

Evaluation of the Human Security Program

- Final Report -

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Evaluation of the Human Security Program

Executive Summary

DFAIT received Treasury Board authority to launch the Human Security Program (HSP) in June 2000 to fund initiatives seeking to bolster the capability of the global community to respond to threats to human security and support peaceful governance. The program's stated objective is to "enhance people's safety and freedom from violent and nonviolent threats to their rights, safety or lives" (RFP, p. 14). DFAIT's notion of human security focuses on the safety of people, especially victims or targets of violence, complementing traditional approaches to protecting national security and fostering international development.

To meet Treasury Board requirements, DFAIT decided to sponsor a formative evaluation of the HSP. Power Analysis Inc was contracted to conduct the evaluation. The cardinal objective of the evaluation is "to gain a deeper understanding of the Program's progress, strengths and weaknesses in order to guide the future planning and management of the program."

EVALUATION DESIGN

The mid-term review of HSP was a formative evaluation that assessed the management and operation of the Human Security Program. Formative evaluations answer the question, "*How is the program operating and how can it be improved?*" The main objective is to provide feedback to managers on whether the program is being carried out as planned and in an efficient manner. Six sources of information were used to evaluate HSP: a review of documents and files; key informant interviews of DFAIT and other government and non-government officials; a review of administrative data; on-site visits; a review of the program's performance measurement system; and a survey of project managers.

MAIN FINDINGS

HSP enables DFAIT to try innovative policy initiatives that if proven successful can be picked up by other departments in Canada, by other nations and by international agencies. It does this by

funding (mainly) small projects that focus on policy development, advocacy, research and consultations. DFAIT has proven that it is good at coming up with innovative policy ideas in the area of human security. But, although human security might have had a profound conceptual effect, argue program managers, without money it would lead nowhere. HSP is the only program in Canadian government that can back up Canada's rhetoric on human security with funds to push these innovative ideas forward on an international stage: "to put our money where our mouth is," as several informants put it.

Although DFAIT's Human Security Program has a few minor operational problems, especially in the area of monitoring, it has at the very least contributed impressively to advancing Canada's human security agenda. Its contributions to the accomplishment of a few critical initiatives – the establishment of the International Criminal Court, advancing the agenda relating to the responsibility to protect vulnerable citizens, improving the safety of war-affected children, reduction of small arms proliferation – were widely cited by interviewees. HSP has given Canada a powerful voice in their design and earned Canada well-deserved praise on the international stage. A major lesson of the program as cited by several interviewees and as demonstrated by these key initiatives, is that one does not have to spend a lot of money to bring about a significant impact. "It has brought significant credit to Canada at a very modest price." More broadly, HSP has undoubtedly raised the profile of individual human beings in security matters, which is a major breakthrough according to informants in Canada and abroad. "It has put a human face on discussions of security." It also reinforces the multilateral system and the principles that Canada stands for such as good governance, democracy and human rights.

Much of the credit goes to a talented core of policy and programming professionals within DFAIT who generate the high-level intellectual work it takes to make important advances in the human security arena. The key partners the program has chosen to work in key areas have also demonstrated intellectual leadership in bringing the ideas to fruition. HSP is the tool for testing and advancing the concepts envisaged by the policy makers. The international community takes the ideas more seriously when Canada is willing to put some money behind it. "Sometimes rhetoric isn't sufficient in trying to make things happen. It gives us more leverage when we can put in money and enhances our credibility with our key partners."

The program as implemented closely reflects the one designed, although as some pointed out, the design was so broad it would be hard to stray outside the mandate. Many informants lauded the program's flexibility, which enables it to respond quickly to diverse policy priorities in a timely fashion. HSP enables the department to consider "a much larger range of possibilities because we can now dabble in so many areas." But flexibility is a two-edge sword: it can also be considered a key weakness of program design because it allows the program to work in too many areas, considering its modest budget. Program management has already taken steps to improve program monitoring, most centrally by considerably simplifying its RMAF in response to earlier recommendations from this evaluation.

Final Comment

When considering whether to extend HSP, the government should think of what the program's demise would mean. Terminating the program would deprive the government of a crucial foreign policy development and advancement tool. Canada would lose credibility internationally, not being able to put its money where its mouth is; to put its theory into practice. "HSP really does benefit Canada, we get good value for the money."

Recommendations

The report lists 8 recommendations for improvement of program policy, operations and monitoring. A summary of these recommendations are found below:

1. The HSP should re-evaluate its list of 22 sub-priorities.
 - drop sub-priorities that have been largely overlooked or unused.
 - consider doing more with the HSP in the area of anti-terrorism.
 - make project funding more strategic and improve the likelihood of showing a demonstrable impact by choosing countries where effort can be concentrated, rather than spreading the money over dozens of countries.

2. The HSP should chiefly fund global, larger projects and multi-lateral projects.

3. The HSP should establish and link clear policy standards and issues to every particular project.
4. The HSP program and DFAIT should explore the possibility of integrating the International Commission for State Sovereignty (ICISS) initiative outside the HSP, no longer as a HSP program project but as a core funded DFAIT activity or program.
5. The HSP should do more to encourage funded NGO's to find alternate funding sources and reduce dependence on the HSP for on-going core funding activities.
6. The signing authority for the HSP project approval for the Assistant Deputy Minister should be raised from \$ 50 000 to \$ 100 000.
7. Concerning DFAIT and CIDA:
 - The dichotomy of each of the two mandates should be clear. CIDA for development and DFAIT for political, diplomatic action and domestic capacity building. Every effort should be made to avoid duplication or overlapping of initiatives.
8. The HSP should improve its monitoring practices and administrative information gathering practices.

Evaluation of the Human Security Program

CHAPTER ONE: METHODOLOGY

- **Introduction**

The end of the Cold War World has ushered in a period of dramatic change in the world. Although the implosion of the Soviet Union has reduced the likelihood of global nuclear war, it is certainly not an era of peace: dozens of wars rage at any one time. All are distant from Canada and most are internal conflicts, so they may seem of little significance to our nation's security. Unfortunately, as the events of September 11, 2001 made painfully evident, destabilizing forces threaten not only neighboring states but the world at large. The sources of insecurity behind these internecine conflicts are ethnic, religious, economic and political (e.g., former Yugoslavia, Burundi, Rwanda, Chechnya, Georgia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan). The international community, lacking effective tools to deal with a concept of security that is not predicated on the protection of the state, tends to respond as it always has: with force. Key to protecting our security are new mechanisms to promote global peace, which is a central element of our foreign policy and is a prerequisite for economic growth and development both domestically and internationally.

At the same time globalization continues apace and all nations must strive to realize the potential benefits of an increasingly interdependent world and to combat novel threats spawned by free flow of ideas and technology, people and capital. The threat is most manifest in terrorism, but takes manifold other forms that transcend borders such as organized crime, drug trafficking, alien smuggling, infectious disease, environmental degradation, overpopulation, and mass involuntary migration. Because the benefits and risks are too extensive and complex to be managed exclusively within national borders, a new generation of global governance is being created based on new international institutions and global principles. Canada has been in the forefront in helping to bring about international institutional reform, not only in pursuit of human security, national security and international order, but because it is clearly in the nation's economic interest.

These economic and security motivations, along with a desire to project Canada's values such as tolerance, democracy and respect for human rights, generated the impetus for Canada to take a lead in defining and promoting the concept of human security.¹ As defined originally in the 1994 Human Development Report, human security encompassed two broad themes – freedom from fear and freedom from want – and seven dimensions of security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal (from torture, war, ethnic tension, crime), community and political. The Canadian Government, feeling that this concept was too broad and unwieldy to encourage foreign policy development, encouraged the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada to pursue a narrower delineation: "Human Security is a people-centered approach to foreign policy which recognizes that lasting stability cannot be achieved until people are protected from violent threats to their rights, safety or lives." Human security shifts the focus of security beyond just the purview of the state to also include the point of view of the individual. In concrete terms, this means:²

- elevating the concern for the safety or protection of people, of individual persons and their communities, particularly the most vulnerable segments of a population;
- treating the safety of people as integral to achieving global peace and security;
- addressing threats from both military and non-military sources (e.g., intrastate war, state failure, human rights violations, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking);
- using new techniques and diplomatic tools to achieve our goals;
- recognizing the emergence of non-state actors as significant players in the international system.

Canada had been pursuing policies that fit under the rubric "human security" well before the concept began to gain prominence. Peacekeeping is the most obvious example. Canada has more recently earned an enviable reputation for its work on eliminating landmines, establishing the

¹ Human security thus fits squarely within the government's key foreign policy objectives: the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian values and culture.

² Heinbecker

International Criminal Court, the protection of civilians in Kosovo, in addition to its long history of accepting convention refugees.

DFAIT formally instituted the Human Security Program (HSP) in June 2000 to fund initiatives seeking to bolster the capability of the global community to respond to threats to human security and support peaceful governance. Its objective is to “enhance people’s safety and freedom from violent and nonviolent threats to their rights, safety or lives”. The HSP has seven principal goals:

1. Increased awareness, understanding, knowledge and mainstreaming of human security issues.
2. Increased international policy dialogue and coherence on human security issues.
3. Increased adherence to and compliance with international norms and standards with respect to human security.
4. Increased leveraging of political and financial commitments.
5. Strengthened capacity of multilateral organizations and international NGO’s with respect to human security issues.
6. Strengthened capacity of regional and national organizations and NGO’s with respect to human security issues.
7. Strengthened capacity and coordination between Canadian actors with respect to human security issues.

DFAIT's notion of human security focuses on the safety of people, especially victims or targets of violence, complementing traditional approaches to protecting national security and fostering international development.

To meet Treasury Board requirements, DFAIT decided to sponsor a formative evaluation of the HSP. The cardinal objective of the evaluation is “to gain a deeper understanding of the Program’s progress, strengths and weaknesses in order to guide the future planning and management of the program.” This report presents the results of the evaluation.

1.2 Background

Canada's blueprint for human security is a paper entitled, *Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security*. The document identifies five foreign policy priorities for fostering human security:

1.2.1 Protection of Civilians

According to *Freedom from Fear*, wars are now fought almost exclusively within states. Approximately one million people die each year from these hostilities, about 80% of them civilians. "In the face of massive state-sponsored murder, the calculated brutalization of people and appalling violations of human rights, the humanitarian imperative to act cannot be ignored ...".³ The objective of this policy is to improve the legal and physical protection of civilian populations thereby reducing the human costs of armed conflict. Means to carry this out include focusing on the most vulnerable, and creating the initiatives and principles needed to help guide international responses.

1.2.2 Peace Support Operations

The world has turned to Canada for leadership in peacekeeping for almost half a century. With contemporary warfare bringing greater and greater peril to defenseless civilians, traditional peacekeeping operations have had to evolve into broad and multidisciplinary "peace support operations." Peacekeeping operations may now include such complicated mandates as democratization, human rights protection and humanitarian assistance. As the UN's capacity to deal with these missions has not kept pace with the demands, Canada's key peace support initiatives focus on reinforcing capabilities by improving our deployment and training systems to provide civilian, police and military experts; developing the capacity of other countries to participate effectively; and supporting specific capacity-building initiatives at the UN and with other international and regional organizations.

1.2.3 Conflict Prevention

The best approach to ensuring human security is to prevent armed conflict. "The international community often has ample warning when societies are threatened by deadly conflict... What is

³*Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security* (2000), p.3

often missing, however, is timely and effective action for conflict prevention.”⁴ The carnage in Rwanda is frequently cited as an example where the world came to the rescue too late to prevent the slaughter of millions. To avoid future Rwandas, Canada works with the UN, the G8 and other organizations to address the root causes of conflict so it can be prevented or quickly resolved, and to build local capacity to manage conflict without violence. Conflict prevention tools might include fact-finding missions, negotiation/mediation endeavors, special envoys, backing for peace processes and assistance for development of early warning systems.

1.2.4 Accountability

“Just systems of law and governance are essential guarantors of peace and security.”⁵ Establishing just systems in countries emerging from war is a serious challenge. It implies creating an international means of bringing perpetrators of human rights violations to justice. It also demands improved accountability of public and private sector institutions, especially those in the security sectors.

