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INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of this report is to correlate the research already completed or readily available on the Canadian Militia and Canadian defence policy in the period 1867 - 1900. The evidence is neither complete nor is it appropriately weighted. The intention is to provide semi-processed raw material from which a more balanced and briefer chapter may be developed. For the period up to 1890, an attempt has been made to deal with specific areas of interest; thereafter a more strictly chronological form has been adopted.

2. Considerable areas of evidence have not been examined. The records of a government department for a third of a century are substantial in themselves.

Added to that is a wealth of material in newspapers and in contemporary pamphlets and books. Much of the field has been wormholed by specialists in regimental history, in military traditions and even by those who become enthusiastic about badges and buttons. Recently, however, there would appear to be several students who have been trying to come to a better and wider understanding of Canada's military institutions in the period after Confederation. This may produce the sort of sifting of material which has been quite impossible in a research period of five months.

3. In this report, areas which have been adequately covered by readily available secondary sources have not been dealt with in detail. The background to the period has been covered by another study. The military campaign in the Northwest in 1885 has been very lightly sketched. The report

ends with the removal of General Hutton in February, 1990. Like any closing date, it is far from satisfactory for his career marked the beginning of a period of military reform and expansion in Canada and the departure of General Gascoigne in 1898 might be a more satisfactory terminal date for a study which is so largely based on the Militia as a social and political institution. Since battles and campaigns have a small place in the history of this period (and even a smaller place in this account) other elements have been allowed to dominate, chiefly the Militia as a factor in Canadian self-government within the British Empire, the Militia as an area of conflict for the doctrine of ministerial responsibility and the Militia as a social and political institution.

THE MILITIA ACT OF 1868

4. Although it has no very prominent place in the British North America Act of 1867, defence was a major issue in the negotiations which preceded the formation of the Dominion of Canada. The earlier conferences took place amidst a general apprehension about United States policy after the Civil War.

Would Northern armies be turned against the last major British possessions in North America? With the conclusion of the American Civil War, these fears passed but they were replaced by apprehension at the activities of the Fenian Brotherhood. This movement believed that it could serve the cause of Ireland by attacking British rule in Canada. While its military capacity did not prove to be particularly formidable, its threats were a continuing source of anxiety to the Government even up to the turn of the century. In forming a

federal union in British North America, Canadian political leaders had no desire to forfeit British Military protection from the United States. On the other hand, the British Government was anxious about its military liabilities in North America and conscious of a strong public sentiment against them. There was a widespread feeling that any conceivable British garrison would be no match for the American might and that British battalions would some day share the gloomy fate of the legions of Varus.

5. In the fall of 1863, Lieutenant Colonel W.F.D. Jervois of the Royal Engineers visited Canada and prepared an extensive report on the defences of Canada. The major centres of fortification were at Quebec and Kingston but there were British troops scattered in garrisons further west. Jervois felt that it would be impossible to achieve naval superiority on the Upper Lakes and on Lake Erie and that it would only be possible on Lake Ontario if the canals were enlarged to allow ironclads to come up the St. Lawrence. Without control of Lake Ontario, no defence of Canada West could be possible and the garrisons should be withdrawn to Canada East and concentrated at Montreal. The defence of Montreal was essential to Canadian defence for the capture of the city, only a few score miles from the American border, would sever communications with the interior and cut off the retreat of any forces stationed there. The fortification of Montreal received a high priority in Jervois's report and he also recommended improvements in the defences of Quebec. Jervois was in Canada at the time of the Quebec Conference of 1864. For it, he prepared a second report, more cautiously adjusted to the limited means available to the Canadian government. He arrived at an estimate of

\$8,770,000 to cover the cost of gunboats, works and armament.¹ Since the amount was equivalent to the annual revenue from all sources for the Province of Canada,² it was a daunting figure for the Canadian politicians.

6. Jervois's report was also studied by the British government. The British Government eventually agreed to improve the fortifications of Quebec but it refused to consider even guaranteeing a Canadian loan to cover the cost of defending Montreal. On 21 January 1865, Edward Cardwell, the Colonial Secretary, sent his government's views to Canada. While the British authorities accepted Canadian reluctance to assume heavy defence burdens while negotiations for closer union were in progress, and while they would proceed to strengthen Quebec, they looked to Canada to undertake the fortification of Montreal.³ This memorandum formed part of the basis for the negotiations in the spring of 1865. At a series of meetings with British ministers, including Cardwell and William Gladstone, the Canadian representatives were pushed closer and closer to definite commitments to participate financially in the defence of Canada. On May 19th, the opening meeting was held at the Colonial Office. Macdonald was left to explain his mission and did so at length. He spoke of Canadian anxiety for efficient defence in connection with Britain and a Canadian willingness to make every exertion in men and money. In the course of the following week, the Canadians agreed to proceed with implementing the recommendations of the Jervois Report, with the exception of deepening the waterways, the prerequisite of moving warships into the Great Lakes.⁴ In the course of the conference, the Canadians made an undertaking to increase their annual expenditure on the Militia from \$300,000 to \$1,000,000 and to train the

Militia annually while Confederation was pending. They were also committed to the construction of fortifications at Montreal. The British had also adjusted their stand. They were now willing to guarantee the loan for the Montreal fortifications provided the Canadians provided satisfactory security and the Canadian Parliament acted first.⁵ The Cabinet also gave the Canadians the assurance of strong support in carrying Confederation and in renewing the Reciprocity Treaty with the United States. Moreover, as George Brown exultantly informed his wife:

We have received strong assurance that all the troops at England's disposal & the whole Navy of Gt. Britain will be used for the defence of every portion of Canada in the event of war. We have got quit of the burden of five millions of dollars for works of defence. We have choked off the cry that we will do nothing towards defence.⁶

7. Although they antedate the period of Confederation, the arrangements of 1865 were of importance in two spheres. The Jervois Report remained the only serious, professional study of the defence of Canada until the Defence Committee of 1898 and its recommendations for the defence of Montreal remained an unrelieved concern for military authorities for many years. The offer of spend \$1,000,000 annually on the Militia remained a background principle in establishing the defence estimates for many years thereafter.

8. The first Dominion cabinet was formed on 1 Jul 1867. The second senior minister was Sir George Etienne Cartier,* Macdonald's loyal colleague from the Province of Quebec. With his free choice of most of the 13 portfolios, Cartier chose to become the first Minister of Militia and Defence. It was, as he explained to the House of Commons and to several public meetings, the most difficult post in the Government.⁷ Cartier had good reason to believe it. In 1866, there had been a serious engagement with the Fenians at Ridgeway there had been other minor incursions along the Border. In 1867, there were further alarms. Along with the very real responsibilities of the Militia, the new Minister was aware that military expenditures were basically unpopular in Canada. In 1862, he and Macdonald had been defeated through their advocacy of a Militia Bill rather less ambitious than it had subsequently become the practice to present regularly. There would also be the difficulty of extending the Militia system of the old province of Canada to the new members of the Dominion. The portfolio offered several real challenges to a veteran political leader.

9. In 1867, the Volunteer Militia of the province of Canada had just been increased, in a year, from under 20,000 to just under 34,000 men, all of them volunteers. It was headed by British officer, Colonel Patrick MacDougall, who held the title of Adjutant-General. There were two assistant adjutant Generals, Lieutenant Colonel Walker Powell for Canada West and Lieutenant Colonel Casault for Canada East. The men were armed with the

* Cartier was christened "George", not "Georges".

Snider rifle, a breech loading conversion of the Enfield muzzle loader. There were 30,000 of them in the hands of the Militia. The cavalry were armed with the Spencer carbine. Some 107 drill sheds were built or building in the two central provinces.⁸ While later generations were made aware of the selfless enthusiasm with which the Volunteers gave their service during the Fenian Raids, contemporaries were not so sure. In his Report for 1867, Colonel MacDougall warned that the most serious weakness in the Volunteer system, after an experience of almost three years was the feeling of the members of the force that they were contributing out of all proportion to their neighbours. While they paid their taxes, they also gave their service and their pay was hardly an adequate compensation. The Adjutant-General suggested that since the State had the right to demand some sacrifice from every citizen for the common defence, there might be some pecuniary sacrifice from which the Volunteer would be exempt. Other problems of the force were equally fundamental. Rifles might be externally clean but they were so dirty inside that they could not be fired. The officers commanding the various corps of which the Militia was composed neglected to make the necessary returns to Headquarters. At the same time, Colonel Casault in Quebec could report that many companies had been formed whose services could not be accepted by the government.⁹ Such observations were to form a consistent refrain in Militia Reports for many years to come.

10. After delays due to illness and to preoccupation with other government business, Cartier was able to give his full attention to a Bill which would extend the Militia system of Ontario and Quebec to the other two provinces of

the Dominion. It was introduced to the House of Commons on 31 March 1868 in a five hour speech which Cartier regarded as one of his major parliamentary performances. The purpose of the Bill was to give Canada the means, in ordinary times, of looking after her own defences. Military force, he declared, was the crown of a national edifice of population, territory and sea. By the time that the Bill had become law on 22 May 1868, it had evoked general support from both sides of the House and Richard Cartwright, a Liberal, had gone so far as to admit that the defeat of the Militia Bill of 1862 was an unpatriotic action.¹⁰

11. Because that Act of 1868 had such a central place in establishing the post-Confederation Militia, it will be necessary to examine it in some detail.

It provided that the command in chief would be vested in the Queen, to be exercised personally or through the Governor General.¹¹ The Minister of Militia and Defence was charged with the administration of Militia affairs and with the initiative in spending money.¹² The conscriptive aspect of the old Canadian Militia system was carried over to the new and a considerable part of the Act is devoted to it. The Militia was to consist, in fact, of all the male inhabitants of Canada between 18 and 60 and not otherwise exempted, although all able bodied males capable of bearing arms might be conscripted for the levee en masse.¹³ The men were divided into four classes depending on their age and marital status.^{*14} The Militia was divided into an Active and a

* The 1st Class were those between 18 and 30, unmarried or childless widowers. The 2nd Class were the unmarried or the childless widowers between 30 and 45. The 3rd Class were the married men or widowers with children between 18 and 45 while the 4th Class were those between 45 and 60.

Reserve portion, the Active Militia to consist of Volunteer, Regular and Marine Militia. The first was to consist of corps raised by voluntary enlistment, the second of men who either volunteered or were balloted to serve in it and the last was to consist of sailors and seamen and those who were normally engaged in "navigation Dominion waters."¹⁵ All volunteer corps in existence before the Act were held to have survived it but they had to be remustered within three months of its passage and all the members who had not previously indicated that they would be withdrawn would be re-enrolled. Thereafter, no volunteer could retire without giving six months notice to his commanding officer. The term of service in the Volunteer Militia was set at three years.¹⁶ In the other two components, it was two years, with the further proviso that men could not be compelled to serve another engagement until all the men in the same area belonging to the first three classes had been given a turn.¹⁷

12. For Militia purposes, Canada was divided into nine military districts and these districts were to be further subdivided into brigade, regimental and company divisions.¹⁸ These further subdivisions were chiefly designed for the enrolment of the Reserve Militia, consisting of all those who were not involved in the Active Militia. Officers were to be appointed in the company and regimental districts and the company officers were to complete their enrolment by actual enquiry at each house before 28 February 1869. A complete nominal list of the Reserve Militia would thus be available and it was to be renewed at two yearly intervals thereafter.¹⁹ Certain people were reserved from this service, including Judges, clergy, professors and all teachers in

religious orders, the wardens, guards and keepers of penitentiaries and lunatic asylums, those disabled by bodily infirmity and the sons and sole supports of widows. Except in case of war or insurrection, half-pay and retired military and naval officers, seafarers actually employed, pilots and their apprentices, and school teachers were also exempted. Those who objected to bearing arms from religious scruple were to be exempt under conditions and regulations which were left up to the Governor in Council.²⁰ There was also provision for balloted men to purchase exemption for \$30 in time of peace or by arranging a substitute at any time.²¹

13. The Active Militia was to consist of troops of cavalry, field batteries of artillery, companies of mounted infantry, companies of engineers, brigades and batteries of garrison artillery, battalions and companies of infantry and naval and marine corps. The military train, medical staff and other services were only to be formed when required.²² The services of volunteers might be accepted but their commanding officers would be responsible for keeping them at full strength and they might be disbanded if they became inefficient or weak in numbers.²³ There is a curious off-handedness in references to the only existing component of the Militia. Matters were more definite in reference to command. There was to be an Adjutant General, "a person educated in the military profession" and a field officer in the regular army. He was to be a colonel and to be paid \$3,000 per year. There was also to be a Deputy Adjutant General, for whom no qualifications were specified, to be a lieutenant colonel and to earn \$2,240 per year. There were also to be Deputy Adjutant General in each of the Military Districts, also lieutenant colonels

but paid only \$1,200 per year.²⁴ For other officers in the Militia, the transition from the old to the new system was to be accomplished by placing them all on the retired list and then appointing them back to the Active Militia.²⁵ The maximum peacetime rank was to be lieutenant colonel save for the Adjutant General. The relative rank of the Militia officers would be the same as in the regular army but regular officers would always be senior in the same rank, a provision necessary if the Militia was to work in harmonious subordination to the British garrison.²⁶

14. The new Act also made detailed provision for the administration and training of the force. While officers were to furnish their own arms, clothing and accoutrements, the government would provide the men with uniforms which might be replaced at five yearly intervals.²⁷ The officers and 40,000 of the men of the Militia might be drilled for eight to sixteen days each year and for each day's drill of three hours, each officer, non-commissioned officer and man was to be entitled to 50 cents and each non-commissioned officer and man in a mounted corps was to receive 75 cents for his horse.²⁸ The same period of drill and rate of pay was provided for the Regular Militia and the Marine Militia. The Act also authorized the appointment of drill instructors, the holding of inspections and the establishment of Schools of Military Instruction for Militia officers. There was authority for Rifle Associations and Drill Associations and independent companies in schools and universities. In educational institutions where instruction in military drill and exercises was offered, arms and accoutrements might be issued, under regulations, to all pupils over the age of 12.²⁹

15. In the event of invasion or insurrection or its imminent danger, an officer commanding might call out all or part of the militia under his command and they were to march whither he directed.³⁰ The Militia might be called out to serve for a year or more although no man would serve for more than a year save in an emergency. A man who volunteered to serve throughout a war, however, might be compelled to fulfil his engagement.³¹ When on active service, the militiamen would be under the same rules and articles of war as a regular soldier but corporal punishments other than death or imprisonment, were specifically excluded.³² There were a considerable number of possible offenses with penalties listed in the Act. Refusing to attend a drill might be punished by a fine a \$10 for an officer and \$5 for a soldier in the ranks. Disobedience of a lawful order or insolent or disorderly behaviour to an officer could also be fined - \$20 for an officer, \$10 for other ranks. Since the Militia was obliged to turn out to aid the civil power when called upon, there were stiffer penalties for failing to appear on such occasions \$40 for an officer, \$20 for other ranks. However, there was a limitation on prosecutions. Proceedings against officers had to be authorized by the Adjutant General while a Commanding Officer had to authorize prosecutions of other ranks.³³

16. The Act of 1868 was very comprehensive but, like most such statutes, many of its sections had no effect from the start and others rapidly lost their force. The provisions for compulsory service were a survival of a system which had never had more than the barest reality since the beginning of

the century. The enrolment was taken three time.* An amendment Act of 1874 increased the interval to four years³⁴ but, for reasons of economy, it was never again carried out. Even the provisions for maintaining discipline in the Militia by means of fines foundered on the voluntary principle. Nonetheless, in its broad outlines, the Act provides a useful description of the Militia until the end of the Nineteenth Century and, to some degree, survived until the National Defence Act of 1950.

17. On 1 May 1868, Cartier also introduced a Bill to authorize a loan of 1,200,000 pounds, to be guaranteed by the British Government and to be used for payment of the cost of fortifications for Montreal, Saint John, New Brunswick and for other places vaguely referred to as "west of Montreal".³⁵ Although the Bill was passed and received assent on the same day as the Militia Act, it was never put into effect. The failure in this case rests with the British Government which, under the vigorous domination of Gladstone's first Ministry, had more serious matters to concern it than colonial fortifications.

ORGANIZING THE MILITIA

18. Although there was a threat of a Fenian invasion in 1867, none materialised and there was relative calm on the frontier until 1870. There was a opportunity for the reorganization which the Act had authorised. In the

* 1869, 1871 and 1873

meantime, the Militia of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia continued to exist in a relative state of independence, with Colonel MacDougall exercising a sort of distant authority over them. The Ontario and Quebec militia who were not posted on the frontier against the Fenians were authorised to complete their sixteen days of drill for 1868-69 at Battalion headquarters -- in effect, serving only six days, with a day to come and a day to go and drilling for six hours a day.³⁶ This order was issued on 22 Jun 1868. Then, on 2 July, almost as an afterthought, an order was issued for the Eastern Provinces, authorising their Militia, including the Nova Scotia Naval Brigade, to drill at their local headquarters for the period of eight days. New Brunswick was authorised, in a footnote, to have a camp of instruction if it preferred, provided the total cost did not exceed \$26,000.³⁷ In all cases, the pay was the same. Since two drill days were compressed into one, the officers were paid \$2.00 per day and the other ranks \$1.00. \$12.00 per horse was authorised. The Militia Act principle of equal pay for all ranks had not survived into practice. Apart from an allowance for transportation, all other expenses, including rations and quarters, had to be defrayed by the Volunteers from their drill pay.

19. The new Act came into effect officially on 1 October 1968. That was the day on which the Volunteer Corps were required to remuster³⁸ and the results were awaited with some anxiety. The results for Ontario and Quebec soon showed that the vast majority of the men were willing to transfer to the Militia under the new Act. There were some exceptions. In the Peel Battalion, the men of the Streetsville company refused to re-muster but this

was said to be due to local indignation at their town being passed over in favour of Brampton as the country seat.³⁹ 21,816 were mustered for Ontario and 12,637 for Quebec, virtually the same strength as before the enrolment date. Comparisons were more difficult in the Maritimes but it is clear that opposition to Confederation was reflected in a total of 1,789 volunteers for New Brunswick and 928 for Nova Scotia.*⁴⁰ The enrolment for the Reserve Militia was begun at the same time and it found a total of 618,896 men, 69,946 in Nova Scotia, 53,833 in New Brunswick, 202,597 in Quebec and 293,536 in Ontario.⁴¹ The regimental districts, with few exceptions, were the electoral districts for the House of Commons.

20. With the Act, it also became possible to confirm appointments. The first Adjutant General was Colonel MacDougall, an officer who had served for some years with the Royal Canadian Rifles and who had been Adjutant General for the province of Canada since 1 May 1865. The Deputy Adjutant General and Lieutenant Colonel Walker Powell, an officer who was to have a long career in Militia Headquarters and a considerable influence on the development of the force. Born at Waterford in Upper Canada in 1828, he had spent four years as a Liberal member of the Legislature from 1857 to 1861. In 1862, he became the

* Colonel Maunsell, the Adjutant General of New Brunswick, maintained that the record in his province was satisfactory since, although his quota was 3,264, there had never been more than 2100 volunteers in the province. The units which had not converted had failed to turn out due to the distance necessary to travel. In Nova Scotia, however, 5,000 men had been trained under provincial auspices in 1868. Lieutenant Colonel Lauriex, one of the staff officers, later laid claim to special recognition for his services in this difficult period. [Militia Report, 1868 57 *et seq.*; 68. Macdonald Papers, M.G. 26a 1 (c) 331, 149868, Laurier-Macdonald, 1 May 1889.]

Deputy Adjutant General for Canada West and his promotion to Headquarters was a natural advance.⁴² The boundaries of the nine Military Districts were also established on 1 October, by Order in Council. M.D. 1 was to consist of London and the counties of Western Ontario. M.D. 2 included Toronto, Hamilton, the Niagara Peninsula, and Central Ontario counties and the North. M.D. 3 consisted of more easterly bloc of counties running from Durham to Frontenac and including Kingston. M.D. 4 covered the remainder of Ontario. Quebec was divided into three Districts. M.D. 5 consisted of the Eastern Townships of Quebec and included part of Montreal. M.D. 6 consisted of the remainder of Montreal and the western counties up to Three Rivers. The remainder of the province formed M.D. 7. M.D. 8 was New Brunswick and M.D. 9 was Nova Scotia.⁴³ On 23 December, 1868, Deputy Adjutants General for the Military Districts were named.⁴⁶ Within each District Brigade majors were appointed to supervise training within each Brigade Division. Most Districts had two or three of these subdivisions. a total of 22 Brigade Majors were appointed, most of them retired British officers and the remainder with experience in the volunteer Militia.⁴⁷ Each Military District was also provided with a paymaster and storekeeper.

21. When the Militia Act was being passed through parliament, MacDougall had protested vehemently that the provision which would allow a militiaman to resign by given six months notice would make all discipline impossible. While admitting that the provision for balloting would not be as satisfactory as a voluntary system, he also wanted its provisions strengthened so that it would serve as a greater impetus to the volunteer system. All of these views he

pushed most emphatically and when Cartier proved unwilling to accept his advice, he asked that he not be associated with the Militia when the new act came into effect. To spare the Government embarrassment, he chose as his grounds of resignation the low rate of pay allowed the Deputy Adjutant-General at Headquarters and the other staff officers.⁴⁸ His resignation took effect on 4 May 1869 but his successor, Colonel Patrick Robertson Ross did not reach Canada for several months. The Deputy Adjutant General acted in his stead, and it was he who bore the burden of setting up the new system.

22. Walker Powell was left with many of the problems to solve. One was the existence of the civil Service Rifles, a battalion of Ottawa civil servants which was an anomaly in the new structure. It had been authorised in 1866 by Order in Council and consisted of six companies. One, composed of employees of the Queen's Printer, was on a voluntary basis but the other five were based on obligatory service. The battalion was popular with the officers but, Powell discovered, there was "a positive dislike" for it among the men. Under the voluntary system, he believed that perhaps two companies might be formed.

His recommendation that the Civil Service Rifles should be disbanded was accepted.⁴⁹ A more serious question was to establish the allowances for the various volunteer corps. \$40.00 per year was allowed to the commander of each troop, company or battery for drill instruction and the commanding officer of a rural battalion or artillery brigade received \$25.00 per year. A field battery instructor who would also act as care-taker was allowed \$200.00 per year. \$40.00 was allowed per company or troop for the care of arms where they were not kept in public armories under caretakers paid by the Department. A

postage allowance of \$5.00 per efficient company was allowed each Battalion commanding officer.⁵⁰

23. The Militia Report for the year indicated that the gaps in the Volunteer Militia had been made up quickly and that across the country there was such a pressure of offers of new corps that the strength could be increased. The units authorised gave a total strength of 43,541 although the authorised strength was 40,000. Only Nova Scotia had failed to reach its quota. Robertson Ross, in his first report, was full of praise for the system which, he announced "worked with ease and smoothness". Already, however, there were criticisms and Parliament had discovered that a useful target for indignation was the large size of the staff. Since many of the appointments were less influenced by competence than by political influence, the criticism had a certain justice but it was not based on any very profound analysis of Canada's military needs. Robertson Ross attempted to meet the attack by recommending the removal of a number of Storekeepers and District Quartermasters but he insisted that the Brigade Majors were necessary.⁵¹

24. The training period for the year was reduced to 6 1/2 days, again squeezing two drill days of three hours each into a single day. This time, however, the order explicitly excluded Sunday from the calculation.⁵² The drill was conducted at local headquarters. In his inspection, the new Adjutant General was reasonably pleased. Having had considerable experience in South Africa with irregular cavalry, he recommended that the cavalry should be converted to mounted rifles. He was impressed by the field artillery,

finding the men active and intelligent and capable wagon drivers. There were 75 battalions of infantry, armed with the Snider Enfield and with accoutrements which were "not of the latest or best description, though quite serviceable." The 10th "Royals" of Toronto had worked out a new system of drill which e founded to be well executed but which he nonetheless condemned for the sake of uniformity. The 13th Battalion in Hamilton looked like a regular regiment. Throughout he found much to praise. He was particularly impressed by the quality of the men. Of the 33rd (Huron) Battalion, he wrote that "it would be difficult to see a finer body of men assembled under arms".⁵³ It is clear that the Volunteer Militia had survived the transition. The Adjutant General claimed, in concluding his report, that in a few hours after the order was given:

... more than 40,000 men of the active Militia, who are at least admirably armed, would stand forth to form the first line of defence, animated with as much courage and determination to defend their Queen an country, as has ever been exhibited by any nation, and their ranks might be hourly swelled by men form the Reserve Militia.⁵⁴

25. It was, however, a Militia consisting chiefly of infantry battalions with 10 batteries of field artillery and 1,500 cavalry. There were no arrangements for supplies or transport. Medical arrangements were limited to the battalion surgeon and his assistant. Assuming that a militiaman received, in his three years of service, the full training that the statute authorised, he would have had 144 hours of drill. In fact, he got very much less.

Already in 1869, the authorised drill was reduced to 39 hours. At best, two days of the annual drill were devoted to coming and going and a third day would be a Sunday on which no drill could be performed. There was an assumption in the Militia Act that the volunteer Corps would recruit all their men for three years. At the end of that time, there would be a complete change of faces save for the officers, and the training cycle could begin again. In fact, one of the first casualties of the voluntary system was the three year engagement. Men fell sick or left the district. Others refused to complete their engagements and, in many cases, employers refused to let them go. As a result, commanding officers had to complete their ranks with new men each year and the three years training cycle had little chance to develop in many Militia units. None of this need have caused alarm to the authors of the Act of 1868. The Canadian Militia was not intended to serve as an independent field army. When Colonel Peacocke had sent Militia, unsupported by regulars, to Ridgeway, he was generally considered to have blundered. The Canadian Militia was an auxiliary to the British regulars who were the real defenders of Canada. This was the understanding. Unfortunately, it was rendered obsolete almost at the moment that the Act came into effect.

THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL

26. This drastically altered policy belonged to the Gladstone Government which took office in December 1868, and particularly to the new Secretary of State for War, Edward Cardwell. Yet there were leaders on both sides of the British House of Commons who regarded continued defence of a self-governing

colony as an expensive anomaly. There were also other reasons to oppose retaining a British garrison in Canada. Some who were in position to judge could not anticipate any victorious conclusion of a war with the United States in Canada. In a somewhat lugubrious note to the Canadian Prime Minister shortly before he left, the British commander in North America, Lieutenant General Sir John Michel wrote:

The worst that could happen to Canada would be annexation to a free and prosperous country. To England, pecuniary ruin, & loss of prestige.⁵⁴

27. Cardwell's motive, however, was to make possible both a reorganization of the British Army and a reduction of its cost. This could be accomplished only by bringing troops home from colonial garrisons. He and his fellow Ministers became indignant at the thought of British taxes being spent on colonies which used their autonomy to raise barriers against British goods. Introducing his first Army Estimates of 11 March 1869, Cardwell announced that the garrison in British North America would be reduced in that year from 16,185 to 6,249. Even the risk of war which followed American rejection of the Johnson - Clarendon settlement of the Alabama claims did not divert the Secretary.⁵⁵

28. The official news of a substantial reduction of the garrison reached Canada in a despatch of 14 April 1869 from the Colonial Secretary, Lord Granville to the Governor General, Sir John Young. It began by

dismissing the Fenian menace, the main previous justification for the presence of the British troops.

Her Majesty's Government trust that the annoyance arising from the organization of Fenianism in the United States is fast disappearing. This organization, founded on the hostile feelings entertained by numerous Irishmen in the United States against Great Britain derived its substantial importance from the circumstances that large armies had been recently disbanded and were not yet thoroughly absorbed in the pursuits of peace. Such a state of things must always contain elements of danger to a neighbouring country and so far as Canadians suffer it they suffer not so much from their connexion with Great Britain as from an unhappy - I hope a passing accident of their geographical position."⁵⁶

In the course of the summer, Lord Granville warned, the bulk of the British troops would be withdrawn. 2,000 would garrison Halifax and 4,000 would remain elsewhere. But even this was to be temporary and Granville was disposed to agree with Cardwell that it would soon be unnecessary to maintain any British troops in Canada apart from those "required for the training of the Militia and Volunteers and the maintenance of Schools of Instruction." The Royal Canadian Rifles, the corps of older soldiers which had been localized in Canada, was to be disbanded - four companies that year and the rest later. The three gunboats on the Great Lakes would be fitted out again that year if the Canadian Government so wished but any further that year if the Canadian Government so wished but any further naval force would be at her

own initiative and expense. The despatch recalled the guarantee for the fortifications loan and affirmed the new Government's willingness to redeem the pledge of its predecessor. The mood had changed, however, and there was no encouragement to the Canadian government to undertake the project. Indeed, during the summer, Young was asked to sound out his Ministers as to their real feelings about the fortifications. It was evident that the British Cabinet would not be unhappy if no more was heard of them.⁵⁸

29. The news was not popular in Canada but there was no particularly forceful objection. French Canadian newspapers displayed some bitterness at the brusque tone of the Colonial Secretary but most Canadians had short memories and many preoccupations. Those who felt anxiety were relieved by the speeches of the Governor General, who emphasized the British commitment to defend Canada to the limit of its resources. Much reference was made to the despatch from the Conference in 1865* with its assurance, written by Cardwell himself, that the Imperial Government would be prepared to defend every part of the Empire.⁵⁹ Throughout the summer, British troops embarked for home and Sir Charles Windham, Sir John Michel's successor, attempted to re-deploy his reduced force. His decision to leave a small garrison at Toronto provoked a storm from the War Office. Evidently Cardwell did not share his colleague's belief in the disappearance of the Fenian menace for he protested at leaving a force at "an expensive and isolated position". There was, in fact, a Fenian scare in 1869 and when the Canadian Government at first refused to call out

* c.f. supra

its Militia, Windham threatened to withdraw the men from Toronto. The Cabinet promptly reconsidered and promised to call out 3,000 Militia in the event of further threats.⁶⁰ In its defence, the Cabinet was well aware that the disruption of normal life, the demands on the Volunteer force and the expense were making the periodic Fenian scares a more serious problem than the actual rare incursions.

30. Through 1869, pressure continued in British political circles for the complete withdrawal of the garrisons from the colonies and, on 12 February 1870, another despatch was sent from the Colonial Secretary to the Governor General of Canada to warn him that Parliament would expect the intentions announced in the previous year to be carried to a conclusion. For the present, a battalion of infantry and a battery of garrison artillery were to remain at Quebec and there would still be a garrison at Halifax although it would be reduced from 2,000 to 1,500. The remainder were to be withdrawn. Their fortifications and barracks would become the property of the Dominion but should Imperial troops ever come again to Canada, either at the request of its government or to serve a colonial interest, Canada would be obliged to furnish them with barracks or lodgings to the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government. There was some solicitude for the surviving Canadian defence forces. The 43,870 rifles on loan to the Canadian Government outright. The Secretary of State for War was even willing to facilitate the formation of a Colonial regiment and if the members of an entire British Battalion would volunteer to transfer, he would allow it, returning only the Headquarters and a nucleus to reform the unit in Britain. Finally, the despatch stated that

the arrangements were contingent on the continuance of peace and would not alter or diminish the mutual obligations of Britain or Canada in the event of a foreign war. There was a reference to the fortifications loan guarantee in the despatch -- a demand for a further pledge that the Dominion was prepared to go ahead.⁶¹

31. The news was not officially transmitted to the Canadian ministers for some time, as Sir John Young waited for the arrival of a promised draft of the British bill authorising the guarantee of the fortification loan. Undoubtedly, however, the Canadian Government had considerable time to ponder a decision which was revolutionary. The deduction of the garrison had been inevitable but to remove it altogether was to create a state of affairs which no one could recall. It was also unexpected. The British Government, after all, had spent a considerable sum building three new forts at Levis. The despatch did renew the promise to defend Canada in the event of war but it was doubtful that this was an utterly reliable guarantee. White settlers in New Zealand had seen their last British battalion depart as the Maori War reopened. The ultimate result was fortunate for New Zealand but it caused consternation at the time. The despatch, of course, had carefully specified a "foreign" war but the Gladstone Government -- or some of its members -- later showed in the Treaty of Washington negotiations how little they were prepared to risk that contingency.⁶²

32. The Canadian reply was written by Sir George Etienne Cartier and was presented to the Governor General on behalf of the Cabinet. It was a

restrained but firm protest. The Fenians were still in existence and:

... if the British Government should feel it necessary to withdraw the Troops, as they appear to have determined on doing, the Canadian Government trusts such a determination will not be fully carried into execution until after an entire cessation and disappearance of the hostile feelings shown by that organization, which the Imperial Government is aware have not yet taken place.

Other points in the British Despatch of 12 February 1870 were answered in detail. The proof of the Fenian threat was that several thousand of the Canadian militia had been called out in the previous month to meet a rumoured invasion and Habeas Corpus had been suspended. There were also difficulties at the Red River. If the decision to withdraw was irrevocable, Cartier could not understand why a garrison was not placed at Quebec, a more strategic place than Halifax and the most heavily fortified place in the Dominion. On the proposal to form a colonial regiment, Cartier seems to have misunderstood Cardwell's intention, assuming that the headquarters which would go back to England would continue to command the regiment in Canada. Such an idea could not be recommended. The fortification loan guarantee was still wanted. The works would be spread over a period of five years and would be begun, in the first instance, at Montreal, Kingston and St. John, New Brunswick. Canada accepted the barracks, fortifications and landed property of the War Department in Canada on the terms offered. There was gratitude for the 43,879 rifles and for the decision not to withdraw 25,000 Snider rifles, an agreement

reached with some difficulty after the arrival of the British despatch. Above all, the Canadians were pleased with the reiteration of the commitment of

17 June 1865:

... that the Imperial Government fully acknowledged the obligation of defending every portion of the Empire with all the resources at its command, in the reciprocal assurances given by the Canadian Ministers then in London, that Canada was ready to devote all her resources, both in men and money, to the maintenance of her connection with the Mother Country."⁶³

33. The Canadian protest did not deflect the British government. Neither did a series of abortive Fenian raids at the end of May. The only concession was that the Rifle Brigade would not leave Montreal until the 60th Rifles had returned from the North West.⁶⁴ During the summer, the Canadian Postmaster-General, Alexander Campbell was sent to London and the British withdrawal was prominent on his list of problems. He particularly sought the retention of a garrison at Quebec as a proof of continuing British support. The British refused. With the summer had also come the Franco-Prussian War and new apprehensions among the British about the state of their home defences. As the winter of 1870-1871 approached, there was only one battalion left in central Canada together with artillery, engineers and administrative remnants.⁶⁵

34. Amongst the military authorities, there were many backward glances.

Lieutenant General the Hon. James Lindsay,* who had replaced Sir Charles Windham, proposed to send two companies of the battalion to Ottawa for the winter. This was promptly vetoed by Cardwell.⁶⁶ When Lindsay had returned to England to become Inspector-General of Reserve Forces, he was replaced by Sir Hastings Doyle, who had been commanding in Nova Scotia. Doyle was made aware that, with the withdrawal of the British troops, there would be no provision for the instruction of the Militia and he acceded to the urging of the Canadian Government that a school be established at Montreal. Doyle agreed to send a company to Montreal on condition that there would be no expense to the Imperial Government and that quarters would be provided. He reported his decision to the Military Secretary at the Horse Guards, adding, for the comfort of the Duke of Cambridge, that since the detachment could reach Quebec in twelve hours by rail, the principle of concentration had not been lost.⁶⁷ Unfortunately Doyle had neglected to inform the civil side of the War Office nor had he discussed the order with his own administrative officers. The Deputy Controller, Colonel Martindale, who was deeply involved in the administrative arrangements of closing out British establishments, learned that a company would be going to Montreal only through General Orders. Either Doyle was unaware that the administrative facilities had largely been dismantled at that city or he was unaware of their necessity. In five days, Martindale, who was deeply involved in the administrative arrangements of closing out British establishments, learned that a company would be going to Montreal only through General Orders. Either Doyle was unaware that the

* Only as commanding the troops in Ontario and Quebec.

administrative facilities had largely been dismantled at that city or he was unaware of their necessity. In five days, Martindale improvised arrangements, chiefly by delaying the retirement of superannuated clerks and storekeepers and by rearrangements of his small administrative staff.⁶⁸ A strong countermanding order was immediately despatched. In the meantime, the proposal had, in fact, died through the unwillingness of the Canadian authorities to meet the expenses of the school.⁷⁰

35. Throughout 1871, the withdrawal and closing of British stations continued. The stores were handed over to the officials of the Militia Department and little if any material was returned to England. Still the Canadian Government failed to realize that the British were determined to renounce all obligation for Canadian defence. Since the Canadian Militia had been armed successively with the Enfield and the Snider rifle at the expense of the Imperial Government, there was an effort to commit the British to replacing the Snider at no cost when it should become obsolete. This was promptly refused.⁷¹ In April, 1871, Cartier made one last attempt to persuade the British to retain a garrison at least temporarily in Quebec. The abandonment of the fortress should at least be deferred, he wrote, until the Intercolonial Railway had been completed and it would be possible for a part of the Halifax garrison to be sent up in an emergency.⁷² It was to no avail.

On 11 November 1871, the 60th Rifles, with the last detachments of artillery and engineers, embarked on the transport Orontes. A great crowd watched the ship drop down the St. Lawrence.⁷³

FILLING THE GAP

36. The final departure of the British troops was a moment of great historical symbolism, possibly greater than 1 July 1867. It was the moment of tangible proof that Canada would have to stand alone with her neighbours and with the world at large. However, to Canadians in 1871, defence was not a matter of primary concern nor, save for a small minority, was sentimental imperialism a governing emotion.

37. The British departure left some very immediate gaps to be filled. There were fortifications and stores and barracks to be taken over. Without constant care, these would deteriorate rapidly. Masonry heaved and cracked in the extreme Canadian climate. Muskets and cannon rusted. Leather harness and equipment dried out and decayed. Canvas rotted. Munitions deteriorated in such a variety of ways that only a highly trained technician could be expected to manage them. There was also the problem of training the Militia. The Militia Act of 1868 required that those who wished commissions should be qualified. Until 1870 the most common method was attendance at schools run by British battalions. It was this gap which Hastings Doyle had tried so ineffectively to fill at the end of 1870. Almost as effective an influence in training the Militia was the presence of a large body of trained, regular troops. It was possible for a great number of Canadians to know how soldiers were expected to behave. The most important gap was the structure of the volunteer Militia itself. In two years, it was promoted from an auxiliary to full responsibility. No longer would there be a British garrison to look

after the auxiliary services of supply, transport, stores or medical care. The Lieutenant General Commanding in Canada had been a military adviser to the Canadian Government in time of peace and a command of the Militia in time of war or emergency. He would now be departing to Halifax to a lesser and rather different role.

38. The British were not completely indifferent to continued Canadian military needs. The only condition on which they were adamant was that these needs must not impose any further burden on the Imperial Treasury. In his despatch of 12 February 1870, Granville had referred to the willingness of the War Office to facilitate the formation of a Colonial regiment and the transfer of officers and men to the Canadian service. As has been seen, this offer was misunderstood by Cartier and turned down. The intention, as Granville later tried to explain, was that a wholly distinct regiment might be formed by Canada and that only the skeleton of the British battalion would be returned home, to reform under its old name and colours.⁷³ This explanation did not apparently make the offer more acceptable. The British also passed over virtually the whole of their property in British North America except for Halifax. When Lord Kimberley replaced Lord Granville at the Colonial Office, he took the trouble to ensure that a spirit of generosity prevailed during the transfer of stores.⁷⁴ Admittedly, it would have been difficult for the British to take their land and fortifications back to England while even the ordnance and stores were not of the newest of most modern pattern in what was then an age of rapid military obsolescence.

39. The officer who took the future plight of the Canadian Militia most seriously was Lieutenant General Lindsay. Coming out to Canada early in 1870, he later reported that he "lost no time in making every effort to be of assistance to Canada in the handing over of responsibility."⁷⁵ Throughout the spring and summer, he bombarded the Governor General, Sir John Young, and through him, his Ministers, with suggestions and recommendations. His first proposal was that Canada should provide herself with a permanent force through the simple expedient of paying the expenses of one or more British line regiment. It would be cheaper than raising a force in Canada and, he added a little tactlessly, a colonial regiment was liable to deteriorate in officers and men.⁷⁶ He followed this proposal with a list of the advantages which were to be offered to the Canadians in forming their own permanent force. He recalled Gransville's offer to allow officers and men to take service with the Canadians. Half pay officers were also to be allowed to take service and could revert to half pay when their services were finished. He had already had a number of offers from officers and men of the Royal Canadian Rifles, then being disbanded. There was some urgency in the formation of a permanent force of some kind because the fortresses at Isle-aux-Noix, and Kingston and the stations at St. John, Montreal, Toronto and Ottawa were being abandoned that year and he was aware that the Militia system, as then constituted, allowed no provision for permanent garrisons.⁷⁷

40. It eventually became clear to Lindsay that the Canadian Government had no intention of either hiring a British battalion or raising any of its own. However, he was allowed to confer with the Minister of Militia.⁷⁸ This

meeting only confirmed that the Canadians were not interested in the transfer of officers and men and Lindsay had to work out other plans for the Militia. These were embodied in a very long memorandum which was sent to the Governor General on 26 July 1870. It was couched in more modest tones than the preceding memoranda and reflected a better appreciation of what could be expected from the Canadian cabinet. There would have to be garrisons for Quebec and Kingston -- 300 men for the former and 100 for the latter. Isle aux Noix would need 30 men to preserve it from the Fenians or, alternatively, it might be demolished. The garrisons should be artillery and Lindsay recommended that they be "engrafted" to the militia as a means of spreading military instruction. To meet the Fenian menace, the three Imperial gunboats should be again fitted out as a far better answer on the water frontier than any number of infantry battalions. Along the 45th parallel from Huntingdon to Sherbrooke, there should be a corps of Mounted Rifles, paid a fixed sum annually in return for attending a number of drills, for knowing how to use a rifle and for keeping a horse. With an intelligent commander in each Military District, the force would be a basis for the future cavalry of the Dominion.

41. The proposals which Lindsay gave the most emphasis in his memorandum dealt with the appointment of a Major General to command the Militia when necessary, to act as military adviser to the Government and to do all those duties in respect to the Militia which had recently been assigned to the Command in Chief in Britain in respect to the Reserve Forces:

A professional man, whose rank and experience carry weight, is

absolutely necessary at the head of a Militia of 40,000. Such a force must entail a large charge upon the Country, and unless it is well instructed, disciplines and equipped, and also well Commanded, and put into vigorous action when necessary, the money spent upon it is thrown away.

Such a general would have the staff pay of his rank and serve for five years only. "He should be young for his rank and have had experience in training soldiers." It would then be unnecessary for the Adjutant General to be in the regular army. Lindsay placed a special emphasis on the Deputy Adjutants-General. They, too, like all other staff officers, should be appointed for only five years and should be selected from the Brigade majors or the best of the commanding officers.

42. Lindsay also saw that the Canadians would need a Control Department, the organization which the British had evolved by that time to cover the administrative needs of their Army. There must also be an engineer and an artillery branch in the Militia to look after the stores then being acquired.

An officer trained to inspect ordnance stores should be obtained immediately and should also serve a five year term.

43. The remainder of the memorandum dealt with more detailed matters. The artillery garrisons and the mounted rifles would provide a basis for the instruction of the Militia cavalry and artillery but the infantry would remain a problem. Lindsay assumed that the Military Schools would be reopened

although naturally on a very different basis. The Militia should be trained in camps and their musketry would be improved by encouraging the establishment of Rifle Associations. Like most others who inspected the Militia at this period, he complained about the boots of the City corps. These,* provided by the men themselves, were narrow, high-heeled and utterly unsuitable for marching. Above all, efficiency could only be achieved by training the officers. In turn, this would only be possible through the appointment of a General Officer and so Lindsay could close his memorandum on the point which he was to urge most strongly.⁷⁹

44. It appeared to Lindsay as though the Canadians were no more prepared to heed these moderate suggestions than they were his earlier and more ambitious proposals. In the meantime, stores were being handed over of officials who had evidently no notion of what to do with them. In the meantime, stores were being handed over of officials who had evidently no notion of what to do with them. In the middle of August he again urged on the Governor General the necessity of making some provision for the management of the valuable stores which were being presented to Canada. Many of the experienced storekeepers who had served the British were being retired and their services would be available at relatively low pay. He once again pressed the need for a qualified Inspector to be obtained from England.⁸⁰ He also sent a report of his recommendations to the Canadians to the War Office with an appeal that if they were approved of, they might be urged on the Canadians from a higher

* Of a type now know as Half-Wellingtons.

level, and with the full weight of the Imperial Government.⁸¹ Cardwell's reply was cautious approval of most of Lindsay's suggestions save the proposal that Canada should pay for a British battalion. This, he explained, might lead to the conflicts of authority which had troubled similar arrangements in other colonies. Instead, he quoted the commitments which the Canadians had given in 1865 and since and pointed out that any obligations undertaken by Britain were no exoneration of Canada.⁸² Even this cautious emphasis was moderated at the insistence of the Colonial Secretary.⁸³

45. Throughout 1870, the Canadian Government and the Militia Department made little effort to adjust to the problems which would be created by the British withdrawal. Perhaps the limited time available for military matters was too completely devoted to the arrangements for the Red River Expedition and to meeting renewed Fenian threat along the border. Privy Council minutes make only the most scattered reference to the developing situation and it seems possible that most Ministers never believed that the British would carry their policy through.

THE RED RIVER EXPEDITIONS

46. The formation of a provisional government at the Red River and the exclusion of William MacDougall, meant that Canadian authority in the territory of Manitoba could only be established by the presence of an armed force. The British government would agree to allow its troops to participate in the expedition only under strict political and financial conditions. Lieutenant General Lindsay had been sent to Canada to ensure the conditions were met. From the first, the force was to be composed of British regulars and Canadian Militia. Lindsay's original instructions limited him to 200 British infantry and a small detachment of artillery but subsequent negotiations increased the number and also gave Canada 3/4ths of the cost.⁸⁴

47. The arrangements for any joint expedition are always difficult and, in this case, they were aggravated by Canadian reluctance and a hope that an undertaking which had dangerous political overtones need not begin. However, affairs at the Red River showed no signs of resolving themselves to Canadian satisfaction and the expedition was gotten underway. The contribution consisted of two battalions of Militia, each of a strength of 350 men, one recruited in Quebec and the other in Ontario. Colonel Robertson Ross, the Adjutant-General of the Militia, was responsible for the arrangements. The men were to be between 18 and 45 years of age, of good character, sober habits and good physical condition. They were to be mustered by 1 May 1870, two weeks after the orders were issued. The men were to get free uniforms and kit, free rations and lodging and a pay, for privates, of \$12.00 per month.

Their engagement was to be for at least a year.⁸⁵ One of the men who joined was Sam Steele* who was then commissioned in the Militia but who joined as a private. His account of the expedition bears out the record of endurance and hardihood which both British and Canadian soldiers established during this expedition.⁸⁶ It was also a triumph of planning and leadership by the commander of the expedition. His success in leading the Red River Expedition helped the reputation of Colonel Garnet Wolseley and sent him on his way to becoming one of the principle figures of later Victorian Britain. He had considerable praise for his men. In memories written many years after, Wolseley observed:

I can draw no distinction between the relative merits of the military value of the regular soldier and the Canadian militia man who went with me to Red River; each had arrived at Prince Arthur's landing with special attributes peculiarly their own, but by the time Fort Garry had been occupied, each had acquired the military virtues of the other.

What it is that a large army of such men under some great leader could not achieve, I, for one, know not.⁸⁷

Unfortunately, Wolseley did not have a correspondingly good opinion of Canadian political leaders as a result of his experience. He and his officers felt that French Canadian feeling had favoured Riel and opposed the expedition and that French Canadian members of the Cabinet, including Cartier, had reflected

* later Major General Sir Samuel Benfield Steele KCMG, CB.

this feeling and had deliberately caused delays by dilatory arrangements and misinformation.⁸⁸ On his return, Wolsely published an account of the expedition in Blackwood's Magazine in which Canadian politicians, particularly the Minister of Public Works, were bitterly criticized. The Article provoked considerable comment in Canada but Cartier's view was that Wolsely's anger was more due to his being refused the Lieutenant Governorship of Manitoba.⁸⁹

48. Four days after they had reached Fort Garry, the British members of the force began their journey back to the East and all had safely returned to Montreal by 14 October 1870. The two Canadian battalions remained until the spring when the force was reduced to two companies. They had not proven particularly good garrison troops, particularly in the tense situation which had followed the overthrow of the provisional government. During the march to the Red River, Wolseley had forbidden liquor, an experiment which he found highly satisfactory and which was to be regularly quoted in subsequent military discussion in Canada. No other part of his report seems to have stuck so securely in the public mind. However neither his men nor the residents of Manitoba were natural advocates of temperance; indeed there were few other means of escape. Some of the men in the Ontario battalion had enlisted as patriotic Orangemen, determined to avenge the death of Thomas Scott. The mixture of fanaticism and alcohol led to a series of incidents of persecution of the metis. They were encouraged by a noisy minority of the England speaking settlers. The worst incident was the death of Elzear Goulet, a member of the court martial which had condemned Scott. He was seen in the streets of Winnipeg and a crowd, including militiamen,

gathered. Goulet tried to make his escape to St. Boniface across the Red River. As he attempted to swim across, rocks were thrown and Goulet sank, either as a weak swimmer or through being struck by a rock.⁹⁰ Whatever the truth of either side's allegations, it does seem that the presence of the Canadian Militia did not particularly contribute to the restoration of peace and order in the Red River settlements and the reduction of the garrison was certainly sensible.

49. Unfortunately, the events at the Red River had attracted the attention of the Fenians. W.B. O'Donoghue, the late treasurer of the Riel government, persuaded John O'Neill, who had led several unsuccessful expeditions, to make a further attempt on Manitoba. O'Neill and a few followers crossed the border on 5 October 1871, rifled the Hudson's Bay Company post at Pembina and were promptly arrested by a party of American soldiers who had crossed the border in pursuit.⁹² The Canadian Government learned of the planned invasion from the man who sold O'Neill his rifles. There was immediate alarm in Ottawa and plans were made for a relief expedition. In its unsettled state, Manitoba was in great danger. The Government was unaware that the majority of the metis had rallied strongly to the new government in the face of the Fenian threat and that Riel himself had been chosen by its members as the captain of a volunteer company. O'Donoghue was arrested after the shambles of the O'Neill expedition by two French metis.⁹³

50. Unaware of the exact situation in Manitoba, the Canadian Government ordered an expedition to be sent overland the day before despatches arrived

from Governor Archibald. Lieutenant Colonel Osborne Smith, Deputy Adjutant-General at Montreal, who had distinguished himself at the engagement at Eccles Hill in 1870, was sent direct to Winnipeg to assume command. 200 men were raised, divided equally between Ontario and Quebec and for a period of engagement of six months, with a right to a further six months service. The men were collected at Collingwood under Captain Thomas Scott of the 42nd Brockville Battalion, a veteran of the 1870 march. So were many of his officers and men. They sailed on 21 October 1871, just nine days after the order had been issued for their formation. With winter fast approaching, time was very short. The men reached Prince Arthur's Landing on 21 October and immediately set off. Conditions were miserable from the outset. The weather was bitterly cold, with intermittent snow storms. Although ice was forming on the water, there were many places where the men had to jump into it to push their boats along. At other places, it was only three inches deep and empty boats were pushed through the mud. By 9 November, the force had reached the mouth of the Rainy River. The Wolsely expedition had gone farther north to follow a more watery route but Scott's men crossed overland. They did not have time to waste. When they reached the Lake of the Woods, the freeze-up had begun. The last eight miles were completed on foot in the teeth of a gale. Each man was burdened with his own kit and obliged to struggle along smooth ice. Some of the men were so exhausted that they finished to march on sleds. The expedition was practically caught by winter and might well have faced tragedy. Fortunately Colonel Smith had used his time in Winnipeg to organize transport and relief. Scott and his men were met on the western side of the Lake of the Woods and assisted to Winnipeg which they reached on

18 November 1871. They had taken one month and four days from the moment the Cabinet had authorised their despatch compared to the three months of the Wolsely expedition. It was an impressive accomplishment.⁹⁴ Reinforcements were sent the following year to bring the Manitoba Force to a strength of 300 men.

REPLACING THE BRITISH GARRISON

51. Despite the appeals of General Lindsay and a little gentle pressure from the Imperial Government, the Canadian cabinet refused to be panicked into extravagance. If the British expected Canadian defence expenditures to raise to match the sums which had been spent by their Treasury in Canada, they were mistaken. The adjustments were made slowly and without any wish to add to Militia estimates. At the end of 1870, authority was given to conduct six Schools of Military Instruction for a total of 550 cadets. At Quebec, Halifax and Saint John, New Brunswick, the schools were to be conducted as usual by the British garrison but, at Toronto, Kingston and Montreal, they would have to be run by the Militia staff. A Deputy Adjutant-General was to act as Commandant and a Brigade major as adjutant. If troops were required for drill purposes, they were to be taken from the Militia at 25 cents per person per time.⁹⁵

52. The staff of the Department had also been worked out by this time. It was of modest extent. The Adjutant General had the assistance of a chief clerk, five ordinary clerks, an office keeper and a messenger. His only staff

officer was Colonel Powell. There was an accounts Branch with five clerks and a messenger, and a Stores Branch with four. Lieutenant Colonel Wily, the chief clerk of the Stores Branch was retitled Director of Stores and Keeper of Military Properties during 1870 but his staff was not increased. The Minister had the services of three clerks and a messenger.⁹⁶

53. During the summer of 1870, Lindsay had proposed the raising of a force of artillery to man the fortresses at Quebec and Kingston with the further possibility of a small detachment at Isle-aux-Noix. In his report for 1870, Colonel Robertson Ross developed this proposal. Already there had been some use of the militia called out for the Red River expedition to look after affairs in the East. Two depot companies for the two battalions had been authorised and these had both been stationed at Kingston. Another company had been left at Thunder Bay to guard stores. It had been brought back to Montreal to guard the stores on St. Helen's Island. The Government had provided itself with a sort of permanent force almost by accident.

Robertson Ross proposed that two batteries of garrison artillery should be raised, as were the rifle battalions, by allowing a proportion of the men from the Militia garrison batteries to join them for twelve months at a time, to be replaced on a more or less rotational basis each year. The officers, non-commissioned officers and artificers would have to be employed on a more permanent basis. In this way, 170 trained gunners would be made available annually.⁹⁷

54. The Government was sufficiently impressed to make provision for the

formation of the two batteries in its estimates. It had also taken sufficient of General Lindsay's advice to appoint Captain G.A. French of the Royal Artillery to be "Inspector of Artillery and Warlike Stores" as of 1 December 1870.⁹⁸ It then did no more. The summer passed and autumn approached. Since the British Government was not bluffing, the Citadel would soon stand empty. French, who had served for a number of years in Canada and who had played a considerable part in the development of the Militia artillery, proved so loyal a servant of his new masters as to gravely annoy the British military authorities who asked for his recall. Since the matter had aroused the anger of the Secretary of State for War, only a strong appeal for his services by Cartier saved him from return to regimental duty and probable oblivion.⁹⁹ In the middle of September, he was joined by a second Royal Artillery officer, Captain Thomas Bland Strange. Both officers held the local rank of lieutenant colonel in the Militia. With two experienced professional officers, it became possible to organize the two garrison batteries.

55. On 20 October 1871, a General Order was published, authorising the establishment of two batteries "in order to provide for the care and protection of the Forts, Magazines, Armaments and Warlike Stores, recently or about to be handed over to the Dominion Government, ..."100 The Batteries were also to serve as Schools of Gunnery, offering practical training for gunners and drivers and short courses for officers and non-commissioned officers. 'A' Battery was to be at Kingston, with a detachment at Toronto while 'B' Battery was stationed at Quebec and required to furnish a detachment for St. Helen's Island and a small guard for the Levis forts. The rates of pay were similar to those prevailing in the Militia. Privates received 50 cents per day and all ranks received rations of 1 lb. of meat and 1 lb. of break each day. The officers and non-commissioned officers at the outset were to be selected for instruction for a course of three months. They might then advance to a long course of nine months. Those who were wanted for full time service could then be retrained provided they were within the establishment. The other ranks for the batteries were required to be members of an artillery battery and those who sought to join direct were first required to enrol in a Militia battery for three years service. They could then serve in the battery for a year - no longer if they wished and if it was expedient. The men who had returned from the Red River Battalions and who were waiting at Kingston and at St. Helen's Island could be shared out between the batteries if they wished to join. Lieutenant Colonel French* was appointed to command the School of Gunnery at Kingston. A later order gave Strange the command of the school at Quebec.¹⁰¹

* promoted to Militia rank.

There was a reference in the Order to the establishment of Schools of Gunnery at Halifax and Saint John but nothing more was heard of them.

56. The organization of the batteries had been left so late that the British garrison had left Quebec before Strange could begin. He was pleased by the officers he had been given. Capt Short became very highly regarded and his death while fighting a fire in the late 1880s was greatly regretted. The two lieutenants, Duchesnay and Holmes, later became Deputy Adjutants-General. His surgeon, Hubert Neilson, was to become the first Director-General of Medical Services. French's officers were to have comparable careers. Among his recruits was Sam Steele, back from Manitoba and waiting with his fellow riflemen at the Depot at Kingston. He and his brother were the 22nd and 23rd recruits to join. The non-commissioned officers were selected from the Depot.

The chief instructor was John Mortimer, who had been sergeant major of the gunnery school at Shoeburyness and who had been released after 22 years of service. Other non-commissioned officer instructors came out in the spring.¹⁰²

Strange seems to have obtained his non-commissioned officers from England while many of his men were French Canadians who had little artillery training but quite as valuable a background in the logging camps.¹⁰³ Both batteries made up their strength by assigning quotas to the Militia batteries; French observed that the most efficient batteries sent the most men. The 10 batteries of M.D. 4 had produced only 3 men among them.¹⁰⁴

TRAINING THE MILITIA

57. The withdrawal of the British troops, the despatch of expeditions to Manitoba and the formation of the Schools of Gunnery had not greatly affected the bulk of the Volunteers at the time. Three years of Fenian scares, however, had ensured regular and extensive training. The Report for 1870 showed that the nominal strength of the Militia was 44,519 and that all but two of the Military Districts exceeded their quota. A special return showed that 2,469 officers and 33,662 men were ready for immediate service on the frontier, not counting the 2,000 men of the Grand Trunk Brigade who were expected to defend only their own line.¹⁰⁵ Since the United States Regular Army consisted of 30,000 men, chiefly engaged with the Indians, there was presumably some for self-confidence.

58. In 1870, too, more of the Militia were trained in brigade camps where more ambitious manoeuvres could be carried out, corps could compare their efficiency with other units and training could progress beyond elementary drill. Above all, it could be supervised by staff officers.¹⁰⁶ However, the practice had continued of training for two days in one. With eight days in camp, it was difficult to train raw recruits to handle their rifles. At the same time, there was still a strain on the voluntary spirit in requiring any training at all. Robertson Ross found much indignation that a few were bearing the burden of defence while others did nothing. It was aggravated by a pay scale which gave \$1.00 to each officer and 50 cents to each other rank.

[One may assume that senior officers formed a large proportion of the aggrieved with whom the Adjutant-General consulted.]

59. By the following year, there had been progress. The strength of the Militia had fallen slightly to 43,174 but 34,414 of them had been trained and 22,544 of these had spent 16 days in brigade or divisional camp.¹⁰⁷ A camp was held in each District, either in June or September. For the first time all ranks were paid according to rank, ranging from \$4.87 per day for a lieutenant colonel commanding a battalion to the standard 50 cents a day for a private. Rations were also provided and it was carefully stated that pay and rations would only be issued for days that the individual was in camp.¹⁰⁸ For the first time, too, an effort was made to give garrison artillery batteries training as artillery. Hitherto, for lack of equipment, instructors or money, they had really only undergone instruction as a form of second class infantry.

Some problems persisted. M.E. 1 in Western Ontario and M.Ds. 5 and 6 in Quebec still had difficulty in filling the ranks of their corps and their Deputy Adjutants-General were unanimous in demanding a recourse to the ballot.

Colonel French, who had gathered 13 artillery batteries at Fort Henry in Kingston, discovered that some of them had serious difficulty. The garrison artillery from Quebec had been obliged to recruit a number of very small men although their work demanded considerable physical strength. Battery commanders explained that it was impossible to persuade better men to come. In some cases, men had been promised three days leave as part of their camp simply to induce them to attend.¹⁰⁹

60. There was one strong dissenter to the introduction of the ballot. Lieutenant Colonel William Durie, Deputy Adjutant-General of M.D. 2, who had been a lieutenant colonel in the Militia since 1856, was convinced that

balloted men would never turn out as quickly as volunteers while the voluntary system had proved itself in the past. He felt that regular issues of clothing, company rifle ranges and a little pay for extra drills between camps would solve the problems of the force. He also pointed out the little meannesses which soured the men. Since there were no plates or baskets issued during the camps, men had been obliged to collect the bread in their blankets.

There were no rations authorised for the first day in camp and so the men became hungry and ate the whole of the second day's ration for breakfast.¹¹⁰

61. 1871 was a crucial year for the Volunteer system for it marked the end of the three years engagement which the men had made on 1 October 1868.

Robertson Ross had reason to be concerned about the number of men who would re-engage and the difficulty which commanding officers would find in filling the ranks of their corps with suitable men. It was discouraging for him to discover that only one of his Deputy Adjutants-General was opposed to the ballot and that a majority felt that it would be necessary.

62. For all the despondency, 1872 found a total of 30,144 men prepared to attend camp for 16 days. The Adjutant-General felt that real progress had been made, and that it was due to the Brigade camps, where the men were away from home and all distractions. Now he proposed that the full force be trained at a cost of \$1,500,000 per year:

Although happily there seems every prospect at present that the peace of the world may not be disturbed, yet with the acquisition of the

great North West comes new responsibilities, new and unforeseen military demands may therefore have to be met, and at all times the Force should be made as efficient as possible, and held available to turn out at short notice in support of internal law and order.¹¹¹

On the other hand, if Militia estimates were to be reduced, then the best solution would be to train the full number of men for a shorter period of time rather than reduce the number authorised to be trained.

63. Despite the strong numbers in camp, several Districts had fallen well below their quotas. Colonel Durie was only 27 men short but M.Ds. 1 and 3 were each short 1,500 men and M.D. 4 had 1,365 missing out of a total of 3,228. In M.D. 6, there were only 1184 men out of an authorised strength of 3,051 and Colonel D'Orsonnens complained that his officers were dispirited and that some of the men had been in the Militia for fourteen years. In the two Maritime provinces, there were also serious shortages.¹¹²

64. Along with further calls for the imposition of the ballot, there were further explanations for the failure to recruit. Many of them centred around the uniform. In the first place, there was provision for its replacement only every five years. This meant that a recruit might be expected to wear clothing which had been used for as much as three years. In many cases, it was not merely used but worn out. Since the men had only one suit, even one summer camp, drilling, performing fatigues and sleeping, caused severe wear. There were many men who protested against the official forage cap, a "pillbox"

design which protected the head from neither sun nor rain and which, in the eyes of many men looked ridiculous.

65. One unit which seemed to cause little trouble was the Grand Trunk Railway Brigade, a special organization of two brigades of garrison artillery and two rifle battalions, composed entirely of employees of the Grand Trunk Railway. Since many of their employees were military veterans, the Brigade must have seemed to the directors an ideal way to combine patriotism and corporate discipline. The Brigade was even called out to break strikes.¹¹³ At the re-enrolment of 1871, the entire Brigade re-enlisted en masse. This was one application of the voluntary system in which employers seem to have given considerable co-operation.

66. Another small aspect of the Militia which seemed almost as anomalous as the Grand Trunk Railway Brigade were the two small gunboats, the Prince Alfred and the Rescue. The Militia Department had inherited them from the British and they were used throughout the Fenian Raids as patrols. The Prince Alfred, a large and powerful lake tug, could carry four guns but it was too large to pass through the Welland Canal. The Rescue was based on Kingston. It was very old and rather slow and could manage two guns. The two vessels were managed by a Mr. G.H. Wyatt, superintendent of Gunboats, whose thankless task it was to fit them out annually. In 1870, he was bold enough to propose that \$26,000 be spent to build a replacement for the Rescue which was past saving.¹¹⁴ The Prince Alfred was used that year and the next as a training ship for garrison artillery, providing, doubtless, a pleasant summer and some

little known precedents for the Canadian artillery.¹¹⁵ In 1872, the Prince Alfred was used in M.D. 1 to carry two battalions to the concentration at Windsor but the Rescue does not appear to have stirred. At the beginning of 1873, the Canadian government decided to liquidate its small navy.*

A GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING

67. As has been seen, the recommendation among many to which General Lindsay had attached most importance was the appointment of a British Major General to the command of the Canadian Militia. There was an urgent need for a real commander for the force. Robertson Ross made the same point in his Report for 1870. His change, however, was to be more sweeping. In one of the longest sentences in a Militia Report, he recommended that the Adjutant-General be commissioned as a major general and styled as such, that his deputy be promoted to colonel and appointed Adjutant-General and that all the Deputy Adjutants-General should also be promoted to be colonels of the staff. In explanation, he pointed out that cases had arisen of Deputy Adjutants-General

* On 20 January 1873, the Prince Alfred and the Rescue, then laid up at Chatham and Hamilton respectively, were handed over to the Department of Marine and Fisheries by Hector Langevin, then acting as Minister of Militia after Cartier's death. Eight days later, authority was asked to sell the Rescue and on 21 March 1873, George Futvoye announced that the only tender had come from the St. Lawrence Tow Boat Company. Langevin promptly recommended acceptance. Two months later, in May, he again recommended that the tender be accepted. It was delivered to the company on 6 June 1873 and by 11 February 1874, Thomas McGreevy, the president of the company had completed his payments. On 7 May 1874, the Prince Alfred was again handed over to the Department of marine and Fisheries although there is no record of it ever being handed back to the Militia Department in the interval. [R.G. 9, II A 21, 22.]

being junior in date of commissions to lieutenant colonels in their Districts.

Foreseeing the objection that the command in an emergency would go to an Imperial Commander in Chief, he explained that a Canadian General Officer Commanding would simply function under an Imperial officer. There were other motives in Robertson Ross's proposal for he added the recommendation that all staff appointments should be for five years, that they should not be renewable in the same post. It is evident, even from the Militia Reports, that some of Cartier's staff appointments had been better than others.

68. Robertson Ross's annual report eventually reached the War Office where this section received some attention. Lindsay (now Sir James) was at the War Office as Inspector General of Reserve Forces and he was invited to give his somewhat predictable opinion. It was evident that his view laid rather greater stress on the Imperial connection than on the direct command of the Canadian Militia. What he wanted was a General who would be appointed by the Queen with the concurrence of the Governor General and the Dominion Parliament, who would have the military command and supervision of the Militia and who would be responsible that unified Imperial military policy was carried out. What Lindsay did not want was for Robertson Ross to become the Major General and he bridled at the suggestion, implicit in the Report, that the present Adjutant-General believed himself to be commanding the Militia in all but name. The Adjutant-General of the Militia, he felt, should be appointed by the Dominion Government, to act as an assistant to the General and to have under him the civil duties connected with finance and stores. Lindsay was particularly adamant in refusing to recommend Robertson Ross. As a commanding

officer, he had twice been a failure and he had given little assistance during the Red River Expedition. "If he had been left to himself, the Militia would have been found half equipped".¹¹⁷ Cardwell passed this opinion to the Colonial Secretary with his partial concurrence. He had some doubts as to whether the observations would be as valid when the Imperial forces would have been withdrawn to Halifax.¹¹⁸

69. In the session of 1871, a Militia Act amendment was passed to extend its effect. As a result of some pressure from private members, a further clause was included to allow the appointment of colonels in the Militia but no rank higher than major general in peacetime. This added one step to the promotion ladder.¹¹⁹ However, no further action was taken for some time. At the beginning of 1872, Cartier sent a long explanation of his planned promotions to the Colonial Office, suggesting that in deference to Parliament and the expectations of the officers, promotion could no longer be delayed. The intention was to make the Adjutant General a Major General and the other staff officers were to be colonels. In additional justification, Cartier drew attention to the Governor General's praise of the 1871 training camps and the fact that the latest enrolment of the Reserve Militia had found 694,570 men. In the event of an emergency, the Imperial Government would hardly send less than a general and the Militia Act already provided that a British officer of the Regular Army would always take seniority over a Militia officer of the same rank. After some months delay, the War Office agreed on the understanding that the promotions were to Militia rank only.¹²¹ By the time the reply reached Canada, the summer elections of 1872 were in full progress.

Cartier, already a dying man, was defeated in his constituency of Montreal East. He was quickly provided with another seat in Manitoba but the affairs of the Militia Department were clearly beyond him. Shortly after the election, he left for England to seek medical advice. He never returned. During the remaining troubled year of its life, the Macdonald Government had more urgent concerns than the raising in rank of senior Militia officers. In October, when there was some likelihood of the matter being raised in Cabinet, the Governor General, Lord Dufferin, asked Macdonald to hold the matter over until he could discuss it with him.¹²² The opportunity was lost.

70. By the time the matter could be raised again, over a year had gone by. At the beginning of 1873, with no apparent formal authorization, Robertson Ross began describing himself as "Colonel commanding the Militia and Adjutant-General"¹²³ but no one took the hint. When he resigned in August, at the end of his five year tenure, he returned to England without even the transient glory of a Militia Major Generalcy.* On 7 November 1873 Alexander Mackenzie formed his Liberal government. With the enthusiasm of most new ministries, the Liberals were determined to clear away the unfinished business which they had inherited. A major need was to obtain a new Adjutant-General of the Militia. Lieutenant Colonel Walker Powell had been Acting Adjutant General since 22 August 1873 but under the statute, as a Canadian Militia officer, he could not obtain the appointment. While the Liberals might have been pleased to promote an old colleague, they were not yet

* Hope was deferred until 1880 when he became a major general through seniority.

prepared to suggest that a British officer was unnecessary. A list of possible appointments was obtained by the Governor General, but Lord Dufferin, too, was anxious for the appointment of a Major General. It was probably this which had caused him to delay discussion by the Conservative cabinet some eighteen months earlier. The list of officers was not particularly impressive, Dufferin explained to the new Prime Minister, but:

Should you however decide upon having an Imperial General Officer with a Canadian Adjutant General under him, the field of choice would be much enlarged, and I would write a very strong letter to the Duke of Cambridge urging him to a good choice. I will also take care that the Secretary for War and the Colonial Secretary should be consulted, reserving, however, to yourself and colleagues the ultimate choice and decision.¹²⁴

71. The proposal caused some further delay but eventually the Government appears to have been converted. One major problem was the question of salary. Having been accustomed to paying the Adjutant-General \$4,000. there was no desire to pay any more. A common criticism of the Militia among all politicians was that the staff was an extravagance and the Liberals could hardly redeem their election promises of economy and retrenchment by increasing it. Then there was some difficulty in working out the exact terms with the War Office through the Colonial Office. As finally settled, the British general was to have command of the Militia under the Minister. His tenure was to be for five years and his salary would be \$4,000 per year in

addition to his British pay - the half pay of his rank. He would also be entitled to \$1,000 for an aide-de-camp of his own choice. While he was to receive no further allowances, he would be reimbursed for any necessary travelling expenses.¹²⁴ Both the Governor General and the Colonial Office communicated a sense of urgency in getting the appointment arranged.¹²⁵

72. The Duke of Cambridge, as Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, was responsible for such appointments. He submitted a list of five officers, headed by Major General Wolseley. After some informal correspondence, and for unknown reasons, the Canadian government chose the second name on the list, Major General Edward Selby Smyth.^{*126} Selby Smyth matched a few of the qualifications which Lindsay had suggested some four years before. An infantry officer, he had served in several campaigns in India and South Africa, being selected for the staff at a fairly young age. His only apparent experience with irregulars had been a term as Inspector-General of the Irish Militia during the '60s. Although he had only been promoted to Major-General in 1870, he already stood in the top half of the seniority list for his rank.

His previous appointment had been as commander of the troops on the island of Mauritius, an appointment which had given him two opportunities to act for the Governor. In 1874, Selby Smyth was 54 years old.¹²⁷

73. Despite the haste to get Selby Smyth to Canada, he could not become the

* When Panet interviewed Alexander Mackenzie in 1880 on this matter in 1880, the only explanation for passing over Wolseley was that Selby Smyth seemed to be the better qualified.

commanding officer of the Militia officially until the Act was amended. Although Militia General Orders described him as assuming the command of the Militia from the time of his arrival, he was actually the Adjutant-General Walker Powell reverted to the title of Deputy Adjutant-General but continued to look after the administration of the force and to sign the orders.

74. A Bill to amend the Act was introduced in the session of 1875, providing for the appointment of an officer to command the Dominion Militia at \$4,000 per year and for an Adjutant-General at \$2,600. Nothing was said about promotion for the Deputy Adjutants-General of the Military Districts. Predictably, the debate was largely devoted to charging the Government with colossal extravagance in administering the Militia although members on both sides also regretted that Walker Powell's salary was to be reduced from the \$4,000 he had been drawing for well over a year as Acting Adjutant-General. The Government spokesmen referred vaguely to allowances which would help to make up the difference. It was also pointed out that if the Imperial Government had not agreed to continue the General's British pay, Canada would have had to offer a rather larger sum. The other main theme was that the appointment should be open to a Canadian officer. While no member went to the limit of declaring that a British officer should not be appointed for the present, a number wished to amend the bill to remove the exclusion of Canadians. Their numbers were not sufficient, however, to bring serious pressure on the Government.¹²⁹ The new appointments took effect from 20 April 1875 while Walker Powell's colonelcy was dated back to 22 August 1873

when he had begun to act as Adjutant-General.¹³⁰

THE LIBERAL MINISTRY

75. The difficulties in the Government during 1873 were reflected in the state of the Militia. It was in that year that Canada first began to feel the effects of the world-wide depression of the 1870s. With declining revenues and a developing crisis of confidence in economic progress, the reflex reaction of the Government was to lower expenditures. The Militia was an obvious target. There were few Members in Parliament who did not believe that economies were possible and the numerous M.Ps. who were also militia officers were almost united in believing that the first target should be the staff officers. In fact, this proved more difficult than some members were prepared to admit since the Government had appointed a high proportion of the officers from among its own political friends. In addition, the staff was none too large for its many duties, particularly when some of the officers looked upon their positions as sinecures. It was easier to make reductions in the money spent on training. 1873 saw a return to local training. Only 19,963 men were drilled that year, 10,000 less than the year before. The system created many difficulties. In rural areas, men might have to tramp as far as eight miles to the place of drill and, since no rations were authorized for that year, they would have to tramp home at night. In the cities, employers were less willing than ever to allow their men leave to drill. With the growing economic crisis, workers were in no mood to risk their jobs. Above all, in Walker Powell's view, there was a decline in the volunteering spirit and not

even an increase in the private's basis pay would help. To keep up a force of 40,000, resort to the ballot would be necessary.¹³¹ The reports from the Districts indicated other reasons why the service had lost popularity. While one of the Quebec Districts reported that the men preferred to drill in their own areas, others indicated that the men had missed their opportunity to get away from home for a few weeks.¹³² For some units, there had been an opportunity for an eight day camp but in M.D. 3, the men and their medical officers had agreed that one blanket was not enough.

76. Since the inception of the Volunteer Militia, there had been an implicit distinction between the City and the rural corps. The latter tended to be based on one or more counties, with companies established in small towns and villages. Its officers were selected from among the more prominent farmers but in most parts of the Dominion, this did not mean that they were also very prosperous. The rural corps normally assembled only once a year for training.

The city corps, particularly in larger centres, had no regional unity but depended on their organization and cohesion on developing their own cohesion or on inheriting that of a parent organization. The Governor General's Body Guard of Toronto was created and maintained almost entirely by the Denison family. Other battalions became clubs for the urban middle class, sometimes really on a social or political basis but also as a military outlet for their members. Since the members lived in close proximity, they could be drilled regularly through the year and so city corps were always in being. In an age when formal military drill was the be all and end all of Militia training, the city battalions always appeared more efficient than the rural corps. With

more wealthy officers willing to contribute heavily to their units, it was possible to provide better uniforms, facilities and attractions and hence to attract more suitable recruits. In return, militia officers acquired a considerable support to their self-esteem and a pleasing sense of being more patriotic than their neighbours.

77. In the age of stringency which began in 1873, the difference between the rural and the city corps grew steadily. At the same time, it would be easy to overestimate the advantages of the city corps. Rural corps could normally obtain men for training provided the camps were not called during either the sowing or the harvesting seasons. They could also obtain horses. City corps could only train at night or on week-ends. Horses were difficult to obtain save from livery stables at much higher rates than the Militia Department was prepared to pay. Even drill halls were lacking. For two decades the militia in Toronto had none.¹³³ In Montreal, the drill shed collapsed in 1873 and was not rebuilt for many years. The Corporation of Montreal was responsible for replacing it but no serious pressure was applied. In the meantime, the wreck lay unrepaired while scattered parts of the building which still stood were used for the storage of arms. The city corps shared in the decay of the Militia from the modest standard achieved in 1872.

