

FROM TRUST TO DIGITAL SCRUTINY

ID Management and e-government: The Dutch Approach

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ADMINISTRATIVE IDENTITY AND e-GOVERNMENT

Administrative identity

consists of the set of data that are unique for one individual person and which set of data is inseparably connected to that particular person


Main subjects

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- ☐ Infrastructure for id-management in the Netherlands
- □ ID-management and e-government: coinciding and conflicting interests
- ☐ The new approach
- ☐ The future

INFRASTRUCTURE - government organisations - banks - local authorities - employers national - police - public transport government - juridical authorities - schools - social security organisations - health institutions - etc. - etc. control identification data supply registration office Personal Records issue of passports and Database id-cards immigration local travel office document registry municipality

DATASUPPLY



Datasupply:

- spontaneous or by answering questions
- costs of supply are charged




FLAWS

- □ use of official personal data is still voluntary
- ☐ increasing demand for government guaranteed personal data
- □ e-government services are not supported:
 - the system is slow
 - no electronic authentication mechanisms
- ☐ the system is vulnerable to fraud, especially:
 - false address information
 - use of "look alike" travel documents



COINCIDING AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS





BIOMETRICS

- main use: prevention of look alike fraud
- timetable and specifications according to EU-rules:
 - facial scan in august 2006
 - fingerprints probably late 2007
- □ some test results:
 - facial scan has a relatively high false rejection or false acceptance rate
 - fingerprint enrolment under 6 and over 60 is difficult
 - encrypting information is necessary
 - uncertainty about actual verification



CENTRAL STORAGE OF TRAVEL DOCUMENTS DATA

☐ from 595 local databases (municipalities, embassies) to one central database
□ contents:
bearer's administrative data (name, d/p of birth, Citizen's Service Number)
■bearer's biometric data (facial scan, fingerprints)
document data (number, place and date of issue, lost/stolen/in use etc)
□ accessible for <u>verification</u> by 1:1 search
□ accessible for identification by 1:n search




ON LINE SUPPLY AND MANADATORY USE OF PERSONAL DATA

☐ predominance of official personal records over all other personal data
☐ mandatory use by all governmental and local authorities
☐ mandatory feed back on presumably incorrect data
□ ban on asking citizens for known facts

☐ one central database for on line supply of data to users

SUPPLY OF AND FEED BACK ON PERSONAL DATA





AUTHENTICATION

- □ "DigiD" (as from 1-1-2006):
 - authentication by user id and password
 - data guaranteed by the central personal records database
 - data traffic secured on basis of SSL
- ☐ introduction of *e*-ID-card (early 2007)
 - authentication of identity by DigiD and pincode (eventually biometrics?)
 - authentication by digital signature
 - data traffic secured on basis of government guaranteed PKI




CITIZEN'S SERVICE NUMBER

- □ each citizen has one personal number in governmental and local administration
- ☐ CSN is a reliable, government issued carrier of personal data between sectors and between institutions

- ☐ social security, finance, health care, education, insurance, etc.
- □ each user can verify a limited number of personal data on a 1:1 basis (name, CSN, id-document number)

NEW FACILITIES COOPERATING





THE FUTURE

no documents needed?

(verification only by use of central database)

subcutaneous chip?

(our dog has one!)

who will be big brother?

(security authorities? privacy watch dog? e-government itself?)