
# The SARS Experience in Ontario, Canada Presentation to the Campbell Commission

- Dr. Colin D'Cunha
- Commissioner of Public Health, Chief Medical Officer of Health and Assistant Deputy Minister
- Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care



### **Presentation Outline**

- The spread of SARS in Ontario
- Demographics of infected patients
- Incubation period
- Hospitalization and case fatality rates
- Quarantine data
- Multi-level Response: management, infection control, communication
- Next Steps





## **SARS: Evolving Knowledge**

	Initial State	Current State
Origin	Unknown	Animal species
Symptoms	Uncertain	Well understood
Laboratory Test	Non-existent	Test only available for confirmation
Transmission	Unknown	Droplets & contacts
Protective Measures	Unknown	Well defined
Incubation Period	Unknown	About 10 days
Treatment	Unknown	Empirical
Vaccine	Unavailable	Unavailable
Long-term Effect	Unknown	Unknown



#### **Onset of SARS Outbreak in Ontario**



Household transmission

Nosocomial transmission

**Ontario** 

#### **Outbreak Control Measures**

March 14

March 28



➤ Isolation and contact follow up measures recommended

March 25



SARS becomes reportable, virulent, communicable disease

3

Directives for contact, droplet, airborne precautions instituted province-wide

4

Suspension of admissions, and emergency and non-urgent services at index hospital

- Hospital closed to new patients and visitors
- Contact follow-up initiated



#### **Definition of a Probable SARS Case**


#### A person presenting with:

- Fever (over 38<sup>0</sup> Celsius)
- Cough or breathing difficulty
- Radiographic evidence of infiltrates on chest x-ray\*
- One or more of the following exposures during the ten days prior to the onset of symptoms:
  - Close contact with a probable or suspect case
  - Travel abroad to an area with recent SARS transmission.
  - Recent travel or visit to an identified Canadian setting where SARS exposure may have occurred




<sup>\*</sup> after May 29, 2003

#### **SARS Cases in Ontario by Case Status and Phase**





#### **SARS Cases and Persons under Quarantine**





## **Quarantine Orders Issued During the Outbreak**


Breakdown by HU and Order Type



Health Unit	S. 22	S. 35
Toronto	27	
York	20	1
Durham	11	
Wellington	4	
Simcoe	2	
Halton	1	
Total	65	1




# **SARS Cases Reported by Health Units**






## **Epidemiological Link by Contact Type**






# **Prevalence of Clinical Symptoms**





## Diagnosis and Intervention

Probable and Suspect Cases



Chest X-Ray Infiltration

**Patient Intubation** 



## **Case Distribution by Sex**

Sex	Pha	ise 1	Phase 2		
Sex	N	%	N	%	
Male	90	35	41	35	
Female	167	65	77	65	
Total	257	100	118	100	



## **Age Distribution of Cases by Sex**

Cav	Phase 1			Phase 2		
Sex	Mean	Median	Range	Mean	Median	Range
Male	44.6	42	2-89	54.3	56	16-98
Female	43.3	42	1-99	49.5	49	11-90
Total	43.7	42	1-99	51.2	50	11-98



## **Case Distribution by Age Group**

Age Group	Phas	se 1	Phase 2		
[years]	N	%	N	%	
< 18	18	7	2	2	
18 – 35	71	28	20	17	
36 – 64	132	51	70	59	
65 +	36	14	26	22	
Total	257	100	118	100	



# Incubation Period by Sex

#### Probable and Suspect

Dhoos	Phase Sex	Days from Exposure to Onset		
rnase		Mean	Median	
Phone 1	Male	8.2	8	
Phase 1	Female	7.4	7	
Phone 2	Male	7.1	6	
Phase 2	Female	6.3	5	
Ph. 1 & 2	Both	7.1	6	



# Incubation Period by Age Group


Probable and Suspect

	Mean Incubation Period [Days]				
Age Group	Phase 1		Phase 2		
[years]	Males	Females	Males	Females	
< 18	14.5*	7.4	8.6	7.6	
18 – 35	8.3	7.4	7.1	6.3	
36 – 64	8.3	7.2	6.8	6.0	
65 +	7.6	8.5	9.3	8.1	
All	8.2	7.4	7.1	6.3	