78. For this decay, Mackenzie's government bore the blame. This is perhaps unfair. Faced with a depression, it applied the solution which contemporary thought considered wise -- it cut expenditure. By reducing Militia estimates, it showed a sound understanding of Canada's defence needs in the era after the

British withdrawal and particularly after the Treaty of Washington. The first event meant that either the Canadian Militia would have to become very much more efficient and expensive and so become an effective field army or else it would not be a dependable protection against the United States. No Canadian political figure would have put it in this way publicly but also no Canadian would have believed that his country could provide an effective and unaided military resistance to the United States. The importance of the Treaty of Washington made this unnecessary in any case. At the cost of some painful sacrifices, the significant causes of difference between Canada and the United States were eliminated. Not only was Canada unable to protect herself against the United States, she had no need to.

79. Why, then, was a Militia maintained at all? The answer is complex and, in some respects, unflattering. In the first place, political leaders, like other men and women, do not always think through to coldly logical conclusions. If they do, they tend not to be re-elected. The Militia was there, it was of long standing, it was embellished with myths from the War of 1812 and even from the ancien regime. It was, in other words, an institution of a sort that the conservative Canadian politician does not take lightly. In the second place, the Militia represented a large if incalculable political influence. It was represented in the House of Commons and amongst the wealthy backers of both parties. It was also represented among the people. Even that organ of conservative Reformism, the Globe, attacked the fuss and feathers of military pomp only to cast into relief the sterling qualities of the neglected rural militiamen. It was also an instrument of political influence by the

government. Militia commissions took the place of the British Honours List as an inexpensive reward for service. The enthusiasm for militia drill pay among rural M.Ps. reflected the thousands of voters who would be receiving a periodic pittance from a thoughtful government. Finally, there were contracts, positions on the staff and in the permanent corps, thousands of favours to be distributed. In the third place, the Militia might be useful. It was used with a frequency which now seems surprising in aid of the civil power. And there might be a war and every Government bore somewhere in its collective consciousness the fearful responsibility to be prepared.

80. Mackenzie was not particularly fortunate in his Ministers of Militia. Having decided to allot the portfolio to one of the Nova Scotia representatives in the Cabinet, his choice fell on Lieutenant Colonel William Ross from Cap Breton Island. In addition to being a Militia officer, Ross had represented Victoria in the Nova Scotia legislature for eight years and in the Dominion Parliament for six. These appear to have been his sole claim to office for, as Mackenzie's biographer observes, he was a disappointment from the beginning. He was boastful, indiscreet, fond of the trappings of office but not of its work. He was also of dubious political morality.¹³⁵ After six months, Mackenzie had enough. Alfred Jones, one of the members of Halifax and one of his most important Nova Scotia supporters, proposed William Vail as an alternative. Vail had been provincial and financial secretary in the Annand government but he was now anxious to retire. He would also serve as a better leader for the Nova Scotia members than Jones, whose political background was rather shorter.¹³⁶ Mackenzie agreed and Vail was elected for Digby. Ross had

no intention of giving way gracefully. At length, Mackenzie gave him thirty hours to make up his mind to resign. In a lengthy protest, Ross complained that it did his Nova Scotia colleagues no credit to go outside their ranks for Vail. He had found his Department "a heap of confusion" with decisions required on every hand and he had not even been allowed a capable Deputy. There had been no complaints of his department - indeed there had been compliments on the careful way in which he had consulted others. He was not even impressed with the offer of the Collectorship at Halifax which was to be his reward for going quietly.¹³⁷ Sober second thoughts did persuade him to go while there was any reward at all, but having handed in his resignation,¹³⁸ he then sought to recall it. "No member of any Government of Canada has been so harshly and cruelly used as I have been" he complained.¹³⁹ Nevertheless, a Collectorship is an attractive thing and Ross's resignation took effect from 29 September 1874.¹⁴⁰ "How such a gobemouche was ever named by his fellows as a cabinet minister is a mystery."¹⁴¹ Mackenzie commented to Jones some months later.

81. Unfortunately, Vail did not prove as valuable as some of his friends had promised. Mackenzie was notoriously unable to find satisfaction in his cabinet ministers and Vail, as he discovered, could not be let loose.¹⁴² In 1877, it emerged that Vail had an interest in a newspaper called the Citizen which had accepted government advertising. Under the Independence of Parliament Act, he thereby forfeited his seat. The tempest of the times had turned against the Liberals and Vail doubted that he could regain his seat for Digby. Above all, he had no desire to face a campaign in which his opponents

would be able to cry corruption at him. He was even prepared to resign and leave his seat unrepresented for a session.¹⁴³ It was an embarrassing problem for Mackenzie and some of his colleagues, who tended to take a serious view of such matters. David Mills, for one, was satisfied that Parliament should not be asked to pass a special bill to relieve Vail and that he should take his chances with the electors.¹⁴⁴ Mackenzie agreed and Vail was driven into the contest. Despite the efforts of his workers and the most vigorous use of the power of patronage,¹⁴⁵ Vail was defeated. He blamed the disaster - which had become unexpected - on the labours of a Conservative organizer named Thibault among the French Canadians. Dr. Tupper had also played his part by attending a Baptist service and conspicuously leaving a twenty dollar bill in the plate. The real villain, however, was the new right of secret voting:

The fact is no Election can be considered safe under the Ballot. While the system was new to our people, they voted as they agreed to, now they are fully up to the dodge of talking one way and voting another, and I fear every election under the ballot will be worse and worse. If I could have my way, I wd strike the law off the statute book with as little delay as possible. No Govt can stand over five years under this system of voting.¹⁴⁶

Mackenzie seems to have shown little regret at his loss of a minister. In a letter to his brother, he described him as a very weak man who had managed his county very badly indeed. "In debate he was so awkward that I fairly dreaded his getting on his feet."¹⁴⁷ Perhaps nothing demonstrated the failings in

Vail's character so quickly as his post election demand that not one dollar be put in the estimates for Digby County. "If there is anything in for Metigar breakwater or any other place, please have it taken out. The Govt will be stronger and the present member weaker if you take this course."¹⁴⁸

82. The Minister for the remainder of Mackenzie's period in office was Alfred Gilpin Jones, who had originally recommended Vail. Like many ministers appointed in the last months of a Government, he did not have an opportunity to make his weight felt in his department. In the House, he was subjected to a lengthy and bitter attack by Macdonald and the Conservatives for his alleged part in disloyal demonstrations in Halifax at the time of Confederation.¹⁴⁹ None of this could help to strengthen the Government.

83. Another Liberal appointment long outlasted the MacKenzie Government. William Ross had complained about his lack of an efficient Deputy Minister. Georges Futvoye, the first Deputy, is a somewhat shadowy figure of whom little is known. He left office on 10 January 1875. His replacement was Colonel C. Eugene Panet, who had been colonel of the 9th Quebec Voltigeurs. He was a son of the Hon. Philippe Panet, the first Speaker of the Legislature of Lower Canada. Colonel Panet had been trained as a lawyer. In 1874, Mackenzie had appointed him to the Senate but a year later he was offered and accepted the post of Deputy Minister of Militia. Perhaps at the age of 45 he felt himself too young for the Red Chamber.

84. Lord Dufferin's Military Secretary was Lieutenant Colonel

Henry Charles Fletcher of the Scots Fusilier Guards. At the end of 1873, he published a pamphlet on the Canadian Militia which offered some perceptive comments on its structure. There were three ways of determining military policy, Fletcher observed:

Given the number of men required, and the efficiency to which they are so attain, what amount of money will be annually necessary? Or, as it is stated in Canada - Given the amount of money, and the number of men required, what is to be the standard of efficiency? Or again - Given the amount of money and the required efficiency, how many men can be raised?¹⁵⁰

The story of the next thirty years in the Canadian Militia was the record of attempts by military authorities to persuade the Cabinet to abandon the second equation in favour of the first or third. Only one senior military official ever recommended the second course:¹⁵¹ Colonel Robertson Ross, and he left in 1873. Fletcher reported that the estimates, for the Militia were \$1,549,000 in 1872 but that they had been reduced greatly in 1873 and of the minimum expenditure had not been set at \$1,000,000, they would have been reduced still farther. With this expenditure, the results were very mixed. Some units were better than the best British Militia - others were worse than the worst. The chief fault throughout was that the men did not know their defects. The only possible enemy for Canada was its neighbour, the United States. Even Fletcher had to admit that the likelihood of war had been so reduced as to cause doubt as to the need for any defence expenditure and could and could only protest

that peace never lasts very long, that Britain could not send sufficient troops and that a military force was part of self-government.¹⁵²

85. To improve the Militia, Fletcher urged the establishment of three schools, each with a small force of cavalry, artillery and infantry. The Militia would be divided into three districts, each served by one of the schools. The full time members of the school units would be fitted into Militia units during any emergency. Normally, they would serve as instructors and non-commissioned officers during the training period. Most would serve for only a year although they would be allowed to re-engage for five. Long service, however, would be discouraged. For the remainder of the Militia, Fletcher recommended that officers be required to train at the schools, and that there should be provision for transfer of elderly and unfit officers to the reserve. For city units, he suggested the English practice of pitching camp near where the men worked and arranging morning and evening drills.¹⁵³

86. Copies of the pamphlet were sent to both Alexander Mackenzie and Sir John A. Macdonald and both men appear to have read it attentively. Macdonald pointed out two errors of fact and went so far as to be surprised at the modest force proposed.¹⁵⁴ Mackenzie also sent his personal thanks and raised, very delicately, the possibility of a financial reward. The Governor General, on behalf of his secretary, suggested that an Order in Council expressing the thanks of the Government would be sufficient.¹⁵⁵

87. It seemed to be easier for the Government to approve of Fletcher's

sentiments than to put them into effect. In 1874, it was decided that only 30,000 men could be drilled and paid. A number of units which had been authorized but not equipped were removed from the Militia. Then all companies which had mustered less than 30 men the previous year were cut off. Finally, to bring the total within the limit, the efficient Grand Trunk Railway Brigade was excluded from training.¹⁵⁶ Even at that, companies were reduced to 40 other ranks and training was limited to 12 days including travelling time. As a compensation, the pay of lower ranks was increased. Privates were to be paid 60 cents a day. Cheese and barley were added to the authorized Rations.¹⁵⁷ In both years, city corps were allowed to drill at local headquarters if circumstances so required (and they nearly always did). Only the city field artillery batteries were required to train in camp. Training was to be in brigade camps so far as possible but since there was transportation authorized only for units within fifty miles of camp many could not attend in practise. In 1876, the limitations were even more rigorous since the estimates were reduced to \$650,000. Companies remained at their reduced strength and camps were limited to 8 days (12 for the field artillery) only 23,000 men were allowed to be drilled but the selection was left to the Deputy Adjutants-General by assigning quotas to the Military Districts. That year, there were no large camps and corps were required to drill at local headquarters. In rural corps, this meant that they would have to drill as companies. The pay was reduced to the old level of 50 cents a day for other ranks and \$1.00 for officers, regardless of rank. 25 cents was allowed per day in lieu of rations.¹⁵⁹ Much the same system prevailed in 1877 and again in 1878 although in both years the number of men authorized to drill was reduced

to 20,000 and the number of days was increased to 12.¹⁶⁰

88. The consequences for the Militia were, of course, serious. Since the overall strength of the force was not reduced, the quota system meant that only half the force was trained each year. The annual orders gave a priority by which units were to be selected for training. Field artillery batteries were to be chosen first so that they, at least, had the advantage of annual training. At first Deputy Adjutants-General could select the remainder by drawing lots but in 1878, a standard order was established which varied little thereafter. After field batteries, garrison artillery with guns of position were to be chosen. Then, city corps, followed by the corps which had not drilled the previous year and finally the corps which could gather the most companies at their local headquarters without transportation costs. In practice, this favoured the field artillery and the city corps for the majority of garrison artillery had no guns at hand. In most rural districts, rural battalions were fortunate to drill in alternate years and some drilled only three years. Since the engagement for men in the ranks, was three years, men could hope to drill no more than twice -- a total of 24 days - during their enlistment and many would only attend one camp. Even the 12 days included one Sunday and two days for travelling. When companies drilled locally, the old practice of two drill days per day was common. Even with annual drill, it had been difficult to keep rural battalions together. With two years separating the training periods, it became almost impossible and many battalions became disorganized. A more common weakness was for battalions to be composed entirely of new men for each camp. Only the most

energetic and wealthy commanding officers could keep even a nucleus of his men together between camps. Therefore, when their corps were selected for drill, they had to set to work to fill up the ranks with any men who were available and there was more than a chance that these would be local wastrels and idlers. The common wage in rural areas and even in the cities was \$1.00 per day and the Militia pay of 50 cents was unlikely to attract any man who was neither an enthusiast nor capable of earning more. Since the annual drill depended on the annual appropriation by Parliament, and was further delayed by the time taken to work out District quotas and obtain Ministerial approval, the order for the annual training appeared only in May. In William Ross's inglorious period of office, it appeared only in June. There was a further delay while local staff officers worked out which unit would be allowed to train. Since the most favourable time for training in rural areas was during the last two weeks in June, commanding officers had very little time to get their battalions ready for the camp.

89. There were other things wrong with the Militia besides its lack of training. The equipment which it had inherited from the British was deteriorating rapidly. Again, the greatest weakness was in the rural areas where company commanders were paid a small allowance for storing the weapons and accoutrements of their men. The sum was small and the captains had many other things to concern them and the equipment was badly neglected. Selby Smyth found rifles which were filthy, rusted past use and which had not even been cleaned after firing. They were stacked against walls and sometimes left for a year with the trigger cocked.¹⁶¹ By 1875,

Lieutenant Colonel Jackson of M.D. 4 found that 10% of the rifles in his District were unserviceable.¹⁶² There were two possible solutions - to place the equipment in central stores under the care of paid caretakers or to make payment of the allowances to the company commander contingent on the good condition of their stores. The former would have been expensive and both would have been politically dangerous.

90. Clothing was another problem for the Militia. All authorities were agreed that a smart uniform was the greatest attraction of the Volunteer force. The Government furnished each man with a cap, a jacket, and a pair of trousers, and a greatcoat. In 1870, Walker Powell had been sent to England to inspect the facilities of the new Army Clothing Factory in Pimlico and to arrange to buy a bulk order of clothing. He returned with the recommendation that the men be dressed in serge rather than cloth and that cloth be manufactured in Canada for greatcoats and trousers.¹⁶³ The recommendations appear to have been accepted and there was a natural pressure to manufacture more of the clothing in Canada, thereby keeping the money in the country and broadening the basis of patronage. The chief difficulty seems to have been the inability of the military authorities to obtain any change. Clothing came under the civil branch of the Department and there was no willingness to accept recommendations. The complaints about caps and trousers have already been mentioned. They continued. The original regulations had provided for the replacement of the clothing at least every five years. Unfortunately there was no consideration of the fact that trousers wear out rather more rapidly than jackets. There continued to be no consideration when the matter

was raised by Deputy Adjutants-General year after year.¹⁶⁴ Moreover, the first attempts to manufacture trouser in Canada were not uniformly successful. The cloth split across the seat without much notice, causing some embarrassment.¹⁶⁵

The serge tunics purchased by Walker Powell were not popular but neither was the first attempt to manufacture scarlet cloth in Canada. The uniforms turned black after the lightest shower.¹⁶⁷ For many years, artillery and cavalry officers pleaded that their men be issued gaiters. Otherwise, the trousers of mounted men tended to ride up their legs, causing an unsightly appearance and considerable discomfort.¹⁶⁸ There was no response. The chief complaint, however, was with the cap. It was uncomfortable, ugly and pointless in the opinion of most men and their officers. The refusal to wear it was alleged to have caused breaches of discipline. There was no evident reaction. Contracts were issued annually for the same unsatiable patterns and the men in camps continued to discard it for their old straw hats whenever their officers would allow.¹⁶⁹ Eventually, the problem could only be solved by the Militia units themselves, with the city corps leading the way. By 1876, Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher was reporting that the Montreal city regiments were buying their own shakoes, busbys and helmets. The Stores Department did not deign to change their design until the majority of the militia had done it for them.

91. There were more serious matters in which the Government equally refused to move. For years, there were complaints about the deteriorating conditions of the snider rifles in the hands of the Militia. While much could have been done to keep them in better condition, there were precisely two armourers in

Canada to look after them - one at Montreal and the other at Quebec. They were also responsible for looking after the artillery. Only in 1877 could Selby Smyth report that armourers had been established at Kingston and Toronto.¹⁷¹ In 1871, medical chests had been issued in the Brigade camps¹⁷² and in most Districts, the same chests appear to have been issued again year after year without any inspection or replacement of the contents. One surgeon in M.D. 3 reported bitterly in 1878 that he had gone through six medicine chests in attempting to make up a complete one. such medicines as there were proved to be useless.

The pills had to be broken between stones to give them any particular virtue, having been in stock since the chests were first issued. In urgent and even dangerous cases I had no immediate means to command to treat actively excepting those furnished by myself.¹⁷³

The men were still limited to one blanket and no hospital tent was authorized. Such conditions were duplicated in most other Districts. Attempts to ensure that only fit men came to camp had solid humanitarian grounds. As a final and somewhat lighter instance of the attitude of the Government storekeepers, Lieutenant Colonel Strange reported that his detachment on St. Helen's Island had been forced to fight a fire left by some picnickers which had eventually destroyed the Government boat house. Lacking equipment of their own, the soldiers had used the fire engine in the Military Stores over the furious protests of the storekeeper who said that they would have to obtain permission first.¹⁷⁴

92. All the faults of the Militia were not due to the penuriousness of the Treasury or the failings of the Civil Branch. The military staff, as well, was somewhat imperfect. In 1870, there were 9 Deputy Adjutant-General and 23 Brigade majors.¹⁷⁵ The latter were each responsible for a Brigade Division and were paid on the basis of the number of efficient companies under their charge. Since they were largely the judges of what was an efficient company, the system had a certain element of imperfection. In 1870, Robertson Ross had suggested certain reservations about his officers when he had recommended a limited tenure and an examination for the appointments.¹⁷⁶ On his arrival, Selby Smyth had little praise for any of the permanent staff. The paid caretakers in the military stores and armouries were inefficient. In one case, he had inspected a store and left the town before the caretaker had been aware of his presence.¹⁷⁷ He, also, wanted a five year term for staff officers. Such a limit would force officers to remain competent. It would also make it possible to switch them around for he had found many completely entangled in local influence. In his somewhat opaque prose, Selby Smyth made it evident that many of the officers were unqualified and had been appointed only from political motives:

Officers selected for employment in such positions should by their previous service as well as by their acquirements and character, be considered fully qualified to discharge with advantage the duties of a staff officer.

It is however necessary in the interests of the service, that qualification and competency should not be kept out of view by suffering officers to be placed in such responsible positions through any local or other influence. In such an event, the officer may or may not be professionally qualified, sometimes the latter, and so his duties may be slurred over.¹⁷⁸

The situation was especially serious in Canada where the staff were so widely dispersed. Any official whom the General regarded as largely superfluous was the Brigade Major. For a quarter of the year he was very busy; for the remainder, his position was a sinecure.

This I think undoubted, that too long a tenure of office, with but little to do for several month of the year, has a tendency to render most men in such positions, less careful, zealous and active minded, if not actually neglectful, than is consistent with the public service...¹⁷⁹

The alternative was to appoint permanent adjutants and drill sergeants to the various corps and to rename the Deputy Adjutants-General as Inspecting Field Officers. As such an officer in Ireland, Selby Smyth recalled that he had travelled 5-6000 miles a year and he could not see why Canadian staff officers could not do the same. He also wished another officer at Headquarters.

93. Since the staff was a perennial target in Parliament, Selby Smyth's report in this respect was particularly well received. The \$29,400 which was

spent on the District staff was regarded as a particularly notorious extravagance. The attack was normally led by Mackenzie Bowell, a past Militia colonel, member for North Hastings and, from 1870 to 1878, Grand Master and Sovereign of the Organe Order of British America. His anger was particularly directed against the Brigade majors and he welcomed Selby Smyth's corroboration of views which he had so long felt and expressed. Bowell's criticisms^{*180} received attention during the year of 1876 when the services of seven Brigade Majors were dispensed with shortly before the beginning of the training season.¹⁸¹ This did not at all meet the wishes of the Opposition, particularly as it was maintained that the Government had managed to preserve and promote its friends. On the other hand, many of those who had been dismissed, as was evident from their friends and spokesmen in the House, had been good conservatives.¹⁸² At the same time, it was made clear how inadequate some of them had been. One had been long notorious for drunkenness and inefficiency and had died shortly after his removal. Another was 75 years old. The two in M.D. 6 had shared the supervision of a mere 2800 men.

94. By 1877, the staff consisted of Selby Smyth, his aide de camp, by then, his son, the Adjutant-General, 12 Deputy Adjutants-General and 11 Brigade

* Bowell's indignation at the staff seems to date back to 1867. The Brigade Major in Kingston, Lieutenant Colonel David Shaw got into trouble with his Deputy Adjutant General and appealed to Bowell as both a Militia officer and a member of parliament to intercede for him. Since Bowell was no quiet combatant, his intervention led to a considerable row with Colonel Patrick MacDougall. The result forced a cabinet intervention. A legal opinion from Alexander Campbell condemned Shaw, MacDougall and Bowell and vindicated only Jarvis. [Macdonald Papers M.G. 26 A 1 (c) 300 pt. 2 137379-137443]

Majors.¹⁸³ There was still under-employment, particularly among the three new Deputy Adjutant-Generals. Lieutenant Colonel Osborne Smith in M.D. 10, at Winnipeg, was at least responsible for the Manitoba Force but the remainder of his troops were very scattered indeed. In 1876, he was even authorized to hire a private detective to track down the Saint Jean-Baptiste Company.¹⁸⁴ Lieutenant Colonel John Hamilton Gray of M.D. 12 in Prince Edward Island at least had the distinction of being a Father of Confederation, but the Militia on the Island consisted of only a few hundred men. The District was only created to respect the Islanders' claim to equality in all things with the other provinces. M.D. 11 in British Columbia could at least claim a growth potential but there was very little militia in existence when Lieutenant Colonel Houghton was appointed in 1873 and very little more when he left some years later. On his arrival, he found four companies in being and a fifth being organized in Nanaimo under the drill instruction of a Gunner's Mate from the Royal Navy who had been hired by the manager of the colliery, who also happened to be captain of the company.¹⁸⁵ By the following year, the Nanaimo company had been reduced to 2 officers and 12 men. By 1878, Houghton had managed to create a force of an establishment of 267 but in that year only 146 could be persuaded to do drill.¹⁸⁷

ESTABLISHING A MILITARY COLLEGE

95. The Mackenzie Government was deprived by the depression, by its own viewpoint and by the inadequacy of its Ministers of Militia from doing very much for the Militia but it had one major accomplishment to its credit. In

later years, whenever Canada's military effort was condemned, and it was frequently, one exception had to be made: the Royal Military College. The establishment of such an institution seems to contrary to the general tenor of the times that it remains difficult to know who it came into being. In 1870, Robertson Ross had suggested that it would be necessary to establish a staff college in Canada and that a few candidates might be sent immediately to the British staff college at Camberley as a preparation.¹⁸⁸ Nothing came of his suggestion. Again, in his Report for 1873, Walker Powell had suggested that an institution for higher military learning would be necessary to supplement the Schools of Military Instruction:

An institution at which young men could secure a superior military and scientific education would produce results alike beneficial to the Dominion and to those who join for instruction. To the Dominion it would prove a ready and economical means of providing officers whose military service could be used hereafter in the different districts, and to the cadet an education which would fit him for both civil and military duties, would give undoubted facilities for remunerative employment at all times.¹⁸⁹

Walker Powell may have been very persuasive but there were many other equally valid proposals in his Report which the Government ignored. If there is any explanation, it must be that the Prime Minister himself favoured the idea and pushed it to fulfilment. In so doing, he was well ahead of public opinion and perhaps even ahead of the needs of the Militia. Alexander Mackenzie was

interested in military affairs and had served as a militia officer on the St. Clair frontier during the Fenian Raids. He may have been particularly impressed by the amazing prestige West Point had acquired during the American Civil War when its graduates had provided the generals for both sides. It is clear that the American academy serviced as model for much of the Canadian college's system and, indeed, has continued to do so.

96. The Bill to establish the College was introduced in the session of 1874.

It was to give a complete education in all branches of military tactics, fortification, engineering and general scientific knowledge in all subjects to qualify officers for command and staff purposes. Provision was made for a Commandant, to be paid \$3,000 and two professors at \$2,000. Admission to the College was to be by examination and candidates were required to be between 15 and 20, to submit to a medical examination and to produce evidence of good moral character. The first class was to consist of not more than 22 and thereafter the College could expand to 120, with all Military Districts being represented. The course would be for four years. The proposal received support from both sides of the House of Commons and became law on 26 May 1874.¹⁹⁰

97. It remained to put the law into effect. Nothing more occurred in 1874 by 1875, the buildings of the old Naval Dockyard at Kingston had been selected as the site and work had begun to alter them for their new role. After negotiations, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Hewitt of the Royal Engineers was invited to become the first Commandant. Hewitt, who had spent seven years in

Canada following the Trent Affair, had made himself well known in Militia circles. At the same time, he had some misgivings about the pay. As he explained to Mackenzie, the War Office had agreed to allow him half pay while in Canada but should it be discontinued after two years, his position would be materially altered. While he was willing to spend his private means in Canada, he had a large family and could not afford to serve at a loss. Hewitt attempted to obtain a confidential commitment from Mackenzie that the Prime Minister would support his claim for higher pay should his British pay be withdrawn.¹⁹¹ Mackenzie, somewhat stiffly, refused to give any undertakings in advance.¹⁹² Nonetheless, Hewitt did accept the post and was officially appointed Commandant on 12 November 1875, with effect from 16 September.¹⁹³ It remained to obtain the cadets. The examinations required a knowledge of arithmetic, algebra, geometry, geography, British and Canadian History, freehand drawing, English, Latin and either French or German. Further regulations required cadets to advance \$200 in their first year for their uniform, clothing, boots, books instruments and apparatus, and \$150 for each year thereafter. Board, furniture, washing and attendance would be furnished at public expense.¹⁹⁴ The first examinations were held in each District on 8 February 1876 after some delay and a relaxation of the regulations which made either French or German compulsory.¹⁹⁵ Even then, only eight candidates were successful, six of them from Ontario.¹⁹⁶ Another examination was immediately ordered for May in an attempt to fill the 22 vacancies. The first set of examinations aroused criticism in Parliament that they had been too severe and Hector Langevin tried at length to make the Minister understand how they discriminated against French speaking candidates. Vail at first could

not appreciate this, as one of the problems had been that the candidates had not done well on the French examination. Langevin pressed his point, suggesting the difficulty imposed in requiring a candidate to write French and Latin papers in English.* he seems to have accepted the point for the regulations for the second examination allowed questions to be answered in English or French.¹⁹⁸

98. The College opened on 1 June 1876 with 18 cadets, a Commandant, two military professors and a staff adjutant, Captain Ridout, a Canadian officer in the British Army.¹⁹⁹ The budget for the first year was \$26,000,²⁰⁰ a reduction from the \$29,000 originally proposed but still very much an experiment. As at West Point, there was a considerable emphasis on engineering subjects and a cadet was prepared as much for a civil as a military career. Despite the excellent management the College received from first from its Commandant and staff, the number of applications for entry were at first disappointing.** The problem, as Selby Smyth maintained, was that parents were doubtful about the future employment of sons who attended. A course fitting a young man for a career in the Canadian Militia was hardly likely prove attractive when the majority of full time Militia officers were elderly and torpid veterans on the District staff.²⁰³

* but he was Alfred George Godry Wurtele, from the Quebec High School.

** Although the number of vacancies for 1877 was reduced from 36 to 24, only 7 applicants came forward. Another special examination had to be held. [Report, 1876, xii]

99. One answer to the problem of employing the graduates was to offer them places in the civil service but there was no enthusiasms for limiting a cherished realm of patronage. Another was to seek a few Imperial commissions. This was Selby Smyth's proposal in 1877 and two years later it had been arranged. Alfred Jones was able to tell the House of Commons on 16 April 1878 that an application had been made to the British Government to discover the terms on which two or three of the cadets who graduated highest in their class might obtain Regular Army commissions.²⁰⁵ The actual request was for a mission in each branch of the British service and it was supported by Selby Smyth's comments on the progress of the cadets and of the College.²⁰⁶ The proposal was forwarded to the War Office with strong backing from the colonial Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks Beach.²⁰⁷ The idea gained the approval of the Duke of Cambridge²⁰⁸ although the Director General of Military Education was a little sceptical about the level of instruction. There were so few Canadian cadets and they did not have the chance to experience life in a large garrison or to visit a large arsenal. However, with further training, he felt that they would be suitable for the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers.²⁰⁹ By the summer of 1879, the offer of four Imperial commissions had been negotiated.²¹⁰ Only 15 years after the College had opened, out of 175 graduates, seventy had served or were serving in the British Army, almost half of them with the Royal Engineers.²¹¹

100. Granting Imperial commissions to the graduates was a recognition of the standing of the institution as well as an attempt to win Canadian favour. Another distinction was obtained for the College in a slightly more irregular

fashion. At the request of the Commandant and with the approval of Selby Smyth and the Minster, an Order in Council was passed on 8 April 1878 that the institution would thereafter be designated the Royal Military College of Canada. While the title had certainly a more positive flavour about it than simply "Military College", the Governor General unfortunately forgot to ask for the approval of the Queen. This somewhat disturbed the British authorities²¹² who were therefore obliged to proceed in somewhat of a state of fait accompli. Nevertheless, the approval of the Duke of Cambridge²¹³ and the Queen²¹⁴ were obtained to the title.

PROGRESS AND REGRESS IN TRAINING

101. However valuable the Royal Military College might become to the Militia, it was solving a problem which had yet to arise - a need for training Canadian senior officers. The real need was for schools to train junior officers and non-commissioned officers. Selby Smyth was at least partially justified in feeling that the College had been established prematurely for it impeded the establishment of more elementary and immediately necessary military institutions. The presence of the British garrison and regular training, augmented by lengthy alerts during the Fenian scares had allowed an adequate training for junior officers and non-commissioned officers but the generation which had obtained that experience passed rapidly out of the Militia. The Schools of Military Instruction which were continued after the British departure were no replacement. The cadets in most places lived at home or in lodgings²¹⁵ and the instruction offered by the Deputy Adjutant-General and his

Brigade Majors was, at best, chiefly theoretical. From the very rare references to them in their annual reports, most of the Deputy Adjutants-General do not seem to have taken them very seriously. Only the enthusiastic Lieutenant Colonel Maunsell in Fredericton regularly reported his achievements in the training of candidates and he was the only one to express regret when it was announced that a school would not be authorized in 1879.²¹⁶ In at least one case, a local commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Ibbotson, in Sherbrooke, organized his own school to qualify officers²¹⁷ but any such course was necessarily perfunctory. Above all, cadets never had the opportunity to see soldiers better trained than themselves and inevitably standards had to fall.

102. The one exception to the general deterioration was the field artillery.

Their success was due to the existence of the two Gunnery Schools and to the fact that these schools were commanded by a series of very able and energetic officers. When Lieutenant Colonel French left to command the Northwest Mounted Police in 1874, he was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel D.T. Irwin, also an officer in the Royal Artillery. Some of the early officers and non-commissioned officers were also men of distinguished abilities and considerable energy and several of the other ranks rose to commissioned rank.

Sergeant Major Lavie was a classical scholar and master of English prose of some distinction while another Sergeant Major took a University degree and became a professor of mathematics. Two of the original sergeants were later ordained as clergymen.²¹⁸

103. From the first, the Schools faced difficulties. Only a small part of the establishment was permanently embodied -- the remainder were expected to serve only for a year, to be trained as gunners or as artillery officers and then to return to their parent units. However the small establishments were also expected to mount guard over their respective barracks and fortresses, look after the vast quantity of equipment under their respective charge, provide detachments to Toronto and Montreal, help instruct the Militia artillery and, periodically, turn out to fight fires and support the civil power. The latter proved a regular occurrence in Quebec to judge from Strange's account.²¹⁹ It was a particularly arduous life for the men, often obliged to be on guard during the night and then to be on duty during the day.²²⁰ After some experience, the Government was persuaded to permit a number of the men to re-enlist and so to enlarge the permanent cadre available for duty until most of the men were, in fact, enlisted for three years. However, until 1881, the principle persisted and both batteries remained part of the Militia.* Not only the men were under a strain; the original establishment for the School had authorized only eight horses. Almost immediately, pressure began to increase the number for it was simply impossible to perform field artillery drill with so few forces, much less instruct in riding. The strain at Kingston became particularly severe after the founding of the Military College because the only way the cadets could be taught to ride was on the horses of the Battery. It was a small matter to fix but for years the appeal to increase the establishment by as few as four or six horses went unheeded.²²²

* C.f. M.G.O. (24) 21 Dec 1877.

104. Nonetheless, for all their deficiencies, the Schools existed, providing instructors, pressure and the standard to emulate which the other branches of the service lacked. There were complaints that the Schools were not sufficiently used, one hinderance, apparently, being that officers wishing to take courses were required to equip themselves with a very expensive full dress.²²³ On the other hand, even the artillery suffered from the loss of enthusiasm which pervaded the Militia as the seventies progressed and Irwin and Strange, as Commandants of the Schools and as Inspectors of Artillery regularly complained of battery commanders tolerating unqualified officers when there were vacancies at the Schools.²²⁴ With other ranks, it was less difficult to obtain men in a period of serious unemployment. Strange found that there were many men who were anxious to attach themselves to his battery for no pay at all.²²⁵ However, there were also criticisms that local battery commanders were willing to enlist men who were wandering out of work in their districts and to send them to the Schools as a means of providing for them. Such men were naturally unlikely to prove satisfactory and as with many before and since who have trained at Canada's expense, they were said to have made their way to the United States on their discharge.²²⁶

105. Another force for improvement in the artillery was the Dominion Artillery Association, founded in 1875 chiefly through the initiative of Colonel Strange. It was modelled on the Dominion Rifle Association which had been founded in 1869 and which, with the aid of a Government grant, had played a considerable part in fostering an interest in shooting. The objects of the

Association were to develop gunnery skill and to disseminate artillery knowledge throughout the Dominion. It was governed by Council consisting of virtually all the permanent staff officers and the commanders of artillery corps which affiliated. The Governor General agreed to act as patron and the General Officer Commanding the Militia was the President with the Adjutant-General as Vice President.²²⁷ By the following year, all but two or three of the Militia artillery batteries had become members and the Association had also received a grant of \$700. The initial activity of the Association was to present badges to the most successful Artillery marksmen, thereby reducing the rather pointless waste of ammunition which had so regularly accompanied firing practice in the past.²²⁸ As the years progressed, it played a steadily growing role, arranging for teams of gunners to compete in England with British Volunteer artillerymen and practically determine the nature of the practice which the garrison and field artillery were to fire in Canada.

106. Among many interesting artillery batteries, one has perhaps been overlooked. The Grosse Isle Garrison Battery consisted of only 24 men, the staff of the Government quarantine station in the St. Lawrence. Perhaps because their commanding officer, Captain F. Montizambert, was also their civil chief, they were said to approach the discipline of regulars. In 1877, they were inspected by the commander of the Royal Artillery at Halifax who declared that they were better than any auxiliary artillery he had seen in Britain. They easily won the Dominion Artillery Association prize for garrison artillery for the year.²²⁹ Unfortunately, by the time of their next inspection, the building containing their uniforms and equipment had burned to

the ground and rather than replace them, the order was issued for the Battery to be disbanded.²³⁰

107. The success of the artillery schools convinced many that similar establishments would have a comparable value for the cavalry and infantry. Although officers and non-commissioned officers from these branches were allowed to attend the Gunnery Schools to obtain their qualifications,²³¹ there could never be sufficient numbers to make a real difference. Regularly, and with increasing urgency, local staff officers and the General Officers Commanding himself pointed out the serious lack of infantry and cavalry instructors²³² and the declining number of qualified junior officers.²³³ Since those who did qualify in the Military Schools in the Districts can have been of limited value and since most of the men in the rural battalions were soon recruits, the strain on the few qualified officers was too much and the summer camps degenerated into military picnics.

108. To cope with the problem, Selby Smyth felt that the eventual solution would be to establish schools of all arms at the present sites. However, a Government which would not buy a half dozen horses for the Gunnery Schools was unlikely to authorize a cavalry school and so he recommended in 1874 that three companies of infantry and a company of engineers should be formed. The latter would be divided between Quebec and Kingston and would be responsible for stopping the rapid deterioration of the masonry. The infantry would furnish instructors and, eventually, permanent regimental staffs for the Militia battalions. Companies would be located at Toronto, Ottawa and at some

place in the Maritimes.²³⁴ Such a proposal plainly lent itself to the rhetoric about a standing army and was of course too expensive for the Government. Each year, Selby Smyth attempted to counter the rhetoric of the politicians with more of his own and his prose provided a growingly impassable barrier at the beginning of each Militia Report. In 1875, he admitted that his three small companies would be the beginning of a permanent army but that had to come in any case.²³⁵ By 1876, he was prepared to abandon the rural militia altogether, retaining only a nucleus in each county, and to spend the money on three or four infantry and cavalry schools and on the city corps. The three schools, he suggested would cost a total of \$113,250. With the appropriation for that year, they could afford to have the schools and to train 20,000 men.²³⁶ By 1877, he had come to anticipate the need to form three battalions of 500 men each although, as a practical recommendation, he went no further than to propose that 50 more men should be attached to each of the artillery schools to make their work in training infantry more effective.²³⁸ The problem was so urgent that he was prepared to see the Militia cut in half if only there could be a way to get them trained officers and instructors.

109. None of these proposals, of course, could be accepted by the Government. Few members supported them in the House of Commons. Alonzo Wright, the "King of the Gatineau", was one of very few who supported the idea of infantry schools and more permanent instructors.²³⁹ Most of his colleagues seem to have believed that their role would be fulfilled by urging that every possible dollar be spent on their constituents in terms of drill pay, allowances and payments to the captains of companies, and local drill sheds. proposals to

limit or do away with the rural Militia, to concentrate its stores and equipment and even to demand value for money for the allowances paid to militia officers for instruction and the care of stores, all met the head-on opposition of a rural-dominated House.

110. In the circumstances, matters were left to the militia officers themselves. Some of the more wealthy city corps paid their adjutants and instructors from regimental funds contributed by the officers. An occasional wealthy commanding officer would employ an instructor himself. One example, which came to the attention of the House of Commons, was the instructor employed by the Toronto Engineer Company. The company commander, Lieutenant Colonel Scoble, was a distinguished railway engineer and worked for the Ontario provincial government in a variety of ways. He was also an enthusiastic militiaman, having served as a staff officer during the Fenian raids.²⁴⁰ When he was planning to establish his unit in 1875, Scoble obtained the services of a Sergeant Hart who had been discharged after 21 years service in the Royal Engineers. The terms were that Hart was to receive \$300 a year, a free house and assurance of a job at \$2.00 per day. The arrangement did not work out very well. While the corps was being formed, he was employed in Scoble's office at a mere \$250 per year. He was even made to sign a letter so that Scoble could obtain the \$200 allowed by the Government for an instructor.

Deciding that he had been hoaxed, Hart resigned his job. he still remained in the Militia, however, and his troubles were not over. In January 1877, the Governor General visited Toronto and the Engineers were detailed to provide an orderly. Hart, out of work and needing the money, applied. Having been

picked, he prepared his uniform with the diligence of an old soldier and waited for word. None came. In fact, Scoble had been told to call him and had forgotten. To cover his neglect, he had hart placed under arrest and dismissed him from the Militia.²⁴¹ What seems a little surprising is that the unfortunate sergeant had no redress for what appear to be very palpable grievances. Although there was a court of enquiry, this was more to settle the public criticism than to attack Scoble, a Canada Firster and somewhat a Liberal supporter. Under the regulations, as the Minister explained to the House of Commons, the Militia Department had no control over how the grants for instruction were spent and the fact that none of the money had gone to hart was none of their concern. Neither was his arrest and dismissal since the discipline of other ranks was entirely under the control of commanding officers.²⁴² As for the agreement which Hart claimed to have made with Scoble, it was a verbal undertaking and hardly enforceable in any court of law.

AID TO THE CIVIL POWER

111. Members of Parliament might question the value of a militia force and one of its functions, providing a defence against foreign enemies, was fit only for Dominion Day oratory. The other main function, however, was very real indeed. In an era when provincial police forces did not exist and city police forces were always small and sometimes inefficient, the Militia was used regularly to support the civil power. The Act of 1868 had made detailed provision for this service. Militia officers were obliged to call out their men when a riot or emergency occurred in their area and when they received a

requisition from the local Major or Warden or from any two magistrates. The men became special constables without further arrangements. An important provision, explained in some detail, was that the expenses would be paid by the municipality - the officers at the Imperial rate of pay with an additional \$2.00 per day for mounted officers, the men at \$1.00 per day and \$1.00 for each horse. The municipality also had to pay for food and lodging. It was the commanding officer who was responsible for recovering the pay and the expenses from the municipality, and the rates were somewhat higher than normally paid to the Militia during training.²³⁴

112. This section was no dead letter. During the following years, militia were turned out for many small affairs as the only force local authorities could rely upon. Record of many of them has not survived but in Militia General Orders for 2 June 1871, Lieutenant Colonel David Tisdale, a future Minister of Militia, was officially thanked, with his battalion, for their part in preventing a prize fight.²⁴⁴ Election brawls were a common source of disturbance and, as the seventies grew darker, economic discontent was added to that commonest source of dispute in Canada, the battles of Catholics and Orangemen.

113. In 1873, the Militia Act was amended to make it somewhat more difficult to call out the Militia. The disturbance would have to be one which the civil authorities lacked the power to suppress. The number of men was to be up to the senior Militia officer.²⁴⁵ Nothing was done about the most serious weakness of the Act, the provision that commanding officers would be

responsible for obtaining the money for their services from the municipality.

This was an obvious abuse. The commanding officer might be a poor man and unable to undertake legal action against the municipality. The municipality could easily disown decisions made by local magistrates or allow the matter to drag through the courts. However, the Act left no option to the Militia officers in turning out and it imposed serious penalties on him and his men if they failed to do so. It might be easier for a member of his corps to sue him for pay than it would be for him to collect it from the municipality. This problem was, of course, brought to the attention of the Government but there was no desire to become involved in a form of service which could never reap political dividends and which was under the constitutional responsibility of the provinces for the administration of justice. There was also a shrewd suspicion that mayors and magistrates would call for the cost. While this reasoning might be politically sound, it was of little help to the unfortunate militia officers responsible.*

114. The 1873 amendment may have reduced the number of small, local calls on the Militia. Some still continued. In 1880, in what may have been a vintage year for the District, M.D. 1 reported three separate incidents, one to stop a riot and two to prevent prize fights which had been arranged in the United States but which were to be held in Canada.²⁴⁶ The major centres of trouble were in the major cities and in the coal mining areas of Nova Scotia. The long

* In 1878, Selby Smyth reported that the men called out on Cape Breton Island two years before had still not been paid. Their Captain had sued the local authorities for payment but his suit had been thrown out by the grand jury and now the members of his company were threatening to take him to court.

and bitter struggle of the coal miners on Cape Breton Island brought intervention by the Militia at least ten times between 1876 and 1926.²⁴⁷

115. The Liberals were particularly troubled with disturbances during their later years in office. The 12th of July each year almost invariably threatened a riot. In 1876, the Militia were called out in Saint John New Brunswick and their presence evidently prevented disorder.²⁴⁸ On 2 October 1875, the whole of the Toronto corps were called out as a precaution during Pilgrimage Riots. Catholics had been in the custom of conducting pilgrimages between their churches in the city and the Orangemen had threatened to put a stop to them. Since many members of the Militia were enthusiastic members of the Orange Order, the strain to their discipline could have been severe but the troops were kept away from the processions and the Orangemen did not appear in force.²⁴⁹

116. A more serious test of the Militia was the Grand Trunk Railway Strike. The company had fallen on difficult times with the depression and had imposed more severe working conditions on its employees and had laid off a good many. Finally, James Hickson, the General Manager, called for the men to accept a cut in wages. This was too much for his employees and at Belleville, they came out on strike. The Prime Minister had only just managed to get back to Ottawa from Toronto when Hickson asked him for help. Like most of the remainder of his party, Mackenzie was strongly opposed to organized labour and prepared to believe Hickson when he said that the strike had been organized from the United States. At the same time, he had to stick to his consistent

principle that it would be the duty of the municipalities to restore order.²⁵⁰

This seems to have been quite a burden for the authorities in Belleville. The walk-out had stranded a train at Belleville and the major was convinced that the angry railwaymen were a riot to be put down. Instead of referring to the Deputy Adjutant-General at Kingston, a few dozen miles away, who could have supplied men from the Gunnery School, he applied to the commanding officer of the local militia battalion, one of the rural corps. Since it was the evening before New Year's since some of the men of his corps were among the strikers Day, and others were sympathetic, and since only one of his companies was in Belleville, Lieutenant Colonel Brown could only gather a handful. On the next day, the situation not having improved, the major called on the 15th Battalion. Most of its companies were stationed in Belleville but it had not trained for two years and only 40 men could be gathered. None of the men of either battalions had greatcoats and there was no ammunition for their rifles.²⁵¹ The mayor was still not satisfied -- indeed he accused the militia somewhat inaccurately of sympathizing with the strikers -- and so he telegraphed Toronto. Having already received some warning, the Queen's Own Rifles paraded before dawn on New Year's Day, 1877, and 200 men under Lieutenant Colonel Otter set out by train for Belleville - somewhat melodramatically mounting an armed guard in the cab to watch the engineer. The train arrived to be met by an angry crowd. As the troops disembarked, they received a shower of stones and coal. Two of the militiamen were injured but the crowd was pushed out of the freight yard with some difficulty. Two of the crowd were bayoneted in the process. A detachment of the force then escorted an express train to Montreal. The intervention at Belleville ended the strike

and by 3 January 1877, the men of the Queen's Own were on their way back to Toronto.²⁵²

117. With their return, the recriminations began. The Grand Truck strick had been a severe shock to the business community. "The men had simply mad up their minds to force the Company to comply with their wishes"²⁵³ observed the Toronto Mail, and it wished to know how they had been allowed to get away with it for a full five days. The Liberal Globe blamed the Belleville magistrates²⁵⁴ but most papers took Hickson's lead and pointed to the deficiencies in the Militia.²⁵⁵ Selby Smyth took the chance, to add a postscript to his Report for 1876, pointing out that every deficiency in the force was due to Parliamentary restrictions on money for training and equipment and adding that it was remarkable that on a Sunday and a holiday it had been possible to obtain any men at all.²⁵⁶ The Queen's Own had their grievance too. In addition to spending three winter days without greatcoats or winter caps and with nothing more substantial than mufflers hastily issued on their departure,* they wanted their pay. On 11 July 1877, Otter had to tell his men that although they could keep their mufflers, he had been compelled to take his claim for their pay to court and that the case would not be heard until October.²⁵⁷ Eventually, their pay was forthcoming.

118. The main excitement in maintaining the civil power was in Quebec and

* It is sometimes said that the mufflers were issued later as a souvenir [Chambers, 83]. It would appear that they were issued at the time and simply retained. [R.G. 9 II A 2.3, p. 1611, 17 Jan 74].

particularly in Montreal where racial and religious antagonism ran high. Latent bitterness was revived by the conflict surrounding the burial of the printer Joseph Guibord. When he was finally conveyed to Notre Dame des Neiges it was to the accompaniment of 1,019 men and 63 horses as well as a somewhat hostile crowd. The sole French-speaking battalion in Montreal, the 65th, seems to have been excused this ordeal.²⁵⁸ The Guibord affair was only the first of a series of demonstrations. To show their power, the Orangemen determined that on 2 July 1876, they would stage a "walk" through the city. There was bound to be a clash between them and the Irish Catholics and they were finally persuaded to cancel their plans. This only ensured that there would be even stronger determination to hold it in the following year. As 12 July 1877, excitement was even greater. As a precaution, guards were mounted on all armouries. On the night of the 10th, a sentry of the 65th at the Quebec Gate Barracks became involved in a scuffle with one of a hostile crowd which had gathered and the civilian was killed by a bayonet. Since the sentry was named Fitzpatrick and his victim, McKeown, the story may possibly be more complicated. Fitzpatrick was immediately arrested* but feelings were aroused by the incident. Although cooler heads again cancelled the proposed parade on the 12th, an Orangemen named Hackett was shot in an affray on the day and immediately all available militia were called out to deter violence. Many of the men remained on duty for much of the following week until Hackett's burial on the 17th. The excitement was intense as Orangemen flocked to Montreal, determined to make the largest possible demonstration in such a

* Fitzpatrick, a much smaller man than his assailant, was acquitted, praised and promoted. [Chambers, 65th, 82]

largely Catholic city. The mayor refused to authorize the service of the troops, fearing the bill for their services and the men were finally turned out only on the order of four magistrates.²⁵⁸

119. 1878 proved even busier than the previous year. In early June, a strike broke out along the waterfront at Quebec. Once again, it was a protest against economic conditions which had become unbearable. Lord Dufferin, the Governor General, was at the Citadel at the time and even he was impressed by the reality of the grievances. The men were demanding an increase to their daily wage of 50 cents. However, there were many who did not earn even that and there was not even a poor law to save them from starvation. The chief of police reported that many families which had meat and milk four times a week a year before could now afford it only once and that in St. Sauveur, families were living on nothing beyond beam flour cakes. To go on strike was to invite strike breakers in such circumstances and violence soon broke out. There were two Militia battalions in the city but only the English-speaking 8th was reliable. The 9th Voltigeurs was largely recruited from the Lower Town dock area.²⁵⁹ Fortunately for the Governor General's peace of mind, there were the 150 men of the Gunnery School, commanded by the vigorous and thoroughly unsympathetic Colonel Strange, who had already found some release for his energies in putting down Quebec riots.²⁶⁰ In the ensuing melee, several of the crowd were shot and some of the artillerymen were wounded.²⁶¹ The Deputy Adjutant General at Quebec immediately sent for help to Montreal and 649 were on their way within four hours. By the time they arrived, the fighting was over but they spent three more days in Quebec, suffering considerably from

their lack of blankets.²⁶² They were also to suffer even more from the difficulty of obtaining pay for their services for the Quebec City authorities vigorously protested the expense of Militia from outside the city.²⁶³

120. In Quebec, religious peace had perhaps been preserved by the accident that the one man whom Strange's men had killed had been a Protestant. In Montreal, religious strife continued and the Militia had hardly returned from Quebec before they were involved in the plans for the third Orange attempt to celebrate 12 July with a "walk". The Prime Minister entered the struggle to persuade the Orangemen to desist. The Imperial Government warned Dufferin not to allow any Imperial troops to become involved until the Canadians had been taught a lesson about the need for proper forces.²⁶⁴ The Canadian Government was in the unpleasant position of knowing that it could make no friends whatever happened. If it did nothing about the march, there was sure to be violence and it would become anathema in Catholic circles. If it acted vigorously, it would promptly alienate the Orange vote. Mackenzie, to his credit, chose the path of action. While trying to preserve a facade of local autonomy, Selby Smyth, who had become a Lieutenant General on 1 October 1877, was sent down to Montreal to take command of a Militia force which drew heavily on the units from the Eastern Townships and even from Quebec City. Both the Gunnery Schools were present. Altogether some 3,000 men were assembled and the city took on the aspect of an armed camp. At the same time, thousands of Orangemen also gathered, coming from Ontario, the Eastern Townships and even the United States. As the 12th approached, there were several small, violent disorders and some of the wealthier inhabitants

barricaded their offices and warehouses and left for their holidays. When the 12th arrived, Selby Smyth left his Montreal battalions in the background and moved the out of town troops to the vicinity of Victoria Square where the Orangemen were gathered in a large hall.²⁶⁵ A large crowd gathered outside the hall and prepared for the collision. At 11.00 a.m., as the Orange leaders emerged, the mayor and a small party of police seized them and hurried them away. The leaderless Orangemen milled around in the hall and finally sent an angry telegram to the Prime Minister. There was no reply. Throughout the afternoon, the crowd outside waited for them to emerge. Eventually it grew tired and broke up. After dark, furious and humiliated Orangemen slipped away in twos and threes through the back streets.²⁶⁶

121. These events naturally provoked considerable discussion of the suitability of the Militia for aid to the civil power. Selby Smyth had no doubt either about the seriousness of the situation or about the weakness of his means to deal with it. He was certainly not prone to admire members of the working class. Referring to their reluctance to enlist in the ranks of the Militia, he observed:

To expatiate to such men upon the constitution of society, and to point out the obvious truth that the main condition of a civilized community is mutual dependence, would be to no purpose. Chivalry may not inspire them, martial renown may not tempt them, patriotism even may not animate them; but, they must admit, sordid though it may seem, that their wages in civil capacities would ill bear the strain of providing

such luxuries as education and medical attendance, in addition to the necessities and creature comforts of food, lodging, bedding, and physical recreation...²⁶⁷

He was also prey to fears which were apparently casting a long shadow before.

In 1877, he warned the readers of his Report:

.... We must never lose sight of conscience and honour, nor for a moment permit the chance that Communism should with impunity make a grand experiment on the smallest portion of that collection of properties termed the British Empire.²⁶⁸

Before writing his report of 1878, he had actually seen a Canadian mob and seen in it a further and powerful justification for a stronger and better Militia. There might be peace with the United States:

.... But in a young and growing country disturbance to the public peace is not only possible, but very likely annually to occur from various causes in the absence of any organized force, other than the Militia, with the knowledge that we have tested over and over again, that the small police force is impotent to deal single-handed with the turbulent mob...²⁶⁹

Such being the case, he recommended the establishment of three small battalions of 500 men each. Alternatively, six small battalions might be

raised, three to serve in Great Britain and three in Canada. This was a notion which Selby Smyth was to develop in view of the wider crisis of a war with Russia which then confronted the British Empire. For Canada, it offered a more certain answer to the problem of internal order. In the city corps, as he had observed in his dispositions in Montreal, the men might be opposing and even firing upon friends and relations.²⁷⁰

122. Naturally, Parliamentarians also felt concern. One member insisted that the lesson the Grand Trunk strike was the value of the rural militia and quoted a report by the colonel of the 15th Battalion that many of his men had even refused to turn out.²⁷¹ The session of 1879, after the Conservatives had returned to power, debated a bill presented by Mackenzie Bowell which would have allowed the Government to pay for transportation and certain other costs of cases of aid to the civil power which were not localized, as, for example the Grand Trunk strike which had extended from Montreal to Sarnia.²⁷² The Bill would have been a clear improvement over the existing statutory position so far as the Militia were concerned and it would have gone no farther, in fact that the previous Government's advance of \$10,000 to cover the cost of transporting and maintaining the troops gathered in Montreal for the threatened Orange riots.²⁷³

123. The bill was promptly opposed by David Mills, the late Minister of the Interior, who compared it to paying for juries and insisted that the responsibility had to rest exclusively with the provinces. The Federal Government could go no farther than to convey the Militia to the borders of

provincial authority. The discussion collapsed into an attempt to recall Liberal wickedness unresisting the Orangemen and nothing more came of the suggestion for a time.²⁷⁴ Responsibility still remained to be clarified.

THE MANITOBA FORCE

124. The two Schools of Gunnery were not the only full time Militia in the Dominion. With the arrival of Captain Scoot's little force in November, 1871, the total authorized strength of the Manitoba Force became 300 men. When Robertson Ross inspected them in the summer of 1872, as part of an extended tour of the West, he found that there were only 243 all ranks but more were sent that year to bring it up to strength and a detachment of 25 gunners was authorized. Their main trouble was accommodation for they were quartered in dilapidated buildings rented to them by the Hudson's Bay Company.

Colonel Robertson Ross changed the uniform from the dark rifle green to the red coats of the remainder of the Militia. He also recommended that a police force be established but only if a military force was also maintained as a support in case of trouble.²⁷⁵ His suggestions were evidently heeded for by the following year, the little force had been housed in wooden huts of its own, its numbers had been maintained and it had been kept busy - quelling riotous railway workers, guarding Ambrose Lepine and other prisoners, escorting the Governor General in his negotiations with the Ojibwa and fighting a fire which destroyed the Legislative Buildings. The composition of the force was altered to allow for a battery of artillery.²⁷⁶

125. A total of 156 men were needed in 1873. These were recruited on the same terms as their predecessors - \$12 per month for privates, uniform, rations and quarters provided. Each officer and man who completed a full engagement of two years was to be entitled to 160 acres of Manitoba land. The men of this draft were selected from the Gunnery Schools and from the two Maritime districts. Preference was to be given to "young farmers or skilled mechanics who, in addition to respectability of character, are desirous of settling in Manitoba."²⁷⁷ The young men from the Maritime provide as satisfactory as their predecessors from Ontario and Quebec although it was noticed that they tended to succumb to the severe climate rather more often.

126. At the end of 1873, the formation of the Northwest Mounted Police was authorized, due to large part to the recommendations arising from Robertson Ross's report after his long trip through the West in 1872. In the summer of 1874, the new force trekked west from Winnipeg to begin its distinguished career. Meanwhile, the men of the Provisional Battalion had been demonstrating its ability to cross the prairie by an impressive march from Winnipeg to Qu'Appelle and back. The force of two companies, about 120 men, set out from Winnipeg on 17 August 1874 and reached qu'Appelle 24 days later, having covered 351 miles in 101 hours of marching. The return march was done in 17 days. It was an impressive performance. While the men were relieved of their packs, they carried their rifles, 60 rounds of ammunition, canteens, bayonets and haversacks. Prairie marching is not easy -- in wet weather, the soil sticks to one's feet and in dry weather, feet slip on the grass. In summer, there is also the problem of very hot weather.

Nevertheless, Osborne Smith reported that his men actually seemed to thrive on their exertions and they gained in health and marching powers. Perhaps this was due in some part to his own careful arrangements and evident common sense.

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127. The arrival of the Mounted Police meant that much of the purpose of the Manitoba Force as the sole symbol of the Dominion's power had been taken from it. Its continued duty as a sort of police force for the Manitoba Government could hardly serve as a justification either and at the end of 1874, it was ordered to be drastically reduced.²⁷⁹ The new establishment was for a small battery of 50 all ranks and a battalion of 150. The service cannot have been popular for on the terms of the reduction being announced -- two months pay and a sum equivalent to their transportation to their District of enlistment, over 200 applied and preference in discharge was given to those with the best character and longest service. By the time Selby Smyth reached Winnipeg in the summer of 1875, the force had again been cut in half and actually consisted of only a few men, most of the men's time having expired. The General strongly objected to any further reductions, referring to the arrival of the Sioux around Portage Leprairie.

The withdrawal of troops at present at Winnipeg would cause a feeling of alarm and insecurity, and I am led to believe might result in a disturbance among the cosmopolitan and as yet only partially settled population of that young but thriving province.²⁸⁰

In his report for the year, Osborne Smith as usual reported discipline to be excellent. Another draft had been organized in July, this time recruited from all districts. This time, the pay of private was set at \$13.00 per month, a small increase and in selection it was desirable that "a portion of them be mechanics and men having other callings than that of labourer."²⁸¹ 92 men were required which, for a force not much in excess of 100 meant that almost all the older members of the Force had left it.

128. In 1876, the force was again reduced to a mere 50 men, half artillery and half infantry. It also became clear that all was not as well as had been reported in or out of the force. The paymaster was dismissed for shortages in his accounts.²⁸² Lieutenant-Colonel Masson, a member of Parliament and an ex-Brigade Major, reported that he had visited the Force and found two men who did not even know how to load their rifles. It was not their fault. The men were employed undrawing wood and water. It also emerged that many of the men had continued to reenlist in the hope that they would acquire a land grant for each enlistment. When it was settled that there would only be one, they felt defrauded.²⁸³

129. Complaints also circulated in Manitoba. An angry letter in the Daily Free Press of Winnipeg from an ex non-commissioned officer complained that the volunteers were chiefly employed on fatigue work. He went on to comment on the equipment and rifles. The knapsacks were so old and rotten, he reported, that it was not uncommon for one to fall from a man's back as he marched out for guard duty. He noted that the march to Qu'Appelle had been possible only

because the equipment had travelled in waggons.²⁸⁴ The men who were removed in 1876 seem to have felt particularly aggrieved. One of them, Charles William Allen, had been a paymaster sergeant and was their spokesman.

In a letter to Macdonald, he explained that he was a Conservative although he had been forced to find a job with the Free Press, and that a commission or committee to investigate the grievances of the Volunteers would certainly do Mackenzie harm.²⁸⁵ At a meeting in Winnipeg on 3 July 1876, presided over by the Mayor and supported by John Schultz and Senator Gerard, the men complained that the previous autumn, their land grants had been worth \$120 - \$160 and a discharged volunteer could dispose of them for from \$85 - \$110. Now, they were told that the maximum value for the next twelve months would be \$50. When they had been given an opportunity to take their release, they had not been informed in the decline in value. Nominally, they had been engaged for twelve months. They were dismissed at seven day's notice without any means of disposing of their warrants. Even if they wished to use them for settlement, the season was already too far advanced.²⁸⁶ Having failed to get an answer from the Government, the men then turned to the Opposition²⁸⁷ but it could offer them little beyond sympathy.²⁸⁸

130. The end for the Force came in 1877. Throughout the winter of 1876-77, a small detachment consisting of Ensign Street and ten men maintained the quarantine regulations imposed by the Manitoba Government to attempt to restrain a smallpox epidemic which was then ravaging the Indian bands and the struggling Icelandic community on the shores of Lake Winnipeg. It was a disagreeable duty performed in the most arduous climatic conditions. On

3 August 1877, the remainder of the forces, some 54 officers and men, was disbanded.²⁸⁸ The services of this little force were not particularly dramatic but they did demonstrate the hardihood and endurance of the Canadian soldiers of that age.

THE WAR SCARE OF 1878

131. In 1877, war had broken out between the Russian and Turkish Empires. By the following year, Great Britain grew steadily nearer the possibility of being involved in war with Russia to preserve her somewhat unappealing ally and Canada found herself involved in a situation for which she was almost totally unprepared, a war in which Russian cruisers might make attacks on her two coasts and on her merchant shipping. Apart from Halifax, the coast was defenceless. In 1876, the Militia Reports indicated that apart from the Garrison Artillery in Saint John, there were few other really efficient corps.²⁸⁹ In Sydney, there were guns but no gunners.²⁹⁰ Elsewhere, there were gunners but no guns. More important, almost all the guns available were smoothbores, useless against ironclad ships. At Quebec, there were a few experimental 7-inch breechloaders of a primitive design, but they were the only artillery, Selby Smyth, reported, capable of disputing the passage of an ironclad.²⁹¹ In that year, 10 rifled guns were ordered for Quebec and 6 for Saint John.²⁹² By the following year, both orders had been delivered but the platforms were only then under construction. With the encouragement of its artillery officers, the Government accepted an offer by Sir William Palliser to conduct experiments with a view to converting its 400 old smoothbores into

rifled cannon.²⁹³

132. In 1877, Colonel Irwin, the Inspector of Artillery for Ontario, pointed out once again how useless it was to expect the garrison artillery to be efficient when in many places it trained only on the same basis as the rural infantry - in alternate years - and when many batteries were without guns. He proposed the elimination of such batteries. Related to the artillery were the engineers. They, too, had no more training than the infantry save that they were allowed to train annually. In 1877, there were four companies in existence, including Colonel Scoble's in Toronto. Of the two companies in Montreal, one had virtually ceased to exist and in Saint John, the little company was really the creation of its captain, Henry Perley, an enthusiast who seems to have devoted himself wholly to the service. In 1880, he was appointed to be "Engineer Officer at Headquarters" and his company rapidly made up its mind that it could not continue as engineers without him and eventually became part of the 62nd Battalion. In the summer of 1878, a new company of engineers was formed at Charlottetown and in 1880, Perley was replaced in New Brunswick by a possibly even more enthusiastic Militia engineer, D.A. Vince, who organized the Brighton Company of Engineers. This still left a total force of under 200.²⁹⁴

133. Apart from guns and men, there were few fortifications and they were not in the best of repair. Selby Smyth had recommended the formation of a small force of engineers to keep the works repaired for as early as 1873, Colonel French had found them to be crumbling away.²⁹⁵ The responsibility for

repair rested with the Department of Public Works, whose engineers had no particular training in the peculiar problems of fortifications and whose policy was even more governed by the best principles of political patronage than was that of the Department of Militia and Defence.

134. Finally, it now mattered that Lieutenant Colonel Houghton's efforts in British Columbia had been so unavailing. In 1877. In that year, he had managed to find a total of 7 officers and 88 men at his inspection. 11 of the men were in the band. There were two 24 pounder brass guns but the wheel had fallen off one of them and the carriage of the other was too rotten to be safe.²⁹⁶ The real problem was that British Columbia was far from Ottawa and its appeals received little attention. The population of the province was small, wages were high and there were very few with the leisure to devote to military activities.

135. Through the winter and spring of 1878, Canada passed through the unaccustomed excitement of a war scare. There was real alarm on the Eastern coast when the Russian steamer Cimbria sailed into a Maine port with a cargo of rifles guns and a very large crew. Ship owners feared that privateers would be the result of this voyage and began to press the Government for action to protect their property. The real excitement was on the West Coast where the British naval base at Esquimalt was almost completely unprotected. For some time, Selby Smyth had been trying to persuade the British to lend a number of guns which had been in store in the dockyard but to no avail. Suddenly, they were released. Colonel Irwin was despatched to the West Coast

to supervise the establishment of the new batteries and to work out a plan for the defence of Victoria and Esquimalt. Very temporary batteries were set up, the expense of labour in the province apparently deterring any more substantial work. The Royal Navy provided the labour to move the guns to their new sites. A battery of 50 men was authorized²⁹⁷ for the ten guns and had been organized by Houghton by the time Irwin arrived. Twice a week in the evening, he was able to instruct them but it was evident that if the guns were to be properly cared for, a more permanent arrangement would be necessary. Irwin urged that a small force of Canadian or Royal Marine Artillerymen should be employed in the hope that they could also train the local artillery and improve the defences.²⁹⁸

136. In the crisis, the British Government had formed the Colonial Defence Committee, an interdepartmental meeting of naval and military officers, which made recommendations on the defences which would be necessary in the event of war. For Eastern Canada, it proposed batteries for Saint John, Sydney, Charlottetown and Pictou with a total cost of about 50,000 pounds. When Selby Smyth was invited to give his views, he pointed out that the Committee had not judged the temper of his government. Instead of the Committee's plan which called for some 38 guns of heavy calibre, he suggested that 17 converted, rifled 64/32 pounders would be a more realistic proposal, a contribution which did not please the Committee since it could not recommend such an inferior gun. As a result, none were ordered, and Selby Smyth was driven to attempting to persuade his government that his own judgement was sound while, at the same time, attempting to get them to buy the more powerful

funds recommended by the British.²⁹⁹

137. By 1878, with the encouragement of the Canadian artillery officers, Pallister's experiments in converting smooth bores to rifled cannon had satisfied the authorities and the attractive possibility of making over the stock of cannon inherited from the British now seemed close to realization. A contract was made that year with the Canada Engine Works in Montreal to do the work. To encourage the good will of the Canadians, the Pallisers had presented two of their guns to the Government and they had been mounted on the Citadel. Selby Smyth was enthusiastic about their generosity and about the prospects for an armament industry in Canada.³⁰⁰

138. There was close communication with London throughout the period of the crisis as the Canadian Government sought practical assurances that the promises of 1865 and 1871 would be fulfilled. Canada had made no provision for naval defence although she then possessed a large merchant fleet and Alfred Jones asked the Governor General that the Royal Navy provide a fleet of fast cruisers to protect the Eastern coast.³⁰¹ The Admiralty faced too many demands of its own and its answer a month later was that "it is only reasonable to assume that the Canadian Government will avail themselves of their own resources for the protection of Canadian ports and shipping"³⁰² The same philosophy prevailed in the Colonial Defence Committee's deliberations and Mackenzie complained to his brother that he was getting telegrams daily about the state of their defences. On 22 May 1878, the Cabinet agreed to spend \$10,000 to protect the Atlantic coast but in June, the Congress of

Berlin gathered and the crisis had passed. When the formal proposals of the Colonial Defence Committee arrived, they could be viewed in a more restrained mood and the Cabinet was encouraged by the cautious advice of Selby Smyth and his warning that the powerful guns proposed would demand permanent garrisons.

It was decided to do something for Saint John and Sydney but "in view of the probable peaceful solution of the threatened Russian war," the batteries at Charlottetown and Pictou were deferred.³⁰³ Nothing was done either about an Admiralty suggestion that in the event of an outbreak of war, the Dominion should take up and arm steamers for her own protection and that therefore she should keep some guns in storage.³⁰⁴

139. All of Canada's concern was not devoted to her ocean coasts. There were many offers of service and several prominent citizens wished to form regiments.³⁰⁵ In New Brunswick, the enthusiastic Colonel Maunsell proposed to form a brigade and reported that most of the units in his district which were in any state of organization had volunteered their services.³⁰⁶ Even the Prime Minister seems to have considered sending a Canadian contingent in the event of an emergency occurring although he made it clear that the Canadians would have to serve in their own units.³⁰⁷ There were also many new offers to form militia units. Selby Smyth was only moderately in favour of this enthusiasm for, as he pointed out, the best trained of the officers and men would have gone off, leaving the Militia disorganized and battalions denuded of their few remaining qualified personnel. He was also pleased by the offers of service from private personnel but he pointed out that most of these people appeared to lack any notion of how much training they would need to be fit for

service.³⁰⁸

140. At moments of crisis, the Government's collective mind could never stray far from the Fenians. In addition to being suspected of fermenting the Orange-Catholic battles in Montreal, it was anticipated that they would renew their invasions in the event of any war with Russia. The Prime Minister's brother Charles was the city clerk of Sarnia, a town close enough to the border to be nervous. He was told that the government was sending guns and ammunition to Sarnia, Windsor, Port Erie and Brockville and that Government boats were ready to put out at an hour's notice. There is no evidence that this in fact happened but the Prime Minister's excitement seems to have been real enough. The Fenians were said to have \$49,000 in the bank, to have organized several companies and to have secret lodges in Toronto and Montreal. Behind them was the vast mass of unemployed men in the United States, to whom a raid on Canada would provide "real enjoyment".³⁰⁹

THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT

141. Mackenzie had not much longer to bear such anxieties. In the September elections, the Liberals were badly defeated and Sir John A Macdonald was asked to form a government on 9 October 1878. The new Minister of Militia was Lieutenant Colonel Louis Masson, from Terrebonne. Masson had earlier been a Brigade major and he was the first Minister to have had any serious military experience. However, he also had the heavy responsibility of representing Montreal in the persistent battle of patronage with Quebec and the strain for a man in weak health was too much. For much of his time in office Masson was sick.

142. Although defence had not been a major issue in the election of 1878, the Conservatives had made as much capital as they could from Liberal reductions and they had promised better treatment of the militiamen and, of course, a reduction in the costly and extravagant staff. Macdonald, while in opposition, had come to support Selby Smyth's suggestions for the establishment of a small permanent force and during the Russian crisis of 1878, he had proposed to the Governor General that the moment might be opportune to introduce it.³¹⁰ The following October, in his first official interview with Lord Dufferin, he had suggested that the programme of his new government would include the formation of three small battalions.³¹¹ In his report for 1878, obviously directed at the new cabinet, Selby Smyth announced that for \$2,000,000 annually, he could create a good force although it would have to be purely military and relieved from political influence.

... it should be understood that troops or companies cannot be

raised merely to please some local community without any practical view as to the need of that particular force in that place.... It is I think my duty to submit that political pressure of this kind should be resisted, and that the force should not be overcrowded by raising corps to please communities, costing money which is much required to maintain the force that is absolutely wanted for the defence of the country,
...³¹²

He also had practical suggestions for the reduction of the staff. M.Ds. 3 and 4 and M.Ds. 5 and 6 could both be combined and Prince Edward Island could be put in with New Brunswick, leaving only a staff adjutant on the Island. However, the headquarters staff would have to be increased.

The beginning and the end of the present headquarters staff, the sole representative is the attentive and painstaking Adjutant-General, for a large force spread over the Canadian Dominion with nearly as many square miles as the whole of Europe, and everything connected with the every day work, which embraces every imaginable description of subject, both of organization, discipline and supply, passes through him to the General Officer,³¹³

143. As with most governments, an early enthusiasm for reform was soon dissipated. Only 20,000 men were authorized to drill for the year, and that merely at local headquarters. The drill period was only 12 days and those who established camps could do their service in 6 days, each of six hours drill.

The pay for the year was the same as the pervious year, \$1.00 for officers and 50 cents for other ranks, with 75 cents authorized for horses. To make up quotas for each district, the same priorities were to be applied. The staff remained unchanged although the Royal Military College at last received its full complement of professors. There had also been money to establish three schools for instructors temporarily at Toronto, Montreal and Saint John and nine sergeants had been added to the establishment of "A" and "B" Batteries for this purpose.³¹⁴ The Government, with its interest in the Northwest, had already agreed to establish militia units int he Territory, a decision strongly praised by Selby Smyth, who also felt that the Indians were certain to become difficult with the extinction of the buffalo herds and that the Police should be moved into forts which would be mutually defensible.³¹⁵

144. Another development, in which the additional instructors were to have a part, was authority for the organization of drill in educational institutions. For the first time, complete regulations wee issued and an attempt was made to develop military instruction in schools and colleges. The attempt was very modest. A total of 74 companies were authorized and the Government would lend rifles, bayonets, belts, ball bags and bayonet frogs. Drill books would be provided free of charge and an instructor would be paid for a month during any year. In return, the institution wishing to establish a company would sign a guarantee for the equipment and arms, provide suitable storage for them, form a company of boys over 14 years old and drill it regularly and make sure that the members of the company provided themselves with uniform. The drill and training in military evolutions, tactics and gymnastics wee to be a regular

part of the curriculum and suitable days and hours would have to be allotted for their performance. These and other conditions were published in July of 1878.³¹⁶ A little later, the uniform was laid down to be a scarlet, blue, rifle green or grey Norfolk jacket, blue, black, green or grey trousers and a forage cap or shako. "Clothing of any pattern worn by cadets or soldiers in foreign countries will not be approved."³¹⁷ For all these instructions, drill associations in schools appear to have been a passing fancy both for the military authorities and for the public. Some of the Deputy Adjutants-General in 1879 reported that there were applications to form companies but with a few exceptions in M.D. 1 and M.D. 7, none seem to have materialized and the cadet movement had to wait another two decades to be born.

PROPOSALS FOR A PERMANENT FORCE

145. As Sir Edward Selby Smyth's term drew to a close it became evident that there was one project on which he had set his heart more than any other - the formation of a Canadian permanent force which could also help the Empire. In 1878, he had put forward his proposals in a tentative fashion, pointing out the advantages which such a force would have in putting down riots, strikes and other disorders, in employing the graduates of the Royal Military College and in providing instructors for the Militia.³¹⁸ He knew that the Prime Minister was a supporter of an increased permanent force, and in his final report, he hopefully presented a detailed scheme for the establishment of three schools, each of 100 men, at Toronto, Montreal and Quebec. As an alternative, 100 men could be added to each of the Artillery Batteries, 75 to

act as infantry and cavalry and the remaining 25 to serve as artificers in maintaining the fortifications.³¹⁹ An additional school at Quebec seemed necessary because of the numerous calls for aid to the civil power - a riot had occurred that year between French and Irish workers at the shipyards and one man had died.³²⁰

146. Another idea was to raise three battalions in Canada. After six months, six of the eight companies would be sent to England and the two remaining in Canada would recruit two more and serve as a depot. After three years, the men would begin to return to Canada to serve out the remainder of a six year engagement. Selby Smyth anticipated that Canada could, by then, find men for six battalions. He also suggested that the cost would rest very lightly on Canada since Britain would be paying for half the force while it was in her service.³²¹

147. Yet a further scheme proposed by Selby Smyth may have been more within the financial means of Canada since it demanded a substantial British contribution. A Royal Canadian Reserve would be formed, consisting of 7 battalions with a total of 56 companies. Each company would be attached to an existing infantry battalion of the Active Militia. There would be one battalion in Nova Scotia and in New Brunswick, two in Quebec and three in Ontario. Each battalion would train annually at Imperial expense. The men would be enrolled for six years to serve anywhere in the world. They would be paid 6d a day plus training pay when in camp. When the battalions were called out on service, the men would be treated on the same terms as British army

reservists.³²² This scheme enlisted the support of the Governor General, Lord Lorne, who suggested to the cabinet that it would have an excellent moral effect on the rest of the world and on the Empire itself to see all the colonies so united in the defence of the Mother Country.³²³ A little later, Sir Patrick MacDougall, now promoted and commanding the garrison at Halifax, was asked to report the scheme to the War Office in the course of a visit to the United Kingdom.³²⁴ Selby Smyth also brought his arguments to bear on the cabinet. He admitted that Canada might not be rich enough to afford permanent regiments but his scheme would be a beginning. It would also attract favourable publicity from the British press, a question of some concern to a Government trying to raise money in the United Kingdom. He admitted that there would be problems. Some of the men would move to the West. In other cases, employers would refuse to let their men go. However, if the force was recruited from the farmer and artisan classes, there would be less trouble for such men were reliable. It was useless to fear that such a scheme would denude the country of its young men in time of war for if Britain was at war with a first class power, they would go in any case. Moreover, the 6d a day pay would bring money into the rural districts, always a concern for thoughtful ministers. The General was also anxious that the officers and non-commissioned officers should be Canadian. "I object in the first place to the introduction of Imperial officers merely because I know they would not be favourably accepted and that the force in general would work against them with great local influence." He also had no use for any idea of bringing out British non-commissioned officers for his Reserve. Some had been sent out during the Trent Affair and most of them, he believed, had gone bad, released

from the restraints of discipline. To provide Canadians, however, there would have to be the military schools he had advocated but with the Royal Canadian Reserve in operation, he anticipated that Britain might be able to contribute to them.³²⁵

148. During this period, the British Army was finding increasing difficulty in finding sufficient men to fulfil its commitments. The many changes of the Cardwell era could do little to raise the traditionally low status of those who served in the ranks while the short service created a new pressure for recruits. Selby Smyth was no admirer of the new system³²⁶ but his scheme had been an attempt to fill the gap which it had created in British military manpower. The attempts were to continue. In 1858, the grave shortage of troops caused by the national uprising in India had led to the formation of the 100th Royal Canadian Regiment of Foot. The new regiment was raised in Canada but it was part of the British Army. Within a few years, it ceased to obtain any recruits from Canada or to retain any ties with its land of origin.

