffery	Maj	MBE	-	HQ 25 Cdn Inf Bde
Ball	Harold William	Maj	MBE	-	57 CDN Indep Fd Sqn
Beer	John Pope	Maj	MBE	-	81 Fd Regt
Berthiaume	Elie William	Capt	MC	-	1 RCHA
Bingham	Peter Richard	Lt-Col	DSO	-	1 RCR
Black	Reay Melbourne	Maj	MBE	-	HQ RE 1 Comwel Div
Blake	George Stewart	Capt	MBE	-	191 CDN Inf Wksp, (att from RCOC)
Bogert	Mortimer Patrick	Brigadier	CBE	-	H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde
Brodie	Harry Band	Maj	MBE	-	HQ 1 Comwel Div
Brooks	Edward Geoffrey	Lt-Col	OBE	-	2 RCHA
Brosseau	Bernard Louis Persillier	Lt-Col	OBE	-	25 CDN Fd Amb
Bruce	Robert Fraser	Maj	MBE	-	3 PPCLI
Caldwell	Douglas Samuel	Capt	MC	-	1 RCHA
Cameron	John Ralph	Lt-Col	OBE	-	1 PPCLI
Campbell	Kenneth Laidlaw	Lt-Col	OBE	-	3 RCR
Campbell	Stanley Leonard	Capt	MBE	-	HQ 25 Cdn Inf Bde
Carter	Charles David	Lieut	MC	-	59 Indep Fd Sqn
Caswell	Clive Browning	Lt-Col	OBE	-	37 Fd Amb
Clancy	John Anthony	Maj	MBE	-	HQ 25 Cdn Inf Bde

SURNAME	GIVEN NAMES	RANK	AWARD	DATE (IMMEDIATE AWARDS)	UNIT
Clark	John	Lieut	MC	22-23 Oct 52	1 RCR
Cloutier	Herbert George	Capt	MC	23 Oct 52	1 RCR
Connell	John Rossiter	Capt	MBE	-	1 Comwel Div Sig Regt
Copcutt	David Russell	Capt	MBE	-	1 RCHA
Corbould	Gordon Charleson	Lt-Col	OBE	-	2 RCR
Cote	Laurie George	Lieut	MC	2-3 May 53	3 RCR (att from RC Sigs)
Couche	Richard Arthur	Maj	MBE	-	3 RCR
Covey	George Ross	Maj	MBE	-	25 Cdn Fd Dental Unit
Danby	Ernest Deighton	Lt-Col	OBE	-	HQ 1 Comwel Div
deHart	John Edward	Capt	MC	-	81 Fd Regt
Dextraze	Jacques Alfred	Lt-Col	OBE	-	2 R22eR
Dolan	Joseph Ignatius	Maj	MBE	-	23 Tpt Coy
Dubois	Albiny	Capt	MBE	-	3 R22eR
Ellis	William Hodgson	Maj	MC	-	A Sqn LdSH(RC)
Ferris	Harold Rowley	Maj	MBE	-	1 Sqn LdSH(RC)
Filshie	James Alexander	Capt	MBE	-	2 PPCLI (att from RCACHC) 1 PPCLI
Fleury	Frank James	Brigadier	OBE	-	CMMFE
Fortin	Gerard Raymond	Capt	MBE	-	1 R 22e r (att from RCA Ch C)
Freeborn	Frederick Roberts	Lieut	MC	-	57 CDN Indep Fd Sqn
Galloway	James Duncan	Lt-Col	OBE	-	38 Fd Amb
Galway	Edward Thomas	Maj	MBE	-	23 Fd Sqn
Gardner	Herbert Russell	Lieut	MC	24 Sep 52	1 RCR
George	Donald Harry	Maj	MBE	-	(HQ 25 Cdn Inf Bde) (25 Cdn Inf Bde Sig Sqn)
George	John Hebert Bothwell	Maj	DSO	10-11 Dec 51	1 PPCLI
Hamilton	Charles John Alexander	Maj	MBE	-	HQ 25 Cdn Inf Bde
Hauser	Rollin John	Capt	MBE	-	81 Fd Regt
Hession	Edmund Gilbert	Maj	MBE	-	56 Tpt Coy
Hitsman	James Stuart	Maj	MBE	-	25 CDN F D S
Hollyer	Edgar Herbert	2/Lt	MC	2-3 May 53	3 RCR
Howitt	Gerald Henry	t/Capt	MC	-	1 RCHA