The Human Security Program invests in initiatives that promote each of these objectives. For example, as a part of Canada’s ICC Campaign, the HSP has sponsored several projects to promote ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC and implementation of its obligations into countries’ national laws. The Program has also worked with the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (ICCLR) and Rights & Democracy to craft and update a step-by-step guide to help countries ratify and implement the Rome Statute.

1.2.5 Public Safety

The benefits of globalization have been widely lauded, but globalization brings with it inherent threats as well. Problems originating elsewhere can easily cross borders in today’s world. In particular, transnational crime threatens the safety and prosperity of Canadians. Canada and the rest of the international community are working together to address these challenges, in fora such as the UN, G8, Commonwealth, the Organization of American States (OAS), APEC, ASEAN, and others. The negotiation of the UN *Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols*

⁴ Ibid, p.8.

⁵ DFAIT’s the HSP web site.

(TOC) and the *Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism*, as well as the creation of the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), demonstrate the drive to create meaningful multilateral mechanisms to counter threats to our public safety and security.

The HSP was allocated \$10 million per year, from 2000/01 to 2004/05. Since its inception, the HSP has supported over 300 projects across the globe.

1.3 Evaluation Design

The primary purpose of this project is to carry out a formative evaluation that will assess the management and operation of the Human Security Program. Formative evaluations answer the question, “*How is the program operating and how can it be improved?*” As specified by the Terms of Reference, the objectives of the formative evaluation are:

- to determine the program’s progress, strengths and weaknesses to guide planning and management;
- to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the current management approach and program design in the context of Canada’s foreign policy objectives in human security, and beneficiaries and stakeholders’ interest;
- to determine the progress made towards achieving the program’s expected results in view of the HSP’s Results-Based Management Framework
- to determine lessons learned and potential niches for future programming; and
- to inform senior management decisions regarding future design or adjustments of the HSP, or similar programs in the future.

1.4 Structure of this Report

Chapter One deals with all aspects of the methodologies used in the evaluation. Chapter Two considers the relevance of the human security agenda as addressed by the program. Elements

related to efficiency are discussed in Chapter Three. In Chapter Four, the effectiveness of the HSP is reviewed. Chapter Five presents the conclusions and recommendations.

Six sources of information were used to evaluate the HSP: a review of documents and files; key informant interviews of DFAIT and other government and non-government officials; a review of administrative data; on-site visits; a review of the program's performance measurement system; and a survey of funding recipient project managers.

1.5 Methodology

1.5.1 Review Document and files

The overall purpose of the document review was to enable the evaluators to learn about the program and its context. This is imperative for the conduct of a formative evaluation wherein a thorough understanding of the program as designed is the foundation for all subsequent work. DFAIT provided various documents during the initial meeting, which were read before preparing the draft research instruments.

For those projects selected for case study, paper files were reviewed. The files included the original proposal, signed contract, final budget, background documents, correspondence between DFAIT and the agency involved and any financial and narrative reports submitted.

1.5.2 Key Informant Interviews

Interviews with key stakeholders were crucial to assess program implementation, management and operation; to determine interviewees' understanding of the goals and objectives of the program; to identify any major obstacles to achieving program objectives; to ascertain interviewees' need for evaluative information; and to gather suggestions for making the program more successful. The first step was to obtain a list of interview subjects from DFAIT. Concurrently, interview guides were designed to govern the interviews. Somewhat different guides were needed to reflect the different perspectives of DFAIT managers and staff, other government officials, NGO representatives, and key individuals overseas. In all 27 interviews were completed.

1.5.3 Administrative Data Review

DFAIT provided an electronic file and file description of its administrative data concerning the HSP. The main purposes of the analysis of the administrative files were: to produce a profile of the program and its projects; to select samples for the project surveys; to address several evaluation issues; to help assess the monitoring and performance measurement system; and to examine the data sets for completeness and accuracy.

1.5.4 On-Site Visits for Case Studies

The evaluation thoroughly examined program delivery via on-site visits at 11 projects funded by the HSP. Case study projects were selected by DFAIT on the bases of significance to the program in terms of size or reputed impact and coverage of priority areas. Thus, the case studies do not necessarily represent the typical HSP project and results will not be generalized to represent the entire program: very small projects were not chosen as case studies.

Each site visit included an in-depth interview with the project manager, interviews with other staff, and observations where applicable (e.g., of computer systems and reporting mechanisms). Site visits occurred in November and December 2002. The typical visit lasted one day.

The culmination of each site visit was a brief report on the project, which combined qualitative and quantitative information to outline its context, how it was operating at the time of the visit, how well it did respecting its intended objectives, and ideas for improvement.

1.5.5 Review of Performance Measurement System

A review and refinement of the HSP=s Results-based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF) was an important aspect of the evaluation. It began with a thorough review of the RMAF as it stood. A report was prepared that commented on the adequacy of the measures and suggested improvements.

Because the number of indicators in the original RMAF was universally considered burdensome, the evaluation team directed a workshop in which program managers had the task of selecting a "critical few" performance measures. Management adopted the recommendations for a much simpler RMAF. The output was a report recommending focusing on eight short term outcomes, one from each of the six components of the HSP. Each outcome had one to three suggested performance indicators associated with it. It also helped managers to:

- define key terms used in the indicators;
- identify data source (i.e., name and location of the data bases);
- specify frequency of data collection;
- specify frequency of reporting; and
- specify position title responsible for indicator

1.5.6 Survey of Funding Recipient Project Managers

A questionnaire was drafted to cover the key issues identified in the Request for Proposals. The funding recipient project manager survey investigated organization background; focus, activities, beneficiaries, outputs and outcomes of the project; project funding sources; problems encountered, successes, failures; dissemination; follow-up; and suggestions for improvement.

The questionnaire was pre-tested. Respondents had few problems with the questions or response categories, or with recalling details of interest. Small modifications were made to improve the questionnaire.

The original intention was to send the survey to project managers of every project funded by the HSP since its inception. Incomplete computerized data precluded this, however. Instead, the survey was limited to all projects funded during the 2001-02 fiscal year; outdated contact information meant the 22 of the 127 projects could not be included in the survey. In addition, DFAIT decided that no project manager would be asked to complete more than one survey. Removing duplicates reduced the sample by 17 more. One contact did not recall the project. Thus

87 surveys were emailed, faxed or mailed to project managers (depending on the contact information available).

The response rate was modest: 56%, despite three rounds of follow-up: two by email and one by phone. There were no statistical difference for any of four variables (Priority Area, Geographical Priority, Activity and Funding Disbursement), which is fortunate for the analysis given the extent of non-response. This finding may be partially due to the small number of cases.

Once the completed surveys were received, they were edited and coded, and keyed into the evaluator's statistical analysis software, the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).

CHAPTER TWO: RELEVANCE

DFAIT considers its Human Security Program chiefly as an advocacy tool – “to change the hearts and minds” of various international players as many interviewees put it. Its most important objective is to enhance people’s safety from the danger of violence, which it attempts to achieve predominantly via changing attitudes of specific governments or of the international community towards conflict and violent threats. Stated succinctly, the challenge of the Human Security Program is to spend a modest amount of money to the greatest effect on a broad agenda aimed at convincing influential people to think about security in a different (people-centered) way.

Using mainly interview results with some case study information, this chapter discusses the relevance of the human security agenda in light of how came about, its breadth, its cohesiveness. Five projects are presented as samples of the type of projects the HSP funds successfully.

2.1 Canada’s Human Security Agenda

DFAIT’s policymakers delineated Canada’s human security agenda by designating five relevant human security priorities for funding (summarized in the first chapter). Under each HSP priority are sub-priorities that define the types of project areas that can be funded. There are 22 in total, excluding research and communications (the agenda was approved by Cabinet). These comprise Canada’s human security agenda:

Protection of Civilians

- War-affected Children
- Legal and Physical Protection
- Internally Displaced Persons
- Human Rights Field Operations
- Landmines
- Humanitarian Intervention

Peace Support Operations

- Peace Support Capacity
- Expert Deployment
- Police in Peace Support Operations

Conflict Prevention

- Co-operative Conflict Prevention
- Targeted Sanctions
- Small Arms
- Post-conflict Peacebuilding

Governance and Accountability

- International Criminal Court
- Security Sector Reform
- Corruption and Transparency
- Freedom of Opinion and Expression
- Democratic Governance
- Corporate Social Responsibility

Public Safety

- Transnational Organized Crime
- Illicit Drugs
- Terrorism

Some interviewees held that the 22 comprise a logical and cohesive agenda, well thought out from the very beginning. Others maintained the opposite: according to these interviewees, some sub-priorities were included simply to achieve buy-in from other DFAIT divisions; others were predilections of the players at the time.

There were some in DFAIT who regarded the 22 as too limiting. The program arrived at its focus on violent threats after fending off arguments that it should also encompass environmental threats, economic dislocation, natural disasters and others.

Canada's human security agenda, albeit narrower than that espoused by the UN and many other states supportive of the concept, remains sweeping. Critics of the agenda believe it is too expansive and vague to give policymakers guidance in prioritizing competing policy goals. "If human security means almost anything, then it effectively means nothing."⁶ Those pushing for the more restricted focus argued that the HSP should be active only in areas where it could produce

⁶ Paris, Roland (2001) Human Security Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? *International Security* 26.2 (2001) 87-102, p. 93

added value; that is, relevant areas of human security that are not covered by other agencies, especially CIDA.⁷

It is fair to conclude that most people interviewed believed the 22 sub-priorities have resulted in a program spread too thin. Unfortunately, among those interviewed who believed that there were too many sub-priorities, no one was willing to say which sub-priorities should be eliminated. Two did suggest landmines, not because it was perceived as unimportant, but because there is a unit in DFAIT that specifically deals with this issue and provides funding for landmine related projects. Neither was there a consensus concerning which sub-priorities are most important, although ICC and ICISS⁸ were mentioned often. Each thematic (functional) division will choose different sub-priorities that serve its mandate, so a consensus regarding the most important sub-priorities may not be possible. Geographic divisions will pick sub-priorities that resonate in their region of responsibility. That other divisions within DFAIT tend to view the program as a way to fund their own initiatives and other departments see HSP funds in terms of furthering their mandates as opposed to the HSP's is to be expected. But it makes it difficult to systematically address the overarching concept.

The chief argument given for keeping the 22 sub-priorities is that they give the program needed flexibility to respond to the many human security issues that arise. "It gives us the room to do a lot of things. The department doesn't have many other options to put money (towards policy initiatives)."

More compelling was the contention that the 22 areas merely reflect situations of violence in the world. "We didn't create new priorities for the department. This is what the department was doing already," at least at a policy level. Taking this one step further, as some argued, the sub-priorities constitute a continuum of activities that are present in varying degrees in places like Kosovo and Afghanistan. Thus, the human security agenda is an accurate reflection of the mission of the

⁷ All references to CIDA in this report refer to CIDA's Peacebuilding Unit.

⁸ ICISS is not a sub-priority of the program. It falls under "humanitarian intervention."

department because that mission mirrors the full range of human security needs in situations where civilians are at great risk of violence. Of course, this group is reluctant to drop any sub-priority. “It is extremely difficult to make choices. On all these issues there is a great need to (proceed).”

Another reason for keeping the 22 was said to be raising awareness in the international community of the broad human security agenda. By keeping these important issues alive, the argument goes, other countries or organizations may pick it up and push it. In this guise, the HSP is seen as a catalyst. By itself, the HSP, with its limited resources would accomplish little. But if the ideas it espouses and sets in motion are cogent enough to attract the interest of other funders, the human security agenda will move forward.

One final argument for a broad agenda was the expansive constituency it encompasses, including not just civil society and academics in Canada, but those identified by DFAIT’s posts overseas. From this viewpoint, it is politically astute to keep the agenda wide to maximize the number of partners involved in human security. Limiting the agenda makes the program vulnerable because the number of supporters declines.