In 1880, plans were being made to "territorialize" the British infantry regiments so that they would be connected by title and by the location of their depot with the area from which most of their recruits would come. The idea arose of localizing the 100th Regiment once again in Canada. The Adjutant General, Sir Charles Ellice, approved of the idea, provided it was feasible financially and politically but these were serious obstacles. It was pointed out that there would be the expense of transporting the Canadians from Canada and, six years later, transporting them back again. The Canadians would also probably want more pay than the British soldier.³²⁷ The comments of

Sir Edward Selby Smyth were invited. He had by then retired from his Canadian post and had the leisure to reply at even more than his usual length, rehearsing most of the schemes which he had offered the Canadian Government during his service there.

149. The difficulties which he foresaw were largely those of control and expense. Supporting that a Canadian regiment was sent to Britain and an Imperial regiment was sent to Canada, would it be as much under the control of the Canadian Government as the Canadian battalion would be under the British.

The Canadians would wish to use the battalion to suppress internal disturbances and they would certainly not give up their own troops unless they were certain that the replacements would be equally available for this duty.

The Canadian battalions would only be available for three years service overseas and this would be a hinderance to their being sent to India.

Finally, the British would have to bear the financial cost. Selby Smyth's experience in Canada had convinced him, as he warned the War Office, that the difficulties of raising regulars in Canada would not easily be surmounted.

When he had made his tentative proposals, they had been opposed in every newspaper from Halifax to the Great Lakes. The opposition was founded partly on fears of the cost and partly on the suspicion that an expensive regular force would sap the resources available for the Militia.

150. Selby Smyth did favour the placing of the depot for the 100th Regiment in Canada. If the depot was allowed to serve as a school of instruction for the Canadian militia, it would certainly be a better source of recruits than

lawless and rebellious Ireland. It would be a comparable offer for other ranks to the already generous gift of commissions to graduates of the Canadian military college. Selby Smyth announced that he had been reliably informed that Canadians were some of the best soldiers in the United States regular army and they would undoubtedly welcome a chance to fight under their own flag.³²⁸

151. Selby Smyth's proposals and others relating to a Canadian contingent were referred to the Royal Commission on the Defence of British Possessions and Commerce Abroad³²⁹ which had been created as a result of the crisis of 1878. There they languished.

152. The proposal to bring the 100th Regiment back to Canada was not yet dead nor was it really to die until the regimental silver had been deposited at the Royal Military College of Canada after its disbandment in 1922. A year later, Sir Patrick MacDougall, still commanding in Halifax and struggling to keep his garrison from being further reduced, presented a new scheme. The British system of linked battalions meant that one battalion was in England while the other was abroad, generally in India. MacDougall's scheme was that the battalion in Halifax would be the home battalion of the 100th while the other battalion might be in England, in India or elsewhere. When the other battalion was in India, the home battalion in Halifax would be authorized to increase its strength to 900 men and would have to provide drafts but when the other battalion was in England, it would be responsible for its own recruiting and the Halifax battalion could be reduced to 850 men. If, at any time, the

battalion at Halifax was also required for overseas service, its place could be taken by a battalion of Canadian militia specially embodied for the purpose. The title of the new regiment was to be the Prince of Wales Royal Canadian Regiment and its men would be recruited on the same terms as British regulars but they would be returned to Canada on the completion of their service whereupon, MacDougall predicted, they would become the best of recruiting agents.

153. Once again, there were financial misgivings. According to the Financial Secretary, MacDougall's proposal included the suggestion that an Imperial battalion would be permanently stationed in Canada at Imperial expense. It had only to be stated in that way to be condemned. Secondly, he had no great love for the increased establishments which were sought. The strength of the battalion at Halifax would not be allowed to exceed the strength authorized for the garrison. Finally, there would be an additional cost of transportation to India and the Indian Government would not pay it. Perhaps the main objection, raised by several who contributed their minutes, was that men simply could not be got for the rates offered unless the regiment was to be filled with what the Permanent Under-Secretary delicately described as "loafers and mean whites".³³⁰ However, no possibility of obtaining recruits could be ignored and the Colonial Office was asked to discover from the Canadian Government whether it believed that recruits would be forthcoming. Six copies of a memorandum reciting the attractions of service in the Army were included.³³¹ There is no record of a Canadian reply but a Government which was spending money to entice immigrants to fill the country was unlikely

to look favourably on any project to draw able bodied men away. The Colonial Office also wondered who was to pay for the Canadian militia who were to replace the battalion at Halifax if it were called away.³³² This, the War Office replied, would fall on the Canadians only in the event of a European War or one which directly affect the safety of Canada.³³³

154. The crisis which was affecting British military manpower in 1882 and which encouraged them to make such proposals was the very large military commitment involved in garrisoning Egypt. The Egyptian War and the accompanying international crisis had brought Canadian militia officers once again to offer their services - almost invariably as officers and almost invariably at the head of their gallant bands of militiamen - and it had also brought renewed pressure on the Canadian Government to make a definite contribution. On 22 July 1882, Lord Lorne tried to persuade Macdonald to offer to garrison Halifax during the Egyptian occupation - then envisaged as a very temporary affair but due to last for over eighty years. He suggested that the duties of the infantry in the garrison could be taken over by four Canadian Militia battalions embodied for the purpose.³³⁴

155. Macdonald's reply offers a revealing and important insight into his attitude both to defence and to Imperial military contributions:

On looking over the Militia Act, it would seem that the contingency has not arisen when the Militia can be called out for actual service. This can only be done in case of War, invasion or insurrection, or

danger of any of them. Now England is not at War, nor is there any danger of invasion or insurrection. War may ultimately grow out of the present Egyptian complication but we cannot say that there is any present or immediate danger of it. There is certainly no danger of the War reaching Canada.

As a matter of policy, I am inclined to think that any action on the part of the Government would be premature.

The Country would, it appears to me, look with disfavour on our people being called away from their peaceful pursuits in consequence of the Eastern imbroglio. The Canadians can be trusted to do their share if the Mother Country were engaged in any serious war but it would be well to leave the initiative to the enthusiasm of the people.

The action of the Government would be supported by the general voice of the country, offers of service would come from all quarters, as they did during the Crimean War, the Indian Mutiny and the late impending war with Russia. Then would be the time for the Government to take advantage of the aroused loyalty of the people and go to parliament for the creation of a nucleus of a standing Army.

I have no doubt that just now the Opposition press would come out loudly against the embodying of a Force in consequence of an obscure quarrel in a remote country with which Canada has no concern, and it

might give an impetus to the cry for independence.

Besides, if the Halifax garrison were once removed at our request, we have no security that they would be returned to us. At all events, real emergency and our request in this case would be quoted as a precedent.

In case England were really engaged in a War, the true course it seems to me would be for H.M. Government to state in a despatch written in an ad captandum style the necessity for withdrawing the troops, and that H. Majesty is well assured that she can trust to the well known loyalty of Her Canadian subjects not only to provide for the Defence of that Dominion but to aid the Mother land in the struggle. This would surely "bring down the House" & secure a warm response.³³⁵

156. Lorne was not satisfied with this assessment of the Canadian political situation and complained about Canadians waiting for an Imperial request. As he was possibly more concerned with British and world opinion than with Canadian feeling, he stressed the value such an offer would have if it came unsolicited. However, if it was necessary, he would approach the Imperial Government to send an appropriate message.³³⁶ This was not what Macdonald wanted. If such a request came before the Canadians were prepared for it, it would be necessary to summon Parliament at a time when there was no apparent need and, indeed, when the situation in Egypt looked to be solving itself without need for outside assistance. The Prime Minister really wanted to use

the crisis as a moment to create a Canadian permanent force and he did not want his plan to be set aside by any premature move.

My own opinion has been ever since 1866 (the time of the first Fenian Raid) that we should have a regular force embodied and not to be obliged to trust to our Volunteer Force exclusively.

The latter are not sufficiently trained for an emergency and being principally composed of the higher order of artisans and yeomanry are too valuable to be away from their avocations for any length of time. If there was a present danger of war, we might be able to induce Parliament to embody some Regiments for permanent service.

They would not only always be ready for work, but if well officered and disciplined would form a standard up to which our Volunteers would work.

With this object I should like to wait with patience for the occasion when the country would go with the increment. It would be a pity if the first step in that direction was met with coldness or opposition.

P.S. I am not quite sure that my colleagues as a whole, would agree with me as to having a standing force.³³⁷

Lorne's reply was that he did not think that the British would now ask for troops.³³⁸ Macdonald was left to wait for an occasion when he could spring his idea on an excited country.

THE MARINE MILITIA

157. The Act of 1868 had provided for a Marine Militia to include the seafaring men of the Dominion. Some gestures had been made toward creating most of the other proposed components but nothing was done about the Marine Militia. In 1865, the British Parliament had passed the Colonial Naval Defence Act which authorized colonies to maintain navies and permitted the employment of officers and men of the Royal Navy to assist. Canada, however, had not taken up the offer. The gunboats on the Great Lakes which have already been mentioned were manned by civilian crews hired for the season,³³⁹ while the guns were manned by men of the Garrison Artillery, a civil-military arrangement reminiscent of the early days of the Royal Navy. It was not tested by action. When the gunboats were disposed of, the only force remotely resembling a navy in the Dominion's possession was the motley collection of vessels operated by the Department of Marine and Fisheries.

158. The provision of the Militia Act providing for Marine Militia did produce a number of units which were gazetted but nothing was done to encourage them. In the remustering of 1868, the sole naval company to survive Confederation, the Hamilton Naval Company, refused to be transferred and so was dropped. In Halifax, a naval brigade of four companies under a major was

formed but at the end of 1870, it was turned into a second brigade of garrison artillery. There were two other companies formed in Bonaventure County in Quebec in February, 1869, and a third company was formed at Carleton in the same county later but none of the three companies seem to have been equipped or trained. There were no references to them in the inspection reports and in the reduction of the Militia to 30,000 in 1874, they disappeared.³⁴⁰ Their only assistance which seems to have come from the Royal Navy for the Canadian Militia in this period was the loan of the services of a petty officer to instruct the Nanaimo Rifle Company in 1874.³⁴¹

159. The Russian war scare of 1878 presented Canada with a particularly acute naval problem. Ship owners were well aware of what the Alabama had accomplished during the American Civil War in just one cruise. Her efforts and those of other Confederate commerce raiders had contributed to the destruction of the United States mercantile marine. The Russians could be expected to be even better provided; hence the alarm when the Russian ship Cimbra put into Ellesworth Maine with allegedly the men and guns to fit out a large number of privateers. Selby Smyth appears to have originated the suggestion that the Royal Navy should station a fleet of lightly armed, fast steamers in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Bay of Fundy to counter this threat.³⁴² The Canadian Government took up his proposal fervently and urged the Governor General to press the need on the British Government.³⁴³ The Admiralty was not enthusiastic. They could certainly not guarantee that a few raiders, particularly if fitted out in the United States, might not get loose and it was up to the Canadians to use their own resources to protect their

ports and shipping. They suggested that the British Government might lend guns and arm Canadian vessels but that, of course was not under their charge.³⁴⁴ The Colonial Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, passed this news back to Canada in July and recommended to the Governor General that his Government might do much good by taking up and arming its own fast ships and that it should have a few guns in storage for this purpose.³⁴⁵

160. In his report for 1878, Selby Smyth echoed this British suggestion and in a further report, submitted just a little later, he went on to propose an even more ambitious approach to naval defence. Canada, after all, was a maritime country, with a population of seafaring men in excess of 90,000 and some 6,500 registered vessels. At the same time, the winters made fishing impossible. The Royal Navy was disposing of a number of old ironclads and it might be prepared either to present one or two to Canada or to sell them at a very low price. Armed with a few moderately heavy guns, they would serve as blockships for coast or harbour defence. At the same time, they could serve as training ships for Volunteers or for lads. During the summer, the ships could cruise and during the winter, they could be tied up in various Maritime ports and be used to train the local fishermen and sailors.³⁴⁶

161. Three and a half months later, when the Cabinet discussed the proposal, the traditional argument was raised against it. Ministers were "of the opinion that the present state of the Finances of the Country does not render this an opportune moment for bringing the subject before Parliament." However, when affairs had improved, they anticipated that the matter would be

raised again and they suggested that one or more of the provinces might be interested in the educational aspects of the scheme.³⁴⁷

162. A year and a half later, Canada acquired H.M.S. Charybdis. Whose initiative provoked the gift is a little unclear. The Official History of the Naval Service of Canada states that the request came from the Canadian cabinet through the Governor General, Lord Lorne, on 8 October 80³⁴⁸ but four days later, Lorne wrote to Macdonald to tell him that the offer of a ship by the Admiralty should not be refused. Seeking to reassure the Prime Minister, he advised him that accepting the ship implied nothing. However it could be used as a training ship, it would be seizing the initiative from the maritime Provinces and it would be popular.³⁴⁹ The Admiralty offered the Charybdis, an elderly steam corvette, which had just returned from seven years and which was not considered to be worth refitting.³⁵⁰ There was a brief dispute over the terms. The British Government said that it was lending the ship but the Canadians had no wish to be obliged to return her if they were to spend any money on rebuilding the vessel for their own purposes.³⁵¹ At last the Colonial Secretary explained that the gift was called a "loan" to discourage other colonies from demanding warships as well.³⁵²

163. The new acquisition was not a success. The Canadian Government sent a retired Royal Navy officer to England to collect her. He decided that she would be suitable as a training ship but his chief engineer reported that the boilers were practically worn out and that the ship could not undertake a voyage across the North Atlantic in winter. The Canadian Government paid for

repairs and the Charybdis was sailed into Saint John harbour early in 1881. Once there, she broke loose and damaged shipping in the harbour. Later, two citizens fell from a rotted gang-plank and were drowned. It was discovered that the ship was hard to manage and would require a large and therefore expensive crew. Finally the Royal Navy was persuaded to take their gift back and she was towed around to Halifax.³⁵³ She was not forgotten, however, and the Charybdis became a slogan to bedevil both the Government and anyone who might ever suggest that Canada should again start its own navy.

FRENCH SPEAKING CANADIANS AND THE MILITIA

164. Finding a place for both nations in Canada's armed forces has been a perennial problem of Canadian military policy since Confederation. It had not been solved by making the first Minister of Militia and Defence French Canada's spokesman in the Cabinet. The appointment seems to have ensured that French Canadians would play a prominent part in the Civil Branch and until after the Second World War, the Deputy Minister was a French-speaking Canadian. Although the original military districts were planned on a geographical basis, it was soon established that M.D. 6 would include only French-speaking units, including the one French-speaking city unit in Montreal, the 65th Battalion. Its staff officers, and those of M.D. 7 in Quebec City were and remained French-speaking with few exceptions. In 1892, the two districts in the Montreal area were reorganized once again on a geographical basis.

165. French Canadian militia units suffered under particular difficulties.

In a military system which was intended to resemble that of Great Britain as closely as possible, there was little room to develop institutions which would appeal to French Canadians as such. In the course of a century, there can be no doubt that differences in outlook, tradition and method have developed but at this period in particular, there was no encouragement for such differences.

More important were the practical difficulties, French speaking members of the Militia were obliged to receive most of their instruction in English. The social structure and the customs of the French Canadian society did not encourage voluntary militia service.

166. These were among the points which General Lindsay made in a lengthy report to the Governor General on the militia he had observed around Montreal.

In particular he was concerned at the relatively poor turnout of the French Canadians. The number in the ranks was well below their proportion of the population. While many of them served with English-speaking corps, three entirely French Canadian regiments, the Chasseurs, the 64th and the 65th each had a nominal strength of 335 other ranks but they had turned out 113, 95, and 150 respectively. In the battalion raised in Quebec for the Red River expedition, only 77 of the 350 other ranks were French Canadians although over half of the officers were French speaking. Moreover, in the Fenian crisis earlier in the year, Lindsay had found the French Canadian battalions so badly trained, he had kept them back to drill instead of sending them to the frontier. The battalion from Three Rivers was the finest French Canadian unit he had seen but he found that many of the men had never been taught how to

load a rifle and that the men could not even be deployed from column into line. Admittedly one problem was that the commands were in English and they then had to be explained in French. This meant that the French-speaking battalions could never become as efficient as the English. At the same time, he clearly felt that the fault lay with the staff officers in the province who must become sufficiently conversant with military knowledge to inspire the confidence of Militia officers.³⁵⁴ The implication is plain that such a situation did not then exist. Since the offices then on the staff remained for some years thereafter, it seems equally fair to assume that the situation cannot have seriously changed.

167. The difficulties of the French Canadian militia do not seem to have been altered by the departure of the British garrison. The Deputy Adjutants-General of M.Ds. 6 and 7 continued to be among the most urgent in their plea for the introduction of the ballot as the only way of maintaining their corps up to strength.³⁵⁵ Colonel de Lotbiniere Harwood of M.D. 6 reported in 1871 that he had been told by several well to do men that they would willingly serve if they were obliged to do so but that they could not afford to leave their businesses if no one else had to bear the burden.³⁵⁶ The same plea was again made the following year and Colonel D'Orsonnens, one of Harwood's Brigade majors, reported that the officers at the camp that year were dispirited from their failures in recruiting. Many of the men in camp had been out for the past fourteen years.³⁵⁷ The other problem was the lack of instructors and qualified officers. The reduced numbers in intermittent camps

after 1872 seems to have solved the problem of recruiting enough men* but it aggravated the problem of training them properly.³⁵⁸

168. In 1873, the Schools of Military Instruction in the province were closed, presumably to be replaced by the services of the Schools of Gunnery at Quebec but four years later, the loss was still being regretted.³⁵⁹ The following year, Colonel Duchesnay, the Deputy Adjutant-General at Quebec proposed very modestly that a depot of drill books be established at Ottawa and the officers be permitted to buy them for their own use. When officers were checked for their errors, they assured him that they were anxious to attend a School and improve their knowledge.³⁶⁰ Selby Smyth himself saw a company of French Canadians drilling in a field.

The officer was doing his utmost with his company, but he was, to use an expression known in the army "knocking them about". The men had no steadiness, no preliminary drill; they got through a few company formations in a perfunctory fashion, but it seemed to me that if they had to be made use of, confusion would have resulted. ... Here, too, I noticed the absence of proper means for protecting the Government arms and clothing; hardly one tunic was complete in buttons; the trousers were of various patterns and material; boots with high heels and pointed toes that would have lamed the men in a few miles over a muddy road; the arms but tolerable, and some of the locks out of order; there were no

* Indeed, the Deputy Adjutants-General began reporting offers of units which they could not accept. [Report, 1873, p. 19, 1877, p. 34]

slings, no snap caps, and I think I missed some ramrods; the sights of these rifles if examined, would, I am sure, have been found defective. But this is the fault of the existing system not of this particular officer, and I believe could only be possible in an independent company.³⁶¹

It was unfortunate that independent companies were common among the French Canadian militia. For all their weaknesses in training and equipment, it was possible to find a spirit which did not seem to exist elsewhere. In 1876, when Colonel Harwood arrived to inspect one of the companies of the St. Hyacinthe, he discovered that a fire the day before had laid waste much of the town, including the house of the captain, containing all the arms and equipment. The men had to be inspected outside.

It was a bitter cold night, the men were half clad and shivering. They had no arms and there was no space for any kind of movement.

I counted 2 officers and 28 men.

The captain said the balance of his men were away, some working in the States, others with farmers away in the country. I then, after addressing a few words to them, dismissed the company, which gave three hearty cheers for the Queen.

It was a pitiful sight to see such a lot of fine young men totally

ruined, some having lost their houses and homes, with all their clothing, others all they had in the world.³⁶²

169. The organization of the two Gunnery Schools was a means of producing instructors and trained men for at least a part of the Militia. "B" Battery in Quebec City was commanded by Colonel Strange but two of his three original officers were French Canadians as were over half his men. Strange was impressed by his men, finding them inured to the hardships of winter and trained to the rough engineering tasks of the logging camp.³⁶³ The ability of the Battery to provide French-speaking instructors was limited both by its size and by the language of the bulk of its original instructors. The Quebec Field Battery, which for some time won high praise, seems to have been able to take advantage of the School and in one year, in the absence of all of its officers, three from the School filled their place. However, garrison artillery did not thrive in Quebec despite extensive fortifications which would have needed their services in the event of an emergency.³⁶⁴ In 1880, "B" Battery was exchanged with "A" Battery in Kingston. The exchange was particularly unpopular with the men in "B" Battery who were now predominantly French Canadian and who found themselves torn from friendly and familiar surroundings and set down in a city where their language was not spoken. For the first time, desertion became a serious problem.³⁶⁵

170. The other great advance in training during the seventies was the foundation of the Military College. Reference has already been made to the difficulty the entrance examinations provided for French-speaking candidates.

By 1879, the entrance examination regulations permitted answers in either language and provided that:

The Standard of knowledge of English required from French speaking candidates for the present will be: - To write and speak English sufficiently to understand and be understood in that language.³⁶⁶

This remains the standard until 1914 and after. Needless to say, if French Canadian officers were wanted in the Canadian Militia and in Canadian military affairs generally, this was not good enough. Few if any French Canadian schools or colleges in Quebec were designed to produce graduates with the grounding in mathematics and sciences required for the entrance examination. Few, if any, directed their students towards the heavily technical education to be obtained at the College. Only one class in Quebec can be excepted - the heavily assimilated and self-consciously aristocratic French families of Quebec and Montreal were prepared to send their sons to the Royal Military College and into military careers. By 1900, 255 cadets had graduated from the College: ten were French Canadians. Their names explain their background: two Joly de Lotbinieres, two Panets, and du Plessis, a Caudet and a Broucher de Boucherville.³⁶⁷ If commissions in the permanent corps were to be reserved for graduates of the college, a promise often made and, as time passed, more frequently kept, it meant that the officers would not represent French Canada adequately.

171. A further disadvantage of the French Canadian units of the Militia was that almost all of them were rural corps, sharing the disadvantages of rural corps throughout the force of infrequent camps and scanty training. It was unfortunate that there were only two city battalions, the 65th Carabiniers Mont-Royal of Montreal and the 9th Voltiegurs of Quebec. While both regiments had their vicissitudes, they were on an equal footing with their rivals among the English-speaking city battalions.

172. In 1879, a group of French-speaking Montrealers proposed to raise a new regiment, to be dressed in Zouave uniform. This Franco-Algerian costume had been so popular some decades before that a number of American militia units had adopted it.³⁶⁸ Above all, it had been the uniform of the French Canadian Papal Zouaves of 1868-70, a force of volunteers which had gone to Italy to help protect Rome against French attacks. This military episode had been almost bloodless but it was the one expedition organized and undertaken by French Canada completely on its own and the Zouaves had acquired a particularly strong place in the minds of most French Canadians. The proposal had the immediate and strong support of the new Minister, Louis Masson, both as the spokesman from Montreal in the Cabinet and as one who was anxious to strengthen the place of French Canada in the Militia. The remainder of his colleagues had no objection.

173. The opposition came from the Horse Guards and particularly from the Duke of Cambridge. Whatever the strength of their personal prejudice against a somewhat flamboyant uniform, the British officials stuck to the principle that

the militia of both Britain and Canada were to be dressed in uniform as like those of the regulars as possible so that an enemy encountering them would not know whether he was facing irregulars or well disciplined professionals. Not only would the Zouave uniform not be British, its grey color would allow it to be confused with a common colour among Canada's most likely enemy, the soldiers and militia of the United States.³⁶⁹ In making this point, Lord Lorne also recalled a similar correspondence in 1875 in which the War Office had taken the same position.³⁷⁰

174. Masson was understandably disappointed by the opposition to the proposed regiment's uniform. His position was made worse by the assumption in Montreal that the new corps would be organized with its uniforms.³⁷¹ A further aggravation for Masson was that he felt that his health to be failing at a time when his ability to get results for his Montreal friends was in such question. He offered to change the color to rifle green if that would suit the British authorities.³⁷² This did not sway the Governor General.

175. The dispute was a minor one and it would be easy to exaggerate the importance of this venture into a specifically French Canadian military dress; one may even be relieved that such a singularly inappropriate costume did not find a foothold here. Nonetheless, the attitude of the British military authorities and their allies in the Canadian Militia Department showed that little would be done to widen the character of the Militia to suit the wishes of French Canada. This was in contrast to the approval, even the enthusiastic support for Canadian units which adopted the wildest extravagance of British

military dress. Selby Smyth delivered a stern rebuke to those who criticized the Governor General's Foot Guards of Ottawa for adopting the full dress uniform of the Coldstream Guards.³⁷³ Possibly even more absurd for Canadian conditions were those regiments which struggled to obtain Highland dress. Unless the British should plan to station Highlanders in Canada, any militia regiment so attired would be promptly distinguished as such. They would certainly be more conspicuous than Zouaves in scarlet, blue or rifle green,³⁷⁴

A NEW GENERAL AND A NEW MINISTER

176. On 25 November 1879, Masson told Macdonald that he could not continue. Ill health had plagued him throughout his period in office and Departmental work had suffered. Although his resignation followed closely on his disappointment in the Zouavre business, there is no reason to believe that it was the cause. Masson himself wrote:

You may rest assured that it is not without deep regret that I have to take this determination and separate myself from colleagues with whom I have been in such complete accord.³⁷⁵

In fact, he did not separate himself completely for when the resignation was accepted on 16 January 1880, it was only to transfer Masson to become President of the Council while Macdonald's friend, Sir Alexander Campbell was promoted to the Militia Department from his previous post as Postmaster-General. Even this arrangement did not last. Before the end of the year,

Masson had again resigned because of his health although his subsequent political career carried him through the Canadian Senate and the Quebec Legislative Council to become Lieutenant Governor of his native province. Campbell also returned to the Postmaster General's Department before the end of the year.

177. Although he had left the Militia Department, Masson was responsible for introducing a new Militia Acts Amendment Bill to the House of Commons in 1880.

There were four proposed changes. The enrolment which had been supposed to take place in 1881 was postponed until 1882. Authority was sought to call out the Militia on other occasions than war or national emergencies. The crime of impersonating a militiaman was to be extended to cover anyone instead of merely other ranks who were actually with the force. Finally, there was to be authority to establish canteens on service or in camp when local ordinance did not forbid them. While the first and third proposals were not particularly controversial, the second gave members a considerable scope to reveal their view of the Militia and the fourth gave them a pleasant opportunity to discuss the morals of others.³⁷⁶

178. The problem which the first amendment was intended to solve appears to have arisen as a result of an incident in London, Ontario on 10 September 1879.³⁷⁷ During the first visit of Lord Lorne and Princess Louise, a reception was organized in the City Hall. A guard of local militia was placed around the building, chiefly for show but also with strict orders to allow no one to pass until the vice-regal party had entered. One of the

sentries was a man named Thomas Bond who had served for eleven years in the British Army and who seems to have taken his duties very seriously. When Judge Davis approached to enter, he was promptly ordered back. He was followed by Chief Lallery of the London Police, in full uniform and accompanied by several ladies. Bond was not impressed and, when Lallery proceeded to bypass him, he brought his rifle, with bayonet fixed, to the position of the charge. Lallery then knocked the rifle out of his path and went in. Bond was arrested, tried by Judge Davis and fined \$1.00 with \$2.85 costs. The case was appealed and a jury reversed Davis's decision but the judge refused to order costs on the grounds of a perverse verdict. In explaining the case to Headquarters, the local Deputy Adjutant General, Lieutenant Colonel Taylor had pointed out that both Lallery and Bond were hot headed men but that his sympathies were with the Chief of Police, "a capital officer and very strict and won't soften to the ways of the Aldermen and easy going folks and so he has got many enemies."³⁷⁸ Taylor certainly had no sympathy for Bond but the dispute drew considerable public attention to the Militia.

179. The amendment was presumably designed to protect sentries like Bond in the future. It was also a protection and an authority for guards called out to protect armouries as had occurred on a several occasions during riots in Montreal and Quebec. Again in London an incident was quoted in which a sentry, posted on the armoury, had tried to arrest a man who was loitering nearby. The man had resisted and had eventually taken the sentry to court where the sentry was fined. The Liberals in opposition opposed the extension

of this sort of power to the Militia. Constabulary was a provincial responsibility and David Mills, the Opposition's legal critic, wished to keep the military and the constabulary roles of the Militia quite distinct. Although the Prime Minister suggested that the bill was quite harmless, Mills and Blake pointed out the dangers of the liberty of the subject in denying a citizen appear to a court simply because he had disobeyed the orders of a militia colonel or captain. It soon emerged that the Government was seeking to clarify its right to call out militia in addition to the right already possessed by magistrates. There then developed a dispute about the legal obligations of the Militia. Several M.Ps. tried to force the Government to solve the perennial enigma that a soldier could be shot for disobeying orders and hanged for obeying them.³⁷⁹

180. There was little political capital to be made from trading charges about tyranny with reminiscences about Mackenzie's role in suppressing the Orangemen in 1878.³⁸⁰ The debate on canteens brought a different band of contributors.

They were led by the ardent prohibitionist George Ross from Middlesex West, a future Ontario Minister of Education. Ross was opposed to canteens in any form and although he acknowledged that the canteens was to keep the young men from straying into the towns, even a moderate supply of drink in the camps would lead the troops into excess. It was in vain that Masson pointed out that his Bill had the support of the "temperance gentlemen" in the Senate, that it would not set up canteens where the Temperance Act was in force and that it would keep the men under better control where it was not. Ross persisted with an amendment to remove the repugnant clause. He was supported

by several other members. A Montreal member suggested that the idea had come from Headquarters and not from the commanding officers who know better the temptations to which young men were prone. Before long, liquor had been blamed for everything from the reluctance of pure young men to join the Militia to the atrocities allegedly then being committed in South African and Masson withdrew the section without a vote.³⁸¹

181. Masson also supervised the estimates for the year. For the first time there was a strongly argued proposal for a reduction of the whole force to 20,000 men, to be drilled longer and at better pay. The suggestion came from Fred. W. Strange, Member from North York and an officer of the Queen's Own Rifles, who had provided himself with figures to show that such a reduction would cut expenditure by \$175,000 a year, most of which could then be used to increase the drill pay.³⁸² The suggestion, of course provoked considerable opposition, led, very mildly, by Masson himself, who gave generous praise to both city and rural Militia. "The country does not regret the amount spent on its volunteers, and it would be a great difficulty for the Minister of Militia to make any reduction."³⁸³ Why it was difficult became evident as a succession of members arose to address their constituents, to demand the usual reductions in the staff and increases in the pay and numbers of their local militia supporters.³⁸²

182. Selby Smyth's five year term as General Officer Commanding expired in the spring of 1880 and on 31 May 1880, he officially laid down his appointment and returned to England. His service in Canada had largely been a matter of

watching the decay of the Militia but he seems to have accepted the limits of his position as an adviser rather than as a creator of policy. His advice was extensive, moderate and often very sound. More than most of his successors, he was aware of the indifference of the Canadian Government to military expenditure and he was content to produce grandiose plans and to content himself with fitting in a few extra instructors in odd places. His lengthy reports are his only real memorial in Canada. Selby Smyth made his annual account into a lecture on militarism which grew longer and more rhetorical each year. He took space to advance a wide variety of personal causes, the most interesting being a causeway between Newfoundland and Labrador which would cut off the Labrador current, warm the water of the Gulf of St. Lawrence and change the climate of eastern Canada.³⁸³ In return for allowing him scope for these ponderous essays, the Canadian Government was not much bothered by trouble in the Militia. The few enemies Selby Smyth made, including George Denison,³⁸⁶ it might have been hard to avoid making. That he did not make very many is proven by the apparent ease with which he was accepted as military commander by two successive governments.

183. If Selby Smyth gave general satisfaction in Canada, he was less satisfactory to the British and before his departure, the Colonial Secretary, Hicks Beach, raised the possibility of combining his duties with those of the British general commanding the garrison at Halifax. This possibility was considered by the cabinet and found to be inexpedient. Apart from the belief that the duties of looking after the Militia were a full time occupation in themselves, and that the Militia would be discontented and doubtful that they

would get as much attention as before, there was the question of conflict of authority. An officer working with the Militia and under the Canadian Government would be more likely to adopt its policies faithfully than if he was also the servant of the British Government. The Canadians were obviously growing more conscious of their own interests. Above all, the senior military officer at Halifax had continued to have the additional responsibility of serving as Administrator when the Governor General was away. This was an anomalous situation in itself, as Macdonald pointed out in 1881 when the temporary office nearly fell to a colonel at Halifax.³⁸⁷ The Canadian Government refused to recommend a situation when its subordinate, the officer commanding its Militia, would also become its superior as the replacement for the Governor General.³⁸⁸

184. Instead, the British authorities had to set about obtaining a second General Officer Commanding. They had the advantage of Lord Lorne's advice on the qualities of his successor. The candidate should have tact, a record of bravery and experience with volunteers. Above all, he should have a large personal fortune. "An officer who could afford hospitality would have great influence among the militia officers in other than merely military respects."³⁸⁹ The first to be offered was Lieutenant General Arthur Hardinge, but he was refused by Macdonald.³⁹⁰ The choice then fell on Major General Richard Luard. When the Canadian appointment had been considered some six years before, two officers who were eventually to hold the appointment had been considered. They were Luard and Colonel Frederick Dobson Middleton. Of Luard, The Duke of Cambridge had written:

... a good officer who has seen a good deal of service. He has been Assistant Inspector of Volunteers and therefore has a good deal of experience in this respect, but I don't think his temper is as good as that of Colonel Middleton, though I daresay he would do the work well, being an active and intelligent man.³⁹¹

If Luard was short of temper, there was no question of his courage. He had served in the campaigns in the Crimea and in China and had been mentioned in despatches as the first man to scale the walls at Canton.³⁹² Perhaps the real reason that his name was chosen by the Duke in 1880, however, was a certain desire to see him out of the country. In order to qualify for a pension, Luard needed two more years of service and so he was looking for employment. There is also some evidence that he was due to succeed to the colonelcy of his regiment and that there were other, more desirable claimants for the honour.³⁹³

185. In addition to his temper, Luard had another disadvantage; he was a poor man. Not only could he not undertake to keep up a fashionable establishment in Ottawa, he was even obliged to bargain with the Canadian Government for better financial arrangements. This angered the Canadians and placed the Governor General in an embarrassing position. Not only was there a question about the General's financial position, there was also a growing suspicion of his qualifications, prompted by private letters and newspaper reports from England.³⁹⁴ Luard's request that his fare and that of his family and servants should be paid in advance was rejected and he was warned a little bluntly that

if he did not wish to accept the Canadian terms, he could return to his half pay of 25 shillings a day and another officer would be found.³⁹⁵

186. Luard accepted the ultimatum and on 1 August 1880, he arrived in Canada³⁹⁶ four months after the Order in Council appointing him had been passed.³⁹⁷ His arrival coincided with a number of changes in the Militia. The order to switch "A" and "B" Batteries between Kingston and Quebec had gone out on 7 May 1880³⁹⁸ and was completed on 16 June 1880. Captain Oscar Prevost and fifteen other ranks capable of instructing in French were left in Quebec to assist "A" Battery. Another change which was almost certainly due to Luard's insistence was an almost complete shifting of the staff in the districts. Three of the oldest Deputy Adjutants-General were retired and every one of the others was ordered to be moved. Two of the Brigade Majors were promoted to Deputy Adjutant-General and a third was ordered to take over the duties of that office in Prince Edward Island. The move was to be complete by 1 April 1881 and the officers were entitled to their personal transport expenses and hotel bills while en route, a baggage allowance of 1,000 pounds and two months pay to cover their other incidental expenses. Those going a distance of over 500 miles were entitled to three months pay.⁴⁰⁰

187. This massive uprooting was not accomplished without pain. The two French speaking Deputy Adjutants-General managed to get their exchanges cancelled but they alone were successful. Colonel Osborne Smith preferred to resign rather than leave Winnipeg to come to Montreal.⁴⁰¹ To take advantage of this opportunity to reduce the staff, Lieutenant Colonel Taylor who had been

sent to M.D. 9 in Halifax was given charge of all three Maritime provinces. All the districts were given a brigade major save M.Ds. 10 and 11 which had none and M.D. 5 which had two, one French and the other English speaking.⁴⁰²

188. There were also changes at Headquarters. Colonel Wily, the Director of Stores and Keeper of Militia Properties became superannuated at his own request.⁴⁰³ An engineer officer was added, Captain Henry Perley, whom the Department of Public Works had transferred from Saint John and who was to take charge of the growing amount of engineer work to be done by the Militia Department for itself.

189. Luard did not waste much time in making his personality felt by the Militia. He was also made aware of some of the difficulties which would confront him. The training season was over by the time he had arrived but it was possible to inspect some of the city battalions and a few rural corps which were late with their drill. There was provision in 1880 for the drilling of 21,000 men and for holding of brigade camps on an optional basis.⁴⁰⁴ Luard's opinion of the Montreal battalions had been sufficiently outspoken for the Montreal paper to describe him as "an old scold" but he was apparently more impressed with what he found in Toronto and thereby won the approval of the local press.⁴⁰⁵

190. The new General also came into contact with the perennial problem of discipline in the Militia. The officers of the Militia were understandably conscious of the sacrifices they felt called upon to make and they were ill-

disposed to accept criticism. If they took umbrage at a rebuke or at a disciplinary limitation, they could resign. If they did not resign, they had quick recourse to a friendly newspaper or a sympathetic Member of parliament.

Sometimes, they were Members of parliament already and Selby Smyth himself had used his annual report to urge them to have more to say on behalf of the Militia.⁴⁰⁶ Militia officers also felt the narrow basis of their authority. Shortly after his arrival, Luard had to deal with a case in which a lieutenant commanding a company had struck one of his men. It turned out that the man had been rebuked on parade and afterwards had started an altercation with his officer about who had been right. Luard ordered both to be dismissed from the Militia.⁴⁰⁷

191. Another problem which was common in all battalions but which was most prevalent in the richer city corps was the tendency of the officers to regard themselves as members of a gentlemen's club in which the Colonel was merely the president. They were encouraged in this view by the many social affairs centring on their regiment, the funds and subscriptions which were forever circulating and the existence of social rivalries which carried over from outside life. Such an atmosphere made intrigues against unpopular commanding officers seem normal, however subversive such proceedings would strike more professional officers. Such a state of affairs had plagued the 10th Royal Regiment of Toronto in the later years of Selby Smyth's command as a number of officers applied pressure to remove Colonel Stollery from the command. The result was a situation in which the unit fell into disorder and was nearly disbanded.⁴⁰⁸ Only a complete reorganization and a different list of officers

managed to restore it. In the process, the affairs of the regiment were canvassed in the newspapers, in Parliament⁴⁰⁹ and among the Cabinet.⁴¹⁰ In his last report, noting that he had found no record of a court martial against an officer of the Canadian Militia, Selby Smyth had tried to remind officers that such conduct was against the Articles of War.⁴¹¹ Since these disputes often involved officers of considerable political influence, there was a certain hazard involved for a General to go any closer in tackling disciplinary problems than Selby Smyth's menacing generalizations.

192. One of Luard's first encounters with this sort of problem was a series of charges against Major Kennedy of the Winnipeg Field Battery by one of his lieutenants. The accusations largely dealt with fraudulent payment of men who had not been personally by the Minister, Sir Alexander Campbell, as one of his last acts in office. In lengthy opinion, written in his customary judicial manner, he acknowledged that six out of seven charges were proven although there were extenuating circumstances. One was that Kennedy had not used the latest forms with their printed warning against paying men who had not performed drill. Another was that the high wages in Manitoba made it difficult to obtain men. It is hard to avoid the impression, however, that Kennedy was a man of considerable political influence and while he might be warned, he could not be punished.⁴¹²

193. In preparing his first Report, Luard decided that there was much to criticize and little time to be lost. His first observation was that although the city corps were doing well and making the best use of their opportunities

and money, the rural corps, for all their excellent material, could not get by with thirty hours of drill every other year. \$75,000 was spent on 9,600 city militia and \$100,000 on 27,000 rural militia. For an officer who was to be characterized as the very model of a traditional British major general, Luard had common sense views about dress. Accepting the principle that the Canadians should look as much as possible like the British Army, he still asked for brown leather and an end to the messy, inefficient but extremely traditional pipeclay. He regretted that the Canadian cavalry had been dressed in Hussar uniform and suggested that a plain blue uniform would be cheaper and more suitable. He also wanted the cavalry to be equipped and trained with rifles. Finally, he asked that a soft cap be adopted which might look like a helmet from a distance but which could not be crushed and which would offer some protection from the sun. In the field of equipment, Luard pointed out that the snider rifle was a weapon of the past and asked for something better. Those do not seem to be the urgings of a military mossback.

194. On 8 November 1880, Sir Alexander Campbell was replaced by a new Minister who promised to be as energetic as the new General. Adolphe Caron was a Quebec lawyer, the eldest son of a one time lieutenant governor of his province and married into the Baby family. He had been in Parliament since 1873, representing Quebec County and the Militia and Defence portfolio was his first chance of cabinet office. Caron was only 37 when appointed. Although his predecessor, Louis Masson, objected to his appointment on grounds of seniority,⁴¹⁴ other members of the Cabinet soon came to have considerable respect for him.

195. Early in March, Caron had to present his first estimates and, although the questioning was hardly severe, he appeared able to handle himself competently. Although he had to answer criticism raised on behalf of some of the displaced staff officers, he was greatly helped by having good news about drill pay. In the previous year, the orders had allowed the men to draw pay only for the time that they were in camp, excluding Sunday, when they were allowed only rations, and the days of coming and going. For 1881, 17,000 men were to train in camp for 12 days and they would be paid for every one of them. Only one member rose to demand a reduction of the staff and the main fire was drawn by a British Columbian who demanded a pair of armouries for a corps which had mustered one officer and sixteen men the year before of a total strength which he claimed to be over 120.⁴¹⁵

196. During the summer, Caron visited several of the camps which he had authorized and found that all was well. From Quebec, he reported happily to the Prime Minister:

... I believe the volunteers will give us a big lift in 1883. That is what I am trying to work. My general is not exactly gifted with diplomatic tact but I hope we can pull through. The forces are in good spirits.⁴¹⁶

Laurd, as he indicated, was his one problem. At the camp at London, the General had caused an awkward scene. The 27th "Lampton" Battalion came from a

rural district of Ontario with little cash to spare for military trimmings. Its commanding officer was Lieutenant Colonel Robert Campbell, a fairly prosperous farmer from Watford, who was proud of the uniform he had purchased for himself at Sarnia. When Luard inspected the battalion, he was in a bad temper. Before the whole battalion, he rebuked the colonel for failing to pay compliments properly. Then he began to criticize the state of his dress. The furious and humiliated colonel rode off to camp headquarters and submitted his resignation. In the ensuing storm, he was persuaded to withdraw it but strong feeling was raised against the General.⁴¹⁷ The Toronto Telegram, even while suggesting that Luard had been even worse used than Campbell in the controversy, took the chance to suggest that the time had come for a Canadian officer to command the Militia.⁴¹⁸ Even the Governor General appreciated the bad impression that the General was making:

I fear General Luard has been making himself unpopular by unnecessarily nagging criticism, and I shall take an opportunity while in the East Provinces to tell him so.

Caron, on the other hand, "is doing his work very well, and seems happier than the most victorious Field Marshal".⁴¹⁹

197. Luard was able to give praise when he felt it to be due and he continued to have a high respect for the basic material of his force.

The militia man of Canada appears to have one sterling merit -

regularity of conduct. From all reports made to me, I gather that he is eminently sober, willing and intelligent. It follows, therefore, that all the Militia of Canada wants is sufficient instruction under qualified teachers and for a sufficient period, to become most valuable troops.⁴²⁰

He was also able to attract the sympathy and the support of the relatively limited number of officers who were making a serious study of military affairs and who were working sometimes almost full time to make their battalions efficient. One of these was Lieutenant Colonel W.D. Otter of the Queen's Own Rifles, the young commanding officer of the Queen's Own Rifles of Toronto. Luard's satisfaction with this corps was in marked contrast with his opinion of most of the rest of the Militia and the two men were soon in private correspondence, with Luard describing his problems and plans.⁴²¹ Satisfactory relations with a few officers like Otter, who lacked political influence, was inadequate compensation for Luard's declining standing with the rest of the Militia and with a Government which was coming increasingly to regard him as a liability.

198. As Luard's stock fell, that of Caron was rising in the estimation both of himself and others. At Christmas, he received a letter from Lord Lorne, then in England, reporting the opinions circulating around the still continuing Royal Commission on Colonial Defence. Lorne had been speaking with Erskine Childers, Gladstone's Secretary of State for War "He as well as other ministers here naturally think your office no unimportant one, for by the

ability for self defence the value Canada places in her present political connection must be determined." Caron was invited to produce schemes for coast defence and for torpedo corps* and for a policy of dovetailing British and Canadian military policy.⁴²²

199. With this sort of respect being paid to his opinions, Caron proceeded with a growing confidence. When he faced Parliament in 1882, he could offer more good news to the members. Since Osborne Smith had not been replaced and since Colonel Laurie in British Columbia had resigned as well as a few other staff officers, it was possible to make a saving of \$4,600 in the staff. He was able to turn the tables on George Ross, who had not bothered to check his facts and he had been able to explain to Cartwright that the delay in producing the modified old cannon at Montreal was due to a wise and cautious Government's waiting on developments in the United Kingdom. There was a certain amount of difficulty in explaining to the Opposition that the scarlet cloth for the uniforms could not be manufactured economically in Canada and there was a slight disquiet that the greatcoats were manufactured in Kingston Penitentiary rather than by honest capitalists but there was the compensation of hearing Timothy Anglin deliver a National Policy speech.⁴²³

200. The trouble began three weeks later when Caron presented the remainder of his estimates. Before discussion could begin, Alexander Mackenzie arose

* Torpedo corps were the latest craze for cheap and easy coast defence. Torpedoes, now known as mines, were an army responsibility and engineers were specially trained to set and maintain them. The cheapness of the equipment gave it a long life in Canadian defence thinking.

and set the members to debating a somewhat interesting event of the previous summer. The brigade camp for M.D. 3 had been held on a large farm owned by Lieutenant Colonel Walter Ross of the 16th Battalion, a former Liberal Member of Parliament. Although the camp was under the command of the Deputy Adjutant-General for the District, Lieutenant Colonel Henry V. Villiers, Ross had been left in charge for the day. On the authority of the Minister, the local Member, James S. McCuaig, had been authorized to establish a canteen in the camp. A man named Heffernan was sent to establish it. Although Heffernan explained to Ross that he had the authority of the Minister of Militia, the colonel was furious and sent an officer and sixteen men to remove him. One report was that the troops had fixed bayonets and charged the wretched sutler who turned and fled. The canteen was dismantled and thrown over the fence.

201. This incident was revived with added relish because there had been an investigation of the incident, as a result of which Colonel Ross was officially censured in Militia General Orders, the first time such a punishment had ever been meted out. Since the General had only recommended in his report that Ross should be reprimanded in the presence of two officers, someone had determined on a more exemplary punishment. That person could only be Caron. The only mitigating feature was that he had provided that no liquor would be allowed to be sold in the canteen but even that was suspect to a few.

The debate was not particularly serious and it was conducted through the last hours of a Wednesday evening session when some members at least had equipped themselves to endure a temperance debate but it was also the first occasion on which Caron had met censure as a Minister and he did not evidently enjoy it.⁴²⁴

202. Whether or not he blamed Luard for the Ross affair, relations between the Minister and the General were becoming impossible. Luard would probably have resigned his appointment if he had the choice but he needed several more months of service before he could be confirmed in his rank. Otherwise, he would be forced into a financially disastrous retirement. He explained to Otter that he planned to take his three months leave and go to England in the spring of 1882, hoping that matters might improve in his absence. "Only by going away can I pass the time safely," he explained rather sadly.⁴²⁵ He began his three months leave in April, planning to return at the end of June.⁴²⁶

203. The Government, however, had no desire for his return. Seeing the situation, the Governor General himself wrote to the Duke of Cambridge to suggest the necessity of finding another place for Luard while he was in England. The indignation against the individual was giving a new force to the old cry that the position should be held by a Canadian. The Duke was unable to oblige and in his reply merely emphasized the necessity of having an Imperial officer in Canada. Having made this gesture, Lorne had to patch up matters as best he could. In a letter to Macdonald, he suggested that the fault had not been all on one side.

If General Luard be retained or another officer appointed, one thing is always desirable, and that is the leaving as far as possible of all matters of military discipline to the general. I have rejoiced to see the great interest Mr. Caron takes in his work. I wd. advise that at military gatherings in camp, etc. he shd. leave the military authorities entirely alone. On the other hand, the general must not expect to have power of dismissal or appointment, but that in all things not belonging to the handling of troops, his duty is fulfilled when he makes a representation to the Minister....⁴²⁷

Macdonald reluctantly agreed that Luard would not actually be removed but he did not see any end to the dispute between the general and his minister. If the Duke could make another effort to get him placed, the Prime Minister agreed to get him a handsome allowance. Macdonald's real preference would have been for the newly promoted Major General Strange. The late Inspector of Artillery had been promoted by seniority to be a general officer at about the same time as he was forced, by the Royal Warrant of 1881 to choose between forfeiting his pension and quitting the Canadian service. He had opted for his pension with some reluctance and had set out for the Rocky Mountains, intending to establish a ranch.⁴²⁸ If Strange was out of the question, Macdonald hoped that instead of an elderly general, it would be possible to get a young staff colonel with a future, who might be given the local rank of Major General.⁴²⁹

204. Lorne evidently proposed Strange to the Horse Guards but the Duke of

Cambridge would not approve of a retired officer.⁴³⁰ Since there was no alternative, Luard had to return from his leave.⁴³¹ Lorne seems to have made his point fairly strongly with the British authorities, warning them that the return of Luard might risk the whole appointment but since they had not taken the warning, he could only suggest to Macdonald that there be some clearer definition of their respective spheres of authority. The recommendations of the General on discipline would be brought before the Minister and if he did not concur, they would be passed to the Cabinet. Caron would also leave all talking to troops on parade about their appearance to the General.

These little mistakes which have culminated in estrangement between the Minister & General might easily have been avoided and are in truth only the result of a little trop de zele in both, and the subordinate has pressed his views a little too pertinaciously on a superior who on his part has been a little inclined to leave the General too little military scope.⁴³²

Macdonald may have taken this description of the conflict as a little too sanguine but he undertook to warn the Minister about the limits of his responsibilities. On the other had, he hoped "that with Your Excellency's good counsels, the General will draw his salary and deserve it by doing as little as possible."⁴³³ A few weeks later, after a cabinet meeting and a few private conversations, Caron was reported as "a sadder and wiser man". If Luard would only draw his salary and wink at a few irregularities common among irregular troops, all would be well. On the other hand, the attitude of the

Duke of Cambridge had provoked a certain indignation in the cabinet. As Macdonald observed in reporting their reactions:

It is better that Luard should return as I don't think that either the Ministry or Parliament will acquiesce in the claim that the Commander of our Militia Forces is simply a bit of Horse Guards patronage.

The truth is that the appt of a man like General Luard and the objection to an able officer like Strange are not calculated to increase our confidence in the selection from home of the Commander of our Forces. In case of European Complications, volunteers for service would probably be looked for in Canada and in such case it would be highly expedient to have an officer in Command able to arouse the enthusiasm of our Militia force.⁴³⁴

205. Luard only returned to Canada on 7 August 1882⁴³⁵ although the Government does not seem to have resented his prolonged absence. A few days after his return, he called on the Prime Minister and they agreed that he was to call upon him at any time that a clash was imminent and before the correspondence got started. Having met both sides, Macdonald still felt that Luard wanted tact. On the other hand, Caron had not paid much attention to him nor had he "shown that deference which is due to the General's rank, age or experience."⁴³⁶

THE CARTRIDGE FACTORY

206. Canadians of both parties resented the money that was spent in England for uniforms, arms and equipment for the Militia. However the creation of industries to supply the force was difficult when the amounts were so small and the needs so specialized. Even small requirements could present difficulties. The Canadian-made tent poles issued in the early seventies were made of the wrong wood and snapped regularly. In one camp, fence rails were adapted to replace them.⁴³⁷ Another requirement was uniforms. While Canada could manufacture greatcoats and, after some failure, trousers, the heavy scarlet cloth used in British style uniforms was too difficult to be produced economically. This had led to the discussion in the 1883 Parliament.

207. For one sort of supply, there was a strong strategic argument for Canadian production and that was ammunition. The manufacture of artillery was beyond Canada's means and even the project undertaken by Gilberts' Montreal Engine Company to create rifled cannon out of smoothbores proved abortive. Ammunition, however, was a possibility. Colonel French, the first commander of the Gunnery School at Kingston was enthusiastic about the possibilities of establishing a powder factory in Canada. The many buildings obtained from the British would offset the higher labour costs and, in any case, children could be used for many of the operations.⁴³⁸ Colonel French, however, was ahead of his time and guns and ammunition continued to be imported from Britain.

208. In 1878, as part of a revived interest in the possibility of War,

Selby Smyth discovered that for each Snider rifle in the country, there were about 150 rounds of ammunition. Since the Snider was being replaced in England, there would soon be no more coming from the Royal Arsenal and Canada would have to look elsewhere for her ammunition. His answer was to recommend a reduction in the ammunition allowance for the annual training. This was not completely unsound for a variety of reports indicate that with no musketry instructors, the men simply fired their rifles at the required ranges and in the general direction of the target and called it a day.⁴³⁹ By this time, there was a powder factory at Hamilton and it was approached to see if it would undertake to manufacture ammunition for the Snider. It considered it at length and eventually said no, seeing no profit in it. Selby Smyth had no recourse but to recommend that the Government should build its own cartridge factory. The cost would be defrayed by letting the current small reserve run down for they could then be manufactured more cheaply than they could be bought in England. For a site, he suggested Quebec for although it was farther from the centre of population than the other possible choice, Kingston, it had buildings, it had the men of the battery should it need extra labour in an emergency, it had a railway running down the North Shore of the Saint Lawrence and it had the protection of the fortress. It was also about as far from the American border as could be managed.⁴⁴⁰

209. Perhaps because the necessity could not be evaded unless the Government preferred to provide the Militia with completely new rifles and perhaps because it had been suggested that the factory be established at Quebec, the Cabinet approved the idea on 22 December 1879. \$31,300 was appropriated to

buy the equipment and arrangements were made to send an officer to England to be trained at the Royal Arsenal. The officer proved to be the same Captain Oscar Prevost who had been left behind in Quebec by "B" Battery as a French instructor. His background suggests that he would be an unusual choice to make a success of such an enterprise, as he was trained as a lawyer and had proven sufficiently prominent in the profession to be invited to become a partner to Adolphe Chapleau, the prominent bleu.⁴⁴¹ Possibly this connection had kept him in the Government's mind. Prevost may have been a political choice but he was also a good one and the Cartridge Factory became his creation.

210. Prevost spent a year in England, learning the processes of the Royal Arsenal and ordering machinery. In the spring of 1881, he returned to Canada but his work was just beginning. There were buildings in Quebec as Selby Smyth had said, but they were in very bad condition and many of them were unsuitable. Prevost was faced with a long delay while extensive repairs were made and new structures were put up.⁴⁴² This took two years and might never have been accomplished without the support of Adolphy Caron. His enthusiasm for the Factory endured considerable testing during Parliamentary sessions but as a wise Member of Parliament, he was also aware that he had obtained a valuable prize for his district.

211. Only in October, 1882, did any manufacturing begin. Even then, there were delays. The additional appropriation had not allowed for spare parts and these had to be manufactured by the Factory itself. The machines themselves

seem to have been very faulty. Prevost and the Canadian Government seem to have been very badly fooled by the British firm which supplied them. One of the bullet machines lacked a spring without which it would not feed. The manufacturers had neglected to put one in. The other machine produced bullets which were 1/100th larger in diameter than the Snider calibre. The press to produce paper pellets made them cylindrical, not conical as required. Many of the other components of the process were equally unsuitable. However Prevost and his engineers managed to alter and repair the machinery as it broke down and in his report for 1883, he was confident that the Factory would be able to produce 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition a year without difficulty.⁴⁴³

212. The factory was operated on a piece work system. There was a sixty hour week, with employees working from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. with half an hour off at noon. On Saturdays, work ceased at 3 p.m. and the employees were paid off. The average salaried employee earned between \$1.00 and \$2.50 a day but the piece work employees, mostly women, ran from a maximum of 30 cent to a minimum 15 cents a day. To this was added their piecework earnings.⁴⁴⁴

213. A year after the factory began production, a board of officers from M.D. 7 inspected the factory and tested the ammunition. They were satisfied of the quality of the product.⁴⁴⁵ In the following year, there was a further inspection by artillery and engineer officers from both Ontario and Quebec. They found that the Factory had by then cost Canada \$50,000, chiefly for machinery. It had by then produced 2,200,000 cartridges with less than 40 employees. By 1885, the factory was producing 2,000,000 rounds when it used

its reserve capacity. The efficiency, if not the humanity, of this particular public enterprise was proven.⁴⁴⁶

THE MILITIA ACT OF 1883

214. One of Caron's first personal achievements as Minister was the passage of the Consolidated Militia Act of 1883.⁴⁴⁷ Since the original act had passed in 1868, there had been many amendments but these were in separate acts and there seems to have been some confusion in Parliament at least about the current state of the law. More important, Caron had determined to establish more schools and to convert all of them from the quasi-permanent conditions to which the Gunnery Schools had evolved into a legal status as permanent corps.

On 27 January 1883, he submitted a list of his proposed changes to Macdonald, pointing out that it provided for three infantry schools and for a force exclusively of artillery for British Columbia.⁴⁴⁸ Since Macdonald had already indicated his preference for more permanent troops and since he was then sitting as the senior member for Victoria, B.C., he could be expected to approve the changes.

215. The Bill, as it emerged from drafting was based on the old Act but in some respects it was totally new. The Militia was now divided into an Active and a Reserve Force rather than the old tripartite division. The Active Militia could consist of corps raised by voluntary methods, corps raised by ballot and corps raised by a combination of means. The Marine Militia was similarly composed.⁴⁴⁹ A little addendum for the sake of modernity allowed the

Government to raise and maintain a corps of Submarine Miners for coast protection should the exigencies of the service require.⁴⁵⁰ Section 21

would make it lawful to establish Schools of Military Instruction and to maintain a troop of cavalry, three batteries of artillery (including "A" and "B" Batteries) and not more than three companies of infantry. The total strength was not to exceed 750 men. Officers were to be appointed at pleasure and the other ranks would serve for three year enlistments.⁴⁵¹

216. Some of the other sections remedied some long standing complaints. The problem of paying troops called out for civil power was still left to the Commanding officer and the municipality to settle. However, the Government was given the right to advance the amount from the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

When a riot obstructed a railway along which mails were carried and it was beyond the powers of the local authorities to control and when the cause was not due to a local situation, the Dominion Government might pay whatever part of the cost it felt to be right. When a disturbance occurred in the Northwest Territories or the district of Keewatin, the Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba might order that the Militia of the province be called out and the cost would be borne by the Consolidated Revenue Fund.⁴⁵² The new Bill also gave the right to combine military districts and to appoint only one officer to command them.

It also allowed for the future change of the title of the officers commanding the districts.⁴⁵³ Having made that small move in the direction of a reduction of the staff, the Bill also allowed for the appointment of a Quartermaster-General in the Headquarters staff, who, like the Adjutant-General, would be a full colonel and would be paid \$2,600. a year.⁴⁵⁴ Section 45 established the

rates of pay by rank, ranging from \$4.87 for a lieutenant colonel to the standard 50 cents for private, all calculated on a daily basis.⁴⁵⁵ A further section provided that Militia would be on service for the whole of the period for which they were called out and that they would be entitled to pay food and shelter for that period.⁴⁵⁶ There would be no more attempts to avoid paying or feeding the men on the days that they were coming or going from camp or on Sundays. Another new section authorized the called out of the militia for the opening and closing of Parliament, of Legislatures, to attend on the Governor General or members of the Royal Family while in Canada and to guard armouries or other buildings where arms and ammunition were stored.⁴⁵⁷

217. Under the category of military law, there were fewer changes although some of the penalties were increased. An officer failing to turn out to aid the civil power was now liable for a fine of \$100. There was a new offence of aiding or counselling desertion with a punishment of six months imprisonment with or without hard labour.⁴⁵⁸ The power of court martials was strengthened to provide for the obligatory attendance of witnesses and their co-operation during the trial. If a witness was obstructing his Court, the President could certify the offence to a judge who had power to try such offenses who could then investigate and, if satisfied that an offence had been committed, could give sentence as if the offence had occurred in his own court.⁴⁵⁹

218. Piloting the bill through Parliament was not an easy task. On militia matters, partly lines tended to loosen. The numerous Militia colonels each sought an opportunity to give their views on the force and some others

appeared to have set speeches to be delivered annually. Debating the Militia was also an opportunity to address the electors of Buncombe County. There were a great many interests which could be aroused. Rural members could unite against urban members, Imperialists against nationalists and prohibitionists against everyone else. The debate, prolonged over several days, gave a chance to many members to say what they knew and thought about the Canadian militia. They managed to cover a very wide range of views.

219. William Vail, an earlier Minister of Militia, led the attack on the establishment of new schools by insisting that the whole need had been filled by the Royal Military College.⁴⁶⁰ He was followed by Colonel O'Brien, a Conservative and commanding officer of the 35th Battalion, who also attacked the College but from the other direction - it did not do enough to train officers for the actual Militia. Unlike most of the speakers who followed him, O'Brien felt that Canada should spend more on its Militia, even if it was only to increase the amount to the \$1,000,000 which he believed had been promised at Confederation. One interesting point which he did raise was the need for a fixed period of drill. When the drill was announced only a week or two in advance, employers would not let their men go.⁴⁶¹ George Ross, the self-made Reformer from Middlesex, enjoyed his last Parliamentary session by making a whole-hearted assault on "the mere trappings and flummery of military service", and the "enormous burden" which would be entailed by the new schools. As for a Quartermaster-General, "If an invasion occurs, the hon. gentleman the Minister could obtain a Quartermaster-General in a day who would know at what point to send the supplies, but this Bill will probably give us a Quartermaster-General whose greatest duty will be, I suppose, to draw his salary."⁴⁶² A large proportion of those who spoke against the establishment of the permanent corps maintained that the money would be better spent on the raising of pay and length of training of the Volunteers. Darby Bergin, a doctor and the commanding officer of the 59th Battalion, spoke with some experience when he reported that the men regarded the camp as a holiday and their pay as pocket money. From his viewpoint, he wished to have the power to dismiss an unsuitable soldier summarily - "a man of bad character, a drunkard,

a profane wretch, one who makes the night hideous and disturbs every man in the camp." ⁴⁶³

220. To all of this, Caron replied with an appropriate urbanity, thanking Members for their interest, answering the criticisms, pointing out that Canadians were only spending 19 cents per capita for defence while Americans were spending \$1.19 for federal defence alone and reminding George Ross that, as usual, he had not bothered to read the Bill. Caron presented himself as a most economical man. He had asked for a Quartermaster-General not because he wanted one but simply to avoid amending the Act another time. A standing army of 750 men would not create much of a stir in the world. As for the camps, the British officers were all agreed that Canadians learned more in a short time that they could ever have imagined. In any case, to increase it might be the extravagance that Ross had condemned. ⁴⁶⁴

221. In committee stage, Caron was forced to hold over the section on the new schools until their cost could be worked out. Noah Shakespeare, the other member for Victoria B.C. and supporter of many causes including the presidency of the Anti-Chinese Association, sought to broaden his electoral appeal by demanding inclusion of a section making it an offence to drink liquor in camp. He had heard, he told fellow members, that officers gave liquor to their men. At this, there was a chorus of denial from the bevy of Militia colonels and Colonels O'Brien and Williams rose to deny ever having seen such a thing. ⁴⁶⁵

222. To introduce the statutory levels of pay, a resolution had to be passed

and this gave another opportunity to debate the staff and militarism. The lines were drawn between those who demanded extra money for the men in the ranks and those who condemned extravagance and members from the both parties were represented on each side. One participant, J. Alderio Ouimet, the member for Laval, the colonel of the 65th Mount Royal Rifles and a friend of Caron, even went so far as to urge an increase for the hated staff. He then went on to explain that he saw the great purpose of the Militia as the building of a national spirit. "... I look upon the Militia as a national institution, the promotion of which is the best means of creating among our population a national feeling, real Canadian feeling."⁴⁶⁶

223. When the House returned to the Bill, George Ross had managed to work out the probable cost of the new schools as \$200,000. Caron congratulated him on coming so close.⁴⁶⁷ Encouraged, he went on to press that the General Officer Commanding should be selected from among the Canadian Militia. He was answered by a somewhat blunt statement from Colonel O'Brien:

We do not want an officer at the head of this force to have political character, there is enough politics in the force now. If the Major General were one of ourselves, who has never seen any but Canadian services, he would certainly occupy a different position from a man in the regular army. I speak from my own personal experience; and I hope that the clause will be left as it is. I would like to take this opportunity of saying that the effect upon the force of last year's inspection and supervision by the gentleman who now commands it, was

most satisfactory, and that the camps of 1882 were much superior to those of any previous year. I make that statement because I think it is due to the officer that it should be made in the most public way, and by someone who knows something about it."⁴⁶⁸

224. Having been talked out of one change, Ross tried another. As an ex-Most Worthy Patriarch of the Sons of Temperance of North America, he was even better fitted than Noah Shakespeare to espouse the cause of prohibition in the Militia and he demanded that the Act be amended to forbid the sale of spirituous beverages in any canteen. Caron tried to suggest that they could not go farther than forbid the sale by regulations. He might even have read Ross the opinion of another would-be enforcer of prohibition, Colonel Jackson, then the Deputy Adjutant-General of M.D. 1 who had complained sadly in 1881:

However stringent the rules, experience shows that the average canteenman can always distribute spirits under the guise of beer or pop in such a manner as to avoid detection except perhaps by those officers who wink at the violation of rules they profess to think unnecessary, and who are themselves in some instances interested in the sale of liquor.⁴⁶⁹

225. The House adjourned before there had been discussion of the amendment proposed by Ross and when it reassembled a week later, he had apparently been persuaded that regulations would be sufficient to ensure complete prohibition. He was sure, he told his fellow members, that many more parents would now

allow their children to join. He was not yet finished with the Bill, however, for pointing out that in 1882, \$218,000 had been spent on just 318 permanent troops while 20,000 militiamen only got \$227,000, he moved that the entire proposal for the permanent corps be stuck out. Besides, recruiting the men would take them from active industrial pursuits. He was soon supported by his leader, with Alexander Mackenzie maintaining that the Bill would create a standing army in Canada. Caron said that Ross's resolution was not fair and if it passed, he might as well withdraw his whole Bill. On that being established, the amendment was defeated by a vote of 113 to 60 on party lines and Bill 31 was passed.⁴⁷⁰

226. It remained to put the new terms of the Act into effect.

Major J.G. Holmes of "A" Battery was sent to British Columbia as an Acting Deputy Adjutant-General with the evident intention that he would be on hand to take command of the new artillery battery which would be authorized for the West Coast.⁴⁷¹ The commanding officers for the three infantry schools and the cavalry school were selected from among Militia officers and staff.

Lieutenant Colonel Turnbull had joined the Militia in 1855 at the age of 20 and ever since had been trying in one way or another to escape from civil life to become a cavalry officer. Throughout the seventies, he made repeated trips to Europe to attend cavalry manoeuvres and courses and in 1879, he offered to raise a cavalry regiment in Canada for service in South Africa, a gesture for which the British authorities offered generous praise but no further response.

Of the three Infantry School Commandants, two were officers on the staff and the third was Lieutenant Colonel Otter, commanding the Queen's Own Rifles in

Toronto and Luard's confidant, Lieutenant Colonel George Maunsell, the enthusiastic Deputy Adjutant-General. He was 47 in 1883, a former British Army officer who had been brought to Canada in 1864 and who had been Adjutant-General of the New Brunswick Militia at the time of Confederation. The third was Lieutenant Colonel the Count Louis Gustave d'Odet d'Orsonnens, was the grandson of a Swiss officer in de Meuron's Regiment. It had been intended that he join the Swiss Regiment in the Neapolitan service when Garibaldi intervened and d'Orsonnens had to content himself with the Canadian Militia in which he was active during the Fenian raids. He also played a part in the movement which sent the Papal Zouaves to Rome and his title was bestowed by Pius IX. D'Orsonnens was obviously intended to create a national balance among the commandants but his background was hardly typical of French Canada.

On 21 July 1883, all four officers left for England for training and attachment with various units of the British regular army.

227. While there might be little criticism that the officers chosen to be commandant were unsuitable, some of their subordinates were chosen with at least some attention to political favour. Major Henry Smith had been eliminated as a Brigade Major under the Liberals and Major Beaufort Vidal had identified himself as a Conservative ever since coming to Canada as a young man. However they were said to be efficient officers. The main criticism centred around Captain C.J. Coursol of the 65th. In his case, Luard protested to the Governor General directly. Although he had not been consulted about the appointments, he had seen a list and Coursol had immediately struck him as unsuitable. When attached to "A" Battery to obtain his certificate, he had

been arrested for drunkenness on duty. It would be too bade to impose such an officer on a Commandant trying to organize an efficient school.⁴⁷² Lorne accepted Luard's opinion and passed it to Macdonald with a strong endorsement based on personnel knowledge of Coursol. "If such nominations are not given to trained men - Imperial - or Kingston Cadets - the Schools will be very bad." He also noticed with regret that Caron had again stopped taking Luard's advice and hoped that the Prime Minister would take an interest.⁴⁷³ Macdonald's explanation was that all the officers were very good - five were Royal Military College graduates, five had served under Strange or Irwin at the Artillery School and four had been in the British Army. The exception, of course, was Coursol but the French Canadian ministers had made such a point that he had to yield. Young Coursol had only been guilty of a little indiscretion at New Years. Most important, he was the son of the member of Parliament for Montreal East and grandson of Sir Etienne Taché "and connected with most of the families of the old noblesse remaining in Canada". With this, both Lorne and Luard had to be content.⁴⁷⁴ The junior officers appointed to the Schools were sent to Halifax for an attachment with the British garrison there.

228. The breakdown of relations between the General and the Minister made the arrangements for the Schools rather more difficult. After some discussion, it had been decided to locate the Infantry Schools in old British barracks at Toronto, Saint Jean in Quebec and at Fredericton, with the Cavalry School in Quebec. They were in urgent need of repair before they could be occupied and Luard tried to get Caron to move.⁴⁷⁵ With the summer, however, the cabinet met

rarely and Ministers left for their holidays. He also tried to get a ministerial decision on uniforms. Luards still worked for a more simple, more serviceable dress which would be cheaper for the officers and eliminate pipeclay and yellow chrome for the men. The matter was urgent since it would be easier for the officers than in England to work out what they wanted together and then to obtain it more cheaply from English tailors.⁴⁷⁶ A final service which the officers in England could perform would be to recruit old British soldiers who would serve as instructors. He sought permission from the Minister to have leaflets printed showing the terms to be offered.⁴⁷⁷ Throughout August and September, Luard tried to get a direction from the Minister on these questions. He seems to have been particularly concerned about uniform for this was a matter on which the officers would have to spend their own money. Walker Powell had already talked some of them into buying the expensive uniform for staff officers and this he did not approve of at all. Luard was most anxious that his new Infantry School officers would be an example of neat and inexpensive dress to the Militia.⁴⁷⁸ In correspondence with Otter throughout the summer, he described his growing frustration and helplessness.⁴⁷⁹ "I have sent to Maunsell the Minister's telegram saying there is ample time -- but he always does think there is sample time - and then hurries at the end."⁴⁸⁰

229. On 10 August 1883, "C" Battery was authorized for Victoria on Vancouver Island but Holmes remained its only officer. The same order created a regiment out of the three batteries, to be called the Regiment of Canadian Artillery.⁴⁸¹ The appointment of Colonel Irwin to the command of the new

regiment was a recognition of his ten years of service and of his decision to remain in Canada rather than to return to England. There was also a slight suggestion of political influence. In February of 1882, Irwin had recommended a similar arrangement as a means of obtaining uniformity between the two batteries then in existence of and of offering promotion to other officers.⁴⁸²

At that time, Caron had recommended against the change. "Between ourselves," Caron told Macdonald, "Col. Irwin has not had the same success with A Battery as Strange has had with B. He seems to have been rather careless of our Canadian soldiers."⁴⁸³ Later in the year, however, Irwin had enlisted the support of his father-in-law, Robert Hamilton, a prominent merchant in the square timber trade and an old friend of Macdonald.⁴⁸⁴ "Hamilton is such a good fellow we must try to aid him",⁴⁸⁵ Macdonald told Caron and less than a year later, Irwin was promoted, and a letter was to be sent to Hamilton to explain what had been achieved.⁴⁸⁶

230. On 21 December, 1883, the three Infantry Schools were officially authorized under the title of the Infantry School Corps.⁴⁸⁷ A later order indicated that each school would be designated a company, with "A" Company at Fredericton, "B" Company at St. Jean and "C" Company at Toronto.⁴⁸⁸ The first course at the Infantry Schools began on 1 April 1884. As with the Schools of Gunnery at their inception, the students were to attend for a short course of three months which might be extended to twelve. The men were to come from units and were to be attested by local company commanders. An order was given that commanding officers were not to appoint members of their corps as non-commissioned officers just to give them rank and higher pay at the Schools of

Gunnery but the fact that it was regularly repeated suggests that it was not adequately heeded. Commissioned officers were paid \$1.00 per day for attending the school and non-commissioned officers 50 cents.⁴⁸⁹ The cavalry school was somewhat slower to become organized, its regulations only appearing in October, 1884.⁴⁹⁰

231. There was no difficulty in enlisting the men but Colonel Turnbull soon found that 40 men were not enough to operate a unit. His men were so fully employed in housekeeping duties, fatigues and guards that there were few left over to be instructed.⁴⁹¹ The pay of the men in the permanent corps had been reduced to 40 cents a day although they were now provided with rations and a small increase when they re-enlisted after three years. As Quebec, "A" Battery in 1884 started a small school for the children of the other ranks, charging 25 cents per child per month.⁴⁹² The infantry schools had begun to show the different personalities of their commandants before they were a year old. Colonel Maunsell had pioneers in taking his hundred men to the annual militia camp, had provided them with a library and canteen (where no ardent or spirituous liquors would be sold), and had worked out Standing Orders with which he was eminently satisfied. The other two commandants had somewhat less ambitious reports but Colonel d'Orsonnens reported that he had run a special course for university and college students during the summer of 1884. Both he and Colonel Otter were already concerned about the suitability of some of the men being sent them from some of the units.⁴⁹³

232. The only one of the new units which failed to make an appearance was "C"

Battery in British Columbia. When it was authorized, Members of Parliament had warned that it would be more expensive than the other batteries because of the high cost of both labour and living on the West Coast and Caron had attempted to reassure them by limiting the strength of the battery to 100 men compared to the 150 authorized for the others.⁴⁹⁴ In 1883, British Columbia was in a railway boom and there were no men willing to join a force which paid a mere 40 cents a day. As the battery failed to materialize, Caron became embarrassed and recalled an earlier suggestion that British artillery pensioners might be induced to settle in the western province. The men would not only be already trained, they would also have a life pension of a sufficient size to deter desertion to the United States. Almost two years were used up in haggling with the British authorities to obtain free transportation to Canada but in July of 1887, posters were put up inviting recruits of "C" Battery. Even then there was failure for, through a mistake, the posters invited only unmarried pensioners to apply and there were very few who wished to apply.⁴⁹⁵ Eventually, the men for the battery were obtained by drafting men from "A" and "B" Batteries in the East.⁴⁹⁶ The battery really only came into existence at the end of 1887.

GENERAL LUARD IS REMOVED

233. When Luard returned in the late summer of 1882, Lorne and Macdonald hoped that a measure of reconciliation had been patched up. Unfortunately, it did not seem possible for Caron and Luard to remain long at peace.