SURNAME	GIVEN NAMES	RANK	AWARD	DATE (IMMEDIATE AWARDS)	UNIT
Jaffey	Bertram David	Maj	MBE	-	37 Fd Amb
Jenkins	John Gallington	Capt	MC	-	3 RCR
Jewkes	Victor Wilfred	Maj	DSO	-	C Sqn LdSH(RC)
Johnson	Howard Wesley	Capt	MBE	-	(1RCR) (25 Cdn FDS (att from RCACHC))
Keane	Robert Angus	Lt-Col	OBE	-	2 RCR
King	Andrew Martin	Lieut	MC	-	1 RCR
Klenavic	Francis	Maj	MBE	-	1 RCR
Laughton	Robert Charles David	Maj	MBE	-	54 Cdn Tpt Coy
Lawson	Quentin Earl	Maj	MBE	-	1 Comwel Div Pro Coy
Leach	John Edward	Maj	MBE	-	HQ 25 Cdn Inf Bde
Leclerc	Roland	Capt	MC	-	2 R22eR
Leonard	Albert Clark	Lieut	MBE	-	B Sqn LdSH(RC) (att from RCEME)
Leslie (formerly McNaughton)	Edward Murray Dalziel	Lt-Col	DSO	-	1 RCHA
Liboiron	Real	A/Maj	DSO	24 Nov 51	2 R22eR
Loomis	Dan Gordon	Lieut	MC	-	1 RCR
MacDonald	Josephine Isabel	Lieut(NS)	ARRC	-	CDN Sec Britcom Hosp
MacDonald	Strathcona Clifton	Lieut	MID	17-24 Nov 51	C Sqn LdSH(RC)
MacDonald	Thomas Murray	Maj	MBE	-	HQ 25 Cdn Inf Bde
MacDuff	Raymond	Lieut	MID	24 Nov 51	2 R22eR
MacGregor	John Hector	Capt	MBE	-	3 PPCLI (att from RCACHC)
MacNeill	Charles Edward Collie	Maj	MBE	-	3 PPCLI
Mastronardi	Edward John	Lieut	MC	2-3 Nov 51	2 RCR
Mayer	Paul Augustus	Maj	MBE	-	HQ 1 Comwel Div
McKinlay	James George Clyde	Lieut	MC	-	1 PPCLI
McLachlan	Malcolm Francis	Lt-Col	OBE	-	3 PPCLI
McLarnon	John Robert	Maj	MBE	-	HQ Crème 1 Comwel Div
McLaughlin	Harold Edgar	Capt	MBE	-	191 CDN Inf Wksp
McLaughlin	Ivan Murray	Maj	MBE	-	HQ CRÈME, 1 Comwel Div

SURNAME	GIVEN NAMES	RANK	AWARD	DATE (IMMEDIATE AWARDS)	UNIT
Merrithew	Haldene Owen	2/Lt	MC	-	1 R22eR
Middleton	David Alexander	Lieut	MC	21 May 52	1 PPCLI
Mills	John Graham Wallace	A/Capt	MC	24 Apr 51	2 PPCLI
Mullin	Mercier Joseph	Capt	MID	22-25 Nov 51	2 R22eR
Nash	Walter George Joseph	Lieut	MID	22-25 Nov 51	2 R22eR
O'Brennan	Matthew Terrance	A/Capt	MC	-	2 RCHA
Orton	John Swaffield	Maj	MBE	-	2 RCHA
Pense	Elizabeth Barker	Capt (Matron)	RRC	-	CDN Sec Britcom Hosp
Peterson	Allan Angus Sloss	Lieut	MC	31 May 52	1 RCR
Pilley	Cyril Aylward	Maj	MBE	-	HQ 25 Cdn Inf Bde
Pitts	Herbert Chesley	Lieut	MC	-	3 PPCLI
Pope	William Henry	A/Maj	MC	-	3 PPCLI
Poulin	Jean Louis Gaston	Lt-Col	DSO	-	3 R22eR
Preston	William Ross	Maj	MBE	-	1 Comwel Div Ord Fd ck
Riffou	Jean Berchmans	2/Lt	MC	-	3 R22eR
Robertson	William Cryle	2/Lt	MC	-	1 PPCLI
Robinson	Aaron	Maj	MBE	-	1 RCHA
Rochester	Donald Harvey	Maj	OBE	-	57 Cdn Indep Fd Sqn
Rockingham	John Meredith	Brigadier	CB	-	HQ 25 Cdn Inf Bde
Roxborough	John Sutton	Maj	MF	-	B Sqn LdSH(RC)
Ruffee	George Edward Moodie	Lieut	MC	-	81 Fd Regt
Sare	Paul Francis Lionel	Lt-Col	OBE	-	CMMFE
Schmidlin	Laurence Edward Carson	Maj	MC	-	59 Indep Fd Sqn
Sevigny	Joseph Georges	Maj	MBE	-	1 R22eR
Smillie	Roy Alexander	Lt-Col	MBE	-	37 Fd Amb
Smith	Gerald Lucian Morgan	Col	CBE	-	1 R22eR
Smyth	Robert Dunlop	Lieut	MID	22-26 Oct 52	1 RCHA
Snider	Christopher Burnet	2/Lt	MC	-	3 PPCLI
Sterne	Henry William	Lt-Col	DSO	-	81 Fd Regt
Stevenson	Henry Carson	Capt	MBE	-	2 RCR (att from RCAMC)
Stone	James Riley	Lt-Col	DSO (second bar)	-	2 PPCLLI