2.2 Funding Criteria

Even if it could be argued that the 22 issue areas as approved by Cabinet for the beginning of the HSP program comprise a cohesive agenda, that does not necessarily imply that the projects selected by the HSP faithfully represent this agenda. With such a broad concept underlying the program, it is difficult to place limits on what can be funded. There is also a lack of clarity as far as some thematic divisions are concerned regarding funding criteria. It seems to be difficult to say in the abstract what can be funded; in some cases, a concrete proposal is needed for a specific response. Staff are encouraged not to speculate with people making general inquiries, but rather to request that prospective applicants fill in the application form available on-line and send it to the Program for review.

Decisions on what to fund are critical for the success of the program. During this evaluation, several interviewees contended there is not enough strategic thinking in setting priorities for the program. Early in its mandate, some interviewees asserted, the program was more proactive. They would make an assessment of what types of projects would advance each priority, set an agenda, and search for partners to implement the project. But as program funding increased and as knowledge of the program spread and more and more proposals began to arrive, it became much more difficult to be strategic in deciding which projects to fund. “More and more projects were really pushing on the edges of the envelope.” Managers and staff began to ask themselves questions about what should be funded and why. “Why are we doing this? Is it because no one else would or because it fits with our foreign affairs priorities?” Some DFAIT interviewees began to worry about certain projects being proposed and funded but that are not clearly linked to a specific priority. They advocated going back to core principles to ensure the program stayed faithful to its original intentions.

What types of projects should be funded by the HSP? The predominant view within DFAIT is that the HSP should restrict its funding to supporting projects based on Canada’s most important foreign policy objectives, and that change thinking about security in the direction of a more people-centered approach. The original human security key issues were based on policy. But, said several interviewees, some projects seem to have weak or no sound policy basis. Ideally every project should have as a basis a solid assessment of how it contributes to Canada’s foreign policy agenda.

In practice, according to several interviewees, this implies that the HSP should chiefly fund projects that support global, multilateral initiatives such as the ICC (International Criminal Court), war-affected children, small arms and Responsibility to Protect. Future projects should “reinforce these areas where we’ve achieved a critical mass.” For these types of initiatives it is easy to craft a strategic vision of where the program wants to end up – for instance, the creation of the ICC. Any project funded with this goal in mind is linked to this strategic vision and can be justified and judged on that basis. Taken together, these momentous issues clearly define Canada’s human security agenda and maximize Canada’s visibility internationally. The HSP was and remains much more proactive in identifying projects and forging partnerships for delivery for these major issue areas,

than for smaller ones. It is also easier to demonstrate results with large, multi-year projects. (HSP management points out that the HSP also has a mandate to support small Canadian projects that are congruent with the human security agenda – building Canadian capacity – which is comparatively of smaller size.)

Continuing this line of argument, the other side of the coin is the small pilot project or country-specific project. According to some key interviewees, seldom are these linked in a direct way to an overarching policy agenda, so country-specific projects act to water down the coherence of the program and hence its demonstrable impact. Only a small minority of those interviewed felt that a significant number of inappropriate projects had been funded: it was more a matter of a lack of fit with a strategic agenda. “It’s hard to see these projects amounting to anything... Unless a project is really catalytic we don’t have the money to make a difference in every country.”

Almost all interviewees felt the HSP was underfunded, especially in view of its expansive mandate. But two people felt that the amount of funding available was too high in one key sense: It was easier to achieve policy coherence under the previous peacebuilding program, which had only \$3 million, because there were only a few major policy issues being funded. Moreover it was easier to fend off requests for project money that detracted from this coherence because “we could easily say we didn’t have enough money.” Now there is \$10 million per year but the crucial human security issues don’t need that much, they asserted: few new human security issues have arisen since the turn of the century. The HSP thus chooses to spend the extra on small, isolated projects that may not have a lasting impact on human security. Hence the argument that the program has so much money that clear principles become blurred and the quality of projects and partners erodes: “With \$10 million per year it’s hard to be strategic.”

One idea put forward to make project funding more strategic and to improve the likelihood of showing a demonstrable impact is to choose countries where effort can be concentrated, rather than spreading the money over dozens of countries, (Recommendation 1) This might limit the program’s lauded flexibility to respond quickly to new trouble spots, but there can be geographic prioritization as long as there is provision to permit the program to react to human

security emergencies that may arise. CIDA's PBU limits the number of projects and limits the policy and geographic scope to maximize the potential for successfully helping people. PBU can limit the number of projects and the policy and geographic scope because the bilateral country desks (within the Asia, Africa, Americas and Central/East Europe Branches) fund these projects and have more money than PBU. At DFAIT, the bilateral country desks do not have funds. The only source of funding for many of these bilateral country desks is the HSP which means that it has to spread its limited funds globally.

2.3 HSP Success Stories

The underlying message in a lot of what the evaluators were told about the Human Security Program was that the relevance of the funded projects often contributed to the simple fact that it had achieved a great deal for the modest amount of money the government dedicates to it. The case studies selected do not represent a stratified random selection of HSP projects; time and budget limitations did not permit this. Projects selected received some of the highest levels of funding or mid-range funding. No small funding projects were selected. This chapter, based largely on the case studies, therefore, does not represent an unbiased account of the program's impact mid way through its mandate. Nevertheless, as will become evident in reading the chapter, it seems clear that the HSP's chief accomplishments have been impressive and well worth the money expended on them. The initiatives to be summarized in this chapter account for about half the funding granted by the HSP since its inception: they are important for that reason alone.

2.3.1 International Criminal Court

The commission of egregious crimes in recent years has prompted the global community to come together in an attempt to bring justice to victims and end the culture of impunity that the perpetrators of these crimes have enjoyed in the past. Canada and other states have also asserted that war crimes should be investigated and prosecuted in internal conflicts. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by 120 countries in 1998, creates the world's first permanent international institution with jurisdiction to try individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The principle aim of the Rome Statute is to promote compliance

with international norms and deter the commission of the world's worst crimes by an international source of accountability; violators will be held responsible for their actions.

Canada is regarded as a world leader in efforts to create the ICC and ratified the Rome Statute in 2000. Advocates of the ICC wanted to capitalize on the momentum gained in Rome to quickly bring the court to fruition; long delays, they feared, could jeopardize its creation. True to its commitment to the ICC, Canada's efforts have focused on helping other countries implement and ratify the international treaty. DFAIT's United Nations, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Section has been working with HSP funds to help establish a strong and effective International Criminal Court. Canada has been funding approved projects to: 1. promote the ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute, especially in under-represented regions; 2. ensure the effective operation of the Court; and 3. conduct education and outreach on the ICC. As shown in Table 6.3, the HSP has expended almost \$2 million or about 7% of its budget sponsoring 37 projects related to the ICC.

With its 60th country, the Rome Statute entered into force in July 2002, less than four years after its adoption. The United Nations and international justice advocates have hailed the creation of the International Criminal Court as among the most significant advances in international law since the establishment of the UN. The ICC is located in the Hague and will begin operations in 2003.

DFAIT's ICC campaign was held up as a shining example of the Human Security Program at its best by many of the dozens of people interviewed for the evaluation. It is not possible to quantify the HSP's contribution to the success of the ICC campaign. Several interviewees in and outside of DFAIT contended that - at a minimum - the campaign hastened entry-into-force of the Rome Statute; some felt that without the campaign, critical momentum may have been lost and the ICC would not have been established. The ICC campaign continues to provide contributions to approved projects that support the Court, especially with regard to continued ratification and comprehensive implementation of the Rome Statute. As the ICC is based on a model of state cooperation, the success of the Court depends on countries implementing their obligations under the Rome Statute.

2.3.2 The Responsibility to Protect

“... if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?”

When Secretary-General Kofi Annan uttered these cogent words at United Nations General Assembly in 1999, the UN was in the midst of soul searching over Security Council inaction regarding a series of appalling cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing in the 1990s; these powerful states had refused to abrogate the concept of state sovereignty to protect innocent civilians. He was challenging the international community to reconcile the seemingly competing claims of sovereignty versus intervention to protect human rights and redress the situation wherein sovereignty could be a shield behind which any atrocity could be committed.

Canada took the initiative in responding to the Secretary General’s challenge by founding and funding – along with several private foundations – the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). A distinguished group of 12 persons from diverse national and professional backgrounds, the Commission’s mandate was “generally to build a broader understanding of the problem of reconciling intervention for human protection purposes and sovereignty; more specifically it was to try to develop a global political consensus on how to move from polemics – and often paralysis – towards action within the international system, particularly through the United Nations.”⁹ Its report, entitled, *The Responsibility to Protect*, holds that sovereignty implies not only rights, but also responsibility – responsibility to react to an actual or probable human calamity, responsibility to prevent it, and responsibility to rebuild after the event. The report sets six criteria for whether, when and how to intervene militarily. The Commission and its report are widely viewed as being highly credible by the international community, according to interviewees. The UN secretary general, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the nations of the Human Security Network have endorsed the report.

With the issuing of its report in December 2001, ICISS disbanded. Phase two began in the autumn of 2002. Its purpose is to promote the widest distribution of the *Responsibility to Protect* and to

⁹ ICISS (2001) *The Responsibility to Protect*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, p.2.

advocate internationally for greater global consensus on its recommendations. In total, Canada has committed about \$1.6 million, about 6% of total expenditures, on seven projects to support the Responsibility to Protect between 2000 and 2002, much of it used to support the activities of the secretariat located in DFAIT.

Although the follow-up campaign has just begun in earnest, the unmistakable impression of people interviewed in New York regarding ICISS is that the Canadian government seems to have lost interest in the issue. Compare the great care taken to ensure success in phase 1 – the political backing, the level of funding, the staffing, the orchestration – to that phase 2, they said. A indicator of this could be that DFAIT is still funding ICISS through the HSP and not at a DFAIT core funding level; ICISS is still dependant on temporary program funding. The Responsibility to Protect is a central element of Canada’s long-term effort to focus international attention on protecting civilians from armed conflict. “The ideas and principles have a life of their own beyond certain projects and initiatives. The issue is not likely to go away.”

2.3.3 War-Affected Children

Children are among the primary victims of modern warfare. The statistics are sobering:¹⁰

- Over two million children have been killed and another five million wounded in wars over the past decade;
- Twenty million children have been forced from their homes, including seven million refugees; and
- More than half the victims of landmines are children.

Canada’s strategy on war-affected children encompassed three goals: to increase awareness about the issue both domestically and internationally; to specifically address the problem of child soldiers through the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement

¹⁰ Freedson, J. (2002) Watchliston children and armed conflict. Forced Migration Review. Oct: 10-11.

of Children in Armed Conflict; and to consolidate international efforts for child protection.¹¹ Working with NGOs, multilateral organizations and other governments, Canadian action focused most centrally on raising the minimum age at which children can engage in combat and ending the impasse over the Protocol. The work culminated in the Global Conference on War-Affected Children, a September 2000 meeting in Winnipeg aimed at taking stock of progress and agreeing on concrete goals and actions for child protection. During the conference 132 states adopted the Agenda for War-Affected Children, an international action plan to protect children in conflict situations. That conference alone cost several million dollars, \$2.5 million through various projects from the HSP. War-affected children has accounted for about 19% of total HSP expenditures: 21 projects costing \$4.75 million.

A key current thrust in the area of war-affected children is the Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, launched in May, 2002. It is a network of NGOs that had been active in the arena. The primary output of the project is a series of country reports, which use a common template to chronicle the threat to children in a specific country and set out recommendations for ameliorating the situation. Each report covers health, HIV/AIDS, refugees/IDPs, landmines, small arms, education, child soldiers, trafficking and exploitation, gender-based violence, violations and international law and recommendations for action. The ultimate goal of the Watchlist is to “improve protection of the security and rights of children in specific conflict situations by providing information, urging implementation of international commitments and linking local groups with international policy-makers whose decisions impact children’s lives.” The Watchlist, in existence for less than a year, has not had time to achieve this end in any specific situation.