234. In 1869, the Dominion of Canada Rifle Association had been established.

Although its first president was Lieutenant Colonel A.D. Botsford, its guiding genius was Colonel Casimir Gzowski, who became president of the Association in 1870 and remained in officer until 1884. A wealthy and capable engineer, Gzowski was very interested in the Canadian Militia and a munificent contributor to many of its activities. His contributions helped the Association to send Canadian teams to Wimbledon to compete with the best of British marksmen.⁴⁹⁷ Although the Rifle Association lacked the enormous impact of the Artillery Association in improving the training of the Militia, it did play a substantial part in maintaining enthusiasm among militia officers and men.

235. One the Gzowski's achievements had been to establish a competition for militia units in which teams were required to wear their full equipment and to fire a course which was intended to simulate active service conditions. In 1882, the competition was held at Rockcliffe Ranges in Ottawa. General Luard, an enthusiastic marksman, attended in civilian clothes. the team from the 8th Royal Rifles from Quebec City had been drawn up for inspection when Luard noticed an officer approach from the tents to give a man a towel. This, it seemed, to the General, was cheating, for the men were supposed to be in possession of their full kit, and he snatched the towel from the officer's hand. Immediately Major Erskine Scott, the acting commanding officer of the Rifles came over to explain. Luard exploded into an angry tirade and placed Scott under arrest.

236. It was a somewhat impetuous act. Major Scott was a prominent citizen of Quebec, a good Conservative and a friend of the Minister. The action was much discussed in the press and Luard added to the heat by sending his own letters to various newspapers. In a letter to the Mail of Toronto, he compare the incident to a jockey adding weights and in the Montreal Star he also described it as comparable to a crooked horse race. Having seen the breach of faith, the Government would have held that he had connived at it if he had not acted.

Scott, on his part, reacted with great indignation. After twenty years in the Militia, his honour had been gravely impugned and he refused to offer any excuses to Luard. Eventually the General demanded a General Court Martial for Scott, the first that had ever been ordered for an officer in the Canadian Militia. He got little help. Colonel Laurie, the retired officer who had been judge for the competition, refused to make any comment, saying that he had been too busy holding back the crowds to see anything. Meanwhile Scott remained under arrest.

237. Having to deal with an angry Luard and an even angrier Scott, Caron did not take long to decide. Scott, he ruled, had not been under military law during the rifle match and the fact that the Department made a financial contribution to the Dominion Rifle Association did not make it a military body. Scott must therefore be released from arrest. When Luard complained about Caron dealing personally with a matter of discipline and of receiving letters directly from Scott, the Minister replied that since Luard was personally involved in the case, only the Minister could deal with it. Luard was infuriated at the thought that Scott would be getting away with what he

felt to be a dishonest and dishonourable act. The problem was complicated by the fact that Lieutenant Colonel Stuart of the 8th, who had been sick for sixteen months, finally died on 11 March 1883 and Scott was due to take command of the regiment. Luard tried in vain to have the other major in the battalion, Charles A. Pentland, accept the command but Pentland refused the offer and the Deputy Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Duchesnay, refused to recommend him. Duchesnay was in direct correspondence with Caron on the matter and doubtless knew who would have the greater influence on his future.⁴⁹⁸

238. The Scott affair helped to restore the relations of the Minister and the General to their previous hopeless state. In drafting his new Militia Bill for 1883, he originally wrote that the Officer Commanding the Militia, could be one who "had held" a British commission. This was noticed by the Governor General who immediately wrote a lengthy letter of protest. The provision would be a way of evading the approval of the Commander in Chief and other military authorities in England. It had been defended as offering a larger field of choice for it would include officers like Major General Strange who had retired in Canada. Lorne disagreed. Some of his reasons may have struck the Canadian ministers as more frank than complimentary. The present system, he assured them, offered the least temptation to act for other than military reasons. The Canadian Government could always refuse an officer named by the Command in Chief but the initiative rested with him. Secondly, the system fostered unity among the forces of the Empire and gave the Canadian Militia every five years a new officer capable of comparing its efficiency with that

of forces elsewhere. It also meant that the five year term could be enforced.

Just how narrow the field of choice would have been had been repeatedly demonstrated in recent years when each time the office became vacant, a few senior officers like Strange, Laurie and others who had retired to Canada had always been put forward. "It may be safely inferred from this experience that the natural pressure of a friendly, personal or political nature will, of the present, be too strong to allow of any appointment to the Chief Command in Canada being made from the wider field afforded by the Imperial Army, and that the choice will be narrowed to the few men who are, by accident, residents in the Dominion."⁴⁹¹

239. The camps for 1883 were held in the last week of June save for M.D. 3. It was a wet summer, the turn out of men was unsatisfactory in many instances but the most common complaint was that the equipment was worn out. For some time, this had been brought to the attention of the readers of the Militia Report. The leather knapsacks were periodically tarred to preserve them. This was not merely bade for the leather; it also meant that on very hot summer days, the tar melted and they stuck to the men's backs.⁵⁰⁰ The other leather equipment was worn out and rotted. In M.D. 5, two battalions arrived at camp with only a few men but with their full complement of officers. Only in the Maritimes were there good reports although the New Brunswick men had misbehaved themselves in camp and had fired blanks through the train window on their way home.⁵⁰¹ For Luard, it must have been a discouraging summer and his temper was not normally good.

240. The camps for M.D. 3 was the only one to be held in the fall, being ordered for 11 September 1883.⁵⁰² There was a late harvest and some of the battalions were very weak. The poorest turn-out was that of the 46th Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Williams M.P. Out of an authorized strength of 26 officer and 252 other ranks, there were 24 and 151.

One company had ten men in the ranks, another only three.⁵⁰³ General Luard inspected the camp on 20 September. From the first, he was not pleased. According to critical journalists, he inspected the ranks minutely, cursing at every fault and becoming almost beside himself at the sight of a great-coat improperly strapped on a knapsack. Several staff officers were ordered from the field for failing to be mounted. An adjutant who was on horseback but in some momentary difficulty was advised to get off and walk. Coming on a suntanned soldier, Luard told him he was dirty. Turning to the officer, he told him that he was none too clean either. There was particular criticism for Colonel Williams' battalion from Port Hope.⁵⁰⁴ After the review, there was a luncheon for the General, presided over by Colonel Gzowski. During its course, Gzowski and Luard chose to comment unfavourable on the lack of interest Members of Parliament had shown in the Rifle Association. When Williams, as a Member, sought to disagree, Luard bluntly silenced him and went on to add some further views about the House of Commons and its members. He must have realized that he had spoken out of turn for shortly after, he left the gathering in some haste.⁵⁰⁵

241. Within a few days, the General's conduct at Cobourg had been condemned by both Liberal and Conservative newspapers. It was supplemented by reports

of his statements at the luncheon which may have been passed on by Williams. The Conservative Toronto Empire did not surpass the Liberal Globe when it declared:

It is very clear that the Major-General does not know the country nor the people. It is clear he has no adequate understanding of his duties. It is certain that he lacks all sympathy with the sacrifices made by the militia service, officers and men, in keeping together as a organization. He is entirely wanting in tact and kindness.

.... It is very obvious that General Luard and Canada must part company. We have no desire at all to dictate; but we mean just what we say. Public opinion and militia opinion, and parliamentary opinion are all pretty much the same.⁵⁰⁶

On the same date that the press reports in the Port Hope Times appeared, Williams formulated his charges against Luard for his comments about Members of parliament and sent them to the Secretary of State.

242. For both Luard and Caron, the Cobourg affair was the culmination of a summer of frustrations and mutual annoyances. Throughout the summer, Luard had tried to get an answer on problems related to the new schools. At the end of August there was a dispute about the appointment of a temporary replacement for the Adjutant-General who was away. Luard decided to appoint Colonel Irwin who was now in Ottawa as the Inspector of Artillery. Instead, the Adjutant-

General's clerk erased Irwin's name and did the work himself. When Luard protested, the Deputy Minister backed the clerk. Luard in turn protested to the Minister himself, recommending that the case showed the need for a second officer to be appointed at Headquarters.⁵⁰⁷ Then the Adjutant-General's clerk, Lieutenant Colonel Bacon authorized the Deputy Adjutant-General for M.D. 4 to leave his district without the General's knowledge. He authorized the band of the Victoria Rifles to go to the United States, again without reference to Luard.⁵⁰⁸ Throughout, Luard sought some reply from the Minister. Caron chose to ignore him, to back the Deputy Minister and to describe the temporary appointment of Irwin to act for Walker Powell during the Department's busiest season as "simply a piece of impertinence on the part of the General which should not be tolerated."⁵⁰⁹

243. The Cobourg affair was not, however, a simple basis for sending Luard home. Although Lorne warned the Colonial Secretary early in October that the Canadian Government was likely to demand the General's recall,⁵¹⁰ Luard refused to go without an investigation of Williams' charges. A year before, Luard had saved himself from premature retirement by clinging to the job in Canada. He now faced another stage in his career, for he was due for promotion to the rank of lieutenant general at some time in the near future but this could not occur so long as charges were hanging over his head. On 23 October, a new Governor General, Lord Lansdowne, arrived at Quebec. Caron, as the minister representing the Quebec City area, was in charge of the welcoming arrangements. Luard was also present and in his report to the Prime Minister, Caron reported that the General was in trouble again.

It is obvious that he cannot remain any longer here without breaking up the force. Don't you think that Lord Lansdowne should write a letter by the mail to the Duke about his being recalled & pending that he should apply for 3 months leave.⁵¹¹

He had already arranged that Lord Lorne, on his return to England, would be pressing the same course on the Duke of Cambridge.

244. Lord Lansdowne was naturally anxious to settle the affair as quickly and quietly as possible but he too had to respect Luard's obduracy in refusing to resign while charges hung over his head. Unfortunately his could not be done until Colonel Williams returned from a trip to Europe.⁵¹² He was anxious that the matter be settled before parliament should gather, anticipating an ugly debate in which Luard's conduct would be intermingled with attacks on personalities and on the policy of appointing a British officer to command the Militia. When he had a chance to study the papers, he suggested to the Prime Minister that Williams could hardly expect any action on the basis of a collection of extracts from newspapers. "The answer is, I suppose, that Col. Williams meditated a Parliamentary attack & that these evidences of the General's unpopularity were to be referred to & published with the papers."⁵¹³

His recommendation was that Williams be officially informed that his statements had been submitted for discussion rather than in expectation of action and that since the statements on both sides were ex parte, the Privy Council would not come to any decision. If that was done, the Governor

General was certain, Luard would take his leave or resign and the whole affair would be at an end.⁵¹⁴

245. The cabinet seem to have accepted the advice and they managed to persuade Colonel Williams to withdraw his correspondence with the Secretary of State. In return, General Luard was granted another three months leave from 1 March "on private affairs."⁵¹⁵ Three months later, it was officially announced that Luard had been appointed to the command of a brigade at Aldershot and he took the opportunity to publish a valedictory in General Orders, thanking:

... the many officers and men of the Militia of the Dominion, who have done their best towards improving the force in discipline and appearance - and, as he stated in his last annual report, there are, he is glad to say, many who have made marked improvement in these respects.⁵¹⁶

246. Although Luard had left the country, the Parliamentary debate which the Governor General had feared still took place. It seems to have been precipitated by the General himself and he placed his affairs in the hands of William Mulock, the new member for North York and a Liberal. While the outcome of the debate was less damaging to the Imperial connection than Lansdowne may have feared, it did not spare Luard. For most of a day, members from both sides attacked and defended the General and the ideas of discipline which he had sought to bring to Canada. Because Luard was said to have

insulted members of Parliament, there was an added indignation on the part of some members. Mr. Coursol, whose son had had such difficulty in securing his commission, recommended that Luard was a fit person to talk to Osman Digma in the Sudan but he should never come back to Canada.⁵¹⁷ Colonel Ouimet complained of a letter in French which the General had returned to him to have translated.⁵¹⁸ Neither the Prime Minister nor the Minister of Militia chose to defend their General. Caron regretted the difficulties which had arisen but he had no doubt who was responsible for them:

... let me say that, in Canada, we require in the command of the Militia Force a gentleman who not only will be a strict disciplinarian, as every British officer who is sent out from England is supposed to be, but also, in dealing with and meeting the members of the Militia Force, will have the suaviter in modo which, I believe, is certainly as indispensable to a commanding officer as the other qualifications which hon. gentlemen have spoken of as pertaining to a commanding officer."

On the other hand, Caron was not prepared to change the system of getting an officer from the British army.

I have always approved of the system which is followed in Canada of getting an experienced officer from the old country, until we in Canada can have men sufficiently experienced to take command of the Militia Force, but I believe it would be a great mistake if an officer on coming here from England, imagined himself independent of the Government of

Canada, and as merely an Imperial officer coming from England.⁵¹⁹

Macdonald, for his part, regretted that Luard had provoked the debate for it the other matters which affected Luard were brought up, it would only be a matter of embarrassment to the General and his friends. It was not true that the General's promotion had been stopped by the charges since they had been dropped by the withdrawal of the correspondence. The fact that there was a debate at all was due to the General's decision to break an agreement and to place his papers in the hands of the supporters in the House.⁵²⁰

247. Luard was the first General Officer Commanding the Militia to be driven from Canada before his time but he was not to be the last. He had been driven into an undignified exile in Canada and then was driven out of it. A great deal of the fault was due to his own temperament, his lack of tact and his failure, so unlike that of his predecessor, to appreciate the state of politics in Canada. On the other hand, the General had tried to accomplish reform in the Militia. He had worked hard to impose notions of discipline, order and dress among the Militia. Like many professional soldiers, he was perhaps excessively concerned about the appearance of his Militia but his preferences were for simple uniforms and for equipment which could be kept clean easily. Some of his reforms seem superficial - he took pains to see that military bands were provided with uniform sets of marches and calls⁵²¹ - but failure to deal with such matters of detail is often what makes a military force absurd. Luard also had a genuine concern for his officers. Although he

had been responsible for uprooting his staff and redistributing them throughout the country, a policy which was extremely unpopular with many of them, he also pleaded with the Government to improve their pay and to provide them with a pension.⁵²² It was to no avail. Luard was not the man to win the sympathy of the Government to any such expenditure, however pre-eminently just it might seem.

THE SERVICES OF MAJOR GENERAL MIDDLETON

248. Long before Luard had left the country, Caron had made up his mind on a successor.⁵²³ His choice was Colonel Frederick Dobson Middleton, an officer whose name had arisen as early as 1874 as a possibility for service in Canada.

Middleton was a graduate of Sandhurst who had received his commission in 1842. He had taken part in campaigns in New Zealand, India and Burma. During the Indian Mutiny, he was twice recommended for the Victoria Cross and five times mentioned in despatches. He had graduated from the staff college and had first come to Canada in 1868 and had cemented his relations with the country by marrying Miss Eugénie Marie Doucet of Montreal in 1870. Middleton returned to England with the bulk of the garrison in the same year and in 1874, instead of coming to Canada, he had been appointed as commandant of the Royal Military College at Sandhurst where, in 1878, he still remained.⁵²⁴

249. Caron did not immediately have his way. The advocates of a Canadian commander for the Militia concentrated their support behind Major General John Wimburn Laurie, the late Deputy Adjutant-General in British Columbia.

Laurie, who was ten years younger than Middleton, had also been an officer in the British Army. While at the staff college in 1862, he had volunteered to come out to Canada and had been sent to organize the militia of Nova Scotia. He evidently chose to make his life in the province and at the time of Confederation, had joined the Militia staff, becoming first a brigade major and later becoming the Deputy Adjutant-General for M.D. 9. In 1877, he had been one of those who had offered to raise a regiment in Canada to fight the Russians and in 1881, he had accompanied Roberts to South Africa on the abortive expedition against the Boers. In 1881, he had been transferred to British Columbia in Luard's grand shuffle. In 1882, he had become a major general in the British Army on whose half pay list he had remained and therefore resigned. Laurie's real influence came from his involvement in politics in his adopted province. He had been a justice of the peace since 1869, two years a warden of Halifax County and ten years the president of the Provincial Board of Agriculture.⁵²⁵

250. At the end of April, 1884, Caron raised the issue again in a lengthy letter to Macdonald. In backing Middleton, he felt that it was necessary to get an officer who had been in continuous active employment. For 22 years, Laurie had really been engaged in farming and agriculture and he would hardly be up to date in military matters. Middleton had excellent professional testimonials. Another fear was that Laurie might become a permanent fixture in the Department instead of serving for only five years. The influence which he had brought to bear to get himself employed in the first place would obviously be exerted to keep him there. Caron still felt that the officer

commanding the Militia should continue to come from the Imperial service for some years to come.⁵²⁶ The Governor General also intimated to Macdonald that if the Duke of Cambridge was asked to name an officer to replace Luard, he would choose Colonel Middleton.

251. Lansdowne's intervention at that juncture may have been a little unfortunate as it seems to have annoyed the Prime Minister that the name should be suggested in England before he had made up his mind. The issue at stake was who would nominate the short list of names for other's final selection, Lansdowne, representing the British viewpoint, naturally preferred that the Duke of Cambridge should make the suggestions and that the preferences of the Dominion Government would be respected as far as the British regulations permitted. Of course, private preferences could always be made know to the Duke and that had happened in the case of Middleton. If, however, the Privy Council put forward a name to the British authorities for their approval, Lansdowne foresaw that the Government would be exposed to canvassing and pressure on behalf of competing individuals. By keeping recommendations on an informal bases, it would also be easier for the War Office to point out its objections to particular candidates.⁵²⁷ Once again the Governor General's intervention seems to have caused offence for in the next letter he explained somewhat abashedly that "Nothing was more remote from my mind than to suggest that the Government of the day might be unequal to the duty of resisting pressure in favour as an incompetent candidate."⁵²⁸ However the Government also seems to have accepted his suggestion that the informal nomination of Middleton should be confirmed and that the procedure should be established for all subsequent nominations.⁵²⁹

252. Middleton arrived in July. As of 12 July 1884, he assumed command of the Militia, becoming, at the same time, a Militia major general.⁵³⁰ Since all but one of the camps had been held in June, he had only a limited opportunity

to inspect his force but his first report, published early in the winter of 1885, showed that he was more inclined to be satisfied than his predecessor. For a force which was to be pitched into a campaign, however, there were some notable deficiencies.

253. In 1884, only 18,070 men were allowed to drill out of a total establishment of 36,466. This was the smallest number yet and since all city corps were allowed their twelve days, it ensured that a number of rural units were unable to have even their alternate year. Although the annual expenditure had risen to \$989,498, a quarter of this amount was spent on the permanent corps.⁵³¹ In the instructions for the annual camps, inspecting officers were directed to pay great attention to the cleanliness of arms, the fitting of accoutrements, the manner in which sentries and guards were mounted and company drill. Twenty rounds of ammunition were authorized to be fired, five rounds at 200 yards, standing; ten rounds at 400 yards kneeling; and five rounds at 500 yards, in "any military position".⁵³² Since few of the men would have had any previous experience with the Snider, no very high standard of marksmanship could be expected.

254. Although the number authorized to be trained was reduced, it was still about 1,700 men larger than number actually trained during the year. There were many factors besides the low repute of the force to deter recruiting. One was the Kilmarnock cap which was issued by the Government. While it is now popular among girl pipers and Highland dancers, in 1884: "Many good men who are willing to volunteer decline to do so when shown this cap, and to

enforce its use causes much trouble and many breaches of discipline."⁵³³ To Colonel Lamontagne in M.D. 4, the cap was also a problem for the men complained that it gave them no protection from the sun. In M.D. 3, there were complaints that one blanket was not sufficient for the men and that they were obliged to sleep in their uniforms.⁵³⁴ Another evil that the men faced was drink. Colonel Denison at Niagara insisted that the few drunkards in the camp were civilians who had wandered over from Hamilton. At Camp Aldershot, there was perfect order but Colonel Taylor was troubled by "certain disreputable persons" who set out booths just outside the boundaries of the camp and "it takes many additional guards and piquets to watch these place."⁵³⁵

255. Middleton's own report gave high praise to the new Schools and anticipated great progress from their work. He announced that:

... a certain number of Officers will yearly pass through these Infantry Schools, all leaving with an improved knowledge of their duties and with their ideas enlarged, having been under Military discipline, obliged to obey orders, to be punctual and see that others were the same, and in cases where they may have been room for it, with their manners improved.⁵³⁶

He was equally impressed with the Royal Military College. There were few institutions in Europe equal to it, he informed the Government, and none that were better.⁵³⁷ His recommendations, after his first few months included the reduction of the force so that all members of the Militia could drill for

sixteen days a year, the abolition of the Kilmarnock and improved equipment and arms. He also felt that there should be more engineers.⁵³⁸ These were now inspected annually by the Professor of Engineering at the Royal Military College, who found them to be the step children of the Militia. The Brighton Engineers were without tools. The Toronto Engineers had disappeared some years before when Colonel Scoble moved to Manitoba and the Montreal Engineers were collapsing into more and more hopeless inadequacy. It was very difficult to recruit engineers when there was no glamour but only the risk of physical work.⁵³⁹

256. The Militia remained at its weakest in the Northwest and in British Columbia. In M.D. 11, Lieutenant Colonel Holmes's little force seemed to be declining. The Nanaimo Rifles had finally ceased to exist. The New Westminster Battery was still armed with smooth bores but these were without sights and were falling to pieces. The stock of Snider ammunition had not been replaced since the first shipment. The Royal Navy had a large reserve of Martini-Henry ammunition but repeated suggestions that this type of rifle should be supplied to the West Coast were apparently ignored. Since the Indians were said to possess modern repeating rifles, there was some pardonable concern about being armed with the aging Snider. The guns which had been so hastily mounted in 1878 had, of course, not received the care that Irwin had recommended and by 1884, the carriages and slides were rotten.⁵⁴⁰

257. In M.D. 10, matters were equally bad, although 1883 had seen the formation of the 90th Rifles in Winnipeg. The only survivor of the earlier period was the Winnipeg Field Battery, which had been authorized in 1871 and a troop of cavalry which dated from 1878. A series of independent infantry companies had risen and fallen at regular intervals, usually being retained on the Militia List long after organizational life had gone out of them. There were many reasons for this state of affairs. The population of Winnipeg was ill provided with the bourgeoisie which was the backbone of the Canadian Militia. All classes were enormously concerned with merely daily living. This was particularly true in rural areas where it proved impossible for some years to organize any stable Militia unit. At the same time, it would have helped if the independent companies had ever been allowed to train. The restricted quotas for Militia training and the provision that city corps would receive a preference meant that the Winnipeg Field Battery and the Winnipeg Troop of Cavalry were able to train annually while most of the independent companies never had a chance. Even when, as in 1881, all the companies were allowed to drill, results were not impressive. Lieutenant Colonel Houghton, who had been sent to Winnipeg from Victoria, was no the man to exercise much influence on his huge District. In the year, he reported:

All the Corps in the North-West Territories have been selected for drill, this year, but not having received any communication from them on the subject, I am unable to state what progress they are making. I learn, however, from private sources, that some, if not all of them have been performing more or less drill this season.⁵⁴¹

It was in that year that five companies had been authorized in the Northwest.

It remains uncertain whether they drilled that year. They certainly did not drill in the following years and they were never supplied with uniforms. In 1884, they were all removed from the Militia List for the somewhat unfair reason that they had "become inefficient".⁵⁴² There remained only the Militia units in Winnipeg and the remnants of companies in the surrounding communities. For them, there was the further problem that their equipment and weapons dated from the Red River Expeditions of 1870 and 1871 and there was no armourer in the West to repair their rifles.⁵⁴³ The men of the Winnipeg Field Battery suffered for their fidelity for after five trainings, their uniforms were completely worn out.

258. In the summer of 1884, alarmed by reports from the Northwest and even more about Farmer's Union agitation in Manitoba, Sir John A Macdonald asked his son, Hugh John, then in Winnipeg, for a confidential report on the military situation in the Province. It was evident from the reply that Colonel Houghton, a political appointee in the first place⁵⁴⁴ and a failure in British Columbia, was hardly the man to build up the Militia in Manitoba. With some effort to be objective, Hugh John told his father:

Colonel Houghton is getting of fairly well as Deputy Adjutant-General. He does not go on sprees and I have never seen him under the influence of liquor though I think that day in and day out he drinks more than is good for him.⁵⁴⁵

He went on to admit that he had had little chance to assess Houghton's military capacity and he did feel that he knew enough drill for his job. The Colonel would be a good fighting soldier but it was doubtful that he would be a good commander for "he has not much head and still less judgement." It was not an encouraging assessment for an officer in a crucial position. Hugh John was rather kinder about the Winnipeg Militia, reporting that the artillery battery was up to strength and disciplined, that the newly formed 90th had 262 picked men and that it would be better than most rural battalions. He also told his father that there would be no trouble getting the men to turn out against the Farmers' Union as there was no sympathy for them and thereby disarm at a single coup the whole of the Government forces.⁵⁴⁶ The problem of guarding the Winnipeg Armouries seems to have been settled by John Norquay, the Premier of the Province who appears to have ordered a guard and then sent the bill to the Department of Militia and Defence, somewhat to its surprise and indignation.^{*547}

259. A change in the Militia Department in 1884 was assumption of responsibility for its own buildings, works and fortifications. Henry Perley had been attached to the Department since 1881 but the system of relying on the Department of Public Works still annoyed Caron. He complained of

* As early as April, 1884, Caron had decided that it would be impossible to keep up an efficient volunteer force in Manitoba and he proposed to establish another Infantry School at Winnipeg, of the same size as in the East, at an annual cost of \$36,410. MG 26 A 1 (b) 200, 84647-49, Caron - Macdonald, 22 April 1884

continual clashes between the two Departments and the lack of military knowledge of the Public Works engineers. There was also some suggestion that he wished a closer control of the patronage which was exercised in his own political centre of Quebec.²⁴⁸ He appears to have imposed his views on the Cabinet for in 1884, Sir Hector Langevin shepherded a Bill through Parliament which transferred the control, management and repair of military buildings to the Militia Department.⁵⁴⁹ It met with little opposition.⁵⁵⁰

MORE IMPERIAL COMMITMENTS

260. When Major General Charles Gordon was bottled up in Khartoum in the summer of 1884, a focus for the growing feeling of Imperialism in Great Britain had been provided. A storm of public opinion arose and forced the British government's hand.

261. The war in the Sudan had its repercussions in Canada. Lord Wolsely, the commander of the First Red River Expedition, was selected to command the force being sent to rescue Gordon. Rejecting the shorter route from Suakin to Dongola across the desert from the Red Sea, Wolsely decided to take his little army up the Nil. To assist him, he decided to employ a force of Canadian voyageurs of the type which had played such a part in his journey to Manitoba.

The arrangements for the force of 300 Canadians were made by the Governor General and his military secretary, Lord Melgund. Macdonald offered his support and his advice and the officers, including Major Frederick Denison of the Governor General's Body Guard, the commander, and Lieutenant Colonel Kennedy of the 90th, who later became paymaster, were all from the Canadian Militia. So were some of the men for Kennedy brought with him some members of Winnipeg militia units whose sole qualification seems to have been a wish for adventure. Eventually, 386 men left Canada on 15 September 1884. 16 of them were not to return to Canada, including Colonel Kennedy. Although there was some dispute about the value of their services, the fairest conclusion would seem to be that the majority of the men fulfilled their contracts and did a valuable job. At the same time, the men were not an official Canadian contingent. They were raised by the British Government through its agent in Canada; they were under contract to the British and their offices were paid at rates appropriate to their militia rank.* The men were, in fact, civilians.

262. The Canadian Government was quite willing to give a little quiet

* The fullest account is in C.P. Stacey, Records of the Nile Voyageurs, 1884-1885, Champlain Society, Toronto, 1959.

assistance to British sponsored and paid undertakings like the Nile voyageurs.

It was no more willing then it had been before to take any official interest in the offers of service made by militia officers at moments of Imperial crisis. The announcement that Khartoum had fallen and that Gordon was dead produced an emotional reaction among the British at home and abroad. In Canada, it took the usual form of officers offering their services and those of their men. Major General Laurie led the way in November, 1884, and the news of Gordon's death led him to renew his offer. Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Williams and Lieutenant Colonel Osborne Smith also made well publicized offers. Altogether, there were thirty one offers listed by the Governor General's military secretary⁵⁵¹ and there were many other individual offers of services to the numerous militia commanding officers who promised their battalions. Any of these which reached either the Prime Minister or the Militia Department were promptly passed to the Governor General. The Prime Minister would not be drawn into organizing a contingent. What he was prepared to do was to revive the earlier project of raising a second battalion to the 100th Regiment, which had become the Prince of Wales Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians). In a letter to Lord Melgund on 10 February 1885, he explained that to call out the Militia would be straining the terms of the Militia Act and also that no single battalion in the Militia could be called out as a whole and be expected to fit for service. The answer would be to repeat the pattern by which the 100th Regiment had been raised in 1858.⁵⁵²

263. Lansdowne promptly interpreted Macdonald's somewhat tentative proposals as a firm approval, tied it to the most prominent offers of men and cabled the

Colonial Secretary on 11 February 1885 that the Canadian Government had authorized recruiting in Canada, that a force should be specially enroled with a battalion of 500 men each from the Maritimes, central Canada and the Northwest. General Laurie, who had missed getting the command of the voyageurs, would be the brigade commander and Colonel Arthur Williams would have one of the battalions. Lord Melgund wanted to be Brigade Major. The cost would be borne by the Imperial Exchequer. This was interpreted by the British as an offer of troops. It was not as generous as the New South Wales offer for in that case the troops were in being and their cost would be borne by the colony but it did qualify Canada for the Queen's message of thanks which was sent out indiscriminately to the colonies. The failure of the British Government to take it up with any urgent enthusiasm was condemned by a growingly imperialistic press.⁵⁵³

264. To the Canadian Government, this was embarrassing and Lord Lansdowne also realized that there had been a misunderstanding and hastened to explain himself to Macdonald. It was certainly obvious to him that the Canadian Militia were neither trained nor equipped for active service and it also remained to be seen if they would accept the terms of service in any numbers.⁵⁵⁴ Only Sir Charles Tupper in London seems to have actively worked for Canadian participation but it would have been surprising if such an ardent Conservative had not been swept up in the torrent of emotion. He was embarrassed that Canada should stand second to Australia in public praise.⁵⁵⁵ To Tupper, Macdonald explained that Canada was not in the same position as Australia. The Suez Canal was not a real concern of hers neither was she

anxious to use British military pressure to restrain France and Germany in the South Pacific.

Why should we waste money and men in this wretched business?

England is not at war, but merely helping the Khedive to put down an insurrection, and now that Gordon is gone, the motive of aiding in the rescue to our countrymen is gone with him. Our men and money would therefore be sacrificed to get Gladstone and Co. out of the hole they have plunged themselves into by their own imbecility.⁵⁵⁶

265. For Britain, the possibility of another expedition into the Sudan was delayed for fifteen years when a Russian force forced an Afghan garrison out of Penjdeh and the possibility of a real war between Britain and Russia suddenly became very real. For Canada, there was also a more pressing diversion. On 26 March 1885, Gabriel Dumont and his men encountered the Mounted Police detachment en route to Duck Lake and chased it home. Gordon and the Sudan were promptly forgotten. The precedent, however, remained. In earlier, as in later adventures, Macdonald had revealed that his preferred policy for imperial wars was to leave it to the British to raise what forces they wished in Canada. He would seek to gratify supporters like Williams, Laurie and Kennedy by pushing their claims with the Governor General but to Tupper, he could only refer to them with some annoyance:

The spasmodic offers of our Militia Colonels anxious for excitement or notoriety have aroused unreasonable expectations in England, & are so

far unfortunate. I dare say that a Battalion [sic] or two of Venturous spirits might be enlisted but 7d. a day will cool most men's warlike ardour.⁵⁵⁷

THE NORTHWEST CAMPAIGN

266. The Northwest campaign of 1885 remains one of the few Canadian military enterprises undertaken without allies. Even then, it was not without foreign assistance. The Canadian cabinet was relieved that it had a General of Middleton's qualifications. Two other British major generals, Strange and Laurie, played prominent parts in the campaign and the only Canadian born officer to play a major independent role, Lieutenant Colonel Otter, was not a conspicuous success. The outline of operations has been given many times and the tactics have been examined and criticized in almost absurd detail. Since an enormous body of material exists on this subject alone, a complete account would demand considerably more time and space than is available now. The major subject of the next few paragraphs will be Middleton's relations with his political superiors rather than a more rounded summary of the performance of the Canadian Militia.

267. When Middleton departed for the Northwest late in March, 1885, the Canadian Government had no very clear idea of the situation in the Territories. The General cautiously told reporters that he was going West for nothing more serious than a routine inspection of M.D. 10, and it was only on his arrival that he received news of the skirmish at Duck Lake on

26 March 1885. With that, both Middleton and the Government realized that formal military operations would be necessary.⁵⁵⁸

268. From the moment of his arrival at Winnipeg, Middleton was left with the full military responsibility for the conduct of the campaign. Both Macdonald and Caron seem to have been conscious that it was their duty to leave to their military commander all the possible local decisions and to devote themselves only to providing for his needs. Their only importunities to Middleton were to obtain his guidance as to the men, equipment and supplies which he might need. From the flood of telegrams which were sent west from Ottawa, it is easy to distinguish the respectful and solicitous messages to Middleton from the querulous and often contradictory directions to the officers and civilians responsible for supply and transport. The General was not entirely without suggestions, requests and advice. Macdonald himself, admitting his inexperience in military matters, felt that there would be no harm in submitting his "crude ideas" in dealing with the local troubles. His first principle would be to localize the conflict by guarding the line of the C.P.R. Parties must be sent to Emerson and to other points along the border with the United States to prevent assistance from being sent to the rebels. A force should be sent to Battleford and, if possible, extended south to the railway to cut off the westward spread of the rebellion. The Prime Minister in his letter and repeatedly through messages sent by Caron recommended the services of the Mounted Police.⁵⁵⁹ While Macdonald was aware that the spring break-up would limit mobility, by suggesting that the difficulty could be overcome with mounted men, he ignored the problem of forage.

269. In Ottawa, Caron and his small remaining permanent staff had the task of improvising all the administrative support for the campaign, from the enlistment of doctors and medical orderlies to the contracting for supplies of clothing and equipment. With his natural energy, Caron threw himself personally into the work, hastening the movement of troops across the C.P.R. line to the Northwest, dealing at long range with the Hudson's Bay Company in Winnipeg and even looking after the persistent efforts of a C.H.J. Maguire of Saint John who was determined to sell his patent cypher code to the Government.⁵⁶⁰ He was particularly concerned in the services of the 9th Voltigeurs, a regiment raised from his own constituency and commanded by a fellow Conservative member of Parliament. The dangers of war were brought home to him when he was warned by his political agents in Quebec of the unpopularity of sending youngsters to such a dangerous and fatiguing campaign.⁵⁶¹ The Minister, in sum, was kept busy in his department, dealing with almost every imaginable sort of business. Even if he had the intention of directing the campaign from Ottawa, it is unlikely that he would have had the time.

270. Middleton's telegrams to the Minister also reflect a certain mutual confidence. Evidently, in his nine months in Ottawa, the General had done a great deal to restore the shattered relationships of the Luard period. In his first telegram, sent while he was en route to the West, Middleton had promised the government: "You may depend on my acting judiciously and carefully,"⁵⁶² and no subsequent historian has accused him of being rash. Caron passed onto

him frightened messages from towns throughout the West which imagined themselves to be in imminent danger of massacre. "Do what can be done", was Caron's only request. Even Port Arthur,⁵⁶³ at the head of Lake Superior, demanded help but for most of them, Middleton could do very little. Caron was more insistent that Battleford be relieved until Middleton pointed out the difficulties: the continuance of an abnormally long and severe winter, the distance from the railway and his own opinion that Inspector Morris at Battleford was greatly exaggerating the danger. On 7 April 1885, Caron asked the General for his plan of campaign and he had his reply by 9 April 1885. Middleton was anxious to ease the anxiety of the Minister and to minimise the alarm and excitement which he found all about him. In Colonial tradition, this has normally led to the humiliating and disastrous downfall of the British commander but, in Middleton's case, his assurance seems to have been justified. At the same time, he was far more acutely aware of the deficiencies of his little force than were most of its members. Many of his men lacked even the rudiments of military training. The 90th Winnipeg Rifles included a large proportion of men who had never before fired a rifle. For all the confidence which Middleton sought to exude publicly, he could be forgiven some grave private misgivings.

271. The General had a right to be aggrieved about the political appointments to his force and about the continuing patronage in contracts. It certainly never occurred to Caron that the emergency of a rebellion would justify him in forgetting his friends in the awarding of contracts. The Government was obliged to reply on the Hudson's Bay Company for the bulk of its supplies:

its size and extensive organization made it almost indispensable for the early success of the campaign. On the other hand, purchases in the East were still regulated by the patronage list and even in Winnipeg, anguished cries from political supporters got results. The battalion commanders included a high proportion of Conservative Members of Parliament - O'Brien, Williams, Amyot, Ouimet and Tyrwhitt were all present while the surgeons of the force were also chosen with the Conservative caucus in mind - Bergin, Orton and Roddick were all Conservative members. Lieutenant Colonel Osborne Smith was authorized to raise a battalion in Winnipeg while officers whom Middleton did not want, like Major General Laurie and Lieutenant Colonel Houghton, remained on his staff or occupied important posts at his base. In two cases, volunteers were dismissed because of their political past. Colonel Atwood and Scoble, both retired militia officers of some experience, offered their services to the hard pressed Lieutenant Colonel Jackson, then the Chief Supplies and Transport Officer in Winnipeg. Desperate for lack of staff, he accepted them. Macdonald promptly received a telegram from the Premier of Manitoba, John Norquay, declaring that the two officers were notorious organizers of the Farmers' Union and demanding their instant dismissal. Macdonald immediately passed on the order and Middleton added his own rebuke.⁵⁶⁴

272. The little battle at Fish Creek on 24 April 1885 was Middleton's first encounter with the Métis. His own dispositions had been so faulty that he felt obliged to withdraw in order to correct them. At the same time, he seems to have been a little shaken by the sharpness of the engagement and he told Caron that it had only been through chance that he had been saved from a

massacre. He set up camp at Clarke's Crossing and waited for the steamers hired by the Government to reach him. Most were the property of Alexander Tilloch Galt, the son of the prominent Conservative politician and they were not particularly efficient. They were not helped by the fact that both branches of the Saskatchewan River were very low that year.⁵⁶⁵ Only on 5 May 1885 could Middleton announce that he was moving cautiously towards Batoche, the Métis stronghold. On the way, he heard that Colonel Otter, whom he had sent with 500 men to the relief of Battleford, had been involved in the unfortunate battle at Cut Knife Hill. "This is contrary to my orders to him", Middleton told the Minister,⁵⁶⁶ There was further exasperation when reinforcements failed to arrive as planned. When he complained to Ottawa that his orders were being interfered with, there was a prompt response from Caron. "Who interferes with your plans," Caron wired, "if you tell me, I will put a stop to this."⁵⁶⁷ A few days later, Middleton was embroiled in the Battle of Batoche and calling for more troops. On 11 May 1885, however, he was able to report his success. "Men behaved splendidly", he announced.⁵⁶⁸ When the capture of Riel was reported on 15 May, Caron responded with congratulations.

273. With success at Batoche, Caron for the first time began to involve Middleton in his anxieties about the cost of transport. Much of the work had been done by teams hired through various contractors. From a number of sources, Caron discovered that these entrepreneurs were making a gigantic profit, particularly since the teams were being paid by the day rather than by the work done. Middleton had relied on his transport officer, Captain S.L. Bedson, the Warden of Stoney Mountain Penitentiary to hire the

teams and the job had been done in considerable haste. Later, Caron despatched Lieutenant Colonel E.A. Whitehead of Montreal to take charge of the transport arrangements at the base and this helped to ensure a somewhat more businesslike management. From Batoche until the end of the campaign, the Minister grew more insistent in reminding Middleton of the need for an early and economical liquidation of the expedition. He particularly warned Middleton against Bedson and his colleague Bell who were "proven speculators" and to be mistrusted.⁵⁶⁹

274. It did not make Caron's task lighter that Parliament was in session throughout the campaign and those members who could not manage to make their way to the front were determined to be vigilant critics from the rear. Edward Blake warned the Government that the Snider rifle was unsatisfactory and that if it did not provide the Volunteers with the best possible weapons, he would hold them responsible. He was answered by Colonel O'Brien who said that no better rifle could be put in the hands of the Militia.⁵⁷⁰ An easy target was the failure of the Government to do anything about the Militia in the Northwest Territories, which had been allowed to collapse and which was now sorely regretted.⁵⁷¹ By the end of May, there were reports of pillaging and destruction. Francois Langelier, the able Liberal lawyer who sat for Megantic, raised reports of houses being demolished, furniture smashed and a sewing machine and a stove being broken. One man, in appropriately named Vandel, was said to have had his clock and bedstead destroyed and that the troops had returned on the following day and burned his house.⁵⁷²

275. By June, the continuing pursuit of Big Bear was becoming more and more hopeless. Middleton was anxious by now to know who was to have the command in the Northwest. During his second delay at Clark's Crossing, he had telegraphed his suggestions for the future protection of the Territories. Since, in his view, the Mounted Police had forfeited all respect, they should be replaced by a force of 1,000 mounted infantry. The solution seemed particularly suitable since martial law must have replaced civil law. He proposed that the new force would have khaki uniforms and be armed with Winchester rifles.⁵⁷³ On June 12th, growing anxious lest officers whom he regarded as incompetent such as Laurie, Strange or Osboren Smith should obtain the command through political influence, he invited the Minister to come out to see matters for himself. He even volunteered to retain the command in the West himself, provided he was allowed a brief reunion with his family.⁵⁷⁴

276. In the end, Middleton returned with his troops. There was a brief delay in Winnipeg where a triumphal arch had been erected and the citizens wished to hold a victory parade on 16 July 1885. Colonel Amyot perhaps reflected the opinion of the force more accurately than usual when he complained that the General was detaining the troops "for a hotel keepers' circus."⁵⁷⁵ Two days prior to the event, heavy rains began to fall and they continued steadily for five days. The grand review was cancelled and the troops were allowed to continue on their way to their homes.

277. On his return, Middleton was regarded as a hero. The fate of the Conservative ministry had hung upon the outcome of the campaign and even if

the campaign had been long and expensive as well as successful, the political damage would have been great.⁵⁷⁶ As it was, to most Canadians, Middleton's campaign seemed like a distinct success. As a reward, his Major Generalcy was confirmed, he received a special gift from Parliament of \$20,000 and, in company with the Minister of Militia, he was awarded the K.C.M.G.⁵⁷⁷

278. Winding up the campaign left the problem of the Northwest only partly settled. On 13 July 85, Macdonald introduced a bill to provide land grants to the veterans of the campaign which received quick acceptance.⁵⁷⁸ All those who had served west of Port Arthur except for home guards could choose between 320 acres or \$80 in scrip before 1 August 1886.⁵⁷⁹ The terms were rather easier than those which had been applied to the Red River Expedition and the grant was double the size of the earlier allowance.⁵⁸⁰

279. Above all, the Government faced the problem of providing for the security of the Territories. Middleton's recommendation for supplanting the Northwest Mounted Police was not accepted. Instead, the Militia Act of 1883 was amended to allow for a total permanent force of 1,000 and from the increase, a new infantry school at London and a combined mounted infantry and infantry school at Winnipeg were authorized.⁵⁸¹ The Mounted Police was also doubled to a total strength of 1,000. Before the increase had been approved by Parliament, Macdonald had approached Lord Melgund, the Governor General's Military secretary, to invite him to accept the command. Melgund, who had accompanied Middleton as far as Fish Creek, had some knowledge of the West and was extremely interested in the offer. The decisive obstacle appears to

have been the reluctance of his wife to spend a number of years in Regina.⁵⁸²

YEARS OF DECAY

280. The campaign in the Northwest aroused a new interest in the Militia and in military affairs. The feeling was not lasting but the permanent force had profited to the extent of an extra two schools. When Parliament discussed the Militia in the very long session of 1885, there was a more persistent interest than usual, even with the majority of the colonels away. The question of uniform occupied more attention than to provide uniforms for the men going to the Northwest, everything in store had had to be issued. Malcolm Cameron, a Liberal from Goderich, demanded an explanation of the reports of badly made clothing, buttons falling off and unpopular caps reported the previous year by Colonel Jackson. Other Opposition members repeated reports that the Volunteers who arrived at Port Arthur had clothing in a very dilapidated condition. A Conservative member suggested that the Canadian Militia should adopt some other colour than scarlet. Not only would this allow it to be manufactured in the country, it would also be less conspicuous, and easier to keep clean. In this, Cameron agreed. The Minister replied with the conviction of an expert that scarlet was the best of colours, that anyone wearing green was a better mark at any distance than anyone wearing scarlet and his point was proven by the fact that it was the colour of the best armies in Europe. The Prime Minister, quoting from his own experience, agreed with him.⁵⁸³

281. There was a continuing attention to the campaign. Newspapermen seem to have been allowed free range in their reports and at least some of them were concerned to satisfy the religious and political prejudices of their readers.

The shocking case of Private Conway occupied the emotions of the House of Commons for some time. Conway was a member of the 65th Regiment, part of a detachment which had been left in Edmonton. According to the Edmonton Bulletin, several men of the 65th had refused to march in a Corpus Christi procession because they said they were Protestants. Some of the men received extra guards and Conway, who was particularly insistent, was sentenced to eight days of bread and water in a cell. Members seem to have been reassured a few days later by a message from their colleague, Colonel Ouimet, that Conway had enlisted as a Catholic and had been locked up for insulting his captain. An attack on the Militia from another direction came from Alphonse Desjardins, a Conservative, who expanded on press reports of the misdeeds of the soldiers in Batoche. Families had been plundered and stripped, according to the reports published in the Toronto Mail, and soldiers had ripped open mattresses just for the pleasure of throwing the feathers to the wind. The people were left in a condition of skin and bones. To these charges, Caron had no equally satisfactory answer. He could only reply that Middleton had given strict orders and he was not surprised that a few panes of glass had been proven when a village had been under fire for three days. Besides, when there were such a number of men in a small place, there were bound to be a few irregularities.⁵⁸⁴

282. For the Militia, there was some delay in returning to normal. In

addition to the men sent to the Northwest, several battalions had been called out as a reserve. Two battalions, the 8th Royal Rifles and the 14th, had each provided a few companies to replace "A" and "B" Batteries respectively. The 32nd Bruce Battalion went into camp on the Saugeen for several days and, on returning, was given a generous grant by the Bruce County Council.⁵⁸⁵ In New Brunswick, a provisional battalion was formed under Colonel Maunsell, based on the men of his school and companies from other corps in the province and in Prince Edward Island.⁵⁸⁶

283. The drill for 1885-86 was not authorized until the end of July. 18,070 men were authorized to have the now customary twelve days, with city corps at local head headquarters and rural corps in most districts being assembled at brigade camps. The corps which had been called out either for service in the Northwest or to be held in the East were not to be called out.⁵⁸⁷ In some respects, active service had accentuated the deficiencies of the force. Uniforms which it had been intended to replace every three years had been obliged to last much longer simply because the appropriation for clothing would not stretch to over 12,000 new uniforms a year. The men who had been sent to the Northwest returned in tatters. Some of the clothing which was obtained was obviously unsatisfactory. M.D. 3 reported that buttons fell off very quickly and the jackets provided for rifle battalions had "bad cloth and worse sewing".⁵⁸⁸ In M.D. 4, the trousers issued to the cavalry tended to split. Everywhere there were complaints about the equipment and Colonel Duchesnay in M.D. 7 complained that everywhere men could be seen with black patches on their back, caused by melted tar on the knapsacks.⁵⁸⁹ In M.D.

12, which had not sent men to the campaign, Colonel Holmes managed to drill a total of 122 men in M.D. 11. How could men keep up their interest, he bitterly asked, when they were obliged to train with obsolete guns on rotten carriages.⁵⁹⁰ The Brighton Engineers, which continued to receive high praise at its annual inspection, also continued without tools although its demand would have cost only \$150.00.⁵⁹¹

284. When the Militia returned to the East, the two artillery batteries and "C" Company of the Infantry School Corps remained to guard against any further flare-ups. The few remaining men at Kingston and Quebec had not been able to continue their courses of instruction. Only "A" and "B" Companies of the Infantry School Corps had remained in the East of all the permanent corps. Mausell had worked hard to be sent but Colonel d'Orsonnens had taken the creditable but uncommon view that it was not up to an officer to push his career by volunteering for active service when it was a speculation on the lives of the men under him.⁵⁹² At the beginning of October, "C" Company was ordered to return and the school at Toronto was reopened. The bulk of the men of the two batteries remained until the following spring. The Governor General pressed the idea of sending a flying column through the Northwest during the spring of 1886. His concept was of a force in being, largely composed of permanent corps with a commander nominated in advance. Such a force, he felt, would impress the Indians for he believed that the day had passed when a few police could arrest an Indian in a camp.⁵⁹³ The idea seems to have been considered by the Government but the conditions in the spring of 1886, with a greatly strengthened Mounted Police, did not warrant the

expedition.

285. In the excitement of 1885, two new permanent force units had been authorized but London had to wait until 1887 for its school. The Mounted Infantry School was formed in September of 1885. It was to consist of two companies of mounted infantry, each of fifty men and twenty five horses.⁵⁹⁴ The first commanding officer was Lieutenant Colonel John B. Taylor, the elderly Deputy-Adjutant-General of M.Ds. 9 and 12. By 20 December 1885, he reported that he had recruited 75 out of his hundred men and that 52 of them had previous Regular Army or Militia service. The School was established in the old huts erected for the Manitoba Force; \$4,000 were spent on their repair.⁵⁹⁵ Middleton had his own views on the training of Mounted Infantry, some of which seem sound. He insisted that they were not cavalry, that horses were a means of moving from place to place while fighting would be done on foot. Other ideas seem less sound. "...the experience of the late campaign shows that half-breeds and Indians fighting lying down in coulees and bluffs cannot stand up against the resolute rush of white men on foot."⁵⁹⁶

286. The years from 1886 to 1890 were a period of routine and decay. The burst of energy which the Minister had shown in his earlier years in office was dissipated. The success of the volunteers in the Northwest may have suggested that nothing could be improved. General Middleton was not of a character to be constantly importuning the Government for change. The complaints were engulfed in the annual Militia Report which few seem to have read. The criticisms which it provided of the Government's policy were not

such as to appeal to the opposition. During the period, annual expenditure on the Militia ranged from \$1,178,659 in 1886 to \$1,364,779 in 1889. The small increase was largely due to the expansion of the permanent corps through the establishment of "C" Battery at Victoria, the Mounted Infantry School at Winnipeg and the new infantry school at London. Each year, somewhat less than 20,000 militia were allowed to train for twelve days. As before, the rural battalions could expect to train every other year in a brigade camp although in some districts where there were a large number of city corps, notably in M.D. 2 and M.D. 10, the interval might be longer. The 96th Algoma Rifles were authorized in 1886 but by 1890 they had still not been drilled.⁵⁹⁷ The city corps, field batteries and some of the garrison artillery were permitted to drill annually. The field batteries were required to attend camp but the other city corps were only allowed to drill at headquarters and such field training as they could obtain could only come from sham battles on holiday week-ends. The 65th of Montreal attended camp at Three Rivers in 1888 but it was at the battalion's own expense.⁵⁹⁸

287. In or out of camp, there remains some question of the value which the men received from their training. Most of the permanent staff officers continued to express their surprise at the speed with which battalions found some sort of cohesion in the few days of actual training. The lack of instructors for the cavalry and infantry should have been overcome although, for reasons which will be suggested later, the new cavalry and infantry schools were far from satisfactory. The General was suitably concerned about improving the musketry of his force but given both the weapons and the amount

of ammunition, it was doubtful that much could be accomplished. The Snider had been in the hands of the Militia for some eighteen years by 1886. It was to remain with at least some militia units for twenty years more. By this evidence alone, it must have been a remarkably robust weapon and Middleton was not the only General Officer Commanding who insisted that nothing better be given the rural militia until more satisfactory methods of storage and maintenance had been adopted. At the same time, it was worn out and generally in a bad state. Colonel Otter in M.D. 2 reported an alarming proportion of the rifles in his district as "almost useless ... being honey combed and worn out by wear, age and bad care."⁵⁹⁹ The Government, of course, was reluctant to go to the considerable expense of rearming the Militia. Captain Greville-Harston of the 10th Royal Grenadiers had patented a system for converting the martini-Henry into a repeating, magazine rifle and this, Middleton decided, would be the rifle for the Canadians for the future. In the meantime, he reassured the Government about its aging weapons:

I may add here in defence of the much abused Snider that the Indian Government have just armed the whole of their military police force in Burmah with the Snider, and I believe that if our present supply of Sniders are all made serviceable that the Dominion Government can well afford to continue its use until the rifle of the future is definitely decided upon.⁶⁰⁰

In the meantime, to become marksmen, the men were allotted twenty rounds a year. Middleton was successful in reducing the ranges at which it was to be

fired but, by 1888, five rounds were being fired at 100 and 200 yards from the standing position, five rounds at 300 yards, kneeling and five rounds from 400 yards from any position. At these ranges, encouraging results must have been difficult to obtain and the range facilities at many camps were so limited that even this course had to be hurried through. Middleton also insisted that officers should not be allowed to fire as they have an advantage over their men and, in the field, it was not their duty to use a rifle.⁶⁰¹

288. A difficulty which many Districts faced in establishing its brigade camps was the lack of suitable ground. The selection of campsites was an annual political problem for the Government for many communities demanded attention and there were many rival claims. In return for considerable profit to local contractors and merchants, municipalities often undertook to provide water and even electric lights but once the camp had been assigned, it often proved a little more difficult to obtain fulfilment of promises. In 1887, M.D. 4 held its camp at Rockcliffe. Ottawa had agreed to provide everything but it neglected to look after water and as there were no streams in the vicinity, there was considerable inconvenience.⁶⁰² In other parts of the country, the difficulty was to persuade towns to give ground for camps. Van Straubenzie in M.D. 5 in the same year wrote:

Year after year, I have to solicit offers from the various Corporations of Towns in the District to give me ground for a Camp and Rifle Range, begging subscriptions to put the same in order, which, to say the least, is a very unsatisfactory state of affairs.⁶⁰³

The recommendation of the staff officers was that permanent camps be developed with more satisfactory facilities but even this was only partially satisfactory. As the years passed, grounds which had seemed admirably suitable became too small. The field which had been purchased at London from Sir John Carling was already showing signs of being much too limited and the camp on Barriefield Common, near Kingston, had little space left when the men had pitched their tents.⁶⁰⁴

289. The long standing complaints about the quality of the medical supplies furnished by the Government continued throughout the period without abating. A principle medical officer was now appointed in each camp and the only box of medical supplies was put in his charge. They were sometimes of little value.

At Niagara on the Lake in 1886, Dr. Strange reported angrily that he had run out of the supplies in less than a week, that the adhesive plaster was useless because of its age and there was no cotton for bandages. There were no instruments at all, not even a pair of scissors to cut the useless plaster.⁶⁰⁵

Four years later, a future Minister of Militia, F.W. Borden, reported from the M.D. 9 camp that his chest had been, as usual, "meagrely and inefficiently supplied." He had had not a single surgical appliance - not even a tourniquet.⁶⁰⁶ The men themselves seem to have been pretty healthy although regulations continued to permit them only one blanket if the camp was in June and two if it was in September. Rubber sheets seem to have existed but they were not available. In 1889, the camp for rural corps in M.D. 5 was held at St. Johns. Since the men who had contracted to cut the grass on the camp site

failed to do so and since there was a heavy rain on the first night, the men were flooded out and obliged to seek refuge in the Y.M.C.A. tent. Rubber health problem was the water supply. In the following year, the M.D. 6 camp was held at St. Jean and the medical officer reported that water was distributed from a hydrant in the barracks by means of barrels spread through the camp. The water from the hydrant was muddy and it got still dirtier and warmer through sitting in the barrels.⁶⁰⁸

290. There were, of course, some improvements. The gaiters which Colonel French had recommended in his first report appear to have been authorized some eighteen years later in 1889 and artillerymen would no longer have to wear their trousers up to their knees. The artillery, in general, continued to improve substantially. The field artillery batteries were brigaded which gave a little more supervision, allowed promotion to some of the officers, and encouraged emulation. The garrison artillery, which had always been a source of disappointment, suddenly began to win praise from the Inspector, largely because the small annual sum spent on buying rifled guns was beginning to have an effect and even more because the Artillery Association began organizing an annual meeting on the Isle d'Orleans for teams from garrison batteries. This competition, which began in 1887, had gathered representatives from 21 batteries by 1889. In that year, the field batteries began a similar competition at Kingston.⁶¹⁰ Other corps lagged behind the artillery. The Brighton Engineers and their commander, Major Vince, continued to receive annual bursts of praise but nothing was done to help them. The engineers in Montreal, after vain efforts to spread their energies into

heliographs, a cyclist section and photography, seem to have lapsed into despair. The small establishment allowed the few engineer companies meant that they could do little substantial work and they were allowed no more training in camp than the Militia infantry. Repeatedly Inspectors of Engineers asked for small concessions such as working clothing and boots, working pay to compensate for hard manual labour and even a few basic tools.⁶¹¹ Nothing happened.

291. When the infantry and cavalry schools had been established, it had been hoped that they would have the considerable impact on their respective arms that the two Schools of Gunnery had had on the artillery. This did not happen. Partly, this was because of the other advantages which the artillery had always had - annual training in camps and rather more interesting work. The cavalry was notoriously the weakest arm. The few city corps could not get horses easily while the rural corps could not get properly trained. The artillery had been and remained something of an elite in the Militia with a strong esprit de corps reflected in the Dominion Artillery Association. The spirit did not prevail in the cavalry and infantry on anything like the same basis. Commanding officers were more likely to exert themselves to buy new white helmets than to persuade some of their abler young men to become qualified at a winter course of instruction.* In addition, the eighties were more prosperous than the seventies and there were far less suitable men

* Some counties, notably Huron and Bruce, took a paternal interest in their battalions, paying the men 25 cents a day in addition to the Government pay and buying them helmets. This was naturally a spur to efficiency.
Report, 1889, 14.

willing to share even for three months the somewhat unappealing life of the permanent Corps soldier. Both Otter and d'Orsonnens complained annually that they were being sent far too many men to instruct who neither intended nor could be intended to become instructors to the Militia. So many of the men who came to St. Jean were illiterate that d'Orsonnens started a school to help them.⁶¹²

292. The Cavalry School at Quebec appears to have been particularly unfortunate. It had originally been intended to divide the troop of 40 men into equal detachments at Quebec and Toronto but even 40 men proved too few to operate a viable unit. Once Caron had established the school in Quebec, he seems to have forgotten it. Three years passed before saddlery was provided and four years before they were given quarters of their own. Because the work was very heavy, men refused to re-enlist and desertion was high. This, in turn, aggravated the manpower problem. In 1886, Turnbull enlisted 19 men but 14 purchased their discharge, 3 were discharged as unfit or as bad characters and 5 deserted.⁶¹³ In 1887, there was an improvement in the strength of the little troop, perhaps because the stables had burned down and the work may have been temporarily lighter. By the following year, however, matters were as bad as before, with only 31 men available to look after 30 horses and all the chores of the unit - servants, waiters, orderlies, clerks, and such labours as cutting wood and shovelling snow.⁶¹⁴ In 1889, after losing 14 deserters and 15 others to other causes, Turnbull wrote with evident desperation:

The sawing and splitting of firewood is an evil that cries loudly for a remedy, as most of the men who join the Cavalry come from a class who join the military profession with a view to becoming soldiers, and not labourers, and the fact of the general public watching them when at this drudgery is calculated to wound their self-respect, and cause them to dislike their profession. These may appear to be small matters, but soldiers' lives are made up of trifles.⁶¹⁵

In this atmosphere, it was unlikely that effective work could be done and the number of men at ending the School declined annually.

293. The Mounted Infantry School At Winnipeg also started off in a fine flush of enthusiasm but it soon encountered many of the same difficulties which Turnbull reported. Colonel Taylor had reported proudly on the quality of men he had been able to enlist but they were no more willing than the cavalrymen of Quebec to spend their lives cutting wood and carrying coal.⁶¹⁶ Despite the repairs at the outset of the School, the buildings at Winnipeg were inadequate. The building intended as a canteen had to be used as a hospital.

A lavatory and latrine were only erected in 1888 and by 1890, the greater part of the buildings, put up eighteen years before in some haste, were showing signs of decay. In these depressing circumstances, it was difficult because of the high wages on the prairies and because of the attraction of the Northwest Mounted Police, whose lives may have been as hard but whose service was more varied and whose prospects for promotion were much greater.⁶¹⁷

294. In October, 1887, orders were issued for the formation of "C" Battery at Victoria from drafts sent from the other two permanent batteries. The men were required to re-enlist for three years from the date of their transfer and they were further prevented from purchasing a discharge within eighteen months of arriving on the West Coast. New equipment was issued to the men but, in spite of Colonel Homes repeated urging that the rifle issued in British Columbia should be the martini-Henry and despite the serious shortage of Snider ammunition on the coast, the men were provided with the Snider Rifle. When they arrived, regular quarters were not available for the men of the battery and they had to be quartered in the Exhibition Hall. This temporary and highly unsatisfactory arrangement continued until 1890 when the permanent barracks were finally ready. From the first, "C" Battery was unhappy. The arrival of the little force did not revive the local Militia. There were few enough to start with and, as Holmes observed, the cost of living was so high that the Militia could not afford to drill. The high costs also affected the gunners and Holmes appealed annually for an increase of at least 25 cents as a cost of living allowance for the officers. There was not even an allowance to pay for the men's compulsory attendance at religious service. Desertion was kept down in the first year, Holmes reported, because the men did not have too much drill to perform, but by 1890, it was necessary to send a draft to replace almost all the gunners in the battery.⁶¹⁸

295. If the permanent corps were to be effective, they had to have a high level of discipline and a high proportion of long service men. As the eighties closed, it was evident that the Schools had neither. Desertion was a

heavy tax on efficiency, particularly for corps close to the American border.

In 1887, d'Orsonnens could afford to be merely rueful about the problem:

Everything would have gone as nicely as possible had we not been marred by the desertion of six of my musicians during the summer who were enticed to cross the frontier to form a band.⁶¹⁹

Earlier, d'Orsonnens had been the first to draw attention to what was to become a regular problem of the permanent corps, the tendency of men to join in the fall and desert in the spring.⁶²⁰ These "snowbirds", often abetted by a kindly militia commanding officer, took advantage of a fairly arduous form of "work for relief" which was of little service to them and none at all to the Militia.

296. There were few reasons for better men to join. Accommodation ranged from unsatisfactory in Victoria's Exhibition Hall to the crumbling stone of the Citadel at Quebec or the New Fort at Toronto. The work was monotonous and heavy, with the men of the schools providing the guards, the work parties and the drill squads for successive classes of Militia officers and non-commissioned officers. When numbers were reduced by desertion or discharge, the work fell the more heavily on those who remained. Because the turn over of men was so rapid, a large proportion of the men in the permanent corps were, themselves, recruits. The pay of privates was 40 cents a day, 10 cents less than the rate for the Militia who served only part time. For the lowest rank, there was good conduct pay ranging from 3 cents to 7 cents a day for the

first six years but no substantial increase was possible unless a man was promoted or could obtain one of the few vacancies for which working pay was allowed. All ranks were allowed a daily ration but it consisted chiefly of 1 lb of bread, 1 lb. of meat and 1 lb. of potatoes with smaller quantities of barley, coffee, tea, cheese, sugar, salt and pepper.⁶²¹ These conditions might have been acceptable if there had been better provision for the married men. Colonel Turnbull reported that he did not enlist their service. The same restraint could not apply to his instructors and, to the evident surprise of the Government, marriage seems to have been quite common throughout the Permanent Corps. It was the custom in the British Army to provide rations and quarters for a proportion of the married men - up to 10% of the strength - but repeated urging from the commanders of the permanent corps could not bring the Canadian Government to follow suit.⁶²² Nor could they persuade the Government to introduce pensions for either staff officers or members of the permanent corps. This was, if possible, more serious for quite apart from the cruel effect on the officers and men it ensured that older soldiers would cling to their positions long after they were fit for them while younger men would have no encouragement for a career. The failure to provide for the soldiers was a little more glaring because pensions had been provided for the men of the Northwest Mounted Police and a superannuation system had long been in effect for the civil service.⁶²³

297. The grievances did not come exclusively from the men. They began at the very top when the British Government determined to cut off all pay to British officers serving in the colonies. Even retired officers, drawing their

pensions, would lose it if they were employed by colonial governments and this caused General Strange to lose his pension when he took part in the Northwest Campaign of 1885.⁶²⁴ For Middleton, who had been receiving regimental pay while in Canada, it was a serious blow for the \$4,000 paid by the Canadian Government was by no means as much money as he had received as a Colonel in the British Army while his expenses were rather larger.⁶²⁵ Other Canadian officers were more completely dependent on their own Government. In 1889, the Prime Minister received a pamphlet from Captain A.J. Wilson, one of the original officers of the Gunnery Schools. It was seventeen years since Wilson had been appointed to the School and he was still receiving exactly \$3.50 a day. The pamphlet, he said, was not his work, but it highlighted many of the same complaints. Except for lieutenants, the pay of Canadian officers was less than for corresponding ranks in the British and American armies. The pay in Australia was almost double the Canadian rate. The difference was accentuated by the lack of pensions for the Canadian force.* Another

* Comparable Rates of Pay for Permanent Officers

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Canadian</u>	<u>British</u>	<u>American</u>
Major General	\$ 4,000	\$ 5,222	\$ 7,500
Colonel	2,600	3,547	3,500
Deputy Adjutant- General	1,200	2,660	3,000
Lieutenant Colonel	1,440	1,600	3,000
Major	1,095	1,424	2,500
(after 4 years)	1,277		2,750
Captain	1,095	1,029	1,500
(after 4 years)	1,277		1,980
Lieutenant	730	606	1,600
(after 4 years)	912	697	1,760

MG 26 A 1 (c) 329, 148919, "Notes Relating to Standing of Permanent Corps, Canadian Militia".

grievance was that officers in the Canadian permanent corps had no seniority over non-permanent Militia officers. In contracts, British regular officers were given seniority by statute and when any came to Canada, they were also given an automatic step in rank.⁶²⁶

298. The Government showed itself little disturbed by these complaints. After all, as the eloquent testimony of Caron's files proves, there was no lack of applicants for the humblest commissioned vacancy in the permanent corps and if men did not like the service, they could always go elsewhere. The Deputy Minister's little summary at the front of the Militia Report was sufficient for any busy man to read. While it gave a muffled echo to some of the more urgent recommendations concealed within, its tone was of pride and optimism in an efficient and economical force. In his report from 1887, Panet informed his Minister that "as we enlarge the sphere of our operations under your direction, it is clearly proved that the military system of the Dominion is steadily increasing in efficiency."⁶²⁷ In the following year, Panet could report that Canada's military fame had spread throughout the world. Blue books and the Regulations and Orders for the Militia had been exchanged with the principle colonies and there had even been a request from India for the design of the Red River Cart. The Governor of Jamaica had sent one of the officers of his Militia to attend one of the schools.⁶²⁸ In the following year, the inspection of the General Officer Commanding was reported as highly satisfactory although there was a slight anomaly a little later in the report when there was a gentle warning that money would have to be spent on the walls of the Citadel at Quebec or they would be a danger to the inhabitants living

below.⁶²⁹

299. If readers of the report wished further comforting information, of a rather more domestic kind, there was always a lengthy account of "A" Company at Fredericton by Colonel Maunsell. Although undoubtedly helped by local economic conditions, Maunsell was able to keep his men by good man management and by an evident enthusiasm. In 1888, when comparable figures were given, he had only 3 deserts. The next lowest was "D" Company at London with 9. "A" Company was the first to attend camp with the other Militia units. Its colonel was strong for temperance and he was supported by his famous Sergeant Major, Thomas McKenzie. In 1885, he had formed a Temperance Club with 95 members and in the following year, it received a fresh impetus after being addressed by the visiting Mayor of Toronto: "as a result, many (seventy one) names were at once added to the list of members".⁶³⁰ Maunsell also sought to keep his men in barracks by making it as attractive to them as possible. He arranged lectures by the Lieutenant Governor, Sir Leonard Tilley, and soon had a library of 300 books, largely donated by the Tilleys, by the Bishop and by the Chief Justice of the province. The atmosphere described by Maunsell sounds almost utopian: "The recruit should be made to feel that the Officers and non-commissioned officers of the Company are his friends and protectors, and to consider the barrack room his 'home' ".⁶³¹

* Another but almost equally favourable picture of the life at the School in Fredericton has been left by Thomas McKenzie, the first sergeant major. A British veteran who came out to Canada and who devoted the remainder of his life as a drill instructor to the Militia, McKenzie had hoped to become the first adjutant but had to be content with a lower position. It was he who was the founder of the unit's lodge of the Sons of Temperance and he served as its first deputy grand worthy patriarch. He points out that failure to provide

300. The Royal Military College in this period did not share the idyllic progress at Fredericton. In 1886, Colonel Hewitt finally returned to England, leaving the institution firmly founded but with continuing difficulties of cramped accommodation and facilities. His successor was Colonel John Oliver of the Royal Artillery, a professor at the College since September, 1877. Oliver had had an adventurous career before coming to Canada but he seems to have been willing to settle in the country and, in 1880, he had married a lady of Kingston. He was 52 when he became commandant. He appears to have been a fairly energetic officer and in his first year, he could report an increasing number of applications from parents seeking to enrol their sons.⁶³² Two years later, he announced that courses in simply surgery were being given to the cadets by the Sergeant Major. At the same time, progress had been made in having the College diploma recognized as at least a partial fulfilment of a university degree. The major deficiency for a fuller academic qualification was Latin.⁶³³ In 1888, Oliver, having been promoted and retired as a Major General, gave way to Major General D.R. Cameron.⁶³⁴ In this, there was something strange, for Cameron was also a major general and retired. He was also the son in law of Sir Charles Tupper.⁶³⁵

rations for the wives and children of the married men was a very serious difference between the Canadian and the British service. Married men could only keep their families on 40 cents a day if their wives did the washing of the single men. The married men were also employed by the officers.

Thomas McKenzie, My Life as a Soldier, (St. John, 1898) 174 -- 189, 198 - 202.

THE DOWNFALL OF GENERAL MIDDLETON

301. His achievements in the Northwest Campaign of 1885 had been the making of General Middleton's reputation. They were also to be the source of his downfall.

302. During the campaign, Middleton had shown himself to have many of the highest qualities of a soldier. His energy was astonishing for a man of sixty. He did not spare himself in reconnoitring, he was tireless in checking on piquets and scouts and he made himself responsible for a great variety of jobs which should have been left to his staff. At the same time, he almost completely failed to evoke the loyalty and appreciation of his men. They sensed that his precautions were a reflection of his mistrust. Moreover, as George Needler wrote, years after the campaign: "his willingness to do so much himself easily passed over into a too obvious desire to assume the credit for everything himself."⁶³⁶ Middleton's conduct of the campaign has been described as "marked with undue deliberation and hesitancy".⁶³⁷ His own apprehensions about his own ill armed, ill trained and ill ordered force are in striking contrast with his contempt for the fears of others, particularly of the officers of the Mounted Police. Middleton also made enemies by his appointment to his staff of officers who had originally been with the British Army like Lord Melgund, Lieutenant Colonel Van Straubenzie and S.L. Bedson.

303. If Middleton had returned to England in 1885, his reputation might well have gone with him. Posterity might say that the campaign could have been

completed far more quickly but contemporary opinion was surprised that it was over so soon. However Middleton served on in Canada. He received his knighthood, his promotion and his \$20,000. His officers continued to wait. Meanwhile, those with grievances against the General managed to give them wider and wider publicity. Major General Laurie, who claimed seniority over Middleton and who was certainly better connected in the Conservative Party, had a bitter grievance that he had been left to manage supplies along the lines of communication. Colonel Houghton, another officer with sound connections, was convinced that, as Duty Adjutant-General of M.D. 10, he should have commanded the expedition. A variety of officers, and most particularly Lieutenant Colonel George Dension of the Governor General's Body Guard, were apparently aggrieved that they were not in Batoche to lead the final charge in person.⁶³⁸

304. The malcontents were fortunate in having a martyr in the person of the officer who had led the charge, Colonel Arthur Williams. The commanding officer of the Midland Battalion in Middleton's force was felt to have been largely responsible for the almost spontaneous dash which captured Batoche and somewhat embarrassed the General. Middleton had not been particularly grateful for the exploit and later, when Williams fell sick, the General showed him little sympathy. When Williams died a short time after the battle, the critics were prepared to describe Middleton as a major contributing cause.

Other disputes about seniority and prestige might be of interest only in militia messes but Williams had been the popular Conservative member for East Durham since 1878. The discussion of the circumstances of his death added a

discord to the general chorus of approval at the successful end of the campaign.

305. The publication of Middleton's report in 1886 provoked further attacks from those who accused the General of being neither fair nor frank in his description of the campaign. The real grievance was that apart from the generous treatment of the General and a K.C.M.G. for the Minister, there were no honours or awards for either military or civil subordinates. When T.C. Casgrain raised the question of rewards at the end of the 1885 session, Macdonald had assured him that the matter was out of the hands of civil authorities and that it would be up to the military commanders to make their recommendations.⁶³⁹ When no medals were forthcoming, it was natural that the deprived Militia officers blamed "Old Fred" for keeping the glory to himself.

The accusation was unfair. Only on the eve of his departure could Middleton reveal that he had presented a list of nominations to the Prime Minister and to Sir Adophe Caron on his return from the Northwest. At that time, they had rejected his suggestions on two grounds: that only two or three C.M.Gs. could be recommended and the remaining officers would be jealous and that neither of the two French Canadian commanding officer, Ouiment or Amyot, were included. Later, Middleton had pressed the claims at the time of the Jubilee celebrations of 1887 but again without success.⁶⁴⁰

306. The awards question created a continuing bitterness against Middleton among many Militia officers. It is difficult to know what he could have done. If he had included either Amyot's or Ouiment's name for a C.M.G., the list

would have become absurd. The former had commanded a battalion with considerable alarm and not a little financial mismanagement⁶⁴¹ while the latter had left his regiment as it set out under Strange and, after a hurried trip back to Montreal, was finally persuaded to take command at Edmonton.⁶⁴² Caron's honour had come as a result of a hint from the British Government at the same time that it suggested that only two or three C.M.Gs. would be forthcoming for the campaign. Lord Lansdowne felt that one of them should go to Colonel Powell. There were others who clamoured more directly for attention. Having been informed by a War Office friend that he would get a K.C.M.G. if the Canadian Government would only recommend it, General Strange addressed himself in characteristic fashion to the Prime Minister.

I am already the most distinguished Imperial officer that ever served in Canada - distinguished by not having been years ago give the distinction of 3 or 4 letters that have fallen the lot of every officer of rank who has ever served Canada from Col. Irvine to Col. Howett.⁶⁴³

It was all to no effect.

307. At the end of 1887, Middleton had been placed on the retired list of the British Army. Normally, this would have meant that he would have had to vacate his Canadian appointment since the Militia Act required that the command be held by an officer on the active list, but the Canadian Government asked that he should be kept on. This was to prove unfortunate for him. Although he had lost some of his reputation for military competence thanks to

the attacks of his brother officers, his personal honour had not been impugned. The Canadian Military Gazette was later to maintain that the General had set his face against "the race of boodlers and jobbers".⁶⁴⁴ Unfortunately, even this reputation was to be forfeited.

308. Even in the session of 1887, David Mills of the Liberals had accused Middleton, S.L. Bedson and the Indian Agent, Hayter Reed, of plundering \$7,000 worth of furs from a Battleford half-breed named Charles Bremner. Since he had no evidence at the time, no more could be said. When Middleton was taxed with the matter, he denied all knowledge. The suspicious did not subside, however, and with mounting pressure and growing accumulation of evidence, the Government conceded a Select Committee during the session of 1890. Even Middleton had come to admit that it was desirable.

309. The Committee discovered that Bremner had been a prisoner in Poundmaker's camp near Battleford. When he escaped, he was carrying a Mounted Police rifle and this caused him to be suspected as a rebel and to be sent to Regina. When he was released by order of the Department of Justice and returned to Battleford, the trouble began. He discovered that his stock of furs, which had been seized by the Police on his arrest, had disappeared. He carried his case to several Members of Parliament but, because Middleton and others denied everything, he got no satisfaction. Somehow he persevered and with the aid of a few Liberal members, notably James Lister, a few of the details fell together. It finally emerged that Middleton had directed Hayter Reed to make up several bundles of the furs, reserving the best for himself.