SURNAME	GIVEN NAMES	RANK	AWARD	DATE (IMMEDIATE AWARDS)	UNIT
Taylor	George Gray	A/Maj	MC	-	1 RCR
Tees	Peter Joseph Angwyn	Capt	DFC	-	1903 Indep Air OP Flt (att from RCA)
Therrien	Jean Paul Andre	Lieut	MC	-	2 R22eR
Trower	Norman George	Capt	MBE	-	57 Cdn Indep Fd Sqn
Trudeau	Louis Fremont	Lt-Col	OBE	-	1 R22eR
Turcotte	Lucien Rene Pierre Gustave	Maj	MBE	-	3 R22eR
Vallee	Joseph Alexander Armand Gaston	Lt-Col	OBE	-	2 R22eR
Wheeler	Walter Edward	Capt	MBE	-	25 Cdn Inf Bde Sig Tp
Wilson-Smith	Norman George	Lt-Col	DSO	-	1 PPCLI
Wood	Michael Bruce	Lieut	MBE	-	1 PPCLI

B. MEN

SURNAME	GIVEN NAMES	RANK	AWARD	DATE (IMMEDIATE AWARDS)	UNIT
Algee	Burnell Gorden	L/Cpl	MID	23 Oct 52	1 RCR
Allen	Trevor	A/Sgt	MM	21-22 May 52	C Sqn LdSH(RC)
Anderson	Peter	S/Sgt	MM	-	1 RCR
Armer	Eric John	WO 2	MBE	-	B Sqn LdSH(RC)
Armishaw	Robert Vincent	WO 1	MBE	-	2 RCHA
Arsenault	Earl Joseph	Pte	MID	23 Oct 52	1 RCR
Asselin	Ernest	Pte	MM	-	2 R22eR
Barter	Walter Franklin	L/Bdr	MID	17-23 Oct 52	1 RCHA
Barton	Leonard	Pte	MM	7 Mar 51	2 PPCLI
Barwise	Kenneth Francis	Pte	DCM	-	2 RCR
Bauer	Rupert Edward	Pte	DCM	-	2 RCR
Beaudin	Arthur	Sgt	MM	-	2 R22eR
Bell	Curtis Ora	Pte	MM	15 Aug 51	2 RCR
Bergeron	Bruno	Sgt	MM	-	1 R22eR
Bourdeau	Jean	Sgt	BEM	-	1 R22eR
Brayton	Ronald Joseph	Cpl	MID	2-3 May 53	3 RCR (att from RCAMC)
Buxton	Richard George	Sgt	DCM	26 Mar 52	1 PPCLI
Carley	Douglas Wesley	Pte	MM	-	2 RCR
Champoux	Joseph Renaud	Sgt	MM	-	1 R22eR
Charland	Bernard Irene	Sgt	BEM	-	3 R22eR
Clouston	Byron Clifford	S/Sgt	BEM	-	CMMFE
Cole	Vernon David	S/Sgt	MM	-	3 PPCLI
Collier	Veasy Eric	Pte	MID	2-3 May 53	3 RCR
Cormier	Delphis	Cpl	MM	24 Mar 52	2 R22eR
Dearden	Thomas Edward	A/Bdr	MM	-	2 RCHA
Dion	Antoine	L/Cpl	MM	-	1 R22eR
Dorman	Francis Merton	L/Bdr	MM	-	2 RCHA
Douglas	Smiley	L/Cpl	MM	25 Apr 51	2 PPCLI
Downs	William Malcolm	Cpl	BEM	-	3 RCR (att from RCAMC)
Dugal	Paul	L/Cpl	BEM	-	1 R22eR