The conflict diamonds problem is another important issue related to war-affected children. Although conflict diamonds constitute only a very small percentage of the overall trade in rough diamonds, they carry a high human cost for children in affected countries (Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo), and threaten the legitimate diamond industry, which makes an important contribution to numerous economies worldwide, including Canada’s. Canada has actively participated in the South Africa-led Kimberley Process (KP) since its inception in May 2000 and hosted an important meeting of the Process in Ottawa in March 2002. The KP has

¹¹ Sorger, C. & E. Hoskins (2001) War-affected children. Ibid.

brought together diamond producer, consumer and trading countries, as well as industry and civil society, to develop concrete proposals for an international certification scheme for rough diamonds aimed at increasing transparency and accountability in the legitimate trade, and preventing 'conflict diamonds' from reaching legitimate markets. The KP developed proposals for the certification scheme, which came into effect on January 1, 2003. As of March 1, 2003, nearly 50 countries are implementing the KP certification scheme.

2.3.4 Small Arms

The widespread development and use of small arms represents a serious threat to human security, be it in wars between states, civil wars and conflicts, or disagreements between individuals. The impact is felt at a national and international level, a community level and an individual level: the political and economic development of states is jeopardized, communities destroyed and lives devastated. "Small arms and light weapons are the real weapons of mass destruction, taking well over a thousand lives each day, more than half a million lives each year."¹²

The HSP has sponsored 14 small arms projects totaling about \$1.6 million, accounting for approximately 6% of program funding. Most of the projects concentrated on advancing the human dimension of the issue (e.g., protecting children from small arms violence, preventing health injures from gun violence and integrating small arms initiatives into development programs). The greatest share of the money – about one-third – has been devoted to the Small Arms Survey. This initiative came about because there was too little sound information on small arms proliferation on which to base policy. The principal role of the Small Arms Survey project is to provide well researched, reliable, policy relevant information on the production, transfer, stockpiling, and use of small arms and light weapons. The production of the Small Arms Survey report (or yearbook) is the most significant activity undertaken by the project. Canada, through DFAIT, has contributed about half a million dollars, though this is but a small proportion of the \$3 million annual budget of the project (Switzerland is the primary funder). Regarding the first annual Small Arms Survey published in 2001, Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, is quoted as saying the

¹² The Small Arms Survey, 2001.

report “was widely praised by diplomats, government officials and activists as a valuable resource and for the part it played in raising global awareness of the many dimensions of small arms.”

2.3.5 Domestic Capacity Building

Domestic capacity building is one of four “activities” under the HSP. It is wide-ranging, with about 75 projects funded since the program was instituted and total funding exceeding \$5 million.¹³ The activity is included here mainly because of two initiatives raised by many interviewees as key success of the HSP (and chosen for case study): CANADEM and the Canadian Consortium on Human Security (CCHS). Together, these projects have received about a third of the money dedicated to domestic capacity building, or approximately 8% of HSP funding since program inception (includes funding for current fiscal year). Because CANADEM is the HSP's largest single project, it will be highlighted here.

CANADEM is Canada’s primary mechanism for identifying civilian candidates for foreign deployments. CANADEM’s roster of experts links multilateral organizations needing the expertise with Canadians who possess the requisite expertise. Its two main goals are: to support UN and other international initiatives that might otherwise be delayed or abandoned if needed personnel could not be quickly deployed; and to help place skilled Canadians in international missions to ensure Canada is well represented in international activities that Canada deems important. The mandate is pursued through three activities: maintain a roster of Canadian experts; market CANADEM to domestic and international clients; and nominate Canadians for field operations. The organization has no budget to cover the actual deployment: that costs about \$150,000 per expert per year.

The consensus around and beyond DFAIT is that a properly screened standby force of civilian experts is desirable if not essential to help the UN and other multilateral organizations to provide immediate help and protection to civilians at risk around the world. The case study on the

¹³ Some CANADEM projects are denominated “Strengthening multilateral mechanisms.” Including them as domestic capacity building raises the total to over \$6 million.

organization concluded that CANADEM has achieved its original mandate: the mechanism works well and seemingly to the satisfaction of its clients.

Given that most civilian deployments aim to assist civilians at risk of harm, there is a clear link to human security. But was the HSP established to provide on-going core funding to NGOs? The answer, say most DFAIT interviewees, is no. CANADEM says the HSP “shouldn't have been burdened with us after the first couple of years.” They make the case that DFAIT should continue funding CANADEM however, since it carries out the key foreign policy objective of strengthening multilateral organizations. This is questionable because there appear to be more than enough civilian experts available outside of Canada. That means, regardless of CANADEM's rhetoric, its real value added is its second goal: to help place skilled Canadians in international missions. How much is this worth? CANADEM consumes 5% of the HSP budget every year. CANADEM urges that the \$500,000 be considered in the context of what it would be if CANADEM did not exist. DFAIT would have to set up its own roster, they argue, and that would cost much more. Some DFAIT interviewees confirmed this.

DFAIT needs to determine precisely what it wants CANADEM to accomplish. If it is convinced of its value – and most in and outside of DFAIT interviewees are – then it should help the agency to identify alternate sources of funding to continue in the event the HSP ends in 2005. CANADEM also needs to work harder to find alternative sources of funding.

2.4 Conclusion

In the global context, the relevance of the HSP is not in question, but it is a small fund trying to affect global issues with manifold facets and actors. For the International Criminal Court, the Responsibility to Protect, war-affected children and small arms, Canada has played a leading role in advancing the causes and the HSP can claim a good deal of the credit. Everyone interviewed in Canada and abroad underscored the importance of the achievements in these areas for improved human security and recognized the key Canadian role played in bringing about the advancements. DFAIT and the HSP can be justifiably proud of their work in these areas, not just in providing funding, but in providing intellectual leadership and political backing. Domestic

capacity building garners Canada less international credit in the short run, but if advocates are correct, the expertise Canada is attempting to build will help keep Canada in the forefront of the human security agenda in the future.

Conspicuous by its absence in the list of areas of highest achievement for the HSP is anti-terrorism. Since September 11th, counter-terrorism has been on everyone's agenda in the international community, yet the HSP has funded little in the area: 10 projects funded at just over half a million dollars across the first two and a half years.¹⁴ In the wake of September 11th extra HSP money was dedicated towards anti-terrorism projects (10% of the HSP budget now goes to Public Safety), although capacity limitations in the responsible DFAIT division meant the number and value of the HSP projects in the area hardly changed. The Program argues that project funding in other areas that reduce insecurity is designed to reduce the factors that lead to terrorism. "As reducing insecurity is a cross-cutting theme throughout all priorities, it is clear that many projects not counted in the anti-terrorism category could in fact reduce the terrorism threat." This is possible, although the survey results suggest that only 4% of project managers believe their project had an anti-terrorism element. This fiscal year was said to be an anomaly because Canada's presidency of the G8 meant a great deal of work for the division (international crime and terrorism was a big part of this year's G8 agenda). Thus the problem should not be repeated next year. The UN Counter-Terrorism Commission has made legislative drafting assistance to help member states implement Resolution 1373 its number one priority. Canada agrees and has taken steps through the HSP to help bring this about. Canada and the United Kingdom have co-sponsored "Commonwealth Regions Workshop Initiatives" to assist countries implement the UN's counter-terrorism standards. Consistent with the needs identified by the UN CTC and the commitments made by Canada in the G8 and other international fora, AGC, in conjunction with AGP, will be developing an ICC-style sub-program in the HSP to fund counter-terrorism capacity building assistance. Funding will be made available to provide Canadian expertise to less-advantaged countries to build their capacity to prevent and respond to terrorism, using multilateral mechanisms such as UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and the 12 UN counter-terrorism conventions and protocols as a guide.

¹⁴ The program notes that in FY 2002-03, the Human Security Program funded six projects with a direct terrorism focus.

Although Canada's human security agenda is narrower than that of other states interested in the concept, it remains sweeping. If the \$10 million were spread evenly across the 22 sub-priority areas, each would only have a budget of \$454,545 per year. Of course, funding is not applied equally across these 22 – some get very little attention – but it may be unrealistic to expect the program to address each sub-priority with so little money dedicated to achieving it.

The gap between this ambitious agenda and the limited funds available to carry it out would seem to demand a reconciliation of what the program wants to accomplish and what can be done with available funds. Its mandate may be too broad to enable it to have a tangible impact in most of the 22 sub-priorities, at least with the amount of funding available. Yet virtually no interviewee – in DFAIT, from NGOs or from academia – was willing to nominate sub-priorities to discontinue.

Political and bureaucratic realities come into play when trying to identify areas that could be excluded: it is unlikely they would be overcome by recommendations in an evaluation report. It should be up to the program to narrow its focus. To some degree it does do this already: that is, it keeps the broad agenda intact, but narrows the focus during each fiscal year to the sub-priorities that are most salient at the time. But there are certain sub-priorities that have been essentially ignored: there have been no landmine projects and no police in peace-support operations cases;¹⁵ and five or fewer projects concerning internally displaced persons, human rights field operations, targeted sanctions, and corruption and transparency. There is an argument to be made that with only two years left in the program, that it is too late to start modifying the list of sub-priorities now and discontinue considering the sub-priorities that have heretofore been largely overlooked. Another option could be considered were the list of 22 sub-priorities as a whole should be reviewed in light of factors, both national and international that have evolved since the inception of the HSP program.

Because of Canada's limited funds, DFAIT has focused on the intellectual work. "We're very creative and have a lot of good ideas, but we don't have the money for massive, sustained commitments that are often necessary." Ideally, HSP projects should be catalytic: The HSP does

¹⁵ Landmines and police in peace support were funded from the start through their own specific mechanisms: the Mine Action Fund and the Canadian Policing Arrangement.

the initial groundwork, theorizing, research and consciousness raising, with another funding source (such as CIDA) picking up long-term implementation. This worked for judicial sector reform in Afghanistan, for example. These projects need massive funding over a long time span. Other countries can also pick up Canada's lead and advance it.

CHAPTER THREE: EFFICIENCY

This chapter will examine how DFAIT administers its Human Security Program, the efficiency of this program. It considers program structure, staffing, activities, constraints, the HSP RMAF and monitoring.

3.1 Program Structure

One notable element of HSP administration is the separation within the Peacebuilding and Human Security Division into policy and program units. In theory, the structure is logical. When policy officers work closely with program officers, they can be more systematic in addressing the key human security requirements in specific regions. For example, since small arms proliferation is a particular problem in eastern Africa, the small arms policy officer and the program officer responsible for Africa should be able to work together to define a coherent strategy for applying program funds strategically to ameliorate the problem. This has not always been the case in practice, although the division is taking steps to improve it. Interviewees from both the policy and program sides felt there was a gulf between the groups. "We don't talk to each other as much as we should."

A second structural feature of the program is the relationships between it and the various divisions within DFAIT. Human security crosses many divisions on the policy side and is of obvious concern for certain geographic desks. In direct contrast to CIDA, geographic divisions at DFAIT do not have programming funds. DFAIT's geographic and functional divisions accordingly have no mechanism for providing grants or contributions to further the work of other organizations. As already stated, DFAIT divisions naturally pursue their own interests in asking for HSP funds but if a project does not fit within the HSP mandate, it is not funded.

Recognizing that other divisions will pursue their own interests, but cognizant of the need to maintain policy coherence, the Peacebuilding and Human Security Division consulted with the geographic and thematic divisions and Canada's missions overseas in the spring of 2001 for their

input. The results were interpreted by the relevant geographic division to set out regional priorities. Only projects meeting these priorities are funded in that region for the upcoming year.

This exercise, an attempt to integrate geographic and thematic priorities into the human security agenda, was said to be valuable by various interviewees, but it still left a broad scope of sub-priorities in each region. Three or four of the five priorities, with many associated sub-priorities, were still in play in every region but North Asia and Oceania, which had two. A good example is the main human security priorities for South and Southeast Asia:

Major concerns under governance and accountability are democratic governance, transparency and corruption, security sector reform, support to civil society and national human rights organizations. Protection of civilians presents concerns related especially to legal and physical protection of civilians (including victims of human trafficking, and child sex tourism in Thailand and the Philippines), internally displaced persons and human rights field operations. Public safety issues are a serious concern: illicit drugs (notably originating in Afghanistan and Myanmar), transnational organized crime (including human trafficking), and terrorism ... all of which affect Central Asia as well as South and Southeast Asia.¹⁶

Nine sub-priorities plus other areas of concern are specified. The exercise was a good start, but the divisions need to be more focused given the limited funding available. Perhaps one or two critical sub-priorities for each geographic region would be realistic. AGP plans to prepare memoranda to the Minister on each global region that will identify a select few priorities for targeted program funding for each region.