To satisfy the Mounted Police inspector, a note was dictated, one version of which directed that the matter be kept quiet. Later, the instructions were withdrawn but the inspector insisted that he must have a receipt. He was provided with a copy of the original note but this time there was no mention about the matter being kept quiet. Middleton had to admit dictating the letter to Reed but he also maintained that as a commander of a victorious force, he had a right to confiscate. He also insisted that he knew nothing of what had become of the furs. He had noticed a bundle on the steamer carrying him home but had been informed that they were a gift from well-wishers. He had presumed that the kind donors wished to remain anonymous and, in any case, they had disappeared during the voyage. The General did agree to pay for his share of the furs - about \$1,630. The Committee chose to condemn Middleton for taking the furs but it did not determine whether Middleton or Reed had insisted in the original note that the matter was to be kept quiet. There was another lead that Middleton had given furs to a furrier in Ottawa but Middleton's explanation for this was that the furs involved had been neither from Bremner's supply nor from the mysterious gift package but from a third source of his own.⁶⁴⁵ He also recalled a telegram from Sir Adolphe Caron asking him to bring back souvenirs of his own selection for "Sir John, Sir Hector and himself."⁶⁴⁶ The furs, he implied, were his response to this open-hearted invitation.

310. by 1890, the excitement and the sense of triumph of the campaign had worn off. The Northwest Rebellion was no longer a matter for self-congratulation for the Government. Middletown no longer had claims to favour.

There was sharp language in the Committee's unanimous report. The confiscation had been "unwarrantable and illegal." Middleton had acted under "an unfortunate misconception as to his power." His own appropriation of the furs had been "highly improper". Hayter Reed had since returned the furs but there had been nothing from Middleton.⁶⁴⁷

311. The Report of the Select Committee was debated on 12 May 1890. For over two hours, Edward Blake poured out a mixture of learning and invective upon the unfortunate General while the Government held back its skirts to avoid the sparks. From a large accumulation of legal and military precedents, he belaboured his listeners with learning on plunder, booty, rebels and confiscations. Occasionally the speech stretched towards a parody of Burke on Warrne Hastings. Then it was brought back to earth with a quotation from one or other of the General's more pompous statements to the Select Committee such as:

I thought I was the ruling power up there owing to the state of the war, that I could do pretty much as I liked as long as it was within reason.

Blake did not hold Middleton responsible merely for his portion but for the whole of Bremner's furs and he demanded in the most uncompromising terms that Middleton, and not the Government, should pay every cent.⁶⁴⁸

312. If Blake was attacking the Government, this was a tactical error for it

ensured that they would be able to escape the blame for their servant's crime.

They took prompt advantage of the opportunity. Caron went so far as to invite members to consider extenuating services in a man who had done good service to the country and that Middleton had promised to make good his "error of judgement".⁶⁴⁹ The Prime Minister had less trace of forgiveness. While he:

...would be charitable enough to believe that the confiscation of goods was an error of judgement, but as to the appropriation of the goods, it seems to me that it was not an error of judgement. It was an illegal and improper act and cannot be defended.⁶⁵⁰

Even this seemed palliation to some Opposition members like Peter Mitchell. He demanded that an example should be made of the General, that he should be dismissed, sent home to be cashiered and compelled to refund the price of the furs.⁶⁵¹ E.G. Casey, the Civil Service reformer, called the act "violent theft."⁶⁵² The members on both sides did not entirely forget poor Bermner. As the very last business of the session, they agreed that the Government would not be liable to compensate him and that all efforts would be devoted to making Middleton "atone".⁶⁵³

313. As for Middleton, he was not repentant. Indeed, he believed himself aggrieved. He maintained to Otter that he had been far too busy in the Northwest to be concerned with such things. He had only remained in Battleford for a very short time, planning his dispositions before setting out in pursuit of Big Bear.⁶⁵⁴ He believed that he had been forfeited to appease

French Canadian supporters of the Government⁶⁵⁵ although it had been men like Blake, Lister, Mills and Mitchell who were his most merciless pursuers in the House. On 30 June 1890 he submitted his resignation,⁶⁵⁶ having held on a little longer to avoid any impression of giving way before his attackers and thus admitting their charges. Since 1887, he had been a lieutenant general on the returned list and his military career was over. In accepting his resignation, Caron allowed himself a restrained expression of gratitude for, as he explained cautiously to the Prime Minister: "I feel that as a commanding officer of the Force, he has been a success."⁶⁵⁶

314. It was a bitter disappointment for Middleton to be driven from Canada. With his Canadian wife and his six years of service in Canada, he had practically determined to make his home there. In the few remaining weeks in the country, he attempted to rally sympathy for himself, finally publishing a "Farewell Address to the People of Canada" in which he presented his side of the Bremner scandal and the problem of honours. This did not restore his reputation. His protestations of innocence were ridiculed - in some cases unfairly - while by pushing his list of recommendations, he aroused the anger of that vast majority of potential recipients who felt that they had been offered too little.⁶⁵⁷ He promptly returned to England where he was cordially received by the Duke of Cambridge⁶⁵⁸ and passed into retirement. In his last years, Queen Victoria appointed him to be Keeper of the Crown Jewels in the Tower of London and it was there that he died in 1898.

GENERAL HERBERT AND A CHANGE OF PACE

315. Middleton's departure brought renewed pressure for the command of the Canadian Militia to be placed in the hands of a Canadian. There was no proof that a Canadian officer would be any more popular or any more scrupulous than General Middleton but there was a feeling that he might be more amenable to Canadian feeling. The strength of this pressure aroused considerable alarm among imperialist circles in Britain and when there was considerable delay in announcing the new appointment, Lord Lorne and the Duke of Connaught, both then staying at Osborne, took it on themselves to offer a little paternal advice to the Canadian Prime Minister. The Duke had heard that Colonel Herbert had been recommended to succeed Middleton and he endorsed him warmly. The Canadian force required a military man at its head with a thorough knowledge of his profession. There was excellent material in Canada but the officers required careful training.⁶⁵⁹ Lord Lorne was a little less blunt. While granting that a "son of the soil" should one day have the command, it would be better not to break a link with "Home" until Canadians had had time to gain in rank and experience.

That political and party influence must touch Army as well as other Administrative Departments we all know but I believe that men of both parties may profitably for themselves and their country endeavour by all means to keep matters of Defence outside the action of political exigencies. I know this was your view and I would submit that to allow the Imperial people to have a voice in nominating for the acceptance of the Canadian Govt an officer of military reputation is one safeguard for

Canadian party leaders that may allow them to choose a man for military aptitude alone. There is but one wish here, namely to choose for yr approval the best man who can be got. For such a high Federal command, I should like to see the Canadian Govt. asking 200 or 300 to help in the payment of the officer named, but this may be difficult. That you will reconsider the matter and for the time take a man recommended by the Imperial Govt. is the earnest wish of all here who so much value our close allegiance.⁶⁶⁰

316. This somewhat maudlin appeal was unnecessary for Macdonald had no intention of taking any other than an Imperial officer. In his replicas to these two correspondents, he made his own view clear. To Connaught, he offered a blunt statement of what Canada wanted:

Our sole desire is to get an officer qualified for the position not only on account of his military attainments but from his ability to deal with an irregular force.⁶⁶¹

To Lord Lorne, he went into rather more detailed explanation:

I am very sorry for General Middleton and did what I could to save him, but he acted foolishly and I fear there is more trouble in store for him. The consequence of his faux pas has been that the press have been calling for the appointment of a Canadian officer without reference to the War Office or Horse Guard. The government has no sympathy with

this cry nor, so far as I know, have the leaders of the Opposition. All we want is to get an officer fit for the position and I am personally opposed to the appointment of anyone who is believed by the Imperial Military authorities to be unfit.⁶⁶²

317. Some time before Middleton had even resigned, the Duke of Cambridge had determined upon a successor. Since Middleton had been on the retired list since the end of 1887 and had continued in Canada at the special request of the Canadian Government, it was not surprising that some thought had been given to an appropriate replacement. The new man was Colonel Ivor Caradoc Herbert of the Grenadier Guards. Rather more than most of his brother officers in the Brigade of Guards, Herbert was an enthusiastic, educated and experienced soldier. He had the attributes of manner and fortune which might have been expected of a member of one of England's most distinguished families. He was a Roman Catholic in religion and spoke French well. He was forty years old, active and energetic. It would have been hard to find an officer in more complete contrast with those who had filled the post before. It would have been equally hard to find one who more fitted the qualifications as they had been revealed during fifteen years.⁶⁶³ Of course, there could be difficulties in such an upright man. Lord Stanley, the Governor General, had himself been an officer in the Grenadier Guards in his youth and had subsequently served as Secretary of State for War. He therefore knew his man when he advised the Prime Minister that:

From what I have heard, I think he would be a man who would insist

on things being smart, and who would not hesitate to speak out his mind in the public interest of the service, to those to whom he was answerable officially. He would be led but not driven. I believe he has private means beyond the average, and he would certainly find re-employment at home, so he would probably throw up his appointment if his assent either tacit or expressed, were asked either to neglect of discipline, or to diversion of the money voted by Parliament from the service for which it was given!⁶⁶⁴

318. Macdonald refused to be hurried even in the acceptance of such a paragon. He was annoyed that the selection had been made by the Commander in Chief and widely publicised in the British military press before the Canadian Government had even been consulted.⁶⁶⁵ The pattern for the appointments of Luard and Middleton had been that the Commander in Chief had put forward a short list of suitable officers from whom the Canadian Government had made its choice. Macdonald was determined that this procedure would be followed in this case. The Governor General, sharing the alarm lest a Canadian should be nominated, hastened to support his Prime Minister. Other appointments were brought forward, including Colonel Cavaye, the Duke of Connaught's military secretary, General Hewett, the late Commandant of the Royal Military College at Kingston and Colonel Robinson, the son of a former Canadian Chief Justice.⁶⁶⁶ It was this delay which provoked such alarm at Osborne.

319. Negotiations began in early July and by the middle of September, Stanley felt that they had lasted long enough. At the beginning of that month, the

Duke of Cambridge had written to indicate that he accepted the principle of Canadian selection although he continued to press Herbert's claims. The only officer against whom the Duke was adamant was a fifth possibility, Major General Cameron.⁶⁶⁷ Evidently Tupper's sone-in-law was regarded as rewarded well past his merits with the command of the Royal Military College at Kingston. Stanley had his own objections against Hewett. "R. Engr. officers are not always good in dealing with men - whatever they may be with materials, & they are apt to be "'faddy'".⁶⁶⁸ Macdonald finally made way, having won his point, and Herbert assumed command of the Canadian Militia on 5 December 1890.⁶⁶⁹

320. Unlike his predecessors, Herbert could depend from the outset of his appointment on the close support of the Governor General. As one who still regarded himself as a solider, Lord Stanley had taken an interest in the Canadian Militia from his arrival in 1888 and he looked forward to Herbert as a means of restoring its efficiency. Before the new General had even been appointed, Stanley had sought to draw the Prime Minister's attention to the failings of the force:

The law is excellent, the personnel on the whole is good but in arms, equipment and, above all, discipline, thee seems to me to be very much to be desired. No one, so far as I know, wishes to see Canada a great military country - no one would wish to see the Estimates largely increased - but do allow me to impress on you how strongly I feel that if it were capable of development, even a smaller force than you have

would be preferable, if it could be made efficient, to what you have now. I do not vouch for the statement - for I don't possess the requisite knowledge - but you must be aware that it is openly said that the disposal of the money voted for the Militia is not always that for which it is voted, nor is it influenced only by considerations of the well-being of the force, or of its proper equipment. ...

Let me repeat therefore, that I hope the New General will have a chance given him - I have set & always will set, my face against the Dominion Govt. being asked for too much, but I should be grievously wanting in my duty, if I were to pretend that things were satisfactory at present. If we do not keep our eyes open and our hands fairly ready, we may have a bitter awakening some day.⁶⁷⁰

321. The Government had had warning of the aggressive leadership it had obtained. Herbert's first act was to announce that he would take no responsibility for the Militia Report for 1890. It was left to Colonel Walker Powell to write it, compile it and send it to the printer. His next act was to make a close examination of the state of the permanent corps. The results were alarming. The authorized strength in other ranks was 996. Although they were maintained by the Government to serve as instructors and as models to the rest of the Militia, Herbert discovered that over half of them had less than two year's service. Well over a quarter were employed in duties not connected with instruction. When the non-commissioned officers engaged in regimental duties were also subtracted, Herbert calculated that there were

about 10 men available as extra instructors for the Militia. Of this force, 152 men had deserted during the year although 32 of them had subsequently returned. In a year, there were 128 court martial convictions.⁶⁷¹ Herbert also worked out that the great majority of the men who re-enlisted did so because they were holding the positions with the higher rates of daily pay. Since these were limited in number and since there was no provision for increasing pay with service, the system would not cure itself.⁶⁷²

322. He also discovered that the unit with the most unsatisfactory reputation was the Mounted Infantry School at Winnipeg. After its initial burst of enthusiasm, it fell steadily into a less and less satisfactory conditions. Middleton described Taylor as "an honest, well-intentioned and hard working man" but much afflicted by two or three useless officers.⁶⁷³ In the fall of 1890, conditions had become so bad at the School that complaints were made and Walker Powell was obliged to set out on his own visit of inspection. In his report, he told of very little, beyond the decrepitude of the buildings, the expense of their heating and the lack of light available.⁶⁷⁴ Taylor's own report gave clearer evidence of the state of the units when he admitted that only four men had re-enlisted and nineteen out of a strength of under a hundred had purchased their discharge.⁶⁷⁵ Deciding that the Adjutant-General had not done enough, Herbert set out for Winnipeg in early February to see for himself. His conclusion was that the entire school would have to be changed.

"The condition in which I found it was such that no measure short of complete and radical reorganization could have been of any avail."⁶⁷⁶ Colonel Taylor died not long after the inspection, another officer was obliged to resign his

commission* and two others were transferred to other schools as rapidly as possible. The Mounted Infantry was given a new title, the Canadian Mounted Rifle Corps, a new uniform and a new organization.⁶⁷⁷

323. Back in Ottawa, Herbert once more went after fundamentals. Court martial sentences struck him as being unreasonably long and he told his officers so in a lengthy General Order. "... Punishment should be the necessary and not the excessive vindication of military discipline, since an error on the side of excess, is calculated to cause a feeling of discouragement in the young soldier."⁶⁷⁸ From now on, court martial returns were examined closely and by the General himself. The instructions for the camps for 1891 also show his personal attention and a remedying of some of the old grievances. Instead of having to wait until after their first night in camp to receive rations, the men could be given food on the first day of camp. All ranks were to be provided with two blankets each and small allowances were given to companies and batteries to purchase their own camp kettles. The target practice was again revised so that the only range from which the men would have to fire standing would be 100 yards. The most striking change was the introduction of a point system for the performance of units in camp, with marks for drill, discipline, care of arms and equipment and cleanliness of

* The officer who was compelled to resign was Lieutenant James Bremner, the son of Lieutenant Colonel J.S. Bremner of Halifax, a supporter of Sir John Thompson. The Father's passionate correspondence on behalf of his son gives a vivid, if ex parte view of the social life of Canadian Permanent corps officers in this period.

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dress and regimental lines.⁶⁷⁹ Another major change was that the units to drill were selected by the General himself.⁶⁸⁰

324. It was unfortunate after these careful arrangements that the camps were all held in August and September, for it was never as satisfactory for the rural battalions as June. Herbert managed to see most of the units in camp and many of the city corps during the year. He was not impressed with what he had seen. Some battalions received high praise. The 30th Battalion from Wellington County was evidently worth the 25 cents extra per man which the County spent of it. The 42nd Battalion was reported as one of the best rural battalions the General had seen. For most, however, there was blunt criticism of a sort which had obviously long been due. Uniforms and rifles were dirty. Men were claiming pay for utterly unsuitable horses. Although the infantry schools had been in existence for seven years, there were still few qualified non-commissioned officers in rural battalions and in French speaking units there were almost none.⁶⁸¹ Herbert also complained that money was wasted in training the Militia through the annual shifting of camps. He claimed that he could train more men without increasing the estimates simply by cutting out wasted transportation. In paying the men, he felt that the worst of the British Volunteer and Militia systems had been combined. In the former, as he explained, a capitation grant was paid to units for having efficient members, while in the latter the militiaman himself received a daily rate of pay. He had discovered that in some Canadian city corps, the militiaman was required to sign over his pay to the regimental company fund, an agreement which was not legally binding and which had been successfully challenged. He wished

that this system should be made general and backed by law. In rural corps, he found that the allowances given to captains for drill instruction and for the care of arms were not looked upon as payment for service but as prerequisites to meet the considerable expenses of recruiting their companies every other year. This situation, also, he wished to be recognized.⁶⁸²

325. Middleton had seen virtue in clinging to the Snider. Herbert did not. At best it was an obsolete weapon and those he found in the hands of the Militia had both sights and rifling completely worn out. There were Martini Henrys in store, held chiefly for marksmen, and he recommended that they should be issued. The only problem was to insure that they would be properly cared for. Even in the armouries which had a government caretaker, the military authorities had no control over him. The equipment was also obsolete and rotten. There was not a battalion which could turn out fully equipped on a given day, he reported; there was not a battalion whose boots would stand one month's active service and there was not a regiment of Cavalry nor a battery of artillery whose harness would last even that long. The eighteen field batteries were armed with the 9 pounder rifled muzzle loader, which he felt to be satisfactory, but there was no heavy artillery at all. The old guns handed over by the British in 1870 were out of service. In clothing, he found that some units got more than their share while more got non.⁶⁸³

326. As the Deputy Minister said a little plaintively in his part of the annual report for 1891, "... the Major General has made himself conversant

with the minutest details, good and bad, of our present system," He had not stopped with the Militia. The barracks of the permanent corps were largely unsatisfactory. He could only add a personal emphasis to what Walker Power had said about Fort Osborne in Winnipeg the year before by calling them "... Wholly unfit for occupation by any troops, in the climatic conditions which exist at Winnipeg." As for Tete de Pont Barracks at Kingston, they were host to a series of epidemics of diphtheria and typhoid fever and should be abandoned.⁶⁸⁴ Herbert naturally made himself an immediate advocate for a pension system for the staff and permanent corps. He was shrewd enough to approach the question with an eye to future savings. The excessive proportion of recruits was expensive while a force of aging and trained pensioners would be available as caretakers and as instructors for the Militia. Pensions were not to be separated from efficiency for otherwise pensioners would tend to rise in rank to the highest possible pensionable level and then become a permanent burden to the country.

Appointments on the permanent staff of the Militia are already, in some degree, regarded in the light of pecuniary rewards for past services, rather than as offices, involving duties for which energy, activity and technical knowledge are essential requisites.⁶⁸⁵

327. There were other questions which Herbert did not leave for his Report but took directly to the Governor General. Within a few months of his arrival, he had lodged a determined protest against a practice of long standing in the Department - the reference of questions of discipline to the

Minister. It was a violation of the statute which made the military head responsible for discipline and matter of military administration. It made the Minister a court of appeal over the General's head. All of this was passed along to Macdonald with a gentle suggestion from the Governor General:

I do not know if you mean to move Caron, in course of other Cabinet changes - you once thought of doing so. In that case, I earnestly trust, as I said to you in a letter of July last, that the new Minister will be a man who has some practical knowledge of the Militia force, that he will be a man who can be trusted to administer the votes granted by Parliament with honesty and impartiality & that he will leave details of military discipline to the officer who is charged with it under the statute.⁶⁸⁶

Caron was evidently concerned with every aspect of departmental business which might be described as patronage, even the nomination of officers to Boards of Survey to condemn worn out stores. This degree of interference brought another letter of protest from the general through the Governor General to the Prime Minister. Stanley's kindly excuse for passing on the point was his desire to relieve the Minister from a mass of detail. At the same time, if the General was reduced to a cypher, it would be unlikely that the Canadians would ever get or keep the services of any officer worthy of the name.⁶⁸⁷

328. On 6 June 1891, Sir John A. Macdonald died. On the Militia, as on every

other institution of the Dominion which he had helped to create, his influence was difficult to measure. He was not a simple man and his thoughts about the exiguous military forces which he had allowed to survive were not always the same. The small permanent force which he had once considered to be necessary had come into being but there were few other military developments to his credit. Like his countrymen, he gave military affairs a low priority and was largely unmoved by the Militia colonels and amateur militarists who pressed him to do more. They played little part in Canada or in the Conservative party while Macdonald was alive. General Herbert, who had been in Canada less than a year when Macdonald died, wrote this description of his Military policy to the Duke of Cambridge:

His views were very peculiar. Whilst upholding in the strongest manner political the idea of the integrity of Canada, as a portion of the British Empire, he would do nothing practically for the defence either of the Dominion or the Empire. He looked upon money, voted for militia purposes, only as a means of gaining political party ends, but he was honest enough to keep that use of it within strict limits, and consequently cut down the militia estimates to the lowest possible figure. He knew that at any time he could obtain an increased vote, but he also knew that any money so voted would not yield any corresponding efficiency but would merely add to party claims which would have to be satisfied from that source.⁶⁸⁸

329. Sir John Abbott emerged after the death of Macdonald as a caretaker

Prime Minister. He remained in office for a year and a half.

Sir Adolphe Caron finally gave up his portfolio on 25 January 1892, having held it for ten years and three months. He was succeeded by Mackenzie Bowell, now in his seventies and a somewhat mellower man than the intrepid foe of brigade majors of some twenty years before. The new Minister was faced with a sixteen page memorandum from the Governor General when he entered office. This document, almost certainly written in close collaboration with Herbert, was an attempt to make up for the lost time under Caron. It began with a suggestion that the system of command in the Department be brought up to date with that in the War Office. There were suggestions that boots should be sold at cost to the troops and that the cross belts and other old equipment should be abandoned. Stanley recalled that in 1889, he had arranged for Sniders to be sold to Canada for \$1.00 apiece but Caron had delayed for so long that the offer had fallen through. Now, something would have to be done. The Militia also needed heavy artillery as Herbert had already recommended. The old suggestion that permanent corps commissions be reserved for Royal Military College graduates was raised again. So was the virtue of permanent camps. A new proposal was a permanent school for Ottawa, both to be under the supervision of the Minister and Headquarters and to be available in case of trouble. There were elements in Hull, Stanley pointed out, which might be stirred by religion, politics or strike and "if not checked at once, they might defy control." The Governor General concluded with a stern warning to his elderly Minister:

In conclusion, may I recall the fact that you are in Canada - as the

Secretary of State for War is in the United Kingdom - the Minister responsible for the Defence of the country. I do not think that this was a point which was ever properly appreciated by your predecessor. It does not do to live in a "fool's paradise" in these days of great armaments.⁶⁸⁹

330. Although Bowell had taken a considerable interest in Militia affairs as an independent member, he did not leave much of an impact as a Minister. This did not disturb Herbert who evidently did not seek the attentions of an energetic Minister. In 1883, the artillery had been made into a regiment. Middelton, for some reason, did not like the idea, and the other school corps remained independent and largely unco-ordinated. It seemed to Herbert that one of the ways of restoring their efficiency and morale was to give them a regimental system. In February 1892, he re-numbered the companies of the Infantry School Corps, running them in reverse order so that the old "D" Company became 1 Company and "A" Company at Fredericton became No. 4. Enlistments were to be for general service in any company.⁶⁹⁰ This step was completed by an order in council of 14 May 1892 which approved the titles of Canadian Dragoons and Canadian Regiment of Infantry for the mounted and infantry schools respectively. The same order in council rearranged the military districts. Prince Edward Island lost its independent status and was merged into M.D. 8. The counties of Ottawa and Pontic were put into M.D. 4 which was largely made up of Eastern Ontario. M.D. 5 was given all of Montreal and the surrounding counties while M.D. 6, with headquarters at St. Jean, now was responsible for the Eastern Townships. M.D. 10 acquired the

western end of Algoma including the Lakehead.⁶⁹¹

331. In some areas, Herbert was forced to a halt. While it was possible to draw new boundaries for the district so that they would be easier to control, it was much harder to reduce the number of units within them. In 1892, when he was appealing against the imbalance between rural and city units, a brand new city battalion, the 48th Highlanders, was authorized in Toronto.⁶⁹² Although he was able to find the funds to drill 1,000 extra militia in 1892, largely through allowing more local camps. He still felt that economies could have been made on transportation. Even his efforts to obtain small military libraries for the permanent schools and active militia units were at first frustrated.

332. The camps for 1892 took place chiefly in June and July. The system which Herbert had worked out the year before was largely repeated and once again the permanent corps were used for the bulk of the duties to allow the Militia the maximum opportunity for training. The General was able to visit most of the camps and his comments reflect an even greater displeasure than the previous year. While there was praise for the Toronto city battalions, other cities did not fare so well. The 7th Fusiliers of London, long an unsatisfactory regiment, was reported as "of no Value" and there was a question about even bothering to retain it. Of the 2nd Dragoons "The Commanding Officer does not know his duty and there is general disorganization." The Montreal battalions, with the exception of the Victoria Rifles, were all very weak and the 1st Prince of Wales Regiment was described

as "useless". So were many of the other battalions in the District. The 6th Hussars were in such bade order that the General sent them home and called for the resignation of their colonel.⁶⁹³

333. On 5 December 1892, Sir John Abbott resigned as Prime Minister and his place was taken, as had been arranged, by Sir John Thompson. The new Prime Minister was both a Catholic and a Nova Scotian and it was necessary to give a better place to a representative of Ontario Orangeism like Mackenzie Bowell. He was promoted to the Department of Trade and Commerce. The new Minister of Militia was James Colebrooke Patterson. He had been born in Ireland and had spent many years at Windsor, Ontario. By profession, he was a lawyer and by avocation, a politician. Although he lost his seat in the election of 1891, he retained considerable influence through his control of the Conservative Union of Ontario and Sir John Abbott had brought him in as Secretary of State, arranging a seat for him in West Huron.⁶⁹⁴ Feeling the need of all the Ontario support he could muster, Thompson advanced him to the Militia portfolio. Patterson was not a man with strong opinions about Canadian military policy but his correspondence suggests that he was as aware as some of his predecessors of the patronage potential of his department. His presence ensured that Herbert could continue without interference but without hope of strong ministerial backing.

334. Unaffected by ministerial changes, Herbert continued to urge on his reforms. By the middle of 1893, he could report a new barrack building at

Fort Osborne although the Engineer Branch refused to spend any more money on Tet de Pont barracks at Kingston, reporting them as so unsanitary as to be uninhabitable.⁶⁹⁵ The Canadian Dragoons, Canadian artillery and Regiment of Canadian Infantry were all given the title of Royal Regiments and the right to wear the Royal crown and cipher as a badge. This symbolic distinction was accompanied by a more practical advance through allowing a number of officers and non commissioned officers to attend courses of instruction in England. The year also saw the end of the old three batteries of artillery. "C" Battery was finally withdrawn from Esquimalt. Herbert had found that it was impossible to recruit sufficient men at the Coast and that men would have to be sent continually from the other two batteries. He also found that the little unit, far from supervision, had lapsed into habits which he found unmilitary. It was therefore brought back to Quebec and a new organization for the permanent artillery was worked out. There would henceforth be two garrison companies and a skeleton field battery at Quebec and a complete field battery at Kingston. This allowed the Militia artillery in Ontario to have easy access to a full field battery while the garrison artillery in Quebec and the Maritimes would have a chance to see comparable units functioning at full strength. To make space for the additional artillery and to remove the cavalry from an unsuitable station, "A" Troop of the Royal Canadian Dragoons was moved to Toronto.⁶⁹⁶ None of this helped to solve the recruiting problem and it was also discovered, once a centralized administration was imposed, that many men who had been discharged as unsuitable from one unit were being recruited by another. On the other hand, the quality of the force was beginning to show a modest improvement. Out of the force of an established

strength, of 966, there were only some 820 men on strength on 30 June 1893. However desertions, which had totalled 199 in the previous year, had fallen to 154. There was a small rise in the number of men who had served for more than three years -- from 250 in 1892 to 299 in 1893.⁶⁹⁷

335. Progress with the Militia was much more modest. Herbert evidently felt that he would have to show the public the state of its forces before the Government would be moved to do something about them. An Order in Council was passed at the beginning of 1893, at his instance, which required the submission of a list of establishments for the Militia to Parliament each year. In this way, members would see exactly how large a force of Militia was being maintained on paper and also its real state in numbers.⁶⁹⁸ Having publicised these figures, the General then set out to show that in the Militia, there was one officer for seven privates. Indeed, the situation was even more absurd for when bandsmen, buglers, grooms, servants, waiters and cooks were withdrawn, many of whom were physically unfit for service, probably only 10,000 of the 19,856 privates would actually carry a rifle.⁶⁹⁹ The only solution would be a vigorous programme of consolidation of units. Another aspect of the problem was revealed when Herbert reported that out of about 2,700 militia officers, 678 had no qualification and 135 were still serving with certificates obtained before the British departure.⁷⁰⁰ The same Order in Council which provided for the publication of establishments also laid down that unqualified officers would hold their commissions provisionally and that they would not be appointed in future in any higher rank than second lieutenant. A final improvement for 1893 was the establishment of permanent

training grounds although, in some districts, these were unsuitable for the purpose.

336. 1893 also saw major changes in the staff of a sort which should have aroused considerable interest in Parliament. The brigade majors were finally disposed of and two new appointments were created at Militia Headquarters.⁷⁰¹ The initiative came from Herbert. In his view, the brigade major had nothing to do. They had originally been appointed to supervise the Reserve Militia and subsequently, with reduced numbers, had served as staff officers for the Deputy Adjutants-General. In his view, even these officers had little enough to do. Only two brigade majors had little enough to do. Only two brigade majors were retained - one at Montreal where Lieutenant Colonel Houghton, who spoke no French, had become the Deputy Adjutant-General, the other at Charlottetown as a sop to the Islander. The remainder were dismissed. One was brought to Ottawa to become Adjutant-General. Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. Matthew Aylmer was the first son of Lord Aylmer, a former Governor General of Canada who had settled in the Eastern Townships. He had entered the British Army but, after several years of unexciting garrison service, he resigned his commission and came to live in Canada with his father. He began his service in the Canadian Militia as the the adjutant of his father's battalion and then worked his way slowly through the Militia staff from paymaster to brigade major and when he reached Ottawa at the age of 51, he could look back on twenty three years of plodding but devoted service. Herbert may have regarded Matthew Aylmer as a suitable colleague for Walker Powell. The appointment of quartermaster General, authorized by

statute ten years before, was also filled, by a rather more distinguished officer, Lieutenant Colonel Percy Lake. The new Quartermaster General was the son of a British officer who had settled in Canada. He had served in the Afghan Campaign and in the Sudan, had graduated with honours from the staff college and had spent some years in the War Office and as assistant adjutant-general in the Irish Command. He was an able and energetic officer who was to have a considerable influence on Canadian military affairs.

337. The manner in which these changes were announced to the House of Commons was parenthetical evidence, if any were needed, that Patterson did not have a strong grasp of his department. The presentation of the annual militia estimates was always made more difficult, of course, by the bevy of members who demanded armouries for this place and an additional company for that but Patterson solved all such problems by granting the requests "when the money will be available". The reduction of the staff would save \$5,000, an unexpected triumph but it is evident that he had forgotten the details. When he was prompted, he then forgot the difference in the duties of the brigade majors, the commandants of the schools and the deputy adjutants-general. He finally was reduced to admitting that his figures must be correct because they had been checked by the General. It was not impressive, even as a first performance, for the Minister.⁷⁰²

MORE IMPERIAL ENTANGLEMENTS

338. The 1880s had seen an increase in emotional imperialism in the English-

speaking parts of the British Empire. The Imperial Federation League was formed in the United Kingdom in 1884 and in the same year it had extended to Canada. Its leader in Toronto was Colonel George Denison, the commanding officer of the Governor General's Body Guard and author of a number of works on cavalry which had gained him world acclaim. Denison represented an extreme position in this, as in most of the many causes of his life, but imperial sentiments were a very real force both in England and in Canada. In Canada, they might move in the direction of Imperial Preference but in the United Kingdom, it seemed preferable to think in terms of colonial participation in Imperial defence.

339. In the spring of 1887, a number of colonial representatives were in London to attend the Golden Jubilee of Queen Victoria. Arrangements had been made beforehand that a conference would be held in which important matters of common interest would be discussed. So far as the British were concerned, these were defence and communications. In the former question, they hoped to build on the offers of troops which had been made by several colonies at the time of the Egyptian crises of 1884-85. The Conference was the first attempt to discuss Imperial questions in a common forum and it afforded a fairly accurate foretaste of most of those which were to follow. While colonial delegations were anxious to reach agreement on matters of common concern which independent nations would have settled by treaty, there was a distinct reluctance to enter into binding commitments and nowhere more than in the realm of defence. This was particularly the case with Canada.

340. The two Canadian delegates to the 1887 Conference were Sir Alexander Campbell, Macdonald's confidant and a former Minister of Militia, and Sandford Fleming. In his opening address to the conference, Lord Salisbury, who presided, left no doubt that the question of defence was the major business of the delegates, particularly the sort of imperial defence which had been so lacking at the time of the war scare o 1878. It became evident, however, that apart from some modest concessions on the pay of British officers who might be loaned to the colonies, the British Government wanted the proposals to come from the colonies themselves. They were to have a lengthy wait. When it was his turn, Campbell made a lengthy and somewhat flattering report on the state of the Canadian Militia. The construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway was drawn in as proof of Canada's devotion to Imperial defence. As for the British gifts to Canada, they did not seem so generous in his telling. The crown lands which had been passed over in 1870 had not realized a great amount in annual revenue. And then there was the Charybdis. "She could not steam and she could not sail", he told his fellow delegates, "so that there was no use trying to do anything with her. That discouraged us completely." Other colonies were not yet discouraged about naval defence and the Australian colonies entered into some agreements for the establishment of a squadron of their own. Canada, however, made no commitments and in the final report of the Conference, she should only be congratulated on having "an available force of active militia" of nearly 37,000 men.⁷⁰⁴

341. There were two places in Canada which were of particular concern to the

British authorities: Halifax and Esquimalt. Halifax was their problem and a garrison was maintained there of British troops. Esquimalt, however, was left to the Canadians. It was evident that this was incompatible with any serious effort being made for its defence. The little battery of permanent artillery became steadily further reduced through desertion and wastage. The Militia equally languished. By 1893, all the various and exiguous companies had disappeared save four batteries of garrison artillery, three of them at Victoria, mustering for the annual inspection in December of 1892 only 10 officers and 137 other ranks. In 1885, the problem had led to negotiations between the Canadian and British Governments, part of which had been devoted to the recruiting of British pensioners for "C" Battery. Other parts of the scheme had included British provision of guns for fortifications.

General Middleton had set a minimum garrison for Esquimalt at about 500 men. With "C" Battery and the available Militia artillery, there would be no more than 260. The Canadians suggested that the British should provide a depot of 215 Royal Marine Artillery to fill the gap and that they should also contribute the ammunition for the guns. Although the request was reluctantly passed to the War Office by the Governor General, Lord Lansdowne, it was asking altogether too much from the British authorities and the matter of Esquimalt was allowed to drop.⁷⁰⁵

342. In 1889, the question was again raised in a despatch to the Governor General from England. It was passed to the Prime Minister but Macdonald was not prepared to give the question new consideration and again it was dropped.⁷⁰⁶ On his arrival, Herbert became convinced that to continue to

maintain "C" Battery from drafts from the other two batteries was not efficient and he was also anxious to bring the units of his small permanent force under his own control. Lengthy negotiations began with the British Government for a more satisfactory solution of the problem of providing troops for the naval base. In 1893, they were completed. The men of "C" Battery were withdrawn and the feeble force of Militia artillery was doubled.⁷⁰⁷ Canada agreed to pay the Imperial Government \$70,000 to build forts and to set up submarine mine defences of 42,000 for modern armaments. In addition, she was to make an annual contribution of \$47,500 towards the cost of the British garrison. The first detachments of Royal Marine Artillery and Royal Engineers arrived in August, 1893, with more following during March 1894. Lieutenant Colonel Peters, who had commanded "C" Battery under Holmes, remained as Deputy Adjutant-General for M.D. 11 while Holmes was sent to Winnipeg.⁷⁰⁸ With the establishment of this British garrison, the authority of the British officer commanding at Halifax was extended to the West Coast for the Marines came under the Army Act when ashore.

343. Having organized his permanent corps into a regimental structure, Herbert began to look for further ways of making them efficient. Like others before him, he came to the conclusion that the best means would be to give the Canadians the advantage of serving with the British Army. With characteristic energy, Herbert set himself to preparing a lengthy memorandum which he submitted to the War Office in May, 1894. He began with an account of the Canadian Militia since the British withdrawal in 1870, pointing out the steady deterioration due to the lack of proper instruction and the pervasiveness of

political corruption. The establishment of permanent corps had not fully made up the deficiencies for it, itself, lacked experience and training. His solution was to make its units interchangeable with those of the British Army so that it could serve abroad. This would have the effect of giving Canadians greater pride in their own forces while the British units which would be exchanged for the Canadians would provide an excellent example for the Militia. There were political advantages as well. The bonds between the two countries would be made stronger, British troops would wish to settle in Canada and their presence would open new fields for British capital.⁷⁰⁹

344. Herbert was not cast down when there was no response to his proposal. It lay before the Cabinet for the summer. In early October, he apparently read in the newspapers that Britain was planning an increase to the garrison of Hong Kong. Patterson was promptly approached and the idea was implanted in his mind that it would be a splendid stroke for Canada if she were to make the offer to supply the additional troops. Patterson evidently put it before his colleagues and quickly gained a somewhat lightly considered approval. When he emerged from the cabinet meeting, he asked Herbert to draft a telegram to the High Commissioner in London, embodying the offer. Herbert suggested that the message had better pass through the Governor General's office, suspecting privately that it would be a more secure check on the Minister's work. On the following day, Herbert discovered that the telegrams had been sent both through the Governor General's office and to the High Commissioner, Sir Charles Tupper. However neither telegram had gone in cipher. What was more astonishing was that they had not gone by cabinet order but by the sole

authority of the Minister. The text was uncompromising:

Dominion Government desires to offer services of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Infantry to the Imperial Government in the event of circumstances necessitating increase of Garrisons. Please ascertain from War Office the terms under which such an offer would be accepted.⁷¹⁰

Sir John Thompson discovered about the offer from the governor General's secretary. The bewildered Thompson was given two choices - he could cancel to offer or he could ratify. Full of protests, he chose to ratify the offer and then settled back to await the appalling possibility that it might be accepted.

345. The telegram bewildered the Colonial Office. There had been no request for troops and there was no urgent need for them. 1894 was one of the more peaceful years of the late Victorian period. Sir Charles Tupper, however, understood the purpose of the message and took his responsibilities seriously.

He was sufficiently aware of the interests of the Canadian Pacific Railway to know that the publicity could have as much value for the company as for Canada as a whole. As for accepting the offer, there was really not much danger. A polite reply was sent to Canada thanking her but explaining that the need for troops had not arisen. It was more difficult to know whether or not to publicize the offer. The Permanent Under Secretary at the Colonial Office was convinced that the maximum advantage should be taken of the offer both to publicize the Empire and to work out firm procedures for the future. The

Secretary of State for War, Henry Campbell-Bannerman, took a more restrained view. By the time the papers reached him, he had been made aware of the circumstances behind the offer. He had found out that Patterson had acted improperly and, with some experience of his own generals, he was inclined to suspect that it was Herbert who was really at fault. For some time, the Colonial Office continued to protest that their version was correct because it coincided with that presented by the enthusiastic Tupper and they were only quietened by a copy of Herbert's own report on the arrangements which proceeded the offer.⁷¹¹

346. The offer of troops for Hong Kong was an aberration, a serious cabinet fumble rather than a change in policy. It did mark a change, however, that Thompson could even have conceived of approving the offer once it had been made. It was an anticipation of the sort of military imperialism which was less than six years away.

HERBERT IS OVERCOME

347. The Hong Kong affair did not help Herbert's stock in either London or Ottawa. The War Office was displeased that it had not been consulted and it was not properly grateful for the prospect of having 500 Canadians of doubtful efficiency presented to it. In Ottawa, the cabinet had its suspicions aroused. Patterson, too, did not last much longer at the Militia Department. His parliamentary performances did not improve with time although he was carried along by his competent subordinate. On 25 March 1895, he was demoted

to Minister without Portfolio and during the following summer, he was appointed Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba. The new Minister of Militia was Arthur Rupert Dickey, the son of one of the Fathers of Confederation and, at 40, one of the youngest men to become Minister of Militia. Dickey was a Nova Scotia lawyer whose chief interest until he entered the cabinet appears to have been prohibition. He had served a few months as Secretary of State when he transferred to his new office.⁷¹²

348. 1894 saw continued progress in some aspects of the Militia. Crime was reduced in the permanent corps while the number and quality of the recruits was increased. Two particular advances were made during the year. Small detachments from the Militia field batteries were assembled at Laprairie where officers, non-commissioned officers and gunlayers received intensive training from "A" Battery. Even more significant was the assembling of the four companies of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Infantry at Levis. In addition, 162 volunteers from the Militia, of all ranks, attended the camp and were formed into two additional companies of the battalion. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Otter and under the close supervision of Herbert, the troops worked and drilled together for the first time. It was a lengthy job to mould four very different systems of discipline and administration into a uniform pattern. There was also a chance to modernize the thinking of officers and men. As Herbert observed:

The ideas on military training which have been handed down traditionally in Canada, are those of a bygone age, antecedent even to

the introduction of the breech-loader, and though the more recent changes, in certain forms of drill, have been adopted, the tactical requirements, on which these changes have been based, have been ignored.⁷¹³

When the camp was over, Herbert could feel that real progress had been made and that, with regular camps for the permanent force, the little army could achieve a high standard of efficiency.

349. It would have been astonishing if Herbert had been allowed to pursue his merciless course of reform without opposition. While there were many faults with the Canadian Militia, including the perpetual problem of political influence, Herbert shared the common belief among competent commanders that main weakness was among his officers. He did not spare them from criticism. When Colonel Holmes took six months to send in a return, an angry observation was placed on his file: "I have never read a report exhibiting a more complete absence of energy and life. If this is the condition of the Officer Commanding this District, I have little hope of the militia under his command becoming a living organization."⁷¹⁴ After the camp at Levis, the Commandant of the School at St. Jean received a severe rebuke for the condition in which the men of his company had left their lines. He was also warned against passing on the blame to a subordinate.⁷¹⁵ Among permanent corps officers, Herbert insisted on meticulous observation of the regulations. When Lieutenant Colonel Smith at London appointed an orderly room sergeant, he neglected to notify Headquarters. Promptly there was a series of messages from the General

informing the Commandant that he was guilty of submitting a false return.⁷¹⁶

Colonel Peters at Victoria was treated to a categorical reprimand:

It is but too evident however that this officer looks upon his appointment as a mere sinecure, that he lacks all interest in his duties, and fails to realize that any importance attaches to them.

It is not sufficient for him to remain at Victoria, and to be satisfied with the routine, of little more than normal duties, which is all that there is to occupy him there. He must, by constant and persistent attention, establish his influence on the mainland, and must lead, and direct, the instruction and organization of the units of Militia which are committed to his charge and are solely dependent on him for guidance.

At present he is neither looked up to be the Militia, with which he is not in touch, nor does he command any confidence from his superiors.⁷¹⁷

350. When officers failed to improve, they had to be removed. Lieutenant Colonel Turnbull of the Royal Canadian Dragoons had attracted his attention from the start. When his troop was moved from Quebec to Toronto, a serious deficiency in Government property was uncovered. Instead of arresting quartermaster sergeant who was responsible, Turnbull tried to cover up the loss and gave the non-commissioned officer a discharge with an exemplary

character. For this, Herbert demanded his resignation. When it was not forthcoming, Turnbull was suspended. Herbert then proposed that the inefficient colonel should be removed but that he should retain his gratuities.⁷¹⁸ Instead, he was released from suspension by the Minister. Another officer whom Herbert managed to remove was Colonel Houghton, the Deputy Adjutant-General at Montreal. The statement of his faults was withering:

His habits are indolent and intemperate, he has no knowledge of military duty and apparently no desire to learn. I am constantly obliged to call him to account for neglect of duty, and on one occasion brought him personally before Sir Adolphe Caron, then Minister of Militia, who warned him against a continuance in the course of neglect which he was then pursuing. He is not respected by the local militia force nor is he looked up to as a guide or instructor by them.

To Houghton, too, Herbert suggested generous treatment. He should be placed on the retired list with a gratuity of two year's salary, the standard terms for retired staff officers.⁷¹⁹ Thus Houghton, too, escaped for a little longer.

351. 1894 was the year that Patterson was persuaded to re-arm the Militia. After a warm debate, the British Army decided to adopt the Lee Metford, a bolt action, magazine rifle. The Canadians, with the advice of Herbert, decided that the Martini Metford would be sufficient for the Militia.⁷²⁰ It was simply

a Martini Henry, a single shot rifle modified with the Metford barrel. Although it was hardly a revolutionary weapon, it satisfied military authorities by its simplicity and relative durability under rough treatment while parliamentary experts were reassured by its familiarity. Although Martini Henrys had never been generally issued to the Militia, they had been held in store for target practice. 1000 of the rifles were purchased in 1893 and they were distributed to the permanent corps. Since the more modern bullet rendered almost all the old rifle ranges unsafe, an extensive rebuilding programme had to be started. This was, in fact, to be a major controlling factor in the adoption of the new rifle.⁷²¹

352. The drill for 1894 had been planned as usual, with 12 day brigade camps in most districts and the city corps looking forward to drilling at their own armouries as usual. The adoption of a financial year which ran from 1 July to 30 June meant that the actual details had to be left until very late. However there were rumours that the Minister had other plans. Government revenues had not been satisfactory during the year as Canada was suffering the side effects of a depression in the United States. On 22 June 1894, Patterson rose in the House to announce that he was cutting \$103,500 from his estimates for drill pay. The camps which had already been ordered for Ontario had been postponed for the year but now they were to be cancelled. There were to be no camps for the Militia until the following year. The excuse was the proposed purchase of rifles. "We cannot have both camps and rifles," he told the members, "and the militia would rather get the rifles and go without the camps for one season." He went on to explain that he was buying 8,000 of the Martini-Metfords from

the British Government, spreading the payments over three years and that the 5,000 Martini-Henrys in store would also be converted. With all the additional costs and the expense of conversion, the amount to be spent on rifles came close to \$100,000 but since the saving by not holding camps was \$159,000, Patterson could still make his peace with the Minister of Finance.⁷²²

353. The sudden cancellation of the drill for almost all the rural corps meant that orders had to be issued quickly. This task fell to the Adjutant-General, and Herbert gave him a rough draft. The proofs of the orders came back on Friday and it was essential that they should appear in the Gazette on the following Saturday. Otherwise, they would be delayed for a week,. Herbert did not come in to the office on that day, as he was indisposed, and Walker Powell himself initialled the order and sent it out. When Herbert returned to the office, he demanded to know why the proper procedure had not been followed.⁷²³ Walker Power, in comparable dudgeon, explained that since Herbert had been absent, the proof had been returned with orders to print.⁷²⁴ Considering this to be an impertinent answer, Herbert ordered that Powell would be suspended, his office closed until further notice and the Quartermaster General, as the senior staff officer, would act as Chief Staff Officer.⁷²⁵ This explosion was, of course, only the culmination of a long series of irritations which Herbert had felt towards his Adjutant-General. It was inevitable after twenty six years of conducting the affairs of the Department that Walker Powell should feel perfectly competent to issue orders without the supervision of a transient General Officer but Herbert would not stand for it. Only a few days before, he had discovered that Walker Powell

had reversed a decision which the General had made in March. At that time, Herbert had sent him a characteristic order that he was to "have the goodness to bear in mind in future that you have, as Adjutant-General, no authority to give any decisions except 'by order' of the Major General Commanding".⁷²⁶ The appointment of additional staff officers at headquarters may also have been a source of grievance to Walker Powell.

354. His suspension was ended by the Minister of Militia as soon as possible. The old officer was a popular and respected figure in Ottawa. His knowledge of the Department was encyclopedic and his influence with parliamentarians and with the wide circle of Militia officers was enormous. Even Colonel Denison liked him.⁷²⁷ By his attack on Walker Powell, Herbert opened the gates of anger which had been building up against him and all he had been trying to do in the Militia. On a supply motion on 17 July 1894, Herbert was attacked by members of both parties on the floor of the House. The debate was opened by Lieutenant Colonel David Tisdale who raised Walker Powell's grievance and challenged the right of any British general to suspend an official of the Canadian Government. The broader basis of his attack on Herbert soon became clear. The General was demanding too high a standard from the Militia while forgetting that they had other concerns in the world besides soldiering.

His criticisms are always harsh, his exactions are severe, his demands for minutiae in the force are exacting. I desire to say further that a man who properly understands the force and wishes to make a success of his command would always meet the officers and men in a

spirit of conciliation, of instruction, and of encouragement, and of one of appreciation throughout.

Unless the General became acquainted with the circumstances of the country, the sooner he severed his connections with it the better.⁷²⁸

355. Tisdale was seconded by Major Sam Hughes Member from Victoria County. As a high ranking Orangeman, Hughes had already had occasion for an attack on Herbert.⁷²⁹ During his inspection of the 65th Battalion in Montreal earlier in the year, Herbert had addressed the unit in French, praising the Zouaves Pontificaux as an embodiment of the fine military tradition of the French Canadian.⁷³⁰ This delighted Quebec but provoked the Orange Lodges to fury. Hughes now had a second opportunity. He had no difficulty in judging that Herbert was very good at field manoeuvres but as a manager of men, he was a complete failure. To prove it, he brought forth a long recital of officers who had been injured by the General through not being promoted while others, all of whom had something against them, had been brought forward to displace the righteous. There were Captains Harston and Manley of the 10th Royal Grenadiers who had seen Captain Mason passed over their head. There was his dictatorial treatment of the officers of the 1st Prince of Wales Regiment of Montreal. Most terrible of all was the treatment of Colonel Lazier of the 15th Argyll Light Infantry of Belleville.

356. Colonel Lazier had commanded his battalion since 1876. His battalion had its inspection date postponed in 1983 from June until October. How it

happened that on the day in October on which the inspection was to take place, the local Conservatives were receiving the Prime Minister and a number of local members and they wished the use of the drill hall. Lazier asked for a postponement of the inspection as a matter of course and was astonished when it was not granted. Since Lazier had given up drilling in anticipation of a lengthy delay, he was far from ready to be inspected. He got no mercy from the Deputy Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Colonel Cotton. The inspection took place and it was not a success. Lazier was even more discontented when he discovered that men whom he claimed for pay were struck off. He had failed to notice reductions in establishment which had been ordered in General Orders. Indeed, he claimed that he had received no notification. Not long after, Lazier left for Battle Creek, Michigan, for the sale of his health and from there, full of his persecution, he submitted his resignation.⁷³¹ Hughes was supported in presenting this sad example of Herbert's discipline by William Mulock, the Liberal member for North York, who demanded British justice for the unfortunate colonel.⁷³²

357. Unlike the majority of the other Ministers of Militia, Patterson rose to defend his British general. While he refused to state whether military officers had the right to suspend, he did admit that the action might have been a little hasty. However, he pointed out that Herbert was not here to defend himself and insisted that no British officer would be a stranger in Canada. As for Colonel Lazier, the facts were that his battalion had fallen into a complete state of disorganization.* The year before, at the request of

* This is borne out by the Inspection Reports for the battalion.

the officers, a large deficiency had been written off but this year, there was another just as large. Books had not been kept and regulations had not been observed. The caretaker in the armoury had not even been paid, although the allowances for that purpose had been drawn. When called to account, Lazier had replied in an insulting and insubordinate manner. The Minister hoped that his example would be of value throughout the force.

The members of the militia force are under service. The privates are sworn in for a period of years, and the officers are there under obligation to carry out their duty under the Militia Act. and the rules and regulations of the service. They have got to live up to their obligations or retire from the service, for we are not going to have a mob and pretend that we have a militia. The work of the militia is not a camping-out like a Knights of Pythias excursion, and we want the distinction to be understood.⁷³³

358. On 23 February 1895, Herbert obtained leave and returned to England. While he conducted some minor business for the Government, he was not expected to return and there were conflicting rumours about his position. Personal affairs had drawn him back to England and as the end of his leave approached, questions were asked in Parliament as to whether he would be back. The question had a little additional urgency since the camps which had been cancelled so precipitately the year before were suddenly authorized for June. The rural battalions which had been deprived the year before were given just over a month's notice to prepare themselves.⁷³⁴ Herbert did, in fact, return,

but it was only for the month of July.⁷³⁵ His resignation took effect on 1 August 1895, and he promptly returned to England. In a valedictory address to the Militia, he gave acknowledgement to the new desire for efficiency and for qualifications which had arisen in the Militia. There was a paragraph of recognition for the rural militia and "the cheerful manner in which they responded to his efforts to raise the standard of instruction, sobriety, order and soldier-like behaviour..." There was special tribute to the officers and men of the permanent corps who had found him a demanding but devoted master.⁷³⁶

Once again Walker Powell found himself in acting command of the Militia.

359. Since Herbert's main concern had been with the permanent corps, it was unfortunate that the first act of the new Minister, R.B. Dickey, was to reduce their strength from over a thousand to eight hundred. Since the Government had been forced by public outcry to allow the annual training for 1894-95, a reduction in the permanent corps was one way of making a compensating reduction in the estimates. It was also enormously popular to judge from the reaction among members. A succession of speakers arose, very few of whom had anything good to say about the permanent troops. William Mulock spoke for those in the Militia who had been able to qualify while carrying on their normal daily work. Such men resented the necessity to attend schools and subject themselves to continuous military discipline in order to qualify for commissions. Frederick Denison, a member of the Denison clan, pointed out that while the Militia estimates had steadily risen over the years, the increases had almost entirely gone to pay for the permanent corps. Colonel O'Brien, although a Conservative, had little praise for his

colleagues' management of the Militia. Not only had the uncertainty about the annual drill caused him great difficulty in turning out his battalion but the Government had broken the law by allowing the strength of the permanent corps to exceed 1,000. He, too, complained that the force was kept up as a standing army at the expense of the Active Militia.⁷³⁷

360. The member who had the most to say about the Militia was Major Sam Hughes. He blamed the permanent corps on the Liberals and suggested that the old cadet system should be revived. By this plan the schools would be systematically supplied with men from the Active Militia battalions who would be sent to be trained and qualified. Referring to the Levis camp of the previous year, he insisted that the two companies of Militia were the equal of the permanent force companies within two weeks. There were other grievances of the rural militia. Hughes complained about the reduction of the number of officers and non-commissioned officers in the Militia. He was also angry that permanent corps officers were placed in charge of the training camps, often over Militia officers who were senior to them in rank. An example which must have particularly annoyed Hughes was the appointment of his life-long enemy Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Buchan to command the camp at Niagara on the Lake.⁷³⁸

361. Although Dickey had hoped to make his entire savings from the permanent corps, he also found it necessary to make a further reduction in the amount of drill allowed the Militia. \$80,000 was provided for the drill of the field batteries and the city corps and the Minister told the House that this would

be sufficient for twelve days training.⁷³⁹ In fact, the order only authorized eight days training and there was no provision for the rural militia at all.⁷⁴⁰

The administration of the Department was evidently in disorder. The reductions which Patterson had so proudly announced the year before had to be covered with supplementary estimates. For two years in succession, the arrangements for the training camps were altered and rearranged without notice. It had also become evident that another military institution, the Royal Military College, was falling into an increasingly unsatisfactory state.

362. Some of the difficulties of the College were of long standing. The radiates of similar institutions in Britain and the United States were guaranteed military commissions in return for their specialized training. This was not the case for the Canadian cadets save for the Imperial commissions which were granted annually. By 1895, only eleven of the officers of the permanent corps and staff were ex-cadets. A second problem, the limitation of the College to one language, had come no closer to a solution. There was also difficulty in making the College better known to Canadians at large.⁷⁴¹ With all these difficulties, enrolment seems to have been limited in great part to the sons of Militia officers and to the sons of the better off in the larger cities. As a result, the College was attacked for giving a heavily subsidised education to those who could best afford to provide it for themselves while there was also a complaint that the Canadian taxpayer was paying for officers for the British Army. In the management of the College, there were all the problems of political pressure and patronage to content with. Catering and tailoring contracts were granted according to a patronage

list and this did not encourage the most economical management.

363. In the summer of 1888, Major General Cameron was appointed Commandant. As has been mentioned, he was a retired officer of the Royal Artillery. He owed his appointment to the influence of Sir Charles Tupper. When he took command, a serious problem of the College was shortage of accommodation but this problem seems to have diminished during his tenure with the steady decline in enrolment. Cameron's reports were in the Selby Smyth tradition of rhetoric but they concealed declining standards of performance. As the standard of the College were set by itself, it is very difficult to know how the qualifications of graduates under Cameron compared with those of earlier classes or of graduates from similar institutions. In the fall of 1894, a young man was forced to leave the College for medical reasons as a result of an incident of "recruiting", the process by which the first year members were initiated by the senior class. In his report, Cameron tried to give a more modest interpretation of the incident. "The case was described as one of extreme hazing - but hazing as properly understood implies the existence of a system in which irresponsible authority is conceded by custom to the seniors over the juniors. Nothing of the kind prevails here.⁷⁴² This version did not pacify the newspapers nor did it convince those who knew the College. The outcry reached Parliament when the Military College was readily tied to the Military Schools as another institution which diverted money from the Active militia.

364. Colonel Fred Denison, who had a son at the College, placed the blame

directly on the Commandant and he moved an amendment that the vote for the College should be reduced to \$3,163, the amount of Cameron's salary. In the course of the debate, it emerged that the enrolment at the College had steadily declined during his tenure. Moreover Cameron's claim that his appointment was for life was sustained by the spokesmen for the Government. In the hands of George Casey, the civil service reformer, Cameron's reports were turned against him. The college was supposed to give an excellent education. The only real progress claimed by the Commandant was the size and weight of his young men. He obviously took a real pride in this fattening process. In the report for 1894, Cameron had written:

No prize is assigned to this important department of college business. I may, therefore, here mention that had a prize been available, it would have been won by a most distinguished competitor, for he added to his chest breadth 5 3/4 inches, to his weight 89 pounds, and to his stature, 8 1/4 inches.⁷⁴³

Other members complained that for the eleven officers then in the permanent corps, keeping the College in existence had cost \$91,000 apiece. For the 58 cadets then at the College, there was a staff of 33, including a butler.⁷⁴⁴ Colonel Amyot described the College as a school for emigrants and demanded its abolition.⁷⁴⁵ The Minister of Militia could only reply that if the Commandant was old, the staff was young.⁷⁴⁶ This did not pacify the members. The College continued to serve as a basis for lively criticism of the Government in and out of Parliament.

GENERAL GASCOIGNE SEEKS PEACE

365. It was necessary for Herbert's vacancy to be filled. The extensive negotiations on personality and principle which had accompanied previous appointments did not occur on this occasion. The Government was far too preoccupied with other matters and Sir Mackenzie Bowell did not have the grasp of detail to be much concerned in it. His Minister of Militia was far too inexperienced and junior in the Cabinet to raise this issue and the Governor General was the most unmilitary Lord Aberdeen. The new General Officer Commanding was Colonel William Julius Gascoigne of the Scots Guards. He was promoted to local major general on 17 July 1895 and took up his Canadian post on 19 September 1895. Gascoigne was described by the Toronto Globe as "peculiarly well qualified for the post he occupies" but in comparison to Herbert, the compliment has a certain ring of irony. Born the son of a general in 1844, his career had been an undistinguished progress through the ranks of his regiment, interspersed with two periods of active service when he had accompanied battalions of his regiment to Egypt. His only previous connection with Canada had been to accompany General Lindsay as aide-de-camp in the spring and summer of 1870. His major connection with reserve forces had been to command a school of instruction for them in London for two years.⁴⁷⁴ Gascoigne was evidently the least distinguished of all the officers who had been sent to Canada. He had not even Luard's claim to a gallant career on active service. His intention seems to have been to keep the peace, avoid dispute and enjoy his stay in Canada as completely as possible. It was

not to be.

366. Previous General Officers Commanding had brought out their own aides-de-camp, under the right which had been established when the office was first set up. This had caused angry comment in Canada among those who felt that excellent Canadian officers had been slighted. Gascoigne determined to avoid trouble by picking a Canadian officer for his staff. This led to a flood of applications for the post from an astonishing number of influential people. From the volunteers, Gascoigne picked Lieutenant Alexander MacLean from the 43rd Battalion.⁷⁴⁸ The gesture started him on the wrong foot. The nationalists were hardly placated by such a minor appointment, those nominations had not been accepted were disgruntled while Ottawa hostesses were deprived of the society of a highly eligible young British officer.

367. If Gascoigne believed that he could avoid difficult situations, he was to be swiftly disillusioned. As a result of the unsatisfactory situation at the Military College, the Government finally established the Board of Visitors which had been envisaged in the original act setting up the College. Under the Adjutant-General, Colonel Powell, the Board consisted of two other officers, and of Sanford Fleming, the distinguished engineer and Duncan Macpherson of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The Board inspected the College in November. While all the members seem to have been agreed that affairs were not satisfactory, Fleming complicated matters by submitting a minority report in which he condemned the whole curriculum of the College, protesting that it should not be offering instruction in subjects taught in

civilian universities. The majority of the Board of Visitors submitted two reports. While not condemning Cameron personally, they came as close as they dared, recommending a fixed term of from five to seven years, to be filled by an active British officer of no more than the rank of lieutenant colonel. This report was made public. A second report, produced on the same date, was not. It stated bluntly that it was necessary for the well-being of the College that several of the staff be replaced by better men.

The first of these is the commandant. This officer, it is clear, does not take that interest in his work and does not exercise that supervision over those under him that he should do. To this more than anything else appears to be due that lack of confidence in the college which seems to have spread throughout the country.. At all events, that is the feeling amongst the staff and cadets and the board is satisfied that no real improvement can take place in the college until a change has been made in the commandant.⁷⁴⁹

Such a report was a grave embarrassment to the Government, particularly since their leader in the House of Commons was Cameron's brother-in-law.

General Gascoigne was asked to go down to the College and make a personal report.

368. On the last day of November, he went down to the College in full uniform, giving warning of his visit. He inspected two classes, saw the cadets on parade and at gymnastics and had another look at them during dinner.

He looked over the buildings and asked for complaints. He received none. On his return, he asked the Minister to grant the young men an extra week for their Christmas holiday in recognition of his visit.⁷⁵⁰ Then he settled down to write his report. Most of it was full of praise. There were some areas of criticism. The hospital was more like a prison cell, located in a dark basement, with hot water pipes passing along the ceiling. The cadet's hair was too long. He was emphatic that commissions in the permanent corps should be reserved to graduates. He placed great stress on the liberality of the British Government in granting Imperial commissions to the young men:

The liberality is so extraordinary that I verily believe that if, in any way, the idea gained ground that this liberality was not properly made use of, it would at once be withdrawn sic any one who really studied what this home competition really was, how terribly it pressed on Young Englishmen, could hardly blame the Mother Country for withdrawing these commissions.⁷⁵¹

Unfortunately this was not all in his report. The staff was excellent with two exceptions. The French professor, M. Duval, was a hopeless incompetent in the General's view. The poor man had not even been able to keep order in his class in the General's presence. And the Commandant was not appropriate.

.... I cannot but think that after a certain lapse of time, any man loses that zeal, activity and interest which it is so absolutely necessary should be kept up in the case of the Officer in chief command

of a Military Educational Establishment. Young men are especially quick to receive impressions and energy and great personal smartness of dress and appearance, are in my opinion essential to form a good commandant.⁷⁵¹

This sort of report was not the reassurance that the Government had sought and both Gascoigne's and the supplementary report of the Board was filed.

Parliament was left to make what it could of the Board's first report.

369. As Gascoigne was preparing his report on the Royal Military College, a crisis was developing which was far more important to Canada than the future of General Cameron. After a dispute over the border of British Guiana, Venezuela broke off diplomatic relations with Great Britain. This led to an appeal to the Monroe Doctrine and the involvement of the United States. In December, President Cleveland addressed a message to Congress in which he declared it to be the duty of the United States to protect Venezuelan territory by war if necessary. In the violence of its tone, it was without precedent and Canadians felt themselves closer to war with their southern neighbour than at any time since the Trent Affair. They were helped in their sense of alarm by the statements of prominent American political and military leaders who hastened to assure their countrymen of a swift and easy triumph in the event of war. The Canadian government reacted urgently. Colonel Lake, the Quartermaster General was ordered to England by the Minister of Militia with authority to purchase the arms and equipment which the Militia so completely lacked. Orders were placed for 40,000 Lee-Enfield rifles and 2,300 Lee-Enfield carbines. Several batteries of twelve pounder guns were also

ordered, together with ammunition and harness. All of this was done in the deepest secrecy and even when Parliament met, in a state of deep tension at the beginning of 1896, money to pay for the new weapons was not requested for fear of publicising the country's defenceless state.

370. In the midst of the crisis, the Militia Department lost its Minister and its Adjutant-General. Under protest, Walker Powell left office on 1 January 1896, complaining about the superannuation he was allowed.⁷⁵² No successor was appointed, and the elderly Matthew Aylmer took over temporary responsibility for the office. On 4 January 1896, partly as a result of domestic crises, partly because of the new dangers of the Venezuela crisis, seven members of the cabinet determined to show their lack of confidence in the Prime Minister by submitting their resignations directly to the Governor General. Among the so-called "nest of traitors" was Arthur Dickey. After over a week of negotiations during which no policy could be made, the Government was reformed, with Sir Charles Tupper being brought back from the Canadian High Commission in London to be the leader in the House of Commons. Dickey replaced Charles Hibbert Tupper as Minister of Justice and the new Minister of Militia and Defence was Senator Alphonse Desjardins. The new Minister was the least competent of all those who had held the portfolio. He knew nothing about military affairs save for such experience as he may have acquired in helping to organize the papal Zouaves. Despite what appeared to be the most serious military crisis in over thirty years, Desjardins took little interest in the affairs of his Department and continued to spend two days each week in Montreal, attending to his personal business.

371. In these circumstances, Gascoigne, who by training and background, had to take the situation seriously, could be excused for writing in desperation to Sir Redvers Buller, the Adjutant General at the War Office. What he sought was advice. Was there any agreement which compelled Canada to play a reasonable part in her own defence or was England prepared to bear the whole burden? If there was no agreement, he would be prepared to do his best by moral persuasion and by influence, should he gain any, to improve the Militia and to obstruct political influence. If there was an agreement, it was his duty to point out that Canada was keeping it in no essential. When he had come out, it had not seemed likely that Canada would face anything more formidable than Fenians but now there was a risk of full scale war. The British might take the situation seriously but the Canadians simply got rid of the Adjutant-General and allowed the Minister to resign without replacing him for ten days. Since even the slightest expenditure had to be sanctioned by the Minister, his absence, or the presence of one who was entirely ignorant of Militia matters paralysed business. He was left without a staff officer since Lake was in England. He asked that some authority should be given to the British officer in charge of the force:

At present, beyond the moral feeling of dislike of dislike to run counter to the opinion of the English Major-General: (a feeling which exists only as long as that Officer is not unpopular) that Officer has literally no power whatever: no power to prevent the most flagrant injustices: no power literally to do the smallest thing himself: and

it is quite impossible without some semblance of power, for any man to be held responsible, for the well-being or otherwise of a force, only nominally under him.

This was not all. He had no control over munitions, stores and fortifications as these were absolutely under the Deputy Minister. Yet nothing was in worse condition. The forts were in decay and none were under the care of more than one man. The gun carriages were rotting rapidly under the effects of the climate. There was no supervision of arms and it was for that reason that he had urged the purchase of the Martini-Enfield. Public pressure had persuaded the Government to buy the more delicate Lee-Enfield.⁷⁵³

372. What Gascoigne was in effect asking his British superiors by this letter was whether he should care. Their answer was no. When Buller replied over a month later, he had consulted the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of State for War. The latter, Lord Lansdowne, had consulted the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain. The Venezuela crisis had passed and their consensus was that the time was inopportune to stir up controversy. They were well aware of the political situation in Canada and could only hope for an improvement of opportunity in the near future. In the meantime, the two Secretaries had agreed that the Governor General might help the General by "taking him into his confidence and by suggesting when it was expedient to press any particular reform and when more expedient not to attempt anything and keep quiet."⁷⁵⁴

373. Meanwhile, Gascoigne worked hard in attempting to ready the Militia for possible war. A new defence scheme was worked out in haste, in which individual units were assigned to divisions the brigades or to garrison. Plans were also made for the selection and formation of staffs. In both cases, the actual details were kept secret and the units and individuals were only to be informed in the event of emergency.* Mobilization instructions were also worked out for the first time, laying down somewhat sketchily what commanding officer would be expected to do. They appear to have been largely the work of Captain Arthur H. Lee, R.A., the Professor of Strategy and Tactics at the Royal Military College. During the training in the following autumn, Captain Lee gave lectures on his mobilization instructions at six camps.⁷⁵⁵

374. In his letter to Buller, Gascoigne had grumbled about the many diversions of his attention:

It is almost like dealing with children: at the very time when large sums of money are being voted, and matters of national importance should be discussed, my time is taken up by discussing whether some officer is or is not entitled to wear some badge, or worse still, by being perpetrated on some officer politically weak.⁷⁵⁶

* One precaution was to ask Deputy Adjutants-General to ensure that all battalions had efficient second-in-command since the best of the commanding officers would be required for the staff. Seniority alone would not justify selection although they were warned to avoid friction.

[RG 9 II B 1 599, 49, Assistant Adjutant General to all Deputy Adjutants-General, 27 February 1896.]

In the middle of his work for mobilization planning, Gascoigne was forced to divert his attention to the affairs of two of the most wealthy and efficient of the city regiments, the 2nd Queen's Own Rifles of Toronto and the 5th Royal Scots of Montreal. In both cases, the officers of the regiments were at odds with the commanding officer.

375. In the case of the Queen's own Rifles, the regimental fund had gotten into some difficulties. Although the finances of the regiment were in the hands of a committee of three officers, many of the officers tended to blame the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel R.B. Hamilton. Their feelings were possibly aggravated by the fact that the colonel had held his command for seven years, despite a tradition in the regiment of limiting tenure to five years. Colonel Hamilton was also a man of limited personal fortune and social standing, occupying the modest civil position of Inspector of Vital Statistics for the province. Matters reached a head at the annual meeting of officers in 1896. Several senior officers withdrew their names from the regimental bond and the Dominion Bank promptly refused to cash cheques on the account. The senior non-commissioned officers also held a meeting to discuss their grievances and, when Hamilton intervened, the Regimental Sergeant Major resigned. Gascoigne arranged that the Deputy Adjutant General of M.D. 2 should investigate the affairs of the regiment. Since Colonel Otter had himself been a popular and effective commanding officer of the regiment, he might be expected to know the best solution. Rather than hold a formal enquiry, he approached a number of the officers, found out as much as he could about the situation and made a full report to Ottawa that Hamilton should be

replaced. Gascoigne accepted this advice and Hamilton was asked to resign.⁷⁵⁷

376. The case with the 5th Royal Scots of Montreal was rather different. The Montreal battalions had consistently been less efficient than those of Toronto and when Lieutenant Colonel J.A.L. Strathy took command of the 5th Royal Scots, he determined to demand new standards of discipline and training. Strathy was personally a wealthy man, a businessman and stock broker, and he had contributed a good deal to the regiment at a time when it was fitting itself out with full Scottish regalia including feather bonnets. His efforts to improve military efficiency, however, did not make him more popular than Colonel Hamilton. The complaints of the officers quickly made their way into the press. Captain Lydons, the adjutant and an elderly veteran of the British Army, backed the commanding officer and recommended to him that he should get rid of the malcontents. His opponent was Major E.B. Ibbotson, a prominent dental surgeon and the senior major of the Regiment. The trouble was precipitated on 21 March 1896 when Strathy sent a circular to all his officers, reminding him that the Militia was Canada's only line of defence and that the administration of the regiment, which had been that of a club, would revert to principles of strict military discipline. When they received this notice, officers began to send in their resignations in such numbers that the regiment was in danger of complete disruption. Gascoigne was directed by the Minister to make a series of trips to Montreal to attempt to patch up a form of truce and this, he believed, he had accomplished.⁷⁵⁸

377. There was much that was similar in the two cases but there were two

things that were different. In one case, the commanding officer had been repudiated at the behest of at least some of his officers, in the other, he had been sustained and, at the expense of some time and effort on the part of the General Officer Commanding, peace had been restored. The second difference seemed more important in the circumstances of 1896.

Colonel Hamilton was a well known Liberal and Colonel Strathy was an equally prominent Conservative. With the Liberals attempting to talk a superannuated and disarrayed Conservative Government to death, the two cases provided a suitable opportunity. the Liberals were given powerful encouragement when it became evident that Colonel Hamilton was not prepared to be pushed out of his command.

378. On Saturday, 18 April 1896, the House spent the whole day debating a motion to adjourn brought forward by William Mulock because of the condition of the Militia. There was a lengthy series of grievances. The case of Colonel Lazier was raised again to remind the Government that the charges raised the previous year had since been repudiated and the colonel had been honourably discharged. Muloch was particularly indignant about Hamilton. The Colonel had been given no opportunity to hear the charges against him. He had been deposed by a cabal of his officers. His own charges against several of his subalterns had not been investigated. From Hamilton, Mulock turned to the Royal Military College. Subsequent reports, including those of the Auditor General and the Board of Visitors, had borne out all that he had said the year before and worse. The prestige of Standford Fleming was invoked to give a particular weight to his dissenting report.⁷⁵⁹ The Government's reply was given by Arthur Dickey since the Minister was in the Senate. He had a difficult case and about Hamilton he could say very little. On the Military College, he could only emphasize how much of the majority report had been favourable to the institution and repeat the praises of its graduates.⁷⁶⁰ Even that somewhat independent conservative, Colonel William O'Brien, was enlisted in support of Colonel Hamilton. He went on to add the vacancy in the office of Adjutant-General to the list of the Government's failing. At a moment of crisis, the post had been left vacant and was still vacant three and a half months later. He even brought up the offer of the Canadian Permanent troops to Britain some eighteen months before:*

* Colonel O'Brien, as a prominent supporter of the Imperial Federation League, might have been expected to look on such arrangements with greater favour than other of his colleagues.

Of all the preposterous and ridiculous proposals that was the most ridiculous. Made in such a form as it was, it did strike me as the most preposterous bit of bombast that ever was perpetrated.⁷⁶¹

It was a difficult day for the Government as member after member rose to attack every part of its military administration. The old reports of General Herbert were finally drawn on to prove the decay of the force. Some of the attacks were directed against General Gascoigne for his different handling of the Hamilton and Strathy cases and his unfortunatesuccess in getting his remarks quoted inthe newspapers. The most violent condemnation came from "Fighting Joe" Lister, the vigourous prosecutor of General Middleton and Sir Hector Langevin. For Gascoigne's behaviour to Hamilton, he demanded nothing less than immediate dismissal:

Sir, we have had these generals over there, two or three of them, of late years. We had General Middleton here and he had to leave. We had a general after him and it was found convenient for him to leave. And now we have another general who has only been int he country for a very few months and almost the first act he does is an act so unjustifiable, so tyrannical, so arbitrary, as stamps him, I believe, as unfit to occupy the position to which he has been appointed.⁷⁶²

Nothing brought the debate to a close but the coincidence of Sunday morning and the members's sabbatarian principles.

379. Three days later, the Government produced a second lengthy military discussion by bringing in a bill to provide for a loan of \$3,000,000 to pay for the rifles and guns which Lake had been sent to buy some months before. There was some objection by Opposition spokesmen to the Government's rashness in purchasing a rifle as new and untried as the Lee-Enfield and there was some indignation when Dickey was forced to admit that there had not even been an attempt to have equipment and saddlery manufactured in Canada. David Mills made the case that the Martini bullet was a far more reliable man killer than the Lee-Enfield. The main criticism, however, was that the Government should spend the money and then seek to obtain it from Parliament in the last days of the session. Some Liberals, particularly James Lister and Louis Davies, attempted to rally their colleagues on an issue of principles but without success.⁷⁶³

380. With the Government fighting for its life in Parliament, with a Minister "who knows nothing of the Militia: beyond the fact that it is an opportunity to fill every possible place with his supporters",⁷⁶⁴ it is astonishing that anything at all was achieved. One development which Desjardins allowed was the appointment of an Inspector of Cavalry and two Inspectors of Infantry. The posts were given to Major F.L. Lessard for the cavalry and to Lieutenant Colonels Otter and Maunsell for the Infantry.⁷⁶⁵ On 1 May 1896, the Government was reconstructed on the resignation of Sir Mackenzie Bewell. Sir Charles Tupper became Prime Minister and, in an effort to strengthen his representation, Senator Desjardins was given the more attractive portfolio of

Public Works. Colonel David Tisdale proved to be the only possible appointment Tupper could make from Ontario and he was appointed Minister of Militia. Like the remainder of the Ministry, he was to hold office for less than seventy days. About the only thing that he could do was to give the city corps the four extra days of drill pay which they had missed the year before.⁷⁶⁶ Other decisions, such as the future of Colonel Hamilton, were left until the election results were known.