<sup>\*</sup> Sample size consists of two cases



## **Hospitalization and Case Fatality Data**





### **Case Fatality by Age Groups**

at the end of Phase 2, Probable SARS Cases

Age Group	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 1 & 2	
[Years]	N	%	N	%	N	%
< 18	0	0	0	0	0	0
18 – 35	0	0	0	0	0	0
36 – 64	10	38	6	31	16	37
65 +	16	62	11	69	27	63
Total	26	100	17	100	43	100



# Case Fatality by Contact Sub-Groups at the end of Phase 2, Probable SARS Cases

	Phase 1		Phase 2	
Case Fatality Rate →	19.	1%	15.3%	
↓ Contact Type	Deaths	%	Deaths	%
Healthcare Setting: Patient	12	46	13	76
Visitor	2	8	3	18
Worker	2	8	1	6
Household	8	31	0	0
Community Setting	1	4	0	0
Travel	1	4	0	0
Total	26	100	17	100



# Comparative Case Fatality Rates <a href="Probable">Probable</a> SARS Cases (as at July 11/03)

Country/Province	Cases [A]	Deaths [B]	Case Fatality Rate <sup>1</sup>
Ontario – Phase 1	136	25	18.4%
Phase 2	111	16	14.4%
China <sup>2</sup>	5,327	348	6.5%
Hong Kong <sup>2</sup>	1,755	298	17.0%
Taiwan ²	671	84	12.5%
Singapore <sup>2</sup>	206	32	15.5%
United States <sup>2</sup>	75	0	0%

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> [B] divided by [A]



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Source: WHO (Jul. 11/03)

#### **Initial Actions**

Feb. 19

- Ministry alerts healthcare providers
- Index hospital closed
- SARS becomes reportable disease
- Quarantine measures instituted
- Provincial emergency declared
- Directives for contact, droplet, airborne precautions instituted provincially





## Response by the Ontario Government

- Provincial Operations Committee
- Provincial directives to hospitals and health units
- Coordination of resources
- Daily media conferences and reports



#### **Outbreak Management by Public Health Division**

- Set up SARS teams
- Conferences to discuss cases
- Routine dissemination of information (daily reports)
- Developed policies & directives through Science Committee
- Dedicated space, staff, communication lines
- Hired / seconded / borrowed staff on short-term contracts



## **Infection Control in Hospitals**

- Enhanced infection control measures throughout the hospitals
- Creation of contained SARS wards
- New directives for patient transfers and visitors
- Work quarantine for selected healthcare staff
- Limiting the number of healthcare settings in which staff can work
- Curtailing other health services



# **Enhanced Infection Control Measures in Hospitals**



- Wearing of personal protective equipment
  - (masks, gowns, eye-gear, gloves)
- Screening patients at all points of entry
  - Temperature check on arrival
  - Completion of form indicating symptom and travel information
  - Outpatients positioned more than one metre (3 feet) apart
- Phone-screening for outpatients prior to appointment
- Banning all visitors (except on compassionate grounds)



### Infection Control Guidelines

- Airborne Precautions
  - N95 respirator or equivalent
  - Negative pressure isolation rooms where available
  - Hand-washing
- Droplet and Contact Precautions
  - Gloves, gowns, eye protection (i.e., goggles, face shield)
  - Hand-washing
- Minimize number of people in room during high risk procedures





## Planning for the Future

- Ongoing epidemiology centre, heightened surveillance
- Epi Investigation and PH Policy capacity
- Ongoing Public Health Call Centre with 24/7 coverage
- Mobile Response Teams to assist Health Units in time of outbreaks
- Additional Public Health field staff
- Strengthened laboratory capacity
- Public education



# Fever and Respiratory Illness (FRI) Surveillance

- active surveillance, builds on current ER & admission assessment
- Looks for febrile respiratory illness, esp. pneumonia
- has not been issued
- supports current IC practices
- all acute care hospitals in Ontario
  - but pediatric and cancer facilities/units
- objectives
  - maintain high level of vigilance
  - establish baseline
  - early identification of
  - early warning system



#### FRI - Criteria for Success

- Cases of FRI are managed with respiratory and contact precautions
- potential SARS cases detected on admission
- audit and compliance indicators met
- reporting requirements are met
- no SARS exposure or transmission
- FRI rates established
- early detection of and successful rapid intervention for other respiratory infection outbreaks