A final structural facet of the HSP concerns funding. The HSP has two different funding mechanisms. "Vote 1" constitutes operational money, which the department itself can use to fund initiatives that generally provide a service to the Crown. "Vote 10," grants and contributions, are transfers of money, goods, services or assets from a Grant and Contribution appropriation to individuals, organizations or other levels of government without the federal government directly

¹⁶ Source: DFAIT, April, 2001 "Summary of Geographic Human Security Priorities"

receiving goods or services in return. Payments that are made in exchange for goods and services are contracts, and are subject to the Government Contract Regulations, Trade Agreements and the Contracting Policy. The breakdown for the HSP is 85% vote 10 and 15% vote 1.

3.2 Program Staffing

When the HSP was instituted, DFAIT had little experience in running a program that provided non-assessed contributions. Although AGP had staff with expertise in policy development, they were not experts in program administration, and the full range of skills needed to run the program did not immediately exist within the department. Originally “there was no awareness of how many people it would take to manage and disburse money and to gather results.”

The Peacebuilding and Human Security Division is divided into policy and program sections. While four program officers are expected to handle projects concerning the 22 sub-priorities, the policy side of this division works on the policy development in approximately 10 of the areas, with the policy expertise on the other areas located in other DFAIT divisions, such as JLHA, AGC, and AGH. The policy side is organized on thematic grounds: where policy expertise concerning the 22 sub-priorities did not exist within the department – for example, war affected children – policy officers were hired in this division to provide it. The program side is structured on a geographic basis. Program officers are assigned specific regions of the globe and manage proposals and projects, regardless of sub-priority, within their regions.

HSP managers argued they were understaffed and short of required expertise from the beginning and remained so until October, 2002. The HSP began with a program manager and one project officer. Later a second project officer was added. These two officers were responsible for the review and approval process for some 250 project applications per annum, plus monitoring projects under way. Given the time consuming approval process, there was too little time for adequate monitoring of projects in operation. In early autumn 2002, however, two new project officers were hired, bringing the total to four.

The HSP receives \$1 million from DFAIT departmental funds (in addition to its \$10 million annual program budget). This \$1 million dollars from DFAIT covers program and some policy staff salaries. This allows the \$10 million dollars of yearly program funds to be almost entirely spent on project activities. Less than 2% of the HSP's \$10 million is needed for communications, printing, evaluation and audit expenses.

3.3 Program Activities

The HSP attempts to achieve its objectives through sponsoring projects. Ideally the process begins with the crafting of innovative ideas to deal with pressing human security problems. Prior to the HSP, DFAIT would have had to propose the idea to private foundations and other government departments because there was no source of funds or funding mechanism for the department to actually fund anything itself. The HSP provides DFAIT with the ability to take action in support of advocacy; specifically, to develop initiatives to research, advocate, test or demonstrate these new ideas. Canada's willingness to provide funding makes a stronger case for financial support from other sources such as like-minded countries and private foundations.

The projects are usually of six types: conferences/ workshops normally for policy advocacy; training; short-term deployments; research; publications; and assessments (experts going to an emergency situation overseas to determine what is needed and where Canada can help). Canadian and/or international NGOs, international and multilateral organizations, think-tanks and academia are provided with contribution funds or contracted to implement the projects.

The program has become a reactive one in some of the thematic areas because there are more than enough projects to react to and because the staff had heretofore too little time to be proactive. Most project proposals, according to experienced staff, are referred through a DFAIT division – geographic or thematic. AGP is then responsible for assisting the applicant through the process. AGP will consult geographic and functional divisions for every proposal. Functional divisions may develop proposals themselves – often based on priorities identified by the geographic desks – and find partners for delivery or may work on proposals from outside agencies.

Most of the balance of proposals come directly to the program from NGOs or other agencies. Finally, some ideas come from a DFAIT division that wishes to implement a project itself. Once the proposal is in, it is assigned to an HSP program officer who oversees the project from start to finish.

Throughout the project evaluation, approval and monitoring phases, the program officer uses a four-page checklist, entitled the “Project Administration Risk-Management Framework.” In the project selection phase, the officer has to determine whether the project presents a sufficient “business case” - how and why the organization and its proposed activity / budget is sound, and then the officer establishes the “program case”: why the proposed activity makes sense for the government to support it from the Human Security Program. The checklist also questions the project’s design, criteria for approval, the project’s management and finally, project closing - including space for the officer’s project notes and observations, the officer’s assessment and finally lessons learned.

The project is considered at a human security pre-screening meeting attended by the officer, along with representatives from the thematic divisions and relevant geographical divisions. The fortnightly meetings give each division a chance to make the case for funding certain proposals. Some interviewees from the policy divisions felt the screening meetings – which were called project pre-screening meetings – took too much of their time. They suggested that more pre-screening should be done by the program officers so that their time could be better spent examining only the most promising projects.

About 100 of 250 proposals are accepted each year. In addition, each year potential projects are excluded informally at a pre-application stage when program officers advise interested parties that their idea would not likely be funded by the HSP.

Program officers go back to the proponent for any further information needed to finalize the proposal. It is then circulated electronically to all relevant divisions within DFAIT and interested departments in the federal government and to Missions overseas. If there are no objections, it is sent to the Minister (projects over \$50,000) or the Assistant Deputy Minister for Global and Security Policy for their consideration and, if they agree, signature. Finally the “contribution agreement” is

negotiated. This series of events carries a high transaction cost: Program officers acknowledge receipt of proposals, present the proposal at the pre-screening, write the memo to the Minister for approval, negotiate the contribution agreement, write out the contribution agreement, seek administrative approval for the contribution agreement, monitor the situation in their geographic areas, write information memos for the minister, answer questions, field calls from the public, read financial and narrative reports, organize meetings with other divisions and departments, monitor results, track ODA, conduct project monitoring and record project results for use in the RMAF.

Preventing duplication

As far as anyone interviewed in DFAIT knew, there was no overlap with what other departments are doing. The working-level mechanism for interdepartmental coordination is the monthly “Peace-building Working Group” (PBWG), which brings together HSP program staff together with counterparts from CIDA, IDRC, RCMP, and DND, to discuss and identify areas of collaboration and deliberate on ongoing and potential projects. The Program Advisory Committee is the main senior-level mechanism for ensuring Canadian human security efforts are complementary and not duplicative. The PAC committee, consisting of ADMs and/or their representatives from DFAIT, CIDA, RCMP, Health Canada, Transport Canada, Solicitor General, DND, Heritage Canada, CIC, PCO and CSIS, meets twice a year to coordinate human security policy and activities.

Three other methods are used to prevent duplication: electronic circulation of proposals; informal interaction concerning proposals; and all applicants are required to declare on their proposals all sources of funding for the proposed project. These various measures have proven to be more than adequate in preventing duplication and ensuring complementarity.

3.4 Partnerships

One important accomplishment of the program was said to be the infrastructure it set up to consult and communicate with partners. “We are connected thoroughly in Canada and abroad.” This infrastructure is both internal and external to DFAIT. Internally it helps to ensure that the HSP

money spent aligns with department policies. This includes consulting with thematic and geographic desks to set priorities for funding, the bi-weekly meetings to assess proposals and informal communications.

Externally DFAIT can determine the views of other departments and of civil society and can advocate policies it espouses. The PAC, already discussed, performs a central communications role between federal government departments. The HSP also has external partners without which it could not carry out its mandate: federal government partners to help with sponsoring projects; NGO partners to run projects; and international agencies for funding and delivery.

3.5 Operational Constraints

Interviewees were asked if the program faced any constraints that affected its ability to meet its objectives. Only three were mentioned. One, a shortage of program officers to manage the proposal process and oversee projects, had been effectively dealt with by the addition of two officers in October 2002. Two others continue to affect the program negatively, according to many interviewees at DFAIT: the need for contribution agreements in order to provide funding to multilateral organizations and the need for Ministerial (as opposed to ADM-level) approval for all projects over \$50,000.

3.5.1 Ministerial Approval

The primary operational constraint on the HSP until recently was the necessity to have every project approved by the Minister. To get ministerial approval takes a great deal of time. A special memo has to be prepared that has to wend its way through the bureaucracy; Director to the Director General to the Assistant Deputy Minister to the Deputy Minister to the Minister's office.

To make the process more efficient, DFAIT amended the approval process so that the Assistant Deputy Minister of Global and Security Policy now approves projects funded at \$50,000 and under. This was considered a wise change by everyone interviewed. Many, though, felt it did not go far enough. For further efficiency improvements, some senior managers felt that the level should be increased to \$100,000 or more: this would mean seeking approval on about 15% of projects as

opposed to about 40%, judging from 2001-02 administrative data. As long as the program keeps the Minister informed by frequent updates, they asserted, raising the level of delegated authority to \$100,000 should increase efficiency at both the bureaucratic and political levels.

3.6 RMAF

Cabinet authority was being sought for the Human Security Program in the Spring of 2000, in the immediate aftermath of allegations of misused funds at another federal department. Following these allegations, Treasury Board established a new policy on June 1, 2000, for all transfer payments. The HSP was reviewed by Treasury Board in the days following this new policy, before thinking had been completed about all the operational demands that would be generated in departments such as DFAIT by this new policy. The HSP's Treasury Board submission and subsequent RMAF were unwitting pioneers of a new era. As Treasury Board's knowledge of logic models and results-based management improved over the past two years, policies and requirements continued to evolve.

Senior program managers praised the program's Results-based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF), proud to say that Treasury Board uses it as an example of best practice. Unfortunately, it was not being used by managers or staff members. The problem was that the HSP's RMAF was incredibly complex.¹⁷

The original RMAF had the potential to create a data collection, reporting and analysis burden that few programs could sustain. The HSP, with a budget of only \$10 million per year, had 97 performance measures, excessive for a program of this size. It is likely that the large number of performance measures would have resulted in unsustainable costs that would have caused a collapse of the performance measurement strategy.

There is clear evidence that due its complexity and the lack of resources to adequately meet its requirements, the original RMAF was essentially being ignored. "We're just going through the motions, we're not really applying it. We make people fill out project proposal forms (based on RMAF requirements) and come up with a nice matrix. That's about it." It was called many things,

¹⁷ A separate report examines the original RMAF and recommends many improvements.

but “overly bureaucratic” adequately captures everyone’s sentiments. To a certain extent the breadth was inevitable given the scope of foreign policy: there are too many outcomes and sub-priorities. Failure to narrow down the scope of the indicators (and perhaps the program) spawned a system that collapsed of its own weight. There are no means of verifying the indicators, no compilation of statistics and no measures of impact.

Program management has already taken an important step to rectify the problems. The evaluators held a workshop with program managers and staff in December 2002 with the aim of simplifying the system and making it feasible to use. The output was a report recommending focusing on eight short term outcomes, one from each of the six components of the HSP. Each outcome has one to three suggested performance indicators associated with it. Management adopted the recommendations of the evaluation for a much simpler RMAF.

3.7 Monitoring

3.7.1 Problematic Aspects of Program Monitoring

Besides the RMAF, there are other problematic aspects of program and project monitoring. The next section addresses *project* monitoring; this one deals with overall *program* monitoring.

Although the HSP has an electronic database, interviewees said the program is run using paper files. Paper files examined for the case studies were mostly complete.

Any attempt to monitor the overall program by somehow looking across paper files would be cumbersome: as the number of projects expands it will eventually become impossible. Paper files are even awkward for monitoring individual projects because it is difficult to dig out needed information from them. Only one of the 11 files reviewed for the evaluation had a handy sheet near the front that summarized the project. That should be standard procedure for every file. There is virtually no follow-up evident in the paper files on most projects to see what became of the issues being propounded.

DFAIT did not have the IT tools required to run a modern Grant and Contribution programs, and the HSP worked to develop its own electronic data-base using its own staff time and resources.