381. When they were known, Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberals were the victors. Tupper and his Cabinet resigned on 8 July 1896, having created a constitutional issue, and Laurier announced the formation of his government on 13 July. Among the first of the ministers to be named was Minister of Militia and Defence, Dr. Frederick W. Borden. In discussing the formation of Laurier's first cabinet, his biographer has observed: "It was not a difficult task to find sufficient cabinet timber. The difficulty was rather an embarrassment of riches."⁷⁶⁷ This does not seem to apply directly to Dr. Borden. He was a Nova Scotia Liberal who had acquired considerable seniority in the House and who might therefore serve as his province's representative. He was a medical doctor, who had trained at King's College in Windsor and at Harvard University. He returned and set up his practice at Canning, Nova Scotia in 1869. Almost immediately he joined the 68th Battalion as assistant surgeon and had risen in the Militia until he had been made the principal medical officer at Aldershot camp in 1888. In 1874, he had been elected to the House of Commons and, except for a defeat in 1882, had remained in the House ever since. John Buchan, in his biography of Lord Minto,

described Borden as "neither a courageous nor an able man" who "conceived his duties as a balancing of party interests and a judicious exercise of party patronage."⁷⁶⁹ The judgement seems too harsh. Patronage was a part of Canadian public life and it would have taken superhuman qualities to have driven them from the Militia Department. Borden was a man of his times. His political training had been in a province in which patronage was at a franker and opener level than in some others. It would be fairer to say that he inherited a system which he did not choose to challenge but which he occasionally sought to moderate.

382. The Department was in urgent need of a Minister when Borden arrived. The work for the year was at a standstill. The camps for the year had not been authorized. On 6 July 1896, Headquarters received a telegram from the Officer Commanding the Infantry School at London. There was no money to pay the troops for the current year. The first message the new Minister received from Gascoigne was to draw his attention to the seriousness of the situation.

"It must be borne in mind that these units of the Permanent Corps are all over the Dominion, and it might become a very serious matter if trouble were to arise among armed men."⁷⁷⁰

* Gascoigne himself, never one to dissemble his feelings, revealed his relief in a letter to Laurier on the morrow of his electoral triumph.

... I may tell you that I have been patiently waiting and hoping for a change; and if no change, or at least no change in the methods of doing business had occurred, I had fully made up my mind to resign.

He went on to tell the Liberal leader that he owed his victory more to the Militia vote than might be admitted as he had heard in conversations with prominent and normally Conservative Militia officers. All that he asked was to be sent a Minister "who will take a real broad interest in the Militia,

383. Another problem which had remained for six months was the appointment of a new Adjutant-General. Arthur Dickey had originally intended to promote the Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Colonel Aylmer, but he had resigned before it could be done. When Desjardins took office, feeling had been aroused among the Conservative members because many of Aylmer's relatives were known to be Liberals. The appointment was postponed and a warm struggle developed for the highest military post available to a Canadian.

Lieutenant Colonel Otter at Toronto was regarded as the most eligible candidate since he had maintained a high military reputation and had been the one Canadian senior officer both to command a column in the Northwest Campaign and to attend courses recently in Great Britain. Two Conservative members, Lieutenant Colonels O'Brien and Tyrwhitt promoted his case.⁷⁷¹ Sam Hughes, now a lieutenant colonel as well, and possessing rather more influence, made himself the protagonist of Lieutenant Colonel Henry Smith of M.D. 1 at London.

In a typically frank letter to Otter, Hughes explained why he had chosen to back Smith:

He has always exercised his rights as a freeman and voted for his party. More than that he has, without injury or loss of time or service to the force, always contributed loyally more than his means would admit of, sometimes, for the old party.

and, above all, one who is likely to stay."^{770A}

Otter, on the other had, was suspected of having "inclined towards grittism" through helping two Liberals, Lawrence Buchan and William Mutton, to obtain permanent commissions.⁷⁷² With Borden in office, Aylmer's relatives were no hinderance to him and within a week, he had been confirmed as Adjutant-General retroactively.⁷⁷³

384. There were other changes as well. There was no further reason to preserve General Cameron as Commandant at the Royal Military College and his resignation was accepted on 25 August 1896.⁷⁷⁴ The Liberals had little mercy on him. He was given a gratuity of two month's pay and his transportation to anywhere in Canada. At the other end of the scale, Thomas McKenzie, who had been made caretaker of the Sussex camp ground on his retirement from the Infantry School, was removed in favour of another who had the favour of the Liberal member and given another post at two thirds the salary.⁷⁷⁵ Another change reflected less evident partisanship. The command of the Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry had been exercised, since its formation, by the Adjutant-General in Ottawa. It was decided that it could be better exercised by one of the officers of the Regiment itself and on 4 September 1896, Lieutenant Colonel George Maunsell was appointed to the command.⁷⁷⁶

385. The camps for that year could only be announced in orders which appeared on 24 August. This gave the units which were selected even less time than usual to get prepared. Since there had actually been no camps for over a year and since the units which were chosen had in many cases not trained for well over two years, the difficulties of commanding officers were increased.

However those units which were called out only lacked 700 men out of a full authorized strength of just over 10,000.⁷⁷⁷ Some regimental camps were permitted. An innovation for the year was a booklet of detailed tables of daily routine for cavalry, artillery and infantry units, laying down in detail the subjects which would be covered and on what day. Reveille was at 5.30 a.m. for all corps, with the infantry drilling from 7.30 a.m. to 12.00 noon and again from 2.000 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. Lights out was at 10.15 p.m.⁷⁷⁸

386. When Parliament opened at the end of August, the Conservatives found themselves on an unaccustomed side of the House. Arthur Dickey had been defeated in Cumberland but the Conservatives had no shortage of critics of the Militia Department. Sir Adolphe Caron had been returned for another riding and David Tisdale had also been re-elected. More and more, however, the Conservative leadership was seized by the assertive Orangeman from Lindsay, Lieutenant Colonel Sam Hughes, commanding officer of the 45th Battalion. It was from other Conservatives, however, that the first criticisms of the new Government were to come.

387. On 11 September 1896, Major Thomas Beattie, the Member for London took advantage of a supply motion to raise the matter of Liberal patronage at the camp then being held in London. The Conservative merchants had not even been permitted to tender for contracts. What was worse, an alien had obtained one of the contracts. This led to an interesting discussion of patronage and a recital of as many injustices as Liberal members could recall from the previous regime. Borden revealed, for example, that the previous government had entered into contracts for as long as three years on the eve of its defeat and that one of them only began in July, 1897. These contracts had been annulled by the Minister of Justice to the great indignation of the Opposition.⁷⁷⁹

388. There was even greater indignation at the dismissal of Cameron. Once again, advantage was taken of a Supply motion, this time by Henry Powell, a member from New Brunswick. There was a dual complaint, that Cameron had been dismissed without a chance to defend himself and that, for an officer of his advanced age and rank, the gratuity was not reasonable. Powell did not strengthen his case by adopting a somewhat offensive manner to the Government but it was already fatally weakened by the previous Government's decision to conceal the additional reports which had condemned Cameron. Whether or not the Liberals could have resisted the temptation to remove Tupper's son-in-law, the concealed reports left them very little alternative and if the unfortunate General had not been informed of the case against him, he had only his friends to blame. However, even a Liberal agreed that the elderly officer had been somewhat meanly dealt with and the Government announced that the travelling

expenses would also extend to carrying Cameron to England should he so desire.⁷⁸⁰

389. Another change which Borden made at the request of his Departmental staff was that the annual report once again covered the calendar rather than the fiscal year. This was a difficulty for the Militia Department and the routine was to change again before the end of Borden's period in office. The Government's fiscal year ended in June but this cut the Militia's training year at a crucial moment since many of the camps were held in June and July to suit the agricultural season. Not only did the report appear late so as to give some account of the year's training but the fiscal year itself made it difficult to conduct training at the most suitable time of the year. An appropriation for training which began to be spent in July would have very little flexibility twelve months later.

390. The report for 1896 was Gascoigne's first. It showed a total expenditure of \$2,136,713, although \$1,000,000 of this was due to the special expenditure on arms and ammunition. The Deputy Minister began what was to be a lengthy and sustained appeal for a militia stores building for Ottawa. The accommodation which was then occupied had been sold for use as a railway station and until a new building was erected, a ticket office, waiting room and restaurant shared the roof which classified stores of a value of over \$200,000.⁷⁸¹ In Gascoigne's report, there was praise for both the permanent force and the Active Militia. For the former, he was working on a pension plan and for the latter, there was reorganization. As a result of a new

cavalry drill book, regiments were now organized in squadrons rather than troops while the artillery field batteries were changing from four guns to six. All was not perfect, however, and the necessity of training all the Militia annually was again urged with what fervency and eloquence he could muster.⁷⁸²

391. The new rifle brought the problems which Herbert had already anticipated. Although two new armourers had been employed because of them, they were both engaged in Quebec in uncrating and cleaning the weapons as they arrived. Gascoigne was not prepared to release them into the custody of Militia units until he was certain that they would be cared for properly. While some armouires had caretakers, nothing had been done over the years to ensure that they were responsible or competent. The rate of pay ensured that the bulk of such men would be the humblest sort of political appointee. Many units did not have even this doubtful service and the captains of rural companies were still inclined to keep equipment in woodsheds and attics for the 102 weeks out of every two years that it was not in use. As serious a problem was the lack of range Herbert had pointed out this problem but no notice had been taken of it. Practically every range in Canada had to be rebuilt to make it safe for the high velocity bullet which had been adopted. Because this could not be done, the Militia was to spend the next few years struggling with Morris tubes and other devices to allow small bore shooting.⁷⁸³

392. A problem which the previous government had made some effort to tackle was equipment. The problem had been raised to successive General Officers

Commanding and in his very first report, General Luard had recommended that the Canadian Government adopt a pattern which had been developed by Surgeon Major Oliver.⁷⁸⁴ There was a certain potential for domestic pride in the Oliver equipment since the inventor, William Silver Oliver, had been the medical officer of the 60th Rifles during the Red River Expedition and he was serving at Halifax at the time Luard recommended him. His equipment had been designed according to the most scientific principles and had been tried by troops of the 52nd Light Infantry and the Rifle Brigade with evident satisfaction. The following year, Luard preferred a testimonial from the commanding officer of the 52nd⁷⁸⁵ while the year after, a picture of the equipment had been framed and was on display in the Adjutant-General's office.⁷⁸⁶ It was all in vain. Luard left and Middleton, his successor, was an advocate of the valise equipment, then in use in the British Army.⁷⁸⁷ It was again to no effect and Canadian militiamen continued to suffer with their rotten and tarry knapsacks. When General Herbert came, he was content to ask for anything in the way of equipment provided it was obtained quickly. The Oliver equipment continued to have a fair publicity, particularly in view of its partially Canadian origin. It was an even more powerful recommendation that the equipment had the support of Lord Wolseley. Dr. Oliver was anxious to sell his patent rights to Canada but he wanted \$12,000 for them. by 1896, he had reduced his price to \$10,000 and the Government, embarking on the expenditure of \$3,000,000 for arms and equipment, was persuaded by General Gascoigne to offer him \$5,000. Oliver accepted. Unfortunately for the smooth conclusion of the deal, the Liberals then entered office and the Order in Council was promptly cancelled. This aroused the Conservatives as

well as the Liberals' own military rebel, Lieutenant Colonel James Donville, to protest. The problem was that faced by any Government - there were other types of equipment being offered and if one pattern was adopted, might something better appear the following month. It also seemed odd that a type of equipment which had been in existence for almost twenty years and which had such high praise from Lord Wolseley and Sir Redvers Buller had never been adopted by the British Army.⁷⁸⁸ Gascoigne, who had taken a personal interest in the adoption of the Oliver pattern,⁷⁸⁹ continued to press its case before his new Minister.

393. One of the major achievements of Gascoigne's tenure of command was the exchange of small units of the permanent corps with equivalent units of the British garrison at Halifax. For some time past the Halifax Militia had been involved with the garrison but Gascoigne was anxious to take even greater advantage of the British regulars. The arrangements were made directly between Gascoigne and Lieutenant General A.G. Montgomery Moore, who was commanding the British troops in Canada. Once he had obtained his Ministers approval in principle, the administrative arrangements had to be worked out. They proved to be awesomely complicated. The basic proposal was that the company at Fredericton would be exchanged for a company of the Royal Berkshire Regiment for six months. For the British, there were worries about the duty free wines to which they were entitled while Canadian officers were not. There were married men to be settled since there were few married quarters in Halifax and a high proportion of the Canadians had families. There was little complaint about transportation although an unsuccessful effort was made to

obtain free passes on the Intercolonial Railway. Rations were a source of dispute since the British claimed that their issue of meat and bread plus 3d stoppage a day gave a fuller and more varied diet than the Canadian practice of eating everything. The Canadians maintained that theirs was better and certainly more expensive than the British issue. A final problem was discipline. It was agreed that the officers of each group would look after their own men but the commanding officer of the Canadians at Halifax would find out from the commanding officer of the Berkshires what he would have given as punishment before passing his own sentence.⁷⁹⁰ Despite all the difficulties, the exchange was administratively effective. The British Company at Fredericton took over the duties of the Canadians and even attended the annual camp at Sussex. The Canadians at Halifax acquired the compliments of the British Officers.* and the arrangement was continued in 1898 with the exchange of a company of garrison artillery.⁷⁹¹

394. One of the problems which concerned Gascoigne was the lack of qualified officers. During 1896, he introduced provisional schools, conducted by a few instructors of the permanent corps, which could be attended by those seeking certificates without leaving their normal employment. It was obviously a less satisfactory manner of qualification than a period of full time training at one of the Schools, but it filled a serious gap. Early in April, Gascoigne had the chance to confer with Laurier and Borden about future policy in

* The only apparent source of friction was the failure of the officer in command of the Canadian company to pay his mess bill. RG 9 II B 1 599, 69, Aylmer-Gordon, 18 September 1897

training the Militia. The new Government was anxious to guarantee annual drill for the whole Militia but this would require a reduction of the force. Gascoigne was ordered to work out how this might be done. He returned with a draft order which would eliminate 250 provisional officers. All those who had failed to qualify after holding provisional rank for three years would be removed. Some who would be affected had had ten years of opportunity. He anticipated that there would be an outcry but he trusted that the Prime Minister and the Minister would be prepared to face it. "Indeed if you are not so prepared," he warned them bluntly, "it would be idle for me to proceed farther in the way of retrenchment and of reducing inefficient Units, because this step is practically an indispensable preliminary in the direction of that policy upon which our present estimates have been based."⁷⁹²

395. Laurier and Borden accepted the challenge. On 1 May an order was issued cancelling all certificates issued prior to 1883 for all purposes of appointment or promotion.⁷⁹³ In July, the regulations governing age limits were amended to reduce the age for lieutenant colonels from 63 to 60. Except "under very special circumstances", officers were to be placed on the Retired List on reaching their age limit for their rank. District Officers Commanding * were ordered to submit lists of officers who could be retired under the regulations.⁷⁹⁴ A third regulation, with the most devastating effect of all was introduced in October. All appointments as commanding officer in the past

* In September, 1896, the designations "Deputy Adjutant-General" and "Brigade Major" were changed to District Officer Commanding and District Staff Officer. MGO 74, 9 September 1896.

had lasted as long as the officer was under the age limit, wished to remain and was not conspicuously inefficient. Now, the appointments were to be limited to five years with a possible extension of three more years on the recommendation of the District Officer Commanding.⁷⁹⁵ In his report for 1897, Gascoigne could look forward to the beneficial effects of regulations which would open up promotion in a great many battalions for the first time in decades.⁷⁹⁶ Two Nova Scotia battalions had had the same commanding officers since Confederation.** Twenty-one commanding officers had held their appointments for over twenty years. It did not escape the eye of the Minister that a great many commanding officers, young and old, were Conservatives and that, in some cases, their aspiring replacements were Liberals. The age limit was also a means of relieving the Militia staff of several elderly officers whose earlier removal on the grounds of inefficiency had proven impossible. Colonels Houghton and Duchesnay were retired because of the age limit as were several other officers who had possibly been more valuable to the Militia. Lieutenant Colonels Henry Smith and Maunsell, however, were retained for a year.⁷⁹⁷

396. To replace General Cameron at the Royal Military College, a young, active and imaginative British officer was obtained. Lieutenant Colonel G.R. Kitson of the King's Royal Rifle Corps took a year to decide what was needed at the College. He had been allowed to employ independent examiners to check on the academic standards of the College and it was they

** Lieutenant Colonels W.E. Starratt of the 69th Battalion and L. de V Chipman of the 68th Battalion.

who set the examinations for the year. The results were devastating. In Civil Engineering, Professor Carr Harris had given his class an average of 70% at their Christmas examination. An outside examiner gave a class average of below 50% at the final examination. The comments of the examiners were devastating. The examiner in French reported that a graduate could make out approximately the meaning of an ordinary French passage. "He cannot write even a passable French letter. He cannot pretend to carry on a French conversation." In Descriptive Geometry, the examiner decided that the young men must be almost entirely self-taught. In mathematics, there was such a variety in ability that the examiner could only assume that the cadets were allowed to progress from year to year regardless of their ability. Colonel Kitson decided that this was probably true of most of the courses and that the enormous totals of marks which Cameron had been able to report in recent years as proof of his competence were due to this "mistaken kindness".^{797a} In June, 1897, almost the whole of the civil professional staff was dismissed with a few weeks notice. They were followed by three senior non commissioned officers of the subordinate staff, including the College's well known drill instructor and gymnastic instructor, Sergeant Major Morgans.⁷⁹⁸ An even more striking change was to reduce the College course from four to three years. The annual fees, which had been set at \$200, were cut to half and the old fine of \$100 for cadets who withdrew before the completion of their course was abolished. The Headquarters Board of Examiners was also eliminated and the entrance examinations were henceforth to be conducted by the Commandant and his staff.⁷⁹⁹ The revitalized College was able to attract forty would be entrants for the fall of 1897, four times as many as in the previous year.

Under Kitson, its reputation began to revive and the real threat of the Imperial Government's withdrawal of the four annual commissions disappeared.

397. These developments did not have the sympathy of the Conservative opposition and particularly of Sir Charles Tupper. The Conservative leader maintained that the new syllabus had completely altered the nature of the College and that it was now a competitor of civil universities. Such was not the purpose for which Alexander Mackenzie had established it and he threatened to work for its abolition.⁸⁰⁰ The debate on the estimates for the College were split on partisan lines but the Government had little difficulty showing, from the testimony of Gascoigne, the Board of Visitors and even from several statements of graduates of the College that it had reached a very unsatisfactory state under General Cameron.⁸⁰¹

398. For many members of the Militia, the most exciting event of 1897 was the attendance of a Canadian contingent of 200 men at the celebration of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee. Originally only 27 men were invited as a Canadian contingent, but the idea caught fire in a wave of popular enthusiasm in English-speaking Canada. On 13 April 1897, that ardent Imperialist, Colonel James Domville moved adjournment to raise the question of a Canadian contingent, and his enthusiasm was echoed by Colonel Hughes, Colonel E.G. Prior and Dr. Thomas Sproule, an ardent Orangeman. The Government announced that it had already been engaged in correspondence with the British authorities and more than merely the Northwest Mounted Police would be represented.⁸⁰² Private enterprise was also active but the Government

felt obliged to turn down offers of Militia battalions.⁸⁰³ The contingent's membership was inevitably the field for intense political jockeying. The men in the ranks were obtained by allotting a number of vacancies to units across the country but places for officers were arranged on a more personal basis.⁸⁰³

By the time the organization was settled, it included 16 officers and 141 other ranks, with 25 from the Northwest Mounted Police and 20 officers who were otherwise unattached. The latter group included half a dozen Members of parliament and the Minister's son, Lieutenant Harold Borden.* The whole were under the command of Colonel the Hon. Matthew Aylmer, the Adjutant-General.⁸⁰⁴

399. The bulk of the officers and men of the contingent had gathered at Quebec by 28 May 1897. They drilled three times a day, were fitted for their uniforms and were inspected by the General Officer Commanding, the Lieutenant Governor of Quebec and the Governor General. There were the usual compliments to the little band save from the correspondent of the Quebec Chronicle who was not impressed:

Either their corps must be most miserable ones as a whole, or favouritism would seem to have decided the choice of the men, for it is hard to imagine many of them as anything like the best possible representatives of their regiments. A number of them are of poor physique, good few would stand quite a lot of brushing up and tidying.

* The Minister seems to have been an unusually fond father. His son became a Second Lieutenant in the Militia on 23 April 1897, less than a week before the contingent assembled at Quebec. At 20 years, he was its youngest officer.

If to all this, poor marching and ill-fitting uniforms are added, the result can be imagined.⁸⁰⁵

The contingent sailed on 6 June on the R.M.S. Vancouver. It was not a comfortable voyage as the ship was overcrowded but daily parades and drills were arranged. On 16 June, they landed and went immediately to London, to be met by the Canadian High Commissioner, Lord Strathcona and by Colonel Ivor Herbert, a familiar face, who was in command of the colonial contingents for the Jubilee. The men were divided among the other colonial contingents according to their arm of service, a policy which aroused some ill feeling but which Aylmer chose to accept. The great parade was on 22 June, with the various colonial forces following their respective arm in the British Army. This great procession was followed by reviews at Hyde Park and Aldershot and the men at least were granted little respite. On 3 July, the contingent was presented its Jubilee medals by the Prince of Wales and by evening, it had reached Liverpool and embarked. The men had hoped for a week's holiday in England but this was not considered by on Government. On 11 July, their ship had reached Quebec and the contingent was promptly dispersed. There were the usual congratulatory telegrams and a dispatch from Joseph Chamberlain to Lord Aberdeen was published in Militia General Orders to help spread his conviction that the military gathering had done much "to knit closer the bonds of union between the Colonies and the Mother Country..."⁸⁰⁷ It was somewhat more to the point that the Contingent cost \$27,875, a sum which was more than rapid, according to the Minister of Trade and Commerce, by the sale of Jubilee stamps.⁸⁰⁸

400. In line with Laurier and Borden's undertaking that the whole of the Militia would be drilled, there were camps in June and September and the great majority of rural militia units, at least in Eastern Canada, had an opportunity to attend one or other of the sets of camps. The orders for the September camps included a new provision which caused considerable grumbling.

Gascoigne tried to lay down physical standards for the men who could be brought to camp. While there had been age restrictions in the past and energetic staff officers had occasionally refused to count the boys or very old men whom commanding officers often drew in to complete their ranks, there had never been a full set of standards before. Non-commissioned officers and men would henceforth have to be between 18 and 45 (50 for senior non-commissioned officers) with a chest measurement of at least 33 inches, and a height of 5 ft. 4 in. for mounted corps and 5 ft. 5 in. for dismounted. They were required to be free of lameness and flat feet and to have the use of all limbs and all senses.⁸⁰⁹ In the instructions for inspecting officers, they were ordered to dismount to inspect each company and to make a careful examination of arms and equipment. "Inspecting officers are reminded that a review and a march-past, or other ceremonial movements, do not constitute as inspection, nor are they even a necessary part of it."⁸¹⁰

401. In his report for the year, Gascoigne could reflect a certain optimism. The Lee-Enfields had been introduced for the first time and sufficient had been sent to each camp to allow two battalions at a time to drill with them. Six batteries of the new field guns had arrived and been issued and four more

were on their way. This would leave nine batteries unprovided for. The Oliver equipment had finally been adopted and he hoped that by the end of the following year most of the Militia would have been re-equipped. there was one request which he would make - that Thanksgiving be placed in the month of October for the convenience of Militia who wished to hold field days in the fall.⁸¹¹ The authorized strength of the permanent corps had been reduced to 750, a strength which available recruits could hardly maintain. In December 1897, there were 703 men in the ranks although almost half of these had more than three service.⁸¹²

402. 1897 was the year of the third Colonial Conference. Once again the British Government took advantage of the presence of colonial premiers in London for a Jubilee. The second Colonial Conference had been held in Ottawa in 1894. Because it was only held in a colonial capital with a colonial minister, Sir Mackenzie Bowell, presiding, it hardly ranks as a Colonial Conference. It had also concerned itself almost exclusively with subjects, such as Imperial Preference and the laying of a cable between Canada and Australia, which were what the colonies rather than Britain really wished to discuss. The Conference of 1897 was to make up for that. In his opening address, the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, sought to make his position painfully clear to his audience of colonial premiers. They were to be taken to see the fleet at Spithead, only part of a force which cost the United Kingdom 35,000,000 each year. Every war in which Britain had been involved had a colonial issue at its base. He pointedly directed his examples at Canada:

Assume - although I am almost ashamed to assume it even for the purpose of argument, - assume that these Colonies were separated from the mother country. what would be the position of the great Dominion of Canada? the Dominion of Canada is bordered for 3000 miles by a most powerful neighbour, whose potentialities are infinitely greater than her actual resources. She comes into conflict in regard to the most important interests with the rising power of Japan and even in regard to some of her interests with the great empire of Russiaif Canada had not behind her to-day, and does not continue to have behind her this great military and naval power of Great Britain, she would have to make concessions to her neighbours, and to accept views which might be extremely distasteful to her in order to remain permanently in good terms with them. She would not be able to, it would be impossible that she should, herself, control all the details of her own destiny; she would be, to a greater or less extent, in spite of the bravery of her population and the patriotism of her people, she would still be, to a great extent, a dependent country.⁸¹³

None of this persuaded Canada to make any undertakings in defence. The Australian squadron was approved by the Admiralty and the Australasian delegates and the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony gained momentary acclaim by announcing his colony's contribution of a battleship. In the realm of military defence, no resolutions were passed although the possibilities of exchanges of permanent units were discussed and Laurier and Borden, who was

also present, agreed with other delegates that they would look into the legal implications of exchanges when they went home.⁸¹⁴

GASCOIGNE GOES HOME

403. General Gascoigne had not found his Canadian appointment particularly comfortable or congenial. As has been seen, he had considered resignation under the Conservatives. The Liberals were an improvement insofar as they appeared more stable but motives of a political nature continued to play a distressingly prominent part in the formulation of policy. Within the Department itself, many of the senior officials were becoming very elderly and slow. The Deputy Minister, Lieutenant Colonel Panel and the Director of Stores, Lieutenant Colonel John Macpherson, were both in their late sixties and old for their years. Lieutenant Colonel Bacon, the chief clerk of the Quartermaster General's Branch, was even older. The effect of their long service with the Department was to make any change from ordinary routine much more difficult to achieve and Gascoigne was not for a character to find such an effort congenial. It had been and remained difficult to co-ordinate the work of the civil and military branches. Questions of the relative authority of the Deputy Minister and the General Officer Commanding were perennially arising. In May 1897, Gascoigne even took his complaints to the Prime Minister. An estimate for repairs to the Levis rifle range had been seen by the General. In his opinion, the figure quoted was "of so astounding a size" as to raise a doubts and he felt that much of the work was unnecessary. He had suggested that Colonel Irwin and an officer from the Architect's Branch

should go down to examine the situation on the spot. There was no reply and a month later, Gascoigne learned that a Mr. Mathieu of the Architect's Branch had gone down alone and considerably reduced the estimate. The General was furious that he had been ignored in a subject in which he felt that there was a military concern. Without his technical approval, military officers would not be willing to take the responsibility of using the range. Laurier was pressed to settle the dispute in the absence of the Minister.⁸¹⁵

404. Another problem which bothered the General was interference in internal administration and discipline, officers of both the Active Militia and the permanent corps continued to write to Members of parliament and even to the Minister to obtain permission or support for personal concerns. One example was Lieutenant F.H.C. Sutton of the Royal Canadian Dragoons. He had been appointed to a vacancy in the permanent corps in 1895 under the Conservatives and, at the time, questions had been asked by the Liberals since Sutton was not a graduate of the Royal Military College and there was a strong suspicion that he had not been recommended by General Herbert.⁸¹⁶ Nonetheless, Sutton seems to have survived the change of Government more successfully than others.

In late 1896, when he was granted lodging allowance, he was informed that, according to regulations, he would forfeit his light and fuel allowance. Then Borden was persuaded to order that he would receive both allowances, a decision which Gascoigne was moved to protest to the Prime Minister.⁸¹⁷ When officers went to England on course in the summer of 1897, Sutton was included on the insistence of the Prime Minister himself. Gascoigne protested that the young man had passed none of the required prerequisite courses and that he had

also acquired a "reputation" but Laurier was adamant. "The Premier replied that all my arguments were good, but that as he had given a promise, it must be kept, and that Lt. Sutton must go. He accordingly was sent."⁸¹⁸ Gascoigne was vindicated when Sutton displaying "either a lamentable want of ability or a culpable lack of attention". Nonetheless, a place had been taken which a more suitable officer could have filled.

405. One of the most persistent problems for Gascoigne was that the troubles in the Queen's Own Rifles and the 5th Royal Scots had not ceased. In the case of Colonel Hamilton, the new Minister seems to have accepted the wisdom of the recommendation made by Gascoigne to the previous government but he also refused to put it into effect by forcing Hamilton out. As a result, the battalion continued to have two commanding officers, Colonel Hamilton and Major Delamere, the second in command. The situation in the Royal Scots was even more annoying because of the much greater prominence it continued to receive in the press. Gascoigne's attempt to restore peace in the winter of 1896 had not had a permanent effect. In April, a meeting of the officers again broke up in a storm. Colonel Strathy sent Major Ibbotson a letter threatening to place him under arrest if a sum of money due from his company was not handed over promptly. Ibbotson sent in another resignation and demanded a Court of Inquiry. Strathy refused both the court and the resignation.⁸¹⁹ In July, 1896, Colonel Lake asked Strathy for a group picture of his officers in full dress to send to an English illustrated paper. Strathy agreed but when he tried to gather his officers, he discovered that several of them bluntly refused. Major Blaiklock replied that he had not "the

time, money or inclination".⁸²⁰ In October, a church parade was held for the battalion but Major Ibbotson and several of his supporters failed to turn out and their absence was very evident. Since the parade had been advertised in three newspapers and mentioned editorially, Strathy chose to regard his officers as absent without leave. After waiting for an explanation for over a month, Strathy sent Ibbotson a registered letter, demanding to know why he had not appeared. Ibbotson resigned again and this time Strathy accepted. Several other officers followed suit and the regiment was in danger of breaking up.⁸²¹

406. From the first, Gasoligne's view was that as much of the fault lay with Strathy as with his officers. He felt that the Colonel was a tactless and inconsiderate man and that the officers had a just grievance. In the summer of 1896, when Colonel Houghton sent him a copy of a special training syllabus Strathy had prepared for his unit, Gascoigne had a chance to make his feelings quite clear. Houghton, as Deputy Adjutant-General must make sure that it would be wise to introduce new rules which were not known in other battalions.

He would be the first to encourage such changes if there was a good spirit in the units and the tact of the commanding officer could be relied upon.

"....I do not wish to be myself made the stalking horse for any errors of tact and judgement of which Col. Strathy may be guilty in the future." The first necessity would be to restore harmony and good feelings among the officers and men and introducing startling new changes did not seem to Gascoigne to be the best way to go about it.⁸²²

407. When the troubles in the 5th Royal Scots had not settled themselves a full year after he had first tried to settle them. Gascoigne recommended drastic action. In an English volunteer regiment, the Commanding officer, his second in command and any other officers who were making trouble would have been summarily removed and a new officer brought in to take the command. Borden was utterly unwilling to take such a violent step and instead ordered that a Court of Enquiry should be held.⁸²³ In order to keep the cost to a minimum, he refused to bring in an officer from outside Montreal, he refused to bring in an officer from outside Montreal but assigned the duty to the two District Officers Commanding on the spot, Lieutenant Colonels Houghton and Roy. To Gascoigne, this seemed worse than useless, particularly since he had no trust in the competence of the former officer, but he was obliged to accede. The Court opened on the evening of 20 April 1897 and dragged through twenty five sittings, all of them in the evening so that witnesses could attend. The affair was all that Gascoigne might have feared that it would be. Only Strathy and Ibbotson were allowed to be present and other officers invoked their legal rights in an attempt to be admitted to the hearings. Ibbotson claimed that Strathy dominated the proceedings, shouting out protests and threatening witnesses with immediate arrest. Houghton later denied that affairs were conducted in this manner although he admitted that Strathy, under great provocation, had uttered "private ejaculations" for all the secrecy, the facts about the case filtered steadily into the Montreal newspapers and for this, Houghton evidently blamed Major Ibbotson and his friends.⁸²⁴

408. Although Houghton made sure that he would not be asked for an opinion on

the situation, he did find proof that there was dissatisfaction in the regiment and that Ibbotson had been absent without leave from church parade. More had to be deduced from a mass of evidence. "Your Sir", Gascoigne later told the Governor General, "never in all your life saw such a mass of discreditable matter brought to light: discreditable to all concerned, but specially so to Col. Strathy in the matter of a gross want of gentlemanlike tact and consideration for the feelings of those under him."⁸²⁵ On the basis of the surviving exhibits, this judgement seems harsh and even unfair but it was the view that Gascoigne was to continue to take. Another view would be that Strathy was simply taking his military role much more seriously than most of his other officers and that he had the wealth and leisure to do so. Certain of his subordinates appear to have had a rooted aversion to obeying orders. The surviving evidence, however, may be very unhelpful in explaining a situation in which personality obviously had a central part to play.

409. Lieutenant Colonel Houghton and his court reported in August. By this time, Gascoigne had joined Borden in being cautious over the affair. Since the regulations limited tenure of command had come into effect, Strathy would be obliged to vacate his command in March. Ibbotson would than take over. If matters could be held over until then, the problem might solve itself. Strathy, who was also an aide de camp to the Governor General, would be safely deposited in the Reserve of Officers, Ibbotson would be commanding officer and the 5th Royal Scots could go on it peace. It was not to be. The newspapers began demanding that a decision be announced. Courts and commissions of enquiry only delay solutions, they do not provide them. Articles which

Gascoigne suspected of being inspired by Strathy appeared in Montreal newspapers accusing him and his Minister of weakness in failing to deal with mutinous officers. Finally even Borden admitted that he regretted that he had not adopted Gascoigne's original draconian intentions. Unfortunately the findings of the Court of Enquiry were simply too weak to warrant such a punishment now. Finally, he authorized Gascoigne to assemble Strathy and Ibbotson in Montreal and, in the presence of the District Officer Commanding, to deliver them a stern reprimand.⁸²⁶ This, Gascoigne did, fully believing, as he explained to the Governor General, that the two officers would accept such a slight punishment with a good grace. Gascoigne was also authorized to deliver a statement to the press so that the official version would be clear. This was unfortunate. As he emerged after an hour and a half session with the two officers, warm with indignation from delivering his reprimand, Gascoigne was surrounded by reporters. Strathy, he announced, had been reprimanded for want of tact and lack of consideration of his junior officers and Ibbotson for over sensitiveness. The major would take over the battalion the following March but if either of them made any more trouble, they would be summarily dismissed. Then, expanding on his theme: "The General added that the whole trouble was simply one such as might have arisen from a squabble of two washerwomen over a washtub, but if it had occurred in the Imperial service, drastic measures would have been taken long ago to put an end to it."⁸²⁷ This was excellent copy and the reporters raced away. When he read the full report of the interview in the Montreal Star, Strathy replied in kind and with even greater acerbity.

410. Gascoigne was furious that Strathy should have reacted by attacking him.

He ordered that he should have his name struck from the Militia List and that he should turn over the arms and equipment of his regiment to Major Ibbotson.

Borden supported him but then there were second thoughts and the notification of the dismissal was not immediately placed in the Gazette. An additional complication was that Strathy was on the Governor General's staff and if he were removed from the Militia, he could hardly remain an aide-de-camp.

Lord Aberdeen promptly solved the problem by backing Gascoigne, informing him that even if Strathy had remained on the aide-de-camp in the circumstances.⁸²⁸

Then he, too, seems to have had second thoughts. On 6 December 1897, the Governor General wrote to Gascoigne to ask whether the fact that Ibbotson was taking over the arms and equipment meant in any way that he would also be taking over command of the regiment.⁸²⁹ Gascoigne promptly replied that it did. After their session on 18 November, Strathy had made trouble but Ibbotson had kept his peace. That part of the undertaking remained and the major would not be punished because his rival had misbehaved.⁸³⁰ In another letter to the Governor General, Gascoigne revealed his own wish to reach an accommodation. He was aware that he was in an awkward position and that by making war on Strathy, he had drawn down powerful enemies. He may also have felt guilty about the newspaper reports of his press interview. He sent Colonel Macpherson, the Director of Stores and an old friend of Strathy, to Montreal an emissary. Working through another mutual friend, Lieutenant Colonel George Starke, he was to tell Strathy that if he would make sure that he was at least restored to the Reserve of Officers. They even promised that Strathy could retain his position in the vice-regal household. Strathy

avoided his callers as persistently as he could and when they finally tracked him down, he refused the offer.⁸³¹ This was the situation which Gascoigne explained to the Governor General on 7 December 1897, without telling him of this own personal efforts to persuade Strathy to relent. He was still afraid of being accused of leniency but he had held the matter over. If only Strathy would ask to be placed on the Reserve and Aberdeen would approve of it, he would be almost certain that it could still be done.⁸³²

411. Strathy, meanwhile, had also been in contact with the Governor General through members of his staff, W.T.S. Hewett, the private secretary and David Erskine, the comptroller of the household. He also set out to get a statement of the charges against him for which he had been dismissed. On 16 December 1897, Gascoigne wrote a memorandum to the Adjutant-General, obviously intended for Strathy, which recalled that Houghton had obtained from the Colonel on 27 November an acknowledgement that the article in the Montreal Star of 20 November had been an accurate report of his statement. This was the basis for Strathy's initial suspension. Gascoigne had then waited a week, in expectation of an apology, and when none had been forthcoming, he had submitted the matter to the Governor in Council.⁸³³ When Strathy received a copy of this explanatory memorandum, he promptly replied to the District Officer Commanding (now Lieutenant Colonel Gordon), expressing his regret at the disciplinary error he had fallen into through annoyance at strictures published about him in the press and asked whether Gascoigne had also acknowledged his own remarks in the Montreal Star of 18 November. Once these remarks were officially repudiated, he would immediately express his own

regret both personally and publicly.⁸³⁴ Strathy followed up this approach with a letter to Erskine in which he explained the damage that the General's insults had done him. As managing director of a trust company, and hence the guardian of the affairs of widows and orphans, it was a serious matter to be accused of being without tact or consideration. His directors, including men of the prominence of Senator Forget, Lord Strathcona, Frank Ross and Mayor Wilson-Smith, were collectively incensed at the General and would not tolerate his actions.⁸³⁵ He was determined to appeal the Governor General in his role of commander in chief of the Militia.

412. When he had decided that Strathy was not going to apologize, Gascoigne did not give up. He discovered that there was a Retired List as well as a Reserve of Officers and that it might solve the difficulty if Strathy would only apply for that. He need not even apologize.⁸³⁶ There was no reaction to this modification and so Gascoigne began to harden again. Two days after he had offered to put Strathy on the Retired List, he again wrote to Aberdeen to state that definite action would have to be taken to gazette Strathy's removal from the Militia List. He did not wish to appear vindictive but he hoped that the Governor General would not even express thanks for Strathy's services.

I venture to think that Your Excellency, and I will take the liberty of including myself also in this; that both of us occasionally are at a disadvantage in dealing with those who aren't brought up to view matters in quite the same spirit of gentlemanlike conduct as is the rule at home.⁸³⁷

Any expression of sympathy would be used as evidence of viceregal support and Gascoigne knew that delay in publishing Strathy's dismissal was being attributed to the Governor General's defence of this aide-de-camp.

413. There was a further delay while approval was sought for the gazetting from the Cabinet. Borden was away in England but Gascoigne had the support of Sir Louis Davies, the acting Minister. After a week's delay, Gascoigne pressed the point, explaining that he had acted throughout with the knowledge and concurrence of his Minister and that he felt entitled to the cabinet's support.⁸³⁸ On the last day of the year, Gascoigne was informed that Laurier had consented⁸³⁹ and the first General Order for 1898 announced that the services of Lieutenant Colonel Strathy had been dispensed with.⁸⁴⁰

414. This was far from being the end of the affair. The Governor General had officially backed the General but he also received Strathy on 19 January 1898 and, with members of his staff, gave him assistance and encouragement in the preparation of his appeal.⁸⁴¹ Meanwhile Gascoigne remained the target for attacks by Strathy's powerful friends in Montreal.

415. A further concern of Gascoigne's was his salary. When it had been originally set at \$4,000, it was on the understanding that the British officer holding the post would continue to draw his half pay. Otherwise, the sum was rather lower than a British colonel would earn on full pay. During Luard's term, the British half pay had been cut off by Royal Warrant. At the same

time, the appointment was an expensive one. British officers found the cost of living in Ottawa high and they believed that they had a substantial social position to maintain. Although they were reimbursed for their travelling expenses, the payments allowed did not fully cover the costs. Generals with very limited private incomes like Luard and Middleton found that they were living far beyond their means while still unable to compete satisfactorily in the round of Ottawa social life. While General Herbert had had considerable personal wealth, General Gascoigne was not as well off. The difficulty in raising the question with the Canadian Government was that all civil service salaries were low. The Deputy Minister of the Department was paid only \$3,200 per annum and there were hardly half a dozen public employees who were paid as much or more than the General Officer Commanding.⁸⁴² As a result, Gascoigne's first appeal was made to the War Office. He explained to LCdr Aberdeen in November 1897, that if the reply was not satisfactory, he would probably resign.⁸⁴³

416. Gascoigne was also anxious to give Colonel Lake a chance to become his successor. The Quartermaster-General had been remarkably successful in Canada and had become one of the most popular of the British officers ever to serve the Canadian Government. Gascoigne was convinced that he would be a popular General Officer Commanding. Lake's term in Canada came to an end in 1889. Before then, an opportunity came for him to extend his service. During the war scare of 1896, it had been made apparent to Gascoigne that there was no mobilization plan. It had become equally evident to Lieutenant General Montgomery Moore at Halifax that there was also no scheme to use the troops

who were mobilized. The Jervois Report was out of date and the fortifications which it had proposed had never been built. In the event of war, it had come to be understood that the command of the forces in British North America would fall to the General Officer Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in Canada, in other words, the British general commanding the garrison at Halifax and at Esquimalt. From time to time, Montgomery Moore had been asked to submit a scheme for the defence of Montreal but he found this difficult when there was no over-all plan. In a visit to Ottawa in the fall of 1897, he drew this lack to the attention of Dr. Borden who in turn invited him to bring the problem to the attention of the Cabinet. Moore did as he was bade and in a letter to Laurier of 3 November 1897 sought to convince the Prime Minister of the growing possibility of a war with the United States and of the helplessness and confusion which would ensue without a defence plan prepared in peacetime.

A solid argument was that the formulation of the scheme need involve no additional expense. It would simply be a plan for the best use of available resources. To get the scheme under way, he suggested that Colonel Lake be given the assistance of a trained British staff officer for a period of three months to work out the framework while details could be filled in later.⁸⁴⁴ He sent a copy of his letter to the Governor General with the further suggestion that representatives from the Royal Navy at Halifax and from his own staff would be willing to co-operate.⁸⁴⁵

417. The possibility of retaining Lake in Canada at first appeared small since the War Office applied for him for a post which would involve a promotion. However the prospect of formulating a defence scheme for Canada

proved popular with the Canadian Government and with the British authorities.

Montgomery Moore's original suggestion of the loan of a staff officer for three months developed into a full fledged commission of three officers under Major General E.P. Leach V.C. of the Royal Engineers, with Colonel Lake as one of the members.⁸⁴⁶

418. In the meantime, Gascoigne had resigned. The exact reasons seem obscure since he did not state any on his letter of resignation.⁸⁴⁷ A variety of causes may have contributed to his decision, among them the failure to resolve the salary problem and the series of irritations with his Minister and with the failure to reach decisions on disciplinary matters as in the Strathy Case.

At the same time, the Government made no effort to restrain him. Gascoigne seemed to them to be pompous, old fashioned and unimpressive. He had also been an embarrassment in the Strathy affair and they were also prepared to let him bear the blame publicly for the Hamilton case as well.

419. The British Government's support for a Commission to work out a Canadian defence scheme indicated a growing desire to take a hand in Canadian defence matters generally. At the Colonial Conference of 1897, Joseph Chamberlain had personally and intensively involved himself in questions of defence. He also felt that the appointment of General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia was too important to go by default. The failure of the indolent and mumbling Gascoigne had been even more evident in London than it had been in Ottawa. To get a better officer, however, would need a higher salary. The Canadian rate was less than even Australian colonies like Queensland and New South Wales

were prepared to pay while Victoria paid about \$7,000. A colonel on the staff in Britain was paid over \$5,000 per annum.⁸⁴⁸ to go to Canada was a sacrifice and at the end of February, 1898, Chamberlain began to put pressure on the Canadian Government.⁸⁴⁹ Lord Aberdeen added his personal influence with Laurier⁸⁵⁰ and the Cabinet was eventually persuaded to add \$2,000 as an allowance to the basic pay of \$4,000. Since the salary was established by statute, the change had to be authorized by Parliament.

420. The debate provided the Opposition and Sir Charles Tupper in particular the opportunity of a violent attack on Gascoigne, who had remained in Canada pending the appointment of his successor. As a result of the Strathy affair, a civil action had been brought against the General which had subsequently been withdrawn. Tupper declared that Gascoigne had purchased its withdrawal with his resignation. He went on to declare that the unfortunate General had repeatedly disgraced his position and that he would cheerfully support the resolution in the assurance that not a penny of the increase would ever go to Gascoigne. The Prime Minister, Dr. Borden and even the Conservative Sam Hughes rose to the defence of Gascoigne, admitting that he was not perfect, but pointing to the advances which had been made in the Militia during his time. When Borden described his attack as unfair and unjust, Tupper was moved to even greater violence of language:

I have no respect for a cad because a red coat is on his back, no the slightest. I respect every man who is engaged, whether in Canada or in any other part of the Empire, in defence of the country, and no man

will be more ready to sustain that important branch of the service than I, here and everywhere. But to say that because a man wears a red coat we must bow down like a Chinese before him and hold his person as too sacred to allow us to speak of him is an opinion I do not entertain.

Winding up his attack, he declared that "... tried by everything that involves manly, straight forward, independent, able discharge of public duties, General Gascoigne has been the most signal failure ever sent to this country to occupy so high a position."⁸⁵¹

421. Other members also favoured the increase although for different reasons in most cases. The only difference of opinion was reserved to the Conservative caucus, in which Nathaniel Wallace demanded that the appointment be given to Canadians in future while his fellow Orangeman, Sam Hughes insisted that, for the present, it should continue to be reserved for British officers.

422. Gascoigne was furious at the attack made on him in the House by Tupper.

At first he judged from the press reports that it was purely vituperation but when he at least read the allegation about the libel suit and his resignation, he set about trying to obtain redress. Tupper left of England not long after his speech. Gascoigne was afraid of the efforts of the vindictive old man among English statesman and he sought the Governor General's backing.⁸⁵² He also sought the governor General's advice on getting redress for Tupper's speech. Aberdeen warned him that Borden would not dare to make a

contradiction but that he would do what he could.⁸⁵³ Gascoigne then wrote a long letter of rebuttal to the Prime Minister. By this time, Tupper had left the country and Laurier had to overcome his reluctance to read it into the record of the House of Commons in his opponent's absence. On 30 May 1898, doing some violence to the Rules of Order,⁶⁵⁴ he finally did so.⁸⁵⁵

423. Three weeks later, when the arrangements for a successor had been completed, Gascoigne resubmitted his resignation.⁶⁵⁶ It was promptly accepted⁶⁵⁷ to take effect from 31 June 1899. Since his replacement did not plan to arrive until the beginning of September, the command devolved in the meantime on the Quartermaster-General, who was still Colonel Lake. Gascoigne left some bits of unfinished business. He made a special appeal to the Prime Minister that his aide-de-camp, Captain MacLean, should be allowed to remain in that position until the new General arrived. He recalled the opposition he had aroused when he selected an officer whose father was a well known Liberal.

"Whether now with the wicked experience which Canada has taught me I should so fly in the face of Tupperian Providence had I to do it over again, is doubtful, but I did do it, and I have had no reason to regret doing it."⁸⁵⁸ He also passed on a final letter from Colonel Hamilton of the Queen's Own Rifles:

As I understand that the inevitable has come to pass even earlier than I anticipated and that you are to leave this country shortly, I think it only fair to inform you that I propose pushing to a conclusion the charges which I propose making at the proper time and place against yourself and others for aiding and abetting insubordination and

conspiracy.⁸⁵⁹

Since he had only acted in full consultation with his Ministers in both Governments and they had agreed with him, he could only leave the matter in the Prime Minister's hands.⁸⁶⁰ Laurier replied that he knew nothing about the matter but since he had repeatedly told Hamilton that the case would not be reopened, Gascoigne could go with an easy conscience.⁸⁶¹

424. The turbulence which Gascoigne had created in Canada did not long survive his departure. In November, he was appointed to the command of the troops in Hong Kong. In the course of time, he was awarded his K.C.M.G. and retired, still a major general.

THE YUKON FIELD FORCE

425. The discovery of gold in the Yukon in August 1896 led a rush to the territory which had become a flood by 1898. A Northwest Mounted Police detachment of 24 was increased until it was over 180 but the extent of the territory and the lawlessness inevitably associated with such developments led to a demand for stronger forces of order. In addition, the United States claim along the Alaska boundary was being pressed with considerable vigour and an American military garrison of four companies of infantry was located along the pan-handle. In the circumstances, the Canadian Government reached the decision to send a small military force to the Yukon. In addition to a military force being some answer to an American military force in the

vicinity, it was cheaper to send troops since their pay was rather lower than that of the Mounted Police.⁸⁶²

426. The force was organized on the authority of an order in council of 21 March 1898. It consisted 12 officers and 191 other ranks drawn from the permanent corps and chiefly from the Royal Regiment of Canadian Infantry. The commander of the Yukon Field Force, as it was christened, was Lieutenant Colonel T.D.B. Evans, Royal Canadian Dragoons, at 38 one of the youngest and the most junior of the permanent corps colonels. His officers included some of the abler of the permanent corps, including Major T.D.R. Hemming, Captain H.E. Burstall and Captain P.E. Thacker. Others of his staff, such as his paymaster, Major Talbot and his Supply Officer, Major Bliss, were less valuable and owed their positions to considerable political influence.⁸⁶³ After a hectic period of organization in which supplies, winter clothing and equipment were collected, the force left Ottawa on 6 May 1898 and reached Vancouver five days later. From Vancouver to Wrangel in the Alaska Panhandle, the force travelled by steamer, transshipping their supplies and equipment to two stern-wheelers at Wrangel for the voyage up the Stickine River. Permission had been obtained for the men to travel through American territory. From Glenora, which was as far up the Stickine as the little steamers could take them, the force split, a party of fifty leaving on 1 June to build log barracks at Fort Selkirk, the prospective headquarters. The main party followed on 9 June, travelling to Telegraph Creek and thence, with the aid of male trains, to Lake Teslin. From there, the journey could be made by water in boats and scows. This was not easy as the water was often fast,

unknown and dangerous and the men were not skilled boatmen. On 11 September, the main body reached Fort Selkirk, bringing with them the greater part of the supplies and equipment with which they had started out, including two Maxim guns.

427. Once safely arrived, the duties of the troops became routine. A detachment of 2 officers and 50 other ranks was sent to Dawson. The men were used as guards and escorts and, on at least one occasion, to fight fire. In September, 1899, the Force was cut in half and the whole of the remainder was moved to Dawson. The command was assumed by Major Hemming of the Royal Canadian Regiment. The reduced force itself was removed after one more winter, leaving the Northwest Mounted Police to watch over the remnants of the Gold Rush.⁸⁶⁴

428. The Yukon Field Force cost \$675,298. Its services were never seriously needed. Nonetheless, its presence helped to put a stake on Canadian territory and the exertion involved in placing it there was a remainder of the Red River expeditions a generation before.

GENERAL HUTTON COMES TO CANADA

429. The new General Officer Commanding was selected with particular care. Colonel E.T.H. Hutton was a young fifty when he came to Canada, an officer of the King's Royal Rifle Corps, who had already seen a career of considerable distinction. Wolseley had picked him as an aide de camp in Egypt in 1882 and

he had had a series of staff appointments in important places. During campaign in South Africa and in Egypt, he had become particularly interested in mounted infantry and when a mounted infantry battalion was formed on an experimental basis at Aldershot in 1888, he had been made the commanding officer. Sir Alex Godley wrote later of his contribution: "Curly Hutton may justly be said to be the father of mounted infantry as it existed till just before the Great War."⁸⁶⁵ Shortly after laying down this command, he was promoted to full colonel and local major general and sent to command the auxiliary forces of New South Wales. When he left the colony three years later, he was regarded as having "the respect of all classes" after having set up a military system "which promises to last for all time as the basis of local land defence."⁸⁶⁶ Shortly after laying down this command, he was promoted to full colonel and local major general and sent to command the auxiliary forces of New South Wales. When he left the colony three years later, he was regarded as having "the respect of all classes" after having set up a military system "which promises to last for all time as the basis of local land defence."⁸⁶⁶ Some of the lessons he learned in Australia were of dubious value to him. During his tenure, there had been a coal strike and, without the approval of the Government, Hutton had used troops to smash it. In the resulting crisis, the premier, Sir George Dibbs, was forced to resign but Hutton survived. It was an example which he was to quote so frequently in Canada that it came to annoy his Ministers. It also helps to explain why a Colonel Secretary like Chamberlain would put such great confidence in his ability to manage colonial governments. Hutton had narrowly missed gaining practical experience in Canada as well. In 1886, Lord Lansdowne had pressed

his name as a Commissioner for the Northwest Mounted Police and he had been considered for the post.⁸⁶⁷

430. Before Hutton came to Canada, he had extensive interviews with the War Office authorities and with the Colonial Secretary. His friend Lord Minto was to be the new Governor General in succession to Lord Aberdeen and Chamberlain intended them to work as a team in reminding the Canadian Government of its obligations. To Minto, Hutton wrote on the eve of his departure for Canada: "Both Lord Lansdowne & Mr. Chamberlain are full of anxiety that the Canadian Military house should be set in order - & both particularly mentioned the fact of your well known soldierly qualities being of the greatest value."⁸⁶⁸ Hutton was also informed of the work of the Defence Committee which had already begun its work in Canada under General Leach.

431. On his arrival at Quebec, he was met by the Prime Minister and several other cabinet ministers who happened to be there. His first impression was that he was not welcome.⁸⁶⁹ His spirits recovered when he reached Ottawa, however, and he wrote to Minto that he was pleased with his officers and hopeful that, with a free hand from the Government and the Governor General's help, much might be done. No one in the circle he entered believed in any entente cordiale with the United States. "I never quite realized before how strong the feeling of animosity to the U.S. is in Canada!"⁸⁷⁰ He also rented Earnscliffe, Sir John A. Macdonald's old house, on the terms that he could cut down the trees and open the place out.*

* In a letter to Wolsely shortly after his arrival, he explained that he had

432. From the first, Hutton set out with two qualities common among reformers, boundless energy and a thorough contempt for all that had been achieved before him. Within two weeks of arriving in Canada, he had begun his travels by inspecting the Nova Scotia Militia battalions at Aldershot. He was not impressed. The standard, he later reported, was even lower than that in other parts of the Empire.*⁸⁷¹ At the end of the month, he met his Minister for the first time at Quebec. Promptly, in the manner which he apparently felt to be successful with colonial statesman, Hutton made his position clear. No party or political influence would be allowed to interfere with the Militia. The story of his career in New South Wales was repeated. The fact that the voters had upheld his contention in a general election was a lesson which he wished the Minister to absorb. To judge from the Canadian newspapers, Hutton added, Canadians felt the same way. Borden's reply was that no one was more determined to eliminate politics from the Militia than he but that the changes would have to be made gradually. Hutton accepted this but sternly warned that in promotions, appointments and discipline, his principle would be inflexibly applied.⁸⁷²

refused to meet Gascoigne in order that he could form his own independent impressions. Gascoigne's failure, he feared, would make his own work more difficult. MG 21 Hutton Papers, Vol. 2, 4

* Captain Clive Bell, Hutton's Aide-de-camp, may have reflected his General's opinions when he wrote to his brother soon after reaching Ottawa:

At present there is perfect chaos. Billy Gascoigne could have done nothing at all except let things drift. Clerks, politicians and civilians seem to do everything without the knowledge of anybody. For instance, half the drill yard had been sold to a pork factory without the General knowing a word about it or being consulted at all.

433. It seems evident almost from the first that Borden and Hutton had quite different understandings of what was meant by political interference. To the Minister, it meant open partisanship and a policy of ensuring that only members of the Liberal Party should have any advantage. This was a state of affairs he was willing to resist to some extent but the previous government had made it such an absolute rule in the conduct of Militia affairs that many of Borden's fellow Liberals were loath to abandon the convention when at last it could work in their favour. Both Borden and Laurier had resisted considerable pressure in the Hamilton Case although the Minister had not been strong enough to come to an absolute decision. Another problem which is somewhat difficult to define was that the vast majority of Militia officers were Conservatives. Some of them might be alienated by Conservative policies on the Militia, as Gascoigne had believed in 1886, but they remained Conservatives. In the House of Commons, of nine Militia colonels, all but two were Conservatives and one of the Liberals, James Domville, was a Tory defector. This meant that the bulk of Militia officers were far more aware of the problem of political influence in the force than they may have been a few years before. As for Hutton, his conception was that interference by a politician or on any political grounds was to be prevented. This meant that in the large area which he defined as his concern, he insisted on making the

He also reported that the military stores contained boarding pikes and "the funniest old guns". The cavalry was "beyond all contempt", and was commended by "the most weird looking people, you ever saw."

MG 21 Hutton Papers, vol. 2, 148.

decisions. The Minister retained authority in the realm of policy but even there Hutton set out with a campaign of public speeches to ensure that his own policies would acquire public support. The Minister was not to meddle in military affairs but the General felt few inhibitions in mixing in at least military aspects of politics.

434. Hutton did not waste time waiting to get to know the local situation. Within the first month of his arrival in Canada, he had embarked on a programme of speaking to all the Militia officers who could be gathered. Everywhere, his message was the same. He began by talking about a Canadian Army whose purpose would not merely be the defence of Canada but participation in the defence of the rest of the Empire as well. Then he went on to describe the pathetic condition of the "Army" as he found it. Then he insisted on the need for a firm but co-operative discipline. Finally, in the part of the speech which he most enjoyed himself, he attacked politics in the Militia, an evil which he continually described as "the Upas tree" which he would uproot.

The same speech with embroidery was delivered to the assembled officers of all the military districts, to the Military Institute in Toronto, at the camps and anywhere that officers could be collected to hear it. Hutton had a vigorous and positive personality, he knew how to be informal and approachable and he evoked considerable enthusiasm from his audiences. He also made himself accessible to the press. After a certain initial caution, they came out generally in his favour. The Toronto caution, they came out generally in his favour. The Toronto Globe, at the end of October, described him as "a practical soldier who is also a man of ideas, a man with a large

point of view, and a man who is likely to try to get his ideas realized."⁸⁷³

The November issue of the Canadian Magazine asked its readers:

Is it possible that somebody who is greater than Canadian public opinion will force the Canadian Government to divorce the militia and politics? Has Downing Street ordered that there shall be no more political appointments to the permanent force? If our citizens who desire to become majors and lieutenant colonels cannot become so in a few months, how disappointing it will be!⁸⁷⁴

There was even attention in French Canada. At St. Jean, the reporter of the Canadian Francais interviewed Hutton who replied "in a very pure French". It was the General's turn to ask questions and he demanded to know whether the French Canadians who had interested themselves in the Militia had been given too little prominence. That, the reporter replied, was exactly the case, but the General's question gave them to hope that something would be done in the future.⁸⁷⁵

435. The first target for reform was Militia Headquarters itself. Lake's term as Quartermaster General had ended in August and Hutton had brought his own replacement, Colonel Hubert Foster of the Royal Engineers, a competent but somewhat uninspired officer of 43, whose basic rank was major.* Foster was by no means the equal of Colonel Lake in getting along with the Canadians and he

* British officers serving in the Canadian Militia were normally given a militia rank, higher than their regular rank.

was thoroughly overshadowed by his superior. Hutton's grievance was not with his military staff, although he quickly developed a dislike and contempt for Aylmer. The main problem was the division of military and civil authority. "It is not too much to say," he told Borden, "that the present condition of the administration as carried out in the Head-Quarter by our existing Head-Quarter system is, from a Military point of view, chaotic and pregnant with friction in peace, and disaster in war or national emergency."⁸⁷⁶ The solution was for Hutton's position under the Militia Act to be made identical with that of the British Commander in Chief as of the Queen's Regulations of 1895 in which the specific duties had been carefully listed.

436. The next assault was on the artillery. The last major reform in the artillery had been the establishment of special camps for firing practice for the garrison and field artillery. Hutton was more concerned about what was taught. Canadian gunners lacked scientific knowledge and this could only be supplied through the establishment of a School of Gunnery on modern lines. Hutton proposed to use the buildings at the Citadel in Quebec. He also recommended the building of a practice battery nearby at Beaumont. The old range on the Isle d'Orleans was now dangerous.⁸⁷⁷ There was also no one in the artillery qualified as an inspector or assistant inspector of Ordnance and permission was obtained to send two-officers and four non-commissioned officers to England on the necessary courses.⁸⁷⁸ Since the garrison artillery at Esquimalt had profited greatly from the instruction of the Royal Marine Artillery stationed there, Hutton also made arrangements for the Militia gunners at Halifax, to take an equal advantage of the British garrison.⁸⁷⁹

437. An area of serious friction was the control of stores. Although these were under Lieutenant Colonel D.A. Macdonald of the Civil Branch of the Department, Borden asked Hutton to visit them. He did not like what he found. The buildings were unsuitable in many cases and in some instances they were in an advanced state of dilapidation. The officials in charge of them knew little about the stores they were supposed to tend and there were few regulations and little system to make them do better. Much of the material which took up storage space was obsolete even for the Canadian Militia and in such bad condition that it might have been disposed of long before.⁸⁸⁰ Hutton's criticisms, however, were only part of the story. While the Stores Department was a major concentration point for patronage both in the contracts and the employees, its failings were not entirely the fault of Colonel Macdonald and his men. His own appeals for better buildings were long ignored while it was only in 1898 that he could report any response to a long-standing request that only men with some military experience should be appointed. He also maintained that the responsibility for inspection while in store was entirely vested in the military authorities and if they failed to carry out their duties, that was their fault. As for the stock on hand, it was entirely due to the Stores Department that there was anything at all for they had never been furnished with a list of requirements from the Military Branch. Moreover, Macdonald had not been informed about stores which had been ordered in Canada or in England and his first notification of their existence was to take delivery.⁸⁸¹ While such a situation betrays a serious lack of enterprise on both sides, the result was an absolute bar to any efficient

management. As a result, Hutton turned to his own Quartermaster-General for a report on the amount of camp equipment which would be required for an infantry division camp. He also wanted estimates on the costs of stores buildings at Toronto and London. He was also to look into the procurement of medical equipment and ambulances and to draft a note recommending the purchase of twelve mess tents.⁸⁸² None of this was passed to Macdonald.

438. Lord Minto reached Canada early in November and took up his appointment officially on 12 November 1898. In a welcoming letter, Hutton advised him that the news was already abroad that the new Governor General had been sent out to press military reform and suggested that he make no remark to confirm the rumour until they had had a chance to confer.⁸⁸³ From 15 - 18 November, Hutton presided over a meeting of staff officers and the district Officers Commanding from Eastern Canada, the first such conference ever to have been held. It was another opportunity for Hutton to get his views across. After the meeting, he sent Minto copies of all the papers and speeches he had written:

If Canada will only determine upon looking on its present Militia Force as its 'National Army' the remodelling & the reconstruction necessary for enabling a defence Force thus designated to perform its role will become comparatively easy - moreover the political interference, and the petty log-rolling, which hitherto have crushed the very life out of the Canadian Troops will cease.⁸⁸⁴

THE CANADIAN DEFENCE COMMITTEE

439. The Canadian Defence Committee began its work in the summer of 1898. It was headed by Major General Leach who had already had some experience in 1896 of reporting on the defences which would be required for Montreal.⁸⁸⁵ It was the fatuity of such a study when there was no larger plan that had persuaded Montgomery Moore to press so hard for the formulation of a Canadian defence scheme. The other members were Colonel James Dalton of the Royal Artillery, Captain M. White of the Royal Navy and Colonel Lake. By the end of November, they had completed their work.

440. The report of the Committee was in three volumes. The first embodied a defence plan which was based on existing resources. It was largely based on the scheme which Captain Arthur Lee had worked out in great haste for Gascoigne in 1896 and it was, to say the least, ambitious in the demands which it would make on the Canadian Militia. The second volume dealt with the necessary reforms which would be essential for the Canadian Militia if it was to have any hope of making the Defence Scheme work. The third part of the report was submitted only to the British government, as a commentary on the other two.

441. The Committee's recommendations were, in most cases, moderate and, in many areas, militarily conservative. Proposals to base the defence of Montreal on elaborate fixed fortification reflected a rather traditionalist view of military affairs while nine inch muzzle loaders for Quebec were cheap

but also highly inefficient. Otherwise, many of the suggestions were of long standing. Department corps - supply, transport, medical and ordnance - must be created. The permanent force must be increased to 1400 men and its training and security should be improved. The officers should eventually have pensions while the men should be able to look forward to minor government jobs. the establishment of the cavalry and the field artillery should be increased. The four infantry schools should also have their strength increased to their old establishment and two new schools, at Kingston and Aldershot, Nova Scotia, should be opened. The Active Militia should train for 16 days. The men should be furnished with boots and with a more serviceable and cheaper uniform. Militiamen should at least look forward to a clean pair of pants on joining. The city corps should spend a few days in camp each year. Stores and equipment should be held at central battalion stores and the company commanders should be compensated with a contingency allowance. The three year term of Militia service should be enforced. In the field of arms and equipment, the Committee urged that a few modern heavy and medium guns be purchased - the Dominion had none - and the other half of the field artillery should be armed with breech loading guns. There was also a lack of rifles. Present reserves would only allow the strength of the Militia to be increased by a tenth. There should be arms and ammunition for 50,000 extra men. There should also be enough equipment and clothing for them as well as spare harness and saddlery. On the other hand, useless stores and guns should be disposed of to make room for new acquisitions. A naval member had been included on the Committee to give particular attention to the Great Lakes. The development of a naval militia in the United States had caused considerable alarm. The

committee proposed that Canada should have a corresponding force of 2,000 men.

Fisheries Protection vessels should be built in future with an eye to service on the Lakes and their crews should be made more permanent and trained in gunnery. Guns and ammunition should be stored for an emergency. The final recommendation of the Committee was for the construction of the Georgian Bay Canal, a water way which would connect the Ottawa River with Lake Huron and thus avoid the exposed lower lakes.⁸⁸⁷

442. The third part of the report explained the hypothetical basis of the first part and the modest nature of the proposals in the second. The situation, the Committee reported, was not hopeless. There was excellent material, especially in Ontario, although they anticipated that it would be very difficult to get recruits among the French Canadians. In 1861, they had crossed the border in large numbers, not from sympathy with the United States but, the report said, in apprehension lest the Militia ballot be enforced. There would be some volunteers from the cities and from areas where there was mingling with the English. However there would be few volunteers from either group merely for garrison duty. The Committee felt that a militia of 50,000 could be organized without difficulty and with that additional strength, their Defence Scheme would have included garrisons for Saint John, New Brunswick and Sault Ste. Marie (important as a potential terminus for their Georgian Bay Canal).

443. The proposals in the second part had been carefully weighted with what the Government might be expected to perform. In the 1896 crisis, they were

satisfied that if the Government had asked for a loan of \$5,000,000 instead of \$3,000,000, it would have obtained it without difficulty. They had grouped the requirements for equipment, clothing, arms and ammunition and had recommended that they be considered as capital expenditure. The Canadians asked them to lay down an order of relative importance between the various items but they had declined, suggesting that any such order of priorities should be suggested by the Colonial Defence Committee in London.

444. Imperial Federation was brought up as a likely prospect, particularly since the members of the Committee believed that Laurier had been a leading advocate of such a union at the Colonial Conference of 1897. At that time, the greatest emphasis had been on the possibility of exchanging permanent force units from Canada with equivalents from the United Kingdom. At the moment, apart from a field battery, this was unfeasible but if Imperial Federation came about, the problem would be solved by the stationing of British troops in peacetime. Aware that such a proposal might be regarded as retrograde in London, they insisted that it had been made necessary by the failure of the Canadians to provide for their own defence. According to the report, the Militia Act was a dead letter, particularly in the sections dealing with terms of service and the creation of a Reserve and the only way to revive military spirit would be through the presence of picked British battalions. It would also establish bonds of respect between Canadians and British soldiers and, in event of war, there would then be British officers in Canada to act as commanders and staff. They also recalled the opinions of many older militia officers who had received their first training with British

battalions prior to 1870 and who insisted that no comparable training had since been available in Canada.⁸⁸⁸

445. The report of the Committee was examined in Ottawa and London. Hutton, who had been in close contact with the Committee during its work in Canada, was largely in agreement with its recommendations. The Defence Scheme, however, he regarded as an absurdity, however respectfully he felt compelled to treat its principles. In recommending the offensive defence, it also declared that there were no means for anything but a passive defence. And a passive defence of Canada against the United States could only result in disaster. The Committee had also based its organizational plans on existing Militia units which were over-officered and under-manned. Hutton also pointed out the obsolete ideas in the recommendations about the defence of Montreal and Quebec. He emphatically agreed that there was a serious lack of staff officers and that many of the senior positions would have to be filled from England but, at the same time, he doubted that officers would be forthcoming in the event of war.⁸⁸⁹

446. In London, the third part of the Report was examined closely. There was little that could be done about the first two parts until the Canadian government had shown some signs of action. The War Office was pleased to discover the Committee's view that the Canadian government was willing to live up to its responsibilities but it was certainly not prepared to send battalions to Canada in peacetime. One change recommended by the Report was put into effect before it had even been received. Captain Arthur Lee, who had

been accompanying the American forces in Cuba, was appointed Military Attache in Washington. For the first time, the British would have professional intelligence about the American Army in peacetime.⁸⁹⁰

HUTTON'S FIRST REPORT

447. After four months in Canada and with the advantage of the Defence Committee's work, Hutton felt able to deliver his programme for reform in his first report on 1 January 1899. He felt that there was much to be done, five years was none too long, and there was not time to be lost. The report was edited in three sections. The first was an account of the year's events. The second was a set of proposals which could be completed in 1899 and the third was a more general report, dealing with broader and more long term recommendations.

448. The first section was a routine narrative but it carefully highlighted the changes which Hutton had wrought since his arrival. The Halifax Militia had been mobilized with the fortress garrison on 26 and 27 October 1898. Six officers and men from the artillery had already left for England. A company of garrison artillery had been exchanged with a company from the Halifax garrison. A number of 5" howitzers would shortly be arriving from England, the first modern guns that the bulk of the garrison artillery would have seen.

The permanent units and the schools had been placed under their respective District Officers Commanding as a form of decentralization. Lee Enfield rifles had been issued to the permanent troops and the city corps; the Oliver

equipment, 30,000 sets of which had finally been ordered on 2 April 1898, would shortly be ready. One institution which was praised unreservedly was the Royal Military College. Its new commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Kitson, was on excellent terms with the new General.⁸⁹¹

449. Hutton's first recommendation for the coming year was that the whole of the Militia should be trained and that it should be concentrated in central camps in the brigades and divisions in which it would be organized in an emergency. The best officers available would be appointed to the command and staff positions. Two years hence he hoped that the period of training would be extended to sixteen days. The permanent force infantry should be concentrated at Ottawa for training, at a time when they could also be useful in helping with the annual Dominion Rifle Association meeting. "B" Squadron of the Royal Canadian Dragoons should be brought from Winnipeg, where it had only two squadrons of Militia cavalry to instruct, to Kingston, and eventually to Montreal when barracks had been constructed. A General Staff was a primary condition for the creation of his Canadian Army and the Minister had already approved the holding of a special staff course under Kitson at the Royal Military College. Fourteen officers would attend the first course. Another addition to the staff should be an officer of the Royal Artillery to provide the modern technical knowledge which Hutton had found to be lacking. After three years of his guidance, the Canadian artillery officers would be able to carry on.

450. Attention was given to a number of aspects of administration. Hitherto,

the men had been responsible for cooking their own rations, usually on a company or smaller basis. Hutton recommended that battalion messing tents should be issued and that attention be given to improving the cooking. He also wanted contracts for supplies to be left entirely to the District Officers Commanding. In rural corps, a serge jacket had been substituted for the cloth tunic. He suggested that the men be allowed two, one new and one part worn. He also suggested, for the first time, that a Canadian emblem or some Canadian characteristic should form part of the uniform. The problem of boots had not yet been tackled and it was proposed again that the Government should sell boots to the men who needed them at cost. The whole regulations for the issue of clothing should be reformed, he insisted, for the system of distribution was spasmodic and haphazard. Hutton added himself to the long list of those who sought regimental storage for arms and equipment. Each regiment should hold the arms and the new Oliver equipment for the whole strength and the clothing for the additional men necessary to bring it up to war strength. Company commanders might continue to hold the uniforms and perhaps the belts and kitbags for the men on the lower peace strength.

451. In the area of new equipment, Hutton noted that the British were adopting new quick firing guns and that Canada should convert her order from the now obsolescent 12 pounder to the new equipment for the nine batteries which were still armed with muzzle loaders. Although there were plenty of tents and blankets, Hutton found that none of the other varieties of camp equipment were held and he suggested that sufficient for two divisions and a cavalry brigade should be ordered. For the Army Medical Service which he was

pushing, there should be the equipment for four bearer companies.

452. A quarter of the permanent force was in the Yukon and Hutton wanted it back or, if it was necessary to keep it there, there should be a corresponding increase in the establishment. The need for pensions for the officers of the staff and the permanent force he pressed as urgent. While Canadian junior officers were paid as well as their British equivalents, senior officers earned somewhat less and their lack of a pension put them in a still worse position. Finally, he asked for a little extra money to provide a qualified bandmaster for the band of the Royal Canadian Artillery and some instruments for the musicians. Such a band, he explained, would be the foundation of a Military School of Music and it would also be available on state and public occasions.⁸⁹²

453. Part III of the report was the most important. It began by explaining in detail just how far below the standards of an army the Canadian Militia fell. It was: "but a collection of military units without cohesion, without staff, and without those military departments by which an army is moved, fed, or ministered to in sickness."⁸⁹³ There was no reserve of clothing, arms or ammunition and the military stores were in the hands of civilians. The services which were required could not be organized in haste at the outset of an emergency. The standard of efficiency achieved by the Militia was too low. More could not be accomplished in the nine days each year which were left when Sundays and travelling days were subtracted. Lack of range accommodation at the camps had prevented anything but the most sketchy training in musketry.

The report continued by listing the two roles which Hutton envisaged for this Canadian Army - the defence of Canadian soil and the power to participate in the defence of the British Empire. For the former, field and garrison troops were needed as well as a naval brigade to defend the Great Lakes. To achieve the desirable condition, the first requirement was to give the General Officer Commanding much more authority and to restrict the Deputy Minister and the Civil Branch to finance, contracts, land management and the running of the cartridge factory. Next would come the creation of a Militia Army, by which he meant the establishment of the services and departments which the Militia had always lacked to make it capable of independent action in the field. Hutton drew attention to the Swiss system where officers in the departments were, in civil life, involved with corresponding services and undertakings. Those in the Transport Service would be connected with railways or shipping while those in the Pay Department would presumably have experience in banks. Only the Medical Service and the Engineers would require considerable special personnel and equipment. A further change would be to ensure a uniform establishment in all militia units of all arms, so that they could be grouped into formations and assigned a fixed proportion of administrative services.⁸⁹⁴

454. The reception of Hutton's report was generally favourable. "Bystander" in the Montreal News was exceptional when he wrote: "No, General Hutton, we do not want a Canadian Army in the accepted military sense," and went on to explain "Our business is to conquer nature by silent, honest toil. He who encourages the passion for militarism is no true friend of Canada."⁸⁹⁵ The Toronto Saturday Night was also perturbed, pointing out that all the people of

Canada could not save their country from a serious onslaught from the South and that such proposals would only excite the Americans.⁸⁹⁶ Other editors were less apprehensive. "General Hutton scores a Bull's Eye" cried the headline of the Galt Daily Reporter, and warned the Government that if it did not put the General's recommendations into effect, it should abolish the Militia and put the Doukhobors on guard.⁸⁹⁷ More influential papers like the Toronto Globe and the Montreal Star were more cautiously favourable. The Mail and Empire warned darkly that all the suggestions would not be taken up and the Liberal press had been directed to refer to it as Hutton's report, not the Minister's.⁸⁹⁸ The Manitoba Free Press concentrated on one item, the proposal to remove the Royal Canadian Dragoons from Fort Osborne Barracks. Such a lack of judgement on the part of the General was enough to condemn the rest but there was the hope that if Hutton were to visit Winnipeg, he might revise his opinion.⁸⁹⁹

455. The report itself was important. In the later difficulties which terminated his career in Canada, Hutton was to claim that his report had been distorted and ignored. It is probably true that the Government had considerable reluctance in proceeding with sections dealing with the powers of the military staff and particularly of the General Officer Commanding while Hutton and his successors remained in the Militia Department. The other sections of the Report might almost have been a blueprint for the reforms which were to be virtually completed before Borden left office.