SURNAME	GIVEN NAMES	RANK	AWARD	DATE (IMMEDIATE AWARDS)	UNIT
Dunbar	John Glenford	Cpl	MM	21 May 52	1 PPCLI
Dunphy	Kerry John	Sgt	MM	3-4 Oct 51	2 PPCLI
Easter	Donald Carroll	Tpr	Queen's Commendatio n for Brave Conduct	11 Feb 53	B Sqn LdSH(RC)
Elliot	George William	Sgt	BEM	-	1 PPCLI
Enright	Gerald Emerson Peter	Sgt	MM	23 Oct 52	1 RCR
Eveleigh	Douglas Fred	S/Sgt	BEM	-	C Sqn LdSH(RC)
Faulkner	Ellroy Morton	Cpl	MID	24 Sep 52	1 RCR
Fenton	Vincent Lloyd	Cpl	MM	-	1 PPCLI
Fernets	John Melvin	WO 1	MBE	-	191 Cdn Inf Wksp
Flower	Karl Edmund	Cpl	MM	24 Sep 52	1 RCR
Fox	George Maurice	WO 2	MM	-	1 RCR
Gagnon	Romeo	Pte	MM	13 Sep 51	2 R22eR
Garaughty	Arthur Martin	Gnr	MM	-	2 RCHA
Gardiner	Lorne Percival	Sgt	BEM	-	13 Fd Sqn
Gingras	Jean Robert	L/Cpl	MM	-	1 R22eR
Gingras	Paul Francis	Cpl	MID	25 May - 1 Aug 51	2 RCR
Graveline	William George	Sgt	MM	-	1 RCHA
Guay	Jean Guy	Pte	MM	6-7 May 52	1 R22eR
Hache	Patrick	WO 1	MBE	-	1 RCHA
Hardon	William Henry	RQMS	MBE	-	1 RCHA
Harnois	Gerard Joseph	Sgt	MID	2-3 May 53	3 RCR
Harvey	Joseph Paul Andre	L/Cpl	DCM	22-25 Nov 51	2 R22eR
Haynes	Malcolm Stuart	Sgt	BEM	-	CDN Sec L of C & Base Tps, BCFK
Istead	Earl	A/Cpl	MID	23-24 Nov 51	2 R22eR
Johnson	Jack David	Pte	MM	-	2 RCR
Johnson	Leo Austin	WO 2	MM	-	1 RCR
Julien	George Patrick	Pte	MM	-	1 RCR
Kawanami	Masao	Pte	MID	22 May 51	2 PPCLI
King	Allan Osborne	L/Bdr	MM	-	2 RCHA

SURNAME	GIVEN NAMES	RANK	AWARD	DATE (IMMEDIATE AWARDS)	UNIT
Lemoine	Donald George	Cpl	MM	30 Apr 52	1 RCR
Long	Harvey Eugene	Bdr	BEM	-	1 RCHA
Ludgate	Clarence Edward	L/Cpl	MID	23 Oct 52	1 RCR
Lynch	Paul Austin	A/WO 2	BEM	-	1 RCHA
Major	Leo	Cpl	DCM (first bar)	24 Nov 51	2 R22eR
McCreary	Herbert John	L/Cpl	BEM	-	57 Cdn Indep Fd Sqn
McCuish	David Allan	Sgt	DCM	25 Sep 51	2 PPCLI
McKinney	Gerald Allan	L/Cpl	MM	23-24 Oct 52	1 RCR (att from RCAMC)
McNally	Richard	WO 2	MID	23-24 Oct 52	2 RCR
McNeil	Joseph Cecil	Cpl	MM	2-3 May 53	3 RCR
McNulty	Robert Ronald	Cpl	MID	23 Oct 52	1 RCR
McOrmond	Kenneth Victor	Cpl	MM	19 Mar 52	2 RCR
Mitchell	Wayne Clifford	Gnr	MID	23 Oct 52	1 RCHA
Morrison	Charles Joseph	Pte	MID	23 Oct 52	1 RCR
Nixon	Melville Joseph	L/Cpl	BEM	-	1 RCR
Ostiguy	Jean Gerard	Cpl	MM	13 Sep 51	2 R22eR
Parker	James Willard	Sgt	BEM	-	25 Cdn Fd Amb
Pearce	Jean Paul Roland	Cpl	MM	-	1 R22eR
Pelley	Cecil Wilbert Hoskin	Cpl	MM	-	1 RCR
Pero	William Daniel	Cpl	MM	2-3 May 53	3 RCR
Poole	Ernest William	Cpl	DCM	3 Oct 51	2 RCR (att from RCAAMC)
Prentice	Rhodes Albert	Sgt	MM	-	1 PPCLI
Prociuk	Michael	A/Sgt	MM	-	1 RCHA
Prud'Homme	Daniel	A/Cpl	MID	24 Nov 51	2 R22eR
Pugh	Wilfred Denis	Pte	MM	3 Oct 51	2 RCR
Richardson	John Henry	Sgt	DCM	15-16 Oct 52	1 PPCLI
Rimmer	James Ernest	Cpl	MM	-	1 PPCLI
Ross	Ronald Leon	Sgt	BEM	-	1 RCR
Rowden	Gordon George	Pte	MM	15 Aug 51	2 RCR
Sargent	John Archibald	Pte	MM	-	2 RCR
Scott	Arthur Allan	Pte	MM	-	2 RCR