AGP explored electronic database models, but with mixed results. After 18 months of fruitless searching within the Department for an appropriate software platform that would link project, financial data and results to DFAIT's financial system, the division opted to do in-house modifications to an off-the-shelf FileMaker Pro data-base software package. By the time of the evaluation, this software was being tried out for Fiscal Year 2001-2002, but it was stand-alone and not linked to the Department's financial system. The Department will be taking action on the need for a system-wide electronic mechanism for tracking Grants and Contributions, but this system is not yet available. In the interim, the HSP is improving its stand alone data base to include significantly more relevant project data.

3.7.2 Problematic Aspects of Project Monitoring

The major problem with project monitoring as stated earlier is the use until the time of this evaluation of unwieldy paper files. Judging from the file review, there does not appear to be a problem with the accuracy or breadth of information captured in the files. Confirming this, the HSP has passed internal audits. About 10% of projects are audited per year. In the autumn of 2001, the Internal Audit Division conducted an audit of selected HSP files to assess compliance with departmental procedures and policy. Nine files were chosen for the audit – the report did not indicate how the selection was made – representing 10% of all projects funded to that time. The audit concluded the program complied with departmental policy. "Files were well organized and contained all of the required documentation." Four recommendations were made and were accepted by the program. One of the four – each file should be augmented with an overall assessment report – is still not present in all files. Every project should have a summary indicating what was learned and when and how to follow up with the project manager: this is clearly not standard operating procedure – only one of the 11 case study files given to the evaluator for review had such a summary. Until the arrival of the additional program officers in the second half of 2002, staff shortage had meant there was insufficient follow-up on most projects to see what became of the issues being propounded.

The central means of project monitoring is reading final reports prepared by the delivery agency. The funded agency has to send a final report and long-term projects must submit monthly or

quarterly reports. The longer the project and the more money, the more reporting. Most funded agencies meet the reporting requirements although the UN reports late concerning financial expenditures. “Some agencies have to be chased, some forget to report, but generally they take accountability seriously.”

Up to the spring of 2002 project final reports had little in common. Reports ranged from a few pages to over a hundred (in the former case the project officer would require more detail). It was often difficult to ascertain what was accomplished. Since then projects have had to report using a special template. To devise the templates a project officer went through all existing reports to select the categories that seemed most relevant – what the projects seemed to report on. There are six templates corresponding to the program’s five priority areas plus the research and communications portion: the differences across templates are slight (e.g., different possible outcomes).

There was no provision at the time of this evaluation for looking across reports to learn about what the program overall is accomplishing. Each program officer might have a good idea of what his/her projects have achieved, but there was no strategy for sharing the findings other than sending the entire report to interested parties. Another difficulty, as with many other divisions or programs at DFAIT, the institutional memory disappears with the constant rotation of staff.

Sending the final report to relevant agencies – including overseas posts – constitutes most of the dissemination done by the program. Projects considered very successful may be highlighted via press-releases or an announcement in Parliament. There is a plan to put summaries of projects funded by region on the web site.

The final report is not always distributed to all key people. In some cases the policy officer from the thematic division has received no final report.

3.8 Conclusion

Monitoring was the aspect of the HSP most in need of improvement. Program monitoring was inadequate, partly because of a complex RMAF, partly because of a lack of expertise in the area of monitoring and evaluation, and partly because of insufficient administrative data. Project monitoring does occur, but it is quite limited. Project visits occur for a subset of projects; otherwise monitoring is limited to reading reports submitted by the delivery agency. Paper files can be awkward to use because obsolete information (e.g., old copies of proposals or contribution agreements superseded by new ones) can accumulate needlessly; yet most of the monitoring that is done is accomplished with paper files. The requirement for Ministerial approval for projects funded above \$50,000 causes delays. Efforts should be made to enquire if signing authority for the HSP project approval for the Assistant Deputy Minister could be raised to \$ 100 000.

During this evaluation period, the HSP program management has taken two steps to improve monitoring: it adopted a simplified RMAF (two separate papers by the evaluation team addressed improvements in the RMAF) and hired a database specialist to refine and maintain their present database so that on going project data can be gathered.

By and large, the Human Security Program seems to operate smoothly. Management and staff have done a good job creating and honing the structures and processes necessary to run a program in a department that had little experience with such initiatives.

CHAPTER FOUR: EFFECTIVENESS

The information in this chapter comes from the HSP administrative data base, survey data and annotations from interviews.

4.1 Project Size

Several interviewees in and outside of DFAIT wondered about the number of different projects the HSP is funding. With so many projects, “it is difficult to screen, monitor and assess outcomes.” DFAIT managers expressed a strong preference to its divisions to pursue projects of at least \$40,000: “Smaller projects take as many (administrative) resources as large ones,” thus there could be more bang for the buck with larger projects.

Using the 2001-02 fiscal year data, the mean expenditure per project was approximately \$77,000; the median was \$48,000. The divergence between these two indicators of “average” suggests a skewing toward small projects. The distribution is as follows:

<u>Project Expenditure</u>	<u>Percent of Projects</u>
\$20,000 and under	15.7%
\$20,001 to \$30,000	16.6%
\$30,001 to \$40,000	9.4%
\$40,001 to \$50,000	17.4%
\$50,001 to \$75,000	13.3%
\$75,001 to \$100,000	12.6%
\$100,001+	15.0%

Fifty-three projects under \$40,000 were funded in 2001-02. It is easy to see the attractiveness of larger projects from an administrative perspective. As the number of projects proliferates, the program officers essentially become financial officers: they are constantly in a reactive mode, with no time to set or maintain a strategy for what the HSP is trying to achieve. And the divisions “talk

less about coordination and more about division of labour.” It is hard to be policy driven, asserted one informant, when your main task is moving money responsibly. Cutting down on the number of projects, argued some interviewees, will make management of the program more efficient.

Others disagreed, however, with the notion of restricting funding to large projects addressing major policy issues. “Small and large are very important. An advantage of this program is we can do both... Is spending \$5000 to get people together to talk peace a good use of money?” The HSP’s original and extant purpose is a rapid reaction seed money fund akin to venture capital that should fund small, innovative projects quickly. This approach is in contrast to CIDA’s PBU, which, on the other hand, can only fund large projects and cannot respond to urgent requests. “Things change so rapidly (internationally) that if you can address them quickly you can have a large impact.” HSP’s sponsoring of the “Afghanistan of Tomorrow” conference, held at DFAIT within weeks of the Afghanistan crisis and in time for results to be factored into the Berlin conference and the Loya Jirga, is one prime example of a project most useful for its timely nature. Under this viewpoint, the HSP should not be going in the direction of larger projects merely for administrative convenience. Raising the funding bar sends the wrong message, this group asserts. The mechanism should be set up to encourage applicants to keep their costs as low as possible. Catalytic projects tend, by their very nature, to be smaller in size. This is where the HSP’s comparative advantage over CIDA funding comes in - smaller, catalytic, policy-oriented projects are the HSP’s niche for DFAIT.

4.2 Sub-Priorities

Table 4.1 lists the sub-priorities covered by the projects funded, combining the two completed fiscal years and adding cases that appear to be valid projects from 2002-03 to show the total number of projects under each sub-priority. There have been no landmine projects and no police in support operations cases whatever (these projects are covered by the separate Canadian Landmine Fund and the Canadian Policing Arrangement). There have been five or fewer projects in each of the following areas: internally displaced persons, human rights field operations, targeted sanctions, corruption and transparency and communications. The table adds expenditures to reveal the proportion of funding dedicated to each sub-priority.

Table 4.1 Sub-priorities of All HSP Projects Sponsored

Sub-Priority	Projects		Expenditure*	
	#	%	\$	%
<i>Protection of Civilians</i>				
War-affected Children	21	7.0%	\$4,748,858**	17.3%
Legal and Physical Protection	10	3.3	\$841,573	3.1
Internally Displaced Persons	3	1.0	\$325,000	1.2
Human Rights Field Operations	4	1.3	\$192,000	0.7
Landmines	0	0.0	\$0	0.0
Humanitarian Intervention	8	2.7	\$1,472,783	5.4
<i>Peace Support Operations</i>				
Peace Support Capacity	17	5.6	\$1,197,235	4.4
Expert Deployment	12	4.0	\$2,107,832	7.7
Police in Peace Support Operations	0	0.0	\$0	0.0
<i>Conflict Prevention</i>				
Co-operative Conflict Prevention	45	14.9	\$3,137,717	11.4
Targeted Sanctions	3	1.0	\$207,855	0.8
Small Arms	14	4.6	\$1,558,213	5.7
Post-conflict Peacebuilding	16	5.3	\$750,224	2.7
<i>Governance and Accountability</i>				
International Criminal Court	37	12.2	\$1,865,649	6.8
Security Sector Reform	9	3.0	\$480,583	1.8
Corruption and Transparency	2	0.7	\$46,029	0.2
Freedom of Opinion and Expression	10	3.3	\$1,030,998	3.8
Democratic Governance	28	9.3	\$2,488,883	9.1
Corporate Social Responsibility	6	2.0	\$292,795	1.1
<i>Public Safety</i>				
Transnational Organized Crime	9	3.0	\$473,259	1.7
Illicit Drugs	7	2.3	\$812,909	3.0
Terrorism	10	3.3	\$558,000	2.0
<i>Research and Communications</i>				
Communications	5	1.7	\$637,757	2.3
Research	13	4.3	\$840,729	3.1
Not specified	13	4.3	\$1,341,300	4.9
TOTAL	302	100.0%	\$27,408,179*	100.0%

* Disbursements in 2000-01 and 2001-02, and contributions in 2002-03.

** Includes the \$2.5 million for the War-affected children's conference

4.3 Activities

The policy framework for the HSP includes support for four types of activities:

1. Domestic capacity building – includes consultations with civil society, finding, training and deploying Canadian experts, communications and improving Canadian human security policy research;
2. Diplomatic leadership and advocacy – promoting human security via coalition building, establishing and supporting expert groups, sponsoring international meetings, and facilitating adoption and adherence to international conventions;
3. Strengthening multilateral mechanisms – helping international agencies and NGOs develop, implement and monitor states' commitments to human security issues, and supporting deployment of Canadian experts to peacebuilding initiatives; and
4. Country-specific initiatives – sponsoring human security projects in particular sectors, countries or regions that would not be covered solely by other government departments.

Table 4.2 reveals the main activities of projects funded in 2001-02. The largest proportion of projects, about 40%, involved strengthening multilateral mechanisms.

Table 4.2 Activities of HSP Projects Sponsored in 2001-02

Activity	2001-02 Projects	
	#	%
Country Specific Intervention	8	6.3%
Diplomatic Advocacy	13	10.2
Domestic Capacity Building	43	33.9
Strengthening Multilateral Mechanisms	52	40.9
Unspecified	11	8.7
TOTAL	127	100.0%

4.4 Types of Organizations Funded

Data for the rest of the chapter come from the survey. The survey sought to determine what kinds of agencies were receiving funding from the HSP. As the table below indicates, over half characterized their agency as non-government. International/multilateral agencies and research institutes accounted for about a fifth each of those funded in 2001-02.