POLITICS AND THE MILITIA

456. Hutton's conviction that politics was the dominating evil in the Militia came to occupy a central position in his thinking. Since he was seeking to advance a policy which was more that of the British than of the Canadian Government, his activities must in any case have generated friction. The question of political interference aggravated relations between the Minister and the General. It also served as a smokescreen behind which issues of constitutional significance were fought out. The fact that politics played a large part in the Militia was no secret. It was equally no secret that political considerations, as opposed to efficiency, economy or other more publicly acceptable motives, played an important part in most Government operations from the Department of Public Works to the Intercolonial Railway.

457. When political parties are not separated on serious issued of ideology or principle, some basis for allegiance must be found. By reserving offices, honours and all the benefits and favours at its command to his friends, a Government can hope to cement loyalties and inspire new allegiances. For patronage to thrive, a number of pre-requisites must be found. There must be an atmosphere of acceptance for the view that to the victors belong the spoils. It is even more important that efficiency or technical expertise is not demanded from the appointee. Thus, in our own age, a postal master or a senator may be appointed through patronage but an engineer or a foreign service officer will only be chosen after a rigorous examination. Finally, the attractions of the appointments must not be too great. When the honour or appointment is a real prize, competition becomes too keen and, instead of making a reliable supporter of the appointee and his relatives, one makes a

host of enemies from those who are disappointed. As is evident from the correspondence of politicians, patronage is misery, not pleasure, to bestow.

458. In the period from 1867 to 1900, the Canadian Militia fulfilled almost all the conditions for a patronage system. The rewards of office were almost entirely intangible. Rural militia officers might pocket their allowances without giving service in return but the allowances were very small. More serious militia officers would be heavily out of pocket for their services but men will pay notoriously heavily for status. The men in the ranks, as well, might give up \$1.00 a day for the 50 cents of a Militia private. The pay of the staff officers was equally low. Nor was the Militia expected to be efficient for, beyond periodic excursions in aid t the civil power, its political masters had no serious purpose for it. The idea of using it as a defence force against the United States was too fatuous to occur to any one but Militia officers and their friends and to patriots on the queen's Birthday. There was one limitation to politics in the Militia: It was not considered correct to proclaim it publicly. Since the British, on whom the Canadians sought to model their military institutions, had reputedly eliminated politics from the armed services, it would have been improper to indicate that Canadians had not. When incidents were brought into the open, there could be expressions of indignation and reproach. In 1904, with the Liberals under warm attack for a particularly open use of their influence, David Tisdale, the former Conservative Minister of Militia could tell the House of Commons that he had:

... never heard of the slightest attempt to introduce politics in any manner whatever into the administration of the Militia Department during the long years of the Conservative Government!⁹⁰⁰

459. There were, in fact, many ways in which political influence could be of advantage in the Militia Department, from obtaining appointments in the permanent corps to the awarding of contracts to supply the summer camps. Even the authorization of new militia units was regarded as a political honour to the favoured area. In 1882, Macdonald was approached with a request to establish a battalion in Essex County. Major J.R. Wilkinson, after congratulating him effusively on his election victory and informing him that "We did our duty in Essex by electing members for the Commons" went on to remind him of a long standing promise to allow a battalion which had already been organized to be accepted. "We have been faithful as a part in the conservative cause and should be recognized."⁹⁰¹ Unfortunately for this claim, M.D. 1 which included Essex County, was already well over its quota of men and the Government felt unable to meet the demand.⁹⁰² In neighbouring M.D. 2, however, where a preponderance of city units meant that rural units might train only every three years, the 10th Royal Grenadiers of Toronto demanded two additional companies. At the behest of the battalion's influential commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Grasett, the Prime Minister asked Caron to oblige.⁹⁰³

460. Both parties, when in office, made careful use of patronage lists in allotting contracts. Even in the crisis of the Northwest Rebellion, party

faithful demanded their rights. The bulk of the supplies in the Northwest could only be furnished by the Hudson's Bay Company, the single organization large enough to meet the unexpected demand. James Wrigley, the Company's commissioner in Winnipeg, was unpopular with local Conservatives and they did their best to persuade the Government to give them preference. Through Amos Rowe, a prominent local politician and a friend of Mackenzie Bowel, they pressed their claims. At his behest, Caron ordered that the purchase of horses be left to one Jack Benson.⁹⁰⁴ Local officials seem to have been careless for Rowe reported angrily that the bread and biscuit contract had fallen into the hands of "Grits, and bad ones at that." Instead, it must be given to Thomas Chambers, a good Conservative and a friend of Colonel Kennedy of the 90th Rifles.⁹⁰⁵

461. On more routine occasions, there was no such carelessness. Each year, militia camps were shifted from place to place despite the inconvenience to the force and unsuitability of many of the camping grounds in order to satisfy the claims of local merchants. In larger matters, there was also consideration. In 1891, a year when the Opposition found much evidence of corruption, the militia clothing contracts came under close scrutiny. For some years, there had been complaints about the quality of the clothing issued to the men and yet the contracts had continued to be given to the firm of W.E. Sanborn of Hamilton, a Conservative senator. Then it was switched to the clothing factory of Bennett Rosamonde at Almonte. Rosamonde was an equally prominent Conservative who entered the House of Commons later the same year.⁹⁰⁶

462. While General Officers Commanding might have little legitimate complaint about the allotment of contracts on a political basis, they were directly concerned when political influence was brought to bear in the making of appointment and in influencing the course of discipline. Most officers of the staff and the permanent corps owed their initial selection to their political influence and it must have seemed reasonable as well as necessary that they should continue to advance their careers by the same means. In 1881, when the Staff Adjutancy of the Royal Military college became vacant, there was pressure that it be filled by a Canadian officer and Captain J.G. Holmes of the School of Gunnery in Kingston made his way to Ottawa to advance his own claims. Not only could he claim twenty years service in the Militia but also, he pointed out, his father was a life long Conservative who had never asked a political favour.⁹⁰⁷ Major J.W. Lewis, who had been recommended by six Members of parliament and who advised the Prime Minister that the Government, with its \$4,000,000 surplus "may safely do just as they please."⁹⁰⁸ Instead, the appointment was given to Major S.C. McGill, a son of Peter McGill of Montreal, who held the post for over seventeen years.

463. When the Royal Military College had been established it was declared that it would be the source of officers for the Canadian Militia and it might have been expected that the Commissions in the permanent corps would be reserved for its graduates. This proved too difficult to achieve for commissions were popular rewards for the sons of the more prominent supporters. By 1889, six of the subalterns in the permanent corps were graduates of the College but twenty were not. Under the Liberals, the

proportion was improved but each vacancy remained a cause for vigorous campaigning. The College itself could be a source of difficulty when candidates for admission failed their entrance examination and proud and disappointed parents could bring pressure to bear. Ministers of both parties seem to have resisted this pressure fairly consistently although regretfully.

In 1889, W.B. Scarth, the Member for Winnipeg, demanded a second try for his son, enlisting the support of Mackenzie Bowell. "Caron has often driven a coach and six through the Militia Act & Military Schools", Boswell suggested, and he might stretch a point for Scarth.⁹⁰⁹ Caron, who seems to have become firmer about such matters as he grew older in his Department, stood firm, although he found it distressing that old friends "should imagine that if I could help their sons legitimately I would refuse to do so."⁹¹⁰ Laurier also used his influence on behalf of applicants for the College. In 1899, when he was in Washington. Laurier wrote to Borden to let in a young man whose mother was a personal and a political friend with a considerable influence in the Country of Megantic.⁹¹¹

464. The main difficulty of any patronage system from the viewpoint of the politicians who must administer it is that it breeds more discontent than satisfaction. For every favour which is granted, there are more which must be refused and supporters who may be alienated. In 1882, there was a struggle for the ill-paid and almost superfluous post of Deputy Adjutant-General in British Columbia. A number of prominent Conservatives, including the Roman Catholic Bishop of Hamilton lent their support to the claims of Major Alexander Moore of the 13th Battalion, Edward Furlong of Toronto

reported that Moore had "all sorts of certificates from all sorts of military schools"⁹¹² and that he was both solid politically and a Roman Catholic in faith, both of which made him suitable. He was also Irish. The Prime Minister was moved chiefly by Bishop Crimmon's intervention to add his support to Moore's appointment⁹¹³ but it was not found possible to appoint him. In 1887, when the new Infantry School was opened in London, a vacancy for captain was sought by Major John Gray of the Toronto Field Battery. Since he was elderly* and had no infantry experience, the appointment would hardly have been suitable but it was strongly pressed by Toronto Conservatives. One correspondent wrote from the Albany Club that "There seems to be a fear that Caron will be inclined to appoint some young man who had done nothing in the way of party work - this would not be liked."⁹¹⁴ While Gray was not given the appointment he wanted, he was made Brigade Major later in the year.

465. Armouries were perhaps the most conspicuous form of political favour and, as meeting halls, they could themselves serve a political function. For several years in succession, the member for Brantford rose in the House of Commons to complain that the roof and two walls of the local armoury had collapsed. Although the town eventually agreed to pay half the cost of repair, nothing was done until 1889. Even then, there was a certain amount of ingratitude. A correspondent wrote to Macdonald:

The Col. of the Battalion here announced at our Sons of England

* He seems to have been over fifty at the time.

dinner that Mr. Paterson M.P. had wired him of the \$10,000 in supplementary estimates for the drill shed. I took him up and said see what our good Conservative Govt. has done for Brantford notwithstanding our member opposed the Ministry.⁹¹⁵

Two years later, Toronto saw an election promise fulfilled when it, too, received a new armoury but the pleasure was considerably reduced when the contract was given to an Ottawa firm. There was a demand that the second lowest tender, from a Torontonion, should be accepted and the possibility of cheap French-speaking labour being imported provoked an outcry.⁹¹⁶ The Liberals also used armouries with an eye to their political effect. In 1900, the Liberal Minister of Public Works, accompanied by a small political and military entourage, arrived at Saint Thomas, Ontario, ostentatiously turning the sod for a new armoury. Three days after his visit, Saint Thomas returned a Conservative and that was the last that was heard of the new building.⁹¹⁷

466. Politics were deeply involved with the Militia Department's decisions on matters great and small. This did not particularly disturb most people, who did not believe the Department's work to be particularly vital and who had little basic respect for the Department's officials. When defence came to assume a more serious place in national life, such tolerance became less easy.

REPATRIATING THE 100th REGIMENT

467. The rising mood of imperialism in the nineties led to a revival in

Canada of the old proposal of providing a battalion of Canadians for the British regular army. This idea developed into the proposal that the old 100th Regiment should be repatriated to Canada to serve as the Canadian contribution. These suggestions paid little heed to the character of the 100th as it had developed in the years since it had left Canada. In 1872, when British infantry battalions were territorialised, the 100th had been associated with the 109th Regiment, a unit which had originally been part of the East India Company's army. The new title of the regiment was the Prince of Wales Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians) with its depot at Birr. The 100th provided the 1st Battalion. although the Regiment's magazine was called the Maple Leaf and the traditions of the Regiment paid considerable respect to Canada, the men were almost entirely recruited in Ireland and none of the officers had even served in Canada.⁹¹⁸

468. The first specific proposal for the repatriation of the 100th Regiment came from the City of Toronto; in May of 1896, the City Council drafted a petition which expressed regret that the name of the 100th had been changed and asked that it be changed back to the Prince of Wales Royal Canadian Regiment and that a recruiting depot should be established in Canada. This petition was signed by the Mayor, Robert F. Fleming, and forwarded to the Dominion Government.⁹¹⁹ It was one of the first concerns of the new Liberal Government at the end of June, 1896 and its only action was to refer to swiftly and without comment to the British authorities.⁹²⁰ When the proposal reached the War Office early in August, it aroused considerable interest. It was recalled that in 1893 the policy had been adopted that Canadians might be

recruited in Canada for the battalions serving there and that they might be recruited in England for battalions serving at home but that men might not be recruited in Canada for regiments serving abroad. However desirable it might be to have Canadians, there was fear of the travelling expenses of recruits and the difficulties which might arise should the Leinster Regiment be full and the recruits sent elsewhere. Finally, to suit the law as it then stood, pensioners and reservists who had completed their service would be obliged to live in the United Kingdom and this might not be popular. In the face of these difficulties, the Adjutant-General, Sir Redvers Buller, decided that it was a choice between sentiment and economy and, in the circumstances, economy should prevail. Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary of War and a former Governor General, was inclined to agree, doubting moreover that recruits would ever be forthcoming in Canada. Both viewpoints were opposed by Lord Wolseley, the Commander in Chief. "Are we ever to risk a little money to foster a feeling of Loyalty in our Colonies?" he asked, and pressed for the establishment of a depot at Toronto, only providing that the Canadian Government should be asked to provide the barrack accommodation. He did not fear to many recruits from Canada but if there were, he would divert the Irish stream. It would be up to the Canadians to make the scheme a success for if men were not forthcoming, the depot would be closed. If recruits did come forward, he was prepared to rename the regiment and even to link two Canadian Militia battalions to it. Under Wolseley's persuasion, Lansdowne decided to investigate the possibilities of the scheme, on condition that the Canadians should provide the barracks and also the medical and commissariat arrangements for the depot. But first he would have to be satisfied that the offer was made by

responsible people. It was only then that it was noted that the petition had not been accompanied by the comments of the Canadian Government or of Lord Aberdeen, the Governor General. The War Office reply, therefore, was a request to know whether the suggestion reflected the will of the Canadian people generally and whether the Canadian Government would be willing to give the scheme any practical support. If the demand was serious, the Canadians were informed that there were tentative plans to establish a depot at Toronto or at some other town in Canada on condition that Canada furnished the barracks and other services.⁹²¹

469. The British reply was sent back to Canada in November and nothing more was heard. In May of 1897, a memorial was prepared by a number of ex-officers of the old 100th Regiment who were in Ottawa including Senator Boulton, Brown Wallis and Lieutenant Colonel MacPherson, the Director of Militia Stores. It made detailed suggestions about the title, badges and uniform of a repatriated 100th Regiment. This memorial was also forwarded to the British authorities.⁹²² The authors of the memorial were full of ideas about designs for collar badges and belt buckles but they had little suggestion about how recruits were to be persuaded to join. There was still no official indication of interest from the Canadian Government until March, 1898, when Lord Aberdeen passed on a letter from the Department of Militia and Defence explaining that no had yet been received the correspondence which had been conducted with Toronto on the subject of providing barracks.⁹²³

470. Pending some Canadian action, the War Office appears to have made its

own decision to move. It was encouraged by a recommendation written by Captain Matthew Nathan of the Royal Engineers, an Intelligence Officer at the War Office who pointed out that while the forty million inhabitants of the United Kingdom were providing 114,000 troops overseas, the ten million white colonists were providing none. a battalion at Halifax could feed recruits to one of the three battalions maintained in the West Indies. Three battalions in Canada could provide for the whole West Indies garrison. If the system was extended to all the colonies, 13 home battalions would be freed from providing drafts and could serve as an expeditionary force in case of need. As for Canada, with a population of six million, the 1,400,000 French Canadians and the 200,000 Indians might have to be ignored but 6,000 men could easily be raised from the remainder. Nathan recognized the problem that Canadians would be unlikely to join for the miserly British pay of a shilling a day but if an allowance was necessary because of the high cost of living, it would be reasonable to ask the Canadian Government to pay it. The battalions would be Imperial, with British officers and Canadian rank and file, but Canadians who had been trained at Sandhurst would be appointed where possible. Nathan maintained that his proposal was much more important than the other suggestion for involving the colonials, the exchange of small units of permanent troops. Canada could only spare a battery of field artillery and this would hardly make any difference.⁹²⁴

471. The 1st Battalion of the Leinsters was then stationed at its depot at Birr. It had returned to Ireland in 1895 after seventeen years in India and its officers and men looked forward to a lengthy stay at home station. On

5 April 1898, without any warning, the battalion received notice that on or about 24 April 1898 it would be sailing for Halifax. The announcement came as a n astonishment to all members of the regiment. Although its magazine, the Maple Leaf, had stressed Canadianism, it had not been taken seriously by more than a few of the editorial staff and the idea of repatriation aroused no enthusiasm from the mass of officers and men. It also happened that the 2nd Battalion of the Leinsters, the old 109th, was at Halifax where it had spent only seven months. The decision to move the 100th had been provoked by the outbreak of the Spanish American War. The War Office decided to send an extra battalion to the West Indies but rather than send the 1st Leinsters, it was agreed that the 2nd Battalion would be sent back to a station it had left only a few months before. The 1st Battalion would go to Canada to try its luck with the repatriation scheme. There could hardly be a better example of planning being conducted without consultation with those most affected. The 2nd Battalion was furious to be moved after a very short period and after spending considerable sums to purchase winter clothing and furniture for their new station. So was the 1st Battalion, whose plans and arrangements were similarly disrupted. As for Canada, it also had little notice of the scheme and when the 1st Battalion sailed into Halifax on 4 May 1898, expecting an uproarious welcome, it was met by a couple of staff officers and a handful of stevedores.⁹²⁵

472. Having sent the 100th to Canada, it remained to find it Canadian recruits. From the first, the prospects were poor. Ivor Herbert, who was called upon for an expert opinion, suggested that the most likely recruiting

ground would be in the large industrial cities and that those most likely to enlist would be "disappointed immigrants, anxious to get away from Canada, or reluctant immigrants on the look-out for a job." The best men, in rural areas such as Megantic, the Gaspé or Cape Breton Island, would not be obtained by ordinary means. So far as he was concerned, it was a step backward.⁹²⁶

Undaunted, the War Office decided that since there were twelve Military Districts in Canada, each District Officer Commanding would be authorized to attest recruits and to have them medically examined. Once he had accepted the recruit, the man would be sent at public expense to Halifax to join the regiment.⁹²⁷ The real encouragement for the recruiting scheme came from Chamberlain, who was anxious to test the potential of the Colonies as a field for recruiting. The response from Canada was favourable. On 17 August 1898, Chamberlain was informed that the Canadian Staff would be instructed to co-operate in every way and he was requested to provide a supply of recruiting posters.⁹²⁸ By the middle of October, the War Office advised the Colonial Office that a case of recruiting posters and a large supply of the necessary forms had been sent direct to the Deputy Minister of Militia in Ottawa. Pending a decision on the depot in Toronto, recruits were to be sent direct to the Leinsters in Halifax.⁹²⁹

473. By the end of 1898, it seemed evident that hope of recruiting large numbers of Canadians in the Leinsters was largely futile. In mid-November, Lord William Seymour, commanding the British garrison at Halifax, sent an alternative proposal to the War Office. The five or six men who had joined had not been made particularly welcome in the regiment and it was evident to

Seymour that Canadians did not want the Leinsters and the Leinsters did not want Canadians. Evidently the Commander in Chief at Halifax had not been informed of the negotiations about repatriation. His own view was that there would be no difficulty in raising 1200 men for a specifically Canadian regiment but that they would not join an Irish regiment. He suggested that a decision be reached quickly as the best recruiting season was approaching, when the men returned from harvesting in the West.⁹³⁰ Seymour's note revived interest in the War Office. General Sir Evelyn Wood, who had become Adjutant-General, was anxious to give a chance to any attempt to raise a battalion in Canada. He proposed that a start should be made by raising a Canadian company. If men did not come forward in sufficient numbers, the company could be left in Canada until it had wasted away.⁹³¹ Lord Wolseley was also enthusiastic about a Canadian battalion but he was also determined that the Canadian tradition of the 1st Battalion of the Leinsters should not be lost. He favoured cutting off further drafts to the battalion from Ireland, the adoption of more Canadian badges and battle honours and a request to the Canadian Government to contribute sufficiently to the pay of the men to make recruiting financially attractive.⁹³² Lord Lansdowne shared the enthusiasm of his officers but he was sufficiently experienced to take a realistic view of the likelihood of Canadian official support. He had no illusions about the political influence of the members of the Repatriation Committee and he knew a little about the self-advertisement of Canadian military imperialists. Nor was Lord William Seymour a safe guide to Canadian opinion. Finally, Halifax was hardly a suitable place to raise a Canadian battalion since the Maritimes were really very remote from the rest of the country.⁹³³ Wolseley continued to

press for an experiment in Canadian recruiting. He acknowledged that the low pay was putting a high price on patriotism but since they could not get enough men in England at that rate of pay, they would simply have to try elsewhere. Both he and Wood were also anxious to make the attempt as a way of disarming the public criticism which accused them of failing to make any effort to involve the colonies. If the experiment failed, the odium would at least be transferred from the War Office to the colonies.⁹³⁴

474. The earnest discussion in London had been unaccompanied by any notification from Canada. Only in February was a report of the Canadian cabinet received in London. It was hardly encouraging. While there was no difficulty in carrying out the recruiting scheme proposed by the British, there was also no barrack accommodation at Toronto. However, this difficulty was not urgent so long as the Leinsters were stationed in Canada. It was evident that the Canadian Government would be no more than a passive spectator of British recruiting efforts. The Cabinet report was accompanied by a memorandum from Hutton to his Minister. Although he had not been asked his opinion of the probable success of the scheme, Hutton made it clear that Canadians were unlikely to join a regiment which was known to be both Irish and Catholic. What would be possible, in view of the military spirit he had found in Canada, would be to recruit for regiments which were then on active service in Egypt, India and South Africa. He was sure that enough men would never come forward to join any single regiment and that to establish a depot in Toronto would be a waster of money.⁹³⁵

475. Lord Lansdowne had also been provided with a report from Colonel Lake, who was then on the staff at the War Office. With his experience in Canada, Lake was able to explain what happened to Toronto's original petition for the depot. The only available accommodation in the city was Stanley Barracks, then fully occupied by the permanent force. The Cabinet had decided that since Toronto would gain something over \$100,000 a year from the presence of the depot, it should make a contribution to the erection of additional buildings. This proposal was put to the City Council but, despite repeated reminders, there was no reply. As for an attempt to repatriate the Leinsters, Lake was convinced that it would be a failure. The battalion had made a poor impression on its arrival in Halifax. It would be better if an attempt was made to raise a battalion in Canada officered by Canadians in the British service. Even then, it was doubtful that sufficient recruits would be obtained. There were many in Canada who thought that it would be possible but they were all very vague about how many would be required annually under a short service system. Although the permanent force private was paid almost twice as much as a British private, it had still proven impossible to keep a permanent force of 850 men up to strength.⁹³⁶

476. This information did not cause the War Office to give up hope.

Lansdowne now acknowledged that if recruiting was to be a success, it must be disassociated from the Leinsters. At the same time, he was averse to any general recruiting, anticipating that only stray immigrants and broken down Canadians would be attracted. He accepted a suggestion that a nucleus of a Canadian officers in the Army should be invited to volunteer for it. While admitting that Halifax was unsuitable, it was the only place available.⁹³⁷

Wolseley saw no difficulty in the scheme, particularly if Canada would pay the "graceful compliment" of augmenting the pay of the rank and file to the level of the United States Army.

If we would now make this experiment in an honest and liberal spirit we cannot fail to graft on to our Regular Army the fighting instincts & national sentiments of the Loyal Canadian people. This would be of great military value to our Army & of immeasurable national importance to our Empire.

I can think of no more certain means of binding together into one strong bundle round England as a core the outlying suckers of our scattered Empire.⁹³⁷

On 20 July 1899, the principles were worked out at a meeting in Lord Lansdowne's office attended by the senior military and civil officials involved. The Canadians in the Leinster Regiment would provide the nucleus of a new regiment to be trained and maintained at Halifax. The title of the

regiment would be the Prince of Wales Royal Canadian Regiment and it would have Niagara as a battle honour on its colours. Four places would be chosen as recruiting depots and buildings would be provided by the Canadian Government. The men were to be recruited for either three or five years with the colours with the balance of twelve years in the reserve. In the explanation to be sent to Canada, it was agreed that considerable emphasis would be placed on the desire to establish a closer military connection and to preserve the historic title of Royal Canadian Regiment. On the other hand, no reference was to be made to the liability of the battalion for general service overseas.⁹³⁹

477. By the time the British proposal had reached Canada, the South African War had broken out and there were more urgent concerns for military authorities in both countries. Hutton forwarded his own suggestions to the Minister on 25 September 1899, acknowledging that few would be likely to come forward at the low rate of pay but putting forward his opinion that a few would join if there was a specifically Canadian title. He was not clear whether the officers would be British or Canadian but half the appointments should be held by the Minister for allotment among Militia officers whom Hutton could recommend.⁹⁴⁰ The matter was considered briefly in the Cabinet on 2 November 1899 but the Minister's view was that little progress would be made.⁹⁴¹ This discouraging answer, in company with Hutton's suggestions, was returned to England and the entire correspondence was filed for the duration of the war.

478. This should have been the end of the repatriation question. It was not. With the war in South Africa, all British regular regiments were required for action. Since Halifax was a relatively untroubled garrison, it was proposed to replace the Leinsters with a Militia battalion from Britain, the 6th Lancashire Fusiliers. The Leinsters were thoroughly elated at the news.⁹⁴² However four days after the battalion had received notice of its move, Lord Lansdowne received a telegram from Lord Minto asking him not to send the Lancashire Fusiliers for the Minister had decided that the moment for repatriation had arrived. An Order in Council had been passed authorizing repatriation on the basis of two battalions being formed, one for Halifax and the other for service in England or in the British Empire. The officers would come from the Royal Military College, Kingston and the men would be recruited on British terms and rates of pay. All that would be required from the Leinsters would be a nucleus of 100 men.⁹⁴³ This meant that the movement orders for both the Leinsters and the Lancashire Fusiliers had to be suspended until the text of the Canadian Order in Council was received. On 24 January 1900. Lord Minto followed his telegram with a more cautious explanatory letter. Borden had been converted to the repatriation scheme on learning that the depot of the regiment would be in Canada, not in Ireland. The Minister's desire to officer the regiment entirely from Canadian sources might not be entirely free from a desire for political patronage while as a Nova Scotia representative in the Cabinet, he would also be doing a service for his province. It was the Minister who had obliged him to send the telegram of the 16th.⁹⁴⁴ The text of the Order in Council laid down the details. The suggestions of the Repatriation Committee about details of

uniform were faithfully reproduced but the cost was to be borne by the British Government. As for the present 1st Battalion of the Leinsters, apart from its nucleus, the men might be drafted out and sent elsewhere.⁹⁴⁵

479. Whatever the political dividends to be gained for Borden through his tardy conversion, the effect on the Leinsters at Halifax was severe. Seymour at Halifax sent an furious angry complaint to the Secretary of War. The first he or the men of the regiment had learned of the Canadian decision was a report in a Halifax newspaper. The Army was being used as a political stalking horse by the Canadian Government. When he had questioned Hutton about the decision, he had been informed that the whole scheme was a political manoeuvre to divert public criticism of the Government for its lukewarmness in supporting Britain in South Africa. The whole affair was unfortunate, both for the war effort in South Africa and for the Leinsters whose discipline, he reported, had become exemplary when it was reported that they were to go to the front.⁹⁴⁶ These observations convinced the British authorities that the Canadians were not in earnest over repatriation and Lansdowne agreed reluctantly that the Leinsters should be brought back to England.

Lord Wolsely, desperate for troops, agreed, suggesting that a battalion of Canadian militia might be accepted at Imperial rates for the Halifax garrison, with the Canadian Government making up the difference between Imperial and Canadian rates of pay.⁹⁴⁷

480. On 25 March 1900, the Leinsters sailed for Liverpool, putting an end to an ill-conceived and ill-considered scheme which, as Herbert had observed, was

a step backward. The battalion had not wanted to come to Canada and it was overjoyed to leave. Its place was taken by a hastily assembled provisional battalion of Canadian Militia. Perhaps embarrassed by its conduct in seeking to hold up the Leinsters, the Canadian Government agreed to pay the full expenses of the battalion of Canadians.

PROGRESS IN MILITIA REFORM

481. Having presented his blueprint for reform with his first report, General Hutton returned to the task of providing the personal direction and leadership necessary to bring it about. On 7 December 1898, there had been a major change in the hierarchy of the Department with the appointment of a new Deputy Minister. Colonel Charles Eugene Panet had been Deputy Minister since 1875 and although he was a Liberal appointment, Borden regarded him as a major impediment to the reform of the Department. In a letter to the Prime Minister, Borden spoke of the old man's senility and decaying mental energies.

The mistakes that are constantly being made, the forgetfulness and carelessness that are displayed, are insufferable. The only wonder is that some really alarming blunder has not been committed.The old man's heart is in the right place. He is a loyal and true friend. He is honest and does his best to guard the expenditure of the Department.

But he is not the man he was and he has failed lamentably within the two years during which I have been his chief.⁹⁴⁸

The old man did not lack the energy to fight for his job. In fact, it had already been offered to another, Lieutenant Colonel Louis Felix Pinault of the 9th Voltigeurs of Quebec, a friend of the Prime Minister. Panet discovered who his successor was to be and accused Pinault unfairly of intriguing against him. Pinault, himself a Liberal of some influence, was embarrassed by the accusation, particularly when it was repeated in the newspapers.⁹⁴⁹ The original understanding had been that he would be appointed at the end of the 1898 session but nothing happened and he sought a definite decision. Panet, in turn, obtained the support of Senator Sir Charles Pelletier, one of the most senior Liberals, a cabinet minister under Mackenzie and Speaker of the Senate under Laurier. Pelletier was a man of great influence whose son Oscar had already had a distinguished career as an officer in the permanent corps. All of this created a minor family crisis for the Liberals, with Pinault demanding a decision, Panet announcing to the press that he would not be resigning, Senator Pelletier refusing to give way and Borden pleading for an efficient Deputy.⁹⁵⁰ The new Deputy Minister was a man of forty six, a veteran of the Northwest Campaign with the 9th Voltigeurs and a barrister. He had been a Liberal member of the Quebec legislature since 1890. Pinault was an energetic and competent man who could be trusted to pay full attention to the political implications of decisions made in the Militia Department. He could not be counted upon as an ally for Hutton.

482. Although he devoted much of January to the preparation of his report, it did not occupy his full time. With the support of the Governor General, he organized the Officers' Association of Canada, arranging that the first

lecture to the members in Ottawa would be addressed by Captain C.F. Winter on lines which he personally approved.⁹⁵² The 7th Fusiliers in London, perennially the most unsatisfactory of the city infantry battalions, remained a problem. Hutton finally decided to dissolve the battalion and then to create a new 7th with new officers and, hopefully, a new spirit. This was accomplished in February.⁹⁵³ A development which reflected the growing activity of Militia Headquarters was the appearance of Militia Orders at the beginning of February. Hitherto, General Orders had been published approximately monthly, in two sections. The first dealt with changes in Militia regulations and with orders for camps, courses of instruction and other matters of policy. The second section dealt with appointments, promotions and retirements. The new Militia Orders were intended to appear daily and to deal with matters of greater detail. In fact, they were sent out only twice a week. There were directions for reports to be submitted, clarifications of the regulations and announcements of the movements of the General Officer Commanding. The two sets of orders continued to be issued separately.⁹⁵⁴

483. At the beginning of February, Hutton was in Kingston to address the fourteen officers who attended the first Militia Staff Course.⁹⁵⁵ He also had a chance to inspect the 47th Battalion, a rural unit which had been trained, two companies at a time, at Fort Henry during January. The reporter of the Kingston Whig was most impressed with the visiting General, comparing him to Sir Wilfred Laurier in magnetic personality and declaring that "it does not require a judge of character to note the fact that he is a thorough gentleman

and a soldier."⁹⁵⁶ On 5 February, Hutton addressed the Dominion Rifle Association, recommending that they modernise their practices, using smaller bullseyes, disappearing and moving targets and mass firing.⁹⁵⁷ On the 9th, there was a speech to the Artillery Association in which Hutton deplored the lack of technical knowledge among the gunners and reported that he had sent officers to study at Shoeburyness.⁹⁵⁸ On the 11th, he was in St. Jean for a "non-political dinner" arranged by Israel Tarte, Borden, who also attended, pointed out the value of military schools to the community but Hutton issued a direct invitation to French Canadians to take a more active interest in the Militia. No people had ever become truly great, he told his listeners, merely by the cultivation of land and pastoral pursuits.⁹⁵⁹ On the 13th, his ball at Earnescliffe was described as the event of the week, lasting until 3:00 a.m. on the following morning. Hutton was becoming a public personality. On 3 March 1899, he spoke at a dinner of Militia sergeants in Toronto, and aroused cheers by his promise to create a Canadian Army soon. He took a risk with his Toronto audience when he explained that by a national army, he meant one in which English and French Canadians were united but he restored delight when he announced that he wanted an army to participate not merely in the defence of Canada but in that of the Empire as well.⁹⁶⁰

484. Hutton's activities were not limited to speeches. On 14 February 1899, the twelfth Militia Order warned officers and staff of the permanent corps and those who aspired to high command that the Major General considered it essential that instructors and staff officers should:

...more especially acquire a practical as well as a theoretical knowledge of the French language, and the Major General suggests that all those who are unable to read or speak French with fair facility should take an early opportunity of making good this defect.⁹⁶¹

On 10 March 1899, orders were issued for all Militia units to select a regimental march before the end of April.⁹⁶² On 15 March, arrangements were announced for the Imperial garrison at Halifax to conduct a provisional school for the local Militia.⁹⁶³ At the end of the month, Hutton spent several days inspecting Militia and permanent corps units in Montreal and Quebec. On 28 March, a forecast of the summer's training was published, an advance notice which had always been lacking in previous years. Officers of the permanent corps were given notice that in future they would be expected to reach the same level of qualification as in the Imperial Army.⁹⁶⁴

485. Hutton's activities did not pass without considerable controversy in the press. The Toronto Evening Star backed Hutton warmly, declaring that "so long as a civilian is at the head of the department, the militia regiment will be regarded as a medium of social prestige rather than as a military arm."⁹⁶⁵ The Montreal Daily Witness was equally enthusiastic, supporting Hutton in his efforts to make Parliament spend money on military matters and to arouse the people in a time of profound peace. It also hoped that his provision for bilingual officers would be made obligatory.⁹⁶⁶ Some other newspapers differed sharply. Referring to Hutton's speech to the Toronto sergeants, the Toronto Telegram questioned his right to call for an army above politics and religious

denominations. It also ridiculed his suggestion that a Militia with new rifles, Oliver equipment and twelve pounder guns could be paralyzed.⁹⁶⁷ The Ottawa Citizen warned that the cost would not be small when the General had all that he wanted.⁹⁶⁸ The Bobcaygeon Independent sturdily maintained that the real question was whether any military force at all was needed. "Who is the militia to fight? The whole arrangement is an absurdity and the country could well be spared the expense of maintaining so costly an extravagance.⁹⁶⁹ On 5 April 1899, the first meeting of the Association of Militia Officers was held in the Railway Committee Room of the House of Commons. Hutton, as president, presided over the thirty six officers who attended and Lord Minto also was present. In reporting this gathering, the Toronto World on the following day announced that Hutton's speech showed that he was an agent of the Imperial government and that this showed that the Colonial Office was at the bottom of his schemes for reorganization. "It looks as if General Hutton had been sent out to sound the gong and had Minto, a military man also, to ring the bell."⁹⁷⁰

486. A major concern for Hutton was the standard of instruction being offered to the Militia. During April, detailed qualifications for instructors in the various arms were worked out and published.⁹⁷¹ It also seemed important to him that his officers be better trained. Having established that all the Militia was to be trained in the summer of 1899 and that it was to be concentrated in large camps, he arranged voluntary three day courses for commanding officers of infantry battalions and cavalry regiments. These courses were conducted at three centres for cavalry officers and six centres for infantry officers and

consisted of practical and theoretical instruction.⁹⁷² A more ambitious scheme was the staff ride which he arranged for three days at the end of May. The staff ride was primarily intended for the candidates of the Militia Staff Course but other Militia Officers were invited to participate. It consisted of a prolonged tactical exercise through the Niagara peninsula, with men of the permanent corps acting as a skeleton cavalry brigade and infantry division. The bulk of the arrangements were made by Lieutenant Colonel Kitson of the Royal Military College but Hutton acted as Director of the ride and as Chief Umpire.⁹⁷³ It was the first time such an undertaking had ever formed part of Militia training in Canada and it was watched with a mixture of amusement and fascination by both the general public and many Militia officers.⁹⁷⁴ At the end, Hutton judged the experiment a success. There had been innumerable mistakes, he told Minto, but these and the general ignorance of the country had made the exercise all the more realistic. With that experience, he was satisfied that if the Government would only put political and denominational prejudice aside, their programme of military reform would be accomplished.⁹⁷⁵

487. With the conclusion of the staff ride, Hutton had less than a week before the summer camps began. The troops at each camp were to be organized as a division with Hutton as the division commander. The first was held at London at the beginning of June. From there, he moved on to the M.D. 2 camp at Niagara and from there to Laprairie. The final camp for the early summer was held at Levis for the men of M.D. 7. At each camp, a similar pattern was followed. A divisional staff was formed of a mixture of permanent force and

Militia officers. A rigorous programme of instruction was laid down, imposing a pace of work that had never been known before. In the course of each camp, the cavalry were practised in an outpost exercise and the infantry in an attack. The artillery was trained separately by a team of officers and instructors under Lieutenant Colonel F.G. Stone, the British officer whom Hutton had brought to Canada to assume command of the artillery. After each camp, the General's observations were published as orders. At Niagara, the Governor General attended the final review.

488. At each camp, Hutton's comments were similar. The men were commended for their achievements but they were also reminded that true discipline could not be acquired in a mere twelve days and that the training period should be extended to the sixteen days permitted under statute. The most unsatisfactory situation was found at the camp at Levis. Hutton had already made an effort to remedy the lack of French speaking instructors in the Militia. He had followed up his warning in February with arrangements for examinations to be held for officers and non-commissioned officers who would be able to qualify as interpreters in either French or English.⁹⁷⁶ Realization of this policy remained in the future. At Levis, he could observe the consequence of the lack of instruction of French-Canadian officers and non-commissioned officers. As they did not know how to instruct, they were unable to command. Hutton placed the responsibility squarely on the staff and the permanent corps. For the future, he was optimistic:

The French Canadian Troops have, for many years, suffered from want

of a proper appreciation but it is earnestly hoped that, by increasing interest of the General Public in the importance of National Defence and by the patriotic zeal and military enthusiasm of the troops themselves in another year the standard of military efficiency will more adequately maintain the great historical traditions of French Canadian Military achievements.⁹⁷⁷

These comments were appreciated by the French press which reported on the camps in fuller detail than usual. By giving a special significance to the church parade during the camp, Hutton attracted much sympathy from Quebec and Montreal papers.⁹⁷⁸ The camps throughout Eastern Canada provided considerable newspaper copy and the incidents of military life were reported in detail. Both Borden and Hutton received praise from many quarters for their decision to ban canteens from the camps and editors were satisfied that this meant that liquor had been banished from the Militia.⁹⁷⁹ Another innovation of the General had a fortunate effect. For the first time, Amusements Committees were set up in the camps to plan entertainment for the men after training had ceased. These were particularly popular at the two camps in Quebec where prizes were offered for the best singing.⁹⁸⁰

489. Hutton's attention was not reserved from the training of the Militia. With some difficulty, funds had been made available to concentrate the Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry at the Rockcliffe Ranges near Ottawa. This was only the second occasion that the men of the Regiment had served together. From the middle of July until the end of August, the permanent force men were

worked hard under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel W.D. Otter. On 2 August, in company with the two battalions of the Ottawa Brigade, a night attack was practised with some success.⁹⁸¹ By the time the practical training was over, Hutton found a very considerable improvement in smartness and efficiency. He even had praise for the instructors although he observed that several officers and non-commissioned officers had obviously been too long at one station and the commanding officer must be careful to move them more regularly from place to place.⁹⁸² The last duty of the troops was to serve as markers and fatigue party for the Dominion Rifle Association meeting at the end of August. During the camp, the Regiment was honoured by the appointment of Lord Wolseley as its Honourary Colonel.⁹⁸³ At the end of the camp, a fifth company was organized and established as No. 5 Regimental Depot at Quebec.⁹⁸⁴ This was an obvious attempt to bring practical assistance to bear on the problem of the French Canadian Militia.

490. This problem was approached in other ways as well. The 89th Battalion had been particularly involved in abuses and Hutton decided to make an example of it. One of the company commanders had taken more railway tickets than he had brought men to camp and he was suspected of keeping the difference for his own use.⁹⁸⁵ Captain Lebel of the same regiment had been absent from drill and his excuses, when called for, were flimsy. Again an example was to be made of him by dispensing with his services.⁹⁸⁶ In the face of an outcry, Hutton held firm. "It is a matter of great importance," he explained to Pinault, "as the discipline of the French Canadian Troops is at a very low ebb..."⁹⁸⁷ The Commanding officers of the 64th and 86th Battalions were advised to resign

because of the state of their battalions despite many years of service.⁹⁸⁸

When the affairs of the 89th Battalion were examined, it was discovered that several officers had signed false transport warrants but by that time, Hutton was deep in other matters and it was decided that a severe reprimand would be sufficient. The offence was evidently so common as not even to be considered an offence.^{989*}

491. On 30 August 1899, Hutton officiated at the opening of the Toronto Industrial Exhibition. He had a chance to make what he later felt to have been his best speech in Canada. It was, in fact, the most rhetorical of his speeches on the Canadian Army, combined with a passionate advocacy of militarism:

Our pastimes, our cricket, our football and our manly games may, and undoubtedly have done much for the manhood of the Empire. There is, however, something greater, higher, nobler, in a nation's life which athleticism does not teach. It is the profession of arms when undertaken upon its true lines, which inculcates the spirit of discipline of mind and body, the subordination of self to a noble end the love of country and honour to God. These are qualities which constitute the warlike strength of a people and become the true reflexes of their moral and mental vigour.⁹⁹⁰

* It was also alleged to be common for units from Southern Quebec to make up their strength from stevedores on the docks of Montreal. (Debates, 20 June 1896, 5419)

492. From Toronto, Hutton returned briefly to Ottawa and then set out to tour the camps in the Maritimes. On the way, he had another opportunity to inspect the Montreal city corps and the permanent corps at Quebec. At Montreal, he announced plans for a military tattoo for the city to which the Militia and representatives of British and foreign armies would be invited. All that would be required would be a guarantee fund of from \$15-20,000. The idea was picked up with some interest by the Montreal newspapers.⁹⁹¹ In the Maritimes, Hutton reproduced the pattern of activity which he had created in the Ontario and Quebec camps and continued to preach his various doctrines. On 23 September 1899, he returned to Ottawa.

493. Several other areas of training progressed outside Hutton's immediate supervision. Chief among them was the training of the artillery. His immediate solution to the technical backwardness of the Canadians was to introduce a British officer, Lieutenant Colonel F.G. Stone, who became the officer commanding the Canadian Artillery on 1 June 1899. The appointment aroused criticism on the grounds that a Canadian officer should have been given the distinction,⁹⁹² but Hutton had no reason to be unhappy with the choice. Stone was directed to make himself responsible for carrying out the practical details of the artillery organization suggested by the Defence Committee Report of 1898, including the regrouping of existing units of garrison artillery to provide a second regiment for Montreal. Hutton also felt that Saint John, New Brunswick, deserved more attention than the Committee had given it.⁹⁹³ On 17 July, Stone was informed that he was also to

act as an Inspector of Artillery and to take a particular interest in the permanent batteries, some of which were in bad order. "A school of gunnery should be organized without delay upon the ashes of that which exists" he was informed.⁹⁹⁴ Stone did not accomplish all that he was asked to do in the first year but a number of alterations in the organization of the garrison artillery brought a standard organization for all the regiments. The field artillery profited from a competitive camp at Deseronto in which eleven batteries participated. Due to the lack of modern equipment, the practice of both permanent and Militia garrison artillery units was less valuable than that of the field artillery but all showed an evident improvement as a result of the year's training.⁹⁹⁵

HUTTON'S DIFFICULTIES WITH THE GOVERNMENT

494. If Hutton's difficulties had been limited to occasional sniping from the press, it might have been that he would have swept all before him. In fact, the coldness and lack of co-operation of which he had complained since his arrival continued. The new Deputy Minister proved to be no ally and the friction with the civil branch of the Department continued. Early in February, Hutton submitted an estimate of the increase in the estimates which would be necessary to carry out the recommendations in his 1898 report. For the current year, there was to be an increase of \$128,000, chiefly to pay for four additional days of drill for the Militia but with smaller sums to pay for additional staff officers and to move "B" Squadron of the Royal Canadian Dragoons from Winnipeg to Kingston. For public works, he wanted \$373,000, almost half of which would pay for barracks and range at Montreal. For other purposes, he wanted \$525,000, mostly for new artillery and to help to organize a naval militia and to provide it with a training ship.⁹⁹⁶ This list was ignored. Another foray into the territory of the civil branch was organized a few days later when Hutton complained to the Minister that the Chief Superintendent of Stores refused to apply the Imperial regulations for the care and maintenance of military stores. It was necessary that he be brought promptly to comply with them for large quantities of artillery and other stores would soon be arriving.⁹⁹⁷ A week later, he was furious to discover that a memorandum he had sent to the Deputy Minister on the care of saddlery had been referred to the Chief Superintendent of Stores for his comments. In an angry letter to the Minister he announced flatly: "I do not desire the remarks of gentlemen in the civil branch upon technical matters of military efficiency." The incident pointed out again the necessity of transferring the

Stores Department to the supervision of the military authorities.⁹⁹⁹

495. Departmental disputes were not the only or even the chief source of exasperation to the General. What provoked his indignation more than anything else was the prevalence of political influence, particularly in questions of military discipline. a number of instances had occurred shortly before his own appointment. On 15 July 1897, Brevet Captain Oscar Pelletier had been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and given command of M.D. 7. On 15 February 1898, Major Robert Cartwright was appointed to the newly revived position of Assistant Adjutant-General. These officers were efficient and capable but the Opposition suspected that both these junior officers owed their selection to the fact that one was the son of the Speaker of the Senate and the other was the sone of the Minister of Trade and Commerce. Politics had governed at least two of the appointments to the Yukon Force as well, Major Talbot, the Paymaster and major Bliss, the Supply and Transport Officer.

Hutton's first problem occurred when Major Talbot appeared in Ottawa in November, having left the Yukon Force under circumstances which Hutton considered as "irregular" and with a clear intention not to endure a Yukon winter. Hutton's first decision was to dispense with his services, his second, to return him to duty. Both decisions were complicated by the fact that Talbot's brother was a Liberal Member of parliament who promptly brought the weight of his influence to bear. This created a dispute between Hutton and the Minister which was fully reported int he newspapers and which aroused considerable comment from Conservative editorial writers. Hutton had to rescind his order when the Minister eventually produced a letter from

Colonel Evans, commander of the Yukon Force, praising Talbot's work and explaining that he had been sent to Ottawa to make a special report to the Minister. Nothing could persuade Hutton, however, that the tardy explanation had not been extorted from Evans by political pressure.¹⁰⁰⁰ The dispute reminded the Ottawa Citizen, normally a supporter of the Government, of the previous difficulties between Generals and the Government. After recalling difficulties of Luard, Herbert and Gascoigne, the newspaper warned that if Hutton went, all would be lost in the Militia since the officers would become politicians in uniform as they were in the United States.¹⁰⁰¹ The Montreal Gazette took a different view, suggesting that the differences proved the need for a Canadian officer who would know the limits of his power. Otherwise, there was bound to be a struggle between the General and the Minister whenever the former tried to interfere with politics. The Gazette thought that Colonel Aylmer, the Adjutant-General, would be an excellent choice.^{1002*}

496. Actually all was not finished with the Talbot affair. It emerged in Parliament that Talbot had not only been drawing the pay of his rank for service in the Yukon but had also been collecting his salary for his normal

* In May, Colonel Aylmer was sent to England at the Minister's behest to visit British military establishments and thus broaden his military experience. Hutton was opposed to this visit. In a letter to Sir Redvers Buller, the British Adjutant-General, he asked that Aylmer be given a few opportunities around Aldershot. Aylmer, he explained, had no experience and was "quite useless". Buller was asked to report on Aylmer and "point out how impossible it is for a man of his maturity to learn anything." To Aylmer himself, he sent a curt letter through Foster, reminding him that he had ignored military etiquette by failing to call on the General Officer Commanding before his departure and ordering him to keep a diary of his movements and of the instruction he received. M.G. 21, HU Vol. 1, 75, Hutton-Buller, 14 May 1899; RG 9 II B 1 599, Hutton - Chief Staff Officer, 26 July 1899.

employment as a Government clerk in Quebec. This was a very clear offence and Hutton's original decision was sustained.¹⁰⁰³ Major Bliss was also in trouble.

In November, 1898, Colonel Evans had been prevailed upon to send a glowing testimonial of his services to Ottawa but at that very time the management of the supplies and their transfer to the Yukon from Skagway was actually in difficulties for which Bliss was felt to be responsible. When, at Evan's behest, Hutton sought to have Bliss removed, he found himself frustrated by Evans' own letter of recommendation.¹⁰⁰⁴

497. Another incident which occupied some of Hutton's time was reminiscent of the disputes which had caused Gascoigne so much difficulty. Lieutenant Colonel Francis B. Gregory commanded the 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment of Canadian Artillery, a unit of garrison artillery at Victoria. In the course of a dispute with his own commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel E.G. Prior, a Conservative Member of Parliament, and after some criticism of his battalion in the press, Gregory called a meeting of his officers and men to have them express an opinion on his command. Such a procedure was contrary to military regulations and Lieutenant Colonel Peters, the District Officer Commanding, directed that the meeting be cancelled. Gregory went ahead with the meeting for Peters evidently had little influence. Hutton was obliged to enforce discipline from his desk in Ottawa. Although the General was prepared to administer no more than a severe reprimand for such defiance of military discipline, Gregory felt that he had committed no offence at all and he used his political influence to prove it. In this case, Hutton held firm although his position had been weakened by the mistakes of Lieutenant Colonel Peters.

The unfortunate officer on the spot, seeking to avoid arousing the anger of a local magnate, had tried to investigate Gregory's offence only through interviewing officers who had been present at the meeting. He had avoided asking questions of Gregory himself.¹⁰⁰⁵ In the case of both Evans and Peters, Hutton had found that Canadian officers were not prepared to join him in his fight against political influence. They were aware that, while the General's post was temporary, they would be left in Canada to face the vagaries of political fortune.

498. However annoying the other cases of political interference had been, Hutton was convinced that the question of Colonel Domville was the most important. If he could settle it to his satisfaction, he believed that he would establish a lasting and vital precedent. Lieutenant Colonel James Domville was a prominent merchant of Saint John, New Brunswick. he had long been engaged in the West Indies trade and his personal fortune had risen and fallen with its course. He had been president of the Maritime Bank of Canada and its bankruptcy had ruined him¹⁰⁰⁶ as well as providing a vital case in Canadian constitutional law. Like men, another wealthy Canadian, he had devoted considerable attention to the Militia and had been for years one of the best known and respected officers in his province. He was the founder and first commanding officer of the 8th New Brunswick Hussars from 1881. In 1884 and in 1896, he volunteered the services of his regiment for the campaigns in the Soudan. Even more important, Colonel Domville was a Member of parliament, first for the Conservatives from 1872 to 1882 and then, having changed to the Liberals and having failed twice in bids for re-election, for King's County

from 1896.¹⁰⁰⁷ Domville was an eccentric and sometimes a violent personality, a strong imperialist and a formidable opponent.

499. The difficulty with Domville began with the regulations governing limitation of tenure of command. Since he had held the command of his regiment for sixteen years when they were promulgated, he was plainly one of the officers against whom they were designed. Moreover his regiment had suffered from neglect in recent years. Unfortunately the situation was complicated by the fact that Domville's second-in-command, Major Alfred Markham, was a prominent local Conservative to whom Domville had taken a violent dislike. To fight his removal, Domville turned to his political friends. To Laurier, he addressed a lengthy series of complaints and accusations. Markham had been guilty of setting fires at Sussex Camp, he reported, and the General Officer Commanding of the day had recommended his dismissal. Only when Domville had been in England had Markham been promoted and only despite his protests. His major had also been guilty of plotting against him in the Conservative Party. As for himself, Domville complained that he had made his regiment effective after twenty years and he had no intention of turning it over to an incompetent like Markham who was even older than himself. (Domville was then 56). Moreover, the political consequences would be suicidal:

...the Regiment and its connections cover a vote of at least five hundred now, and the votes of those who may be brought into the Regiment. It controls all the patronage of the Regimental Camp at

Sussex, buildings, stables, armoury, forage and rations.

He had never made political use of it but now it would be turned over to his bitterest political opponent.¹⁰⁰⁸ Domville supported his case with letters from other recently deposed colonels who warned that it would be impossible to get suitable officers to take up such unrewarding and expensive jobs for a mere five years. Others complained that they, too, had no suitable successors.¹⁰⁰⁹

500. Borden, to whom the letter was referred, replied to each charge as categorically as he could. Markham had been promoted to brevet rank because he was entitled to it by length and service and there had been no reason to discriminate against him because he was a Conservative. As for the charge that he had set fires, Markham had not the slightest connection with them. Borden said that the story was too long to trouble the Prime Minister but Markham had been required to write a letter afterwards in which he regretted the incident and promised loyal support to his commanding officer. Domville had used this letter to suggest that Markham was responsible for the fires. The real problem, as Borden saw it, was that Domville did not like the principle of limitation of tenure of command, but other good Liberals had accepted it and had resigned without making difficulties. The regulations allowed an extension in exceptional circumstances but Domville had already had the advantage of such an extension.¹⁰¹⁰ Besides, as Borden added in a letter a few days later, Domville's term only expired in July of 1898.

501. The problem of Domville's retirement was inherited by Hutton. The Government had retreated from the firm position it had adopted in February, 1898, and Domville, himself, had found further reasons to prolong his stay. Major Markham had formulated charges of financial malversation against him and, although Gascoigne had urged him to withdraw them, he had persisted. The matter was raised by the conservatives in the House of Commons.¹⁰¹¹ and Domville insisted that the whole matter be referred to the Public Accounts Committee in order that his name be cleared. The matter became one which reflected on the reputation of the Government as a whole and to insist on the removal of Domville at such a time would have been interpreted by the Opposition as a proof of want of confidence. Hutton was determined that Domville should go. The Colonel had been involved in a number of business ventures in the Yukon which Hutton described as "most irregular and unbecoming for an officer". He was also "addicted to drink" and had been more or less drunk in the House of Commons on several occasions.¹⁰¹² During the fall and winter of 1898-99, Domville was in England and Hutton took advantage of his absence and of the technicality that he had not obtained permission from the Militia Headquarters to go abroad to transfer the stores and equipment of the 8th Hussars to Major Markham. On his return, Domville was furious to discover what had been done and promptly wired the Minister to demand that further action be suspended. Borden at first held firm but then he agreed that Domville's retirement should not be announced until after the local elections in New Brunswick. In April, Domville won another delay by insisting that the hand-over should be suspended until the Public Accounts Committee examining the regimental funds had made its report.¹⁰¹³ These delays were completely

unsatisfactory to Hutton. He insisted to Borden that Domville was a bad officer who had done nothing about the reports of malversation of funds when they had originally been brought to his attention and that he must go. This brought the matter to the attention of the Cabinet which had no particular desire to arouse Domville and which tended to be annoyed at Hutton both for raising the matter and then for dictating to the Government. The matter was finally referred to the Governor General¹⁰¹⁴ who backed his General and who worked out a compromise. Since the Public Accounts Committee, dividing on party lines, found Domville not guilty of the charges which had been made against him, he was restored to his command until August, 1899 when he was transferred to the Retired List. As for Markham, Hutton recommended that he be permitted to succeed to the command of the Regiment on condition that he would agree to retire at the end of the year.¹⁰¹⁵ By that time, he would be too old to command a cavalry regiment. Instead, Markham's succession to command was purely symbolic. Having been gazetted to the command, he was promptly transferred to the Reserve of Officers. Major H. Montgomery Campbell, a friend of Domville, succeeded Markham.¹⁰¹⁶

502. Hutton was convinced that it was vital to carry the Domville affair to a satisfactory conclusion. There would be incalculable symbolic value in proving that a Liberal Member of Parliament could be made to follow a military regulation that he did not like. He was very grateful for the Governor General's support:

As regards the Domville affair if I may be allowed to say so, Your

Excellency's firm stand has done more to restore discipline & real efficiency into the Canadian Army than all the humble efforts of myself & others. This political interference wire-pulling is a very Opus-Tree which must inevitably wither up all that is good, sound and really valuable in an Army.¹⁰¹⁷

503. In fact, the Domville case was important but its real consequences were not what Hutton had hoped. The cabinet was not grateful to him for raising the affair and it was very far from conceding that matters of discipline could be ruled out of its areas of concern. In Parliament, Hutton had acquired an energetic and noisy enemy who could serve as a rallying point for the other interests he was offending. On 1 June 1899, Domville introduced a private member's bill to amend the Militia Act to clarify the subordinate relationship of the General to the Minister and to provide that the appointment could be held by a Canadian.¹⁰¹⁸ Although he did not have an opportunity for a second reading of his bill, he had a chance during the discussion of estimates to say what he thought of "noisy militarism" and officers of the Wolseley school. Each general, he complained, had spent much of his time in condemning his predecessor. "One is for buttons and another is for shooting, another is for tattoos, another is for cavalry, another for mounted infantry. Now, which is right?"¹⁰¹⁹ Domville might not be a particularly influential or respected member but he was the first to be a firm enemy of the General. He was not be the last.

504. The Domville affair received some notice in the press. The Ottawa

Tribune interpreted the Colonel's temporary reinstatement as a victory for political influence¹⁰²⁰ and the Ottawa Journal, also a Conservative supporter, characterized Domville's demand for a Canadian General Officer commanding as "rank rubbish". It pointed out that Domville himself had been born and educated in England and had been trained in commercial practices in the Barbados. Hutton, the paper insisted, needed protection from "the narrow gauge partisans and conceit-swollen or super sensitive militia pomposities" who had driven out his predecessors.¹⁰²¹ The Saint John Daily Record, more sympathetic to a local man, agreed with Domville that Canada had about enough of British officers commanding the Canadian Militia.¹⁰²²

THE PROPOSAL TO CAPTURE ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON

505. On 2 June 1898, the command of British troops in Canada had passed to Lieutenant General Lord William Seymour. The new commander had begun his service as a midshipman with the Royal Navy during the Crimena War. Afterwards, he had joined the Coldstream Guards. When he came to Canada, he was the fifth most senior lieutenant general inthe British Army, an officer of limited abilities but of boundless energy. His appointment to command the little garrison at Halifax with its one battalion of regulars and its two companies of artillery was a source of disappointment and frustration to him since it was likely to be his last active employment. Thus he sought ways to extend his authority and to exert his influence. He gladly accepted Hutton's request that the British garrison should play a more active part in training the units of Canadian Militia which were to be assigned to the fortress inthe

event of war. Hutton and Seymour were already friends from earlier service together. It happened that the Commander in Chief of the North American and West Indies Squadron of the Royal Navy was an officer with as much energy as Seymour and considerably more ability. Vice Admiral Sir John Fisher was also spending a frustrating period in command of a force which seemed beneath his abilities.

506. In October, 1898, war between Great Britain and France as a result of the Fashoda incident appeared imminent. Both Fisher and Seymour felt a quickening of enthusiasm and both looked about them to make their plans for the onset of hostilities. Their attention was focused on the two French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. In February, 1898, Captain M.A. Bourke R.N. had visited St. Pierre in H.M.S. Cordelia and his report was the basis for their interest. He reported that the islands were undefended save for fifty armed gendarmes and a rumour of five hundred rifles somewhere on the island. The sole importance of the place was that one of the British cables from Newfoundland to Nova Scotia passed through St. Pierre and that others passed close by. There was also a French cable from Brest to St. Pierre. The capture of the island would save the British cables. It would also secure the coal supply of the small French squadron which escorted the annual fishing fleet and allow it to be destroyed.¹⁰²³ On the basis of this intelligence, Fisher persuaded Seymour that a small force should invade the islands at the outbreak of war. In great secrecy, two field guns were loaded on H.M.S. Cordelia and Colonel Collard of Seymour's staff paid a visit to Sydney and decided that the mail packet Bruce would be suitable to carry the landing

party.¹⁰²⁴ On 26 October 1898, Fisher told Seymour that war was imminent between Britain and France and 200 infantry and a detachment of artillery were ordered to be held in instant readiness at Halifax.¹⁰²⁵ Seymour estimated that it would take three hours to get his men entrained, six more hours to get them to Sydney and that within twelve hours of the declaration of war, the expedition would be sailing from Sydney harbour. Within twenty four hours, St. Pierre would be in British hands.¹⁰²⁶ As a further measure of readiness, Seymour sent a telegram to the Governor General, Lord Aberdeen, reminding him that according to the Militia Act, Seymour would take command of the Militia in the event of war and asking him whether he anticipated any internal disturbances in Canada as a result of a declaration of war. He also asked him whether, when St. Pierre and Miquelon had been safely occupied, he could expect Canadian Militia to reinforce or replace the original landing party. Aberdeen's reply was only mildly reassuring. He did not think that there were any districts in Canada where disaffection had actually taken shape but that in the large towns of Montreal and Quebec, "there is a certain element of rowdiness not exactly of the street, but of a certain class, which might be ready to demonstrate against British authority in the event of hostilities between England and France." As for the employment of Canadian Militia on St. Pierre and Miquelon, difficulties were likely to arise since it was a new departure and the step was certainly contrary to the intentions of the Militia Act.¹⁰²⁷ By the time this reply was received, war was no longer imminent, but Seymour sent a report of what he had planned to obtain a somewhat belated approval from the British authorities.

507. The news of Seymour's initiative was received with interest and even approval at the War Office. Colonel Sir William Everitt of the Military Intelligence Department suggested that Captain Bourke's report was inaccurate in some respects. There was another British cable which did pass near St. Pierre. On the other hand, there were three French cables across the Atlantic and the two which crossed St. Pierre could easily be cut by landing parties.¹⁰²⁸ The real importance of the capture of the island would be to cut off communication between France and the North American continent. Seymour was asked to bring his information up to date, perhaps making use of the British employees of the United States Cable Company who were stationed on the island. The second concern of the War Office was that the garrison of Halifax should not be reduced at the outset of war. This made it even more vital that Canadian Militia be involved in the scheme, both to replace the British force which would be withdrawn and to proceed later as a garrison for the two French islands. In this connection, Lord Aberdeen's intimation of limitations on foreign service for the Militia was important. It was even more important, as Everitt pointed out, because one feature of the defence scheme proposed by the Leach Committee was that the Canadian Militia should occupy the right bank of the St. Lawrence from Lake Ontario to Lake St. Francis at the outbreak of war. If the Canadian Militia was not allowed to serve abroad, this part of the plan was in jeopardy. For both these reasons, it was necessary for Seymour to obtain a clarification of the position of the Canadian Militia and it was suggested that this could best be done through the governor General. Finally he was advised that his assumption that he acquired the command of the Militia on the declaration of war was erroneous. The command had to be transferred by

order in council.¹⁰²⁹ The War Office also approached the Admiralty to obtain its approval of the plan.

508. Both the War Office and the Admiralty were satisfied that Aberdeen's doubts about the legality of overseas service for the Canadian Militia were unfounded. Section 79 of the Militia Act provided that "Her Majesty may call out the Militia or any part thereof, for active service either within or without the Dominion, at any time when it appears advisable to do so by reason of war, invasion or insurrection, or threat of any of them."¹⁰³⁰ To Sir Evelyn Wood, it seemed quite clear that this permitted the Militia to be used abroad. On 22 March 1898, Seymour sent Colonel Everitt a lengthy personal letter in which he gave further explanations of the situation. He had just returned from Ottawa where he had met the Governor General. Lord Minto shared his predecessor's view that the Canadian Militia was raised only for home defence and he was sustained in this view by several old letters from Sir John A. Macdonald which he had received during his previous period in Canada. When Seymour had come back to Halifax, Fisher had pressed a further recommendation on him, that Canadian Militia should participate, in an expedition against the French island of Martinique. For military reasons alone, Seymour, replied, this was out of the question. As far as further information about St. Pierre was concerned, he had entertained the Governor of the island a few weeks before. The official had spoken "quite openly and honestly for a Frenchman" and had clearly indicated that his island remained defenceless. Seymour was even more convinced of the advantages of the plan since they might even capture the 200 vessels of the French fishing fleet.¹⁰³¹

509. Despite his own misgivings, Minto had accepted Seymour's request to determine the attitude of the Canadian Government. On 25 March 1899, after Seymour had returned to Halifax, he wrote to Laurier, explaining that he felt that it would be beyond the intention of the Militia Act to allow the Militia to serve outside Canada in the event of war. This did not mean war with the United States, he explained nor did he question the right of the queen to call out the Militia in event of war in or out of the Dominion. What he wished from the Prime Minister was a clarification of the right to use the Militia outside Canada in the event of war with European powers. It did not seem that Section 79 had been framed with the possibility of a European war in mind. He had no doubt that in the event of such a war, there would be offers of troops but he wished to distinguish between what he called "sentimental affairs" and commitments which could be relied upon.¹⁰³² On 27 March 1899, he met with Laurier and to his astonishment discovered that the Prime Minister gave the broadest possible interpretation to Section 79. This opinion was shared by the Minister of Justice, David Mills and by the Minister of Militia. As Minto hastily recorded after their conversation, Laurier had said that "it would be quite within the rights of the Imperial Government in case of war to order Canadian troops to any of the French Islands, such as St. Pierre, Miquelon or Martinique, and equally to order above troops to any part of the world in time of war." The only limitation Laurier suggested was that it might not be wise to move French Canadian troops although it would certainly be within the legal rights of the Imperial Government to do so.

He has no doubt that when the Act was framed, the possibility of moving Canadian troops out of the Dominion did not occur to the framers, that such a thought never entered their heads, and that they had only in view the possibilities of war with the United States - and the possible necessity of crossing the United States frontier - but all the same, whatever the original intention of the Act may have been, he considered it quite clear now as to the right possessed by the Imperial Government to utilize Canadian troops for service anywhere beyond the Dominion in the case of war.¹⁰³³

510. To Minto, this was an unexpected reversal of Canadian policy. He had based his own position on the stand Macdonald had adopted in 1885 over the question of Canadian volunteers for the Sudan. He could not resist the temptation to read a letter from the earlier prime minister in which Macdonald had made it clear that any troops for overseas service which the British Government wished from Canada would have to be raised as part of the British Regular Army under arrangements like those made for the 100th Regiment.¹⁰³⁴ Laurier did not change his stand but continued to hold to his position that the Imperial Government in time of war could order the Canadian Militia where it pleased. On 1 April 1899, Minto passed on the Canadian policy to Seymour, adding for his own sake a further explanation of why he, himself, had thought that Macdonald' policy still stood. Hutton had tried to explain the difference by suggesting that Macdonald was referring to expeditions while Laurier was referring to full scale war¹⁰³⁵ but Minto was convinced that no such distinction existed in the Conservative premier's mind. The only

explanation was that the position taken by Laurier fitted the particular circumstances and he warned Seymour that Canadian reaction could be relied upon to vary with political conditions. He also added a military observation that no Canadian Militia unit would be fit for service as such although a collection of selected volunteers might be satisfactory.¹⁰³⁶

511. All of this news was passed back to the War Office, with Seymour carefully endorsing Minto's two reservations. Although Fisher had been replaced on the North American station, Seymour now felt able to proceed with more detailed planning, confident that the Admiralty approval which had been obtained on 3 February 1899¹⁰³⁷ would also apply to Fisher's successor.¹⁰³⁸ The War Office agreed, being delighted with Laurier's support.

Sir William Everitt recommended that the Colonial Office be moved to send a letter of thanks to the Canadian Government, expressing gratitude for its loyalty and explaining that the question had been raised because the basis of Canadian defence rested on the ability to move troops across the American frontier. There had been no intention of using Canadian troops in another hemisphere.¹⁰³⁹ Lansdowne passed on this request, amplifying it a little incautiously to get the Colonial Office to explain to the Canadians that the doubts had arisen over the employment of Canadian troops to occupy islands in which Canadian interests were directly affected.¹⁰⁴⁰

512. The essence of the St. Pierre and Miquelon expedition was that it must be both swift and secret. Since confirming Canadian participation had meant revealing at least the intention to the Canadian cabinet, secrecy had been

gravely compromised. Major General F.W. Stopford, the Assistant Adjutant-General suggested that the plans be rewritten and that they be kept separate from the main defence scheme for Halifax,¹⁰⁴¹ a document with a relatively wide distribution. Seymour was directed to produce a definite scheme and not merely a statement of what he had planned in the past. Since the Canadian Government had no objection to the movement of its troops, it could have no objection to confidential arrangements being made with Hutton.¹⁰⁴²

THE HUTTON-MINTO-SEYMOUR QUARREL

513. Working out a plan for the St. Pierre-Miquelon operation demanded the close co-operation of Seymour, Hutton and Minto. Through a series of misunderstandings and differences, aggravated by the personality of Lord William and Hutton, the good relations which had previously existed suddenly deteriorated during the summer of 1899. The quarrel between Seymour and Hutton and later with Lord Minto was a distraction in the background of the more important differences which were developing between Hutton and the Canadian Government.

514. On his arrival, the arrival, the relations between Hutton and Seymour had been extremely cordial. In a welcoming letter on the announcement of his appointment, Seymour gave a friendly warning about the difficulties of working with colonial governments. "I say this against myself for there is no one I would rather see in that position than yourself."¹⁰⁴³ Once in Canada, the advice continued. In February, Seymour spent a few days with the Huttons at

Earnscliffe. In March, he gave a mild warning about placing too much stock in the Canadian press and added his opinion that Laurier was probably one of those who was opposed to military reform.¹⁰⁴⁴ In April, there was a slightly stronger warning about Hutton's speeches. When he had been in Ottawa, Seymour had been approached by a prominent Canadian with the warning that Hutton was pushing them too hard.¹⁰⁴⁵ There were more such letters, reflecting a sympathetic and respectful relationship.

515. Into this atmosphere of cordiality came two points of difference. The first occurred when Seymour was asked by the Assistant Military Secretary at the War Office, Major-General Neville Lyttleton, to obtain confidential reports on Lieutenant Colonel Kitson and Lieutenant Logan, to British officers who were then on the staff of the Royal Military College.¹⁰⁴⁶ The General Officer Commanding Her Majesty's Troops in Canada had never been sent such a request before and it was a stupid mistake on Lyttleton's part. Nonetheless, Seymour set about obtaining them. He also asked Lyttleton whether he would be responsible for supplying confidential reports on Hutton and other Imperial officers serving with the Canadian Militia.¹⁰⁴⁷ Lyttleton said that he should and that there was no reason why he should not even make a report on Hutton.¹⁰⁴⁸ To make a confidential report on an officer was an assumption of military authority over him, something which had never been claimed for the British general at Halifax before. Seymour, however, was the man to stake such a claim. A correspondence was opened with Hutton to obtain the reports but Hutton had little difficulty in gaining the support of the Governor General for the view that the Imperial officers with the Militia were none of

Seymour's business.

516. The affair of the confidential reports was further complicated by a dispute over Colonel Foster, the Quartermaster-General of the Canadian Militia. Before he had been given his Militia appointment, Foster had been in the Intelligence Department of the War Office and had been responsible for the preparation of a secret report on Canadian defence. One copy was deposited at the War Office and a second copy was retained, without authority, by Foster himself. Before he came to Canada, Seymour had a chance to see the copy of the report in London but once in Canada, he decided to refresh his memory. At a dinner at Government House in May, 1899, he asked Foster to let him look at his copy. Foster agreed and arranged to transmit it via Major Lawrence Drummon, the Governor General's Military Secretary. After some time, the report had not arrived and Seymour repeated his request. A somewhat abashed Foster explained that he had received a hint that since he should not have kept a copy, he had no right to show it to anyone else. This annoyed Seymour and he repeated his request. Again he was refused, this time in the more decorous terms that the Governor General had retained the report for his own perusal.¹⁰⁴⁹ This made Seymour angry and he directed Hutton to have it handed over, warning that he could give a direct order if he chose, since he had undoubted authority over all Imperial officers in Canada. "I am not easily moved to anger, but the moment I feel that I am being played with, I strike pretty hot."¹⁰⁵⁰ This was a second assertion of a principle which Hutton felt that he could not accept. Imperial officers serving with the Militia were subordinates of the Canadian Government, not of Lord William's,

and they came under his personal authority. He chose to back up Foster, pointing out the extreme secrecy of the report although insisting that he meant no discourtesy by this refusal.¹⁰⁵¹ Seymour would not be placated. On 27 June 1899, the basic issue was brought out when Seymour declared that Foster was failing to acknowledge him as his military superior in Canada and the representative of the Secretary of State and the Commander in Chief.¹⁰⁵² Hutton replied with some surprise, stating that he had no intimation from the War Office that the position of officers in self-governing colonies had been so changed.¹⁰⁵³

517. On the issue of confidential reports, Hutton was more cautious. He would gladly submit confidential reports through Seymour if that was the correct channel of communication; he wanted no disputes about that. First, however, he must ensure that it was the correct procedure through reference to the Governor General.¹⁰⁵⁴ Minto, for his part, drafted a lengthy memorandum on 15 July 1899, pointing out that for his part the two commands, the Militia and the garrison at Halifax, were entirely distinct. The Imperial officers with the Militia were paid by the Canadian Government and had nothing to do with the commander at Halifax. Finally, he drew attention to a counter-charge of Hutton, that Seymour had not been referring to him properly. In recent letters, he had adopted the practice of addressing Hutton as "Colonel (local Major General)" which was improper.¹⁰⁵⁵ After a tentative effort to make peace at the cost of an object apology from Foster, Seymour returned the whole correspondence to the War Office on 8 August 1899, complaining of the secret reports, the confidential reports and, above all, of Minto's support for

Hutton and his failure to treat Seymour as his real military adviser.¹⁰⁵⁶

518. The correspondence reached the War Office as the South African crisis was developing rapidly and staff officers had no time to devote to such a problem. Seymour waited in vain for a reply. Since Minto repeatedly said that he would abide by the decision of the Secretary of State for War, the lack of a reply seemed to suggest that Seymour's contention had not been upheld. Throughout the fall, the unhappy General at Halifax tried to restore the previous good relations without success. He resented the accusation that he had tried to interfere with the Militia but he was anxious to play some part in the preparations for the South African War. As a soldier, he shared the frustration of being far from the seat of the war. He felt increasingly left out of things. Early in October, the Governor General spent a few days in New York. Customarily, the General Officer at Halifax acted as Administrator when the Governor General was out of the country but for such a short absence, Minto did not feel it necessary to call up Seymour. The elderly General was bitterly hurt by what he regarded as a slight.¹⁰⁵⁷

519. The plan to deal with St. Pierre and Miquelon was a partial casualty of the dispute. It was also affected by the views of Fisher's successor, Vice Admiral Sir Frederick Bedford, who had no enthusiasm for it at all. Seymour was converted to the view that it would be enough to send a cable steamer, escorted by a warship, to cut the cables on both sides of the island and join them to the British cable at Port aux Basques. A landing party from the warship would capture the able bodied males of the population and convey them

to Halifax where they would be "out of harm's way".¹⁰⁵⁸ This reply was not what the War Office had requested. Sir John Ardagh, the Director of Military Intelligence and a friend of Hutton, also held Seymour responsible for a number of leaks in the secrecy of the plan. Since he felt that it would still be useful to have a plan to seize the islands early in any war with France, a scheme must still be prepared. To restore its secrecy, he proposed that a public letter, marked Secret, be sent to Hutton which he might "confidentially" communicate to the Canadian Ministers, telling them that the scheme had been entirely abandoned. Thereafter, nothing more in writing would be passed to the General Officer Commanding the Militia and his acquaintance with the scheme must remain verbal. The landing parties would be concealed in the Halifax Defence Scheme as part of the reserve.¹⁰⁵⁹ The necessary letter was sent to Hutton on 26 January 1900.¹⁰⁶⁰ By the time it had arrived, Hutton had gone and the invasion scheme seemed even more hopeless. As Seymour reported on 26 February 1900, the admiral on the station was absolutely opposed to the operation. The battalion of regulars was being replaced by a battalion of Canadian Militia. General Hutton had been removed under circumstances which made the Canadian Government very suspicious of initiatives by Imperial officers. Enthusiasm had certainly suffered.¹⁰⁶¹ The St. Pierre-Miquelon operation returned to the shadows.