SURNAME	GIVEN NAMES	RANK	AWARD	DATE (IMMEDIATE AWARDS)	UNIT
Seed	William Thomas	WO 1	MBE	-	1 RCHA
Sinnott	Sterling Lloyd	L/Cpl	George Medal	16 Mar 52	25 Cdn FDS
Snow	George Henry	Gnr	MID	23 Oct 52	1 RCHA
Sommerville	Samuel	Sgt	MM	13 Oct 51	2 R22eR
Steadman	Leonard	A/Sgt	MM	-	3 R22eR
Stevenson	Roy Charles	Tpr	MM	1-2 Oct 52	B Sqn LdSH(RC)
Stewart	Charles Andrew	Sgt	BEM	-	3 R22eR
Stinson	Arthur Irvine	A/Cpl	MM	31 May 52	1 RCR
Taylor	Frank Henry William	Sgt	MID	22 May 51	2 PPCLI (att from RCAMC)
Thompson	Albert Edward	Sgt	BEM	-	1 RCHA Sig Tp
Thompson	Phillip Charles	L/Cpl	MM	-	3 PPCLI
Thwaites	George Herbert	A/Sgt	MID	17-18 Nov 51	C Sqn LdSH(RC)
Tomelin	Paul James	Sgt	BEM	-	25 Cdn P R U
Tutte	Kenneth Gordon	Sgt	BEM	-	Cdn Sec L of C & Base Tps BCFK
Walsh	Robert Allan	L/Bdr	MID	2-3 May 53	81 Fd Regt
Walters	Wilbert Ernest	Sgt	BEM	-	1 RCR
White	Ottie Malcolm	Pte	MM	12 Oct 51	25 Cdn Fd Amb (att from RCASC)
Whitney	Ronald Arthur	Cpl	MID	23 Oct 52	1 RCR
Wishart	Kenneth Wilfred	Gnr	MM	-	2 RCHA
Wyatt	Henry	Tpr	BEM	-	B Sqn LdSH(RC)

Notes:

1. Rank and unit shown are those of the time or period when the award was won.
2. This Table is based on information supplied by Honoured and Awards (D.H.S. 5-0, vol. 3: Memo H.Q.C. 1450-2, vol 2, D. Hist to H. & A., 1 Feb 55, with Minute 2 (Memo to File) and attached Table).

MAPS

1. Korean Front, 1 Apr 52.
2. Korean Front, 9 Aug 53.
3. Front 1 Comwel Div, 1 Apr 52.
4. Front, 1 Comwel Div, 19 Apr 52.
5. Operation "BUCKINGHAM".
6. Spare.
7. Front, 1 Comwel Div, 11 Aug 52.
8. Spare.
9. 1 R.C.R. Area, 23/24 Oct 52.
10. Operation "IPPERWASH", 18/19 Nov 52.
11. Front 1 Comwel Div, 2 Dec 52.
12. Engineer Work, "Hook" Area, December 1952 - January 1953.
13. Spare.
14. Front 1 Comwel Div, 8 Apr 53.
15. 3 R.C.R. Area, 2/3 May 53.
16. Front 1 Comwel Div, 10 Jul 53.
17. Front 1 Comwel Div, 8 Oct 51 - 27 Jul 53.