Table 4.3 Type of Organization Funded by the HSP in 2001-02

Type of Agency	Number	Percent
Non-government organization	28	57.1%
Federal government agency	2	4.1
International/multilateral agency	9	18.4
Private organization	3	6.1
Educational Institute	5	10.2
Research Institute	10	20.4
Arms-length national agency	2	4.1
Media agency	2	4.1
Other	2	4.1
Total*	63	

* Columns add to more than totals because some agencies specified more than one type

4.5 Sub-priority Revisited

The HSP database allows only one choice of sub-priority, but in fact many projects, 76% judging by survey results, focused on two or more sub-priorities.¹⁸ The results are displayed in Table 4.4. Because the great majority of HSP projects do deal with more than one sub-priority, the data in Table 6.6 should be more accurate. Almost 40% of the projects aimed to affect peace support capacity; one-third post-conflict peacebuilding; one-third legal and physical protection; and 28% co-operative conflict prevention and 20% humanitarian intervention. At the other extreme, only one project addressed targeted sanctions. Three sub-priorities – landmines, corruption and

¹⁸ Three claimed their projects dealt with all 22 sub-priorities save illicit drugs, which seemed doubtful. Those were excluded from the analysis.

transparency, and terrorism – were addressed by very few projects. The typical HSP project funded in 2001-02 addressed 3.3 sub-priorities, according to survey respondents

Table 4.4 Sub-priorities of 2001-02 Projects

Sub-Priority	Projects	
	#	%
<i>Protection of Civilians</i>		
War-affected Children	8	17.4%
Legal and Physical Protection	15	32.6
Internally Displaced Persons	6	13
Human Rights Field Operations	7	15.2
Landmines	2	4.3
Humanitarian Intervention	9	19.6
<i>Peace Support Operations</i>		
Peace Support Capacity	17	37
Expert Deployment	5	10.9
Police in Peace Support Operations	3	6.5
<i>Conflict Prevention</i>		
Co-operative Conflict Prevention	13	28.3
Targeted Sanctions	1	2.2
Small Arms	7	15.2
Post-conflict Peacebuilding	16	34.8
<i>Governance and Accountability</i>		
International Criminal Court	7	15.2
Security Sector Reform	5	10.9
Corruption and Transparency	2	4.3
Freedom of Opinion and Expression	7	15.2
Democratic Governance	8	17.4
Corporate Social Responsibility	3	6.5
<i>Public Safety</i>		
Transnational Organized Crime	4	8.7
Illicit Drugs	3	6.5
Terrorism	2	4.3
TOTAL	150	

* Columns add to more than totals because some agencies specified more than one type

4.6 Type of Project

HSP projects also carried out multiple activities, over two per project on average. Running conferences or workshops, research and delivering training were the most common activities (Table 4.5).

Table 4.5 Type of Project in 2001-02

Type of Project	Number	Percent
Assessment	15	31.3%
Conference	19	39.6
Research	18	37.5
Training	18	37.5
Workshop	20	41.7
Expert deployment	8	16.7
Publication and reporting	2	4.2
Other	16	33.3**
Total*	116	

* Columns add to more than totals because some agencies specified more than one type

** e.g., advocacy, policy development, networking, consulting, creation of on-line database

4.7 Centrality of HSP Funding

The survey posed a series of questions to determine how central the HSP funding was to the project and how much funding and in-kind support others provided. Only 19% of HSP projects were funded solely by the HSP. The rest were supported by various sponsors, usually other governments, most often Switzerland, Sweden, the US, the Netherlands and the UK. Private American foundations also helped with several projects. On average HSP funding accounted for 45% of the funding received for those projects surveyed in 2001-02. The distribution is as follows:

<u>Proportion of Budget Covered by HSP</u>	<u>% of Projects</u>
< 1%	4.7%
1%-4.99%	14.0%
5%-9.99%	9.3%
10%-19.99%	9.3%
20%-39.99%	9.3%
40%-59.99%	16.3%
60%-79.99%	14.0%
80%-99.99%	4.7%
100%	18.6%

The survey does not permit clear attribution of cause concerning leveraging. That is, just because other states or sponsors donated funding for the project, does not mean the HSP caused it. In fact, it is clear in some instances that the HSP had nothing to do with other sponsors' decisions to fund a project also funded by the HSP. Some were in operation before the HSP began, for example. In other cases, the HSP provides a minuscule proportion of the funding. Respondents were specifically asked if the project would have occurred without HSP funding: just over half the projects (54%) would not have proceeded without HSP funding.

Thirty-eight percent of the organizations provided some of their own funding for their HSP project. The mean contribution from these agencies was \$87,780. In addition, 88% of the organizations provided in-kind contributions. Usually this was staff time. Just under half the organizations (47%) reported having partners for carrying out their projects. Slightly more than half the partners provided funding for the project, averaging \$52,188. Most of the projects with partners (74%) reported that one or more partners provided in-kind contributions, usually staff time or office space.

4.8 Follow-up Activities

Projects that lead to no other activities may be supposed to have more limited value in terms of advancing Canada's human security agenda than those with further activities after the project ends. Only two projects (4%) reported no follow-up activities whatever (Table 4.6). Fifty-six percent of project managers said they had followed up with beneficiaries or participants to check on progress.

Four in ten said they had carried out a related project with other sources of funding; two in ten said they carried out a related project with HSP funding. This indicates that most HSP projects lead to other related initiatives; a result that would validate a key HSP role as a catalyst to further initiatives.

Table 4.6 Follow-up Activities for 2001-02 Projects

Follow-up Activities	Number	Percent
No follow-up activities	2	4.3%
Followed up with beneficiaries to check on progress	26	55.5
Ran related project with HSP funding	11	23.4
Ran related project with other funding	20	42.6
Ongoing project	6	12.8
Other	9	12.2**
Total*	74	

* Columns add to more than totals because some agencies specified more than one type

** e.g., improving database, civilian deployments, implementation of recommendations

4.9 Achievement of HSP Goals

A formative evaluation does not aim to determine if the program's objectives have been met: that is the task of the summative evaluation. At this interim stage, the evaluation obtained project managers' views on whether their project addressed seven separate HSP goals. As a modest check on respondent assertions, the survey asked for a brief explanation of how the project met each goal. In virtually every case, the manager provided reasonable explanations of how the goal was addressed. The results are presented in Table 4.7. Every goal listed, but increased leveraging, was addressed by a majority of projects. The projects selected for funding accord well with the aims of the program.

Table 4.7 Proportion of 2001-02 HSP Projects Addressing the Program's Goals

HSP GOAL	% Projects Addressing Goal
Increased awareness, understanding, knowledge and mainstreaming of human security issues	91.7%
Increased awareness, understanding, knowledge and mainstreaming of human security issues	87.2%
Increased adherence to and compliance with international norms and standards with respect to human security	70.8%
Increased leveraging of political and financial commitments	45.7%
Strengthened capacity of multilateral organizations and international NGOs with respect to human security issues	66.0%
Strengthened capacity of regional and national organizations and NGOs with respect to human security issues	63.8%
Strengthened capacity and coordination between Canadian actors with respect to human security issues	55.3%

4.10 Conclusion

At the time of this mid term evaluation, the limited electronic data base from which a detailed statistical analysis could have been completed constrained the profile that could be drawn about the HSP. It appears that the HSP has funded approximately 300 projects across its first three fiscal years for approximately the \$30 million allotted to it. The highlights:

- Sub-priorities with the greatest proportion of projects funded were cooperative conflict prevention (15%), International Criminal Court (12%) and war-affected children (7%).
- There have been no landmine projects and no police in support operations cases whatever, due to the existence of other, dedicated DFAIT funding mechanisms (Land Mines Fund, Canadian Policing Arrangement) for these issues. There have been five or fewer projects in each of the following areas: internally displaced persons, human rights field operations, targeted sanctions, corruption and transparency and communications.

- Survey data, which allow for the possibility that projects may cover more than one sub-priority (administrative data assume only one), suggest almost 40% of the projects aimed to affect peace support capacity; one-third post-conflict peacebuilding; one-third legal and physical protection; and 28% co-operative conflict prevention and 20% humanitarian intervention. At the other extreme, few projects (represented by the survey) addressed targeted sanctions, landmines, corruption and transparency, and terrorism. The typical HSP project funded in 2001-02 addressed 3.3 sub-priorities, according to survey respondents. The survey data does not represent all projects but still presents a reliable but approximate picture of projects funded by the HSP. With a more detailed and up to date data base, the summative evaluation should be able to complete a more complete survey of funded projects.
- The largest proportion of projects, about 40%, involved strengthening multilateral mechanisms.
- Over half the agencies funded in 2001-02 were non-government organizations. International/multilateral agencies and research institutes accounted for about a fifth each of those funded in 2001-02.
- On average the HSP accounted 45% of the funding received for the projects in 2001-02. Only 19% of HSP projects were funded solely by the HSP. Just over half the projects (54%) would not have proceeded without HSP funding.
- Fifty-six percent of project managers said they had followed up with beneficiaries or participants to check on progress. Four in ten said they had carried out a related project with other sources of funding; two in ten said they carried out a related project with HSP funding. This indicates that most HSP projects lead to other related initiatives.
- Project managers felt their projects adequately addressed the seven separate HSP goals. Every goal listed, except leveraging of political and financial commitments, was addressed by a majority of projects. The projects selected for funding therefore, accord well with the aims of the program.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusions

The HSP enables DFAIT to try innovative policy initiatives that if proven successful can be picked up by other departments in Canada, by other states and by international agencies. It does this by funding (mainly) small projects that focus on policy development, advocacy, research and consultations. DFAIT has proven that it is good at coming up with innovative policy ideas in the area of human security. Chapter Seven summarized the main ones. But, although human security might have had a profound conceptual effect, argue program managers, without money it would lead nowhere. The HSP is the only program in Canadian government that can back up Canada's rhetoric on human security with funds to push these innovative ideas forward on an international stage: "to put our money where our mouth is," as several interviewees put it.

Although DFAIT's Human Security Program has a few operational problems, especially in the area of monitoring, it has contributed impressively to advancing Canada's human security agenda. One could make a compelling case that any one of the success stories outlined in Chapter Seven is worth the price of the whole program. What is a functional International Criminal Court worth to the world presuming it proves effective in bringing war criminals to justice? What are the ideas and recommendations spawned by the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty worth to the world if they help forestall another Rwanda? What are the various initiatives undertaken to augment the safety of children in conflict situations worth?

There is no definitive answer to these questions; it is not known yet how effective any of these initiatives will be; and it is impossible to isolate the exact contribution of the HSP to any successes that may be achieved. Still, these initiatives and many others addressed by the program were well worth the effort given their obvious gravity. The HSP has given Canada a powerful voice in their design and earned Canada well-deserved praise on the international stage. A major lesson of the program as cited by several interviewees and as demonstrated by key initiatives such as ICC and ICISS, is that one does not have to spend a lot of money to bring about a significant impact. "It has brought significant credit to Canada at a very modest price." More broadly, the HSP has

undoubtedly raised the profile of individual human beings in security matters, which is a major breakthrough according to interviewees in Canada and abroad. “It has put a human face on discussions of security.” It also reinforces the multilateral system and the principles that Canada stands for such as good governance, democracy and human rights.

Much of the credit goes to a talented core of policy and programming professionals within DFAIT who generate the high level intellectual and project management work it takes to make important advances in the human security arena. The key partners the program has chosen to work in key areas have also demonstrated intellectual leadership in bringing the ideas to fruition. The HSP is the tool for testing and advancing the concepts envisaged by the policy makers. The international community takes the ideas more seriously when Canada is willing to put some money behind it. “Sometimes rhetoric isn’t sufficient in trying to make things happen. It gives us more leverage when we can put in money and enhances our credibility with our key partners.”

The program as implemented closely reflects that designed, although as some pointed out, the design was so broad it would be hard to stray outside the mandate. Many interviewees lauded the program’s flexibility, which enables it to respond quickly to diverse policy priorities in a timely fashion. “It really is a relevant, timely instrument of foreign policy.” The HSP enables the department to consider “a much larger range of possibilities because we can now dabble in so many areas.” But flexibility is a two-edge sword: it can also be considered a key weakness of program design because it allows the program to dabble in too many areas, considering its modest budget.

5.2 Recommendations

Recommendations will be divided into the areas of policy, operations and monitoring.

5.2.1 Policy Recommendations

As this report has highlighted, the primary weakness at a design level is the sweeping agenda of the HSP program. The gap between this ambitious agenda and the limited funds available to carry it out would seem to demand a reconciliation of what the program wants to accomplish and what can be done with available funds. Its mandate is too broad to enable it to have a tangible impact

in most of the 22 sub-priorities, at least with the amount of funding available. Yet virtually no interviewee – in DFAIT, from NGOs or from academia – was willing to nominate sub-priorities to eliminate. It would be a good idea to revisit this list of 22 in the context of extending the program. PCO and Treasury Board, the evaluators were told, felt there were too many priorities when the program was originally approved. A broad agenda does allow the HSP the flexibility to evolve and move in new directions as global situations or national priorities change but the number (22) of project areas begs the question as to how they can be called sub-priorities!