520. So long as Hutton remained in Canada, he remained the focus of Seymour's indignation, while the Governor General remained the possible intermediary to be brought over to his side. To Minto he sent repeated letters, explaining his prerogatives and the authority which had been vested in him by Queen's

Regulations.¹⁰⁶² He also criticized Hutton for the difficulties which he was raising with the Canadian Government.¹⁰⁶³ In return, Hutton continued to insist on the independence of his Imperial officers and their right to be addressed by their Militia rank.¹⁰⁶⁴ On 6 December 1899, having still received no answer to his letter of the previous August, Seymour sent a further collection of complaints and supporting documents to the War Office, asking specifically that the Governor General be informed "authoritatively" that Seymour was his military adviser and the senior military officer in Canada.¹⁰⁶⁵

To this bundle of correspondence, he received a bare acknowledgement, encouraging him to send a third letter on 28 December 1899, complaining most particularly of Hutton's insubordination.¹⁰⁶⁶

521. Hutton's departure early in February was the occasion for a fourth letter of complaint from Seymour, in which he accused Hutton of having acted and spoken in an improper manner on the occasion of his resignation.¹⁰⁶⁷ It was also the occasion for an attempt to return to the good graces of the Governor General. In a letter to Minto of 19 February 1900, he strongly denied that he had ever tried to frustrate Hutton's efforts to develop a military spirit in Canada and called on Minto for the friendship which all Englishmen should have in such a crisis.¹⁰⁶⁸ The Governor General would still not accept Seymour's claims and he had a charge of his own when he discovered that the General had directed a letter to the Canadian Secretary of State dealing with the provisional Militia battalion being sent to Halifax.¹⁰⁶⁹ This was a chance for Minto to assume the offensive and to demand that all letters to the Canadian Government must be passed through him. This led to a total

break down and, on 8 March 1900, Seymour asked to be relieved of his command on the grounds that only one of his letters had even been acknowledged and the Governor General's actions made his position impossible.¹⁰⁷⁰ His resignation was promptly accepted on 11 March 1900, with the request that he continue in his post until a successor could be found.¹⁰⁷¹ Resignation seemed to increase the flow of letters from Seymour. Three letters were written before the end of the April, repeating the old charges and advancing new ones. In his final letter for March, he insisted that he could not defer his resignation any longer unless he obtained an expression of regret from the Governor General for having encouraged insubordination.¹⁰⁷² The War Office had been attempting to delay him with the explanation that his lesser points could not be settled until the larger question of the relative position of the two General Officers Commanding had been worked out, and that was an issue between the War Office, the Colonial Office and Canada. The letter of 30 March 1900 persuaded the War Office to be a little sharper and it advised Seymour flatly that he could turn over his command to the next senior officer as soon as the inspection reports were completed.¹⁰⁷³ At the end of May, he was ready to go and he announced that he was resigning because he had failed to get the support of the Secretary of State and the Commander in Chief in carrying out their orders.¹⁰⁷⁴

To Minto, in a letter on the eve of sailing, he announced that he would be demanding an inquiry on his return and that he would accuse Hutton of falsifying a document with intent to mislead if his demand was refused. He was prepared, he warned, to lay down his commission if justice were not afforded him.¹⁰⁷⁵

522. Seymour returned to England in the melancholy position of a man with a grievance which no one wants to hear. On 23 July 1900, he finally saw Major General Coleridge Grove, the Military Secretary who, as Seymour recognized, only wanted to hush the matter up. Seymour was asked to go away for three weeks to forget about it. He spent it writing further memoranda. Then he returned for a second interview, only to meet a further delay of ten days.¹⁰⁷⁶ Having finally heard and sorted out such of Seymour's grievances as he could understand, Grove decided that he might be happy if a letter was sent to Minto backing Seymour's right to ask for confidential reports of Imperial officers while carefully avoiding any assertion that Hutton had been obliged to provide them.¹⁰⁷⁷ However, as even Grove acknowledged, nothing was likely to pacify Seymour and even when the letter to Minto had been carefully drafted and sent, the General returned to the attack, supported by six peers and four general officers whom he had persuaded of his grievances.¹⁰⁷⁸ There was no alternative but to grant Seymour an interview on 28 September 1900 with Lord Lansdowne, Lord Wolsely and Coleridge Grove all present. After a lengthy session of listening to grievances, the Secretary of State declared that the matter was closed¹⁰⁷⁹ and Seymour's subsequent efforts to raise further grievances were turned down.¹⁰⁸⁰

523. Seymour's own military career was not at an end. By a twist of fortune, when Lord Roberts returned from South Africa, he appointed him Military Secretary. When Hutton returned from South Africa, his future career was at the mercy of his somewhat unbalanced enemy. To Seymour's credit, he did not stand in the way of the offer to Hutton of the command of the Militia in

Australia.

524. The importance of Seymour's quarrel was its constitutional implication of the control of the Canadian Militia and, in particular, of the British officers serving with it. The lengthy delay in dealing with the respective authorities of the two British generals in Canada was only partly due to the preoccupation with the South African War and the difficulties of British inter-departmental communication. To some degree, there was also the hope that the two officers might forget their differences. The real difficulty, for the War Office, was its wish to obtain the confidential reports. They never supported Seymour's claim to see Foster's report. In a War Office memorandum, it was suggested that the two commands would be considered as distinct and that the General Officer Commanding the British troops in Canada would be informed by the Minister of Militia through the Governor General of the state of the Canadian Militia. The Imperial officer commanding the Militia would report on the officers under him to the General Officer Commanding at Halifax. This final principle created the most difficulty. The Canadian Government wished the reports to emanate from the Minister of Militia when requested by the Imperial authorities. Lord Minto suggested that they pass through his Military Secretary direct to the British Government without either the Canadian Government or the General Officer Commanding at Halifax seeing them. Chamberlain objected to this proposal, insisting that the Canadian Government should at least have a look at the reports. The War Office's final proposal was that the General Officer Commanding the Militia should prepare two copies of the report, passing one through the Governor

General's Military Secretary and retaining a copy which he would show the Canadian Government only if requested to do so.¹⁰⁸¹ The question seems to have been solved by the departure of both Hutton and Seymour for no firm system was authorized.

HUTTON AND THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT

525. The growing crisis in South Africa during the spring and summer of 1899 had attracted considerable attention in Canada. The possibility of a war against the Boer republics aroused just those elements of the Canadian population that had been excited by the Diamond Jubilee of 1897. Their excitement had been sustained by Kitchener's successful campaign in the Sudan in 1898-99, with its triumphant climax at the Battle of Omdurman. In the House of Commons, Colonel Sam Hughes had moved:

That in the opinion of this House, having in view the growth and development of Canadian trade, the assisting to perfect the union of Great Britain and her colonies and the maintaining the commerce, prestige and integrity of the British Empire, Great Britain should be given authority to enrol a brigade of Canadian officers and men for the Imperial service abroad, and that Canadian seamen should be afforded opportunity of serving in the British navy.

The detail of his proposal was that Britain should raise a brigade of five battalions in Canada to serve for periods of enlistment of five or seven years

at British rates of pay. On conclusion of their service, the Canadian Government would provide the veterans with land, a cottage and a few cows. Hughes' speech was a mixture of self-advertisement and imperialist enthusiasm. At one point he recalled how, as a school teacher, he had spent a Saturday afternoon painting a map of England bright red.

526. Although Hughes' speech was violently imperialistic, it had also strongly anti-British overtones. He complained that the main objection to his scheme in British military circles was that it would upset War Office routine. He maintained that the only battles of the War of 1812 in which the British had been defeated had been those when Canadians were not there to support them. He announced flatly that Canadians would not serve in a British regiment under the sort of discipline imposed by British officers. On the other hand, he was sure that the French Canadians would loyally support such a scheme:

We find, also, that all the native races in the countries governed by Great Britain are loyal to the British Empire. We have only to remember, in that regard, the famous Indian mutiny, to find that, in these tremendous temptations, the native races have stood true to British interests, and that, as often as the Empire is threatened, these races are as true to the civilization of Britain as are those of her own race and blood.

To prove it, he quoted from a speech by Major Prefontaine of Montreal.¹⁰⁸²

527. Borden's reply to Hughes was to congratulate him on his sentiments and 1 what the Government had done to foster British recruiting in Canada. The first priority, however, was to perfect the organization of the Canadian Militia.¹⁰⁸³ After a further defence of his scheme and of the virtues of military life in teaching habits of discipline and industry, Hughes agreed to withdraw his motion.¹⁰⁸⁴

528. Hutton's view of Hughes' motion was much the same as Borden's. For him, too, the first priority was the Canadian Militia. Shortly after his arrival, he had helped to put an end to the programme of exchanges of permanent force units which had been recommended at the Colonial Conference of 1897 and which Gascoigne had carried into effect. When it was proposed to exchange Canada's only full strength field battery with a comparable battery from the Royal Artillery, Hutton argued that the Canadian battery was needed for the training of the Militia and that there should be no exchange.¹⁰⁸⁵ He had also been lukewarm about the project of recruiting for the British Army in Canada. Finally, he had no use for political soldiers of whom Hughes was an archetype. He had even sought to exert a little clumsy pressure on Hughes to keep him from bringing forward military subjects in the House of Commons. This infuriated the independent colonel and, without mentioning Hutton by name, he took care in introducing his resolution on an Imperial Service Brigade to lay down all the justifications for his right to criticize any aspect of the Militia Department including the General Officer Commanding.¹⁰⁸⁶

529. To Hutton's main scheme of reforming the Canadian Militia, the trouble in South Africa came almost as an unwelcome diversion. In July, Chamberlain suggested to Lord Minto that there should be an offer to troops from Canada and that it should be made soon.¹⁰⁸⁷ Minto promptly conveyed the suggestion to Laurier, adding, as Chamberlain had suggested, that the offer should be spontaneous and not merely an answer to hopes expressed in England. Having made the overture, he could hardly expect it to be anything else. However Laurier was not prepared even to answer British hopes. He replied that he did not think that it would add to the strength of imperial sentiment in Canada to assume part of the burden of imperial military expenditures save in case of the most pressing danger.¹⁰⁸⁸ On 13 July, the matter was briefly debated in the House of Commons, with Sam Hughes again taking the strongest of imperialist positions, demanding that Canada should take positive action in face of the attitude of the Transvaal Government. In this view, he was supported by his leader, Sir Charles Tupper. At that stage, Laurier merely hoped that the trouble would subside¹⁰⁸⁹ but, on the last day of the month and under pressure from his English-speaking supporters, he introduced a motion of sympathy with the efforts of the British Government to secure "full possession of equal rights and liberties for British subjects residing in the Transvaal." The motion was seconded by the Conservative George Foster and passed unanimously, with members rising and singing the British National Anthem.¹⁰⁹⁰

530. During July, Dr. Borden had shown considerable enthusiasm for a contingent for South Africa. Hutton had taken the precaution of preparing a plan for a Canadian contingent which he had shown to the Governor General¹⁰⁹¹

and then to the Minister.¹⁰⁹² The scheme had then been filed in case it was needed. During the first two weeks of August, Hutton was on leave at Saratoga in New York State. When he returned, Parliament had been prorogued and the cabinet had dispersed for its holidays. By the beginning of September, its members were returning to Ottawa. Before he left for his inspection of the Militia camps in the Maritimes, Hutton had a number of discussions with Borden about the possibility of a Canadian contingent for South Africa. On 3 September 1899, there was a long conversation with the Minister in which a number of long standing problems were worked out. Once again, they agreed on the numbers and composition of the contingent and Borden was given a copy of the plan.¹⁰⁹³ On the following day, the Minister made a tentative proposal to Laurier that Canada might offer help. The General, he explained, had worked out a scheme which called for 1200 men and 300 horses and which would cost \$300,000. If Canada had to pay for the transportation to and from South Africa, it would cost as much again.¹⁰⁹⁴ On 5 September 1899, Borden and Hutton had another long conversation in which the General laid great stress on the urgency of authorizing the contingent. It would take at least three months before a contingent could be formed and reach South Africa and if they did not hurry, the campaign would be over.¹⁰⁹⁵

531. At this interview, Hutton also revealed to Borden his own desire to go to South Africa as head of the colonial contingents. He had already broached the matter to the Governor General, explaining that the campaign would be over in four to six months, too short a time to disrupt his work in Canada, while the prestige he would gain if successful would be of great assistance to him

on his return.¹⁰⁹⁶ He also wrote to senior British officers. To Sir Evelyn Wood, he wrote asking for the command of the colonial contingents, announcing flatly that the Canadian contribution would be a squadron of mounted rifles, a battery of artillery and two small battalions of infantry.¹⁰⁹⁷ Anticipating objections in Canada to his departure, he explained that he would be able to give the Canadian troops a better chance while the difficulties of all the colonial troops would be so great that it was necessary that someone who understood them should command them.

532. When Hutton returned from Nova Scotia on 23 September 1899, the issue of a South African contingent had assumed major importance. Throughout the month, the likelihood of war had grown steadily greater. Within Canada, there was a growing division of feeling about the South African War. While those who supported Britain were probably more numerous and certainly far more vocal, there was a growing feeling of identification with the Boers from French Canada while many Irish Catholics had little appreciation of the grandeur of the British imperial mission. These groups were represented in the cabinet by Israel Tarte, the Minister of Public Works and by Richard Scott, the Secretary of State. Laurier, as Prime Minister, found himself between the two camps. As a French Canadian, he could sense the strength of French Canadian feeling against imperial adventures. As premier, he was not completely immune from the imperial mystique and he was also well aware of the strength and even the violence of feeling in English Canada. In the circumstances, he could wish that the initiative would come from the British Government. It was this feeling which, six months before, had persuaded him

to accept the doctrine that the Imperial government could order the Canadian Militia where it pleased in event of war. While he might have fought such an order if it were given, the principle was that the order came from London, not from Ottawa. He and his government would not be held responsible. He would even obey a British request for troops. What he could not do politically I what Chamberlain, Minto, Hutton, the Opposition and the Toronto imperialists were all demanding. He could not make a spontaneous offer of Canadian soldiers to fight the Boers without running a grave risk of splitting his cabinet, his party and his country. It would have solved Laurier's problem if, by some means, a proposal like Hughes' Imperial Service Brigade could have been resurrected as a channel for patriotic fervour. Such a force was just what Chamberlain did not want. The Colonial Secretary had set his heart on independent, spontaneous and, above all, official commitment by the self-governing colonies. His agents in Canada, Lord Minto and General Hutton, had a clear understanding of his purpose.

533. The General spent only three days in Ottawa before he set out on his tour of inspection in the West. It may have seemed strange that he would leave Headquarters at a time of such urgency but he had a purpose. He did not want to be too closely identified with the agitation which was developing in the country for a Canadian participation in the forthcoming campaign. If a contingent was ordered, the plans were ready and he was confident that Colonel Foster would be able to look after any arrangements until he had returned.¹⁰⁹⁸ He had no doubt, in fact, that if a war broke out, the Canadian Government would have no alternative but to send troops. On

25 September 1899, calling on Richard Scott, the Secretary of State, he was asked whether he thought a few men could be got together far South Africa. Hutton replied, by his own account, "Not a few but 5,000 men without any difficulty." Scott retorted that Hutton did not know the real feeling of the country. Hutton grandly replied that he had told Borden and others that public opinion would force the Government to send troops.¹⁰⁹⁹ The little exchange did not add to Hutton's friends in the cabinet.

534. Hutton's first stop on his western tour was Winnipeg, where he stayed with the Lieutenant Governor, the same J.C. Patterson who had had such difficulties with General Herbert. Although Patterson was very cordial, opinion in Winnipeg was hostile to Hutton as the man who threatened to remove the squadron of Royal Canadian Dragoons. On the day of his arrival, the Winnipeg Tribune protested a move which would leave the city defenceless against Indians and Americans¹¹⁰⁰ and the following day, the Free Press was even more scornful of the proposal.¹¹⁰¹ Hutton sought to allay local feeling by calling a public meeting at Fort Osborne Barracks at which he answered questions about his policy. He also tackled the problem of Major Doidge whose 13th Field Battery was in a very bad state. In the view of the District Officer Commanding, Doidge had been embezzling the funds of his battery and was guilty of other malpractices.¹¹⁰² Hutton ordered him to be suspended and summoned a court of inquiry, ordering Lieutenant Colonel Drury to come from Kingston to preside.¹¹⁰³ Hutton found that the condition of the battery was a matter of public discussion in Winnipeg.¹¹⁰⁴ Boidge was a powerful local Liberal and it did not take long before angry telegrams were on their way to

Ottawa. Borden promptly ordered Hutton to countermand his order for an inquiry. Hutton refused, maintaining that it was a matter of discipline, and complaining about the tone of Borden's telegram.¹¹⁰⁵ The inquiry continued save that Drury was replaced as President by Captain V.A.S. Williams, the acting District Officer Commanding.¹¹⁰⁶

535. The remainder of his journey across the west was rather more cheerful. One of Hutton's purposes was to arouse enthusiasm for the new squadrons of mounted rifles which he intended to establish in centres across the prairies.

For some reason, the Militia had never managed to get started in the Northwest but Hutton now found that he was met with great enthusiasm. At Virden, he inspected a troop of the Manitoba Dragoons. At Moose Jaw, he stopped long enough to receive a delegation. At Medicine Hat, where he spent a day, he addressed the citizens in a hall and then was given a banquet.¹¹⁰⁷ Reaching Calgary on 7 October 1899, he received the most enthusiastic reception of his journey. Raising horses was an important local industry and Hutton was able to talk in glowing terms of the possibility of an Imperial Remount Depot being established there. He confided to Minto, however, that many of the local horses were "simply discreditable...ill shaped, ewe-necked, badly broken stock."¹¹⁰⁸

536. Hutton was at Calgary when President Kruger issued his ultimatum of 9 October 1899. It was a tactical disaster for the South African republics. Until the ultimatum, many in Britain and in Canada had had misgivings about the aggressive policy being followed by Chamberlain and his supporters. There

was an element of bullying in such behaviour which was distasteful to many moderate and thoughtful people. The ultimatum was an unexpected and undeserved gift to the extreme Imperialists. When it expired on 11 October 1899, many otherwise neutral folk had allowed themselves to be swept into the war hysteria.¹¹⁰⁹

537. The pressure for a contingent was mounting in Eastern Canada. When Major Sears of Saint John dared to say early in September that he thought that force might be a little premature, he was repudiated unanimously by the city council which demanded that one be sent immediately.¹¹¹⁰ On 3 October 1899, the London correspondent of the Montreal Star cabled that the British Government was sending an acceptance of a Canadian contingent when no offer had actually been made. "The British government does not desire any large number, such as a thousand," he explained, "but only enough to add a fighting unit from each colony to the present united empire front in the field."¹¹¹¹ The following day, the Star bitterly denounced the failure of the Government to act.¹¹¹² The noise was not all on one side. In issue of the Canadian Military Gazette for 3 October 1899 appeared with what seemed to be an inspired article from Militia Headquarters, describing the proposed Canadian contingent. Promptly Israel Tarte denounced General Hutton as the source of the article and of the rest of the pressure on the Government. On 7 October 1899, Borden was passing through Windsor Station at Montreal when he was intercepted by a reporter from La Presse. Asked about Tarte's accusations, all he could say was that it was not certain that Hutton had made the remarks attributed to him. "All that I can add is that I hope sincerely

that he did not make them."¹¹¹³

538. On 9 October, at his Ministers' request, Minto wired Hutton to inform him that the cabinet was very annoyed at press reports of an offer of troops made by Canada and the consequent reply from the Imperial Government. The Canadian Government wanted assurances that no such offer had come from Hutton.

In view of Chamberlain's policy, it must have seemed absurd to Hutton that he could be accused of such a thing and he replied that he had never authorized any communication to the press suggesting that the Canadian Government contemplated sending troops and he had been most careful to instruct his staff officers to avoid communications with the press.¹¹¹⁴ Three days later, he wired in code to Minto that he had had a letter from Chamberlain which stated that he would remain in Canada during the war and that the probable force from Canada would be a lieutenant colonel's command. The accusations in La Patrie* that he had been communicating with the Canadian Military Gazette were pure fabrication.¹¹¹⁵ These denials did not relieve the Government of its suspicions for the article in the Gazette had not merely been authoritative, it had been very widely distributed. It was in the interests of both supporters and opponents of the Canadian contribution to suggest a difference between the Laurier cabinet and its Imperial military advisers.

539. The suspicions which the Military Gazette article had opened had been developed by the reply from Chamberlain to the non-existent offer of a

* Tarte's Paper

contingent. This was, in fact, a circular which was sent to all colonies on 3 October 1899, containing the notorious advice that cavalry would be the least serviceable and infantry the most serviceable troops which could be offered, and directing that the colonial contributions should be in small units of 125 men, armed with .303 rifles and fully equipped, with not more than four officers per unit. The whole contingent must not be commanded by an officer of higher rank than major. The colonial government was to pay the full cost until the contingent was landed in South Africa. Thereafter, the British Government would provide pay, allowances, pensions, supplies and ammunition on the same scale as for its own troops.¹¹¹⁶ This telegram was a source of embarrassment to the Canadian Government and Hutton, unwittingly and unreservedly, was to bear a large share of the inevitable recrimination in the cabinet. Chamberlain left the Canadian ministers little choice. They could either accept the "reply" as an ultimatum or they could take the enormous political risk of rejecting it. If they accepted it, there were many objectionable features. Chamberlain's organization was designed to obtain a collection of representative detachments which would be of almost exclusively symbolic value. There were to be no senior colonial officers to get in the way of British military authority. There were to be no major colonial units to complicate the British order of battle. Infantry was preferred for many reasons but chiefly because the colonials were known to be untrained and infantry, it seemed, could most easily be made useful. In neither case did Chamberlain's proposal bear any relation to the force which Hutton had planned in July or to the reduced force - an infantry battalion - which he had worked out with Foster at the end of September. Hutton, himself, felt that the

Colonial Office had made a serious mistake in its proposal.¹¹¹⁷

540. For ten days after receiving Chamberlain's telegram, no action was taken. Pressure mounted. On 11 October 1899, the Montreal Star, rapidly gaining experience in the art of war propaganda, announced "The Coon Comes Down", reporting that "com Laurier" and his Liberals were finally moving. It was sandwiched between headlines which reported "barbaric excesses committed by Boers on British women and children" and another declaring "Grit papers Sneer".¹¹¹⁸

541. For two days, 12 and 13 October 1899, the Cabinet debated its course of action. The resulting order in council reflected the degree of compromise which was necessary. 1,000 men were to be equipped out of the stores then in the possession of the Militia Department and were to be shipped to South Africa at public expense. The justification was the desire of so many Canadians to serve there and the expenditure was not to be considered as a precedent.¹¹¹⁹ On the following day, a Militia Order was issued according to the plan which had been made beforehand, calling for 1,000 men between 22 and 40 years of age and at least 5'6" tall to serve an enlistment of six months. The various district headquarters were the recruiting centres but volunteers could also apply to Militia commanding officers.¹¹²⁰ With this order, the raising of the force began.

542. Once the Government's policy had been announced, much of the atmosphere of contention passed away. The imperialists now had a chance to urge others

to volunteer and the opponents could content themselves with the small scale of what had been done. Tarte, having succeeded in including the "no precedent" clause in the order in council, remained in the cabinet.¹¹²¹ Only Henri Bourassa, a brilliant young Liberal, chose to register his protest by resigning his seat in the House of Commons.

ORGANIZING THE CONTINGENT

543. Chamberlain had demanded that the contingents sail by 31 October. There were only eighteen days from 13 October 1899 to accomplish the task of raising, equipping, organizing, assembling and shipping 1,000 men. On Monday, 16 October 1899, the arrangements were announced in detail. There were to be eight companies and 120 men were to be enlisted for each. Only the very best men were to be accepted and these would not necessarily be the first comers. Where possible, companies were to be based for administration on existing units of the permanent force and, where possible, permanent force medical officers were to be responsible for the physical examination of the recruits.

On the following day, non-commissioned officers and men of the Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry and the garrison division of the Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry and the garrison division of the Royal Canadian Artillery were allowed to transfer subject to approval from Headquarters. On Wednesday, company commanders were ordered to submit size rolls of their men and practical advice was given to ensure that the clothing would fit. On Friday, the eight companies were allotted letters and locations. "A" Company came from the West, "B", "C" and "D" from Ontario, "E" and "F" from Quebec and "G"

and "H" from the Maritimes. On the following day, the company officers were announced. Six of the thirty two officers were from the permanent force. "F" Company had French-speaking officers.¹¹²²

544. The major difficulty in preparing the contingent in an amazingly short period was the problem of selecting the officers. This should not have been the case for Hutton and Foster had been careful to include lists of suitable officers for the various organizations they had planned during July and September. The difficulty was not with the company officers nor with the commander of the force. Once it was evident that Hutton would not be allowed to lead the Canadians to South Africa, the General's choice had failed on Lieutenant Colonel W.D. Otter, the District Officer Commanding of M.D. 2 and commanding officer of the Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry. While Otter, at 56, was rather old for such a command and although he had seen no active service outside Canada, he was the senior lieutenant colonel in the permanent force, he was the only Canadian officer ever to have held an independent command in the field and he remained an active, energetic and forceful officer. Of the infantry lieutenant colonels in the Canadian Militia, he was the obvious choice. The real problem was to find him suitable field officers.

In the original organization, Hutton had envisaged a tiny brigade, with two battalions of 500 men each. One was to be commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Buchan and the other by Lieutenant Colonel Sam Hughes. Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Buchan, like Otter, had begun his military career in the Queen's Own Rifles of Toronto. He had been in Winnipeg at the time of the Northwest Rebellion and had gained distinction with the 90th Rifles at

Batoche. Immediately afterwards, he had been accepted as a second in command of the Mounted Infantry School at Winnipeg at the time of its formation. Hutton knew him as the commandant of the Royal School of Infantry at London, Ontario, and he was impressed by him. Buchan, too, at 52, was not young but he seemed solid and reliable.

545. It is more difficult to explain the appointment of Colonel Hughes. He was younger than the other two, 47, and he had only been promoted to lieutenant colonel in the Militia in 1897. He had seen no active service, not even in 1885. He was an enthusiastic militiaman as he was enthusiastic about everything else he undertook. Hughes' chief avocation was as a politician. If there was one strong reason for his appointment, it was that he was the noisiest and most energetic proponent of Canadian military assistance to the United Kingdom. With his brilliant talent for self-advertisement, he had identified himself with that cause in the public mind. Since Hutton never imagined that the Canadians would ever have to do any fighting in South Africa, it may have seemed judicious to balance the administrative talents of Otter and Buchan with the flamboyance of Hughes. Hughes, himself, had an insatiable thirst for military glory and, as in everything else he wanted, he could not endure frustration. To oppose Hughes at any time was to earn an abiding and formidable hatred. He would stop at nothing to gain revenge on those who slighted him. This would have mattered little if Hughes had not also had the power to dominate and even to terrify his political colleagues. In a period of war hysteria, he was even more formidable for he was believed to embody the emotions and ideas of the mass electorate.

546. It was thus a decision of major importance when Hutton reconsidered Hughes appointment and determined to appoint someone else. His reason was that Hughes' insubordination had finally passed reasonable bounds. The two men had first clashed the previous April when Hutton had tried to prevent Hughes from bringing forward his motion for the Imperial Service Brigade. After a stormy interview at Militia Headquarters, Hughes had paid no further attention to Hutton's request. Later, he suggested that the General should be punished for having tried to restrict a Member of Parliament's freedom of speech and also for having proposed that the election of a Militia officer to Parliament should cause him to resign his commission.¹¹²³ In June, at the camp at Niagara, there had been another dispute when Hughes encamped his battalion on ground which Hutton had intended for another unit. When he threatened to take his men home if they were moved, he was allowed to stay. The real difference came over the sending of a contingent to South Africa. Both men were anxious for Canadians to serve there but Hutton was determined that it would be an official force while Hughes only wanted a force, official or unofficial, which he would be allowed to command. As the crisis developed, he received many telegrams from men who were anxious to serve in South Africa and who knew of his reputation as the leading Canadian military imperialist. Finally, at the end of July, furious at the slowness of the Government, he drafted an offer of Canadian troops under his command which he sent to the Minister of Militia, to the Governor General and to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. From Borden, he received a polite but non-committal reply. For the Liberal Government, the Hughes offer remained the most hopeful way of

avoiding actual involvement. From Joseph Chamberlain, he received a even politer refusal.¹¹²⁴ From Hutton, who had received a copy of Hughes' letter to the Governor General, he received a curt demand for an explanation of his "irregular" conduct in writing to Canadian and British ministers without going through the proper military channels.¹¹²⁵ If Hutton hoped to crush Hughes with such an approach, he was sadly mistaken.

547. Hughes' reaction to the rebuke implied in being asked to explain his actions was immediate indignation. He denied that he had acted in a military capacity in sending the letters. He had written as a civilian and as a member of Parliament, and if he had signed himself as "Lieutenant Colonel, commanding the 45th Victoria Battalion," that was merely by way of description. Moreover, since the enquiry from Hutton had come "by command of the Government General", he demanded to know by what authority the General Officer Commanding could receive orders direct from the Governor General, particularly when those orders were so improper as to be requests for Sam Hughes to explain himself.¹¹²⁶ Having made this reply, he soon after published in his newspaper an invitation to all those who would wish to come with him on active service in South Africa to send him their names. This action caused press reaction and the observation in some newspapers that Hughes was usurping the functions of Government. Hughes regarded these remarks as slanderous and, through his contacts with news reporters, he believed that he had traced their source to General Hutton. Still later, there was a report that Hutton had informed Hughes that he was liable to a fine of \$100.00 or to imprisonment under the Army Act for attempting to recruit for the British Army. Once again, there

was a Hughes counter-attack, this time in the press, with an interview at Lindsay in which delighted reporters were told that Hughes would not permit "any man, press agent or officer to slander me publicly by publishing untruths concerning me." He was sure, however, that such "absurd assertions" could not have come from the General who would surely know better.¹¹²⁸

548. The duty of replying to Hughes' letters, in the absence of Hutton, fell to Colonel Foster. He pointed out to Hughes that he had in fact acted in a military capacity by the offer of his services and of his battalion and that it was not possible for him to disassociate himself from his military position by claiming that he had acted purely as a civilian. He also insisted that no officer had a right to disobey orders and Hughes had been ordered to withdraw his letter and to apologize.¹¹²⁹ Having had no satisfactory reply, Foster sent a second letter to the District Officer Commanding of M.D. 3&4, directing that unless Hughes' letter was withdrawn, he would be suspended from the command of his battalion.¹¹³⁰ Meanwhile, he had received an "insubordinate and threatening" letter from Hughes on the 10th.¹¹³¹

549. When Hutton had first been made aware of Hughes' determination to lead a regiment to South Africa, in a letter from Minto on 11 August 1899, he had not been too seriously annoyed. It was a "piece of pure presumption" but Hughes remained a good officer under supervision. To give him the command, of course would only ensure that the Canadians were left at the base or on the lines of communication.¹¹³² On 24 August 1899, he sent another letter from Hughes to the Governor General "as a specimen of what a self-sufficient Colonial Officer

can put on paper."¹¹³³ It was the development of the correspondence and Hughes' obdurate contumacy that convinced him that such an officer could no longer be trusted with such a position. It was Hughes' state of defiance rather than any mental unbalance which disqualified him. On 14 October 1899, the day the Contingent was announced, he wired the Governor General to say that Hughes "want of judgement and insubordinate self-assertion...would seriously compromise success of Canada when co-operating with Imperial troops." If infantry were sent, he wanted Otter to command and Buchan and Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Pelletier¹¹³⁴ to serve as field officers. Hughes was not slow to press his claims. Already, on 3 October 1899, he had written to Otter pressing for a place on any contingent. "In official military matters, no one is more ready than I to blindly obey and have no opinion of my own."¹¹³⁵

He also put heavy pressure on the Government. Although Hughes was a Conservative, Borden and his colleagues were not anxious to acquire the further hostility of the vindictive Orangeman and they joined in pressing for at least some appointment. Even Lord Minto advised Hutton to offer him a company. "Otter agrees - Minister of Militia and Premier wish it, I think it would be advisable to meet their views in this case."¹¹³⁶ Hutton stood firm. His presence with the force would be "an endless source of embarrassment to his superiors and will seriously compromise success of Canadians co-operating with Imperial troops."¹¹³⁷ Again Minto pressed for some appointment, explaining to the stubborn Hutton that the Canadian public would regard Hughes as badly used and there was strong feeling that he should not be left out. The cabinet might well insist on his appointment. Hughes, himself, had seemed more sensible recently. "I have the strongest reasons for hoping that

withdrawal of opposition should be on your initiative."¹¹³⁸ Hutton still refused to change his mind. If the Cabinet insisted for reasons of political expediency, he would be forced to obey.¹¹³⁹ By this time, Hutton was on his way back to Ottawa and the Governor General asked him to see him immediately on his arrival. On his way, Hutton saw from the Winnipeg papers that Hughes and Lieutenant Colonel W.D. Gordon were rumoured to be the two majors of the battalion. From the station, Hutton cabled Foster in some desperation that it would be a disaster to send either of them. Hughes he had already reported upon and Gordon was "inefficient, devoid of initiative and short-sighted."¹¹⁴⁰

550. When Hutton reached Ottawa on the evening of 25 October 1899, the storm over Hutton had reached its height. On 23 October 1899, Hughes had submitted a 5,000 word statement of his grievances against Hutton to the cabinet. It was a characteristic document, mixing complaint, accusation and innuendo. There were eight offences, ranging from an outburst of temper to ignorance of constitutional law which Hughes kindly agreed not to consider. Instead, he listed the personal insults which he felt that he had received from the General and claiming at the end that he had been displaced from the contingent by the combined machinations of Hutton and unnamed British authorities. Hughes opened his charges with the dramatic statement that "it would be tantamount to treason to remain silent longer" but his real motives were clearer in his conclusion: "...honour demands that in addition to bearing irritation, provocation, oppression and slander, I shall not endure the even more infamous offence of public humiliation and unmerited disgrace

without letting right, justice and truth have a chance to prevail."¹¹⁴¹ It was on the basis of this lengthy document that Hutton was called before the cabinet on the morning of 26 October 1899, Richard Scott presided in the absence of Laurier. He was no friend of Hutton and his background gave him no reason to sympathize with Imperial officers and their ways. Before Hutton had said anything, Scott demanded to know whether he thought that he governed the country and accused him of being a martinet and of driving Hughes to his insubordination. Hutton's remarks about the fate of the Australian government which had opposed him were recalled and he was asked if he thought the same thing would happen in Canada. The other ministers seem to have been a little surprised at their colleague's violence. They accepted Hutton's explanations and, after two more meetings, Hutton's choices of field officers were endorsed.¹¹⁴² On the evening of 27 October 1899, the list of officers was published in Militia Orders. In addition to the Canadian officers, it indicated that Captain Bell, the General's aide de camp and Major Lawrence Drummond, the Governor General's Military Secretary, would be accompanying the force. For the first time, too, the official title of the contingent was given as the 2nd (Special Service) Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry.^{1143*} Minto had won approval from the British for the regimental organization¹¹⁴⁴ and, in the event that the eight companies would be split in South Africa, two extra officers were authorized as battalion adjutants.¹¹⁴⁵

* The uniform, however, was that of a rifle regiment Militia Orders, 217 (5) 23 October 1899

551. The question of Hughes was not yet dead. On the night of 27 October 1899, Hutton and Borden went down to Quebec by train. The press campaign on behalf of Hughes had continued and Hughes, himself, finally realizing that he might after all be left behind, had made a half-hearted apology to Hutton. During the journey, Borden managed to persuade Hutton to allow Hughes to accompany the contingent but only on condition that he had no military capacity and that he did not wear uniform. Hutton also declared that he would not recommend Hughes for any employment once he reached South Africa.¹¹⁴⁶

552. The arrangements at Quebec were the culmination of three weeks of frantic rush. Much of the material, including the khaki clothing had to be manufactured. There was Oliver equipment enough for the force only if it was withdrawn for the permanent force. The Allan Line cattle boat Sardinian had been chartered for the voyage and it had to be considerably altered to provide space for officers, nurses, other ranks, horses, equipment, ammunition and even a guard room and prison. Much had to be improvised. to determine the storage space for the mens' valises, it was necessary to make a package of the regulation contents and measure it for the actual valises had not arrived.¹¹⁴⁷

The men themselves began arriving on Wednesday, 25 October and the last to reach Quebec was the half company from Vancouver which arrived early on 29 October 1899.¹¹⁴⁸ In some cases, companies had recruited over strength but "F" Company, being raised at Quebec, did not reach its allotted strength and the height requirement was lowered to allow it to bring in a sufficient representation of French Canadians.¹¹⁴⁹

553. The men of the contingent were billeted in the Citadel where, it was alleged, they were left to the mercy of the permanent force garrison. The officers were better treated. On the evening of 28 October, there was a banquet in their honour at the Garrison Club. Both Borden and Hutton made speeches. In the basically Conservative surroundings of the Garrison Club, it happened that Hutton received rather greater applause. This annoyed Borden who remained in the club after dinner. At 3.00 a.m., there was a noisy quarrel between the Minister and an ex-officer of the Militia after which, according to Hutton, Borden was carried helpless to bed.¹¹⁵⁰ On the following day, a Sunday, there was a Church Parade, conducted by Canon F.G. Scott, who compared the British to the ancient Hebrews in their struggle to destroy the effects Canaanite civilization. In the evening, there was another dinner for the officers, this time given by the Governor General. Once again, there was oratory, from Lord Minto, Sir Wilfred Laurier, Dr. Borden and General Hutton. They were, according to the Montreal Star, four remarkable speeches. The Governor General had told the officers that this was no time for quibbles about Canada's responsibility while Hutton added that "Canada lives, moves and has her being in maintaining the British Empire."¹¹⁵¹ Hutton also gathered the officers for his own private briefing, advising them that there would be no fighting in South Africa but there was certain to be hard campaigning. He advised them to divide the men into groups of four for cooking and bivouacking and, for themselves, not to save money on good cooks. Finally, he urged the regiment to stick together. This sound advice was published to the world by an enterprising reporter who had hidden behind a curtain.¹¹⁵²

554. At 11.30 on the following day, Monday, 30 October 1899, the battalion was paraded on the Esplanade for a further allotment of speeches from Minto, Laurier, Hutton and the Mayor of Quebec. There was then a march through the streets, amidst great popular enthusiasm, to the dock where the men were embarked in excellent order. Borden, who had missed the review in the morning, appeared as the troops had marched away. There had been considerable talk that the Government would make up the difference between Canadian and British pay for the officers and men while they were in South Africa. Some of the officers had been pressing Hutton on this point and he took advantage of the Minister's arrival to get him to give the officers some assurance about their pay. He failed to notice that the Minister had not fully recovered his health and was therefore ill-prepared to be told to mind his own business. The rebuke was administered publicly and before his officers and Hutton was to remember it as one of his grievances against the Minister.¹¹⁵³

555. The passage to South Africa took exactly a month and, on the morning of 30 November 1899, the contingent disembarked at Capetown. The voyage had been without incident save for the death of one man. The ship itself proved to be small and more than usually unstable at sea. The accommodation, particularly for the men in the holds, was particularly unpleasant. Colonel Otter developed his reputation as a somewhat unimaginative disciplinarian by insisting on punctilious saluting and as much drill as time and the ship's limited deck area would allow. Another idea of his, to harden the men to heat by requiring them to go barefoot on the deck, had to be abandoned after a

large number of men reported sick. The presence of Colonel Hughes proved to be as difficult and disruptive as he had confidentially anticipated.¹¹⁵⁴ When the Sardinian passed the three mile limit, Hughes emerged on deck fully dressed in the uniform Hutton had forbidden him to wear and announced that the only authority on the ship whom he would respect would be the captain of the ship.¹¹⁵⁵

FURTHER CONTINGENTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA

556. The Canadians had hardly arrived in South Africa before they heard of the three disastrous battles of "Black Week", 10 - 16 December 1899. The defeats at Stormberg, Magerfontein and Colenso shattered three myths of the British Army - that British soldiers never surrender, that Highlanders never run away and that guns are never captured. Imperialists in Canada might delight in Queen Victoria's widely quoted statement: "There is no depression in this house. We are not interested in the possibilities of defeat. They do not exist." At the same time, they could never look on Britain, and certainly not on British military prowess in the same light as before.

557. On 7 November 1899, the Canadian Government had offered the British a second contingent. The offer was rather a formality and General Hutton was not even informed that it had been made and knew nothing of it until he saw a newspaper report.¹¹⁵⁶ The British Government did not reply. It was confident that when General Buller had arrived and taken charge of the situation, the few small reverses of the early days of the war would quickly be forgotten in

a quick and easy victory. Black Week put an end to the amazing confidence in General Buller. Field Marshall Lord Roberts was appointed as Commander in Chief in South Africa and, on 18 December, the Canadian offer was accepted six weeks after it had been made.

558. In the meantime, Hutton had not been idle, nor had his wife. Mrs Hutton set out to organize a soldier's Wives League, a society which had been pioneered in England by Lady Wolseley and which Mrs. Hutton had also begun in New South Wales. The object was to bring together the wives of soldiers of all ranks "so that in sickness and in health they may be able to mutually aid and assist one another, and their families, in times of difficulty, trouble or distress." The wife of the District Officer Commanding was to be the vice president in each district, presiding over an executive board with six officers' wives and the wife of the regimental sergeant major or other senior non-commissioned officer. Mrs. Hutton would be president of each local league. The subscription was set at 25 cents a year. The first project of the League, which soon had branches in Montreal, Ottawa and Toronto, was to send a letter to each member of the Contingent, along with a Testament, pencil, paper, a matchbox and a large bandanna handkerchief. The men were urged not to worry about their families for no one would be allowed to be in want.¹¹⁵⁷

559. Hutton, still regretful that he had been unable to get an appointment in South Africa, returned to his work with the Militia. From 15 - 17 November, he held another of the annual conferences with the District Officers

Commanding which he wished to make a matter of routine.¹¹⁵⁸ On 19 December 1899, he addressed the students of the University of Toronto and on the following day, he attended a ceremony at which the Governor General unveiled a plaque to the dead of the Northwest Campaign of 1885.¹¹⁵⁹

560. It was with a sense of relief that he could turn from this trivia to the organization of the Second Contingent. Its composition had been left up to the Canadian Government and there were none of the detailed provisions laid down in Chamberlain's telegram of 3 October. The only influence offered was that the preference was now for mounted men. Because of this vagueness and because no detailed plans had been made in advance, it was only 30 December 1899 that the order was issued. It announced that a regiment called the Canadian Mounted Rifles would be raised from men of the Militia cavalry units and from the Northwest Mounted Police, with a total strength of 531 men. The conditions were largely the same as for the First Contingent, save that the enlistment might be extended to one year. Lieutenant Colonel Kitson of the Royal Military College was appointed to the temporary command of the regiment. In addition, a brigade division of three batteries of field artillery, with a total strength of 539 men was authorized. One third of each battery was to be provided from the permanent force and the remainder would come from the Active Militia. Batteries were to be raised at Kingston, Ottawa and Quebec. Lieutenant Colonel Stone took temporary command of the brigade. The experience of the previous contingent was used in preparing the order for many of the administrative details which had been worked out from day to day in October could now be embodied in a single

order.¹¹⁶¹ There were details which had to be worked out, however, such as the weapons of the Mounted Rifles (Lee-Enfield, bayonet and revolver¹¹⁶² and whether they should receive pay as Active militia or at the higher Mounted Police rate (the latter).¹¹⁶³

561. It soon was clear that an attempt to amalgamate the Mounted Police and the Cavalry in a single regiment were not going to work and that there would be unnecessary delays. Hutton therefore persuaded Borden to change the organization of the Mounted Rifles so that there would be two battalions of two squadrons each.¹¹⁶⁴ One of the battalions would be raised by the Royal Canadian Dragoons, with one squadron from Ontario and the other chiefly from Manitoba. The Mounted Police battalion was left to the Commissioner to organize.¹¹⁶⁵

562. The appointment of officers for the second contingent did not provoke the disputes of the first contingent. Hutton resented the appointment of Major Harold L. Borden, the Minister's son, to the 1st Battalion of the Canadian Mounted Rifles¹¹⁶⁶ but he had the sense not to resist it. The young man's career in the Militia had already been somewhat meteoric, having joined the King's Canadian Hussars as a provisional second lieutenant in April 1897, but, as an only son, Harold was the Minister's sole delight and hope and he could refuse him nothing. Young Borden reverted to the rank of lieutenant in the contingent. The commanding officer of the 1st Battalion was Lieutenant Colonel F.L. Lessard, who had lately been the commanding officer of the Royal Canadian Dragoons. The Commissioner of the Northwest Mounted Police,

Lieutenant Colonel L.W. Herchmer, took the command of the 2nd Battalion with Major S.B. Steele, veteran of 1870 and a superintendent in the police, as his second in command. Lieutenant Colonel C.W. Drury of the Royal School of Artillery at Kingston commanded the brigade of artillery. Two of his battery commanders were the commanders of permanent force field batteries, Major J.Q.G. Hudon and Major G.H. Ogilvie and the third, Major W.G. Hurdman, commanded a Militia field battery in Ottawa.

563. The real dispute arising from the 2nd Contingent was over the purchase of horses. In public statements, members of the Government had declared that, at such a moment of crisis, political favouritism was in abeyance. A large number of horses had to be purchased for the Canadian Mounted Rifles and, with the Minister's approval, boards were appointed, consisting of the Commissioner of the Northwest Mounted Police, Lieutenant Colonel Kitson and the District Officers Commanding who were concerned.¹¹⁶⁷ The purchasing had not been going on long when complaints began to reach Ottawa that Liberal horse dealers were not getting fair treatment. There were particular complaints against Colonel Kitson and his dealings with Major Hendrie, the commanding officer of the 2nd Field Battery of Hamilton and a strong Conservative. On 5 January 1900, the Minister summoned Kitson to Ottawa to examine his Horse Purchase book and to give him some advice. Hutton, who was present, ridiculed the idea that Kitson had been favouring Hendrie and Kitson returned to Toronto on the same evening. On Monday, 8 January 1900, Hutton himself went down to Toronto to look over the horse buying. While he was there, Robert Beith, a prominent horse dealer and also a Liberal Member of Parliament, appeared and

claimed to have instructions from the Minister to examine the horses. Hutton declared that he would have the same right as any other member of the public to look the animals over. Beith withdrew and at 5.00 p.m., Hutton received an angry telegram from the Minister accusing him of interfering with Beith and command that he be allowed to inspect each horse before it was shipped. Hutton, of course, complied, and the following day, Beith, two other horse dealers and a veterinarian examined the horses and rejected five as unsuitable. The dealers also submitted estimated prices for the horses which were very much below what Kitson had paid. Unfortunately for their independence, they had been rival bidders for the supply of horses.

564. Hutton returned to Ottawa full of indignation. It was, he felt, an outrage on all propriety to send someone like Beith to spy on him. It was an insult to him and a reflection on a subordinate officer. On 12 January, he saw Borden and indicated his feelings. Borden immediately said that no offence had been intended and promised to thank Kitson for his work. Hutton assumed that the matter was closed until the following day when he received a minute from the Minister asking several questions about the purchases. Hutton promptly sent back a somewhat intemperate reply in which he told the Minister that the answers to several of the questions were available in his own office.

This reply was returned by Borden with the note that it was "most unsatisfactory if not intentionally rude." Hutton carried his grievance to the Prime Minister the same afternoon, reporting on the insults which he had suffered and showing him the memorandum and his reply. Laurier was sympathetic and the two men had a long talk, during which the Prime Minister

told of his colleague's suspicions of Hutton while the General explained why he had gone to the West Coast during the crisis and pleaded guilty only to having aroused patriotic enthusiasm in the Militia and to trying to strengthen the bonds with the old country. Laurier quietly observed that he could see little difference between this and politics and Hutton replied that, for an Imperial officer, it was little short of duty. Laurier then saw Borden and obtained a rather different view of Hutton's behaviour. The Minister of Militia was finding the General increasingly impossible to deal with and had become convinced that Hutton's only intention was to gain full control of the Department. This he was determined to resist to the limit of his ability. Laurier saw Hutton again on 16 January and told him that he had changed his mind about Hutton's reply to Borden's request for information and that the Minister had been quite justified. Hutton announced that he would lay the matter before the Governor General. He then left for Halifax to supervise the embarkation of the Second Contingent.¹¹⁶⁸

565. Armed with the experience of the First Contingent, the Militia Department authorities were able to ensure that the Second Contingent was even better equipped. there was also more time. A full month ensued between the order to raise the force and the departure of the first of the three ships which were to carry it on 20 January 1900. Additional time was also valuable because of the greater difficulties of mobilization in the midst of a Canadian winter. The main difficulty at Halifax proved to be the condition of the ships which the Government had arranged for the passage of the troops. Hutton inspected the loading of the Laurentian, the first ship to go, and discovered

that the horses were cruelly over crowded. The Government inspector, he discovered, had not dared to make a complaint since the ship belonged to the politically powerful Allan Line.¹¹⁶⁹ While in Halifax Hutton stayed with Lord William Seymour at "Bellevue", the residence of the British General Officer Commanding, and the two men appear to have resumed, temporarily, their good relations. The same was not true of Hutton and Borden. The two men had an altercation on the dockside as the Laurentian was being loaded and Hutton reported to Minto on the same day:

I have been distant with Dr. Borden & by the wild look, unkempt appearance & distraught attitude of the gentleman I gather that he is in a suppressed state of indignation & whiskey at having put himself in the wrong with me.¹¹⁷⁰

Four days later, he again wrote to Minto to report that the embarkation was going well and that the troops looked well. He was full of indignation at the sudden announcement of the repatriation scheme for the Leisters. It was, he maintained, a miserable scheme to get the support of Ontario.

I am truly & deeply sick at heart over this Militia - it seems impossible to evolve order out of chaos & to make dirty water run clear when the political atmosphere pollutes (sic) everything & no one goes for the public good.¹¹⁷¹

HUTTON'S DISMISSAL

566. Hutton had not many more days to endure the frustrations of the Canadian Militia Department. In his last interview with Laurier before coming down to Halifax, the Prime Minister had agreed that relations between Hutton and Borden were at an impasse. The only possible answer was to get rid of Hutton but to do so would involve possibly grave political dangers. Hutton seemed popular in the country and he could make charges of political influence and intrigue which would be damaging as the time for a General Election approached.

567. An indication of the dangers involved in attacking Hutton was given when Lord Strathcona, the Canadian High Commissioner in London and an extremely wealthy man, made his offer to raise and equip a regiment of mounted infantry for South Africa entirely at his own expense. Strathcona was a vigorous imperialist whose influence had already been brought into play to secure a Canadian contingent.¹¹⁷² His offer of 400 unmarried expert marksmen and horsemen from the Canadian West was made on 31 December 1899 and accepted two weeks later on 13 January 1900. Immediately, Strathcona cabled Hutton to take the responsibility for raising and equipping it, authorizing him to draw up to 150,000 on his account in the Bank of Montreal.^{1173*} Strathcona also made a point of requesting that the force should be raised with no reference to political considerations, an observation which caused the Government considerable annoyance by its implication that such considerations had

* Hutton told Minto on 24 January 1900 that he had heard about Strathcona's offer only from the newspapers. [MG27 II B 1 38, Hutton-Minto 24 Jan 1900]

affected the previous contingents. Strathcona, who had supported both the Liberals and the Conservatives during his long public life, wrote to Laurier on 19 January 1900 that he had meant no reflection on the way that the other contingents had been raised; indeed if he had felt that they had been based on political considerations, he would not have acted at all. He did repeat his request, however, that Hutton should be responsible for the detailed arrangements.¹¹⁷⁴

568. The organization of Strathcona's Horse began on 1 February 1900. Lieutenant Colonel Steele was withdrawn from the 2nd Battalion of the Canadian Mounted Rifles and given command of the unit. Strathcona would have preferred that Lieutenant Colonel Sam Hughes be given the command and he made his favour for Hughes known but he was anxious not to interfere.¹¹⁷⁵ The terms of service were the same as for the previous contingents and Lord Strathcona paid the officers and men at the Northwest Mounted Police rates of pay. The unit was concentrated at Ottawa and moved through Montreal to Halifax where it was embarked on the Monterey on 16 March 1900.¹¹⁷⁶ Hutton, who had left Canada over two weeks before, had little to do with its organization or equipment.

569. The preference for Colonel Hughes was not unique to Lord Strathcona. Laurier had wondered how he could overcome the popularity of General Hutton in the public mind. Colonel Hughes provided the answer.

570. Events in South Africa had already gravely damaged the prestige of British officers, and Hutton had shared in the general devaluation. The case

of Colonel Hughes provided the sort of particular example which public opinion needs as a focus for its feelings. When Hughes had gone off to South Africa in his humble capacity as a civilian passenger on the Sardinian, Hutton believed that he had humbled "the Conservative Insurgent" as he liked to call him and also believed, prematurely, that his victory in reducing Hughes to tears of contrition was the supreme moment in which political influence in the Militia had been overcome.¹¹⁷⁷ He could not have been more mistaken. On 2 November 1899, he included a reference to Hughes in a telegram to South Africa in which he pointed out that Hughes was proceeding only as a passenger and that he would not be willing to recommend him for any military employment.¹¹⁷⁸ Naturally, when he reached Capetown, Hughes found that military employment was not to be had. His reputation as an imperialist, his status as a Canadian Member of parliament and even his contacts cultivated while in London during the Jubilee celebrations of 1897 were all of no use to him. His sense of frustration and bitterness knew no bounds. To Laurier, on 27 December 1899, he wrote in desperation:

Again I appeal to you for simple justice. You can do it me. The military people here are anxious to help me, but say "Your Govt is supreme over General Hutton. Why do not they appoint you. We will be delighted to recognize it".

Moreover I have had no cable of money as was understood and promised me.

I want fully 100 here. Why do you not do me justice Sir Wilfred?

Please cable me some appointment and also by the time this reaches you - \$125.00¹¹⁷⁹

571. Pressure on behalf of Hughes was not limited to the Colonel himself. There had already been very strong support for him in his struggle for a place on the Contingent. The Bobcaygeon Independent had explained that Hughes had been rejected because of the public dispute with Hutton at Niagara Camp the previous June and remarked:

Now you know why Col. Sam is not Major of the Contingent and when you see the General's scalp hanging from the tower of the Parliament buildings next spring, you will know how it came there.¹¹⁸⁰

When there were reports from Cape town that Hughes was left thee without employment, there was a revived interest in him and when, as Hughes and his friends made certain, it was clearly understood that Hutton was to blame for his idleness, there was widespread anger, even from newspapers which had not backed him before. The Toronto Globe which had only come to support Canadian participation after a hesitation and which closely reflected Liberal policy, called for an investigation of Hughes, grievances and announced that Canada "will not submit to have a good soldier humiliated or discouraged because his enthusiasm breaks the bonds of military red tape, or disturbs the dignity of anybody."¹¹⁸¹ On 2 February 1900, it published a lengthy letter from

J.L. Hughes, Sam's brother, demanding that Hutton be the last officer sent to Canada "to irritate Canadians and to put Canadian loyalty to unnecessary strain by arrogance and red tape." Hutton was a "temporary tyrant" who had tried to rob an "enthusiastic patriot and soldier" of his right to fight for the Empire.¹¹⁸² Other papers were rather less restrained. The Galt Saily Reporter declared that "General Hutton came to Canada knowing it all, a martinet in smart clothes, with an elevated opinion of his own merits and an enlarged idea of the dignity attaching to the office of Commander of the Forces in Canada."¹¹⁸³ Another Conservative newspaper, the Toronto Evening telegram described the treatment of Hughes as an "outrage". "Col. Sam Hughes", it announced, "has more adaptability, more shrewdness, more capability for leadership in the sort of warfare which Britain has to wage in South Africa than major General Hutton is ever likely to possess."¹¹⁸⁴

572. Such a storm of abuse made it much easier for the Government to consider relieving itself of the difficult General. Hutton played his own part in sustaining the agitation on behalf of Hughes. Friends of Hughes, including Lieutenant Colonel James Domville, were planning to move for the correspondence which had passed between Hughes and Hutton during the previous October. In a farewell speech to the men of "D" Battery at the Russell House in Ottawa, Hutton took the opportunity of warning friends of Hughes not to do so as they would place their hero in "a pitiable position". Later, Hutton was interviewed by the press on the same subject. He denied that he was responsible for Hughes' unemployment in South Africa, merely pointing out that it was not customary to appoint unrecommended officers. He also repeated what

he had told the men of "D" Battery about the correspondence between them:

Those who have seen the correspondence so far - and all the letters are now before the government - are of the opinion that Colonel Hughes could not have been exactly in his right mind when he wrote in the manner in which he did. The incident possesses most unfortunate features - features that I trust will not again be repeated.¹¹⁸⁵

When this report was published on 30 January 1900, it infuriated Hughes' supporters and embarrassed the Government. Hutton admitted that he had made it, only explaining that he had not intended the interview for publication. He did not explain how he had permitted the reporter to take his statement verbatim.¹¹⁸⁶

573. The alleged mistreatment of Colonel Hughes was converting public opinion to oppose Hutton. The major obstacle that remained was the Governor General. Lord Minto was anxious to delay and Laurier, still a little anxious about public opinion and reluctant to push matters to a constitutional crisis, was trying to be patient. On 20 February, Minto gave the Prime Minister a memorandum of his views, stressing the important role which Hutton had played and suggesting, in strong terms, that the trouble stemmed basically from political interference in the Militia Department. He had not intended that this memorandum be shown to the whole cabinet but Laurier either was not told of the restriction or forgot it. The document was not designed to win support from the ministers with its blunt observations on Borden's actions, largely as

seen through Hutton's eyes. Minto had written that the executive command of the Militia had been placed in the hands of the General and that the Minister was only to exercise a general administrative control and it retain the initiative in expenditure of money. While the supreme authority rested, by statute, with the Government of the day, it was never intended by the statute that there should be ceaseless interference with the General.

Unfortunately, it is universally admitted that political influence has done much to impair the efficiency of the Militia force, but His Excellency is quite aware that it would be impossible to eradicate this baneful influence root and branch, and that if it is to be done away with, it will have to be dealt with gradually.

However, to remove it, the wish had to start at the top and so long as the Minister looked upon the Militia as a political machine, subordinates would take their cue from him. As for Hutton, he was "by reputation the most able and distinguished officer" ever to command the Militia. His position had been made impossible, Minto insisted, and he quoted the horse purchase quarrel in proof. He acknowledged that there might be some justice in the accusations of want of tact laid against the General and he had personally always opposed public speaking by soldiers, but he could recall no speech by Hutton which could arouse objection. Finally, he suggested that there were two points of principle involved: Were there conditions which made it impossible for an Imperial officer of distinction to command the Militia and was it advisable, at such a moment of crisis, to urge the recall of such an excellent

officer?¹¹⁸⁷

574. When unbeknownst to Minto, this document was shown to the whole cabinet, there was considerable indignation.¹¹⁸⁸ A twenty one page reply was prepared by David Mills, the Minister of Justice. In tone it was heated and extremely constitutional. It began with the assertion that the Ministers "respectfully dissent from the doctrines set out in almost every paragraph of your Excellency's Memorandum," and went on to say why. The basic thesis was that no executive officer was exempt from control from some member of the Cabinet and that the statute establishing the appointment of General Officer Commanding gave him no exclusive jurisdiction. While the respective responsibilities might be clearly delineated, nothing could relieve the Minister from responsibility for and therefore from authority over every aspect of his department. The problem with Hutton, as with all the preceding British General officers Commanding, was that they had not understood their position and had demanded powers quite incompatible with Parliamentary authority. If no high minded British officer could take such a position, as Minto had suggested, they might have to change the law. The Cabinet memorandum also gave the Government side of the Beith affair. Borden had sent Beith to Toronto, the memorandum stated, because he had heard that unfit horses were being purchased Beith should have received far better treatment from Hutton as befitted a public spirited citizen.

Your Excellency's advisers do not for a moment admit that the position of General Hutton is unassailable. it has been marked by a

contempt for the authority of the Minister, and by a course of action, which, if acquiesced in, would lead to the destruction of all chance of efficiency in the Canadian Militia service.¹¹⁸⁹

575. While the Government reply was being drafted, there was a further series of rather unsatisfactory interviews between Laurier and the Governor General.

On 27 January 1900, Minto discovered what had become of his memorandum when Laurier reported that Borden's feelings had been hurt by it. Minto also discussed the difficulties of getting a suitable general to replace Hutton at such a crucial moment. Laurier recalled that they had wished to have Colonel Lake as a replacement for Gascoigne but the War Office had insisted that he was too junior. Both Lake and Lieutenant Colonel Kitson had done well in Canada, which showed that Imperial officers could succeed there. He also defended Borden as "a highly honourable and amiable man" to which Minto rejoined that he had treated Hutton with scant courtesy and given him few thanks for his efforts. Minto hoped that after such a frank and full discussion, Laurier would return to the cabinet to make peace.¹¹⁹⁰ Instead, two days later, he was back with a draft despatch to the Colonial Secretary, calling for Hutton's recall. The General's usefulness was at an end and the position in the Militia Department had become impossible, Minto refused to pass the telegram and insisted that the order for recall be embodied in an Order in Council, a form which would give him a chance to add his own comments in a submission to Chamberlain. Once again the matter of Minto's memorandum was raised and the Governor General repeated that he had never intended that it be revealed to the cabinet and, if he had, he would have toned down certain

statements. Once again, Minto thought that he had made sufficient impression on the Prime Minister that he would return to his colleagues to argue them out of their hostility to Hutton.¹¹⁹¹ Once again he was mistaken. The following day, 30 January 1899, Laurier was back, this time with a draft order in council. Once again, Minto threatened that he would not sign it at such an urgent moment in the history of the Empire. He even drew attention to rumours of revived Fenian activity. Moreover, the best military men were out of the country and there were no Canadian fit to take command of the force at short notice. Laurier agreed to have one more consultation with the Cabinet but he insisted that the only way out of the impasse was the removal of Hutton. There was no possibility of a cabinet shuffle since only he would agree to serve over Hutton. When Minto suggested that James Sutherland, the Minister without portfolio and a Militia major, might be a possible appointment, Laurier rejoined that no one was stronger against Hutton. If Hutton was not recalled by the Imperial authorities, there could be no alternative to his dismissal.¹¹⁹² On the following day, at the Governor General's request, Borden came to Rideau Hall. He was, Minto admitted, "extremely sore" and not even the optimistic Governor General believed that he had been successful in pacifying him.¹¹⁹³

576. In the course of the struggle between the Governor General and the Prime Minister, new material had been added to the Government case. It had been agreed that a second Militia Staff Course would be held in 1900 at the Royal Military College. The course was due to begin on 1 February and Hutton had selected the officers who were to attend. Their names were published in

Militia Orders on 20 January¹¹⁹⁴ although they had been privately notified some time before. Hutton had never felt obliged to obtain ministerial approval for what he published in Militia Orders and the first Borden knew of the officers chosen to attend the Staff Course was when he saw the published Militia Order.

Two names caught his eye: Lieutenant Colonel W.W. White of the 30th Battalion and Lieutenant Colonel D.M. Vince of the Reserve of Officers. Both were promptly struck off the list and the amended order was returned to Colonel Foster, the Chief Staff Officer. Foster called on Borden, learned the reasons for the officers' removal and notified the cancellation of their selection in Militia Orders of 26 January 1900.¹¹⁹⁵ He also sent each of them a letter "by direction of the General Officer Commanding", stating that their appointments had been cancelled by reason of "having recently taken an active part in politics by public speaking."¹¹⁹⁶

577. In a sense, it was fair criticism. Both men were well known Conservatives. Vince had been postmaster of Woodstock for many years until he had been dismissed for political activity at a time of a change of government in New Brunswick. White was even better known. He had recently made a speech at the Fat Stock Show at Guelph in which he had compared the French Canadians to the Boers and had looked forward to the day when similar circumstances would produce a similar war.¹¹⁹⁷ It was White who was the first to protest and he sent a letter to Foster complaining that he had been removed only four days before he was due to depart, that he had received the congratulations of his friends and that he had arranged his business for a long absence. He wanted to know the real reason for his removal since his speech had actually been

praised in the Globe. Foster replied in a second letter, more explicitly declaring that White had taken part in politics on the side of the Opposition.¹¹⁹⁶

578. Such an explanation could only be designed to embarrass the Government and it was taken up by the Conservative press. Borden, learning of the uproar on 3 February, hastily sent Vince and White another letter, explaining that their names had been dropped to make room for younger men.* He then set out to find out how such letters could ever have been sent in the first place. He sent his private secretary H.W. Brown, to see Foster and to obtain a copy of the original letter to Colonel White. The secretary returned almost immediately to report that Foster had told him that he could neither send the Minister a copy of the letter nor visit him personally without the permission of the General Officer Commanding. Boiling with indignation, Borden set off for Foster's office. He met the colonel in the corridor and brought him back to his own office. There Foster told him that a year before, Hutton had issued an order that he and the Adjutant General were not to go to the Minister even when called without Hutton's permission. The same applied to

* The Minister's grounds remain unclear. Colonel Vince was certainly retired although he had been the commanding officer of the Brighton Engineers, a unit which was probably more highly and consistently praised by successive General Officers Commanding than any other unit of the Militia. In 1900, he was 55 years old. Colonel White was 57 and, as Borden continually pointed out, maimed as well. However White's maiming consisted of the loss of two fingers in 1871, since which time he had served in the Militia, become a champion shot and a well known rider. The 30th Battalion, which he commanded for seven years, was one of the best Ontario rural battalions. There were also two older officers on the list of candidates. [D. Hist 500.009 (D 9) "Note on Hutton's Resignation".]

correspondence. If they went to the Minister with approval or if they were accosted by him, they were to go to the General and report exactly what had transpired. Borden immediately sent for Colonel Aylmer and the information was confirmed. Aylmer added that they were not to sign any documents being sent to the Minister so long as the General was at Headquarters. Borden ordered both officers to confirm their statements in writing.¹¹⁹⁹ For his own part, he prepared a lengthy report of the whole affair for the Prime Minister:

I need scarcely say that such conduct on the part of the General Officer Commanding the Militia of Canada is unprecedented in our history, is unsupported by the rules and practices of the English War Office, and is opposed to both the letter and spirit of the Militia and Queen's Regulations. It certainly is opposed to common sense and the efficient working of the department.

That was not all. After his steady opposition to Hughes since the beginning of October, even going to the extent of recommending his retirement on the grounds of insubordination and later of saying that he was not in his right mind, on 2 February he had received a memorandum from the General recommending that Hughes be appointed a captain in Strathcona's House. "Further comment on Hutton's conduct with regard to Hughes is needless."¹²⁰⁰

579. 3 February proved to be the crucial day of the Hutton crisis. The night before, he had submitted a twenty page paper to the Governor General telling of his disputes with the Minister.¹²⁰¹ On the afternoon of 3 February, he

received a memorandum from the Deputy Minister stating that the reasons he had given White for having his name struck off were "entirely erroneous and misleading" and demanding to know why he had done it.¹²⁰² That afternoon, Minto had a visit from Lieutenant Colonel Fred White, the Comptroller of the Northwest Mounted Police, who warned him that Hutton was going too far and that he would be foolish to rely on press support. That evening, he had another letter from Hutton announcing: "I have made up my mind to fight, & to fight a l'outrance." The issue was party political interference with every aspect of the force. Unless it was eliminated, there could be no efficient Militia. "The whole of the discourtesy & interference to which I am & have been subjected for the last 15 months is entirely due to the party-political interference with the functions of my military command."¹²⁰³ It was on 3 February as well that the official draft of Minto's originally private memorandum was submitted to the Cabinet. On the following day, he received the cabinet's reply, which he described as "a very long and extraordinary document."¹²⁰⁴ Hutton, having decided to fight, found that there was no very suitable battleground. Instead, he took to his bed with a bade cold during the weekend.

580. On Wednesday morning, 7 February 1900, Laurier called on the Governor General, bringing with him the order in council for Hutton's recall and the confidential memorandum which had been such a source of embarrassment to Lord Minto. After a graceful speech of apology, Laurier tore it up in his presence "as never having been sent". Then they turned to Hutton. The Prime Minister was still anxious that Hutton should resign but Minto stood still

anxious that Hutton should resign but Minto stood firm for recall so that there would be an opportunity to place the reasons on record.¹²⁰⁵ In the afternoon, Hutton called. He was sadly dispirited and disappointed. The country had not rallied to him and he spoke of resignation. Minto insisted that he wait until the country and parliament, which had just assembled, should have a real opportunity to express an opinion.¹²⁰⁶ In fact the opinion was already expressed. The information about the state of the Militia Department was sufficient to persuade the cabinet that there could be no further temporising about Hutton's departure and they felt that it revealed a situation which would furnish an adequate defence of its action before Parliament. On the following day, Hutton discovered that he had escaped bronchitis. With reviving spirits, he announced to the Governor General that he was planning a parting shot at the Canadian Government before he left the country.¹²⁰⁷ Meanwhile, Minto was sending his Government's order in council to Chamberlain with his own covering despatch. In it, he told of the long course of friction which he had hoped would blow over when the cabinet discovered the need for a good general. The accusations against Hutton boiled down to a want of tact. It was also true that he had taken perhaps too pronounced a stand against the recognized evil of political influence. However the force urgently needed a strong Imperial officer for "the social and official surroundings besetting the force would render to quite impossible for one of its own officers to undertake its reorganization with any hope of success." Minto was clearly worried that a Canadian appointment would be made and he urged the Colonial Secretary to make his own view clear on the subject.¹²⁰⁸ The order in council itself pointed out that it had originally been intended

merely to tell the Colonial Officer that the situation was unsatisfactory and that Hutton should not be retained but that it was decided that he must be recalled since his retention would seriously embarrass military affairs.¹²⁰⁹

581. Hutton spent 8 February drafting a letter to the Governor General to demand a Royal Commission to investigate the Militia on the basis of his charges.¹²¹⁰ However the next day, he received notice by telegram from England that he had been selected for special service in South Africa and his concern for vindication waned for the moment. He advised Minto on 10 February that he was writing to Borden to resign his appointment. Once his future service in South Africa became publicly known, there was a small revival of interest in his departure. In the House of Commons, Colonel E.G. Prior, one of the Conservative members for Victoria, moved the adjournment of the House because of Hutton's departure. The attitude of the Government was to allow the General to go as quietly as possible and it refused, at that stage, to raise any of the issues connected with the resignation. So did Sir Charles Tupper, who suspected that there was considerable material hidden in the papers and refused to be drawn. Only Colonel Domville chose to attack the departing General with his customary immoderate vehemence. His attitude evoked little sympathy in the House.¹²¹¹ Hutton, himself, was not so cautious. At a farewell banquet at the Rideau Club on 13 February, addressed by several Conservative members, the General declared:

I should have felt more confident of the ultimate success of this national effort if the government had ever indicated its approval of my

schemes or had shown interest in their evolution.

On the following evening, there was a dinner at the Russell House, given by the officers of the Ottawa Brigade. Hutton repeated most of the themes which he had made familiar during his eighteen months in Canada. Once again, he insisted that the Militia must be placed on a plane above party-political interference. These two speeches Hutton grandly described as the "account of my stewardship" in Canada.¹²¹² Two days later, he was seen off at the station by a large crowd. Mrs. Hutton received a bouquet of roses from the Soldiers' Wives League and a silver tea service from a number of friends.¹²¹³ That evening, they were in New York. Hutton evaded the reporters who waited for him and made his way safely to a hotel. That evening, he wrote to Minto of his conviction that the Government had been trying systematically to get rid of him for the past seven months.¹²¹⁴ The following day, he sailed for England in the Etruria.

A MOMENT OF TRANSITION

582. The departure of Hutton for South Africa put an end to the first period of determined Militia reform. The force, however, was never to be the same again. The difference was that, between Hutton's publicity, the military participation in South Africa and the connection of the Militia with the general atmosphere of imperialism, Canada's military force had come to matter. It had become an institution of consequence both to politicians and to a growing number of people on the street. When this happened, the old

weaknesses of inefficiency, waste and pervasive political influence were no longer tolerable.

583. At his departure, it was chiefly the Conservative newspapers that regretted his going. The Montreal Star described his departure at such a time as nothing short of a crime, for which the Government was entirely responsible.¹²¹⁵ "Vanguard" in the Mail and Empire said that he was the best officer to command the Militia¹²¹⁶ and the Quebec Telegraph said that, while he had made unwelcome decisions, no one had ever put as much snap into the Militia.¹²¹⁷ The Hamilton Spectator shared this regret and pointed out that now that large sums were being spent on the Militia, there would be real waste unless the people in charge knew their business.¹²¹⁸ The Toronto Star, however, warned of Government by Colonel, and reminded readers of the nature of responsible government. Another even more valid point was to recall who was doing the complaining:

The champions of Colonel Hutton profess to be very much concerned lest politics shall be introduced into the management of the Militia and the Ottawa Citizen, which is one of the most active Conservative papers in the country shows that it is Liberal politics only that is objected to.¹²¹⁹

However serious the problem of political influence might be, there was a certain hypocrisy in at least some of the Opposition members who were so anxious to condemn it.

584. The reaction in British Government circles was far more critical of the Canadian authorities. Chamberlain complained to Strathcona about the Canadian failure to wait while he tried to settle the matter for them. He was unaware that Laurier, too, had not wanted the recall placed on an official basis for neither man sought to have the whole affair dragged out in official correspondence. Chamberlain was also disappointed that Borden and Hutton had failed to get along. Strathcona warned the Prime Minister that "It may be impossible to find an officer in every way qualified to be his successor."²⁰¹⁰

It was 17 April 1900 before Chamberlain could reply to Minto's despatch of 8 February and to the Canadian order in council that had accompanied it. It was a stern rebuke to the Canadian politicians. Her Majesty's Government was "deeply disappointed that the Minister had been unable to allow Hutton to complete the work of reform, the more so because his two predecessors had also been obliged to return before their time.

The Officers who have been sent out from this Country have been experts in Military Administration and of course absolutely removed from any political influence. They have been solely actuated by a desire to make the Canadian Militia thoroughly efficient and worthy of the Dominion.

The Canadians must understand that a military commander had to be given a freer hand than a civil servant.²⁰²¹

585. The Canadian cabinet did not let this rebuke go unanswered. In a further Privy Council report of 9 June 1900, drafted by a sub-committee of the Cabinet, the Colonial Secretary was reminded that the principle was not the concession of a very free hand to Hutton but yielding to claims which would have made him the real controller of the policy of his department. There was a firm denial that the spirit which had actuated the offer of contingents for South Africa had been in any way due to Hutton and also that the difficulties had arisen because of political difficulties. The real problem was that Hutton had not understood his position in Canada. The Cabinet's reply was supported by a lengthy memorandum.¹²²¹ from Borden in which he recalled his difficulties with the General. "He seemed to regard himself as entitled not merely to advise but to dictate to the Minister, and to act as though he was occupying the position wholly apart from and independent of the Chief of the Department." His arrogance increased to the stage where he was threatening the Minister with a Royal Commission. It became increasingly impossible to run the Department. Borden recalled that "the Major General's manner to him was very often exceedingly discourteous and at times offensive. On more than one occasion, after receiving and apparently agreeing to carrying out instructions given him by the Minister, Major General Hutton did not scruple to disobey the instructions and to do so in violation of the plain regulations of the service." The conclusive evidence against the General was his attempt to restrict the Minister's freedom of access to information. This had made his continuance impossible.¹²²³

586. There were other loose ends of Hutton's career in Canada. On the same

day, 19 February, that Colonel Prior made use of Hutton's farewell speech to the Ottawa Brigade to draw out the Prime Minister on political interference, Domville gained his motion for the papers relation to Colonel Hughes.¹²²⁴ When they appeared, they had something of the effect that Hutton had anticipated and the Toronto Telegram ruefully observed: "How General Hutton must have laughed at his esteemed contemporaries, not excluding this journal, which rose up in defence of Canadian nationality as embodied in the cruel wrongs of Col. Sam Hughes M.P.... The journals which imagined that Col. Sam Hughes was a victim to General Hutton's prejudice against colonial officers must feel like asking the earth to open and swallow them when they read those awful letters..."¹²²⁵

587. When he reached England, Hutton was pleased to find that he was something of an exiled here to the senior officials at the War Office. He was received by Lord Lansdowne and Lord Wolseley. He found that it was chamberlain who had ordered his recall. They had considered leaving him there to fight but then it was agreed that it would be better to have Laurier as the Prime Minister than in Opposition where he could "pander to disloyal elements in Canada."¹²²⁶ He found that both Chamberlain and Lansdowne were fully conversant with Canadian politics and all the prominent people he spoke with agreed on the necessity of getting the militia above party politics. He found that a low view of colonial politicians was widely shared.¹²²⁷

588. By the beginning of April, Hutton was in South Africa and in command of the Colonial brigade of the Mounted Infantry Division. This placed the two

battalions of Canadian Mounted Rifles under his command. It was while he was in South Africa that he received a copy of the 1899 Militia Report which infuriated him since Part III, dealing with reforms, had been left out. It was, he said, a "distinctly dishonourable act" on Borden's part.¹²²⁸

589. Hutton's removal was only an episode in the history of the Canadian Militia. It was neither an end nor a beginning but a moment of transition. Four years later, another general was to be removed in similar circumstances and with greater ease. It proved easier to remove Lord Dundonald in 1904 than Hutton in 1900. By then, the Laurier government had discovered that a military enthusiasm ostensibly aroused on behalf of the British Empire was actually fostering Canadian nationalism. This was the paradox which has recurred so regularly in Canadian military history. In later years, Hutton mistakenly blamed Laurier and French Canada for his discomfiture and failure.¹²²⁹ In fact, it was the most Anglo-Saxon members of the Cabinet like Borden and Sutherland, and the most Imperialist of the private members, Hughes and Domville, who were his bitterest enemies. It is a paradox of great importance for the understanding of Canadian military policy.

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Abbreviations

MG - Manuscript Group in the Public Archives of Canada.

PAC - Public Archives of Canada.

PRO - Public Record Office.

RG - Record Group in the Public Archives of Canada.

Report - Report of the Department of Militia and Defence (after 1904, of the Militia council of the Dominion of Canada).

D Hist - Files maintained by D Hist.

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