1. The HSP should re-evaluate its list of sub-priorities.

There have been no landmine projects and no police in support operations cases (as stated earlier, other DFAIT programs target these areas); and five or fewer projects concerning internally displaced persons, human rights field operations, targeted sanctions, corruption and transparency and communications. **It is recommended that the sub-priorities that have heretofore been largely overlooked should be discontinued.**

The HSP should be doing more in the area of anti-terrorism. AGP said that 10% of project funds are now being dedicated to the area (this was not evident from administrative or survey data). Consideration should be given to substantially boosting this proportion, making counter-terrorism a major priority of the program for the last two years of its initial mandate.

In order to improve the likelihood of showing a demonstrable impact the HSP should choose countries where effort can be concentrated, rather than spreading the money over dozens of countries.

Management Response to 1: The 22 sub-priorities were identified through a process of consultation within and inter-departmentally and subsequently approved by Cabinet. For this reason, the HSP is not able to modify the list without going back to Cabinet. It should also be noted that some items, for example landmines, are indeed an important human security issue, but programming in this area is undertaken by the Mine Action Team (ILX). The report suggests that some sub-priorities such as internally-displaced persons, human rights field operations, targeted

sanctions, and corruption and transparency have essentially been ignored. The former three sub-priorities are synergistic and projects supported in any one of these three sub-priorities often complement each other under the Protection of Civilians priority. Although only a few projects were found in the database for FY 2001/2002 that programmed in these sub-priorities, the scale of these projects and the number supported in previous and subsequent years is significant and these issues remain important priorities for the HSP.

Over the last year, the program has undertaken to enhance its strategic orientation by deepening policy analysis on thematic and geographic bases by strengthening the linkage between policy and programming. The result of this work has been substantive memoranda to MINA on the subjects of small arms and light weapons, the International Criminal Court and counter-terrorism. The latter document responds to the evaluation recommendation that more should be done on counter-terrorism, clearly a growing priority for the Human Security Program.

While we agree that concentration of funding in specific countries may have more visible impact, it is important to retain some flexibility in HSP programming to allow the Department to respond to initiatives that further our human security objectives wherever they may occur. Sometimes small strategic interventions, particularly when combined with other initiatives (either Canadian or foreign) can have a lasting impact.

Action plan: 1) As the 22 sub-priorities extend beyond the Human Security Program to include other divisions, the HSP will host a policy meeting in the winter of 2003 to review the sub-priorities to be supported as part of the process to renew funding for the Program. A number of thematic and geographic information memos have been submitted to the Minister to provide a more strategic overview of the Program. 2) The HSP will support increased counter-terrorism policy advocacy and capacity building as outlined in the information memo submitted to the Minister. The HSP will contribute to reducing the vulnerability of people and states to terrorism through the provision of training, funding and expertise ('capacity building assistance') to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks in a manner that is in accordance with international counter-terrorism standards.

2. The HSP should chiefly fund global, multi-lateral projects such as the ICC, war-affected children, small arms and Responsibility to Protect.

Future projects should reinforce areas where the HSP has achieved a critical mass. For these types of initiatives it is easy to craft a strategic vision of where the program wants to end up. Any project funded with this goal in mind is linked to this strategic vision and can be justified and judged on that basis. Taken together, these momentous issues clearly define Canada's human security agenda and maximize Canada's visibility internationally. The HSP was and remains much more proactive in identifying projects and forging partnerships for delivery for these major issue areas, than for smaller ones. It is also easier to demonstrate results with large, multi-year projects.

Management Response to 2: The HSP has traditionally spent 45% of its annual budget on global, multilateral projects. To target larger projects, the program is implementing a policy to limit proposals to a minimum budget of at least \$40,000. Nevertheless, while larger projects are easier to administer, it is important for the HSP to retain operational flexibility to engage occasionally, in strategic and timely interventions in small projects. A proportion of the HSP should continue to be available for small scale initiatives. Difficulties are often encountered when negotiating contribution agreements with multilateral organizations because Treasury Board guidelines for contribution agreements are not well-suited to multilateral organizations with diplomatic status. The HSP is endeavouring to establish an effective means of contributing funding to multilateral organizations that are consistent with Treasury Board guidelines.

Action plan: 1) The HSP is collaborating with Financial Services (SMFH) to create a contribution agreement for multilateral organizations that will fulfil the Government of Canada's Treasury Board requirements, but which will allow these organizations greater flexibility in financial and narrative reporting. With support from our missions abroad, initial contact has been made with the contracting and financial departments within the multilateral organizations the Program deals with most. The HSP will endeavour to have a new contribution agreement template for signature with multilateral organizations by the beginning of FY 2004/2005. 2) The HSP is collaborating with the Program Analysis Division (SMPT) to seek granting authority from Treasury Board for projects with the United Nations and other large multilateral organizations where risks are minimal.

3. The department should link clear policy standards and issues for funding a particular project.

For every project funded, HSP officers should be able to answer: What is the foreign policy issue? How does it connect to all the other things DFAIT is doing? What might the impact be on the public policy dialogue? Will it move the issue forward towards new policy or legislation here or abroad or multilaterally? Will it help to get other governments to put money on the table? What is the next step? If there is no follow-on the project cannot advance Canada's foreign policy agenda effectively.

Management Response to 3: The HSP program officers work closely with policy officers who believe that supporting such projects will further the human security agenda. All proposals are subjected to a project review committee which meets approximately every two weeks. The purpose of the project review committee is to test the proposal's "fit" within the Human Security Program's five policy areas. A further formal circulation to other Departmental stakeholders, as well as to other government departments, ensures that projects are consistent with Canadian foreign policy and the human security agenda before they are brought to the Minister and/or senior management for consideration.

Action plan: We agree that continued effort is required to ensure that individual projects are selected with a view to furthering our overall policy objectives. Program management will make enhancing policy coherence and impact a priority in project selection.

4. The Responsibility to Protect is a central element of Canada's long-term effort to focus international attention on protecting civilians from armed conflict. DFAIT should consider that the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) follow-up campaign be mainstreamed as a core funded DFAIT on going activity, no longer linked to a program that we know will sunset.

Management Response to 4 and action plan: At the end of this fiscal year (2003/2004), it is anticipated that R2P initiative follow-up will be integrated into existing DFAIT divisional activities.

5. Both the HSP and the organizations should do more to find other sources of funding to enable them to continue should the HSP end. A few NGOs exist only because of the HSP. The HSP is the major, and sometimes the sole sponsor of “capacity building” projects such as CANADEM, Canadian Consortium on Human Security and the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee. It is open to question whether the HSP was intended as an ongoing funding mechanism for these types of projects. If the HSP ends in 2005, they will more than likely fold, alternate sources of funding being insufficient to allow them to carry on their operations. Even if HSP continues, diversifying funding should be considered . The HSP should make every effort not to be involved in the core funding of organizations.

Management response to 5: The HSP makes it very clear that with limited funds, it is not designed to provide core funding. The average project budget that is supported by the program is between \$50,000 and \$100,000, which is for specific activities and not for core funding. Second phase funding is strongly discouraged and funded - if at all - on a declining scale. Prospective partners are told that HSP funds are meant to be used as seed money to support new ideas and as a means to leverage other funds and are encouraged to find co-funders at the outset of developing their proposals. The HSP application form requests that all sources of funds for the proposal be listed and only in very rare instances will the HSP be the sole funder on any given project.

Action plan: For organizations that rely on core funding, of which there are few, the Department will assist them in identifying a diversified funding base.

5.2.2 Operational Recommendations

6. The signing authority for HSP project approval for the Assistant Deputy Minister should be raised from \$50,000 to \$100,000. This would lower the proportion requiring approval to around 15% from the current 40%. Doing so would reduce administrative burden on senior management and increase the speed and therefore the efficiency of project consideration. As long as the program keeps the Minister informed by frequent updates, raising the level of delegated authority to \$100,000 should increase efficiency at both the bureaucratic and political levels.

Management Response to 6: We agree. The HSP will be requesting that the Minister consider this recommendation which is in line with other government departments. Delegation of selection authority for responsive programming in Central & Eastern Europe Branch at CIDA (formerly housed within DFAIT) is \$100,000 for Director Generals and \$500,000 for Vice-Presidents.

Action plan: The HSP will prepare a memo to the Minister in the fall of 2003 requesting consideration of this recommendation.

7. Concerning DFAIT and CIDA:

- **There should be a clear dichotomy: if it's political or diplomatic action or domestic capacity building, DFAIT is responsible; if it's development CIDA is responsible.**
- **Where both departments share a policy mandate, they should split funding on projects with DFAIT sponsoring the assessment, policy development, advocacy and early training and CIDA following up with longer-term aid.**
- **Every effort should be made to avoid duplication or overlapping initiatives.**

Management Response to 7: We agree. The HSP and CIDA's Peacebuilding Unit (PBU) meet on a regular basis via an informal working group to discuss upcoming proposals and policy directions to avoid duplication and promote synergy of initiatives. This past year, the working group has been expanded to include individuals from other government departments at the working level (Canadian Heritage, RCMP, DND and IDRC) to share information. The two mandates are clear and mutually reinforcing. The HSP supports policy advocacy projects for political, diplomatic action, small capacity building initiatives, and feasibility studies or projects that are beyond official development assistance (ODA). Once the project is established, the organization is often able to seek larger funds from CIDA.

Action plan: The HSP will continue to coordinate with CIDA PBU to ensure that duplication does not exist and will continue to systematically share proposals with CIDA PBU and other government departments who might be interested in HSP project proposals.

5.2.3 Monitoring Recommendations

Reviewing and refining the program's RMAF was a key aspect of the evaluation. Two separate papers presented recommendations for a refined performance measurement system for the HSP. The evaluators held a workshop with program managers and staff in December 2002 with the aim of simplifying the system and making it feasible to use. The output was a report recommending focusing on eight short term outcomes, one from each of the six components of the HSP. Each outcome had one to three suggested performance indicators associated with it. The program has adopted the recommendations.

Because of the complicated performance measurement system, regular collection and analysis of individual project indicator data was limited to reviews of interim and final project reports by Program Officers. Although the original RMAF led to improvements in the risk assessment checklist, and the creation of an annex to the Contribution agreement that covered each of the HSP's priority areas in order to standardize project results reporting, the complexity of the RMAF made it difficult to collect this information on a coherent basis.

8. Concerning administration of the HSP

- **The officer responsible for the project should be required to computerize relevant information.** At a minimum this should include project number, project name, project description, organization name, organization address, partner organizations (if any), project manager, manager's phone number, manager's email address, date project commenced, date ended, total project budget, total budget funded by the HSP, total project disbursement, HSP officer responsible, sub-priorities addressed (allow entry of several), geographic area(s) of delivery, activities undertaken, project deliverables, a brief summary of accomplishments and next step(s) if any.
- **Managers should routinely check the administrative data to determine how the program is doing and where corrective measures may be necessary.**
- **Paper files should be kept to a minimum and should contain only the most relevant information and only the current copy of the contract and proposal.**

- **Each paper file should contain a cover sheet with key information** including project number and name, organization name, project manager, manager's phone number, manager's email address, total budget funded by the HSP, HSP officer responsible, sub-priorities addressed, project deliverables, a brief summary of accomplishments and next step(s) if any. This could be printed off the system assuming it has the information.
- **Every project should have a summary indicating what was learned and when and how to follow up with the project manager.** This should be stapled to the folder and entered into the computerized system.

Management Response to 8: The HSP relies on reporting from implementing agencies and occasionally missions abroad for project monitoring. As part of the formative evaluation, the HSP redesigned its Results-based Management Accountability Framework (RMAF) to allow for greater focus of results and to ease data collection. The original RMAF listed 32 short-term outcomes and this was streamlined to 10 which is comparable to other government programs of this size. The electronic database was also revamped to include and simplify results data collection and a project officer was hired to implement the HSP's new performance management structure. Checklists, financial and narrative reporting outlines have now been revised to allow for clearer and more effective performance indicator gathering practices for both HSP program officers and project partners.

Action plan: An updated RMAF was introduced in the spring of 2003. Checklists, financial and narrative reporting outlines have been updated to promote and ease monitoring practices.